U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in North and South America

Committee will come to order. Today we will begin our fiscal year 2027 posture hearings with the U.S. Northern and Southern Commands. During the last administration, failed open border policies allowed illegal immigrants to flood into our country and deadly narcotics to poison our people. Criminal cartels exploited that chaos, profiting from drug and human trafficking and threatened our communities. At the same time, reckless defund the police efforts weakened law enforcement and made America's cities less safe. President Trump came into office pledging to fix those failures. One year later, we're seeing the results. We have finally achieved operational control of the southern border. Illegal crossings have dropped to the lowest levels on record. Violent criminals are being deported. Fentanyl trafficking into the United States is down by more than 50 percent. Overdose deaths are declining nationwide, and crime rates have plummeted, especially in cities where the National Guard is supporting local law enforcement. But defending the homeland does not stop at our borders. It also requires confronting threats at their source. The President's made it clear that narcotics terrorists, narco-terrorists, and hostile foreign powers will find no sanctuary or foothold anywhere in our hemisphere. Southern Operation Southern Spear is dismantling cartel networks before their drugs cross our borders. Maritime narcotics trafficking has been substantially reduced. The historic mission that brought Nicolas Maduro to justice demonstrated that we will not tolerate threats in our backyard. Nor will regimes aligned with Beijing, Moscow, or Tehran be allowed to undermine U.S. interests just beyond our border. But the United States cannot confront these threats in the Western Hemisphere alone. That's why I commend the administration for establishing the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition. This coalition of 17 countries will leverage capabilities to combat the cartels that profit from drug trafficking and illegal immigration. I look forward to hearing from General Donovan about how we are working with these regional partners to build their capacity to secure their borders and take the fight to the cartels. These partnerships also play a critical role in countering China's growing influence. For decades, Beijing expanded its presence across the region by embedding itself in ports, telecommunications networks, critical minerals processing, and other strategic infrastructure. These investments are not benign. They are part of a deliberate strategy to expand Beijing's influence in our hemisphere and undermine U.S. security. That is why this administration has acted decisively to push back. Successes like denying Chinese control of the Panama Canal demonstrate the results of that leadership. China's ambitions extend well beyond Latin America, reaching toward our northern approaches in the Arctic, where Russia is also testing our defenses. In the past two years, we've seen Russian and Chinese bombers and warships operating jointly near Alaska. This is a significant demonstration of military cooperation between our two most capable adversaries right off our shores. Moreover, the growing missile capabilities of our adversaries make the President's Golden Dome initiative essential to defending the homeland. I look forward to hearing from General Guillot on his efforts to secure our borders and improve our homeland defense. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. With that, I yield to my friend, the ranking member, for any opening statement he may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses for being here today to kick off our posture hearing season. I think the chairman laid out the challenges and the connections between both SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM. It's one of the things we're most interested in hearing about is how that overall fight against drug traffickers and human traffickers is going right now. What are the challenges? What are the plans going forward? And certainly down in SOUTHCOM, attention has shifted. Obviously, major war in the Middle East right now, but the boat strikes continue. The Venezuelan government is still an issue in terms of their stability, how they're contributing to the region. This committee could really use an update on what's going on with that. What's the plan going forward? And specifically, what results are we seeing in terms of the drug trafficking issue? Drugs are still a major problem in the U.S. The drug cartels are still a major problem. Where does that fight go? And then it connects, obviously, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM with what's gone on in Mexico, assassination of the, sorry, the killing of the drug cartel leader and then the violence that followed that. Really want to get an assessment from both of you, all three of you actually, on where that fight is going, what you think the most crucial steps are going forward. And to the chairman's point about the coalition that's trying to be pulled together, I think that's absolutely crucial part of this. We can't just come in and bend all of those countries to our will. We need to work in cooperation. I've always felt that the Plan Colombia model from over 20 years ago was a pretty good model of how to do that, how to partner and work with nations down there to try to combat a problem that affects them as well as us. But we need more details on where that campaign is going as we move forward. In NORTHCOM, there's been a massive increase in the use of the Department of Defense for border security. Would like an update on that in terms of troops committed to it, what their roles and missions are. I had a good conversation with General Guillot yesterday, laid out some of that. I think that would be really important to have a discussion about where we see that going. And then other parts of that, one, as the chairman alluded to, Golden Dome. Where is that headed? We still don't have much in the way of detail on that. Now, Golden Dome contains a whole lot of very important technologies that we're going to work on one way or another, whether it's domestically to prepare us for whatever contingencies we might have overseas. Counter-drone, counter-missile technology is crucial. We want to make sure that money's being spent intelligently. I still worry that this mythical vision that somehow we're going to block every single thing that could possibly come into the U.S. from a missile or drone capability could lead to some very big mistakes in terms of what we spend money on. We need a defensive capability. We also need to be mindful of the fact that no matter what it is, it's not going to be perfect. And we see that in the Middle East now. Israel has an incredibly effective counter-drone, counter-missile system. They have a much smaller area to worry about, and still in a conflict with Iran, some missiles do get through. How does that factor into our strategic planning as we move forward? Two, well, I'll close with three sort of problems, concerns. One is the use of the Department of Defense domestically. That has calmed down recently as we've shifted focus, as I said, to Iran, but the use of active duty troops in Los Angeles, the use of Guard units in Chicago and Portland and other cities is deeply troubling to me and many members of this committee. The role that our military plays in domestic law enforcement should be pretty close to nothing. So we're worried about where that's going, so curious to hear what the plans are in terms of using those domestic forces. And then we have the counter-drone problem that we saw show up down in El Paso. It is just not good for the FAA to shut down a major domestic airport. They said they were going to shut it down for 10 days, which caused all kinds of problems. Turns out just to be closer to 10 hours, but the lack of coordination and communication between DOD, CBP, and FAA, to throw a bunch of initials at you, is a major problem. Yes, we need to be able to defend against the drone threat. We in this, in the NDAA last year, passed a significant piece of legislation to try and address that, but that has to be coordinated with protecting domestic air travel. We can't be taking random shots at what we think are drones and wind up disrupting domestic air travel. So I really want to know what's happening in terms of getting that straight and making sure that something like El Paso does not happen again. And the last point, what is all of this costing? This is a major, major concern for me. The President plans to submit a $1.5 trillion defense budget. That is a 50 percent increase in the defense budget at a time that we have a $38 trillion debt and at a time when just last year we cut taxes by some $4 trillion. Reducing revenue, massively increasing spending when we already had a debt and a deficit doesn't seem like a recipe for a very, very strong country going forward. So we need to figure that out, but specifically, we'd like to know what is it costing to do the boat strikes in Latin America? What is it costing for the massive increases in the use of our military on border patrol? And we still have not gotten clear numbers on that from the department. We'd like to get an update and get those specifics. With that, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the ranking member. First, a couple of housekeeping announcements. In consultation with the ranking member, we will be conducting our questioning today in reverse seniority order. So for the staffs back in their office, if your member sits on the front row of the dais, you might want to have them get in here. And after completion of the public portion of this hearing, we'll immediately reconvene upstairs for the classified portion. And now I'd like to introduce our witnesses. We have first Mr. Joseph Humire, who is the performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs. We have General Greg Guillot is the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and NORAD, and General Francis Donovan's the Commander of U.S. Southern Command. Thank you for being here. Mr. Humire, we'll start with you. You're recognized.

Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I have the honor and the privilege to serve in President Trump's Department of War, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of War for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs. So I want to begin by taking a moment to thank our men and women in uniform, particularly those that serve in critical missions related to homeland and hemispheric defense. Especially the National Guard service members that are helping protect America's cities and the military members securing our southern border. As well as the Marine, sailors, and special operations units that are part of Operation Southern Spear and Operation Absolute Resolve, military members like Chief Warrant Officer 5 Eric Slover and others from Joint Special Operations Command that through their actions in Venezuela exemplify the extraordinary bravery of our warfighters and the unmatched capability of the American military. We are in historic times in the United States. Under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's leadership, we are doing something that has never been done before. In the past, previous U.S. presidents prioritized every region in the world except the one in which we live. Today we have corrected that mistake. We are prioritizing the Western Hemisphere by making hemispheric defense integral to U.S. homeland defense. And in just 14 months, we have achieved historic accomplishments that put America first, Americans first, and the Americas first in U.S. national security. In my written statement, I outline several of these accomplishments in line with the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2025 National Defense Strategy. For my opening statement, I'd like to provide a quick summary. And it begins with our southern border. As President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have said, border security is national security. Which is why my first official trip last year was to Fort Huachuca in Arizona to visit Joint Task Force Southern Border. They took me to the front line of our southwest border in Nogales, where I was able to meet with soldiers of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Seeing Strykers on our southern border for some can seem surreal. But for our department, it illustrates how we've managed to seal the southwest border in record time by using deterrence and close partnership with federal law enforcement. Today the department maintains over 12,000 service members along our southern border and has established six national defense areas covering 845 miles or 42 percent of the border across Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. The military innovation is matched by investments in cutting-edge technology and infrastructure, including to counter unmanned aerial threats and additional miles of border barrier. The result is turning record illegal mass migration experienced during the Biden administration into the lowest recorded border encounters in history. This past January marked the fourth consecutive month decline in border apprehensions, with figures 93 percent below the historic average. As we sealed our southern border and repelled illegal criminal aliens and others, we began to focus beyond the border. For the first time in history, the department is going on offense against designated terrorist organizations and other major cartels in our hemisphere. Operation Southern Spear is restoring deterrence against narcoterrorism threats in the Americas. And since this operation began, there has seen a 30 percent reduction of drug vessel movements in the Caribbean and a 25 percent reduction in the Eastern Pacific. Combined border flows of fentanyl, which is a weapon of mass destruction, has dropped by 56 percent and cocaine flows by 20 percent. That means that there are less Americans dying from deadly drugs that have been poisoning our communities and our children for years. In fact, overall inside the United States, we've seen a 20 percent decline in U.S. drug overdoses in the last year. The point is very simple, the point is Operation Southern Spear is saving American lives. And this is just the beginning. Earlier this month, as both the ranking member and the chairman have indicated, U.S. Southern Command hosted, along with Secretary Hegseth, ministers from 17 countries in Latin America and Caribbean to form the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition. A coalition aimed at rooting out narcoterrorism threats through partner-led deterrence-focused operations. That same week, Ecuador became the first country to conduct joint land strikes in Latin America against cartel infrastructure, bringing collective hard power against cartels and increasing burden sharing. Happy to announce as well as Chile has now become the 18th member of that coalition since last week. Our plan is to continue to transition to partner-led deterrence-focused operation against narcoterrorist networks that threaten the U.S. homeland, while enhancing our posture to secure immediate security perimeter and key terrain. From Alaska to Greenland in the Arctic to the Gulf of America and the Panama Canal and surrounding countries, the department is implementing what the NSS has described as the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, both to defend America's immediate security perimeter and to deny adversaries access to key terrain across the Western Hemisphere. None of this would be possible without the unparalleled efforts of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command. Both General Guillot and General Donovan have shown extraordinary leadership in adapting their commands to these priority missions. So I'd like to conclude by thanking them, and together we stand ready to support our warfighters, defend our nation, and secure our neighborhood. Thank you, Chairman, ranking member, and members of the committee. I look forward to the conversation.

