U.S. Defense Strategy and Posture

...domestically for a whole series of reasons, including again the fact that we have four members of this committee who are attempting to be prosecuted by the Justice Department for exercising their right of free speech, but it also impacts foreign policy. The chairman brought up Russia, Ukraine, and the somewhat inconsistent support that the administration has expressed for Ukraine. And I'm sure there's a lot of different reasons for that. But to take the president at his word, the fact that he and Putin, as he likes to say, went through the whole "Russia hoax" thing together, the fact that it wasn't actually a hoax, Russia did in fact attempt to interfere with the elections aside, it seems to influence his opinion. Because he and Putin were together on something, whereas Zelenskyy, when the president called him up and asked him to dig up dirt on Joe Biden, didn't do it. And then we have this whole performance art in the White House in February of Zelenskyy being dressed down in the middle of a war, undermining confidence in Zelenskyy and undermining our ability to put the pressure on Russia that we need to put on them to end this war and protect Ukraine. Again, all of that driven by sort of a personal amount of loyalty and a grievance that the president has. And we see that play out in the tariffs. We have a 50 percent tariff on India after Modi doesn't give Trump credit for ending the war in Pakistan and India, which apparently he didn't have much to do with. We put a 50 percent tariff on Brazil because they weren't nice to Bolsonaro, who Trump likes. We also put a tariff on Switzerland, and I confess as I'm talking to you, I forget exactly why. It's hard to keep track of all of the grievances past a certain point. But that undermines any sense that we have a set of values in terms of how we're trying to approach our foreign policy. The next step in all this is resources. Here, this is more of a bipartisan problem as we've discussed. We seem to think that we have infinite resources. We can cut taxes and spend $1.5 trillion on the defense budget without ever contemplating how do we use those resources better. So I do seriously want to hear, given the amount of money we have, how are we going to make this work? In one particular example of this, which I'm going to come back to over and over again, is of course the $22 billion battleship, which seems like a horrific idea to spend that much money when we have so many other needs. And by the way, for those of you who follow the whole Polymarket thing, if they're giving you the opportunity to bet, take the over on that. It's going to be more than $22 billion to build that battleship when we walk down that road. So how are we husbanding the resources that we have in order to achieve our objective? But the overall biggest problem is the Trump administration has decided that an excessive reliance on violence, threats, coercion, and the use of the military isn't just their go-to option, it's pretty much all they've got. If somebody in the world isn't doing exactly what we want, our approach is let's punch them in the face repeatedly until they capitulate. And then frankly, even after they capitulate, we decide to keep punching them in the face just on the off chance that they might change their mind. And I think as I said, the Financial Times summed this up fairly well this morning when it said, let me get all of this straight in my head. They want their allies to join in an ill-thought-out war of choice with unclear aims and an uncertain chance of success for any of the myriad aims stated so far. They want everyone else to just absorb any of the externalities, like influxes of refugees, disruptions to shipping, higher oil and commodity prices, and maybe even some incoming missiles. And then they also want to tariff everyone at 15 percent. I'm not sure they can keep pushing at everyone all at once indefinitely. There seems to be an inability here not just to anticipate second and third-order effects, but even just to model a response from any other party, much less every other party. The rest of the world does matter, and I suppose maybe we can just say we're the United States, whatever we want you have to give it to us, and if you don't, we're going to bomb you, tariff you, or do something to you. But that type of confrontation creates more chaos and more war, which is what we have seen. I know everyone likes to dump on the international rules-based order, okay? But the alternative to that was might makes right. Was basically whoever's strongest go take what you want and we'll just fight it out. And after a whole series of world wars, culminating in the war that killed 70 million people and blew the entire industrial world off the face of the map, we decided let's try something else. It isn't perfect, all right, not everyone follows the laws all the time, but it seems like what the U.S. has said is we're going to dump that entirely. And we're going to take what we want, when we want, and how we want, and the rest of the world can go to hell. I don't think that's going to end well. So I would like to see some kind of plan as to how other tools in our toolbox, other than just the military, you know, diplomacy, aid, foreign aid, which of course we decided to cut off food and healthcare from hundreds of thousands of people so that they starved to death, that doesn't help either. Are there other tools that we think about other than just coercion, violence, force, and the use of the military? I think there should be. And I guess the final question I want you to consider is when President Trump was running for office, he said over and over and over again, I'm not going to do wars. In fact, he very specifically said, if I'm president, we will not go to war with Iran. And here we are. So I'm genuinely curious, what changed? What changed from when he was a candidate to when he was in office that has led us to the level of conflict that we are now experiencing? Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I thank the ranking member. I'd now like to introduce our witness. Mr. Elbridge Colby is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Thank you for being here, Mr. Colby, you are recognized.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of this committee to testify on the Department of War's 2026 National Defense Strategy. The animating purpose of this strategy was to put into reality the logic of President Trump's common sense, America First, peace through strength approach. At its heart, as detailed in the 2025 National Security Strategy issued by the White House, this approach is channeled through the principle of flexible realism. That is, the effort to practically and realistically advance and protect the concrete interests of regular Americans. The core of a strategy, as the National Security Strategy eloquently describes, is to evaluate, sort, and prioritize. Needless to say, this is of special importance in the realm of war and peace. The heavy responsibility of effectively doing so motivated our work at the department to produce the 2026 NDS, and we believe under Secretary Hegseth's leadership that we have done so. Under President Trump's leadership and with your support in the Congress, the American military is and will be the world's finest, an unmatched fighting force that has impressively demonstrated its prowess in recent months in Operations Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and now Epic Fury. At the same time, we recognize that, as Secretary Hegseth has aptly put it, we cannot do everything everywhere all the time. This is of course a practical reality. The American military, while without peer, is not infinite in its application and resources. Potential opponents have been building their strength and capabilities, and it is not fair, just, or sustainable to ask the American people to bear burdens that are inequitably distributed with those of our allies and partners. As a result, we must prioritize, and this strategy does so. It does not do so in a way that is pinched or hesitant, instead it does so in a way that prudently and practically navigates between two unreasonable extremes. On the one hand, an isolationism that pretends that we can retreat from the world and that a favorable stability will emerge. And on the other hand, an unfettered use of military force for overly expansive ends that would drain the American people's will and resources in unnecessary and overly ambitious conflict. This strategy rather prudently adopts a middle course that will actually put us on a far firmer, more successful, and thus more lasting course than either of these extreme alternatives. In particular, the NDS does so, we contend, by intelligently and strategically allocating our resources and that of our incredible armed forces towards the priorities that most affect regular Americans and where our efforts are most material and necessary to achieve American interests in the world. This is a reflection of common sense America First thinking. As a deduction, the strategy is built on four pillars. First, it restores, after decades of neglect by some administrations, the military's role in securing our homeland and ensuring that our key interests in our native hemisphere are protected. This is critical for regular Americans because we must ensure that we are directly protected and secure in our own home area. While the military is only a part of this effort and often far from the leading element, it does play a critical role that will be enduring. Second, the strategy focuses our military effort on ensuring the preservation of a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the world's largest market area. America's interests there are real and significant because of the scale of that market. At the same time, our interests are not limitless. We do not need to dominate that region, rather we only need to prevent that vast and dynamic area from being dominated itself so that we can trade and interact with it on fair and reasonable terms for regular Americans. As a result, our strategy there is to deter China through strength, not confrontation. We understand that China is a very powerful country that is undertaking an extraordinary military buildup. That is a simple fact. At the same time, we are clear that we do not seek conflict with China. To the contrary, we seek to avoid it. We make clear that our interests with respect to China are scoped and reasonable. We do not seek to strangle China nor compel a change in its form of government. Rather, we seek to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of the Indo-Pacific. In particular, this requires, as the National Security Strategy clearly states, being able to deny the feasibility of successful aggression along the first island chain. Because of its significance and the central importance of the military role in meeting this requirement, meeting this standard of an effective denial defense along the first island chain is the primary focus of the U.S. armed forces. At the same time, ensuring our forces can pace to this challenging standard will ensure that the department can always offer the president the operational flexibility and agility required for other objectives, especially the ability to launch decisive operations against targets anywhere, including as we see today in Operation Epic Fury. It is critical to emphasize here that our strategy is aligned not only with the interests of our allies in the Indo-Pacific, but with many other countries as well that are not formally our allies. These states seek to preserve their autonomy and thus their ability to chart their own national futures on their own terms. This too is our goal, as Secretary Hegseth eloquently laid out last year at the Shangri-La Forum, and our military focus alongside the efforts of our allies and partners is designed to uphold that ability. Third, we recognize clearly that there are other real threats around the world that imperil our allies and indeed our own interests directly. We do not neglect that. To the contrary, we see it clearly. But we also understand that we need to allocate our own resources realistically and prudently and that we must account for our allies' and partners' ability and will to meet those challenges as well. This is why the strategy so strongly emphasizes burden sharing, which is its third pillar. The logic here is to encourage, enable, and wherever necessary to press our allies and partners in other theaters to take primary responsibility for their conventional defense. This makes sense because, as is so often pointed out, we are allies with many of the world's largest and most advanced economies. As a result, we do indeed have an alliance network that has tremendous latent military power. Unfortunately, over the last generation, partially due to our own permissiveness and perhaps even hubris on this point, many of our allies have functionally demilitarized. This is untenable and unreasonable, and the fact is that our allies know it and are moving rapidly and substantially to step up. They are no longer, because of President Trump's leadership, fighting the scenario. Rather, they have now accepted they must step up and are beginning rapidly to do so. As our result, our approach has adapted to one of let's get down to business. In Europe, we are urging our allies to move to a model of NATO 3.0, in which wealthy European allies take the lead for the conventional defense of European NATO. On the Korean Peninsula, we are urging our South Korean ally to do the same vis-a-vis North Korea. And the good news, distinguished members, is that this is working. Our allies are indeed stepping up along these lines. Now the issue is helping them do so and making this transition as rapidly and effectively as possible, which is indeed our focus. In other regions, we are also urging and seeing progress with our allies. Along the first island chain, with countries like Japan and Australia, we are urging these wealthy and capable allies to do their part for collective defense as the NSS urges. In the Western Hemisphere, we are working with many like-minded countries in the region to address shared threats to our prosperity and well-being, as today's conference in Miami demonstrates. And in the Middle East, we are actively working with our model ally Israel and other regional partners to address the threat of Iran and terrorism, indeed the very purpose of Operation Epic Fury. The final pillar of the strategy, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, is to supercharge the defense industrial base. The NSS and NDS, and I stress this, both call for a national mobilization of our industrial capacity to arm both our own forces and those of our allies and partners. As you on this committee know so well, this is vital because we must be able to arm our own forces and those of our allies and partners with the best weaponry, quickly, at scale, and at a reasonable price. We are seeing tremendous progress on this front thanks to President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and Deputy Secretary Feinberg's efforts as well as your support and leadership in Congress, but this will be a critical continuing area of focus in the coming years. In closing, this strategy promises under President Trump's leadership to put our country and our allies and partners on the path to lasting security. In just a few years, we can expect the warfighting ethos to have been restored in our armed forces and for them to be armed with the most modern, effective weaponry at scale. We can expect our wealthy allies and partners around the world to have stepped up to do their part for collective defense and their own security. We can expect our potential opponents to see the peerlessly formidable armed forces of the United States and the highly capable forces of our allies and partners together and to conclude that peace and restraint is the better course for them. Thus, we can very much reasonably hope for a decent peace for Americans, for our allies, and for that matter for our potential opponents. This is a very good future to which we can reasonably aspire. At the same time, however, we at the Department of War know that we cannot take this future for granted. To the contrary, we will hope for the best but prepare for the worst. We will ensure that our armed forces are as ready as they can possibly be in line with the priorities outlined. Should our potential opponents spurn this reasonable offer, members of this committee, your support in ensuring that our forces are ready will be absolutely vital. Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you and I recognize myself for questions. I have over the last couple years spoken repeatedly with General Grinkewich, the EUCOM commander, his predecessor at EUCOM, General Cavoli, and U.S. Army Europe Commander Donahue about the decision to withdraw the brigade from Romania. All of them made the assessment this would increase NATO's risk in deterring their posture against Russia, but it also sent a terrible signal by the United States commitment to NATO. General Cavoli, in fact, last year when testifying before us in the posture hearing, left absolutely no doubt during that hearing that it was his best military advice that we keep that fifth brigade in Europe. Then we had President Trump state two days before the decision was made that there would be, quote, "no significant changes to U.S. force posture in Europe." And then also we had Secretary Rubio tell his Romanian counterpoint two weeks the very same thing. When I was in your office, I told you there was overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress for keeping our posture in Europe at five brigades. It's clear to me that you decided that pushing your agenda on U.S. force posture without interagency coordination and without regard to the President's opinion or Congress's was the way to go. Can you explain to me how you arrived at that position?

Thanks for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman. Let me, I categorically assert that I was straight with you in our discussions and I commit to be, so that just kind of lay flat as they say in the Pentagon on that point. Let me reassure you emphatically that I am a loyal lieutenant of the President and we don't do anything in the Department of War that is not aligned with the President. I am not in the chain of command, sir, so when you say you, I can only infer that you are referring to President Trump's Department of War. I stay very, very closely tied in with Secretary Hegseth, who is of course with the President essentially every day, whether directly physically or otherwise. So let me just stress once again, sir, that these are the policies of the Trump administration and I am a loyal lieutenant of the President and we follow his instructions on this issue as others. On the specifics of the matter, sir, a couple things. We actually, this decision was coordinated through normal channels within the Department of War and did receive best military advice. And in fact, some of the, I will say, some of the reasons for doing it was the significant stress on the Army forces that were deployed there. So that was actually some of the, in fact, I we all heard about it directly. And without getting into individuals because it's deliberative within the executive branch, I have a different understanding of the best military advice provided by some of our commanders. So happy to go into that.

So we aren't competent to hear best military advice in this committee?

I'm sorry?

You're telling me that we aren't competent to receive best military advice?

I'm not saying that at all. You're absolutely competent.

I mean, General Cavoli sat in that chair and told us that it was his best military advice and he was the EUCOM commander. His successor told us the very same thing.

I'm not questioning your integrity in the least, sir, but I heard something different in terms of when we made that decision. So without getting into personalities. And then actually, sir, and I can, I won't quote the individual specifically, but a very relevant senior European official actually said that this was a very beneficial signal. I heard that about several weeks ago and is demonstrated to Europeans that they need to step up.

Who said that?

Sir, I don't think I was asked not to, maybe in closed session we could go into it, but I can give you chapter and verse.

Well, we'll have a closed session right after this. I look forward to that.

Happy to do that, sir.

The decision as I understand it to remove that brigade was made on October 24. Our committee was formally notified on the 27th. How can you characterize telling us three days later that that's consultation with Congress, which you are constitutionally required to do when it comes to force posture decisions like that?

Sir, I'd have to get back to you on the details, but we take our duty to consult with Congress very seriously. Obviously we're focused on preserving the President's, I know you share the desire to preserve the President's decision space and we want to make sure we do that as well as Secretary Hegseth's. But you can rest assured, in fact, my office just in the last four, five months, I think has done upwards of 100 touches both with your committee and the Armed Services Committee as well, Senate Armed Services Committee as well as with other parts of the Congress. So I would actually go so far as to say our organization is one of the leaders in congressional engagement.

