V-22 Program Update

...identified long-standing mechanical reliability issues, particularly in the drivetrain, as well as high maintenance demands, parts shortages, and challenges in sustainment and data use. Both reviews also underscored the importance of disciplined risk management and clear communication across the Joint Program Office and the services. We must put these challenges into perspective. Operators still have missions, and these material issues have contributed to low mission-capable rates across the fleet. As the department approaches the end of V-22 production, it is essential that ongoing reliability upgrades and sustainment reforms are fully implemented and sustained. The men and women who fly and maintain this aircraft deserve confidence that safety remains a top priority, and we need these aircraft for operational requirements. We appreciate our witnesses joining us here today and look forward to their testimony as we continue our oversight of this important program. I'd like it to turn it over to Ranking Member Joe Courtney of the Seapower and Projection Forces next.

Kelly and Chairman Bergman, who's joined us for organizing today's hearing. Thank you to Admiral Dougherty, General Walsh, and Ms. Moldafsky for joining us to discuss this urgent issue that pertains to the safety of our warfighters and the need for a platform that can transport troops and equipment and conduct search and rescue with speed and range. The V-22 program has been a focus of the Armed Services Committee after the catastrophic crash in Japan in November 2023, which occurred on the heels of fatal accidents in June 2022 and August 2023. Under both chairs, we have had briefings in the Armed Services Committee over the past couple of years, and a request was made by HASC for GAO to conduct a review of the V-22. Today, this hearing follows the issuance of independent reviews by Naval Air Systems Command and the Government Accountability Office. As I've stated in prior proceedings, I view these reviews in the same light as the reviews that were conducted by Congress and the Navy after the catastrophic collisions in 2017 of the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain. Like the V-22 mishaps, Fitzgerald and McCain resulted in an unacceptable loss of life of service members who were performing their job in a peacetime environment. As those collisions were indicative of systemic issues with our surface fleet, V-22 is indicative of broader systemic issues with the Navy aircraft readiness. In 2017, the oversight by Congress with the Navy's collaboration led to systemic improvements. In fact, at the insistence of Senator John McCain, the recommendations of the Navy's comprehensive review were actually codified in the National Defense Authorization Act. That intervention has ensured that seamen are fully qualified before going underway and resulted in an appreciable drop in mishaps. After the CV-22 crash off the coast of Japan in 2023, the services grounded the planes and incorporated various new maintenance and safety protocols, such as a redesigned gearbox and triple-melt steel components to mitigate deadly risk. While those protocols have thus far been successful in preventing loss of life, mechanical issues still plague the program. As GAO recommended, significant sustainment investments, particularly in repair and spare parts, will be needed to make the V-22s operate safely. Both the subcommittee and I am sure look forward to working with the services and the Joint Program Office as the department lays out its fiscal year 2027 budget request so that there is sufficient investments to follow in on those mechanical changes that we need to implement. But mechanical readiness is only just one element of the V-22's issues. Effective and open communication with the JPO and the services, as well as our allies operating aircraft variants, is critical to fix this program. One of the key findings of the GAO report was that, quote, the military services have not proactively shared information from hazard and accident reporting with Osprey units across military services. The department concurred with this recommendation, and I was pleased to hear last week from Admiral Dougherty and General Walsh about the improved communication and review structure which the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting for this aircraft and encourage the services to continue. Routine meetings are just the start, though, and I hope this hearing is used as an opportunity to lay out a structured systemic upgrade in communications and information sharing amongst the services that are flying the V-22. I also believe that we should explore the possibility of legislative action to codify elements of these recommendations, like Senator McCain pushed for in the aftermath of the 2017 surface collisions. The possibility of legislative action to codify elements of these recommendations, like in the aftermath of 2017, would send a powerful message to our service members and the public that real change is happening. If undertaken, I hope that this task is something the department and the committee can work together on to enable the services to operate readily and effectively and protect the lives of our service members. And with that, I yield back.

I thank the gentleman and noted your recommendations, Mr. Courtney. Now recognize Mr. Bergman, the Chairman of Readiness.