Thank you, Mr. Humire. General Guillot, you're recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Humire. General Guillot, you're recognized.

Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and the distinguished members of this committee, and good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today along with my teammates here on my right and left and to represent the dedicated and disciplined men and women of the United States Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command. NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM are distinct commands fundamentally committed to the defense of the homeland. As strategic environment has grown more complex, NORAD and NORTHCOM have responded by transforming both commands, having taken on new missions and rapidly implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America. That active approach can be seen through the command's 24/7 campaign to deter adversaries and defend against all threats in all domains. From intercepting long-range bombers off the coasts of Alaska and Canada, tracking advanced maritime platforms in the approaches to North America, or standing ready to defend against long-range missile attacks, NORAD and NORTHCOM remain vigilant, capable, and committed. That commitment is apparent by the operational units that have been activated over the past year. To secure the U.S. southern border, U.S. NORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Southern Border in March of 2025. Over the past year, JTF-SB has supported Customs and Border Protection partners with unique military capabilities in all domains that have helped reduce illegal border activities to historic lows. To more effectively combat the criminal cartels responsible for the deaths of over 100,000 Americans every year, NORTHCOM established Joint Interagency Task Force Counter-Cartel, a whole-of-government enterprise dedicated to fusing intelligence used to help dismantle cartel networks. And to accelerate our integrated air and missile defense capabilities, U.S. NORTHCOM stood up Joint Task Force Gold to serve as the operational arm for the future layered defense system provided by Golden Dome for America. To address the challenge to safety and security posed by unmanned aircraft systems, or UASs, U.S. NORTHCOM is designated as the department synchronizer for counter-small UAS activities in the continental U.S. and Alaska. U.S. NORTHCOM has developed a rapidly deployable counter-small UAS flyaway kit to defend critical installations and employ innovative technologies to protect U.S. personnel, including along the border. And through exercises like Falcon Peak, we are also accelerating the development of new counter-small UAS technology in partnership with GIATA 401 and industry. Assuring our ability to operate in the high north is a strategic necessity. With the inclusion of Greenland into the U.S. NORTHCOM area of responsibility, we are executing seamless defensive operations across North American Arctic in close cooperation with allies and partners. Through exercises like Arctic Edge and NORAD's Operation Noble Defender, we are enhancing our joint and allied interoperability, stressing our forces in harsh conditions, and ensuring that we are ready to defend the high north anytime under all conditions. NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM continue to pursue critical investments in modernized domain awareness systems and defensive capabilities to meet the challenges of tomorrow. These missions are reinforced by our steadfast partnerships. From our unique binational relationship with Canada through NORAD to our close cooperation with Mexico, the Bahamas, and now Denmark and Greenland, trusted relationships are a cornerstone of regional security and homeland defense. Domestically, U.S. NORTHCOM's mission to provide defense support of civil authorities remains a critical responsibility, and we stand ready to support lead federal agencies during natural disasters and key events, including America 250 celebrations and World Cup 2026 co-hosted by Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The men and women of U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD have embraced these new challenges and are unwavering in their no-fail mission to stay ahead of all adversaries in all domains. We appreciate the steadfast support of this committee, and I look forward to your questions. We have the watch.

