Research Security: CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM-33 Implementation

A couple documents they're going to be.

Introducing for the record.

We've seen them.

Okay, great, great.

Okay, thanks.

The subcommittee on investigations oversight will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the subcommittee at any time. Welcome to today's hearing entitled Research Security: Examining the Implementation of the CHIPS and Science Act and NSPM-33. Of course, I'm already breaking one of my cardinal rules, which is we start on time, we stay on time, and we don't use acronyms. I appreciate all of you being here today. For right now, I'm just gonna recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. Today's hearing confronts a matter that should unite every American and every party, defending our research enterprise against foreign adversaries determined to steal, exploit, and undermine the innovations that keep this nation secure and competitive. In a world defined by aggressive global competition, especially from Chinese Communist Party, also known as CCP, that openness has become a prime target for exploitation right here in the United States. The U.S. Invests billions of taxpayer dollars, in my opinion, not enough, quite frankly, into cutting edge research and technology. We cannot allow foreign actors to siphon off those investments by stealing our investments. In the final days of President Trump's first term, his administration acted decisively to initiate the security emphasis. National Security Presidential Memorandum, which is the NSPM that I've referred to before, 33 is the first unified national strategy to secure federally funded R&D research and development. However, we had four years under the latest president to build momentum and issue guidance that would protect American intellectual property.

But we failed on this basic matter of security.

When we look at the million students that are here from foreign national areas, basically taking leading edge technologies and bringing it back to their countries. When we talk about actually protecting the leading edge technologies that keeps us ahead of our peers and near peer rivals. We have vague and incomplete requirements that left these universities guessing their way through compliance. Only in the past year we have seen meaningful movement. The National Science Foundation finally issued an update research security rules in July. Now, institutes must establish a formal research security program. They must conduct comprehensive assessments. They must maintain documentation of foreign affiliations. And they must train all personnel supported by federal research dollars. But let's be clear, we are nowhere near finished. Universities continue to provide valuable feedback to close the gap of inconsistent, confusing, or incomplete guidelines. The CCP is a major threat, but is not the only threat. Our other hostile actors are probing every weakness in our research system. Of course, we have cybersecurity issues. The implementation that we need must be swift, thorough, and crystal clear. America has always welcomed global scientific collaboration. That's a good thing. However, that relationship must be honest and must be reciprocal, not one-way street that leaves our institutions exposed.

At a minimum, every federally funded institution.

Must disclose all foreign affiliations, manage conflicts of interest and commitment, and protect sensitive data and infrastructure, and comply fully with federal law without exceptions. Congress has a duty to ensure these safeguards are enforced. If institutions take taxpayer dollars, they must meet the standards that protect the nation and where risk is higher, strong protections must follow. Oversight is not optional, it is a national security imperative. Today, the committee will evaluate progress on implementing the memorandum and the safeguards with the CHIPS and Science Act, identify barriers holding institutions back, and determine whether additional legislation or enforcement authority is required. Our mission is straightforward: keep America's research secure, protect taxpayers' investments, and ensure our scientific leadership remains unmatched. The American people expect nothing less. I now recognize Ranking Member Representative Sykes for an opening statement.

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to all of our witnesses who are here today. Happy holidays. I'm glad to see so many of you involved in the holiday spirit. So research security has long been a productive and bipartisan topic in this committee, and we've been able to put aside a lot of the noise coming from the committees and the members who are less serious about understanding the nuances of this issue. And we have a lot of successful legislation to show for that. Our scientific enterprise is better off for it. However, there's only so long that we can close the shutters, mute our phones, and pretend we don't see what's happening outside these doors. This is the second time this subcommittee has met on this topic this year, and this is only our third hearing. Perhaps if our subcommittee were a bit more active, and if there were bipartisan interest in exerting our oversight authority over this administration, we could have discussed the myriad of issues that are directly compromising our agencies and institutions' ability to function and conduct research on topics our constituents care about, from lowering energy costs to new healthcare breakthroughs. All of our science agencies have experienced massive brain drain of career civil servants who were fired or coerced out of the workforce. We would be naive to think that hasn't impacted our research security and our research readiness. Inspector generals have been fired across the government. So how can we claim to take research security seriously if there are members unwilling to call out the Trump administration for firing the very people who hold agencies accountable for following the laws and investigate bad actors in our federal research enterprise. At the agency level, CHIPS and Science mandates that NSF have five full-time research staffers, and it is my understanding that the law is not being followed. Additionally, science agencies are in the process of imposing a 15% cap on indirect costs, falling in line with the edict first proposed in Project 2025. Do the authors of Project 2025 know what indirect costs funds? Well, let me help them out. I hope my majority colleagues who are so concerned about research security can pick up the phone and tell them that university compliance officers responsible for ensuring that grant receiving institutions are following agency policies are paid out of those very indirect costs. The Director of Office and Science Technology Policy, Michael Creasy, should know all of this well, and he should be representing the interests of the scientific community and pushing back on harmful administration proposals while supporting agencies and harmonizing their policies per the Chips and Science Act. However, his agency has been entirely absent as others in the White House have taken a flamethrower to our federal scientific ecosystem. And as we embark on the second hearing of this kind, we should not ignore the fact that the Trump administration.

Is the true threat to research security.

We are not talking about an ivory tower problem removed from kitchen table consequences. We on the science committee have consistently reaffirmed national security decision directive 189, which states that fundamental research should be unrestricted to the maximum extent possible. And I'm proud to say that in Akron, Ohio, where I represent Ohio's 13th district, we demonstrate how fundamental research can lay the groundwork for economic prosperity and good jobs. Researchers at the University of Akron have conducted world-class research in fundamental chemistry. That research is at the core of Akron's sustainable polymer tech hub. That tech hub is estimated to produce a $5 billion economic impact and over 4,000 new jobs over the next decade. Standing up for fundamental science now is standing up for thousands and thousands of jobs that will come from innovation. As a matter of fact, we are already seeing this failure to follow through on investing in science-based jobs in Ohio and across the country. For example, Intel was supposed to be starting operations on a plant to produce microchips this year, but now they are saying it will be delayed for at least five years. We on the Science Committee should be holding companies accountable for breaking these promises because we dedicated billions of federal dollars to these programs, and those dollars need to be spent as intended so the American people can benefit. That's why, Mr. Chair, I sent you a letter requesting a hearing on Intel's delay in September after our March discussion and conversation on the same topic, yet I have not heard back from you or your team. To make sure this letter gets to you, I have printed a copy here, and I request unanimous consent to enter it into the record.

No objection. Thank you.

I truly hope that I can count on my science committee colleagues across the aisle to reject any policy claiming to bolster research security while making it harder for the next great breakthrough to lead to American jobs. There's a lot of talk out of this administration about on shoring jobs and outclassing China and Innovation, manufacturing, prosperity. And if we forfeit, if we continue to forfeit our scientific Excellence, then that is really all it is.

Just talk.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you, Ranking Member Starks. I now recognize Chairman of the full committee for a statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on such an important topic. And I also want to thank, I got here a little too late to shake everybody's hand, but I want to welcome all of you, expert witnesses that are here, Dr. Kaiser, Dr. Evans, Dr. Valdez, excuse me, and Mr. Tilden, thank you all for being here. Looking forward to hearing what you folks have to say. Today we're here to address a matter of growing concern for this committee and the American people, and that is the security of our federally funded research and development enterprise. The United States leads the world in science and innovation because our research system is open, and collaborative and driven by excellence. But that openness, one of our very greatest strengths, also makes us very vulnerable to foreign actors seeking to bypass the hard work and the costs of original innovation and infiltrate research programs. I'm not naive to think that our adversaries, especially the Chinese, are stealing everything because they are innovating as fast as they could possibly be on their own. But these threats are real. They come from governments and organizations that do not share our commitment to openness, to integrity, reciprocal collaboration. Protecting American research from such exploitation is not a partisan issue. It is a national security imperative. The motivation for today's hearing is clear: to ensure that the laws and directives Congress and the executive branch have already put in place to protect U.S. research are being implemented effectively and consistently across our federal agencies. In 2021, President Trump issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 33, Directing Federal Agencies to Safeguard the Integrity of the U.S. Government, Supported Research and Development. The following year, Congress built upon that foundation with the CHIPS and Science Act, which reinforced federal research security standards and required institutions to establish policies on foreign affiliations, conflicts of interest, and data protection. Together, these measures form the backbone of our national research security framework. They are meant to defend American innovation against foreign espionage, cyber attacks, and intellectual property theft. Threats that are neither hypothetical nor distant. We've seen individuals attempting to smuggle federally funded research, sensitive data, and even dangerous biological materials in and out of our country. This committee has already issued several letters to institutions seeking information on research security implementation. These responses that we've received highlight significant confusion about expectations, timelines, and enforcement. These gaps are exactly what our adversaries exploit. And that is why congressional oversight is absolutely essential. We are not here to point fingers. We are here to ensure accountability. The federal government has a duty to provide clear, actionable guidance, and research community has a duty to follow it. Protecting taxpayer-funded research should not depend on which agency you work with or which grant you apply for. It must be streamlined, clear, and effective. However, as implementation of these directives begins, we must ensure that agencies are not.