Thank you, Chairman Kelly, for recognizing me. I am particularly pleased to be working with you, Ranking Member Courtney, and Ranking Member Garamendi. You might say we got a few old dogs up on this dais, but we've been around a long time, done a lot, and I look at our newer members here who bring the vitality to the committee, and we're better when we work together. You know, we've got, let's face it, we've got problems with the V-22 program. We have had. I mean, those of us who flew, I've never flown one, but I did fly the simulator when it first came out, and it, boy, an old 46 pilot had to change some things fairly quickly to understand how to keep it going in the direction. But having said that, at the onset, I just want on a very serious note to highlight the incredible capability that the V-22 Osprey program provides. The extended range, increased speed, and expanded lift options when compared to legacy rotary-wing capabilities are essential in maintaining air superiority in the future conflicts. It is not surprising that the Army chose a V-22 Osprey variant as their long-range future assault aircraft. While I remain convinced that the V-22 Osprey program is essential, I find the trends associated with the costs and mission capability rates particularly troubling. The V-22 Osprey faces readiness challenges due to its complex design, high maintenance man-hour requirements, inefficient supply system, and current sustainment strategy. These factors have led to a persistently low mission-capable rate and a 30 percent increase in operating and maintenance costs per flight hour over the past four years. Undoubtedly, the numbers of hangar queens that are being parted out to support the fleet is excessive. These readiness trends are out of line with the balance of the naval aviation enterprise and need to be rapidly addressed. Cumulative risk posture of the V-22 platforms has been growing since initial fielding. The 28 unresolved risk assessments averaging about nine years is unacceptable. I am pleased that the comprehensive report acknowledges this problem. We need to be aggressive in addressing all of these long-term systemic risk issues. By addressing the limitations associated with mission capability rates and ensuring an enduring V-22 Osprey Joint Program Office methodology of addressing existing challenges, I am confident that we can equally address current and emerging safety concerns. We need to be a learning organization that prioritizes safety of our aircrew above all things. I appreciate Chairman Kelly's support for this important hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.

I'd like to turn it over to the Ranking Member of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Garamendi.

Thank you, Chairman Kelly and Chairman Bergman, and my partner, Ranking Member Courtney. I would also like to welcome our witnesses from the department and the GAO. The GAO has been an important partner to the Readiness Subcommittee, and I thank your team for investigating the V-22 accidents in response to a letter that Chairman, then-Chairman Waltz and I sent some time back. And thank you all for appearing at the hearing today. We cannot overlook the problems connected with the V-22. The accidents that have plagued the aircraft since it was entered into force, with 20 service members having lost their lives between fiscal year 2022 and 2024 alone. Fatalities and mechanical failures have connected to them and led to numerous operational pauses of the program, most recently in December 2023. While the V-22 is an impressive and invaluable asset to the military, these continuing mishaps are simply unacceptable, and action must be taken. I'm looking forward to hearing from the GAO and the department on how we're prioritizing safety and how we address the risks and how the recommendations recently in the V-22 comprehensive review will be implemented, including new material fixes and efforts to share vital maintenance information between the services. Furthermore, I'd like to hear what we can do, what can be done to accelerate such upgrades and changes. Timeframes for the replacement and retrofits that stretch into 2033 and 2034 are simply too far out and not acceptable. That simply means that risks of lives of more of our brave men and women. Lastly, I would like to hear from GAO thoughts on how the department plans and what they might have overlooked and what can be done to address the many gaps or any gaps. At present, the department plans to keep flying the V-22 for at least 30 more years. If this can be, if this is to be the case, then more robust sustainment framework must be started today for the sake of our service members and future missions. With that, I yield back and look forward to the information. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. Now I introduce, thank you, and I'll recognize our witnesses. We have Vice Admiral John Dougherty, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command; Brigadier General David Walsh, Program Executive Officer, Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Missions Programs. I love the way you guys do these titles. And Ms. Diana Moldafsky, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office. And Admiral Dougherty is over to you.

Chairman Kelly, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Garamendi, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address the status of the V-22 program. The V-22 is a unique and indispensable capability for our nation's armed forces. As the world's only operational tiltrotor aircraft, it combines the vertical lift of a helicopter with the speed and range of a turboprop aircraft, enabling missions that no other platform can accomplish. Across the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, the V-22 has transformed how we execute expeditionary operations, special missions, and critical logistics in every theater. That said, this program has not been without challenges. During its 20 years of operational service, the V-22 has faced complex technical issues and, tragically, the loss of service members. We honor their sacrifice by committing ourselves to the continued safe operation of this platform. Safety is and will remain our top priority. Evidence of this commitment was our initiation of the V-22 comprehensive review in September 2023 to address concerning safety and readiness trends. This review, along with the GAO report, identified actionable recommendations to improve safety and readiness and reaffirm the airworthiness of this platform. Of the 32 recommendations in the comprehensive review, 24 are already closed, and the remaining are on track for completion. We are also actively implementing the GAO's five recommendations. Both reviews identified the need for increased oversight and disciplined follow-through. To that end, we've already established the Joint V-22 Leadership Forum. This body brings together cross-service leaders from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to share information, assess our performance, and remove barriers to safe and effective operations. This body reports annually to the service vice chiefs on our performance across safety and readiness outcomes. In addition, I report monthly to the Secretary of the Navy on our progress to plan in driving the findings in the comprehensive review to closure. The comprehensive review was released in December, but we did not wait to take actions on the findings. For example, we have already begun fielding an improved proprotor gearbox with more robust gears, which mitigates the risk of past failures due to microscopic impurities. Until these gears are fielded, the aircraft will continue to operate under the airworthiness controls established in March 2024, which have proven effective. In addition, we have dramatically reduced the rate of hard clutch engagements to zero since implementing life limits on the input quill assembly in February 2023. And we are qualifying a new, more robust design to be fielded in late 2027. To address future safety and readiness of the V-22, we are developing a mid-life service upgrade to modernize the drive system, airframe, and avionics. These upgrades will significantly improve readiness while enabling future modernization to keep the V-22 ready to fight well into the 2050s. Members of the subcommittee, the V-22 remains a cornerstone of U.S. military capability. It provides unmatched operational reach and operational flexibility. Whether conducting special operations, assault support, or logistics resupply, the V-22 is in demand across every theater. We are committed to the continued safe operation and readiness of the platform. Thank you for your continued support of naval aviation and the V-22 program, and I look forward to your questions.