Thank you, General. General Donovan, you're recognized.

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the posture of United States Southern Command. On behalf of the men and women of SOUTHCOM, Sergeant Major Rodriguez and I appreciate your continued support. I'm joined today by my good friends, Mr. Joseph Humire and General Guillot. The three of us are aligned with the department's focus on the Western Hemisphere. We are dedicated to rebuilding U.S. leadership and presence in this critical part of the world. Let me begin by saying that I've learned a lot in the last 41 days about the dynamic region I'm responsible for and the incredible organization I am now leading. As this committee knows, last year was a pivotal moment in SOUTHCOM's history. The command responded to multiple priority missions and operations, each with enormous national security implications. The SOUTHCOM team rose to the challenge while remaining true to its legacy of partnering and collaboration. I specifically want to thank the leaders of our Joint Task Force Southern Spear, SOUTHCOM's warfighting headquarters, who are leading our efforts against drug cartels and terrorist networks with incredible levels of professionalism and precision. Now we're ready to evolve for the future. The 2026 National Defense Strategy lays out the threats we face in this hemisphere and SOUTHCOM's role in addressing them. In response, I have developed four imperatives. First, SOUTHCOM strengthens hemispheric command and control by redesigning and building the SOUTHCOM headquarters for strategic-level operations at range, speed, and scale. Second, SOUTHCOM imposes total systemic friction on drug cartels and terrorist networks. This requires a hemisphere-wide approach led by SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM to help our partners degrade these organizations and reduce the threat they pose to our partners and our own nation. Third, SOUTHCOM develops and fields cost-effective modernized forces tailored for the mission in this hemisphere. These forces fully maximize operational maneuver, autonomous systems, and human-machine teaming to greatly increase lethality, all-domain awareness, and data sharing for U.S. and partner forces. And finally, SOUTHCOM denies adversary footholds and undue influence in this hemisphere. That includes their ability to position forces or other capabilities that threaten our homeland or regional partners and challenge our access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and its approaches. These imperatives and the dynamic security environment we operate in will require the right structures, authorities, and forces to keep pace with mission needs. SOUTHCOM is moving out with speed and urgency and stands ready to work with Congress to defend our homeland and our hemisphere. I thank this committee for their unyielding support to U.S. Southern Command and look forward to our discussions this morning. Thank you very much.

Thank you, General. I'll recognize myself first for questions. Many have heard me complain from up here that both AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM have historically been under-resourced and overlooked. And with President Trump, when it comes to Southern Command, that has changed. He has renewed the department's strategic focus on your area of responsibility. Given this refocus, what is your strategy for SOUTHCOM in its way forward with regard to resourcing and capabilities?

Chairman, thank you. As I look at, in the past 41 days, I look at the capability of the headquarters I just mentioned, that we have to build a headquarters to actually operate 24/7 across our region. We have as the foundation, and I consider it a two-layer cake, the foundation, the base foundation, security cooperation is pretty solid. But I also found that we have some authorities and some really personnel increases we need to ensure that we can actually execute that key mission of partnering across the nation. On top of that, the second layer of the cake that is non-existent right now because SOUTHCOM has never been asked to play the role as an operational strategic-level headquarters. Building that capability to better partner with nations around the AOR while at the same time, Chairman, is to develop a campaign plan to actually get at these cartels, these DTOs, in a systemic way, apply systemic friction across the network. And I consider that from point of production to point of distribution, which would be in the plazas on the Mexican border, U.S. border. And that's the approach we have moving forward.

When do you think that plan will be finalized?

Right now, Mr. Chairman, we're going to build off of what is currently in place, Operation Southern Spear, and evolve that plan. We're in the planning process now. I've given the initial commander's guidance, and we expect in the first, this next 30 days, we'll have the framework of that plan in place.

Well, the department has engaged in thwarting the cartels seeking to traffic deadly drugs into the U.S. How have they adapted to that new approach by the United States, if or have they?

Chairman, I wouldn't provide exact percentages right now. In this time I've had, I've watched our forces engage both from partnership and security cooperation and capability building all the way to kinetic operations. My initial assessment is I believe the enemy is adapting because enemies adapt to pressure. And with our goal of putting again friction across this entire network, we are seeing some changes, whether that's additional flows further to the west into the Pacific, or more air traffic, or more in shipping containers as far as illicit drugs moving north. I can't give you percentages, but we know the enemy's adapting to our actions.

Are you adapting to those new approaches?

I'm very encouraged by the formation of this Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition. But what specifically are we looking for from those partner countries? Is it intelligence sharing, partner-led operations? What are you looking for from those partners? And what are they looking for from us?