Imposing.

Unnecessary administrative burdens or conflicting requirements that make compliance harder rather than easier. Security and innovation are not mutually exclusive, but achieving both requires coordination, clarity, and commitment. The goal of today's discussion is to identify what is working and what is not, and what Congress can do to strengthen support for our research enterprise. We all share the same objective here: to protect American innovation, uphold the integrity of our research system, and to ensure that taxpayer dollars advance U.S. interests, not those of our adversaries. I want to thank our witnesses for being here again this morning and for the work that each of you is doing to address these very challenges. This committee is dedicated to working to secure the future of American science and technology for the benefit of all citizens. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you, Chairman Babin. And now I recognize the ranking member of the full committee for a statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before making my statement, I would like to welcome back to the committee Representative Don Beyer, who was appointed by the Democratic Caucus to our remaining vacancy yesterday. He has been a terrific member of the committee in the past and we welcome him back. I continue to hope that research security will remain a bipartisan and productive topic for this committee. We have an impressive legacy of legislation as well as oversight on research security. For years on both sides of the aisle we have maintained a deep understanding of and respect for the spirit of openness that animates fundamental research. Republicans and Democrats alike have taken threats to research security seriously while understanding that that in order to be the world leader in science and discovery, we must welcome international collaboration. So I don't minimize the importance of this topic. Nevertheless, I wonder why we're holding a second hearing on research security when there's no evidence that the Trump administration has implemented anything of substance on research security this year. Quite the contrary, President Trump has taken many actions that are damaging the very research policies these were designed to protect. As Ranking Member Sykes outlined many of these destructive actions, I'll speak to what we are at risk of losing. For years now, Democrats and Republicans celebrated the fact that the United States was the chosen home of world-class talent. We took pride in the fact that nearly 80% of foreign-born STEM PhD recipients chose to remain in the United States since 2000, About 40% of all Nobel Laureates coming from America have been foreign born Americans by choice. An analysis from the National Foundation for American Policy found that more than half of startups valued at $1 billion or more here in the United States were started by immigrants. Now what happens if we block or discourage foreign born STEM talent from opportunities in the United States? Here's the answer: they'll take their know-how and entrepreneurial spirit to other countries, allies and adversaries alike. Welcoming international talent is important to advance the economic and national security of the United States. In our first hearing this session, we heard testimony from former Republican Congresswoman and former Secretary of the Air Force, Heather Wilson. She told us that the People's Republic of China is vastly overtaking the United States in several areas of emerging technologies. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute studies that Representative Wilson cited, China now leads in 66 of 74 emerging technologies. In the years prior to this administration, U.S. Federal research funding was already stagnant at best. Despite multiple reports citing China's growing advantages. We're now in the worst of times with the Trump administration politicizing grant making, dismantling our federal science agencies, and undermining confidence in the U.S. as a trusted partner. This isn't how you compete with China. This is how you surrender. This is not how you make America healthier. It's how you needlessly send children to the hospital with measles, pertussis, and other diseases entirely preventable with vaccines. This is not how you make America great. It's how you undermine our resilience to natural disasters, epidemics, and all manner of risks to our national security and societal well-being. And this is not how you build a scientific ecosystem that produces research worth protecting in the first place. It's how you atrophy our excellence to the point of no return. The Trump administration is responsible for implementing these disastrous policies, but Congress is complicit in its failure to exert forceful bipartisan oversight and legislation to stop the bleeding. I support the bipartisan work that the Science Committee has done to bolster research security, and I applaud the valuable work that each of the witnesses has performed to further those goals. However, I fear that unless both Republicans and Democrats stand against the destruction of our scientific enterprise, we are ceding our leadership to China in ways that no research security policies can prevent. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ranking Member Lofgren. Now, let me reintroduce our witnesses, which I am exceedingly thankful for considering this special and very busy time of year. Our first witness today is Dr. Rebecca Keiser, Acting Chief of Staff staff for the National Science Foundation. Our next witness will be Dr. Daniel Evans, Assistant Deputy Associate Administrator for Research for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. I will not try to say that twice. Our next witness is Dr. Patricia Valdez, Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer for the National Institutes of Health. And of course, our final Witness will be Mr. Jay Tilden, Director of Counterintelligence and Intelligence for the Department of Energy. I now recognize Dr. Kaiser for five minutes to present her testimony.

Thank you very much, Chairman McCormick, Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Sykes, and Ranking Member Lofgren, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Dr. Rebecca Kaiser, Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy, and Acting Chief of Staff, yes, I have two long titles, at the U.S. National Science Foundation. It is an honor to be with you today to discuss how NSF is working to protect critical U.S. Taxpayer investments in R&D and in our domestic STEM talent from malign foreign actors. Research security is a vital part of the NSF mission and is essential to.

U.S. economic and national security.

NSF works closely with partners in federal law enforcement, including the NSF-OIG and the intelligence community, as well as other federal R&D funders, some of whom are also represented here today. NSF counts Congress as an important partner in this work. We thank you for your work to date, and we remain committed to working with you to continue to bolster U.S. research security efforts in response to current and evolving threats. Under the first Trump administration in 2019, NSF commissioned a report by the Jason, the findings and recommendations of which have helped inform NSF's approach to research security. It found that a group of governments, notably the People's Republic of China, were attempting to benefit from the global research ecosystem without upholding the core values of openness, transparency, and reciprocal collaboration. As co-chair of the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Research Security with OSTP, DOE, and NIH, NSF collaborated on the development of NSPM-33, which was released in January 2021 to provide clear research security direction to the community. Indeed, many of the NSF efforts I'm excited to speak with you about today have either been bolstered by or are in direct response to NSPM 33 and legislation this committee helped to author. And it is my office at NSF, O-CRISP, that stewards these efforts for the agency. This work is a matter of protecting American competitiveness and national security and requires continued vigilance, culture change, and accountability. The security of the U.S. research ecosystem is the responsibility of the federal government, as well as the recipients of federal research dollars. NSF has continued to work diligently to bolster our research security efforts and to implement NSPM-33 and the research security provisions of the CHIPS and Science Act. NSF implemented the prohibition on funding for researchers that participate in a malign foreign talent recruitment program. Including certification requirements of both research institutions and senior personnel on NSF awards. NSF has established robust analytic capabilities and published related guidelines to help the community understand how the agency approaches these practices. NSF, in partnership with the broader interagency community, developed research security training modules to provide researchers with clear guidelines and effective strategies to protect against existing and emerging research security threats. Researchers must also now certify that they have taken research security training to qualify to apply for NSF funding. NSF established the first of its kind Secure Program under which we have funded the Secure Center and Secure Analytics to empower the community to identify and mitigate foreign interference that poses risks to the US funded federal research enterprise. NSF also established the trust framework to guide the agency in assessing grant proposals for potential national security risks. We are implementing trust in three phases, which I outline in greater detail in my written testimony. In FY25, NSF was also excited to fund the first cohort of awards under the NSF Research on Research Security Program. This program was established to advance the understanding of the full scope potential challenges and nature of the research on research security field through scholarly evidence. Safeguarding taxpayer investments in research and innovation is central to U.S. national security and international competitiveness. As good stewards of American taxpayer funds, NSF remains committed to this and we look forward to continuing to work with you on this vitally important issue.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

And I welcome your questions.

Thank you, Dr. Keiser. I now recognize Dr. Evan for five minutes to present his testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman McCormick, ranking member Sykes and Mr. Babbin, Chairman Babbin, it's very nice to see you, sir. Distinguished members of the committee. In 1958, Congress wrote the National Aeronautics and Space Act. That document is something profound.