I now recognize Brigadier General Walsh. Walsh, I'm sorry.

Chairman Kelly, Ranking Member Courtney, Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Garamendi, distinguished members of the Seapower and Readiness subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the status of the V-22 Osprey program. In my role as the Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault and Special Mission Programs, I'm responsible for the V-22 Joint Program Office, which manages the development, testing, fielding, and sustainment of the V-22 Osprey across all variants. I work side-by-side with Vice Admiral Dougherty and the NAVAIR team, and I want to echo his comments regarding our commitment to safety and transparency. I would also like to thank Ms. Moldafsky of the GAO for joining us today, and I appreciate the GAO's partnership in addressing V-22 safety. The V-22 program office that ensures the continued airworthiness and readiness of this critical capability is truly a joint effort, staffed by personnel from the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Air Force. Our team is implementing all recommendations from the recent comprehensive review and GAO report, driving improvements that will keep the Osprey mission-ready for decades to come. The V-22 provides unmatched operational capability and flexibility. It's in high demand across the joint force because of the unique warfighting advantage it provides our warriors. We owe the men and women who count on this platform every day the safest, most ready aircraft that we can provide, and we are fully committed to doing just that. Thank you for your continued support of our service members, of naval aviation, and the V-22 Osprey program. I look forward to your questions.

I now recognize Ms. Moldafsky.

Chairman Kelly and Bergman, Ranking Members Courtney and Garamendi, and members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our work on the V-22 Osprey program. After 20 years of operations, the Osprey continues to face significant challenges that limit its capability. Mission-capable rates are lagging, maintenance burdens are heavy, safety outcomes have not steadily improved. Recent fatal accidents, including a 2023 crash and subsequent fleet grounding, underscore the need for decisive action. While GAO has reported on development and sustainment challenges with the Osprey for over four decades, today, I will focus on three key takeaways from our December 2025 safety report: negative accident trends, unresolved safety risks, and communication gaps. First, serious accidents remain high. We found Marine Corps and Air Force Osprey accident rates for the most serious mishaps, those the Class A and Class B, rose sharply in 2023 and 2024, being 36 and 88 percent higher than prior eight-year averages. The Osprey consistently exceeded serious accident rates for most Navy and Air Force aircraft types. These accidents rarely stem from a single cause. They most often involve material failures and human error tied to supervision, training, and risk management, appearing in 57 percent of the causes we reviewed. Second, risks are identified but not closed. DOD lacks a comprehensive way to ensure that safety risks are prioritized, resourced, and resolved. The problem is not identifying risk; the problem is closing them. We found 28 system safety risks, including serious risks tied to loss of life or aircraft, unresolved for an average of nine years. At the same time, maintenance and operational risks were considered outside the scope of safety working groups, despite being major contributors in accident data. Units described to us heavy maintenance workloads that reduced aircraft availability and limited aircrew experience. But these risks are not consistently captured in risk mitigation plans. Third, communication gaps persist. Communication remains fragmented between the program office, the services, and the operational units. Squadrons told us that hazard and accident data is stovepiped across the service with no regular form for sharing emergency procedures. As a result, lessons learned are not consistently shared, and risks identified in one part of the enterprise are not always visible to others until an accident occurs. So how do we move forward? DOD has committed to addressing our recommendations, and Naval Air Systems Command has committed to resolving risk across the program. These are important steps. But the Osprey has been reviewed many times before. So how do we ensure that current actions will lead to timely and lasting improvements? Making this effort different will depend on whether DOD can establish clear accountability, define milestones, secure adequate funding, and report regularly on progress. Congress plays a critical role in overseeing this effort to ensure the Osprey's full potential is realized. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.

I thank the witnesses and and I commit and I want you guys to be a part of the process with Mr. Courtney and I as we review what how we should make legislation to codify some of the some of the things that we have coming forward because we not only want to do it, we want to do it right. And with that, I recognize myself for questions. Admiral Dougherty, I I listen to other people when they pronounce your name correctly. And then General Walsh, how does the V-22 Joint Program Office share information on aircraft operating procedures across the services?

Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. The V-22 takes our obligation to share across the services very, very seriously, and it starts at the Joint Program Office where, as I mentioned, we have personnel from all three services working together daily. In addition to that, we have regular forums, some of which are have been reinforced and reinstated by the recommendations of the comprehensive review and the GAO report, where the services come together on a regular basis from the O6 level and in the program office all the way up to the four-star level where Admiral Dougherty reports monthly to the Secretary of Navy on progress against the recommendations.