We see that completely differently. It's been like pulling teeth to get information from your office.

I'd be delighted, sir, to make sure that we rectify that. I know Ms. Earl and the SASC has had the same public statements that it's been difficult to get information from your office. I think, sir, if I could maybe just say on that, if you look at for instance some of the leading members of the SASC, they've actually said that we have been doing a much better job. And we're not perfect. I certainly don't say that, sir. So welcome feedback and, you know, I was very good to meet with Ranking Member Smith. I'd welcome meeting members from throughout. I know met with some of the members here. So we're available.

All right. Well, I still feel strongly that I concur with the last two EUCOM commanders and General Donahue that we need five brigades in EUCOM. Having said that, we're at four now thanks to the decision that came out of your department. Now, on September 3 of 2025, President Trump welcomed the Polish President to the White House. During that visit, when asked by a reporter whether the United States would continue stationing troops in Poland, President Trump responded, quote, "We'll put more there if they want. We'll stay in Poland. We're very much aligned with Poland," period, close quote. Do you agree with the President's position that the United States will at a minimum maintain the two armored brigades that are currently in Poland?

Mr. Chairman, you can rest assured that I will absolutely implement the President's guidance on that matter as on others.

Okay. So we will not be dropping below four brigades in EUCOM in the foreseeable future?

Sir, I want to be careful to preserve the President's decision space and be, I'd have to go back and specifically look at what the President said and the instructions he's given us. But my point is I we will absolutely, I make it a point of pride and a point of focus to ensure that we're tightly aligned. We do that through, I particularly through Secretary Hegseth, who's with the President every day. So we have a very, very tight alignment with the President. And this is his defense strategy. This is his War Department, obviously with the Congress needless to say. But you can rest assured, sir, that we are in tight alignment with President Trump.

I have a real concern about that when two days after the President said there'd be no significant changes in U.S. force posture, you announced that you were taking a brigade out of there. But now with that.

I would just stress, sir, that the Department of War, and I would once again stress that I'm not in the chain of command, so those decisions I'm not even and I don't presume to a level of authority that I have not been given by the Congress and the President. So I just, you know, I'm here to represent the Department of War. These are decisions by the Department of War under presidential guidance.

Well, I just want you to know going forward, we feel very strongly that Congress has a say-so in these matters and we're going to help y'all understand that in the coming months and years. I recognize the Ranking Member.

Thank you. Fully understood, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot of different ways to ask this question, but the bottom line is what does success look like in Iran? Basically, what are the objectives that we are trying to achieve and what does it look like when we go, okay, we've achieved our objectives, success, we're done, we're out?

Thank you, Mr. Smith. We're thinking a lot about this. I would say I can give you the perspective from the Department of War, which represents the direction that the President has given for the military campaign, which is specifically focused on degrading and destroying the power projection conventional, particularly the conventional power projection capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and thus especially missile one-way attack drones capabilities and their production as well as the naval forces of the Islamic Iran.

And how destroyed does it have to be?

Well, I think that's, I mean obviously we're going to seek to do the best we can. I think we are on plan as Admiral Cooper has said. I think that can nest with a variety of political outcomes as the President referred to the other day, the Venezuela model.

Two parts to that. I keep hearing that we're on plan and I keep asking and this is oversimplification, but I don't know, they had 10,000 missiles, now they have 8,000. And I keep getting told, yeah, we don't really have those specific information yet. So how do we know that we're on plan if we can't.

Well, you know, we don't want to repeat, you know, the mistakes of McNamara and a false kind of numeracy to it, but I would say that, you know, we are looking at the strategic level. That's we are, you know, and I know some of the both civilian and uniformed representatives will be briefing you in classified session later today. So obviously those numbers are important, but we're looking more at a strategic level at degrading the the capabilities of the Islamic Republic, not only fielded forces but the production capability.

The lack of specifics on that are troubling in terms of how long this is going to last. And then the second piece of it is what you alluded to, which is, okay, so we've done and we've done this before. I mean, we did it a year ago, Israel did it over the course of two years and significantly degraded Iran at a much lower cost in terms of the regional war. But when that's done, if the Islamic Republic is still there, they will simply rebuild. So what is the objective to prevent that from happening?

I don't think that's a given at all.

Well, it's not a given, but what's the objective? How do we get to the point where it doesn't?

No, I think it's precisely to avoid the Islamic, I mean as Secretary Hegseth said, you know, part of this and I think Secretary Rubio as well, was, you know, the Iran was building a conventional shield to enable a recovery of its nuclear ambitions. And so obviously as part of the, you know, end state without being too kind of linear about it, is to prevent an outcome where they don't have the incentive. And that's where the Venezuela model I think there's a realistic sense we have learned the lessons of Iraq and not being overly ambitious.

You do understand that Iran, comparing Iran to Venezuela is like, I don't know, comparing Kentucky to Venezuela. It's equally valid. Iran.

I don't think it's a perfect analogy, sir, but I think there I'm just making a point about in terms of the flexibility of the political objective. And of course the President has said it's a fact, this historic opportunity for the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow this noxious government. But that's not.

But that's no particular plan for that actually happening. That's more of a hope than a plan.

Well, that I can't—the Department of War has been instructed to focus on the military forces of Iran.

The second piece of this that I want—want to get into is I think what President Trump meant when he was on the campaign trail saying that we won't go to war—go—go to war with Iran is the same thing he meant if I was president the Ukraine war wouldn't have happened. That his mere presence and his policies will stop that. That's the America First agenda. So I guess how did the America First agenda fail in Iran? Because I think the president sincerely meant that. He sincerely meant you put me in the off—in office, I'm going to do things that's going to make sure that we don't go to war with Iran. He failed. We're at war with Iran and 14 other countries have been dragged into it. So the—the speech that you laid out was very well said, you know, and if that was what was happening, I'd have some quibbles, but at least we could live with it. But very clearly that agenda failed in Iran. Why?

I—I don't think, sir, it failed. I mean, the president has been uh consistent for many years that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon and it's a serious threat.

He's also been consistent that he would not—that—that war would—look, anyone can come in and blow stuff up. I mean, that option's been on the table and that's the option we've been taking a long time. And that was sort of the president's argument was I'm different. I'm so strong that this isn't going to happen on my watch. And he was wrong. It did.

I—I don't think that's—I don't think the president's wrong. I think the president's demonstrated, I mean, in his first term as well, but certainly in his second term, that he is prepared to use the military instrument. That's why he kind—keeps referring to peace through strength, of course, right? There's the strength element and it has to be credible. He has—I—I have a different assessment, sir. I do think he's—he's—he's used the peace and the diplomacy abundantly over the—over the last year and a half, right? I mean, all the peace deals, etcetera, spent a lot of time Gaza, for instance, uh you know, uh and—and many of these other conflicts. So I think he very much is prepared and he—he was willing to talk to the Islamic Republic, but I think that the—his determination and others, Mr. Kushner, Mr. Witkoff, Mr. Rubio was that the...

Thank you. I want to let some others get in here. That—that's a solid enough answer, but again, there's no question that—that—that he failed in the sense that, you know, he said there was going to be no war if he was president. Here we are. I mean, that—those—those are just facts. So we need to figure out how we got there. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Thank you, Chairman Rogers, for this timely hearing. America, I believe, is in a conflict we didn't choose. Dictators with rule of gun who are invading democracies with rule of law. It began, of course, in February 24, 2022, when war criminal Putin invaded Ukraine, and then it was followed up by the puppets of Iran invading Israel on October 7, 2023. With that in mind, uh I am grateful in your opening statement that you uh have cited the threat of the Chinese Communist Party and Iran, but the axis of evil includes war criminal Putin resurrecting the failed Soviet Union with mass murder in Ukraine since 2014, as Putin has rigged elections in Belarus and Georgia with Russian occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia of Georgia while occupying Transnistria of Moldova. Incredibly, President Trump has achieved the five percent GDP by NATO allies, but peace needs more secondary sanctions on war criminal Putin. Additionally, war criminal Putin, I believe, is insulting you. Uh he is mocking you personally, uh as President Trump has indicated. Uh he's—Putin speaks lovely in the morning and conducts mass murder in the afternoon. With that in mind, Secretary Colby, under the leadership of President Donald Trump, we're preventing endless wars, prioritizing American security and peace through strength. The National Defense Strategy seeks to shift responsibility for security in Middle East to Israel and our Arab partners and prioritize other threats, and you've indicated the other threats uh should be focused on—on the Indo-Pacific. Do you believe that Operation Epic Fury risks wasting the department's limited resources needed to deter war with China?

Uh I—Mr. uh Wilson, I think that the Operation Epic Fury is actually an example of exactly what—what was talked about in the strategy. Uh the threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran is—is explicitly detailed uh and also the ability for the president to be able to take uh effective action against those threats. It's actually a validation of the approach towards allies and partners because we see right now, obviously, Israel a model ally really taking the fight, but also if I could conclude, also the goal to maintain...

But in the meantime, we're going to—we're going to maintain every effort uh in uh success for Operation Epic Fury.

Absolutely. We're committed to making sure that Operation Epic Fury is a success.

And indeed, an extraordinary development today to me, Iran has attacked Azerbaijan and attacked Syria. Uh I am confident President Ilham Aliyev and Ahmad the president of uh Azerbaijan and Ahmad al-Shara, president of uh Syria, that Azerbaijan and uh Syria now will take action against Iran, which again uh adds to our capabilities of uh reducing the threat by Iran. Additionally, uh war criminal Putin continues and our allies in the NATO flank face sustained pressure. Congress is aligned with the clear objectives. Uh Congress appropriated $400 million for the European Capacity Fund to strengthen regional deterrence in partner capability. What is the policy's recommendation for using the $400 million appropriated in the European Capacity Fund?

Sir, I'd have to take that back. I'll get—I'm not uh familiar with the specific issue, but I'll commit to promptly getting back to you on that, sir.

Indeed, uh you set the policy guidance for the security cooperation and uh I would urge you that indeed, these funds should be used uh to support the brave and courageous people of Ukraine. Hey, for four years uh they've stood up to a murderous dictator. I uh was in Kyiv in December uh before the invasion and the entire planning was resistance and guerrilla warfare. The people of uh Ukraine have stood up uh for four years uh and war criminal Putin has actually lost uh nearly a million troops uh killed and wounded uh and uh every effort should be made to back up our—our Ukrainian allies in the intent of the $400 million Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which was authorized in the NDAA. Additionally, President Trump has made it clear that the Baltics and Poland are model NATO allies. The current force posture must be maintained for the benefit of American deterrence and commitment to the eastern flank from our allies of Bulgaria and Romania to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. And so I'm just uh again so hopeful that uh indeed policies uh will reflect uh the axis of evil needs to be defeated. Uh and it's war criminal Putin, uh it's the soon-to-be totally removed regime uh in Tehran and the Chinese Communist Party. With that, I yield back.

Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Thank—thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, uh in the unclassified NDS that uh again was just uh issued about a month ago, on page 11 it states, quote, "The Iran's regime is weaker and more vulnerable than it has been in decades and that their axis of resistance is similarly devastated." For anyone who understands the English language, your department uh clearly explicitly downgraded the threat that Iran poses to our nation. Yet suddenly on February 28, just a few weeks later, uh that all changed. Epic Fury was launched, six service members have lost their lives because of, in my opinion, a gross failure of force protection, and there still is no coherent explanation uh of what caused the change and what is the end game. And that's why if you look at public opinion polls uh over the last week uh across the board, there's been no rally around the flag uh reaction by the American public. First of all, they kind of took you at your word and the president at his word when he said that the nuclear threat was obliterated uh just a few months ago. Uh and now suddenly we're engaged in a war which uh again for a lot of people, um you know, feels very much like past experiences which didn't end uh very well. Um I want to also for a moment just focus on the NDS's uh sort of almost insulting comments about burden sharing by our European allies uh in NATO. Uh again, when you laid out in the—in the NDS what are the homeland security threats, what's the threats in the Western Hemisphere, there is not a word uh in there about the fact that Putin, even in the middle of the Ukraine war, has still been increasing his investment in its nuclear forces. Uh General Guillot from the uh Northern Command when he testified uh this past year in 2025, when he was asked the question again in a public setting, what are the threats to the homeland, uh made it very clear that the bomber fleet uh sorties that the Russians uh have been uh uh conducting over the North Atlantic coastline, uh that submarine patrols, uh there was a port visit in Cuba, uh and again, um you know, there's no question that uh for some of us who uh have had the briefings, um this is something that actually has been accelerating over the last few years or so. Not a mention, not a syllable uh in the NDS in terms of the Western Hemisphere threats uh that again you—you posted there. In terms of burden sharing, as the Norwegian prime minister pointed out to President Trump not too long ago, um he stated that the—the Russians' uh nuclear arsenal is 100 kilometers from its border in the Kola Peninsula. They are the eyes and ears for the United States of America in terms of patrols that go in and out uh from that region. They invested uh some serious money before President Trump was president uh in purchasing P-8s to conduct those ASW patrols. Denmark, UK, France, Greenland, Iceland, Canada, uh all of them are part of the effort to protect the U.S. homeland. And again, the—the premier made it very clear that arsenal's not aimed at Norway. It's aimed at us. So when—when is there going to be a recognition by, you know, your NDS about the fact that really I think probably the most existential threat to the homeland has over the years, decades really, uh been a team effort with our European allies, which they have gladly contributed to, even though for them it's not their number one closest uh security threat?

Well, thanks, sir. Uh maybe I could refer you to page 12 of the document. Uh it says Iran's leaders uh uh although it's suffered severe setbacks, it appears intent on reconstituting its conventional military forces and Iran's leaders have also left open the possibility they will try again to obtain a nuclear weapon. I won't go uh much further, but obviously the threat of Iran is countenanced in here and we talk about the burden sharing piece, but also the ability of the president to use force. And then, sir, I uh on page 10 about Russia, uh the document says, uh "Russia also possessed the world's largest nuclear arsenal, which it continues to modernize and diversify as well as undersea space and cyber capabilities that it can employ against the U.S. homeland." So, sir, obviously this is also the unclassified version, so I don't need to go into that, but I think it's demonstrably here.

Well, I've read the classified—I've actually read the classified version. It is radically different from the briefings that we've gotten from NORTHCOM and EUCOM over the years.

I—I just can't possibly agree with that. It's fully incorporated. We take those threats very seriously, sir.

Yeah, and unfortunately you don't give credit where credit is due in terms of our allies that again...

Sir, our allies are making tons of progress. I saw it in Europe. We're—we're moving out.

Again, this—this had preceded Trump. Uh really again, I have the—the submarine base in Groton where those patrols are happening. Uh again, that collaboration has been going on for many, many years.

Absolutely. We think alliances are actually important and not just symbols, sir. That's the big—the—the hack for what we're doing and it's working.

Well, they do too. They do too. That's what's missing in your NDS. I yield.

It's working, sir.

Gentleman's time's expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner.

Mr. Colby, this is going to be a nice transition uh from your conversation you just had turning you to page 10 where you were just referencing on Russia. You agree that Russia's an adversary and a—and a direct threat to the United States.