At the height of the Cold War.

It declared that the United States would not hide its achievements behind a wall of secrecy. Instead, it mandated that NASA would share its discoveries with the world. That decision to be open was a bet on the American system, and it paid off. Because we shared our science, we sparked a global revolution in technology. Because we were transparent, the world's best.

Minds flocked to our universities.

And because we led with our values, the United States became the undisputed leader of the Space Age. That openness remains our greatest strength. It's the engine that drives our economy, and it's the engine that inspires our children. But we also know that the world of 2025 is not the world of 1958.

We're in a fierce competition.

Our adversaries are no longer just watching our launch pads. They are actively seeking to extract the intellectual capital that this committee and the American taxpayer have invested in. My message to you today is that we do not have to choose between being open and being secure. We can and we must do both.

As of last month, my office is.

Leading a modernized approach to research security that safeguards NASA's crown jewels without dimming the light of American science. And our strategy rests on three simple principles: integrity, clarity, and alignment. First, integrity. We're enforcing a bright line. Pursuant to the CHIPS and Science Act, we've established a strict statutory firewall. We're no longer relying on the honor system. We're implementing a dual layer verification process. Every researcher must certify that they are free from malign foreign talent recruitment programs, and their university must back them up. In short, if you are funded by a foreign competitor to undermine US leadership, then you have no place in a US lab. Second, clarity. We're lifting the fog on who's doing the research. Thanks to the work of this committee and the administration, we moved away from fragmented, agency-specific paperwork and adopted a single, transparent disclosure system across the federal government. This allows us to see the full picture. We can now verify exactly who is working on a grant and ensure that they are free of conflicts of commitment. We've replaced blind trust with verification, ensuring that we know where every single tax dollar is going and to whom. Third, let me speak about alignment. We're protecting the scientist as well as science. We know that red tape can be just as damaging to innovation as any external threat. That's why we refuse to go it alone. We worked hand in hand with the National Science Foundation, with our interagency partners to harmonize our requirements. And this consistency is our safeguard against bias. By adhering to a single objective standard, we ensure that every researcher is judged by the same criteria. We scrutinize conduct, not background. Simply put, we at NASA, one our brightest minds, focus on finding life on Mars or designing the next supersonic jet not navigating a maze of conflicting forms. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, NASA represents the very best of this country. We do the hard things, and we're building a security posture that is worthy of that mission. One that's rigorous enough to stop our adversaries, but agile enough to welcome the brilliant minds who want to join Team USA. We're proving that a free and open society can out-innovate any closed system in the world. Thank you for your leadership. Look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Dr. Evans. I now recognize Dr. Valdez for five minutes to present her testimony.

Chairman Batkin, ranking member Lofgren, Chairman McCormick, ranking member Sykes, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the National Institutes of Health about this important topic. My name is Patricia Valdez and I serve as the Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer at NIH. NIH plays a central role in shaping the biomedical research landscape of the United States. The scale of NIH's investment reflects not only a mission to advance health and discovery, but a duty to protect the integrity of taxpayer-funded science. NIH executes this responsibility through a comprehensive approach and in partnership with institutions institutions across the country. NIH has no tolerance for breaches of integrity or misuse of federal taxpayer funds. It is particularly concerning when problematic behavior occurs at the instigation or support of malign foreign actors. Some behaviors NIH has witnessed include non-disclosure of foreign research support, including undisclosed foreign employment, unmitigated conflicts of interest, violations of peer review integrity rules.

And repeated misrepresentations.

To institutional officials and NIH during compliance inquiries. NIH's compliance efforts aim to ensure proper stewardship of federal funds and to safeguard the research enterprise from foreign interference while protecting the integrity of research. Our multifaceted approach strengthens research security in partnership with institutions across the country. In 2018, NIH undertook an extensive effort to ensure recipient institutions are prepared to mitigate against these concerns. Over the next several years, NIH released reminders and clarifications about policies on disclosures of foreign other support and financial interests and security and confidentiality in peer review. In 2021, NIH strengthened disclosure forms by requiring certification of other support by senior key personnel and enhancing its internal capacity to detect signs of foreign interference or disclosure noncompliance. This year, NIH implemented a system to fund foreign collaborations as direct subproject grants instead of subawards. To improve the oversight of funds going to foreign sites. At the same time, NIH remains committed to responsible international scientific cooperation, recognizing its essential role in U.S. innovation and global competitiveness. Since 2018, NIH's Office of Extramural Research has received almost 700 allegations and has contacted institutions regarding 271 of these allegations. Nearly all cases were resolved through administrative remedies. Escalation to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General occurs only depending on material facts, intent, pattern, or potential harm to agency or U.S. interests. In 53 cases, including six cases working with the Department of Justice and OIG, the U.S. government recovered approximately $37.8 million in repayments. Again, the majority through administrative processes. Institutions have indicated that NSPM-33 aligned requirements offer clearer expectations and more centralized guidance. While establishing new processes can feel significant, institutions have been strong partners. Indeed, reports involving foreign interference to, indeed, in recent years, institutional self-disclosures account for over half of all reports involving foreign interference to NIH.

The number of allegations has declined sharply.

Over the past several years.

This shift likely reflects improved awareness and compliance with disclosure requirements at universities and research institutions. In accordance with the CHIPS and Science Act, NIH recently announced research security training requirements for NIH grants. This training strengthens knowledge and compliance related to topics of cybersecurity, international collaboration, disclosure requirements, conflict of commitment and conflicts of interest. The National Science Foundation in partnership with NIH, the Department of Energy and the Department of War have provided online training modules as a resource to the extramural community. Along with their agency partners, NIH has implemented common disclosure forms in which senior key personnel must certify that they do not participate in a maligned foreign talent recruitment program. To increase transparency of our assessment process.

NH published a decision matrix last year.

NH has also partnered with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and our agency partners to strengthen research security standards and streamline disclosure processes so that compliance expectations remain clear. NH will continue to protect the integrity of U.S. government-funded biomedical research in partnership with institutions, federal agencies, and law enforcement and values its ongoing collaboration with Congress.

To strengthen research integrity and ensure that.

Security measures support scientific collaborations. Thank you again for the opportunity and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Dr. Valdez. I now recognize Mr. Tilden for five minutes to present his testimony.

Chairman McCormick, Chairman Babin, ranking member Sykes and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Energy's commitment to research security. While my role at the DOE is primarily to prevent espionage directed against national security activities, I'm here today representing the entire department's efforts on research security. At DOE, we are clear-eyed about the strategic and adversarial competition that the People's Republic of China poses to the United States, and we view the diversion of taxpayer-funded, unclassified research from malign purposes as an abiding threat to our economic prosperity and our national security. The United States leads the world in science and technology. Central to that leadership is scientific collaboration, bringing together the best and brightest minds, be they American-born or from abroad. DOE strives to balance the inherent security risks of international collaboration while preserving America's S&T edge. Our approach seeks to mitigate risks in an evolving environment while fostering innovation that keeps the United States in the lead. The science and technology threat landscape is dynamic. Certain governments, notably but not only the PRC, exploit our largely open scientific ecosystem through both cyber and non-traditional collection approaches. A more detailed discussion of the PRC and other foreign threats can be provided in the appropriate setting. DOE continuously strengthens our research security through multi-layered approach consisting of foreign national screening, and vetting, internal processes and procedures, cyber tools and controls, and control of critical infrastructure. This is all executed by expert security, export control, and counterintelligence personnel. The cornerstone of DOE's unclassified research framework resides within DOE's national laboratories and their internal safeguards. Unlike some universities, DOE can and does direct national laboratories to operate in a consistent manner, a managed research environment that balance risk and benefit while monitoring, adapting and evolving threats. All 17 national laboratories adhere to an integrated security framework consistent with NSPM 33 and the CHIPS and Science Act implementation. DOE maintains and continues to refine a range of controls at the national laboratories, including foreign national vetting, and tailored mitigation measures based on the science and technology risk matrix. This risk matrix categorizes selected technologies that either allow, constrain, or outright prohibit foreign national participation. Our commitment to safeguarding research extends to grants and external funding. DOE's Research, Technology, and Economic Security framework aims to minimize intellectual property loss.

Protect.

Supply chains and guard national and economic.

