“Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism, Part II: Assessing Federal Government Efforts”

[Gavel sounds.] The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come to order. Without objection, the chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point. The purpose of this hearing is to review federal efforts in preparing for and responding to threats facing our nation's food and agriculture sector. Without objection, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Eps, is permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions to the witnesses. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good afternoon and thank you for joining this subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology. Today, we have a federal panel of witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Department of Agriculture to discuss the federal government's efforts to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of agroterrorism. The subcommittee previously met on September to examine this threat, during which academic experts outlined the risk that agroterrorism poses to our food and agriculture system and its potential to destabilize the United States economy and agriculture supply chain. Terrorists who target our food supply have a variety of tools and methods at their disposal. They can directly target our agriculture by deploying chemical and biological agents, and as our critical infrastructure becomes increasingly connected, they could also carry out cyber attacks on technology that the farms depend on. Our adversaries, particularly the PRC, have also exploited research security gaps to steal the intellectual properties tied to agriculture technologies and genetically modified organisms. This theft could cause significant economic harm and raise concerns that these technologies could be manipulated or weaponized against U.S. crop systems. The reality of this threat was on full display last year when the Department of Justice charged three Chinese nationals with attempts to smuggle biological agents into the United States, agents capable of causing severe harm to crop and livestock. Any serious effort to prepare for these threats must begin with preventing deadly pathogens and harmful species from entering the country through our borders and ports of entry. I'm grateful to Customs and Border Protection work in detecting and intercepting these dangers, but prevention cannot stop at the border. We must also deny adversaries opportunities to position themselves inside the United States in ways that could facilitate harm. The PRC has acquired farmland across the United States, including land near critical infrastructure and sensitive military installations. This proximity creates vulnerabilities that could be exploited to surveil, disrupt, or compromise our food and agriculture systems, undermining prevention efforts long before threat is detected. Addressing these risks requires strong oversight, transparency, and coordination to ensure that our agriculture sectors do not become a staging ground for hostile activities. And even with strong prevention measures in place, we must be prepared for the possibility that these efforts could fail. It is important that the stakeholders and decision-makers across all levels of government and the private sector receive adequate training to detect, report, and respond to these threats. Equally important is robust information sharing across the national laboratories, government partners, and industries to enable rapid and effective responses. We saw the value of this partnership last week when law enforcement recovered and identified biological material from a lab in Las Vegas and sent it to the National Bioforensic Analysis Center for immediate analysis. That rapid response capability is essential to defending our homeland against biological threats, whether they originate from the criminal actors, terrorists, or hostile foreign adversaries. And this is exactly the type of capability we must sustain and strengthen, which is why I've led bipartisan efforts to improve DHS biodefense readiness and advance legislation to counter China's efforts to undermine our homeland security. I also applaud President Donald Trump and his administration for issuing the National Farm Security Action Plan to enhance our nation's preparedness for these dangers. This effort reflects the reality that the threat of agroterrorism is not just a possibility, it is real, evolving, and demands action across the federal government. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the steps they have taken to implement the proposals outlined in this plan, the challenges that they face, and opportunities to enhance collaboration among federal agencies. I also welcome any suggestions on how Congress can support these efforts. I thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today, and I hope their testimony will inspire a bipartisan effort to strengthen and defense against the significant threats. I now recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statement.

Good afternoon. Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I want to begin by saying that I appreciate the chairman for bringing officials from the administration before this subcommittee. I want to see more of these hearings with administration witnesses in the future. I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the greatest threat to our nation currently, and with all due respect to our witnesses, it is not agroterrorism. We're seeing a Department of Homeland Security that's killing our own citizens, terrorizing communities, ignoring court orders, rejecting due process, and advancing an extreme immigration enforcement agenda that's stoking fear, creating chaos, and degrading our democratic institutions. The Trump administration's also dismantling FEMA before our eyes, refusing to distribute critical counterterrorism grant funding, and moving forward with plans to cut half of FEMA's workforce. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I sent a letter to your office to formally request that this subcommittee turns its focus to FEMA issues, including delays in preparedness and counterterrorism grants, workforce challenges, and areas for improvement in disaster recovery. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this letter into the record.

Without objection.