Yeah, Chairman, I believe it's a little bit of all of the above. Fundamentally, I've been able to visit about 16 countries in the last year in the Western Hemisphere, the majority of that in Latin America and the Caribbean. And the number one response I get from all our partners is, why did it take you so long? So they're looking primarily at capacity building. They have capacity building on border security, on domain awareness, on ISR, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. So there's a lot of areas that we can help our partners. But fundamentally what we're looking for from them is a serious commitment to use not just interdiction, but also use deterrence to go after the cartels that are in their sovereign territories. This is going a little bit to what General Donovan was saying on the successes of OSS. A lot of them have been inspired by the bold action by this administration to go after the cartel, combining deterrence with interdiction. We still do historic records of interdiction, but deterrence sends a stronger signal. So if you look at the drug flows that are going from south to north, it's like a four-lane highway. So OSS focused on looking at the eastern lane in the eastern Caribbean and the western lane in the eastern Pacific. We're looking at our partners to do more on the central Caribbean and the western Caribbean, as well as on land. So when it comes to land-based strikes, Ecuador I think has set the pace where they, with their permission, with the permission of their government, we've been able to help Ecuador become much more aggressive at going after their cartel threats, providing them capabilities that they otherwise would not have.

Do you get the impression that any of them are concerned about us intruding on their sovereignty as a part of this process?

Members of the coalition specifically signed a joint security declaration mentioning that they want this support. And most of them all are looking for this. They have the threat of transnational organized crime is a threat that's permeated all countries in the Western Hemisphere for decades. So all of them have been looking to go after this. Some of them have limited capabilities. Some of them don't even really have a military and they're looking to use the United States military to augment them. And that also includes non-kinetic effects on cyber, information operations, and others.

Okay, my time's expired. Chair now recognizes the ranking member.

For General Donovan, Mr. Humire, so how would you measure successes at this point? Do you have any measurable facts that show fewer drugs, less drugs, however you would put that, are getting into the U.S.? Is this something that we're measuring in some way?

I'm happy to take that, ranking member. So as I mentioned on those four lanes of the drug flows, the way that we're looking at it at policy within the Pentagon is movements of vessels and then degrading the capability of the organizations. It's not so much focus on the commodities, whether it's drugs, it could be weapons.

Sure, I get that, but ultimately, and I understand that, you're trying to get the supply, but have you measured, I mean, the ultimate impact? I mean, you can guess at how well they're doing in those four, in that four-lane highway, I guess you can look and see how many cars, boats, whatever are on it. But ultimately the measurement is how many drugs are getting into the U.S. Do we have any measurement on that particular piece of it?

What we've measured, ranking member, is the decrease in the movements of the vessels. So there's been a 20 percent decrease in the eastern Caribbean on the movement of those vessels.

But that's a no in terms of the drugs actually getting into the U.S. I mean, because, and look, I don't disagree necessarily with the effort to stop this. I think figuring out whether or not this is working, bottom line is, are drugs getting into the U.S. or aren't they?

Well, we went 45 days, ranking member, without having a vessel move through the eastern Caribbean. I think when you don't have any movement, there's likely not going to be any type of drugs or any other commodity.

Sure, unless there's four that you just said, there's four lanes on that highway. So not necessarily is my point. I mean, the true measure of this would be, okay, which four lanes, and the true measure is how many drugs are getting into the U.S. So I think we need to, and you obviously work with domestic agencies that have more oversight on that than you do. That's the measure of whether or not you're hitting those, that four-lane highway in the right way, isn't it?

Correct, but it's also the measurement of how many drug overdose deaths we have inside the United States. And that obviously goes beyond to the interagency. But we have seen record drops.

That's an answer. Now, it's not necessarily a controlling answer because there's a lot of different things that can contribute to overdose deaths. But that's what we're sort of looking for. And if you're really going to measure this, that's where you need to focus. And that's the next portion of the question is, so you're doing the boat strikes primarily in international waters, Caribbean, Pacific. Is there a feeling that you're going to be moving to a lot more terrestrial strikes? Land strikes, however one would put that.

Yes, ranking member. So the purpose of the coalition is to look at where our partners are looking at the primary threats that are facing narco-terrorism. In many cases it is on land. It is inside within the and many times on their borders. But those efforts are doing in partnership with these host nation governments and with their permission. So in the case of Ecuador, for instance, they gave us both their consent.

So you do not intend to take any unilateral strikes on the sovereign territory of other nations?

Ranking member, I reserve the right in the decision space of the White House and the President to make those decisions. I know at the Department of War...

Is that part of the plan at the moment?

At the Department of War, we are prepared to give all options to the President. But what we're focused on...

I understand that's not an answer to the question. So is it part of the, it's not, I think you're saying it's not part of the plan at the moment, but it might be.