Security through due diligence reviews, tailored security requirements, and post selection monitoring. The department has implemented CHIPS and Science Act research security requirements and collaborates with our interagency partners on NSPM 33 implementation. DOE requires robust disclosures from applicants. Further, DOE was the first agency to implement required research security training and prohibits entities of concern and associated personnel from receiving DOE funding. DOE is committed to harmonizing our research security requirements with other federal agencies. Despite DOE's efforts, challenges persist. Variance in research security programs and awareness across academia creates potential vulnerabilities. To assist, DOE co-funded research security training modules for academia and collaborates with the interagency colleagues to support the research community, of which the NSF Secure Center is one example. At the same time, sustaining and enhancing comprehensive vetting and monitoring program demands dedicated resources for counterintelligence, security, and R&D unclassified due diligence. To address these challenges, we offer three considerations, three key considerations. First, tailored and risk-based strategies. To avoid blanket prohibitions, we must provide clear, consistent guidance for academic institutions to mitigate potential foreign threats before they arrive at our national laboratories or work on DOE-funded efforts. DOE supports a comprehensive interagency approach with flexibility for agencies to take necessary risk-based actions tailored to their mission. Second, we need to enhance federal capabilities. We recommend strengthening analytic vetting and continuous monitoring through dedicated resources, state-of-the-art tools, and easily connectable IT systems. We need to out-innovate and we need to out-educate. We support investment in research and in academia and in our national laboratories while expanding the American-born STEM talent pipeline. In closing, DOE views research security as a top priority. We're committed to an effective, balanced, and a continuously improving approach to protect our nation's scientific enterprise. We're confident in our framework and our frameworks and expertise, and we are dedicated to working closely with Congress to ensure America strengthens its leadership in science and technology. Chairman McCormick, ranking member Sykes, members of the committee, thank you very much for your leadership, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Tilden. I now recognize ranking member Sykes for five minutes questions.

Thank you, everyone, again, for your testimony. Dr. Kaiser, I'm going to jump right in with you and talk about something I mentioned in my opening statement. NSF's Office of Chief Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy is required per the Chips and Science Act to have, quote, no fewer than four full-time equivalent positions in addition to the Chief of Research Security. Dr. Kaiser, how many people are currently working in that office?

Currently, we have the Chief of Research Security and three additional personnel. And we are in the process of increasing those resources. We've been coordinating with you and your team. And of course, we have been concerned about this reduction. Across the foundation, we have lost quite a few staff members. We're very aware of the priority of research security. And so actually we are in process of adding an additional representative onto the office, as well as developing the hiring plan that's required under the executive order to ensure that we make the office even more robust.

Thank you very much. And how many people were working in the office on January 19th, 2025?

There were the me plus there were seven additional representatives in the office at that time.

So on January 19th, there were seven people and now there are four.

Correct.

And per the Chips and Science Act, no fewer than four full-time equivalent positions in addition to the Chief of Staff. But that is a split job that you have. So would you say that the agency is in violation of the law?

I would say that we are in the process of building up the office again. In fact, we have a representative who is actually transferring to our office next week to ensure that we're compliant. At the same time, we want to go beyond that minimum number because we know what the importance is of research security and national security. So as part of our hiring plan that we're developing consistent with the executive order, we're going to build up the office even more.

So let me be clear.

The law requires how many staff people in this office? It requires four.

And how many people do you have in the office?

We have myself plus three. And so we're building up again, correct? And we do need to build that.

Dr. Kaiser, are you saying you have four people in the office?

Correct.

And the law requires four. So you're saying you are in compliance with the law?

We are in compliance with the law and we are building up even more.

Thank you very much.

So this office has clearly incurred serious.

Damage with the Trump's administration month-long campaign and in the words of OMB Director Vought to make civil servants, excuse me, quote, not want to go to work because they are increasingly viewed as the villains. Now I would imagine as we are using two out of the three hearings that we've had here to talk about research security, perhaps those are not the villains.

They're trying to protect us from the.

Villains, but nonetheless, as they are gone, we'll have a quick commercial break. This administration has wanted to force or coerce people out of the federal workforce and to the detriment of research security and they have succeeded. And so you've explained how you are coming in compliance. What is the timeline that you imagine that we will now have a more robust office.

To actually tackle the issue of research security? We are bringing on an additional member as we speak. That human resources action is taking place now. In addition to that, the hiring plan that we've developed to ensure that we're consistent with the executive order has been developed. It's going through coordination also as we speak to be sent over to the White House and OPM. And we anticipate within the next few months, of course, we all know how human resources actions and that it is unpredictable about the time that it takes, but we will be in train as soon as we receive approval of that plan.

Great, thank you. Really quickly, I'm going to ask the panel and I'll start with Mr. Tilden. I mentioned in my opening statements that the Trump administration is the most direct threat to research security. How is the Trump administration threatening your research security, Mr. Tilden?

And I only have 30 seconds, so please quickly. Yes, the Trump administration is not threatening our efforts. Our efforts, if you were to look at it from Biden to Trump, the efforts that we're doing internally are on a consistent slope to improve. I will say the one thing that is bothering us is being in a shutdown and or see our status, of course, prevents us from going where we need to go.

Thank you, Dr. Valdez.

Our work continues in research security as we had years before, so we continue the work.

Thank you, Dr. Evan. It was a priority before, it remains a priority now.

Great, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Thank you and I recognize, right, actually our chair, Mr. Babin will be, or Dr. Babin will be our next for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and again thank you witnesses for being here. I'd like to address the notion that implementing research security is too costly. Or that agencies and institutions are not funded enough to enact appropriate controls. I'd like to remind my colleagues, especially on the other side of the aisle, that taxpayer funding for research is not a right. It is a privilege. If researchers and institutions cannot protect federally funded research from foreign exploitation, they shouldn't, simply should not be receiving funding. I also challenge institutions to evaluate.

Their priorities.

Funding for diversity, equity, and inclusion, or DEI, at universities has exploded over the last decade. DEI staffing growth has outpaced faculty hiring, increased tuition costs, and done nothing to increase black and Hispanic graduation rates. At R1 and R2 universities, which receive the lion's share of federal research funding, mandatory DEI curriculum is estimated to cost over $1.8 $8.5 billion over four years according to reporting from last March. The average spending at R1 universities on DEI is $8.5 million annually. NSF alone funds $2 billion for DEI line STEM research benefiting R1 universities. If we are really worried about funding research security, then we should prioritize it over I'd also like to talk about R1 universities and staffing and compensation. At DEI investment, as I said, averaging 8.5 million annually has exploded over the years. And where was that other one?

Here it is, I'm sorry.

R1 University's lead in DEI investment averaging 8.5 million annually as I said, that's 0.62% of total expenditures. The University of Michigan employs 241 DEI staff at an annual cost of 30.68 million. While Ohio State University increased its DEI workforce from 88 employees at 7.3 million to 189 employees at 20.38 million. DEI executive salaries frequently exceed faculty earnings with OSU's DEI head earning $300,000 and University of Michigan's former Chief Diversity Officer earning $431,000. Just for the record, I would like to mention those. I'd also like to have a question here for all four of you. If you don't mind, if I've got time and I think I do.

Would.

You agree that delays in implementing NSPM 33 increased the risk that U.S. taxpayer-funded research was compromised or transferred abroad? We'll start with you, Dr. Kaiser.

Chairman Babin, we started at NSF and working together with the interagency to implement NSPM 33 as soon as it was released. We prevented and prohibited the participation in maligned foreign talent recruitment programs by NSF staff. We required that NSF staff be U.S. citizens. We also began the coordination among our agencies to harmonize on the very important disclosure requirements that are needed by those applying for federal research. And it did, we have been successful in having a harmonized approach to that, to to that disclosure, which is currently being implemented. We also have taken efforts, of course, to make sure that we convey to universities that this is a joint responsibility, that they have a responsibility not only to disclose to us, but to address research security risks as soon as they are found and that they need to have programs in place to do so. The Secure Center and Secure Analytics has been established to assist in that regard. It is active. It is providing tools and information and coordination. An example, I think, of the way that this is working and that this is in train is just in the past week, I have received three emails that were forwarded to me from researchers in the community who had been approached for recruitment by Chinese malign foreign talent recruitment programs. Now, the fact that they were approached even now in 2025 is extremely concerning. The fact that they came to us and notified us of that is great progress in that regard. Now, the other thing I wanted to mention, however, is that unfortunately the PRC government keeps moving the goalposts. So, these foreign talent recruitment programs, the names of them are not on any list because the names keep changing. And so, this is why we have to have consistent due diligence and keep at this and not rest on our laurels.