Thank you. Last year, I introduced a bill, H.R. 6507, the Department of Homeland Security Grants Accountability Act, which would require increased transparency and oversight of FEMA's counterterrorism grant programs, and I hope that's something we'll have an opportunity to discuss on this subcommittee in the coming months. Turning to today's hearing, I agree that our nation must strengthen its biodefense, including better preparing for potential attacks on our agricultural systems. This includes ensuring that we have enough agriculture specialists at our borders to detect harmful pathogens, investing in research and development at U.S. institutions through USDA, and strengthening our supply chains to ensure they're resilient against potential bad actors. But the way to do this is not by closing the Department of Homeland Security's Centers of Excellence or freezing funding for USDA university partnerships, including those that directly support agrosecurity. One of these closed Centers of Excellence directly supported agrosecurity by researching and educating federal partners on how to detect and eliminate biological threats that cross our borders. And in my home state of New York, the administration halted funding for Cornell University's Animal Health Diagnostic Center, which tests livestock for diseases that could devastate agricultural sectors and our economy. This significantly impacts their ability to survey for high-consequence animal diseases. All of that to say, the chairman and I are in full agreement that we must strengthen our nation's capabilities against threats of agroterrorism, whether they be foreign or domestic, and I believe we do so by bolstering federal investment and resources rather than gutting them. This also means ensuring our customs facilitators have the resources needed to survey biological threats. I have four bridges in my district in Western New York into Canada. I represent some of CBP's agriculture specialists who report to work at U.S. ports of entry and contribute every single day to our collective biosecurity. So I understand the importance of ensuring our nation is hardened against any biological threats, and I appreciate the chairman's work in this space. I want to thank our witnesses for participating in today's hearing, and I look forward to your testimony as we assess DHS and USDA's preparedness in keeping our community safe. I yield back.

Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy. Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. I'm very pleased to have such an important panel of witnesses before us today. Ms. Suzette Kelly is the Deputy Executive Director of Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison for the CBP's Office of Field Operations at DHS. In this role, Ms. Kelly provides leadership and expertise while guiding collaboration and partnerships to safeguard our agriculture and nation's food supply. Mr. Matt Allen is the Director of the Office of Homeland Security for the United States Department of Agriculture. He has served in this capacity since 2020 and oversees department-wide efforts in radiation safety, emergency programs, personnel and document security, national security programs and policies, communication security, and operations sustainment. Mr. Jeff Cooper serves as program manager for DHS Science and Technology Directorate's PANTHER program. PANTHER provides technical information on CBRN hazards to help leaders make informed decisions on preparedness and response to weapons of mass destruction events. Dr. Ashley Grant is the Senior Health Security and Biodefense Advisor in DHS's Office of Health Security, which leads DHS's effort in medical, workforce health and safety, and public health. In this role, Dr. Grant helps to mitigate the impact of biological threats. I thank y'all again for being here today. Pursuant to the committee's rule 8C, I ask that the witnesses please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee of Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

I do.

I do.

I do.

I do.

Thank you. Please be seated. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. I now recognize Ms. Kelly for five minutes to summarize her opening statement.

Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's role in protecting the United States from agroterrorism and biological threats. I am honored to represent CBP's Office of Field Operations, Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison. Every day, our frontline personnel work tirelessly to safeguard American agriculture, natural resources, and our communities by preventing the introduction and spread of dangerous pests, animal diseases, and biological agents. Agricultural and biological materials, including animal products, genetic materials, and infectious substances, are routine imports that sustain our food supply and support scientific research and medical advancements. However, these imports also pose significant risks. The accidental or deliberate introduction of a pest, pathogen, or disease could have significant adverse effects on domestic agriculture and natural resources. For example, CBP recently intercepted illicit shipments from the People's Republic of China sent to U.S. researchers at academic institutions. These shipments contained a dangerous fungal pathogen, harmful genetic materials, and E. coli concealed to evade CBP detection and circumvent U.S. laws. To mitigate these types of threats, CBP integrates agriculture inspection into its multi-layered border security strategy that includes highly trained personnel, advanced targeting and detection capabilities, and close collaboration with federal partners and industry stakeholders. Using their scientific and law enforcement expertise, agriculture specialists work alongside CBP officers and trade specialists to process and inspect millions of shipments and traveler luggage at air, sea, and land ports of entry. The work we do is vital. In fiscal year 2025 alone, CBP agriculture specialists interdicted approximately 1.7 million prohibited plant materials, animal byproducts, and meat items. They also intercepted more than 100,000 actionable pests identified as potentially dangerous to U.S. agriculture. Recognizing the complexity of agroterrorism and biological threats, CBP established the Biological Threat Exclusion Program to strengthen our efforts and ensure a consistent approach across the agency. Early detection of threats is essential. At the CBP National Targeting Center, agriculture specialists use advanced data systems to identify high-risk travelers and shipments before they arrive at our borders. Our specialized detection capabilities deployed to ports of entry further enhance our efforts. For example, our agriculture canine teams screen luggage and cargo for prohibited items quickly and effectively. CBP is also expanding its use of mobile technology, enabling remote inspections, real-time cargo release, by enhancing efficiency and enforcement. Collaboration is essential to our approach. CBP enforces laws on behalf of dozens of federal entities and works closely with partners such as Department of Agriculture, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These partnerships enable coordinated responses to emerging threats. In closing, CBP's agriculture inspection capabilities are a critical component of our nation's defense against agroterrorism and biological threats. Working in coordination with our partners, we will continue to identify and intercept these threats, protect our national and economic security, preserve our agricultural resources, and safeguard our communities. Thank you for your continued support of CBP's mission. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Ms. Kelly. I recognize Mr. Allen for five minutes to summarize his opening statement.

Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I have the privilege of leading the USDA Office of Homeland Security. The office coordinates across the department to mitigate risk, provide safeguards to USDA personnel and information by leading government-wide initiatives and championing USDA's equities in homeland and national security. I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important topics with you today. As you know, agriculture contributes over $1.5 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product each year. It underpins our society and is one of the most important pillars that feeds, fuels, and clothes the entire world. This past summer, the department launched the National Farm Security Action Plan, a first-of-its-kind comprehensive strategy to acknowledge agriculture as a key pillar of national security. The plan focuses on protecting U.S. farmland from foreign adversaries, strengthening food supply chains, ending fraud in nutrition programs, safeguarding plant and animal health, and bolstering research security. The National Farm Security Action Plan enables USDA to begin this critical work to address the imperative for agriculture security in America. The action plan serves as a launching point for USDA to work in continued unison with government and other partners to fully integrate agriculture into a broader national security enterprise. Continuing the implementation of the plan in January, USDA launched a new online portal to streamline the reporting of transactions involving U.S. agriculture land by foreign persons under the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, or AFIDA. The new online portal is a broader effort to strengthen the AFIDA of enforcement and protect American farmland. We enjoy a strong working relationship with our partners across USDA and the U.S. interagency. With USDA's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, which is the department's lead under the National Response Framework Emergency Support Function 11 for safeguarding animal and plant health, provide critical connections to threat intelligence resources, which APHIS uses to mitigate operational and strategic risk. As the committee is likely aware, we're facing the threat of the northward creep of the New World screwworm towards our border that poses a potential risk to livestock industry and pets. While we've not seen indications of intentional spread, there is well-recognized involvement of cartels, designated as foreign terrorist organizations, in transboundary cattle smuggling that is likely exacerbating the problem. The ongoing security situation south of the border also complicates effective control, pest surveillance in places personnel responsible for addressing this pest at risk. I present this as an example to highlight the complexity of our global connected agriculture supply chains and emphasize risk present in this critical infrastructure sector. OHS works hand-in-hand with both USDA agencies like APHIS and federal partners to include CBP to ensure that we have the best and most up-to-date information for strategic decision-making. As just mentioned, we collaborate with the FBI and CBP on many to identify threats of suspected acts of agroterrorism. Just a few months ago, Director Kash Patel of the FBI commented on the recent Michigan case involving foreign graduate students who illicitly brought Fusarium, an agriculture pathogen, into the United States as a persistent and enduring threat. U.S. agriculture and American farmers are faced with this and many other persistent enduring threats. Our department leans on our partners to assist us in investigating and remedying these issues, and that's why I'm delighted to have our colleagues from DHS here with us today. They have abundant authorities, resources, and personnel to assist us in detecting, defending the most tenacious threats to U.S. agriculture, the economy, and national security. Those situations in Michigan underscore the importance of knowing that federally funded agriculture research and development is being done in conjunction with trusted partners. Just this morning, USDA announced the creation of an office dedicated to enhancing research security within USDA, continuing to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 and educate USDA partners of why research security matters. It is easy to forget that the food on our plates, the clothes on our backs, the warmth of our fires are all predicated on somewhere, somehow transforming living or once-living things into something that sustains us as individuals, families, communities, and a nation. The foundational place of agriculture in our overall well-being as American people and, perhaps more importantly, the source for might in the nation cannot be understated. Safeguarding agriculture is something we take very seriously at the department. Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you again for holding this hearing, the opportunity to testify on this important topic. I would also like to thank my colleagues that are joining me today, our partners in the interagency, as this is a whole-of-government effort. None of us could do this independently, so our continued cooperation and collaboration is essential, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Allen. I now recognize Mr. Cooper for his five minutes to summarize his opening statement.

Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate. The risks to the food and agricultural sector and supply chain are varied and serious. The nation's food and agricultural systems are designated critical infrastructure, and the disruption, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or intentional, can result in cascading impacts to public health, economic stability, and confidence in the government. As global supply chains become more interconnected, they become increasingly vulnerable to biological threats, and understanding and managing these potential risks is more important than ever. DHS has the federal authority to assess and manage threats to critical infrastructure, serving as a coordinator for the whole-of-government effort that includes all levels of government and industry owners and operators. Within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate that supports this mission by providing technical threat analysis, risk analysis, and decision support to inform preparedness and response efforts across the homeland security enterprise. Under National Security Memorandum 16, DHS was tasked with conducting risk assessments related to threat against the food and agriculture. Working in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human Services and others, DHS's role is to ensure that leaders at the federal, state, and local levels have clear, science-based understanding of the threats they face, the potential consequences of those threats, and the tradeoffs associated with different preparedness and response options. S&T contributes to DHS's risk assessment mission by delivering technically defensible analysis and user tools to help decision-makers prioritize actions and resources. One way that S&T executes this mission is through the Probabilistic Analysis of National Threats, Hazards, and Risks program, or PANTHER. PANTHER provides analytical capabilities that integrate threat information, hazard data, and consequence modeling to support risk-informed decision-making across chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber threat areas. These capabilities are designed to inform policy and operations, not to execute or set them. Rather, they help answer fundamental questions decision-makers face, including which threats pose the greatest risk, where vulnerabilities exist, and where investments can most effectively reduce that risk. Risks to the food and agricultural system are complex. They vary by agent, commodity, geography, and response capacity, and the consequences of disruption can extend well beyond the agricultural sector. Through PANTHER, S&T develops and applies risk and computational analytics that support strategic, operational, and tactical planning. These efforts help decision-makers to compare risks across various scenarios and assess how different interventions may reduce the likelihood or consequences of those events. Risk assessments depend on reliable data. For many agricultural threat agents, including emerging and re-emerging diseases, experimental data is limited or incomplete. To address this gap, S&T also conducts the Agricultural Threat Characterization Research project that examines properties and impacts of biological threats relevant to agricultural, such as high pathogenic avian influenza and African swine fever. This research produces science-based knowledge products that inform hazard awareness, analytical modeling, and preparedness planning. In addition to analysis and threat characterization, S&T conducts applied research and development to inform future capabilities and enhance agricultural biosecurity. This includes work to improve screening and sensing technologies at ports of entry, as well as methodologies and decision support tools for depopulation, disposal, and decontamination. These efforts are designed to inform capability development and transition to our operational partners, such as USDA and CBP. S&T works closely with DHS components and interagency partners, including the Department of Agriculture, to ensure analytical capabilities address real-world needs. Through tailored analysis, reach-back support, and scenario development, S&T provides decision support to planning, exercises, and preparedness activities. S&T supports the USDA's National Farm Security Action Plan by providing the technical risk assessment framework needed to inform sound policy and operational decisions. In this way, S&T's contributions align with DHS's responsibilities under the National Security Memorandum 16 and complement USDA's leadership on agricultural policy, compliance, and enforcement. The Science and Technology Directorate is committed to helping the nation understand and manage these risks to the food and agricultural sector through rigorous, science-based analysis and decision support. These complex risks require disciplined coordination across federal, state, and local partners, and with continued support from Congress, S&T will continue to provide the analytical foundation that informs preparedness and protects the American people, our food supply, and our economy. Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to testify before you today. Thank you for your support of the Science and Technology Directorate. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Cooper. I now recognize Dr. Grant for five minutes to summarize her opening statement. Dr. Grant.