Sir, just let me add to that that both in the GAO report and our internal comprehensive review, this sharing of data across the services and then senior leader awareness of the risk on the platform was identified as a gap, and we've updated our policy and our governance structure to ensure that I, as the airworthiness authority, have visibility on all of the risk as they manifest on this platform.

Thank you, Admiral. General Walsh, what specific hardware upgrades and modernization efforts are planned across all V-22 variants and services, and how is the JPO managing cost impacts and tradeoffs among the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force?

The program right now has several several efforts across both safety and readiness to improve the performance of the V-22. Starting from the most the closest to time now, we're already fielding improvements to the proprotor gearbox, incorporating stronger, more robust robust steel into the into the aircraft. Those are delivering right now to all three services. We are also redesigning the input quill assembly, which was the cause of our hard clutch engagements. That effort is in testing right now and will begin fielding to the services. We're implementing an Osprey drive shaft system safety and health information system that will provide the maintainers and the aircrew better awareness of vibrations that are growing in the gearboxes. And beyond that, we have improvements in cells that will improve the maintainability and the availability of the aircraft. Further into the future, we're looking to field the V-22 cockpit technology replacement initiative to address obsolescence issues, increasing readiness, and beyond that, the V-22 aircraft modernization plan, which will keep our readiness and safety going into the 2050s.

Thank you, General. And Ms. Moldafsky, how has the Department of War responded to GAO's recommendations on the V-22 program, and in your assessment, how well positioned is DOD to implement those recommendations in a meaningful and timely way?

DOD agreed with all five of our recommendations, and it stated that it would incorporate them into relevant policies and procedures. Specifically, DOD highlighted its commitment to safety, including developing joint standards for improving safety. So these are definitely positive steps. As the department implements our recommendation, we would, however, like to see it addressed three key elements addressed. First, in the responses we received from DOD, we did not necessarily see a systematic way to address safety risk associated with the operations and maintenance of of the Osprey. And again, this would be an important opportunity because consistently in the dozens of service members that we spoke to across the Osprey units, risks associated with maintenance and operating the aircraft were always noted as safety issues. And again, this was also in the data we reviewed. So a systematic way to look at those risks will improve safety outcomes. Second, we believe that the there is room to be more explicit in the oversight structure for resolving risk. I understand that a new memorandum of agreement has been signed between the services for the management of V-22. This is an important step. I would say that one additional item to that MOA would be an explicit reference to safety in those leadership discussions that the the program is planning on holding. And finally, again, we want to see a proactive process for communicating hazard information, not only from the program offices down to the units, but from the units across the services. What we consistently heard from the squadrons is that right now, this is a informal process. The service members, the pilots talk to each other and hey, cross, but not anything that's formalized. And we think that is an important thing to reducing risk.

And my time has expired, and I now recognize the Ranking Member and my friend, Mr. Joe Courtney.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, Ms. Moldafsky, in your opening remarks, I think you really put it really well when you said, you know, how do we make this review, given all the other reviews in the past, how do we make this one different? And again, I'm glad to hear the chair is ready, and I'm sure Mr. Bergman and Mr. Garamendi as well, I mean, that, you know, we have a chance to put pen to paper this year in terms of the NDAA, and hopefully we can find ways to just kind of really solidify, you know, some of the recommendations. Your report in December, you know, which had an amazing sections there about interviews that you did with pilots, support staff, and it really laid out as the sort of disparity that exists in terms of just awareness of different problems. Even the flight manuals are different. And so, you know, it just seems like there's some pretty common sense simple fixes, you know, that really your recommendations hopefully are going to result in, and like I said earlier, real change. One of the issues in terms of material, which again, I think General Walsh, you mentioned this, is that, you know, the cracking in the gearbox, there's, and we talked to industry a little bit, that, you know, there actually is some I think good work being done for sort of enhanced, like triple-melt design and construction of the gearboxes. Is that happening right now in terms of the whether it's Navy and Marine Corps planes? ...possibly can because again, it sounds like there was a real solution that was developed. Admiral Dougherty, you're nodding your head, maybe you wanted to comment.

Yes, sir. So our analysis shows that going from the double melk gears to the triple melk gears will reduce the probability of this happening by an order of magnitude. It will actually take this risk from a serious risk down to a medium risk. So we appreciate all the support to fund that effort, which is fully funded today to get these gears fielded across the fleet.

Thank you. And again, as we sort of move forward after today, the five recommendations that were included in the GAO report as well as some of the other sort of issues that you all identified, we really want to engage with GAO in terms of, as I said, trying to provide a lift to this process so that as I said, there's going to be something very enforceable by law, but you know, also out there for the public and the families of the service members who lost that actually that what happened is something that resulted in Congress taking action to hopefully fix this problem. With that, I yield back.

I now recognize the chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Bergman.