Currently we are focused on partner-led deterrence focused operations through this coalition.

And how many strikes are being made on land against the cartels and the narcotics groups right now, either in coordination or by one of these 17 partner nations?

So I don't have an exact number. I know Ecuador carried out a recent strike in the last couple weeks. And I know they're beginning an operation that began yesterday or two days ago now that's going to carry out for 15 days inside their country. But I don't have a specific on the number of strikes.

Is there any particular endpoint that you see to U.S. kinetic action in this regard? Because as you point out, we've been battling cartels for a long time. This seems like a forever conflict, is it not? I mean, what would be the level of achievement that would be necessary for you to say, okay, we can stop kinetic action?

So the center of gravity of the cartel threat or narco-terrorist threat has always been border security. We kind of showed that with sealing our U.S. southwest border and the reduction of movements both of drugs, but also of all kinds of illicit activity.

Sure, and that's good, but the boat strikes are continuing.

No, correct. But what I'm saying, ranking member, is that the extension of having border security throughout the hemisphere is a big focus. And as we be able to advance on countries securing their border...

Understood. I got one more thing I got to get in here before I run out of time. So just quickly, there is no particular endpoint to this campaign, and that's something we're going to want to talk about. The second thing, and I'm sorry I took too long on that to not point out, domestically, General Guillot, figuring out how to coordinate properly, as I said in my opening statements, with the FAA, we can't be shutting down airports. So if you could just quick comment on what you're doing to get better coordination. I'm out of time, but...

Yes, ranking member. We are coordinating very closely with the FAA on the use of all of our counter-UAS systems. And we've established very solid coordination methods between those who fly UAVs...

We will want to see the details on that. Absolutely, sir. And with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Hamadeh.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the first time in recent memory, we have a president who understands our national security starts with securing America's borders and defending our own backyard. It made zero sense to be waging endless wars on the other side of the globe while the narco-terrorists and the cartels push their poison freely into our country. In just one year, we lost more Americans to fentanyl than during the entire Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars combined. Nothing is more important than having control of our borders and making sure our neighbors aren't bringing hostile foreign influence to our doorstep. Now Arizona is leading the America First fight on the border. We're home to the Joint Task Force Southern Border headquarters at Fort Huachuca. The Department of War's Joint Interagency Task Force is taking on the cartels out of Tucson, and our 162nd Fighter Wing pilots deliver 24/7 air dominance across the Southwest. Now on behalf of Arizona, thank you all for helping secure our borders and making sure America is safe again. Now General Guillot, I understand with how is NORTHCOM harnessing Arizona's cutting-edge autonomous sensors and AI-driven surveillance at our southern border to give our warfighters the edge they need?

Congressman, first I'd like to acknowledge the great contributions of Arizona, and not because I'm an Arizonan, but as you mentioned, the 162nd, I've flown with them a couple times, outstanding air defense of the United States. And all the other units, JIATF Counter-Cartel and the work that they're doing to fuse intelligence that can counter the cartels, and then JTF Southern Border running the full 1,954 miles of the border in the seal part of the seal and repel order that we have. As for the autonomous sensors, I'm a very, very strong proponent of those. And as the Customs Border Protection fields more of those across the border, what that does is one, it reduces the reliance on soldiers and Marines to backfill that. And two, it allows for much faster response to illegal activity at the border. So as CBP is able to put more and more of those into place, it'll be integrated into the systems that we've moved down to the southern border as part of JTFSB to complete and hold that seal.

Very good. And thank you again for helping secure our border, General, because you know, my district is actually probably one of the most important districts in terms of the cutting edge of AI, right? We have TSMC, we have all the semiconductors. And under the Biden administration, we had tens of thousands of Chinese nationals cross our southern border. And now that it's sealed thanks to the U.S. military's help, we're no longer going to have that type of influence be exploited. And General, you testified that hundreds of drones are invading the airspace of our most sensitive military bases. I know we have many military bases at our southern border like Fort Huachuca. Now what additional resources or authorities do you need from us to fully secure the southern border against drones, tunnels, and other threats, and especially our airspace on our bases?

Congressman, you'll hear something from me you probably rarely hear, but last year we asked for four counter-UAS authorities and all four have been granted over the past year. So we do not lack any authorities now. We just need to work with industry to field the systems at all the bases such as at Davis-Monthan to ensure that all of the bases have the systems they need to counter the drones. And we've worked very closely with Davis-Monthan, in fact did a validation exercise over this past year on how NORTHCOM can come in with a flyaway kit on a moment's notice to help them seal. And this was in an exercise, but we stand ready to do that at any time.

Very good. Thank you. Now Mr. Humire, I applaud your success in capturing Maduro, but a potential power vacuum might be open for our enemies. Now how are you making sure enemies don't just buy or bully their way back into the region? And how do you see the threats by China and Russia towards regional oil and gas and strategic minerals, ports, and tech going?