Thank you so much, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'm honored to be here to speak today about the Department of Homeland Security's effort to defend against agroterrorism and other biological threats. I've spent my entire career focused on trying to make sure our nation is better prepared for biological incidents. As the Senior Health Security and Biodefense Advisor at the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Health Security, I am honored to share our approach to protecting America's food and agriculture sector. Advances in biotechnology as well as artificial intelligence have made it easier for nefarious actors to develop and deploy biological agents that could devastate our crops, livestock, and food production. These threats jeopardize not only economic stability but also our national security. At DHS, we recognize that farm security is national security, along with USDA. The Office of Health Security leads and coordinates efforts across the department to protect our nation's food and agriculture sector from high-consequence threats. Our mission is rooted in statutory responsibility and key directives, including the Securing Our Agricultural and Food Act. We oversee activities related to the department's food defense, agriculture security, and lead policy initiatives for preparedness, detection, and response. Today, I will cover four core areas of our work. First, coordination and policy leadership. The Office of Health Security works closely with DHS components, such as Customs and Border Protection, as well as the Science and Technology Directorate. We also coordinate with our interagency partners, such as USDA as well as the Health and Human Services. Together, we ensure that DHS and the United States government efforts are unified, efficient, and responsive to evolving threats. Second, risk assessment and intelligence integration. The Office of Health Security partners with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to assess risk to our food and agriculture sector. We integrate technical threat analysis and risk modeling with policy and operational planning. A key element of our support to health analysts embedded in state and local fusion centers nationwide. These analysts gather and disseminate health security information, ensuring actionable intelligence reaches decision-makers and frontline responders. Third, preparedness, exercises, and training. The Office of Health Security designs and executes complex exercises... ...to test and strengthen our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats. For example, last month, we held a complex exercise, tabletop exercise down in El Paso, Texas. This exercise focused on a potential New World screwworm incursion in the United States through three different mechanisms: One, through illicit cattle trading; two, through our livestock; and a potential human case. This is a severe pest that can affect our economy as well as our livestock. The exercise brought over 250 participants from federal, state, local, county, tribal, different agencies and highlighted the importance of an integrated response and identified gaps in planning and capability. Our fourth core function is innovation and continuous improvement. The Office of Health Security invests in data analytics and technology solutions to enhance early warning, detection, and response. Early detection and rapid response is critical to making sure we are prepared for threats to our food and agriculture. Through initiatives like the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks, we are advancing our collaborative ability to prepare for and mitigate from emerging threats. In conclusion, threats against our food and agriculture sector are significant and evolving. DHS, the Office of Health Security, and our partners are committed to safeguarding the nation's food and agriculture system through collaboration, innovation, and readiness. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Dr. Grant. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their five minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning may be called after all members have been recognized. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. The actions of agroterrorism could become even more dangerous if they had access to farmland near U.S. military bases. Redstone Arsenal is in my district and I understand firsthand the threat this could pose to our service members and our homeland security. This is why I'm concerned by a 2024 GAO report which found gaps in federal reporting requirements that could allow it to happen. Fortunately, the Trump administration's National Farm Security Action Plan has called for stronger USDA reporting and disclosure requirements for foreign farmland purchases near military bases and other sensitive sites. Mr. Allen, how is the USDA seeking to implement the National Farm Security Action Plan's proposal to tighten these reporting requirements and what steps has the department taken so far?

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question and your support of this. Right now, the department is in the process of moving the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act program from the Farm Production and Conservation mission area to my office to have a more national security focus. Also, as I mentioned, in January, we opened an online portal that will have as a database getting us away from the 1978 paper-based process to modernize the AFIDA system. We have also issued at the end of last calendar year an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to update the form, the process of the entire program to gather more pertinent information than we have in the past to share with our partners, especially at Homeland Security, Department of War, and the Treasury to integrate with the CFIUS process.

Thank you. Switching gears, Ms. Kelly, CBP plays an important role at our nation's borders and ports of entry to detect and intercept harmful pathogens and biological materials from entering our nation. How have malign foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities at ports of entry to introduce threats to our nation's agriculture and how can CBP harden its screening of these materials?