Thank you, Chairman Kelly. I'd like to start with kind of a statement here on the front end, you know, as regards to readiness. The Air Force, as you all know, has invested and incorporated the nacelle improvement program beginning back in 2021. Now they have seen significant results. I would highly recommend that you all look at following that lead, resourcing this proven initiative. It is not theoretical. It is proven and the data that I have seen has been very positive. You know, there's it's okay to copy another service. We may want to have the unique service cultures, but you know, imitation or copying is a very sincere form of flattery that will in the end increase mission effectiveness and save lives. I'm going not address my questions to any one of the three of you in particular. I'm going to state the question, I'd like to hear any or all of your comments if you're okay with that. V-22 availability, is a 60 percent mission capable rate acceptable for the V-22 program? And you could just say yes or no.

So sir, readiness is a top priority for the service. We have clear targets across the V-22 fleet for all the services. We are not at those numbers today, and we do know the root cause of our performance and are going to close that gap to achieve the readiness that we need.

Can you give me a couple of steps that you're taking to, you know, definitive steps that you're taking to increase mission capabilities and as an adjunct to that, what steps can we in Congress take to support a more effective V-22 Osprey program?

Yes, sir. I'll hand it over to General Walsh here in a second, but generally the issues are from the supply chain and us having the repairables and the consumables that we need to operate the aircraft. The program office is highly focused on that and closing those gaps. And I appreciate this body's continued support for the funding of our flight hour program and our O&M accounts, which helps fund that sustainment ecosystem. Over to General Walsh.

I would add to what Admiral Dougherty said. We do have a disciplined process inside the program to identify the drivers, analyze root causes of our readiness challenges, and we're implementing measures to increase supply availability, increase maintainability, and reduce the maintenance workload for our Marines, sailors, and airmen that are out there. And that's an all-hands effort across the services, our NAVAIR partners, fleet, and industry to make sure we get the right parts produced and into those Marines, sailors, airmen's hands to do that work. Some of the specific efforts that we're working on right now is addressing obsolescence and you mentioned the nacelle improvements. One of the benefits of the joint program and the close coordination between services is we understand the benefits that the Air Force is already seeing within the nacelle improvements and both of the other services have already committed to starting those programs on Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.

Okay. So what I just heard you say was that you all have established a comprehensive supply system for tracking parts in the maintenance system. Is that up and running?

We have, yes, Congressman.

Okay. How effective then is the JPO at managing this disaggregated maintenance system?

The Joint Program Office along with our industry partners and our partners in the supply system at Naval Supply Systems Command and DLA do a good job of understanding where our most challenging parts are and working with our industry partners to get those delivered to our Marines and sailors.

Okay. It's one thing to have the availability of parts, it's another thing to have the availability of the maintainers to do the work. Cost per flying hour have increased roughly 30 percent over the last four years. What steps is the V-22 Osprey program office taking to make V-22 a more cost-effective as well as safe program? But let's just deal with what are you doing on the cost-effective side.

Just as we do with our supply system and our safety issues, we have a process to identify what our cost drivers are. We have a reliability control board that talks through the most challenging parts. We understand the elements of our cost per flight hour and we look to drive those down systemically across the services.

Yeah, and I'm sure I won't speak for Mr. Garamendi, but he and I think a lot alike on so many things. We like to see numbers and we like to see performance stats. So anything you can provide for us, we'll consume as members and also as our staff. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I now recognize ranking member Garamendi, my friend.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At some point, it becomes a tireless process of trying to build safety into military operations. All too often, it appears as though the demand for the mission overcomes the demand for safety. And that has resulted in at least one of the most serious recent accidents, at least in my opinion, that the mission demand overrode the safety. So we have focused on the safety issue for many years here, trying to drive into the military the necessity for safety. I think we're losing that fight. Or can you two gentlemen tell me that we're not losing it and that safety is not the least priority and the mission is the first priority?

So sir, I would tell you as the airworthiness authority at NAVAIR, it is my first duty to ensure that the platform is airworthy and safe for operations. I believe that through the mishaps and the engineering investigations that we've done over the past several years and then certainly from the GAO's report and our comprehensive review, we've identified clear actions that we're taking to include the controls that are in place for our aircraft that are flying today. So that is our top priority and it will remain my top priority as the airworthiness authority.

General?

As Admiral Dougherty said, safe operations are the top priority for the program. And military aviation is rooted in a long-standing culture of safety. In 20 years of operations around the world in austere operations, we've made continuous improvements to this platform, including almost 250 hardware and software improvements to reduce or eliminate risks. And we continue to do that. We have a rigorous process for identifying and mitigating those risks. These are complex machines built for combat, but we do owe it to our service members to make sure they are safe every time they go out and fly these. We understand what our mishap drivers are. We understand where there's elements in the design, there's elements in the operations and maintenance where there are risks, and we are diligently working to reduce or eliminate those.

For the GAO, your questions about maintenance seem to be found in every one of your reports. How is the military addressing the maintenance issue and what is the role of the contractor, Bell, and its acquisition of other companies? If you can speak to that.