Russian military forces clearly pose a direct threat to the United States, of course. Yes.

Excellent. Uh you were just uh being interviewed in uh a uh publication Foreign Policy that was published February 2026 concerning uh our commitment to NATO. You acknowledged uh that the United States is committed to NATO. It is committed to Article 5. The administration from the president on down has made that clear. You—you made that statement unequivocally. Uh-huh. Uh however, you were then asked further questions about that statement after having made the unequivocal blank statement. And quite frankly, you waffled. Uh and I'm going to give you a chance to unwaffle. And the unwaffling is uh in that blanket statement, uh I think you made it clear that within NATO there are no territories within NATO that are second-class citizens. There are no territories within NATO that are not uh within our Article 5 commitment, correct? The Baltics, the Balkans, there are no areas in which we have a lesser commitment.

Sir, I respect that you're making those statements. What I said is we are committed to Article 5, which is enshrined in the Washington Treaty. That's what I said.

So to make it clear so that your waffling which goes on page after page, since you are capable of making the blanket statement, you are capable of saying that within the blanket statement that the United States is committed to NATO, NATO the aggregate of NATO, and is committed to Article 5, you are capable within in front of this committee that is committed to NATO and committed to Article 5 to acknowledge that there is no territory within NATO that there's a second-class citizen and there's no area within which that in within our National Defense Strategy is a lesser territory.

Sir, what I said and what I continue to say is that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty...

It's a yes or no question, Mr. Colby, and I'm a member of Congress and you have ability to say yes that there is no lesser.

I have tremendous respect. What I said, sir, is that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty applies to all of NATO. Of course, absolutely.

Great. Thank you. Thank you for that. Because you didn't have to go on and on and to continue which is what everybody's struggling with here. And I want to just say, I want to agree with the chairman. What's been so difficult and which is really kind of gross sitting here listening to you is the chairman has said he feels like you're dishonest, right? And you have been so disingenuous every time you answer a question. You feel this need to just just continue on in this in these a clarifications that are really very unnecessary. And that this clarifications that you give make us all concerned about your commitment to the truth. And I want to give you some of those clarifications that make me uncertain and really very concerned about the policymaking within the department. You talk about the Trump administration when people ask you questions about the president's decision-making. When we're asking about President Trump, you redefine it as the Trump administration. You say our decisions are aligned with the president, as if you're reinterpreting the president's decision-making. I want to know about the president's decision-making, not you being your interpretation about being aligned. So tell me you're not trying to make decisions where you're just divining an alignment with the president and interpretation that President Trump is the one making decisions because up here we're losing confidence as to whether or not Mr. Colby's going into a room and trying to decide whether or not he's aligned with the president or whether or not President Trump's making decisions because we're all comfortable with Mr. Trump's and President Trump's decision, we're not comfortable with Mr. Colby's.

Well, sir, a couple things. First of all, I make it a point of being truthful, so I categorically reject your characterization, but I'm happy to answer your questions here otherwise.

Well, the chairman, and you didn't reject it when he was straight up telling you that he had had conversations with you and was very concerned about what you'd said to him and then what had happened.

I believe I'm just making the point in general. We make it very much our business, part of being truthful is I give you a sense of what I know and what I don't know. I can't speak, I'm not often, the secretary is the one who's primarily over in the White House, but we make sure that we are very lined up. He's secretary is with the president all the time and we get...

You said it again, lined up, lined up. I want you to make certain that the decision-making is President Trump.

I'm definitely in line with the president and I am a loyal lieutenant of the president, Mr. Turner. I can assert that absolutely.

Well, we are very, very concerned in this committee that that is not necessarily happening at times and that's what we try to assert and what we try to make certain happens. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mike, for bringing very serious clarity to this issue. So I think where we're going here is instead of saying the administration, we're going to start saying the president. So the very first page of the president's National Defense Strategy states that the department will no longer, quote, be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building. In the last three months, however, this the president, I had the word administration here but I'm going to follow on you, the president has started wars of choice in South America, the Middle East, and he's failed to lay out any strategic plan for an end game or a consistent justification for these efforts. By the president's own account, he has decided to use missile strikes to murder people in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific, raid and seize the dictator of a foreign country, and he, the president, has started a war with Iran and placed our troops in harm's way in the Middle East. He's also the president has also refused to directly supply necessary weapons to Ukraine. And the president has said he wants Greenland. All of this raises the question of what in the hell is going on? What is what is the strategy? What is the purpose of all of this? The president also said that on day one he would be a dictator. He didn't say when he would end his dictatorship. But for those of us that have observed the president and his policies and his rather wild strategies, we're going it appears as though this dictatorship's not going to end. And you're here basically carrying the president's water and trying to answer the questions that this committee has raised. If it hasn't been clear to you yet, we're concerned that the president and his staff and minions are disrespecting the Congress of the United States, this committee, and simply going to do whatever a dictator wants to do. Now, am I correct that the president is going to do whatever he wants to do, wakes up in the morning and says, well, we obliterated the nuclear program in Iran. A couple of months go by, he wakes up in the morning and said, we're going to go to war with Iran because of their nuclear capability. I don't get it. And if you've not yet figured out from the comments of my colleagues up here, we don't get it. But indeed we seem to have a president that every morning wakes up with a different strategy. So where are we going here? Can you explain what the president wants to accomplish in the Caribbean? Well, he removed the dictator, but the same regime's in place. And by current reports, the military is now engaged in a some effort, maybe not a war, but some effort in Ecuador. That was not explained to this committee either. So what's going on here? Do you, a representative of the president, understand the Constitution? The Constitution gives the Congress of the United States the sole power to wage war. We can debate what the authorization to use force is all about. So please explain to me in the next 30 seconds, what in the hell is this president doing?

I'm honored to be here as a representative of the president and to explain that I do think he's advancing American interests and putting them first. In the case of the Caribbean, he's going after narcoterrorists that have been directly contributing to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans. And the Middle East, he's taking action against the noxious Islamic Republic of Iran, which I know on both sides of the aisle there's a shared sense of the threat.

Excuse me, in the president's National Defense Strategy, he said he would not be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building, but that is precisely that is precisely what's going on.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Colby, for joining us. I want to pick up where Senator Wicker left off. Taiwan is not mentioned in the National Defense Strategy and what we say publicly and what's in a document really matter. You know that the Congress has provided $850 million in the presidential drawdown authority for Taiwan. You know that we provided $1 billion in the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative. And despite clear congressional intent and even the direction in your strategy, it doesn't appear as though any of those dollars have been executed by the department. What's the status of that funding? And has any of it been spent on defense materials, training, or equipment upgrades for Taiwan?

Congressman, I'm not exactly sure about exactly the status, so let me commit to get back to you with the detailed information.

Well, you told Senator Wicker 48 hours ago that you would do the same, that you would get back to him. So you're telling us that in 48 hours you still still don't know what's going on?

We're still within the 48-hour window, sir. So we'll make sure we're within that window or barely over it and I'll ask your forgiveness if that's the case.

It's concerning to me that within 48 hours when you promised Senator Wicker that you'd get that information that it's not forthcoming.

Take that responsibility to engage with you seriously, sir.

I want to get your perspective too on our efforts to work with partners and how we enable our partners. The president's asked our allies to do more. To their credit in NATO, they've all anted up and said that they're going to do their 5 percent, some of them at different paces, but by 2035 it looks like everybody's going to be in line with that. We ask Europe to take the lead in what we're doing to counter Russia. And our message should, I think, be crystal clear. If we step up and make investments in the defense in cooperation with our NATO allies, and we need to be selling Europe our best weapons to make sure that they're in line with what the threat is on the Russian side. And I believe the president's America First arms transfer executive order sends that clear signal. But if our American allies can't buy U.S. weapons, I worry they're going to be in a really, really bad spot because there's no other place to go and we certainly don't want them going to other folks out there. Tell me this, what's what's the message to our allies like the Baltic states or Poland that are meeting or exceeding the 5 percent target? They're all in, but are being told U.S. weapons that they purchased are being delayed or not prioritized. So they're all in, they have the money, they've paid for it, and now they're being told by the way you're not going to get the weapons, somehow the priority list has been changed and somebody else is higher on the priority list. And yet we see an even greater threat by Russia and what they're doing to build their defense industrial base, which creates an even greater threat, and yet we're not doing the things that we're lecturing the Europeans about doing and not providing them weapons. Give us a perspective on how we're going to close that gap.

Sure. Well, actually, Congressman, the way you laid it out, I think is pretty similar to how we see it. I mean, I think we're in excellent we've 2025 was about reframing, 2026 we're getting down to business. The Europeans are moving. I can say that from personal experience, not least in in Brussels and Munich as well as Asian allies like South Korea and I think we're optimistic about Japan and Australia and New Zealand as well. We are ahead of this problem. We share your sense of urgency coming down from the president. I think we've got three main things we're focusing on. One is the president's historic proposal for a $1.5 trillion defense budget. That is a massive signal of the seriousness with which, you know, he and we all take the situation, conscious of the, you know, resource issues that Mr. Smith mentioned, but that's a signal of how serious it is. Second, money is a critical predicate but it's insufficient. We need to have better performance from defense industry. And that's why, you know, the president is convening defense industry leaders tomorrow. You have from the president, the secretary, the deputy secretary, Under Secretary Duffy was here yesterday, absolute commitment to getting better performance and I think you're seeing a lot of progress because we all need to know, you know, we want to be able to get our services where there are unacceptable timeline delays, but also green our allies. And this is not a situation where there's picking and choosing and try to poke at people. We need everybody to be able to get what they need faster. And this, sir, is where I would turn it around to you and to the Congress is where we all need to lean into together, also with our allies. This is where the conversation is. If I may say some of the conversation in the last few minutes has been a little bit backward looking. Where we are and where our allies' conversation is, NATO 3.0, let's get down to business. For instance, we're talking very closely with the Germans about how they're about to make a very significant investment in defense. How do we scale that together to get the best outcome for both of us? Also recognizing that while we need American industry to be eligible in European other markets, there's also going to be growth in the European and allied defense space. And that's actually to all of our benefit. That's where we're heading. I'm confident that under President Trump's leadership we will be able to get through this transition, but we did need to have the clarity and continue to need to have that clarity. But if you look at Secretary General Rutte, he's singing from the same sheet of music as we all are.

Very good. Thank you. I'll reiterate too that the chairman's focus on this year's NDAA is growing the industrial base to make sure we can do those things. We have to do that at the speed of relevance.

Absolutely. And we support that as well, sir.

Mr. Chairman, with that I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, thank you very much for visiting my office for a long discussion last year. I appreciated that engagement. My reading of the NDS is that it clearly ranks threats around the world, putting the homeland first, deterring China second, and everything else a distant third. Is that accurate?

I think the homeland is obviously put first in the same way as it was in 2018. I think the first island chain is kind of the significant weight of effort that military focuses as I said in my opening statement.

So the strategy also focuses quite carefully on the risk of simultaneity, meaning two simultaneous conflicts, either pre-coordinated or because an adversary takes advantage of us being tied down somewhere else. If that is a significant concern and China is the greatest threat, doesn't beginning a war in Iran not really help with deterring China?

I think the strategy is not saying that we're not going to do operations, and this happened under administrations of both parties. It actually specifically goes into that. It's saying we need to be prepared for this. Obviously, the things I mentioned, but also the allies and partners stepping up. And we do see that actually in the Middle East right now. We see Israel, the Gulf partners, hopefully some of our European...

So one of the things that we discussed in my office was concerns about magazine depth, which you know you've heard both from this committee and the China committee. Are you concerned about that today in the Indo-Pacific?

I think what we're, look, I think we have anticipated this reality. We feel good about where we are. Nobody...

You anticipated, just to be clear, you anticipated a war with Iran using hundreds of thousands...

No, no, we anticipated the need for dramatic action on, that's exactly what the strategy says under the president's leadership, is we know we need, we have very significant magazine depths across the force. That is also going to be able to support presidents of either party, etc., in the future being able to use the military, but we need to get better performance. And that's why we're all leaning in on...

But you're not, you're not concerned about the number of missiles that we are using in Iran today?

I'm confident in the situation.

Okay, that is not a view shared by many of the officers who work in the Pentagon. So to confirm, just to be clear, you're arguing that fighting a war with Iran helps to deter China. Is that accurate?

Well, I think there's different debates about this. This is about the threat the Islamic Republic poses directly. That's sufficient for the justifying the action. And we have a scoped objective and right now, sir, and you know this from your distinguished military background, we have gotten through a lot of the preliminary campaign of bringing down the air defense and now we're getting on topic and we're using, as the president indicated, a lot more of the munitions, which we have in very plentiful supply. So I think we're going to be in good shape. And this just, sir, I would turn...

So just to be clear, you think we're going to be in good shape for deterring China because we're bogged down in the Middle East with a war against Iran and we're not using much of our magazine depth.

I think if we activate what the president and we are calling for and with support from the Congress and better performance of the defense industry and better behavior and sort of contributions by allies, we're going to be in great shape.

So let me just ask, does the war, does that Operation Epic Fury deter China?

I think there's an argument that it can have some deterrent effect because I do see, what I do see is that...

Just yes or no, do you think...

Well, I know we want to know. I can give you more specificity. We do see that others around the world, and conscious that we're in an open hearing, are very impressed by the prowess of the joint force and are...

But do you think, as someone who's focused on China for a long time, do you think it deters?

It contributes to deterrence, yeah. I think that's fair.

Okay, and yet for years you have argued that supporting Ukraine does not help deter China. So can you square that circle for us?

I can, because I mean, first of all, I'm a public government official at this point. This document and this effort by our administration are precisely to get ahead of a problem. That's what strategy is about. This administration is getting after the munitions problem under the president's leadership and the secretary's leadership, and we need help from Congress, Republicans and Democrats, to say not only the money, but a better effort by our... As Ms. Jacobs and I were talking about this the other day, we need better performance by our defense industry. I think that's something that's shared across...

Mr. Colby, getting after our magazine depth problem is not shooting them all off in the Middle East. All right? I don't think that really helps. Now look, you talk about a lot about burden sharing. And I think there's bipartisan agreement on the value of burden sharing. We might disagree on how we treat our allies, but we all want them to do our part. The NDS states, "The Department of War will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies." Those are the words you wrote in the National Defense Strategy. How does the U.S. going to war with Iran represent our allies taking primary responsibility for the Iran threat?

Well, I think Israel is a pretty excellent example of the kind of ally we want that is taking, I mean, they're taking a lot of responsibility. Obviously, the United States is also...

Oh no, just to be clear, Senator Rubio said that we are burden sharing for Israel because we started the war on their timeline. So I'm asking how our allies are burden sharing for us.

I'm sorry, can you say that again? Sorry.

I'm asking how our allies are burden sharing for us.

Well, I mean, Israel is obviously doing it. We see it from the Gulf partners where there's a lot of munitions depth, etc. So and actually some of the European... The Jordanian prime minister said that they would contribute...

Okay, we're coming to the end. How many pages was your opening statement? I'll tell you, 1,700 words, 177 sentences. You devoted one sentence to the war in Iran and not one word to the six soldiers who have been killed in action. Do you think that's appropriate today?