Yes, thank you Congressman for the question. Venezuela is an ongoing effort. It's an effort that's going to require persistent engagement. And what we're doing is we're trying to level that engagement across across the interagency, frankly. But within the Department of War, we're focused on the first phase of the three-phase plans that Secretary Rubio has outlined: stabilization, recovery, and transition. So the Department of War has focusing on the stabilization aspect of that plan. And that stabilization aspect requires us to have persistent engagement with the Venezuelan government and the Venezuelan armed forces. We have that engagement. Both General Donovan and I have been able to visit Venezuela in recent weeks. And we've had discussions with the Venezuelan government. And as of today, they are continuing to comply with a lot of the security guarantees that we've been asking for, both for our personnel and our embassy on the ground, as well as any kind of presence of any threats, external and internal, to the country and stability of Venezuela.

Thank you.

Gentleman's time's expired. Chair now recognizes Dr. Conaway.

Thank you.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes Dr. Conaway.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Humire, you addressed the continued threat of unmanned aircraft systems in your testimony. Do you believe that continued investments in UAS and counter-UAS are essential to adapt to the modern battlefield? I'm very interested in this question because I do believe we need to test, evaluate, and demonstrate the integration of improved munition payloads and improved unmanned aircraft systems.

Absolutely, Congressman. I strongly believe that counter-UAS is going to be not just the next frontier, it's the current frontier of the battlefield. We're seeing that as far afield as places like Ukraine and the Middle East, but obviously we're also seeing that on our southern border, as General Guillot has attested to. And I can say that in the Pentagon, at the policy office, we've been able to streamline the coordination process on counter-UAS authorities, statutory authorities from 130i, to reduce that timeframe by 80 percent. We have more to go, but we want to make it fast so that the battlefield commanders have all the authorities they need to engage the threat.

Thank you. And sticking with you, Mr. Humire, recent events of and actions of the administration are of great concern. In particular, I'm extremely worried about the cost of numerous military operations that the President has directed across multiple theaters. I'm concerned, of course, about the human cost. The most recent military operation in the Middle East has led to the tragic loss of 13 service members in that theater. These operations have also had a significant cost in dollars to taxpayers and in terms of the wear and tear on our equipment and future readiness. The administration's National Defense Strategy explicitly states that we need to be clear-eyed about the threats we face as well as resources available to confront them. But in order to do so, this committee needs to know the total costs of these operations. So, what is the total cost of these operations, specifically the operation Southern Spear and Absolute Resolve, in dollars and in wear and tear on our equipment?

Congressman, I'm happy to take questions regarding costs back to the Office of the Comptroller to get you specific answers on the financial costs. Congressman, I'm happy to take questions regarding costs back to the Office of the Comptroller to get you specific answers on the financial costs. Operation Southern Spear is ongoing, so the costs are going to continue to develop as we engage in that. But one of the purposes of the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition is to share that burden with our partners that are collectively have a responsibility for hemispheric defense. So happy to take that question back to the Comptroller. And one point, Mr. Congressman, I can't speak to other conflicts in other places, but I can speak to the commitment that this administration has to making sure that Western Hemisphere and homeland defense are a top priority mission. I think that's evidenced by the fact that even during the conflict in the Middle East, both President Trump and Secretary Hegseth were present in Florida for our coalition in the Shield Summit of the Americas.

And so right now you're unable to give us any cost to date on these operations?

No, I could take it back and talk to the Comptroller.

Moving on, in January, after Operation Absolute Resolve, President Trump stated that he would run, the United States rather, well he, would run Venezuela. And now yesterday, President Trump stated in reference to the current situation in Cuba, and I quote him, "I think I can do anything I want with it," pertaining to Cuba. Mr. Humire, I assume you've read the National Defense Strategy.

Correct.

Here's a quote from Secretary Hegseth's introduction regarding the National Defense Strategy. "No longer will the department be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building." Given that statement and your understanding of the National Defense Strategy, I assume you remember reading this line. I would have to say that the President of the United States seems to think that he can do what he wants not with one, but two or maybe more countries that fall directly under the very definition of regime change and intervention. In fact, it seems that this administration that used to be America First, now seems rapidly engaging in conflicts around the world with little or no strategy. Can you comment on that?

Congressman, the fundamental pillar of both the NDS LOE 1, which is homeland and hemispheric defense, is centered around providing collective security around the United States security perimeter. This is very far different from any other endless wars or forever wars that happen in the Middle East or any other theater that's far away from home. There's a responsibility that I think the top responsibility that an American President has is to protect the homeland and protect American citizens. That begins not just at the border, but it begins around the borders.