Thank you for the question, Chairman. What we've seen, not even specific to one particular pathway but across many of the pathways where we are continuing to harden our processes, are these numerous artful attempts to evade our detection capabilities. We're seeing varying levels of concealment practices such as utilizing public media, comic books to obfuscate the presence of biological material. We're also observing that there are attempts to transport these materials on their person or hidden into personal items such as bedroom slippers. To ensure that we continue to advance our inspection capabilities, we are launching efforts to modernize our infrastructure, we're making strategic investments in our non-intrusive inspection technology, and we are also working with the industry to ensure that there is sustained awareness of biological threats and the numerous attempts by which individuals and malicious actors may attempt to introduce these items.

Thank you. Turning to Mr. Cooper, the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, also known as NBACC, is a DHS Science and Technology operated national laboratory. Through its two centers, NBACC provides expertise to help DHS understand biological threats and the capabilities of our adversaries. As I mentioned earlier, recent news reports indicated that the unidentified biological samples from an incident in Las Vegas were sent to the center for testing. Mr. Cooper, what is the scale and scope of NBACC's cooperation with law enforcement and how does this partnership support DHS's mission?

Chairman, thank you for that question. So as you mentioned, S&T does own and operate the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, NBACC. The forensics center, however, is operated by the FBI. So I would defer to my FBI colleagues on how they are participating in the investigation and supporting the state and locals for that. S&T's role is to ensure the facility has the necessary capabilities in order for the FBI to pursue its investigations.

Thank you. My time has expired. I now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy, for five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Chairman. Our nation's ability to recover from some of the most significant emergencies is largely thanks to one agency, FEMA. For example, during COVID-19, FEMA led the nation's pandemic response efforts, distributing personal protective equipment, ventilators, and testing supplies across the country. If a large-scale agroterrorism attack occurred, FEMA's resources and authorities would be indispensable for minimizing human casualties and economic impacts. However, Trump and Secretary Noem have both stated they want to completely get rid of FEMA. As of just days ago, there are credible reports that Secretary Noem is planning to cut FEMA's remaining workforce in half. So Dr. Grant, as a senior advisor for DHS office responsible for mitigating the impact of biological threats, do you believe that gutting FEMA's workforce improves our nation's ability to respond to a large-scale agroterrorism attack or not?

Thank you for your question, Ranking Member Kennedy. I believe there's an important mission of FEMA, including the different missions that you described. I think our office works across not only industry but also across the department to make sure that we're prepared as we can be for agricultural terrorism threats. I would have to get with our FEMA representatives to talk about specific grants that you brought up in terms of cutting, so we can take that as a get-back to answer your question about the specific grants you're referring to.

If FEMA employees were cut in half, basically gutting the agency, do you believe that that would have a negative impact on your ability to do your work?

Again, I'm not really sure. So in terms of the impact that FEMA can have, we work with them on annexes as well as other documents, but not directly in terms of responding to different incidents like this.

Would a drastic workforce reduction at FEMA compromise the Office of Health Security's ability to protect American people from the impacts of a biological attack?

I believe that we should take that back and get with our colleagues at DHS to look at the complete impact that could have across our department.

Thank you. Ms. Kelly, I represent, as I mentioned earlier, a northern border community in Western New York. The over 200 agricultural specialists who work at our ports of entry are essential in ensuring inbound goods crossing our northern border are free of dangerous pathogens as you have testified today. What are some of the unique challenges that these agricultural specialists face at the northern border?

Thank you. The evolving threat landscape is, I would offer, not specific to a region or a particular port, and that is because of the movement of trade. The complexity of this landscape are taken into consideration, certainly the trade and travel industry and that specific characterization of movement, but also the way in which an agricultural threat may impact the specific sector. As we look at a more granular level such as the ports, then staffing levels, detection capabilities, infrastructure, all of these varying factors may characterize the complexity of that specific landscape.

Thank you. I understand the CBP port of Buffalo has a biological threat operations specialist. Will Buffalo receive a biological threat exclusion coordinator anytime soon?