You're absolutely right that readiness issues and maintenance remain a problem, not just for the Osprey of course, but across many different aircraft types. In reviews we recently reported that only four of 49 aircraft types actually met their mission capable rates over the last 10 years. So it's not just an Osprey problem, I think it is a problem across the departments. And I think it's important to zoom out a little bit and ask how did we get here? As you know, the Osprey, as we've spoken here, is a complex acquisition program and the requirement set drove a very complex engineering solution without necessarily enough attention on how the aircraft could be operated and sustained. So I think part of this is to think about not just where we are today, but in the future, how can we build sustainment into programs at the beginning? And I say this because operations and sustainment represent 70 percent of a weapon system's life cycle cost. And those costs for O&S are built into that program when it's only about 10 percent complete. So the changes that we're seeing now on the Osprey are good and yes, are necessary to keep this aircraft flying until the 2050s. But if you really want to bring change, we need to bring in a better focus on sustainment in the initial design phase. GAO has a body of work looking at leading practices that commercial companies do and the way those commercial companies do it to develop complex systems. Part of that is bringing in the users, in this case it would be the maintainers, the pilots, early into the development cycle to help develop the design. And that is how you would truly make changes. Your last question regarding the contractor, I will defer to the gentlemen here to discuss what costs Bell Boeing has actually had to pay, but it's my understanding that since those risks were accepted by the Navy many years ago, the Navy would pay for any cost associated with the changes.

I see that I'm out of time, but there should be some I'll have some follow-up, I'm sure. Thank you.

And if you guys, Admiral, if y'all can respond for the record, General, if y'all can respond for the record too to his question, not now but in writing, we would really appreciate that. And I now recognize Miss Kiggans.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the brief and the work that you're doing. I know we've had several briefs in this committee just to talk about the progression of V-22 and addressing some of the safety concerns. I just was wondering about crew confidence, what that looks like out there. I mean, we're talking about the ways we're tracking mechanical problems, what we're fixing them. What is it like for the pilots and aircrew? Are they still confident when they get in that aircraft that they can complete the mission? Is there any high turnover rates or people saying, you know, we're not taking this aircraft because we're worried about this? Just curious where their mental state is.

Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. I would say that crew confidence is high in this platform. And just like the GAO went out and talked to the units during this time of investigation, we did as well. We did find some gaps in the flight hours that we want to get our aviators. Part of that was due to our focus on safety and some of the groundings that we had to go through. But I will tell you that we have talked to many, many of the aircrews and they have confidence in this platform and are getting the training they need.

Okay, thank you. And you know, I remember back in the day and I was a 46 pilot, so when we read the books and we looked and we got the hazreps and 46s were kind of the predecessor for the Osprey. So and the reasons we no longer fly 46 and went to a V-22 platform, I can appreciate some of the same concerns. But you know, how are we I remember that was our form of communication. It was way before the digital age and now we're in 2024, there's ways we can communicate from social media to I'm even in a 46 alumni group. But you know, how are pilots communicating with each other? Ms. Moldafsky, you talked about this siloed information and there's got to be ways that I don't know if there's some kind of pilot group chat. I don't know what that looks like in the military. I didn't serve when we had those platforms available. But what does that look like so that the Marines and the Air Force and the Navy are communicating with each other? Because that's a great way to communicate just pilot to pilot, aircrew to aircrew.

Yes, ma'am. There are both formal and informal ways. So I'll talk about the formal ways that the program communicates with the fleet right now. It starts, like I mentioned, at the Joint Program Office where we have pilots who fly these aircraft integrated from all three services in the program. They work together day to day and they have connections back out to the fleet and their counterparts out there. We also have monthly class desk safety reviews where the class desk, the engineers in the program office, engage industry and engage the fleet in those safety discussions. We have semi-annual program safety review boards at a higher level. We just had one and we're having another one in March. We have NATOPS conferences, which you're probably familiar with from your time, where the fleet comes together, representatives from all the squadrons to talk about changes to emergency procedures and new procedures to make the aircraft safer. We have system safety working groups that happen on a regular basis. We're having another one here in March. So there are regular forums, both formal and informal, to address the fleet concerns.

If I can just add to it because it was brought up as an important point in regards to the joint safety forums and the NATOPS. And this was something we did however note that there were several years when those forums were not held. And so one of the things that we recommended was to make sure that those formal conferences would be held on a regular basis. And then to your other point, again, the services did and the service members rely on their informal networks. And while they all were very confident about the aircraft, one of the comments that would come up is we're not worried about what we know, we're worried about what we don't know. And that was something that a number of service members stated, that there were things that came out later that their colleagues maybe in the Navy knew that they in the Air Force did not. So again, I think it needs to be both an informal but more importantly, it has to become a formal network to make sure that those lessons learned are shared and well known across the services and down through the units.

I agree. And I mean, welcome to military aviation. It's an inherent kind of risk you take. You know what you sign up for, hopefully, but as safe as we can make it as possible. We do an amazing job. If you look at the history of aviation safety, there's nobody that does it better than the military. Last quick question, what is your timeline or are we even thinking about replacement of this aircraft? Is it going to be around for a while or are we in a place where we just need to make it as good as we can or we've because I come from the again, F-18 world and my East Coast Master Jet Base, we'd love F-35s, but they're talking about F/A-XX. So those guys, the strike fighter guys are always thinking a step ahead. Where are we at with this program?