Absolutely, thank you. And I'm out of time and I know the other three would certainly have some very good answers that I'd be very curious to hear and all of us would be, but I will yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree.

It's actually a riveting testimony.

I think everybody here would be interested to hear more on, but we'll continue on and stick with my rules. I now recognize Representative Bonamici from Oregon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and thank you to all the witnesses for your expertise. I'm going to start by saying that years ago I was an innovation roundtable and a very successful tech executive said the most important thing for innovation is diversity. So you get people from different backgrounds and different perspectives. I just want to start by saying that. Congress and this committee wrote the Chips and Science Act to protect US research, to incentivize US manufacturing, and to strengthen trusted partnerships. The implementation of this law, particularly the very important and science part, depends on clarity, staffing, and resources. Yet this administration has drained research security offices, capped indirect costs at fund compliance, and abandoned its role as an interagency coordinator. I also want to note, Mr. Tilden, you talked about out-educating. I'm on the Education Committee, and I know this administration is not only trying to close down the Department of Education, but policies that have passed in this Congress and that the administration is talking about will make it harder for people to access higher education in this country. That is not good for this country. I also want to align myself with the remarks that Ranking Member Lofgren made about the contributions of immigrants. Dr. Evans, I discern by your accent that you're not Native American to the United States of America.

That's right.

Thank you for exemplifying the contributions of immigrants in this country. So I want to note that this combination of things does not strengthen our national research security. It creates blind spots. And we can't lead in U.S. innovation and emerging technologies if this administration is undermining science agencies, if they're demeaning immigrants, if they're sabotaging federal research, and if they're making higher education harder to access, colleges and universities. And also, I want to note, as of just two days ago, announcing that they want to recklessly dismantle the National Center for Atmospheric Research. So, Dr. Kaiser, late Tuesday night, OMB Director Vought announced that NSF would immediately begin dismantling the National Center for Atmospheric Research, NCAR. This center is vital for developing life-saving weather models, including atmospheric rivers like just happened in the Pacific Northwest. When did NSF learn about Director Vought's.

Directive to dismantle NCAR?

We have been reviewing all of our large facilities and we've been doing so for several months.

When did you learn about the directors?

We have been having conversations for a while and we're happy to brief you further. I know that there has been a briefing that has been requested in that regard.

Well, when will NCAR functions be transferred elsewhere? Is that what's going to happen? And if so, to where will they go?

So, this is a very large award.

And as I said, we are reviewing.

All of our large facility awards. We're very conscious of the fact that there are vital research functions that are occurring in weather forecasting, weather modeling, seasonal forecasting, wildfires, et cetera. So, as we announced, we are going to be releasing a Dear Colleague letter to solicit input from the community. And I'm going to run out of time.

I appreciate that.

We look forward to seeing that.

Does NSF intend to terminate its contract with NCAR?

We have sent a notification to NCAR that we were releasing this dear colleague letter and that we are going to be assessing the different components of NCAR.

And, Mr. Chair, I request unanimous consent to enter into the record a memo NSF sent yesterday morning announcing that it will begin closing NCAR. I request to enter that into the record, Mr. Chairman.

And if I could be clear that we have announced the intent to restructure NCAR. Can I enter that into the record?

No objection.

And Dr. Kaiser, I understand that the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House has been largely absent from research security coordination. So who's filling that vacuum when the White House steps back?

We do coordinate quite closely with the Office of Science and Technology Policy on research security issues. And we also coordinate very closely with the interagency. OSTP does have a representative who focuses on research security with whom I've met frequently.

Thank you and I appreciate Dr. Kaiser, your you're talking about the recruitment of some of our U.S. scientists by China and other places, and we've seen documented efforts like that. And it's destabilizing, no doubt. So how does pushing talent out of our system affect America's research enterprise? I know Dr. Babin said something earlier about, you know, China stealing everything, and it looks like they're trying to steal our researchers, too. But if we don't have the jobs for them, and if we are not doing what we can to keep them here, how will that destabilize grants and push our talent out of our system.

We do need a whole of government approach and a whole of society approach to make sure that we retain the best talent here in the United States. As you said before, our international researchers, international PhDs, the vast majority stay here. We need to continue that and continue that effort.

Real quickly, does everybody agree with that on the panels that we need to retain the best researchers here in the United States?

Without a doubt.

Yes.

Thank you.

I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

I now recognize Mr. Webster for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So Dr. Valdez does in the Biden administration right at the end of his term, I think in December 2024, he renewed the US China Science and Technology Agreement. So how does your agency provide oversight and place potential conditions, restrictions, restrict activities and sub agreements that might be negotiated under a broader agreement?

Thank you for your question. NIH takes research security very, very seriously. One of the things that we have implemented pretty recently was to remove sub awards, foreign sub awards to foreign institutions, and we pulled them out and now they're awarded as sub projects. And so by having these awards to foreign institutions and foreign sites be made as sub projects, we have better oversight of what's actually happening at those sites and the funding. So we know exactly what the funding is being used for. So instead of having the reporting go through an intermediary, which would have been the US institution or the prime institution, we now can have direct oversight of those foreign awards. So that allows us to have better.

Insight to what's happening.

Does your agency see any conflict between the implementation of the National Security Presidential Memorandum number 33 and the Renewed Science and Technology Agreement? Is there any conflict there?

I'm not aware of a conflict.

Okay. Can the United States remain competitive in global research without China?

So we definitely need to have international collaborations. Science is global. We can't cut off all the other countries. And so I think it's important that we do manage these types of collaborations very closely and really make sure that we are identifying any risks that could potentially happen. So again, the increased oversight is important here.

So how could we, how could the United States structure its research ties to China, with China, to ensure that the most benefits come from it while still protecting the risks against the risks?

Right, and that's one of the things that we've done, again, for foreign sites, when we're funding research at foreign sites, you know, we're now requiring increased oversight by NIH. So we see exactly where the funds are going. We require the progress of supports from those foreign sites are coming directly to us and we have that relationship. So I think the stronger oversight is really key here to ensure that, you know, funds are being spent properly.

So what action should Congress take advance to U.S. research competitiveness?

That have not been done to enhance that research?

Well, I'll say that we definitely appreciate all of the actions that Congress has done to give insight, to give awareness to the issue of research security. We definitely appreciate the partnerships. And so all I can say is really, I think, increased our coordination with you as we see the changing landscape of the different threats that arise to continue our communication and, you know.

Discourse.

And to understanding what those risks are, I think it's really important.

Mr. Tillman, do you have like any additions to that?

Sir, I would, yes. I think we can remain competitive in a global like research without the extensive ties with China. But let me clarify that oftentimes I think we're we may be mixing between many people who are of Chinese nationality who have been in the states for many years and those are the folks that have migrated through our to our labs, that will take time for us to wean off, if you will, right? That will take back to this idea of a STEM-related kind of a growth in STEM pipeline for talent, US-born talent. I also believe that Congress can help us in many ways, and you have, so we thank you. Consistent budget really does help. I don't know if I can emphasize.

How.

Overall, the CRs and/or shutdowns really do send a shockwave through the system. And again, as I mentioned, this idea of how do we collectively, all the departments here, how do we develop that US-born STEM pipeline so we're not as reliant on foreign talent? We are very reliant on foreign talent right now, sadly.

Thank you very much. Time's out.

Thank you, Mr. Wisscher.

