Key Takeaways
- •USDA launched an online portal to streamline reporting of foreign agricultural land purchases and created an office to enhance research security, implementing the National Farm Security Action Plan.
- •Suzette Kelly (CBP) detailed how malign actors use concealment methods like comic books and personal items to smuggle biological materials, necessitating advanced detection and infrastructure modernization.
- •Rep. Kennedy (D-NY) pressed Dr. Grant (DHS) on whether proposed FEMA workforce cuts would negatively impact DHS's ability to respond to large-scale agroterrorism attacks.
- •Republicans praised the Trump administration's National Farm Security Action Plan, while Democrats criticized its alleged dismantling of FEMA and cuts to agrosecurity funding.
- •Federal agencies will continue implementing the National Farm Security Action Plan, focusing on enhanced border screening, interagency coordination, and updating regulations to counter evolving agroterrorism threats.
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Hearing Analysis
Overview
On February 11, 2026, the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology held a hearing titled “Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism, Part II: Assessing Federal Government Efforts.” This session followed a previous hearing that established the theoretical risks of agroterrorism, shifting the focus toward the current federal response and the implementation of the National Farm Security Action Plan. Chairman Dale Strong (R-AL-5) convened the hearing to examine how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) coordinate to protect the nation’s $1.5 trillion agriculture sector from biological, chemical, and cyber threats.
The hearing focused heavily on the threat posed by foreign adversaries, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Chairman Strong and several witnesses highlighted recent attempts by Chinese nationals to smuggle biological agents, such as Fusarium and E. coli, into the United States. The committee also explored the vulnerabilities created by foreign ownership of American farmland, especially land located near sensitive military installations like Redstone Arsenal. Witnesses emphasized that agroterrorism is not merely a theoretical concern but a persistent threat capable of destabilizing the U.S. economy and food supply chain.
Key Testimony
Suzette Kelly, Deputy Executive Director of Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison at U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), testified regarding the frontline defense at ports of entry. She reported that in fiscal year 2025, CBP interdicted 1.7 million prohibited plant and animal materials and intercepted over 100,000 actionable pests. Kelly detailed the Biological Threat Exclusion Program and the use of the National Targeting Center to identify high-risk shipments before they reach the border. She noted that bad actors are increasingly using "artful" concealment methods, such as hiding pathogens in comic books or personal items like slippers, to evade detection.
Matt Allen, Director of the USDA Office of Homeland Security, discussed the implementation of the National Farm Security Action Plan. A major component of this plan is the modernization of the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA). Allen announced that the USDA recently launched an online portal to replace a paper-based system from 1978, allowing for better tracking of foreign land acquisitions. He also highlighted the "northward creep" of the New World screwworm and the involvement of Mexican cartels in transboundary cattle smuggling as significant biosecurity risks. Furthermore, Allen noted the creation of a new USDA office dedicated to research security to prevent the theft of intellectual property related to genetically modified organisms and other agricultural technologies.
Organizations & Entities
Technical and analytical support was addressed by Jeff Cooper, Program Manager for the PANTHER program within the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. Cooper explained how the PANTHER program uses probabilistic analysis to help decision-makers understand the tradeoffs of different response options for high-consequence diseases like African swine fever and highly pathogenic avian influenza. He also clarified the role of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), noting that while DHS operates the facility, the FBI manages the forensic investigations conducted there, such as the recent analysis of biological material recovered in Las Vegas.
Dr. Ashley Grant, Senior Health Security and Biodefense Advisor at the DHS Office of Health Security, emphasized the importance of interagency exercises. She cited a recent tabletop exercise in El Paso, Texas, which simulated a New World screwworm incursion involving illicit cattle trading and human infection. Dr. Grant argued that such exercises are vital for identifying gaps in the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks and ensuring that state, local, and tribal partners are integrated into the federal response framework.
Overview
Partisan dynamics were evident throughout the hearing. While both parties agreed on the necessity of protecting the food supply, Ranking Member Timothy Kennedy (D-NY-26) used his platform to criticize the Trump administration’s broader DHS policies. He expressed concern over reported plans to cut the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) workforce in half and the closure of DHS Centers of Excellence. Kennedy argued that gutting FEMA and freezing funding for university partnerships, such as Cornell University’s Animal Health Diagnostic Center, undermined the very biosecurity goals the subcommittee sought to achieve. He specifically promoted H.R. 6507, the Department of Homeland Security Grants Accountability Act, to increase transparency in counterterrorism funding.