I have only the deepest respect for those soldiers and their families, sir.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Stefanik.

Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Mr. Colby, this is somewhat following up on previous questions. There's been public reporting as well as President Trump's statements on munition stockpiles, and my colleague Mr. Moulton touched upon this. Can you please give the department's assessment on munition stockpiles, what we can anticipate over the next year? I understand we're in an open setting, but the reason I'm asking the question is it will be Congress that appropriates and authorizes through a supplemental. So if you could lay out what you're able to in this open setting.

Sure, ma'am. And obviously we're in an open setting, but I think this obviously has our top priority attention. The $1.5 trillion figure, I'm not exactly sure how that might be broken up in terms of congressional engagement, but I know there's significant engagement from the secretary, deputy secretary, Under Secretary Duffy, etc. So I'm not sure I can get into more specificity here, but, you know, that's obviously as the president indicated in his Truth Social the other evening, that's going to be a top priority for us.

In the National Defense Strategy, the prioritization on homeland defense is incredibly important. It's important not only to the entire country, but specifically to a district like mine given the importance of missile defense. Can you tell me a little bit about the administration's focus on East Coast missile defense site? In the first Trump administration, you will recall that the president designated Fort Drum as the chosen location for East Coast missile defense site. This committee has passed that language. What is the status of that and what is the plan for that moving forward?

Ma'am, I'll have to get back to you as quickly as possible with an answer on that just on the precise status, but obviously the administration's committed to implementing the president's Golden Dome approach. So I think, you know, we see a strong future for missile defense, but I'll get back...

And implementing the NDAA and the language in the NDAA with the selection of Fort Drum as the missile East Coast missile defense site.

I'm sorry, can...

And the intention is to implement the language in the NDAA.

I have no reason to think otherwise, but I'll get back to you, ma'am.

Okay. I guess just broadly, as you know, Mr. Colby, I represent the 10th Mountain Division, which I've just referenced. It's the most deployed division in the U.S. Army since 9/11. Currently, a brigade is deployed to the Middle East. Can you share a message to those soldiers and their families whom I represent in my district? These are families I speak with every single day as their member of Congress, and they'd appreciate to hear from you.

Well, I think I can say on behalf of the leadership of the department that they have, you know, our deepest respects and a sense of their honorable duty in a cause that is, you know, very much in the American people's interests and that we are thinking very carefully and soberly about, you know, how we consider putting them in harm's way. So they can be confident, I can say, you know, Secretary Hegseth is personally leading day by day, hour by hour, really focused attention, obviously with the uniform seniors, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Cooper, etc. So I think they can feel they've got fantastic leadership under President Trump.

Well, we are grateful for their service and our hearts and prayers go out to the six service members in the U.S. military and their families for the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of our country. My final question, Mr. Colby, is as we know, the CCP and the Iranian terrorist regime have long been close allies and partners, exchanging oil, munitions, and technology to repress their people. What is your assessment of the CCP posture today and also what are your biggest concerns over the next six months to a year now that there has been the start of Operation Epic Fury?

Well, thank you, ma'am. I think we're watching this very closely. I'd have to be a little elliptical in open hearing, but I think as I mentioned to Mr. Moulton, I mean, they certainly have been impressed by the prowess of the joint force, the ability to operate so effectively together. So I think that's been a salutary message for, you know, kind of stability. My understanding is the Chinese obviously they're very dependent on energy resources coming out of the Middle East, so that's something they're watching very closely. One thing I think in the administration from the president on down, you know, we don't, the president doesn't use terms like axis of evil and these kinds of things. I think obviously we are, as Mr. Moulton put it, concerned about the potential for simultaneity, but we want to avoid it. So part of that is the military part, but obviously the president's diplomacy is designed to engage with our potential opponents, obviously from a very clear-eyed point of view, from peace through strength point of view, but that's designed to avoid that very outcome. And I would distinguish that from the last administration where Mr. Sullivan, I think, spoke at the end of the last administration about how our adversaries, quote-unquote, were aligned to an unprecedented degree. And if you go back and you look at Henry Kissinger or something, the standard for a successful American foreign policy, you don't want everybody ganging up against you. And I think the president is very clear-eyed, obviously he's very realistic, but he's willing to engage in diplomacy from a realistic frame. And then our job is to provide that peace through strength approach, for instance, in the context of China.

Thank you. Yield back.

Gentlelady's time has expired. Gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal, is recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, thank you for being here today. And finally, finally coming to this committee. I think many of my colleagues in this room from both sides of the aisle agree that communication coming from the department to Congress has been lacking. Trump has consistently said his administration is the most transparent in history. And I assume that that is something you take to heart. I'm going to ask you a few questions and if you could not filibuster and answer the questions as simple and straightforward as possible, I would appreciate it.

Sir, I'll have to get back to you with a specific answer.

SOUTHCOM and SOCOM did not have funding appropriated for these appropriations. What accounts were used for these appropriations for these operations?

Sir, I'll have to get back to you with an answer. Obviously, I'm not responsible for the primarily for the budget.

Mr. Colby, is it safe to assume you were involved in decisions and discussions leading to Operation Epic Fury?

Sir, I've been involved in, yeah, most of these kind of policy and strategy related decisions.

The president recently said he has a very beautiful plan for what comes next in Iran. For the sake of transparency and for us on this committee and the American people, could you please share what Trump's so-called beautiful plan is?

Well, sir, as I said earlier, my focus is mostly my work is mostly in the Pentagon, so I, you know, rely on our secretary and the chairman who are over in the White House. I wouldn't add or say anything to presume to interpret the president's words, but we're paying a lot of attention to making sure as is as he has instructed, that we have a good outcome and a sustainable intelligent one that serves Americans' interests in a lasting way.

Mr. Colby, we're not getting some answers from you. We're getting a lot of rhetoric and oftentimes no answers to our questions, no information. In the National Defense Strategy, our allies are criticized for, and I quote, "investing in domestic programs." To a majority of the world, investing in domestic programs is also known as governing and taking care of your citizens. And I get this criticism was made in the context of allies not investing enough in defense. But even when a country is doing everything right, they seem to be punished by this administration. Take the Baltic nations, NATO's eastern flank, for example. They have consistently led defense spending by GDP in Europe, each topping 3 percent. And despite this, the administration attempted to zero out programs like the Baltic Security Initiative. What else should a NATO ally be doing, in your opinion, if their commitment to defense spending isn't enough to have this administration's support, then what is?

Sir, I find it a little paradoxical that the, you know, it sounds like you advocate for more domestic programs. It's the American people who have been paying to indirectly subsidize, and don't take it from me, sir, Minister of Defense Collins from New Zealand has made this exact point. The Secretary's pointed out that $22 trillion in debt. If you could just answer my question, I would appreciate it. So our allies have invested in their domestic societies. That's not fair. I mean, it seems kind of common sense to me, but it's also not sustainable. And the Europeans and the others, they're not contesting it. What do they have to do? Sir, they just have to step up and do their part. To invest heavily in defense. And sir, let me be very clear, we are we are actually adapting. So I mean, if you look at my travels last month to Brussels and to Munich, that was the message and that was the message the Europeans perceived. And I would say a lot of this is a little bit we're miss we're behind the the target because we are actually working with our allies. They're not fighting the scenario. Everybody knows we're all on the same page, sir. I reclaim my time. Let me ask a few basic questions. Is Russia's illegal war in Ukraine a threat to the United States? Sir, we're all supporting the end of the war in Ukraine. Yes or no? Just yes or no. And sir, we take the Russian military capability. Mr. Colby, how simple is it to answer yes or no? We're taking the Russian military threat seriously, sir. Yeah.

Is Ukraine a friendly country?

Is it a friendly country? Yes, I think so. Yes.

Thank you. I would encourage you to answer our questions and not filibuster with a bunch of BS. Thank you.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.

Thank you, Chairman. Secretary Colby, I'm probably going to take a little different approach than than some of my colleagues have here, but as the subcommittee chair on strategic forces, I have a lot under my umbrella that is the President's priorities, including Golden Dome, advancement in space, nuclear modernization, missile defense, and so, you know, pretty much all things we're talking about here. So, you know, what concerns me the most looking forward is a conflict with China. I would say, you know, people are questioning daily why now, why did we go after Iran? And I would say why not anytime in the last 47 years because we could have spent the next hour talking about all the death and destruction that they've caused directly as a regime and what they've done through their proxies with the Houthis and Hezbollah and Hamas. And so when we talk about cutting the head off the snake, if that's what we're doing right now, how long would you anticipate the proxies to dry up because we know all their weapons, money, and training comes from Iran?

Well, sir, we're not going to close the President's decision space, but obviously I think you've heard the President talk about four weeks roughly for the military campaign. I think the Chairman has talked about three to five weeks in terms of the designated objectives, hopefully getting into a good place, but obviously that's that's going to be as long as the President dictates or as short, that's going to be up to him.

And I would rank China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as our four biggest adversaries in that order. What we're doing right now in Iran, if we were in a conflict with China, would we have the capacity to do both?

Sir, I think we're in we're in very good shape in large part because of the President's leadership, because this strategy is designed to get after the defense industrial capacity and the readiness and the restoration of the warfighting ethos that will allow us and the stepping up by our allies and partners rapidly that will allow us to deal with the full range of potential challenges.

And none of us have a crystal ball. We don't know how this is going to turn out, but I think it's looking pretty good. I think that there's a real opportunity for the Iranian people to take their government back. Over 80 percent want that. And and you know, I am optimistic that we are doing significant damage to the regime that we would not be able to do if we were in a conflict with China. And I think China does take notice in deterring China. Let me put it this way, the best way to win a conflict with China and Taiwan is to not let it start. And I think this is a good way to do it. Let me ask this, and I don't know if you can say in open setting, it doesn't seem like Iran has many friends, and the friends that or were at least neutral to them they're attacking. Do you see any sign that anybody's running to Iran's rescue?

Sir, if I could just briefly address, I think the way you put it the best way to deal with the challenge of China is is not to fight it from a position of strength where interests are respected and that's exactly the approach President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have given us. I've actually been quite struck by how little support there is for Iran. And of course they've made that situation worse by taking shots at people countries throughout the Gulf, Turkey, etc.

Yeah. And I think Trump is we were not happy with what he did in Romania by pulling troops without telling us about it. You know, we're on Team America. This committee is is probably one of the last bipartisan committees in Congress that I can see. And and we're on your side and and we I do ask that we get better communication because we we want to help you, we want to help America, and we want to do this right. And we can't do that without, you know, better direction, better clarification, and the fact that we feel like that you trust us because we do have to speak to our allies and their ambassadors and all that. And if if what we're telling them is not consistent with what the President is doing, it makes our job much more difficult. You know, China is projected to have over a thousand nuclear warheads by 2030, vastly surpassing our capacity. They're also heavily investing in area denial systems and massively in ground test infrastructure compared to what we have in the United States, advancing in hypersonics and, you know, their shipbuilding capacity is probably 230 times what the U.S. is. So how does the National Defense Strategy hold China at risk and pace in fight with all these advanced advancements?

Well, thank you, sir. And maybe I'll answer those questions together. And I appreciate your trust, sir, and I I appreciate also your points about communication. I think as I said earlier, we've been leaning forward on on the policy side over the last four, five months. So I think we've got a good track record, but we can always do better. And I'd welcome myself or my team both sitting down with you and your staff, others who are interested. We're we're an open door and would welcome the communication. Obviously, we now have a settled framework obviously from reflects the Secretary, but with, you know, on down from the President alignment there. But I would say on that issue, we're actually thinking about a nuclear strategy. We're not going to do a formal nuclear posture review of the whole, you know, bells and whistles because I think the first term President Trump's NPR a lot of the things set out publicly were were superb. So but we are going to focus in on a few problems that I can't get into in open setting, but welcome talking to you and your team about that if that's of interest.

Gentleman's time expired. Chair now recognizes gentleman from California, Mr. Khanna.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Secretary Colby, good to see you. As you know, I've read your book, Strategy of Denial, and I've appreciated your counsel in the past. How many major wars has China been in since 1979?

I'm I think zero.

Zero. I mean, the Vietnam-Chinese war in '79 was their last major war. How many major wars has the United States been in since 1979?

I'd hesitate to give you a figure, sir, but, you know, three or four or five.

Dozens? Four or five major ones and probably dozens of interventions. And in the past, you have written eloquently, and I know you say it's your personal opinion, but you've written eloquently about how draining resources into the Middle East, which has very little percent of the GDP, is actually a strategic disadvantage versus China. That basically China's free riding, they don't fight the wars, we've been spending all this money on these wars in the Middle East. I understand you work for the President, but how do you reconcile this view? Because one of the reasons I respected you is you said, look, we're we're getting in all these wars in the Middle East, Iran's like .44 percent of the GDP, and we've got to be focused on China.

Well, thanks, Congressman. I'd turn it back to some of our conversations if I may if I may say. I think I've always said that the Iran is a threat and we're going after it with scoped military objectives and that's what I committed to in my confirmation hearing almost exactly a year ago. So I think this is, you know, I have I'm very supportive of of this effort of Operation Epic Fury. And I know and I personally am involved, I wouldn't overstate my involvement or influence certainly, but and I know from the top top down we are thinking about how to make sure this is net beneficial for the American people. But the real answer, sir, is in is in the industrial policy kind of discussions that you've been leading on on your side of the aisle, but there's I think consensus on, which is we've got to be able to produce at a higher level, more quickly, the the best stuff, but also lower cost stuff. And that's why, you know, the real message of the strategy, and the strategy is more of a heuristic or a framework than a particular, you know, settled point in time, is rather to say we need a national mobilization of our defense industrial base. And sir, I think that's what you've been saying.

No, I I appreciate that. Let me ask you this way because I know you can't contradict the President. What are the biggest risks of the operation continuing in Iran? Is it sort of the munitions drain? Is it the treasury drain? What what would you say? My hope is you'll be one of the voices in the administration saying let's end this quickly. What what do you see are the biggest risks?

Well, I think there are a range of risks and they have to be weighed against the significant benefit of of obviously kind of at minimum the significant degradation or destruction of Iranian conventional military power and the possibility of a dramatic change to a much friendlier Iranian government. We're not the military campaign is not riding on that as a designated outcome, but we're hoping for it and that's a lot of that's in the in the hands of the of the Iranian people. I think that a lot of it would be, you know, and something to say on the munitions piece, sir, is that we've gotten over top now or we're getting over top, our forces are getting over top, so they can use a lot of these munitions that we do have as the President said in much more plentiful supply. I think we're conscious of the risks. I mean, we know what the this is part of the reason for it is the Islamic Republic has conducted terrorism in the past. We're very acutely conscious of that. But I think a goal this is why, you know, we don't this is not Iraq, I guess 3.0, right? This is we are not doing nation building. We are not flowing obviously the President has the option to use a variety of capabilities, but this is not, you know, Jerry Bremer, CPA, etc.