I now recognize Representative Foster out of Illinois for five minutes of questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to our witnesses. You know, I first want to start by acknowledging that you have a really tough job because the, you know, at the end of the Cold War, at the end of World War II, there was a very clear separation. You had stuff that was nuclear weapons relevant and you had things that were maybe bioweapons relevant and now there is so much that's dual use and that's tough because a lot of people come here because they want to develop drugs and they go home becoming experts on viral and antiviral technologies if they decide to go home. So I think that our first and most important duty here is to minimize the times that we push people back to their countries of origin. You know, we're 5% of the world population, so 95% of the geniuses are not going to be born in the United States. And so we just have to acknowledge that fact and continue to capitalize on it very very consciously. And so one of the reasons that we've been so successful is that a lot of people want to come to work at our universities after they get their education to work at our universities because they're free and open and well-funded or work at our corporations and start their own business, which is one of the real engines of growth in this country. And it used to be in this country that if you were going to start up a business to, I don't know, develop new forms of lithography that you'd be guaranteed you wouldn't be facing a government funded competitor. That was one of the disadvantages when you go back to China, okay, you start this business and then all of a sudden the Chinese government has a big equity position in your competitor. And guess what, you don't, there's not a level playing field for regulation. And one of the most frightening things from that point of view is this, this administration's decision to start acting more like China. In terms of taking big equity positions and things. And putting our conflicts of interest into our national labs. The big announcement with XLight, which is a very good idea, but now they're going to be using the national labs to produce parts for their prototypes. And so how do you negotiate those and avoid conflicts of interest when the federal government has an equity institution and they have complete control over the national and it just, there's a reason we've stayed away from this web of conflicts of interest when we have government investments. Now, the other thing is, it's a secret to none of you that we've had a hemorrhage of the top talent in federal agencies. It's less easily understandable. What's happened inside the weapons labs and the people that work behind it. Mr. Tilden, I don't want to put you on the spot. It's nice to see you outside of this But is it fair to say that the problems with retaining top talent from people who work behind the wall in weapons labs and similar, they've mirrored what we've seen in the difficulty of retaining talent in the federal government in the face of dozes and so on?

So Dr. Foster, nice to see you as well. Look, having been in NSA recently, but as you know, I'm in a new position. My sense is that we've actually had a very good track record of talent retention through this whole process, especially for the national security-related functions. Again, just to not beat this dead horse, right now, as you know, we can direct federal employees to work without pay. We cannot direct our national laboratory members because of various laws that are on the books to work without pay.

So while the first shutdown that we.

Went through, we managed very well as an agency, as a department. If we have this second kind of a problem at the end of January, we will see departures. And that will be a problem. And that's just a fundamental funding issue. People are attracted to this Mission, whether or not it is AI in the unclassified or Quantum in the unclassified, or whether it's those related things in the classified section. We, I think, have been fairly resilient in this. I know some labs lost some time.

No, you're right in that, attracted to the mission. And ultimately that depends on being proud to be part of a country that's going in a direction you believe in. And that also, frankly, is under threat. We see what's happening today, where we have now assembled the biggest armada since the Bay of Pigs, or I guess something similar. And with the idea that we're going to use that to take back the oil and the land that somehow was thought to be ours, that makes the United States look like an ugly and dumb country. And that makes it very hard for foreign talent to want to come and work to be part of the United States. And I don't expect you to say anything on that. You're in a very tough position. But look, this is the difficulty that you're going to be facing and will continue to be facing until we can start living up to our own ideals again. I have five seconds left and I'll yield back.

Thank you, Dr. Foster. I now recognize Representative Harrigan for five minutes of questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought we were on a very productive line of questioning a few minutes ago, and so I'm actually going to cede my time to the Chairman of the full committee, Dr. Babin.

I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. I appreciate this, and I'll try to yield back to you in just a second. But Dr. Kaiser had answered my question, which was, do you agree that delays in implementing NSPM 33 increased the risk that US taxpayer-funded research was compromised or transferred abroad? So I would like to ask that question again and start with you, Dr. Evans, and we'll work down the table and answer as quickly as you possibly can.

Yeah, thanks very much. And it really speaks to the heart of who we are as a research ecosystem. We at NASA took a very deliberate strategic posture to eliminate the kill chain, and by that I mean eliminating malign foreign talent recruitment programs. And there have been other cases in which we've moved with speed and agility. But one of the jobs that I have as a research security professional is, of course, to protect the research security posture of NASA. But the other job is to deliver the world's most capable and compelling space science program. And that's in concert with our academic partners who've told us many, many times that bureaucracy really stifles innovation. And so we've deliberately moved with harmony among our interagency partners to get the common disclosures right, to move singularly, because that really cuts down on red tape. And the last thing I want to do is chill the innovative spirit that we have in this country. I think our posture has been strong as a result. Thanks.

Absolutely, thank you.

Now, Dr. Valdez, Thank you. So NIH began communicating with recipient institutions about 2018 of the problem and the issues involving research security. One of the things is mentioned by Dr. Evans and Dr. Kaiser is that we do work together very closely to harmonize any requirements. We have implemented the requirements in that we are using the common disclosure forms and requiring that people that researchers report whether or not they belong to a malign foreign talent recruitment program. So I think as we move along, I think it's very important that we continue to work together as interagency to make sure that those requirements are harmonized because we do not want to increase the burden at institutions and having them to report different pieces to different agencies. So I think the progress has been good, I believe.

Thank you.

Yes, sir. So I will say that within the bounds of everything we do, we have not slowed down implementation. We are continuing to improve. As my colleagues mentioned, the common forms, we're continuing to work on that. We are continuing to attempt to harmonize across the interagency to make sure, again, oftentimes harmonizing does not mean everything needs to be identical. We need to be able to tailor based on the individual missions of our agencies, but we have a very good collaboration going on there. As mentioned before, we co-funded that training. We're continuing that. That I do think an area that we can all agree on that we could do better would be a better more not automated but a more cyber based information sharing regime and protocol. Right now if we discover something that looks bad it's got to be pick up the phone or shoot an email. Hey you have this person too or you have this. I think we have to work on that and that does take some leadership from the White House on this one.

Thank you Mr. Tilden and I'd like to yield back to Mr. Harrigan.

Thank you Chairman and I've got a minute and 30 seconds here and I'll use the time as wisely as we can. Of the comments today was we don't know why we're having this committee hearing for a second time. The reason that we're having this hearing for a second time is because this is such a big problem. The security and safety of our research and development apparatus is of paramount importance to our national security and to the public trust. And when the FBI assesses that across the different mechanisms of intellectual property theft being academic, institutional, and military that due to espionage across all three of those platforms, we are losing $600 billion every single year. That's not 6 billion, that's not 60 billion, that is 600 billion. We have a really big problem and that should not be a political problem. That is a national emergency. And so I think the question ultimately comes down to, yes, we want to welcome international talent. Dr. Evans, I absolutely identify with your comments that we need to be open and secure, but I don't know that that we can do that with our adversaries. They have been robbing us blind for decades. And the fact that, as the ranking member pointed out, that China is ahead of us in 57 out of 64 critical technologies of the future is indicative not of their institutional and academic prowess, it's indicative of their theft. And so with that, I yield back.

Thank you.

Thank you.

I now recognize Representative Rivas for five minutes of questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I appreciate hearing from the witnesses who represent important agencies and research initiatives within our federal government. Since the passing of the CHIPS and Science Act, our institutions have been making great efforts to implement many research security mandates. The CHIPS and Science Act requires institutions who receive funding under the law to.

Implement certain compliance.

With research security policies and stipulates that institutions must maintain internal controls for things like data security. I worry about the capacity of smaller institutions to keep up and that concern has only grown since NIH, DOD, NSF, and DOE issued new policies capping indirect costs at 15%. Indirect costs are expenditures that aren't tied directly to research staffing or supplies but they nonetheless support infrastructure and activities that are vital to the functioning of research institutions, such as with research security. While implementation of these policies is stalled in the courts, our universities are significantly adjusting their operations. The reality is that this drastic reduction in indirect costs, reimbursements, will result in more than $800 million in cuts for the state of California, my home state, just from NIH grants alone. The life science community in California supports over 1.1 million Californians generating around 400 billion in economic output and every American has benefited from NIH funding 3.7 million Californians receive care at teaching hospitals. The capping of indirect costs will devastate the development of groundbreaking research inhibit patient access to life saving treatments and clinical trials and will seat American dominance in biomedical research to our fourth foreign competitors like China, Russia, and Iran for years to come. Dr. Kaiser, Dr. Valdez, and Mr. Tilden, do indirect costs contribute to universities' compliance with laws including those related to research security? And how will capping indirect costs at 15% impact universities' ability to comply with the law? And how will those impacts be felt at smaller institutions in particular?

I can start. We're committed to providing resources to institutions of all size to focus on research security and research security efforts. In fact, we have an award to Los Angeles Valley College in your district to bolster cybersecurity efforts at the college. And that's a direct award. We also, of course, focus on the secure awards to provide the resources that are needed and the Cyber Center has a co-award at Stanford University. So these are the ways that we want to make sure that we provide the overall efforts here. Now let me say that for us, the biggest thing that we need to do for our institutions is provide consistency and provide harmonization. And so the requirement to establish research security programs at universities, we are coordinating through the interagency to do a memorandum of understanding. So we have one set of requirements on institutions to lower administrative burden and lower costs.