Organizations & Entities
Notable exchanges occurred when Rep. Kennedy questioned Dr. Grant on whether a 50% reduction in FEMA staff would compromise the nation's ability to respond to a biological attack. Dr. Grant declined to speculate on specific personnel cuts, stating she would need to consult with FEMA colleagues. Rep. Gabe Evans (R-CO-8) focused his questioning on the speed of information sharing, asking how quickly intelligence from the FBI or DHS translates into heightened inspections at the border. Witnesses confirmed that the National Targeting Center serves as the primary hub for this rapid dissemination of threat data.
Key Testimony
The hearing concluded with a consensus on the need for continued modernization of detection technology and better transparency regarding foreign land holdings. Chairman Strong indicated that the subcommittee would continue its oversight of the National Farm Security Action Plan, while Ranking Member Kennedy requested future hearings specifically focused on FEMA’s preparedness and workforce challenges. The record remained open for ten days for additional written testimony and follow-up questions regarding biosurveillance regulations and grant funding.
Transcript
[Gavel sounds.] The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come to order. Without objection, the chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point. The purpose of this hearing is to review federal efforts in preparing for and responding to threats facing our nation's food and agriculture sector. Without objection, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Eps, is permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions to the witnesses. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good afternoon and thank you for joining this subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology. Today, we have a federal panel of witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Department of Agriculture to discuss the federal government's efforts to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of agroterrorism. The subcommittee previously met on September to examine this threat, during which academic experts outlined the risk that agroterrorism poses to our food and agriculture system and its potential to destabilize the United States economy and agriculture supply chain. Terrorists who target our food supply have a variety of tools and methods at their disposal. They can directly target our agriculture by deploying chemical and biological agents, and as our critical infrastructure becomes increasingly connected, they could also carry out cyber attacks on technology that the farms depend on. Our adversaries, particularly the PRC, have also exploited research security gaps to steal the intellectual properties tied to agriculture technologies and genetically modified organisms. This theft could cause significant economic harm and raise concerns that these technologies could be manipulated or weaponized against U.S. crop systems. The reality of this threat was on full display last year when the Department of Justice charged three Chinese nationals with attempts to smuggle biological agents into the United States, agents capable of causing severe harm to crop and livestock. Any serious effort to prepare for these threats must begin with preventing deadly pathogens and harmful species from entering the country through our borders and ports of entry. I'm grateful to Customs and Border Protection work in detecting and intercepting these dangers, but prevention cannot stop at the border. We must also deny adversaries opportunities to position themselves inside the United States in ways that could facilitate harm. The PRC has acquired farmland across the United States, including land near critical infrastructure and sensitive military installations. This proximity creates vulnerabilities that could be exploited to surveil, disrupt, or compromise our food and agriculture systems, undermining prevention efforts long before threat is detected. Addressing these risks requires strong oversight, transparency, and coordination to ensure that our agriculture sectors do not become a staging ground for hostile activities. And even with strong prevention measures in place, we must be prepared for the possibility that these efforts could fail. It is important that the stakeholders and decision-makers across all levels of government and the private sector receive adequate training to detect, report, and respond to these threats. Equally important is robust information sharing across the national laboratories, government partners, and industries to enable rapid and effective responses. We saw the value of this partnership last week when law enforcement recovered and identified biological material from a lab in Las Vegas and sent it to the National Bioforensic Analysis Center for immediate analysis. That rapid response capability is essential to defending our homeland against biological threats, whether they originate from the criminal actors, terrorists, or hostile foreign adversaries. And this is exactly the type of capability we must sustain and strengthen, which is why I've led bipartisan efforts to improve DHS biodefense readiness and advance legislation to counter China's efforts to undermine our homeland security. I also applaud President Donald Trump and his administration for issuing the National Farm Security Action Plan to enhance our nation's preparedness for these dangers. This effort reflects the reality that the threat of agroterrorism is not just a possibility, it is real, evolving, and demands action across the federal government. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the steps they have taken to implement the proposals outlined in this plan, the challenges that they face, and opportunities to enhance collaboration among federal agencies. I also welcome any suggestions on how Congress can support these efforts. I thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today, and I hope their testimony will inspire a bipartisan effort to strengthen and defense against the significant threats. I now recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statement.
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