Let me ask one more question, my time. And my my goal is to have your voice uplifted, so I don't want to ask you hard questions because maybe they'll discount your voice. I I like the fact that you're in the administration compared to some of the other folks who are in the administration. By the way, the Vice President Vance used to be where you were in terms of not getting into these wars until he's gone in the kind of Lindsey Graham direction. I actually don't understand it. Donald Trump beat Lindsey Graham in 2016 and now Lindsey Graham has become the face of Donald Trump's foreign policy. It's like what happened? But let me ask you this last question. The the what about the view that Iran is just going to rebuild these things in six months, in one year? What what is the plan? You know, General Petraeus said what is the plan after Iraq? What is the plan? Are we going to go bomb them again?

Well, I think that's a that's a great question, sir, and that's the one that we're wanting to make sure and part of the reason why the industrial capacity is such a part of it. And I certainly am thinking about General Petraeus's famous admonition because that's a critical part and this is still obviously the the conflict has just begun, but we need to day by day in a dynamic situation make sure that we end up and we don't and the President has said that we don't get right back into it.

Let me just—I have 10 seconds. You're a serious person. I hope this doesn't hurt you more than help you, but I've always found you to be engaged with intellectual honesty and I appreciate some of your writing.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bacon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Secretary Colby you being here today. My feedback, I got some good, maybe some bad, some ugly. On the good side, I appreciate the actions taken against Iran. I served 30 years in the Air Force. I've lost friends to the Iranian proxy groups, a good friend of mine at Khobar Towers, for example. When I was in Iraq, we were targeted every single day by proxy groups from the IRGC. This action should have been done a long time ago to restore deterrence. And I can't think of a better group of folks to target than the Ayatollah and his henchmen because they have over 1,000 Americans' blood on their hands. I appreciate the action taken against Maduro, who took the most wealthy nation to the poorest nation in South America. For the life of me though, I can't figure out why we're propping up his Vice President as a dictator follow-on. Here's the ugly. First of all, maybe less ugly, China. Some of the statements and I read in the NDS, it communicates weakness to them that China could just do an invasion of Taiwan as a fait accompli and it sort of communicates we don't have the ability maybe to deter that. We'll come back to that. But this is what really steams me. The administration writ large, starting with the President on down, communicates weakness when it comes to Russia. Why does this administration—and this is rhetorical, I'll get to my first question—but I can't figure out why the President treats Zelenskyy and Ukraine more harshly than he does Putin, who's the invader, who's bombing cities every night. He treats Putin with velvet gloves, but he gives Zelenskyy the old boxing glove treatment and I don't get it. There's like a moral blindness in this administration when it comes to Russia. And you see it in the NDS with one line on Russia, one line. Whole pages on Europe and attacking Europe or criticizing Europe and one sentence on Russia. It just bothers me. When I read the NDS, and I'm a history guy and I've read the previous NDSs here and as a general and colonel I read the ones going farther back, this reads a lot like 1890s National Security Strategy. Western Hemisphere, spheres of influence, homeland security, as if we never fought a World War, as if we never had the Cold War, as if we never had the War on Terror where we had allies fighting with us in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I'll get to my first question. In the NDS, it does say there has to be clear accountability. Incentives work and will be a critical part of our alliance. We will prioritize cooperation with model allies, those providing what they need to do and doing more against regional threats with critical but limited U.S. support. I can't figure out why the Pentagon said they didn't want to do the Baltic Security Initiative and also talk about withdrawing forces out of the Baltics when they lead the way. They have the highest level of defense spending. So why not be stronger for our Baltic friends?

Well, sir, I've seen your commentary and one thing I must say I appreciate today is I think you rightly recognize this as part of—from the President and the Secretary on down, we're all thinking the same way. And so it's a total myth that we're not aligned with the President. And I appreciate your point and your questions like Congressman Khanna's, they're straightforward, so I'll grapple with them in the same spirit that you offered and I'm happy to come talk. I know we have different views and different views with many in the administration, but I appreciate the way you've framed it, sir, and don't take it for granted. I would say, sir, from what it sounds like, I mean this document and the National Security Strategy describing the President's approach, and I'll get to your question, sir, is flexible realism. It's a practical approach. It sounds, I think it's a bit different than yours in some ways. Maybe yours has been in the ascendancy in the past and we're trying to make a break, but we're not trying to con you about it. It's pretty straightforward. I recognize obviously your distinguished military service. This is more kind of grounded in military reality, almost like a more empirical kind of dispassionate way and less in the rhetorical style. Sir, one thing I would really stress on is we see ourselves as in line with the Cold War legacy and more of a break from the post-1989 when I think we got a bit hubristic as the document says. I don't—we don't talk about spheres of influence. That's something that's put on us. And I can—we can get into a discussion about the 1890s, that's interesting. On Baltic Security Initiative, let me get back to you on the—we are not trying to punish the Baltic states. The President has been clear that our wealthy allies should be prepared to step up. We're looking at this all in a pragmatic way with generally trying to get Europe moving in the same direction. Just as predecessor sir said about China, the goal with Russia is to avoid a war while, you know, and to Mr. Turner's point about protecting NATO, but we got to do it in a militarily realistic way and you know this very well, sir.

So my opinion is if Ukraine prevails, our world is a much darker, worse place. We're going to be spending a lot more money. We should be doing more in Eastern Europe, particularly helping out Ukraine right now with weapons, sanctions. But the President does not communicate that and it's really I think it's his biggest failure right now because you look at every poll, you look at 30 different issues, Ukraine polls second worst to the worst in every poll and it's because he communicates weakness. I hope you take that back to the President and the White House. Thanks.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, you've said throughout this hearing that you're consulting with the President, the Vice President regularly, great conversations. In fact, you said that you don't do—this is I think your earlier testimony today—you do not do anything not aligned with the President. So I have a question for you. In July, in last July, it was reported that your office suspended U.S. weapons shipments to Ukraine, including but not limited to precision-guided rockets, 155 munitions, and Patriot missiles. And this risked Ukraine lives, it undermined our credibility not just with Ukraine but with our allies, the 50 countries that are part of this alliance, and it made it harder to get to an end to this war. And this decision seemingly took place out of nowhere. Now, this took place at your office, yet the President was asked about this a few days later in the Oval Office and he denied making any order to suspend this. He said, I'll be the first to know, in fact, most likely I'll give the order, but I haven't done that yet. So the President, who you're in consultation with all the time and you're always aligned with, well, he disagreed with this. He said he didn't do anything. He said it didn't happen even though it did and it's your office. So tell us who made that decision. Did the President make the decision the way he alluded to or did you make that decision? Now, the President said from the Oval Office that he didn't make that decision, so who did? Who made that decision that caused such great risk that I just outlined to you? Was it you, sir, since it's your office?

Would you like me to answer or no, sir? Okay. Well, let me just clarify something, sir. I don't—I'm particularly focused on my interactions with the Secretary who interacts with the President, so just to be—just to be clear, not to overstate my access to the President, I wouldn't presume to do so. But obviously we make a point of staying—I make a personal...

Well, you don't appear in concert with the President on this.

I'm aligned—totally aligned with the presidential intent.

Well, well then explain—explain how you weren't aligned in this instance.

Well, sir, I think we are aligned and I'll get to that in a second. First of all, I'm not in the chain of command, so I can't order something and I wouldn't...

It was your office. So tell me who made that suspension decision.

So there is—so there is, sir, so there is a memorandum as has been described before that lays out a framework for making intelligent decisions based on...

No, I don't want this. Listen. You're getting—you're getting something out of the—you had all—please, I'm reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman. Listen, you're getting a chance maybe that you're not getting all morning to deal with a specific instance, a specific time that requires a clear-cut answer. So don't give me policy or framework. I'm asking you who the hell made that decision that endangered so many people's lives.

Sir, there's a memorandum...

Everyone's the—you're like the, you know, the three monkeys. See no evil, hear no evil.

The pause—the alleged pause, we didn't—I'm not in a position to order a pause. I didn't order a pause. I wouldn't presume to order a pause.

Then who did?

I don't actually know. The President didn't, I don't—so I'm not sure. We can get back to you with a more detailed answer.

How can you be in your position, in your office, sir? This is your office. This is your responsibility and you can't tell me who made a decision like that that jeopardized the lives of so many people.

The—the framework in the memorandum was not designed to cause a...

I don't—I don't want the framework. I'm reclaiming my time again for a second. I asked you—I didn't ask about the framework. You're trying to talk over me. It's my question to you. Who...

Well, I'm trying to answer about the oral initiative, which has provided Ukraine in an ongoing way with weapons. In fact, sold by the United States in line with presidential intent, which I had the privilege to represent the department at the UDCG last month.

All right, let me move on here. Let me move on to what the Chairman asked a question to you about the movement of troops just days before we were going to have something in the national—in the NDAA requiring consultation with us. But you moved 700 to 1,000 troops out of Romania. Why Romania?

Sir, we made a—the Secretary ordered a decision obviously in line with presidential intent to repurpose our forces based on the advice that I've talked about with the Chairman. So...

Well, let me ask you a question because I'm running out of time. Let me ask you a question. Are you—you're, you know, you have good conversations with the Vice President. Were you aware that the Vice President gave scathing attack on Romania about their elections in Munich? Did that have anything to do why you singled out—why Romania was singled out for these troops to be moved?

Sir, I'm not going to go into particular deliberations, but we made the decision—we made the recommendation to the Secretary and ultimately the President based on the military logic in line with the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy.

Well, that's—that's what you're here for, sir. With all due respect, you're here in front of this committee. I'm sorry. You said I'm not giving information about deliberations. Then what are you doing here in front of us?

I'm trying to communicate with you, sir.

Well, you're not doing a good job. I yield back.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Jackson.

Thank you. I recognize myself for five minutes now. Under Secretary Colby, I want to thank you for your leadership in delivering this National Defense Strategy that puts the interests of the American people and the security of American warfighters first. Under President Trump, we have already witnessed this strategy's peace through strength goals in actions with decisive victories in operations Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and Epic Fury. These are simply unprecedented victories for our country. Under this National Defense Strategy, there remains no doubt that the critical interest of America and its allies will be defended and our military will be prepared to fight and win if necessary. I want to ask you a real quick question. You and I have talked about this a little bit before. It's kind of a little different pathway here. But the NDS identifies the department's priorities in Africa as preventing Islamic terrorists from using regional safe havens to strike the U.S. homeland while empowering allies and partners to lead efforts against other terrorist groups. Secretary Colby, I appreciated this recent opportunity that you and I had with your team to visit and talk about the department's counterterrorism efforts in Africa, particularly given the worsening environment due to violent extremist organizations such as JNIM, ISIS affiliates, and Boko Haram. I remain concerned about the persistent intelligence and operational coverage challenges in key regions such as the Sahel and the Lake Chad area. Effective operations like the December strikes against ISIS militants in Nigeria depend on reliable intelligence, sufficient force posture, and critical operational enablers. Secretary Colby, what is the department doing to ensure intelligence, force posture, and partner support in Africa are sufficient to keep pace with the growing terrorist threat and execute these NDS objectives?

Well, thank you, Congressman, and thanks to you and to Congressman Moore and others for your leadership on this important issue. And obviously we've been active—the department has been active over the last couple months on this important issue in line with the President's authorities. I think we've got a great combatant commander, General Anderson out there, and a great team in OSW. I'll have to get back to you on the specifics. It may need to be in a classified format in terms of intelligence coverage, but it is something we talk about all the time to make sure that we've got the global requirements obviously for the priority kind of high-end challenges, but also to be able to use in consistent with the discussion the defense strategy to support presidential objectives and otherwise in theaters like Africa.

That's great. And I will get back with you on that because I do not want to take our eye off the ball there. And in that same vein, and you kind of alluded to it here, but the strategic competition with China is often discussed in Indo-Pacific, but Africa is also becoming increasingly important area of influence. China and Russia, of course, have been increasingly militarizing the continent, expanding its economic—expanding their economic, diplomatic, and security footprint and seeking basing for strategic assets that could threaten our homeland at some point. In the context of near-peer conflict with China in particular, how does the NDS approach Africa as a vital supporting theater and are we aggressively doing everything we can to undermine the efforts of our great power competitors to prepare for war with the U.S. executed from the continent of Africa?

Well, thank you, sir. And you know, obviously we are using the military operations especially against some of these terrorist threats. In fact, there are rising concern that Africa may be a base for that, so we're keeping our eye on the ball. Obviously we got to always keep our eye on the CT ball. But in this relates to some of the conversation I had with Mr. Smith yesterday and some of the discussion also in the Western Hemisphere where non-military parts of our national power are going to be extremely important and we're looking at burden sharing not only with European allies and partners that have traditionally played a role—had a conversation with a European Minister of Defense in Munich about this, but also in the Middle East and in Africa itself. I think there's a lot to do where we can kind of build up, we don't have to be the dominant figure in every initiative, we want people to take the initiative and address not only security threats but obviously the things that matter often very much to Africans and others to development and so forth.

Thank you. Under President Trump's leadership, the Department of War has returned its focus to putting America first, ensuring our warfighters have the capabilities necessary to fight and win and advancing peace through strength. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the brave men and women of our joint force who without their leadership, execution of the strategies discussed today would not be possible. And I thank you for your time. And with that, Mr. Crow, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Colby. I'll start with some very simple ones. You're the senior policy official within the Pentagon, correct?

Yeah, I think that's fair to say.

So you're familiar with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

I would say I'm obviously familiar with it in generic terms, but I'm not...

And you're not a lawyer, but you're familiar with the uniform...

I went to law school, but I'm not a lawyer.

Okay. So you know how the law works. You are familiar with the law of armed conflict.

Again, I'm not an expert, I'm not in an official capacity, I'd want to be careful.

But you're familiar with the law of armed conflict.

Yeah, sure. Okay.

And so you know that Congress's job is to conduct oversight of the executive branch, correct?

Certainly.

And that includes a responsibility to make sure that laws are being followed. Is that right?

Yes, I think so.

Okay. Do our soldiers get trained on the law of war?

My understanding is that they do.

Our service members get trained on the law of war.

I'm not an expert on that, but that's my understanding.

Do you believe that it's possible for an order to be unlawful, illegal?

I mean, yes, of course, yeah.

So there is a difference between lawful orders and unlawful orders.

Yes.

And you're a very bright person, you've studied history, you know history well, I've read a lot of your stuff. You're familiar that there has been in American military history instances of unlawful orders being given, correct?

Absolutely.

And service members refusing to abide by those lawful orders. Is that correct?

Yes, I'm not familiar with specific incidents when you're getting to that level of specificity, but in general, yes, I imagine.

But there have been. So is it a problem for somebody to say that a service member shouldn't follow an unlawful order?

Sir, this is not a matter I've been involved in, but I think there's a difference between recognizing those circumstances and taking action designed to facilitate...

It's a pretty simple question. You said that there's a difference between lawful and unlawful orders. You said that you're familiar with the law of armed conflict. You admitted that it's the duty of this body to conduct oversight and to make sure that laws are being followed. You said that you're familiar with U.S. military history and that there have been unlawful orders given in our history. And you're also familiar that service members have also refused to abide by those unlawful orders. So why can't you just say that service members shouldn't follow unlawful orders?

Sir, I think that's a different step to talk about or in any way give some kind of encouragement, that's not... I mean, we can refer to the Office of the General Counsel if you'd want to get into a legal matter, that's starting...