Dr. Valdez.

Yes, and I'll agree with Dr. Kaiser. We do understand that this may be a concern and no, we absolutely want to make sure that all of these requirements are harmonized and all the guidance is harmonized. One of the thing I wanted to mention was also the Secure Center, which.

Hopefully.

When it's all set up and running, it'll be able to provide some guidance towards these smaller institutions that may not have all the resources that they need. Thank you.

So this huge notebook here, and I don't have a perfect answer for you on this one, because this is something that's a little outside of my area, but I will echo Dr. Valdez. One of the ways that we can help, especially the smaller institutes, the smaller academic centers, is through like the the NSF Secure Center and providing the standardized approach. That way they can just adopt it, right? They can just, I want to flag this, I think a fantastic publication. Sadly, DOE was not involved with this, but we have seen it, know it, and it's a great little primer to really help the academic institutes understand this is the kind of stuff that we need that makes you all much more in alignment with our requirements. So, you know, again, barring an additional law or something, that's the way we're attempting to help these smaller institutions to get through this, recognizing there are these caps on the indirects.

Yeah, I'm still concerned on how these caps will hurt, you know, our institutions and inhibit our ability to continue our global leadership in R&D, but I yield back.

Thank you. I now recognize Representative Baitch for five minutes of comments.

Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

I'm gonna start with Mr. Tilden. And before I begin, Mr. Tilden, I love the Christmas cheer. Thank you for bringing that sweater to the committee this morning. And a hat. I love it. I love it. But I wanna talk a little bit about foreign talent recruitment programs for a moment. And I wanna understand from your perspective To what degree do you believe that what we're actually seeing in our academic institutions is more related to technology transfer initiatives rather than academic collaboration? Because we hear so much on this committee and so many others that this is really about collaboration and we've got to make sure we're working with others around the world. And certainly we understand that. But what we also understand is that fact, in Many folks that are here in our nation are here under the guise of academic collaboration but are really engaged in technology transfer. Can you comment on that and then we'll just go down the line?

Yes, sir. First off, this is a great gray area question because it really is nuanced. The department first off was the leading agency to first prohibit any interaction with foreign talent programs. We actually identified some folks and had to deal with that. That is one of the things that we look for just like the entity lists. But it really does, and I agree with you, that certainly, as I think Dr. Foster mentioned, if 95% of the geniuses are not here, or not US-born, right, they're everywhere else and they come here, there's guaranteed a fraction of those that might be doing malign activities. But it does take an individual look. So we actually work with our R-TAS office, whether or not it's folks working on grants, folks working at the universities, and you.

You have to dig into it.

How many years ago were they involved? I mean, ultimately, if you're getting a higher education in China, it is very likely that you're going to have touched an entity. Does that mean you're now an agent of that entity? That's a really hard one to sort out. And this is why we have both an unclassified and a classified component for how we evaluate those foreign nationals coming here. So I hope that kind of gets at it a little bit.

Dr. Valdez?

Yes, so NIH funds approximately 300,000 researchers.

The vast majority of them are intent on doing good research with integrity, but we understand there are those bad actors. And, you know, we want to pay particular attention to those bad actors. And so we have processes in place where we can identify behaviors. And, you know, once those behaviors for.

Non-Disclosure, for example, are identified, then we.

Can work closely with the institution to determine, like, what next steps can happen. But I think it's definitely something that we are always thinking about. We, again, keep research and research security is at the top of our minds right now, so thank you.

I'm going to answer your question with a story. This is, for me, as a foreign-born researcher myself who stayed and chose to naturalize, place into the US. But I'm going to contrast my story with that of my office mate. 20 years ago, I secured very, very fortunately, my first postdoc at Harvard. And I shared an office mate with a Chinese guy. And he was working on incredibly benign research, you know, studying the spiral arms of the Milky Way. He's a scientist, not a spy. But years later, he actually went back to China, and he formed a very successful.

Successful tech company.

So in my assessment, this was not a malign foreign talent recruitment program, but it speaks to talent retention. So the issue wasn't so much that we trained him, it's that we lost him. And the long-term economic benefit of that US research investment was actually accrued to an overseas nation. That, I think, is just a pressing issue. And I think it's just as important as the malign programs as well. It's the leakage of talent after we train them in this country. I agree.

And the way that we are addressing these concerns is through a process that we've set up called the Trust Process, Trusted Research Using Safeguards and Transparency. Because we have to focus on this case-by-case, proposal-by-proposal risk that we see because it varies and we have to look at everyone individually to make sure that we take a careful look. So we look at non-disclosure, we look at associations with malign programs, we look at concerning and from a staffing perspective, Pearl, like I was talking about before, it goes beyond our office. It goes to a whole of agency approach. So we have research security representatives and all of our directorates to focus on exactly these issues, which are extremely important, including in Arctic research.

Thank you, and I appreciate the commentary here. I think what we can all agree on and fully recognize is that there is a gradient of activity from malign all the way to genuine academic collaboration. We need to we continue to make sure that the intellectual property assets that we're developing in this country remain in this country. And my time has expired. So with that, I yield back.

Thank you. With that, I recognize Representative Beyer from Virginia for five minutes of questions.

Mr. Chair McCormick, Ranking Member Sykes, thanks so much. I'd really like to extend my thanks to Chairman Babin and Ranking Member Lofgren for letting me back on the committee. I have eight wonderful years here. I'm so glad to be back, however, temporarily. And I'll do everything I can to advance American Dr. Kaiser, we share a Wellesley history. It's wonderful to see a Wellesley graduate in position of leadership. kind It's of my attention that National Science Foundation used a neural network tool to screen proposals to determine if they're aligned with the Trump priorities. And this is happening after those proposals were recommended for award by merit review panels. And I'm worried about, aside from compromising scientific integrity, If a tool like a neural network, a large language model, is not handled responsibly, this potentially puts proprietary information into the wrong hands. Can you talk about how you're managing the large neural networks overseeing these proposals?

We have, for many, many years, in addition to merit review, we have reviewed proposals and awards for compliance and for harmonization with agency priorities, with many other things, research security compliance, conflict of interest compliance, and many other things in addition to the merit review. And so when we did a review to ensure alignment with agency priorities, we had a multi-layered, multi-pronged approach. We used human beings. We did a multi-level approach that went all the way up to the Office of the Because we have 50,000 awards at NSF, the tool that you mentioned was one tool in the toolbox to help us with the assessment to then go through the human review that we did.

Thank you very much. Is this tool also used to filter proposals from universities who are on the.

Trump Administration's bad list? We do not have such a list. We look at proposals for exactly what we always have. We do the assessment through merit review of intellectual merit and broader impacts. Then our program officers do the additional review for portfolio balance and alignment with priorities and compliance with other requirements at NSF. And then it goes all the way up the chain, all the way to the Chief Science Officer for approval. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tilden, in your testimony, you mentioned DOE's core focuses on minimizing intellectual property loss, protecting supply chains, guarding national and economic security. And DOE has long been involved in semiconductor chips. And we've poured tens of billion dollars into the Chips and Science Act, where the Trump administration has been deeply involved in it. But going back and forth on the chips export policy. First, export restrictions and licensing requirements, then walking the back for certain things as long as a fee was paid, and then the Nvidia H200 chips to China. So this is both a national security issue and also a technological, logical prowess issue because clearly, from everything that we read, semiconductor chips are national security assets and they're critical to our advanced with technologies critical in the AI race with China. How does the current administration's policies and chip exports literally seed technological prowess in a way that walks back the progress achieved under the Chips and Science Act and under the the NSPM 33.

Boy, I was hoping you weren't going to ask me that one. So, fundamentally, any Export Control Act, any export control measure, if you will, is a function of policy and a decision. And so in this case, it's really well outside of my purview, if you will, to kind of comment on whether or not that decision about the Nvidia chips is a correct one.

Thank you for your honesty in addressing it, but I have to confess, for those of us deeply involved in the tech community, we're confused about why we have this massive race. And you talk to the Intel people and everything else that as long as the race to perfect AI is not a race to lose control, we don't want China to beat us.

And so.

It'S fascinating and difficult to understand this administration's decision to sell these top Nvidia chips. Dr. Kaiser, I only have 14 seconds left, but I am concerned about how, first of all, we're thrilled National Science Foundation is gonna stay in Alexandria. We're grateful that the HUD people are gonna not be in an 11-story garage.