Yes, ma'am. We'll be operating this platform well into the 2050s. And we are looking at a mid-life service upgrade to improve the reliability, the safety, and readiness of the platform.

Okay, thank you. I yield back.

I thank the gentlelady. I now recognize Mr. Norcross.

Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate that. A couple questions on the clarity. Marines obviously have the most, followed by equal I guess Air Force and Navy. Are there any significant differences in the accident rate, not per hour, but just service over service that we've identified?

I would say, sir, that the types of events that were happening, the mishaps, the material failures are common across all the platforms and the rate differences are just due to the number of hours and the missions that each one does specifically.

Okay. So that's my question. Ms. Moldafsky, you mentioned that the service and maintenance issue was not part of the review. Would you explain the difference why we wouldn't talk about maintenance because almost any accident, they look into maintenance records?

Sir, what I was specifically addressing was that issues related to maintenance or operating the aircraft are not a part of the system safety risk analysis. So they're not in the same defined way of assessing risk. When you have the risk assessment, the idea is that you identify the risk, you analyze it, you respond to it, and you close it or you find mitigating actions to close it. When the issues associated with maintenance or with aircrew experience, those were things that were commonly brought up. We have done it at GAO, have noted issues with that and others, but there wasn't there's not a systematic way that we could identify that those risks would be identified, analyzed, and responded to.

Okay, thank you. So we've identified they've accepted all five recommendations. It was earlier reported that they're producing I guess the gearbox 12 per month. So my question has to do with how quickly can we fix the problem or the major issue here? So if they produce 12 a month, what's our capacity to install and test per month those parts?

Congressman, those are being delivered to the fleet at that rate and then the fleet installs them as they're needed on the platform.

So we're going on a case-by-case basis, it's not a across-the-board replacement of those gearboxes?

They're being replaced on a regular basis across the services.

All right. So the point I'm getting at, do we have the capacity in our maintenance to replace 12 a month?

We do, Congressman.

Okay. So the question was asked earlier, how many months, years will it take at the rate you're going if assuming there is no ramp-up to replace all these?

For the Navy and Air Force, they'll be complete in the next couple of years, 2027.

So close to 400. Thank you. I yield back.

I now recognize goodness gracious, you guys with names so close, Mr. Higgins.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Walsh, what is the do you know the like the state of mission capability readiness for the for the Marine Corps for the Osprey? What is the percentage?

I do, Congressman. It's roughly about 50 percent.

About 50 percent. And Admiral Dougherty, what about for the Navy?

Currently the Navy is at about 40 percent.

About 40 percent. So I don't claim to be an expert on many things and this is most certainly one of the categories that I'm not an expert in, but as an old soldier myself, it seems to me that we have been stubbornly dedicated to this platform and perhaps it's wise that we remain stubbornly dedicated, but we should calmly assess where we are regarding just what we can do from a mission accomplishment perspective to abide by some of the wisdom that's been shared by an extensive GAO study. So I ask you, General and Admiral, will you just clarify for the committee and for America, what are reliability control boards as it relates to maintenance and both preventive and repair for this platform? How do they work? How do you assess them? Are they shared across the services that use this platform in varying degrees? Would you just speak to reliability control boards? Because it seems to me it should be the focus of our discussion on how to move forward.

Thank you, Congressman. I just want to start by saying that we do understand where the challenges are in our readiness and we're committed to providing the operational commanders with what they need to fight every day. The reliability control board is a process we have inside the program where we take a look with data across all of the components and the drivers in the aircraft. We understand the ones that are degrading readiness the most and we have actionable plans to improve the readiness of those components.

Yes, sir. Admiral?

Yeah, I sir, I would just double down on that. On our journey on F-18 almost a decade ago to get to 341 operational aircraft, mission capable aircraft, the RCB was a key element of that to do exactly what General Walsh said, to understand our degraders. So as the airworthiness authority and as NAVAIR that manages 40 different type model series of aircraft, that is a best practice that we enforce across all our platforms.

Thank you, Admiral and General, for that assessment. Ms. Moldafsky, do you concur that reliability control boards should be a focus of how our services move forward to embrace the experience and the knowledge of the maintenance crews that work on these platforms and then maybe they rotate out? And perhaps rotation is something that we should look at as well. But if they had a way to have a deep documentation of their experiences learned from maintenance work on the platform and they were able to share that broadly, would that be helpful, madam?

I think absolutely. And I believe that in the NAVAIR comprehensive report, they noted that one of the key challenges with the Osprey was that the maintenance systems, there were disparate maintenance systems between each of the services. So knowledge was not shared, lessons learned not shared across the different services in how they would maintain the Osprey.