It's not a legal matter. It seems like a pretty, as the senior official at the Pentagon responsible for establishing policy for our Department of Defense, it seems like a pretty basic thing to say, given what you just acknowledged and what we just walked through, that service members shouldn't follow illegal orders.

Well, I take the law of armed conflict and ensuring that we're being lawful and moral in our conduct very seriously. But I'm also one thing that is not always reported in the public, I'm very conscious of what my responsibilities are and what they're not. And so if you like, I can get you an answer on that point, happy to do so.

I think it's a problem that you can't state the obvious here, and I think moral clarity is important as a leader, and I think your lack of willingness to be morally clear in what is a pretty basic question given what I asked you is a real problem. Let me just pivot for a minute to Operation Epic Fury. You were involved in briefings in advance of the commencement of that operation, correct?

What can you be specific?

You were aware of the operation before it started, correct?

Yes. Yeah.

Did the administration brief private sector officials, oil and gas executives, companies, businesses with interests in the Middle East before that operation commenced on Friday?

I'm not sure, Congressman, I can get an answer back to you though.

I will follow through. I want a commitment because it came to light after Venezuela that the administration actually briefed private sector companies, energy companies before that operation, before briefing Congress. Right now, there are thousands of Americans stranded because there's no evacuation plan. I would like to know whether the administration took the time to brief private companies and executives but didn't take the time to brief this oversight body and also make plans to evacuate civilians and our constituents before setting off a regional war.

Well, sir, I'll get an answer for you.

Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you. Mr. Gimenez, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the National Defense Strategy, is anywhere it says that the United States can't use force against narco-terrorists that have been killing hundreds of thousands of people?

Congressman, I think to the contrary, it says that specifically.

I just want to make sure. Okay. And in the National Defense Strategy, does it also say that United States cannot use force against the leading state sponsor of terrorism before they get a nuclear weapon? Does it say anywhere that we can't?

Again, sir, to the contrary.

Okay. Also, you know, my colleagues on the other side are really concerned about cost. So let's get down to cost. What's the value of an American life?

Priceless.

Well, how much money should we spend to save an American life?

I think...

How much money should we spend to save, let's say, 10,000 lives, 100,000 lives, a million lives? How much money? I mean, is there, do you guys have that?

I don't know if we have that kind of actuarial, I suppose the insurers do, but I don't have an answer, but I think obviously everything has a price, morally priced.

Yeah, because they're very concerned about the cost of certain strikes on narco-terrorists that were transporting poison into the United States and killing lives. I guess there must, up to them, there must be some kind of metric here that, you know, how much is that worth? Okay. So do you have that at all?

I mean, I think we can get a sense of the cost. One thing that's important to bear in mind on the question of cost is, as the President has pointed out, are those forces are going to be active somewhere? And I think what we're saying is we're not going to solve every problem with a, you know, to hammer everything as a nail, that's not the issue here. We are prepared to use all elements of American national power to address the threat of, you know, that's killing hundreds of thousands of Americans.

But every once in a while you do have to use that hammer.

Exactly.

You try not to use the hammer, but every once in a while you do.

But you're prepared to, and that's part of the peace through strength mantra of the President.

And the cost of such a thing in order to save American lives, I don't think that's part of the equation because the number one job of this government, the number one job of this government and any government, actually, is to protect its citizens.

Yeah, I agree absolutely. We've got to be, and that's putting regular Americans' interests first and their protection, their security is what this strategy is all about and what the President's agenda is all about.

That being said, I want to move on to something else. By the way, I agree with a lot of my colleagues that we don't, that we are not strong enough with Russia against Ukraine. I'm a big supporter of Ukraine, and in order to stop our adversary, especially our number two adversary in his tracks, I think we need to help Ukraine more and deny Russia what it wanted to do because you want to deny aggression. And if they somehow gain by this act of aggression, then you're just incentivizing further aggression. And so by helping Ukraine, you're actually showing peace through strength.

Well, sir, if I could address that. I mean, under the President's leadership, we are helping Ukraine, I was trying to lay it out a little bit, we've set up this Pearl initiative and the Europeans are stepping up and we're seeing that when I was in the UDCG last month, we saw very vividly European leadership on providing air defense capabilities. And that's so in a sense the model is actually working and that will contribute not only towards peace but to a more lasting...

But we should be unambiguous in who we back and who the bad guy is. We should be unambiguous in that because I know who the bad guy is. All right. And we should say that very clearly. Shifting over, the National Defense Strategy places renewed emphasis on defending the homeland and strengthening security within the Western Hemisphere, which I fully support because for far too long we have been, our focus has been elsewhere. And this is our backyard, you know, this is our home, okay, the Western Hemisphere. Given the growing military intelligence presence of China and Russia in the region, what steps is the department taking to counter the malign influence and security threats emanating from authoritarian regimes such as the regime in Cuba and frankly the regime that's still in Venezuela?

Thanks, sir. Some of it I can't get into in this setting, but I think we are taking proactive action using all elements of national power to diminish adversary influence and involvement in the hemisphere. On the issue of Cuba, I'll obviously defer to State Department or the White House, but I think we recognize clearly the danger and the menace posed by the government in Havana.

Well, I also think that the government that's still in Venezuela, it's the interim dictator, not an interim president, is also posed, continues to pose a threat to the United States. No matter how they are cooperating with us now, they're just waiting us out. Thank you, and I yield back.

Thank you. Ms. Jacobs, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, good to see you again. To date, the department has failed to comply with Section 1067 of the FY25 NDAA, which requires the department to provide us with copies of each extant execute order issued at the direction of the President and the Secretary. When can we expect the department to comply with this law?

I'll have to get back to you, ma'am.

Okay, thank you. Are we at war with Iran?

I think we're in a military action at this point, I'll leave it to Congress and lawyers, etc., from the administration to determine the exact...

Okay. So yesterday, the President said we're doing very well on the war front, and previously he said we should expect American casualties because, quote, "that often happens in war." So is the President wrong when he says we are at war?

Well, I won't add or subtract anything that the President, I wouldn't presume to do so, but I know this is a material matter in front of the Congress and between the administration and I'm not the right person to weigh in on exactly the criteria.

Okay. You said that regime change is not one of the objectives of this military operation. Is that correct?

Of the U.S. military campaign at this time as directed by the President.

Okay. If that's the case, can you explain why the first military target of the joint U.S.-Israeli operation was Iran Supreme Leader Khamenei?

My understanding is that that's an Israeli strike, we can get you more detail including this afternoon in the classified briefing.

Okay. Well, President Trump clearly disagrees because he immediately took credit for this, saying, "I got him before he got me." And shortly after the strikes on Saturday, Trump told the Iranian people, "Bombs will be dropping everywhere. When we're finished, take over your government, it will be yours, this is probably your only chance for generations." And your boss, Secretary Hegseth, literally said he made sure that the people responsible in the Iranian regime to try and take out President Trump were on the target list. How does arming the Kurds and encouraging a civil war advance our military objectives of degrading Iran's power projection capabilities?

Ma'am, I'm not sure I can comment on that, I'm just not tracking specifically, but again can get into it, get back to you or in the classified...

Okay, great. I'd like to enter into the record three articles about how we are arming the Kurds.

Absolutely.

Thank you. Okay. So you won't say if we're at war, you won't say if regime change is actually part of our thing. Do you agree that there is a risk of Iran becoming a failed state?

I think there are a wide range of risks, but I think those are the kinds of things that we are precisely seeking to avoid and capitalize on to make sure it's net beneficial for the American people.

Okay. And does the department actually have a plan to avoid that and prevent a failed state in this very strategic part of the world?

Well, without fixating on the specific eventuality, ma'am, I would say the department is actively planning to ensure that we are, you know, deliver on the President's objective of a net beneficial result for this military campaign.

Okay. You keep saying that it's important that we have a plan and that you are working on the plan. What is the plan?

Ma'am, I can, it may be worth when my colleagues or we can go in, but particularly when my colleagues come over and brief this afternoon, you may ask them. Obviously, we're not going to talk about that in open session.

Okay. How long will this war last? How much longer will our service members have to sacrifice their lives?

So I'm not going to take away the President's decision space. He's got the wide range, he's the master of that. As he has indicated and Chairman Kane as well, you know, the military campaign at least at this point has been scoped out or I would say people have discussed it as roughly three, four, five weeks, but that of course does not constrain the President's decision space, but again, goes back to the kind of phasing of the military campaign that's been given specifically to the U.S. Armed Forces.

Okay. And what about cost? Can you say how much this will cost the American people?

I'll get back to you, ma'am. I can't give you an answer at this point.

Okay. Mr. Colby, at his first press conference, your boss Secretary Hegseth said this mission is laser focused, destroy offensive missiles, destroy missile production, destroy their navy and they will never have nuclear weapons. In 2003, just as Operation Iraqi Freedom was getting underway, President Bush said our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end the regime's support for terrorism and to free the Iraqi people. Remind me, Under Secretary Colby, how long did Operation Iraqi Freedom last?

I'm actually not sure technically, a decade or something.

It took eight years before Iraq became even remotely stable at a cost of thousands of American lives and trillions of taxpayer dollars. Secretary Hegseth said this week that we're not doing nation building, we don't do quagmires, no democracy building exercise. In fact, his predecessor as Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld said, and I quote, I don't do quagmires. You just said that this isn't going to be another Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld himself said, of course it won't be Vietnam, we're going to go in, overthrow Saddam and get out, that's it. The American people are not stupid, Under Secretary Colby. This administration keeps telling us this is not Iraq while using the exact same arguments that were used to justify the war in Iraq. We have already had six service members die in this war and dozens more injured. And you can't even give me an answer on what the plan is or what the objectives really are. Our embassies have been attacked, at least $90 million worth of fighter jets were shot down by our allies. And you literally can't even tell me whether this is a war, what we're trying to achieve or how much it's going to cost the American people. My generation has been paying our entire lives for forever wars that your President promised to end and yet you sit here today unable to provide us with any clarity. Our service members and the American people deserve better. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you. Mr. Luttrell, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would first like to say my thoughts and prayers are with the family, hopefully are with the families of the service members that we lost. May the good Lord put peace in everyone's heart. Mr. Colby, thank you for being here today. In the NDS, it emphasizes our central responsibility of the Department of War is to ensure that we always are able to negotiate from a position of strength in order to sustain peace in the Indo-Pacific. What is your perspective on ensuring we have self-sustaining energy capabilities to operate in a contested space, in particular as we move forward in technology, the development of mobile tactical microgrid power systems, if you're familiar with that? And I'd like to get your perspective on how that will help enable and as I think it will, our warfighters in those spaces.

Well, thank you, Congressman, and I'm not an expert on that specific issue, but I do think the ability to have logistics that are adapted to the scale of the Indo-Pacific area and also the ability to be resilient even in the face of significant precision attack at scale is very important. And so self-sustaining kind of energy models are I think...

As the, as this, I'm going to call it conflict, war, however you want to define it, as we're moving into this once again. And I'm for sure, and I may be totally wrong in this, but I'm pretty positive we fought in Iraq for about 20 years. I may be wrong on that. It may be a lot shorter than that. I may be losing my mind. But I would recommend if we're not doing that that the Department of War takes a hard look on long-term sustainability if we have to send boots on the ground like we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States lacks a sufficient domestic production for high-purity iron. High-purity iron serves as a foundation input for the rare earth magnets, permanent magnets, naval shipbuilding alloys, electrical systems, hypersonic systems and other advanced defense applications. Where do we stand on that currently if we're trying to pull everything back into the United States?

Sir, I'm sorry, I'll have to get back to you. I don't have an update on that.

I'm going to get something to you here in a second, I promise. What's your familiarity on subsea cabling as far as the department?

Somewhat. Obviously limited in what I can say in this setting.

Are you familiar with the department, I mean the department's stance on in any way, shape or form subsea cabling?

Yes, I'm familiar in general, in general terms. Not trying to be evasive, just obviously a lot of that's behind the...

Do you know how much information travels underneath the subsea cabling systems from the United States everywhere?

I don't have a precise figure, but I think it's a lot.

95 to 99 percent of all communications including Department of War's information travels under the water, not over top of our head. I'm curious as to what the offensive, defensive capabilities of protection of these subsea cabling systems is and what the strategy will be moving forward. And my concern is because we talk about the Department of War, I've been asking every Secretary, Deputy Secretary and all their buddies who's responsible for the subsea cabling protection for the United States. And I've got Department of War, Homeland Security, Commerce, DOJ, FCC, the dude walking down the street and probably the guy that flew the plane here to get me back to D.C. touches this in some way. My question is if we have a catastrophic hit on those cabling systems because $10 trillion travels underneath that system daily. I can't get a straight answer on who's responsible if they are hit, which we get hit twice a week. Nefarious actors, fishermen, doesn't matter. But I need someone to tell me because this isn't where we're looking. And that's guerrilla warfare. And the way that I see it, if you cripple our ability to communicate, whether that's data, banking, Department of War, there's a lot worse things in life than dying and if you take our economy down to a knee, we're in bad shape. So I'm assuming you can't speak to me in detail in this setting, but what I would like to have is either come see you, you come see me or in this classified setting that we're going to have after the fact, I need some answers from the Department of War because if, I'll always say not if but when something happens, somebody's going to have to speak to us and tell us why because what I don't want is to say that we weren't looking. Fair enough?

More than fair, sir. I share your concern about it. It's not, I'm the policy guy, but I commit to give you, get you a good answer and would be delighted to talk to you further about that and other topics.

All right. Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes gentlelady from Washington, Ms. Strickland.

Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Under Secretary Colby, you were one of the principal architects of the 2026 National Defense Strategy. And that document makes it very clear that the PRC is the pacing threat and that deterring the PRC in the Indo-Pacific is the central organizing principle of this administration's defense policy. I've got six questions. The first three are yes or no and then we can go to some other detail. So I want to examine whether current force allocations actually reflect that strategy or if they contradict it. So for clarity, the 2026 NDS identifies the PRC as the pacing challenge, correct?

That's correct.

The Indo-Pacific remains the primary theater shaping force planning and modernization.

Yes, ma'am.

Okay. Second question. Credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires forward deployed naval presence, long-range strike capabilities and sufficient precision guided munitions inventories. Would you agree?

Yes, ma'am.

And the National Defense Strategy emphasizes prioritization and disciplined allocation of limited high-end capabilities, correct?

Correct.

All right. So now let's turn to current operations. Over the past week, the department has executed significant naval and air combat operations against Iran. And I want to be clear, no one is saying that the Islamic Republic Guard of Iran is a good actor. We know that they are the largest state sponsor of terrorism. But your own strategy said, and I quote, no longer will the department be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change and nation building. And nothing says distracted like killing the leader of a foreign nation without even a hint of strategy or planning. This operation against Iran involves large numbers of U.S. aircraft, ships and precision weapons. So Secretary Colby, are high-end capabilities like long-range strike aircraft and cruise missiles being used now in these operations? And those same capabilities, long-range strike weapons and precision munitions are also central to U.S. planning for a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, correct?

Ma'am, we'd have to go into it more in a classified setting. I think we'd have to get to more differentiated in the way that we're managing I think this very effectively.