Anymore.

On the other hand, the 55% cuts.

To the NSF are deeply concerning. And with that, I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Byron. Welcome back to the committee. It's great to have you. I'm going to address real quickly a question you had that I think I'm actually been very involved in the AI dissemination question. We actually sent a letter to open up the ability to sell our chips abroad because we felt like we wanted to be the industry standard. It's not we that were selling on your absolute leading edge chips, but that you don't want to be supplanted by Chinese chips, by Korean chips, by Japanese chips. We want to be the industry standard. If we allow other companies to produce and supplant us, we no longer lead the world in sales, in technology, and in the ability to reinvest in the advanced technologies. And I think that's the answer to Mr. Tilden's question, or actually the question to you, is that we don't want to be supplanted by saying we're not going to allow anybody else to have our We are the world standard of technology and we should remain that way. We will be supplanted if we have all the chips in America and nobody else gets to have them. We should be allowed to have a free market protecting the technologies that are important to go. I'm sorry, I'm taking my own time and I will, I just realized I have to recognize one more. I've read in a member, Mr. Herdapolis.

For five minutes of questioning.

Thank you.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Merry Christmas, everyone. Thanks for making the time for us this morning. It's a very important subject and I appreciate your candor and your responses. I'm going to ask the question of Dr. Kaiser on these if I could. How are we ensuring that institutions receiving these dollars are actually complying with those standards, not just certifying that they complied? What is that matrix, what kind of forensic accounting Honey, what do you do to make sure that they're actually complying, not just saying they are?

We have an active assessment process where we ensure compliance with disclosure and with all of the other research security components. We do this in conjunction and collaboration with our Office of Inspector General. And the evidence on how we've done this is through the actions that we've taken when we see noncompliance. We have taken actions on several institutions where we've seen noncompliance. Sometimes this is in collaboration with the Department of Justice where there are civil settlements on these institutions. Sometimes there are administrative actions against universities or against individual researchers when we see noncompliance as well. So we have many examples of this. We are concerned. We do take this extremely seriously.

That said, are there criminal elements to this as well and have there persons been prosecuted? We hear over and over that China or other nations have stolen technology. What are the criminal ramifications for the individuals who cross the line?

We were just talking about this amongst the panel because of course again we have so much wonderful interagency collaboration. Our concern is often what we're seeing is the theft of know-how, even pre-intellectual property, the theft of the knowledge of our researchers and the taking of that.

To China.

We had an example just last week where, and I think several others have as well, where an NSF-funded researcher, after they got the award, then they were approached by a PRC researcher saying, We now want to be added to your project. And we want an agreement on that project where we get to publish all the results. And of course the answer was no. And so our challenge here is that issues like that pre-IP in the basic fundamental research space are not covered by export control laws and not covered by other laws. Now we look forward to working with this committee and with others to address these issues because we have real issues in this pre-IP space that aren't covered by criminal.

Along.

I'll just reserve comment on it for now. Let me just ask Mr. Tilden if I could. I think a lot of us are intrigued by each of your answers today, but on this specific one, if you could do anything, one thing, to make sure we have this compliance, what weapon, for lack of a better term, would you like to have so that we are protecting our vital Of course, we want to share in the scientific knowledge when it's excellent for the general good, but what one thing would you do that we're not doing today, given your expertise and background?

So I'm not sure it's anything that we're not already doing today. We just have to keep going further so that ultimately, again, balancing the risks with the idea of attracting, I do wanted to emphasize a couple of things. It was mentioned before, and I'll say it again with a little more precision, Oftentimes these Chinese nationals and others, right, I know we're, I'm a little focused on China because I know that's where our head is right now, but it is others. Once they get to that doc and post-doc level, 83 to 85% of them stay in the US. Many of them continue on and become US citizens. And we are in strategic competition with China over intellectual capital, over worldwide intellectual capital. So one of the things that we could get after is again back to I think we've mentioned and we're all trying here is going back to academia. How do we help them better understand whether or not someone first comes into their ecosystem and is it an acceptable risk or is it we're not sure so maybe this person ought to be on different lines of work for now until we understand it better. Because oftentimes at least the DOE National in labs, that's where we bring them.

In at some point.

At some point we draw them out of academia because they've been here for 5, 10, 15 years. So that's an area that I think, and I think the universities, some are fantastic, some have fantastic programs, and others it's either not a priority or they're not funded for it.

I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity today and Merry Christmas.

Merry Christmas, good to have you here with us today. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questions. First of all, I want to recognize that we walk a fine line between talent and risk. When I was an associate professor at Georgia Tech, we had an investigation I helped the FBI with. Only as a associate professor could I actually get the information they needed because the FBI has so many limiting features to investigate these folks at universities, which is a problem. But it's also a real opportunity to poach the talent from around the rest of the world like we've been doing.

For decades.

Indeed, the reason we have the wealthiest man in the world is not just because he came from a foreign country, but he came to a country that actually exponentially magnified his talents and his abilities. I mean, quite frankly, as a guy who's on space and aeronautics and who really loves space and really loves AI, really loves advanced technology, and really, this has been my biggest learning curve as a guy who has an MBA, an MBA, this is my next PhD.

As a course here, I've had that.

Opportunity to kind of to look at.

What really makes us tick as a nation. You have a guy who now we've divested from space. We really have. I love NASA, but we're not doing what we used to do. We used to lead the world. Us and Russia, we're the only two people could put space spaceships up in outer space to get to the moon, to go anywhere. Now we have one man who puts more spaceships in outer space than every other nation combined. That's a huge parabola, that's a shift of not only capabilities, but real pools of money. And that came because somebody immigrated to the United States and then used this amazing texture of technologies and wealth to do what he's done. And that was all pre-political. And I just state that because it's not a political thing, it's about business. It's about the business of America. America is business and we need good immigration but we also need good security. So this is a tightrope we'll continue to walk for the rest of our lives. It's never going to go away. I understand that. It's interesting though, but you talked about the openness of 1958. Elon Musk famously said before he was, once again, this is several years ago, he said, I don't worry about patents. I've never sued anybody. The only reason I get patents is so people you can't keep me from.

Using my own technologies.

Because he knew if you were copying us, you're falling behind. That's why Russia fell behind us in the first place, 'cause they were copying us. So I'm not worried about people copying us, but I am worried about the intellectual property that we have in the leading edge technology. If we have somebody we're training or taking that technology before we've even employed it, that's what I'm really worried about securing. And I thought we've made brilliant comments today. I'm really excited about the future. I actually think this is a bipartisan issue that we can get our arms wrapped around. Will never be done. It doesn't matter who the President is, doesn't matter who the Chair is, doesn't matter who has the majority, this issue will follow us for the rest of our lives. We attract talent, we keep talent, we have to keep our secrets. It's pretty simple. Thank you for being a part of that, it's amazing. I just want to say that when you talk about the US and it's maintaining numerous lists of countries, companies, institutions and persons that the US is prohibiting from cooperating with our research, contracting and exporting. How should those lists be used to assess research skill? And that's the big question that we're asking right now. I'm going to quickly, I know we're running out of time and I got to stick to my own timeline. Dr. Kaiser, your testimony reflected the significant recent process. Why did NSF not issue comparable and enforceable guidance earlier following the NSPM-33 issue in 2018?

After the issuance of NSPM 33, we started immediately in coordinating and after that we issued the implementation guidance. So we did take action right away and we took action right away to issue prohibitions and start developing the common disclosure forms.

Very good. I also want to point out that it's interesting we were worried about following the law and having staffing and I understand we have shrunk.

Government during this administration.

I actually think that's a good thing. We need to be leaner, meaner, kind of like the Marines. Do more with less. That's okay. That means we do have to step up. We have to work harder. We have to be smart. We have to use the new tools, the AI that we have. Each one of you has specifically talked about your roles, and unfortunately, we're gonna run out of time in no time. So I don't have an opportunity for each one of you to speak more than you've already spoken. But I think you've pointed out how even though you have got you've gotten fewer people working for you, you are.

Doing a great job.

You are stepping up to the plate. You are accomplishing the mission. As a Marine, that's very near and dear to my heart, realizing that we can do better. And sometimes bigger government doesn't mean better government. And with that, I'd like to go ahead and do our closing statements. I thank you. I thank you so much for being here for your valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The record will remain open for 10 days for additional comments and written questions from the members. Blessings to everybody this special holiday season. This hearing is now adjourned.