So best practices in closing, let me just say, gentlemen, I deeply respect and support your mission and we're every bit as committed to making this platform work as you are. Back as long ago as the '90s in the civilian realm, certified mechanics working on vehicles, they had old school computer access. If they had an issue with a vehicle and they found a fix, they could go into that system and load that fix, load the symptom that they were addressing and they would make notes on how they fixed it. And a mechanic, a certified mechanic across the country, without a bunch of bureaucracy in between, could look at that in real time. He could see service. So I'm not suggesting that you break down your chain of command and control to that level, but I am saying that we need the experience of these maintenance mechanics that have been on this platform for a while. We need that accessible across the board so we can increase these readiness numbers. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the indulgence. I yield.

Thank you. Mr. Messmer, you're recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Dougherty, correcting the core issues of safety mishaps is critical because of the V-22's projected future service life. Can you talk about why this aircraft is uniquely suited for its assigned missions and why guaranteed safety is critical?

Well yes, sir. As the airworthiness authority, safety is the prime directive from my perspective. It is my responsibility to ensure that the aircraft is safe to operate across all the services with the different missions that it does. And then in terms of the unique capability that it brings to the warfighter in terms of speed, range, and access is unmatched.

Okay. Can you describe how these those capabilities differ from other aircraft in the fleet and how these capabilities change how we can operate in theater?

Yes, sir. I would just say it's related to its VTOL capability, its ability to take off and land vertically, operate from ships, from shore, and have the speed and range of kind of an airplane but have the capabilities of a helicopter.

Okay, thank you. General Walsh, the department has previously worked with industry to identify and address issues that have arisen. Can you talk about how the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps work jointly with industry to make sure safety component issues are identified early and addressed as quickly as possible?

Yes, Congressman. That partnership between the program office and industry is indispensable. That is how we generate safety and readiness. And we work closely every day with our industry partners to make sure that they are producing qualified, safe components for our aircraft.

Okay, thank you. Admiral Dougherty and General Walsh, can you all offer data on the V-22 improvement plan and how it is able to address some of the safety issues described in the GAO report?

The V-22 improvement program focuses on providing capabilities and components that improve the safety and the reliability of those components. Some of the ones that we've mentioned today are proprotor gearbox improvements with the new more robust steel, the input quill assembly redesign to reduce the incidence of hard clutch engagements, the Osprey drive system safety and health information are called Odyssey, that'll provide the maintainers and aircrew better information about the health of their gearboxes, the nacelle improvements which was mentioned earlier that will improve the maintainability, the V-22 cockpit technology replacement which will address obsolescence particularly in the avionics and electronics, and then finally a V-22 aircraft modernization plan called REVAMP, which will make sure that we have the right capabilities out there into the 2050s.

Okay, thank you. How much funding is needed to complete these upgrades? Do you have an estimate on that?

The proprotor gearbox, input quill assembly, Osprey drive system safety and health information are all fully funded. The nacelle improvement is funded for the Air Force and... ...both the Navy and Marine Corps have applied funding to those. And then we are still studying the costs for Vector and the revamp, so those will be in future budgets.

Thank you. Ms. Moldafsky, as the Army moves forward with an accelerated timeline for testing and production of the FLRAA, what lessons can be learned from the V-22 development and production to produce a safe, suitable, effective platform for our warfighters?

As I mentioned before, I think the Osprey provides some good lessons as the department considers and the Department of Army considers its new platform. Specifically, as I noted before, it's important for the program to consider using GAO's leading practices for developing weapons systems. We have a number of recommendations associated with it. I talked about two, and that is in the requirements development phase is to bring in the users, the operators, to help shape the sustainment of that platform because as we saw, you really need to build that into the design early to make sure that down the road it's going to be a maintainable system. So I think that is one of the ways that the Army can consider and perform some of what we've seen on V-22.

Okay. Thank you. Thank you for all your questions, and I yield back.

Thank you, and that completes our first round of questions. Mr. Garamendi has asked to ask another question or two, so you are recognized.

I'll make this very quick. Several suggestions have come up about things that need to be done. This committee will be writing a new National Defense Authorization Act. It's been said that perhaps, or not perhaps, but that we should include in that the Osprey issues. And I would like the three of you to provide to this committee specific suggestions about what you need in the law to fully address the Osprey issues that have been raised by your own review and also by the GAO. I'm not going to ask for it here in deference to time, but I would appreciate it if you can get back to us no later than the end of this month with very specific suggestions about what you need to avoid the 10-year or nine-year timeframe for the full upgrades. Is it money? Is it authority? Please get back to us by the end of the month. Thank you very much. I yield back.

Thank you. You can tell Mr. Garamendi and I have been doing this for a while together, and I share his viewpoints on so many things. I was going to say to you, if there's anything, would anybody like to have a closing comment for something you would have liked us to ask you, but we didn't? And if there's, you know, it's your 60 seconds. Or you don't have to, but if there's something you wanted to tell us that we didn't ask, it's your shot.

Sir, I just was going to say thanks for the support of the committee and thanks for that offer to provide our recommendations for things that we could put in the NDAA going forward. Thank you.

Well, under Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith's leadership, our committee is pretty darn tight when it comes to doing a good NDAA every year, and that's a credit to leadership across the board. So never miss an opportunity to lead and do the right thing. With that, this hearing is adjourned. [Gavel sounds.]