Okay, look forward to that conversation. Now I want to talk about munitions inventories. Last year during the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, U.S. forces fired more than 150,000 THAAD interceptors defending against Iranian missile strikes, up to a quarter of the entire stockpile. Even if every interceptor we buy this year goes toward rebuilding our inventory, it's only going to replace a third of what was used. We already expended a large share of our missile defense inventory during last year's conflict with Iran. Now again, we are using high-end weapons while the Pentagon is warning about munitions shortages. These interceptors as you know are not easy to replace. The U.S. buys only dozens per year and some missile defense systems take years to replenish. And again, how does using these limited weapons against Iran align with your strategy's requirement to prioritize the pacing challenge in the Indo-Pacific?

Well, thank you, ma'am. I think the way the military campaign is being constructed is conscious of that, but more I would say a couple of things. One, I'd reiterate that this strategy and the administration's efforts already anticipate I think the points you're making, ma'am. One with the $1.5 trillion budget request, two with the extraordinary unprecedented degree from the President on down of overhauling something I think we all agree with, was talking to Congressman Khanna about as well, about getting defense industry to produce at a much higher scale. I mean $1.5, $1 trillion is a lot of money for the American people, spend $1.5 trillion is a lot of, we should be getting better results and our allies and partners stepping up. And then in the classified session, maybe a bit more, we're also thinking about how do we really think about novel ways to for the force to be prepared to fight in a way that ensures effective defense. And I think we've got a very good plan and I'm confident and also I think our both our friends and potential foes are seeing the prowess of the joint force and that also contributes to deterrence.

Yeah, and you know as far as requesting more funding, we dramatically increased the budget for ICE. So there's money that exists if we want to use it properly to actually defend ourselves and plus up our munitions. And so closing I'll just say this. Secretary Colby, the 2026 National Defense Strategy says the PRC is the pacing challenge and that our most advanced capabilities must be prioritized for that competition. Yet again, we are using many of those same scarce weapons against Iran, a regional adversary that cannot strike the U.S. homeland and is going to result in the deaths of the young men and women who proudly wear the uniform. And we are hoping and praying for their safe return and our sympathy goes out to those who we've lost. So I think a question for this committee is quite simple. Are our current actions following strategy or forcing to put our service members and our partners and allies in the Pacific at risk? The American people want transparency, Congress has the authority to authorize war and the word war has been used by the President, by Secretary... I yield back.

Gentlelady's time has expired. Chair now recognizes gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Kiggans.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have the privilege of representing Virginia's Second Congressional District, so home to the East Coast Navy fleet. As a Navy veteran, Navy spouse, and now proud Navy mom, I certainly want to first of all shout out to the men and women from my district who are forward deployed in the Middle East right now doing the tip of the spear work for the country. But every time I turn on the news and I see, you know, when they talk about the Iran conflict, it always comes up first these days. One of the first pictures they show are usually of F-18s taking off aircraft carriers, most likely from my district again from the East Coast. And every once in a while they'll show an F-35, I've known that they've integrated that a little bit more. So I want to start off, just you are the self-proclaimed policy guy. So something that's very important to me, I'm starting to sound like a broken record up here, but I think there's no question about the importance of the East Coast Navy and especially the East Coast carrier air wings that we have stationed at our East Coast master jet base. We only have two, we have one on the West Coast, Naval Air Station Lemoore, and then Naval Air Station Oceana. So I want to know from the Department of War's perspective, what is the hold up? What is the delay? Because I've queried the Navy and all Navy leadership every time I can get a hold of them about what the delay is about making that policy choice decision to prioritize getting what we have in front of us, which next generation strike fighter we love to talk about, FAX is always on the table, but we have F-35s. The Marines have them on the East Coast at Cherry Point. We've got them on the West Coast, but I think no one will argue about the importance of what the East Coast Navy is doing, our East Coast aircraft carriers and our East Coast carrier air wings. So what is the plan to integrate that latest and greatest F-35 into the East Coast?

Ma'am, I regret that I'll have to defer to the Navy on that, but I'll commit to get you an answer as soon as possible.

Okay, please make that a priority because it's frustrating for us. We have 30 year old plus F-18s that are aging. We ask these guys to be tip of the spear. In that same line, we spend millions of dollars training our pilots and a significant amount of time, four to five years to wing those guys. We need to make sure that we're taking care of those people as well. So we could we spent a lot of time last Congress on quality of life issues, but let's not forget them. They're an elite fighting force, let's treat them as such. I want to talk a lot more about Hampton Roads, just the maritime industrial base that's there. I know that's a important part of this the National Defense Strategy. So what are your plans again just prioritizing the East Coast and our role there? We have shipbuilding, we have ship repair, but what steps is the department taking to reduce acquisition and contracting delays that are slowing the ship repair and construction?

Well thank you, ma'am. This is obviously not so much in the policy lane, but I can say from the leadership of the department and from the president, we are working very, very hard to try to get better output from our defense industry and reduce red tape in the Department of War, including for instance on FMS reform that's happened that we were all part of. But I think I think that's a the frustration about that is felt throughout the administration and a real urgency to try to rectify the problem.

We have the resources there in Hampton Roads, it's all under one umbrella. So please please don't forget about that when making those policy decisions. And I know that, you know, the USS Ford is currently on a deployment that could extend even up to 10, 11 months. So I just want to know if if you have any insight into what the Navy when they're extending deployments like this because current carrier force levels are insufficient to meet global demand signals, what risks do longer deployments pose to these readiness maintenance cycles and sailor retention?

Ma'am, I defer on that to the Navy and the Joint Staff, but I think you know we're very conscious on honoring and supporting our warfighters and also making sure that our forces are ready.

How often do you get to sit down with Navy leadership? Because it sounds like you're not communicating with them a lot.

Pretty pretty frequently, but more on sort of strategic issues. Again, just to reiterate, I mean I sort of know my role and what my role is and I'm not, you know, the one trying to tell the Navy how to how to do their business. But I've sat down with Admiral Caudle and Secretary Fallon on a range of strategic guidance documents on the AUKUS review and a number of other issues, but I don't I'm not trying to tell them how to manage, you know, the aircraft carrier readiness schedule and that sort of thing.

Can I ask who is the one trying to tell the Navy how to do their business?

I don't I don't know.

Okay, I'd like that name please when you get a chance. Switching gears a little bit, my last remaining seconds talk about munitions capacity and Ukraine support. The war in Ukraine, Operation Epic Fury in Iran have drawn heavily on U.S. precision munitions and air defense interceptors. Has the department increased production of key munitions such as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and long-range missiles over the past year?

I'm sorry, could you could you say that again? I apologize.

Has the Department of War increased production of key munitions such as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and long-range missiles over the past year? I'm worried about our stocks.

I'd have to get you specific figures, ma'am, but my we certainly are moving very much in the right direction and I'm confident that we're going to continue acceleration.

And my time has expired, I'll yield back.

Chair now recognizes gentleman from New York, Mr. Ryan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Morning, Mr. Colby. I want to start with a quote. Quote, from a military perspective, the focus really needs to be tightly on the Pacific, especially the first island chain and Taiwan. Does that ring a bell?

Rings a bell, sir.

That was you. Quote, some believe that Washington can conduct a major military effort in the Middle East and maintain its advantage in Asia. That's a self-comforting delusion, quote. Does that ring a bell?

I defer to you, sir, where the source is.

That was you, Mr. Colby. Quote, does the USA want to be the policeman of the Middle East, getting nothing but spending precious lives and trillions of dollars? Do we want to be there forever? Does that ring a bell?

I defer to you on the sourcing, sir.

That was actually President Trump in his first term. How about this one? Quote, we simply cannot afford to get enmeshed in a large Middle East war. That one?

I defer to you, sir.

That was actually you, Mr. Colby. One more time. Quote, our interest I think very much is in not going to war with Iran. It would be a huge distraction of resources, it would be massively expensive to our country. That one?

Defer to you, sir.

That's the vice president, Mr. Vance, in October of 2024. Last one. Quote, an intervention would not only cost American lives, but also consume vast munitions and equipment and distract American readiness from Asia, harming U.S. capacity to deter China. That one?

I defer to you on sourcing, sir.

And I'm not trying to play gotcha, I'm trying to understand a massive inconsistency in what you've said and others in the administration. That was actually from a piece that you wrote, I'll put the title up as just to help recall. I think it's pretty straightforward and I remember reading it and largely agreeing with it at the time. The subhead of the piece, the title Don't Let Iran Distract From China, the subhead Beijing's bid to dominate Asia is a far greater threat than anything Tehran can do in the Middle East. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter this article from the Wall Street Journal, by the way, into the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Colby, my question is do you still believe this?

Excuse me, sir, I don't think we are going to be distracted. We're very conscious of this, the strategy and the efforts of the department including $1.5 trillion...

Not the distraction piece. I mean you're very clear that it's a mistake, that there's a far greater threat.

Sir, I don't think the current operations are a mistake. I think we are scoping the military objectives in light of the overall strategy under the president's direction. They are reasonable and attainable military objectives.

I think in the interest of time, I think any reasonable observer would say there's a massive inconsistency in what you've said for years and frankly dedicated a lot of your personal career to before this position versus what you're doing now. So the question is were you wrong then or are you wrong now?

I don't agree with your characterization, sir.

That's fine. And to bring it to the present moment, as many of my colleagues have quoted, the National Defense Strategy which you wrote, or helped lead anyway, which was signed by the Secretary of Defense, which was approved by the president, begins with a line that for good reason has been repeated many times today and I'll repeat it again on the record. No longer will the department be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building. In case that wasn't crystal clear, in October 2024 then candidate Trump said quote, you're not going to have a war with me. In case that wasn't clear, in his victory speech on election night, he said quote, I'm not going to start a war, I'm going to stop wars. My constituents, the American people, everybody watching this, how could we consider that anything but just a straight up betrayal of promises made and a lack of any strategic coherence? I frankly think, and I don't use this word lightly, I think you are lying to the American people about it. I think the vice president has lied about it, the president is lying about it. And to bring it into stark relief is these six brave patriots that we lost. And don't you think we at least owe them and their tremendous sacrifice which our nation is grateful for, just being honest? And you came in here and three or four times at least when I was in the room, made went out of your way to say I'm a loyal lieutenant to the president. And I know you're exhausted because I don't think you actually agree with a lot of what he's doing. So I'm going to give you a chance to at least say that.

Well I fully reject your characterization, sir, and I am being honest and I think this is we this administration is going to be prepared for peace through strength and that's what the president's talked about as delivered.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes gentleman from Georgia, Mr. McCormick.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm actually going to help explain this to one of my peers here as we do this hearing because I think I know where you're going with this and it's with the statements you've made, I know where you're what you're talking about when you talk about getting involved in Iran in a forever war. Would you consider this a forever war?

No, sir.

In some ways I would say we've been at war with them for about 50 years. We've been attacked over 40 times through their proxies and their weaponry. We've had Georgians recently killed by their weaponry. He just talked about my my friend from the other side of the aisle just talked about the six lives we lost. We lost over 200 Marines in one day from Iranian proxies. Some of them were my friends. I have a buddy of mine who was blown out of a window that day who I played rugby with for many years. He'll never forget that. We don't forget. The fact is the Biden administration and the Obama administration have both given them money, billions of dollars, and allowed them to have access to billions of dollars that have funded terrorism throughout the Middle East and the world. And quite frankly they were nearing the precipice of nuclear arms. And then on top of that they were able to produce about 100 advanced weaponry platforms as we opposed them with about seven during the time same time frame of about a month. They're outproducing us with something much cheaper too. Would you say that that new information, that new technology is kind of also changed our foreign policy in that region knowing that Iran now has become disproportionately more powerful and more more of a threat to the United States and the entire world in a stability?

Well thanks, Congressman. I would say you're right absolutely right and agreed to put your finger on the reconstitution of Iran's missile and and drone capability and so forth and the and the balance between Iran was at has been at a weaker point after Operation Midnight Hammer and the 12-day war. But we could see as the secretary and the pointed out the other day that Iran was going to build up a conventional shield from which it could then seek to again resume its its nuclear ambitions. So this was the time to take action in a way that's consistent with the strategy which is of course with Israel, with our Gulf partners and now we're seeing partners from around the world in a way that was scoped and attainable military objectives. Those are the objectives of the campaign and so I think that's that's why it's going to be and it's not going to be a forever war. It's not going to be a nation building effort as the president and the secretary have made clear.

I think that's the take home for me is that when you show strength, when you when you develop relationships with other nations and this the Abraham Accords and and seeing the other countries in that region that traditionally were not friendly to us historically when I was there in the 90s and I was stationed in the Persian Gulf and and deployed there several times, we didn't have the relationship we have now. This huge advancement was made through the first Trump administration with the Abraham Accords has benefited us in amazing ways not just economically, but strategically and militarily in that region. I think times have changed. And I want to point out, I was going to make this all about the Marine Corps and the amphibious shipping because that's what I focus on typically. But I think this is much bigger than all of that. It doesn't matter how many Marines you put there. I'm not talking about boots on the ground. It is a limited projected war. Now you could say it's a war. I don't care if you don't want to characterize it or not. It doesn't matter to me. It's all about destroying Iran's capability in a very unstable regime with unstable leadership. When I say unstable, mentally unstable. People that could start a nuclear holocaust. Anybody who's read the book Nuclear War should be scared to death of a country with two nuclear arms. Times have changed. Technology have changed and the threat has changed. And I think what your point, and I want you to summarize for me because I got about a minute and a half, but summarize why the United States could no longer stand on the sidelines and literally supplement, and I'll go back to the Obama administration which gave them billions of dollars in bad faith because they never were honest with us in negotiations. And the Obama administration which said, or the Biden administration has said, I'm going to take off sanctions, allow you to have billions of dollars more to then fund terrorism throughout the entire regions, which Americans died by. And now they want to be a nuclear power. Just tell me what the consequences are long-term in American lives, what the potential consequences, even if it's a 10 percent chance that they could kill millions of people, wouldn't that be a reason to act?

Well, I think, sir, as you pointed out and the president's been clear that we were going to, and the vice president as well, that we will ensure that we and the strategy makes clear that we will deny Iran a nuclear weapon. And the Islamic Republic was rebuilding its military capabilities. And so the military campaign is designed to degrade that. It's designed to take advantage of a range of realistic outcomes. But it's clearly a threat to the United States, to Israel, to our allies and partners in the Gulf and beyond.

And I'll just use my last 15 seconds to say it's interesting when we lost 2,462 lives in Afghanistan and we had already won it, paid the price, we then gave it back to the same people we took it from. And that's the Biden administration's legacy. With that I yield.

Gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cisneros.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Colby, Secretary Colby for being here today. I want to go back to the Gerald Ford. Was there an ESTOB meeting before the Ford was moved down to the off the coast of Venezuela?

Sir, I'd have to defer that question. I'll get back to you with not sure what I can say in this open session.

Okay. Were you part of that meeting?

Sir, same answer. Just not sure classification and so forth.

Okay. Was the GIFMAP modified during that meeting?

Same answer, sir. I'll get back to you based on classification and just deliberative discussions.

All right. So is this something that we can discuss in the closed session?

I think so. I think we can talk around some of the general issues. I'm not sure what from a legislative executive point of view might be sort of privileged information that's deliberative.