Thank you for that question as well. We're very excited about the biological threat exclusion program and really appreciate the support of the program from Congress as well. With regards to our staffing models, they're informed by our resource allocation and workforce staffing models, which predict and take into consideration the type of operational needs. Whether a particular port may have a threat exclusion coordinator or threat operations specialist is strictly determined, or the decision I should say is informed by our staffing models.

Understood. Ms. Kelly, are there gaps in current federal law that could improve biosurveillance in our northern ports of entry?

There are certainly opportunities for the regulations to be updated to ensure that we can continue to deliver our mission and execute in an efficient and effective manner. Regulations that encourage accountability with regards to information sharing and collection can certainly ensure that we continue to make robust decisions at the ports of entry.

I'm out of time, Chairman. If I could just add, Ms. Kelly, if there are opportunities for you to inform myself and the Chairman of legislation that could in fact improve this biosurveillance, we are open to that. Thank you.

Ranking member's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. Thank you to the Trump administration and your work to keep our country safe. The food and agriculture sector is one of America's 16 designated critical infrastructure sectors. Because nearly 95 percent of U.S. farms are family-owned operations, our farmers are especially vulnerable and an attack can rapidly cascade from farms to processors, distributors, and ultimately to grocery shelves nationwide. Agroterrorism isn't just an abstract threat. It is the deliberate introduction of plant or animal pathogens to cause economic damage, food shortages, panic, and strategic disruption. We know this threat is real because agriculture is biologically vulnerable. Many high-consequence livestock diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease, do not occur in the United States today. That means our herds lack natural immunity and an outbreak could spread rapidly before detection. USDA has estimated that a major foot-and-mouth disease outbreak could cost the United States tens of billions of dollars in economic losses, devastate exports, and require the mass culling of animals to contain spread. A pathogen does not need to be weaponized in a sophisticated lab to cause catastrophic damage. It only needs to be introduced into a dense livestock or processing environment. The modern threat environment compounds this risk. Terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations, or state-linked actors could attempt to smuggle pathogens through ports of entry, mail systems, research collaborations, or contaminated feed and biological materials. Agriculture is uniquely exposed because farms are geographically dispersed, biosecurity practices vary, and the supply chain depends on continuous movement of animals, feed, and products. A coordinated biological attack on livestock or crops could simultaneously trigger food shortages, economic shock, and strain on military logistics, particularly in districts like mine that host Fort Campbell. This is why the Trump administration's National Farm Security Action Plan is so important. It recognizes that preparedness is paramount. It requires robust biosurveillance, real-time data sharing between USDA, DHS, FBI, and state officials, strong screening at ports of entry, laboratory capacity for rapid pathogen identification, and joint exercises that simulate deliberate biological introduction. If an adversary wants to undermine the United States without firing a shot, targeting our food supply is a strategic pathway. We cannot afford to treat that risk as secondary. Ms. Kelly, what screening protocols are in place at ports of entry to detect intentionally concealed livestock or crop pathogens and how do those protocols differ from routine inspections designed to catch accidental pest or food violations?

Thank you for the question. Our capabilities start really at the National Targeting Center where we are harmonizing our law enforcement data holdings with information that is collected and or provided by our partners at the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service, excuse me. This information is then shared with our frontline personnel to ensure that we can continue to strike the balance between facilitating trade and enforcing import regulations in a manner in which we can deliver meaningful consequences as well. With regards to malicious attempts, we have varying levels of operational policies and interagency agreements with several of our internal and external partners. These policies are underpinned by the National Incident Management System as well as the National Response Framework.

Thank you. Dr. Grant, when DHS or FBI identifies credible intelligence suggesting an adversary may target U.S. agriculture, how quickly does that information translate into heightened inspection posture at ports of entry?

Thank you so much for that question. We work with our CBP colleagues through the National Targeting Center to disseminate that information to them. In addition, we would work with our state and locals through our health fusion centers to disseminate that information to the localities. So through those both mechanisms, we would get that information to the people that need it.

Great. Thank you. This is both for Mr. Allen and Ms. Kelly. How are federal agencies ensuring that state agriculture departments and producers receive timely threat intelligence without creating unnecessary alarm?

Thank you for the question, sir. Our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service through our National Veterinary Office works directly with state departments of agriculture to pass information on a regular and timely basis, including just last week we had the national state directors of agriculture here in D.C. and had days of face-to-face meetings with them.

Great. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time, so I yield back.

I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.