Okay. Well, I will bring this up in the closed session as well if you won't answer it here. But my concerns are really is like what concerns were brought up by moving the Ford around and keeping it out for 11 months. But if you won't answer those for me here...

Sir, I can address that. I mean, I think actually the aircraft carrier is precisely and I have advocated for it to be moved around to priority theaters. It's part of its a huge part of its value is the ability to be mobile and go where the president, whichever president it is, decides that that's the priority theater, that it's not fixed in place. It can move around, delivers a tremendous combat power.

Oh, I think we all know the value of an aircraft carrier and its ability to kind of move around and having it go, right? But we also know too there's concerns about keeping it out for 11 months. There's maintenance concerns and there's concerns about when it has to go into the work period and what's going to come next after that, right? Those are some of the things I want to address. But I want to talk about the ESTOB as well and the changes that were made. But we'll try answering those in the closed session. So if you can want to answer that, then I guess we'll get to the next thing. What is the Dunroe Doctrine?

The way we put it in this document is the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which is basically ensuring that American interests in the Western Hemisphere are respected once again.

So what is the difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Dunroe Doctrine?

I'd have to get back to you with a specific answer in terms of the precise text. But obviously the Monroe Doctrine is a historic document going back 200 years and this is more of an updating similar approach as US policy has been towards the Western Hemisphere for two centuries, which is to ensure that our interests are respected.

Right. I think...

Except in recent generations.

I would say that the Monroe Doctrine was a policy that came out by President Monroe to kind of keep outside influence outside of the Western Hemisphere, not to come in here. And now the Dunroe Doctrine, as the president is calling, is one not only to keep outside influence out, but is to exert influence upon the Western Hemisphere to make sure that they bend to American will and need. Would you concur with that?

I don't. And I think we also have to look at the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine from about 100 years ago, which is important about as the United States grew in power. Obviously I take your point, sir, about the Monroe Doctrine. But I think and I don't think even today the secretary is leading a coalition of Latin American states. A lot of Latin American states have responded very positively to our actions in the Western Hemisphere in the last few months.

Well, are they doing that again, are they doing that out of fear, right? Because are we not blockading the coast of Venezuela?

I think a lot of them are doing because they share there's a shared view of the threats of narcoterrorism, instability, etcetera.

Well, again, okay, now you want to talk about narcoterrorism and we'll get to that. But what authority does the Department of Defense have to conduct these operations, which are basically law operations, you know, lawful operations to kind of supersede and bomb these boats that are claiming to be transporting illegal drugs? We don't know because we're just bombing them and we never kind of go in there and kind of see or try to gather any of the evidence.

Sir, I defer on the legal issue, but I would say that I think the view from a kind of broader point of view is that these are, you know, these narcoterrorists are bringing very deadly lethal drugs into the United States.

Well, what authority, let me ask you this, what authority as the director of policy at the Department of Defense and and really to get your opinion, how did you advise the the secretary to that okay, now basically the Department of Defense is conducting legal operations, really justice operations, police operations, rather than, you know, which is not our authority to do so?

Well, I think a different assessment that I defer to my colleagues on the legal side, but I fully support the operations that are done in consistent with the law and they are. And this is a very serious threat to the American people and that's one of the main points of the strategy is to introduce the military instrument into the defense of our interests in the Western Hemisphere, but not overdoing it.

Well, the military is not there to conduct law, right? It is not a law enforcement agency.

But law enforcement wasn't working, sir.

Well, it's what's efficient. Obviously it's a critical part of. I will say, I will not argue that point, right? But that doesn't make the Department of Defense a law all of a sudden now it has to start enforcing the law because it wasn't being done properly. With that I yield back.

Gentleman's time has expired. I've just been made aware by staff that we have a hard stop at 12:45 to go into classified session. So we will try to adhere to that. Mr. McGuire of Virginia is recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Colby. And thank you to all of our men and women that are veterans or continuing to serve our country that are here. I say it all the time and I mean it, of all the committees I could be on, this is my favorite committee because I'm a protector, I'm a father of five, I'm a Navy SEAL veteran, and I know we wouldn't have a country without our men and women who serve in our incredible military. We have the best military in the world with the best spirit and the best training and the best equipment. And evidence of that is Operation Midnight Hammer. Who would have thought that we could do that? I bet you our adversaries can't believe how successful that mission was. How about Absolute Resolve? Amazing. All equipment in, out, all people out. And of course Epic Fury. 49 leaders. One of the number one things you want to do is take out leadership and that could normally take six months to a year and lots of boots on the ground. One strike took that out. And of course air superiority. But we couldn't do that without the leadership of this commander-in-chief, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, General Cain, Secretary Colby in the Department of War, but also without the leadership of the chairman and this committee. That success is because of what we do here. So my message to our troops that might be watching this is as we mourn our fallen, we've lost 1,000 or more troops over the last 47 years to their families we're praying for you. To our troops that are on the front line right now, we have got your back. We can do politics later, but right now as a country, we need to all be on the same team, wearing the same jersey, and that jersey says USA. One of the worst things in the world is to be deployed downrange and see your representatives downplaying what you're doing and how important it is. They are on the front line. We can disagree, okay, but let's worry about that later. Let's make sure they're fully supported. Now right now I believe 3.8 percent of our force is in the Middle East in this these operations. China. China has a philosophy. They believe that anything can and should be used as a weapon and that's why we're dealing with them all over the place. Iran. I believe that Ukraine we learned a lot about drones. We weren't even talking about that till until Ukraine-Russia conflict. But these drones and what we have learned has made us better. We have peace through strength thanks to Secretary Pete Hegseth. And as CENTCOM commander said, he asked our troops to be relentlessly lethal. So Mr. Secretary, I'd like to give you one minute to clarify your position prioritization of Iran and China.

Sir, I think under the president's leadership and the secretary's leadership, we are prioritizing the first island chain in accordance with his National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, while we are also enabling him to take decisive action along the lines of the military campaign that he's authorized against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is in the strategy. This is fully encompassed and it builds on the successful operation in Operation Midnight Hammer. And as I said earlier, I think it contributes to deterrence around the world.

You guys are doing an incredible job. I did I do trust the chairman's judgment though if we got to work on communication, I think you've conceded that we'll do that. So thank you. But in the sense of keeping the homeland safe, how are we going to keep adversaries from getting a foothold in the Arctic and the Panama Canal? And again, it would be stupid for us to tell people how many soldiers we have, when we're going to attack. But with what you can say to answer that question.

Well, sir, I think that's exactly what the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine discussed in the National Defense Strategy is all about is making sure that our interests are respected in this hemisphere with the military playing an important part, but not always the dominant or leading one.

In the cyber domain, how would you define the homeland in the cyber domain?

Maybe I could get back to you, sir, with a more specific answer just given the complexities there.

Yeah, I understand that. And then I would say this, I couldn't agree more with the number four supercharging our defense industrial base. The strategy number four pillar in your your plan on supercharging the we need to call a call to industrial arms. We need it today. However, I want to make sure that we're not just investing in weapons and equipment, but the infrastructure needed to build and maintain our factories, hangars, and arsenals. So this is a yes or no question. Does achieving this strategy require us to invest in skilled trades like welding, machining, IT?

I think absolutely, sir. Yeah.

And how does the department encourage growth in these sectors?

Sir, I defer to some of my colleagues in the services and otherwise, P&R, etcetera. But I think we all know that getting a skilled workforce is actually a huge part of addressing this issue.

Well, we've got your back. Thanks for all you do. And God bless America. God bless our troops. Thank you. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Goodlander.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Colby, thank you for being here today. Am I correct, I think you testified earlier that the department is committed to a $1.5 trillion budget this fiscal year?

That's I'm not exactly sure what the parameters are, ma'am, but we're advocating for a $1.5 trillion budget under the president's direction.

Mr. Colby, we cannot do our job without your budget. Your budget was due the first Monday in February. Here we are in March. When can we expect your budget?

Ma'am, let me get an answer for you promptly.

We look forward to that answer. You're asking for a 50 percent increase over the FY26 request. Can you give us any sense of where this plus-up is going to be dedicated to within the department?

Ma'am, I wouldn't want to get ahead of the department in terms of the specifics, but I think the conversation we've had here today illuminates a lot of the issues. We all know, as the president indicated, we've got plentiful munitions supplies, and the last administration worked on this as well, but we know we need to, you know, we can we can work harder on that and get more productive. So I think that's a munitions is going to be a big part of it. Obviously, there's a lot of platforms, some of the personnel issues that were just discussed.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit to the record two articles from the Washington Post dated August 12, 2025, and August 30th, October 30th, 2025, if I may. Thank you. Mr. Colby, these articles detail a plan that you were a part of crafting to send more than 23,000 troops to all 50 states as part of a domestic civil disturbance quick reaction force. Are these reports accurate?

Ma'am, I'd have to get back to you with an answer.

You can't tell us now whether you were a part of this planning or this exists at all?

Ma'am, I just want to make sure I give you accurate answers and I will get back to you as soon as as soon as possible on the specifics.

I look forward to that. Are American cities, our communities in this country an appropriate training ground for our military?

I mean, I think we have training grounds, if you're using the term, ma'am, literally throughout the United States, but I mean, I think the US forces can be deployed in the country for lawful purposes and they would be. I wouldn't probably characterize them as training grounds myself, but

You wouldn't? Well, what do you think the president meant when he said on September 30th, 2025, that quote, "we should use American cities as quote, training grounds for our military National Guard"?

I wouldn't speak for the president. If that's I mean, that's his words speak for themselves and we follow his instructions, ma'am.

Are you concerned about National Guard deployments to American cities to as as part of some training exercise?

Well, ma'am, I think the main purpose as I understand it for those is is lawfully pursuing, you know, presidential and other authorities to ensure, you know, law and order and other kinds of or support to law and order, I should say, which are important parts of of traditional American. But obviously, the use of the American military, it's been done in the past. We're very careful in what we how we give advice in the Department of War and make sure that it's lawful.

Mr. Colby, when Secretary Hegseth was here in June, I asked him a very simple question that has one answer and one answer only. I asked him whether the department would abide by a decision of the Supreme Court. Can you make a commitment that if the department is asked to comply with a Supreme Court decision, you you will do so?

Well, as I said to Senator Slotkin, we all, you know, commit to the Constitution and so forth and whatever the appropriate lawful response to a Supreme Court decision is, certainly I will commit to follow it.

Mr. Colby, concerns have been raised on a bipartisan basis in this hearing about your commitment to the truth. And I want to give you an opportunity to truthfully answer a very simple question, which is who won the 2020 presidential election?

Ma'am, I'm going to I'm not going to talk about that issue. It's not relevant to my responsibilities here, but I've fully rebut any characterization that I'm not being truthful.

Do you have any question about who won the 2020 presidential election?

Ma'am, that's not in my my topic of responsibility here. I'm here to talk about defense strategy.

Mr. Colby, you swore an oath to our Constitution. You are a citizen. You're a lawyer.

I'm not a lawyer, actually, but yeah. I went to law school.

Okay. Well, in any event, you swore an oath to the Constitution.

I did. Uh-huh.

You will not answer this simple question.

I'm not ma'am, I'm not going to be drawn out on an issue of political contention that's totally irrelevant to my testimony here. I'm here being very open with all of you, and I am being truthful. And I absolutely am being truthful.

Well, it's very disappointing that you won't answer this basic question. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlelady yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Harrigan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary Colby, thanks for your testimony today. Really appreciate it. I would just like to say, you know, I've I've been disposed in in other meetings, but I've been watching C-SPAN here and watching your comments and watching some of the questions from the other side. And you know, the the lack of of commitment to the truth is something that continually is coming up from the other side. And I really take issue with that because I've heard many of my colleagues talk about how they don't know what the strategy is. The truth is is that they have not read this document. The truth is that only three members from this committee actually went in to read the classified version of this document. And so when they sit here and they ask for what is the strategy, they simply don't know because they have not informed themselves. But very clearly there is a strategy and that strategy is working to turn the tables on our adversaries around the globe. And we are seeing that play out in real time right now thanks to President Trump's commitment to peace through strength. And I think what most of us fail to understand sometimes is that because we were so weak for so long, we have had to exert force to reassert that strength. Certainly, I believe in wholeheartedly what the ranking member has said, which is we've got to have a commitment to the rules-based order. But the reality is when America is perceived to be incapable of enforcing the rules-based order, some things have to change. And I think this administration has properly understood that paradigm and responded to it. Simultaneously, as a veteran of the Global War on Terror, as many of my fellow veterans are very concerned about long-term open-ended commitments overseas that take away from our focus on our strategic adversary, our true strategic adversary, which you have properly identified in this document as China. I would also caution my veteran friends to understand that sometimes we have to use force in order to not fight for the long term. That we are using a very specific application of force in such a decisive way that we are actually avoiding long-term conflict. And I think that's exactly what we are doing in Iran right now. So all of this being said, I do have a question for you. Given the action that we are taking in Iran and when we look at our strategic stocks, our magazine depth, you have talked about your fourth pillar, which is supercharging the defense industrial base. If we are conducting sustained operations in the Middle East, what specific posture adjustments, munitions allocations, or surge authorities are in place right now to ensure that Beijing does not perceive an opportunity to move against Taiwan?

Thank you very much, Congressman. I appreciate your comments very much. And maybe just kind of go in reverse order. I think in that maybe we can get more into the in the closed session, but we are paying very close attention to the reactions of other potential opponents out there. And we see very clearly that the prowess of the joint force, which you have referred to, has a deterrent effect. But we are also paying very close attention at the nuts and bolts level, not only in terms of quantity, but in terms of how to how we're thinking about how we employ or how our armed forces would be employed for most effectively along the lines of a denial defense along the first island chain. So sir, I just think you you nailed it there. I appreciate your points about veterans, sir, and I know you have a distinguished record yourself. I think that's exactly right. We certainly, I know Secretary Hegseth, all of us in the leadership of the department, Under Secretary Hansell, etcetera, we are all very conscious of the this is not another Iraq War. This is not nation building. This is not an endless war. This is but the as just as I said in my opening statement, we're not isolationists. We're not restrainers. We're flexible realists. We understand you've got a threat with the Islamic Republic. If you look too weak, then you get another problem. And so you got to get as you said, sir, the best outcome, which is the fewest Americans, you know, killed over time or our interests disrespected, important interests disrespected. And sir, I appreciate your point about the truth. I take my commitment to the truth very seriously. To be a little humorous, I think if people who know me know that that is not one of my faults, being being deceptive. I might be truthful almost to a fault. So I think I plenty of other faults, but if that's the best that they can throw at me, anybody who knows me knows I'm not a false person. So I appreciate the opportunity to elaborate on that, sir.

Hey, thank you, Secretary Colby, for all of that clarification. And I truly, truly encourage my colleagues. Let's be about national security here, not politics. Thank you, and I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. That will bring a close to the open portion of of today's hearing. I thank the secretary for being here. And I think that he has heard some concerns about communication and has pledged to improve communication between his office and this committee, and I look forward to that. We all want the department to be successful, and the best way for us to help that along is by having open channels of communication with your office. So with that, this open session is adjourned. We will reconvene at 1:00 in 2212.