But the President has said, sorry, but we're at war with these drug cartels. I mean, he's used this term and that it's a threat to the homeland. And of course, the issue with drugs has been going on for decades. And so it sounds to me like that represents an endless engagement and according to his own definition, sort of an endless war in dealing with the situation in South America and these threats as the President has defined them.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Schmidt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We're grateful for the opportunity to engage with you. I'd like to have a conversation with General Guillot on some homeland security matters. And we love and are grateful for all of our fighting men and women around the world. We love them all, but perhaps we are particularly grateful to you and those under your command for keeping our homeland safe. It is perhaps the most fundamental mission that our military has. Our mission here is to make sure you have all of the tools that you need in order to accomplish that mission without fail each and every time. I represent a number of folks whose mission is to provide fuel to those who give us air superiority wherever we operate. And often we think of the tanker fleet in terms of our ability to project power around the world. But I'd like to get your thoughts on several things related to the tankers and their importance and where we might do a better job of providing you what you need in terms of the homeland security mission.

Thank you, Congressman, for acknowledging the great role of the tankers. Often when we look at the air defense of the United States, we focus on the fighter aircraft that are on alert and scramble to make the intercepts. But every single one of them is enabled by a series of tankers that are behind the scenes keeping the fight going. In fact, just over the weekend, we had several Noble Eagle scrambles and the critical key to success for all of those was the fact that we not only had the tankers airborne, but we were able to scramble more tankers from across the country to get there to keep the fighter aircraft flowing for the duration of those. What I think that we could do is continue to modernize. You know, obviously we're relying on KC-135s primarily for NORAD. They do a fantastic job, but they're all I think at least 60 years old. And the reliability on them in the air is great, but I know it's a lot of work for the maintainers on the ground. For every hour that that aircraft is in the air, it's usually several hours on the ground to make sure that they're ready. So continuing to modernize the fleet with KC-46 and other aircraft would be essential for the homeland defense mission.

Thank you, General. Let me unpack that last point a little more. I mean, it's reasonable to think that in the event we had a near-peer engagement that threatened our homeland, that is probably not limited to engagement in the homeland. There's going to be demand from your fellow combatant commanders all over the globe. They all need to refuel in order to do what must be done. Do we have enough tankers? And a related question in terms of your point on upgrading. The 135s are an old airframe. The 46s have had their share of challenges. What do we need to be thinking about in terms of if we're adding more in the short term, we have what we have, but in the long term, where should we be thinking in terms of next generation purpose-built tankers to support the mission?

Congressman, for any single conflict, we certainly have enough tankers. What we spend a lot of time planning for with Admiral Paparo for INDOPACOM, General Reed from TRANSCOM, and Admiral Crell for STRATCOM, and then myself for NORAD NORTHCOM, is if we have simultaneous conflicts where the tanker distribution would become vital. Obviously here in the United States, we have the advantage of being able to land and refuel and get back up in the air quickly that some of my partners might not have. And so I think in what I'm trying to do is make sure that we have those backup plans if there aren't enough tankers. But everything that I see right now is that we would have a sufficient number of tankers to take care of the homeland defense mission as well as those required to get forces overseas and to keep them fueled overseas.

Sir, could I ask on that, would that assessment be the same and your confidence level as high if we were talking about an extended engagement in the high north, either nuclear or conventional?

The high north does present a unique challenge. We have a lot of steady state tankers up there, but it would take more for us to be able to patrol that vast region. And there I look at our Canadian counterparts to continue their efforts to purchase tankers to help with the NORAD distribution of tankers.

And what about a next-gen tanker and your thoughts on what we should be planning to acquire over a time horizon?

Well, we certainly should look to continue to modernize that fleet. Having a more low-observable tanker is something that the Air Force is looking at. That is not as important for the homeland defense mission. So I think if we get those new tankers, that they should push forward to the overseas fights with the advanced capabilities because the tankers that we have now would be certainly sufficient for our role in the homeland.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Bell.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member. Quickly, one thing that I will take exception with is, Mr. Chair, you announced that you were reversing the order from junior to senior. And there are some in here that thought we were going first because we're important, but now they know. [Laughter.] And on a serious note, this committee is and should be one of the most bipartisan, if not the most bipartisan committees, because national security should be above partisan politics. And Mr. Humire, you mentioned that for the first time in history, there's an administration that is putting protection of this hemisphere as a priority. And in my opinion, whether you intended it or not, I think that is very disrespectful to the men and women who served this country, lost their lives paying the ultimate sacrifice. And it's okay to lift your guy, your administration, but there's no need to disrespect the sacrifices of those who came before. General Guillot, a lot of attention has been placed on Greenland. Already the United States operates critical assets on the territory that support missile warning and space surveillance. And that presence exists because of decades of defense cooperation with Denmark and Greenland. Yet in recent months, we continue to hear deeply concerning and harmful rhetoric from the White House about the United States potentially taking control of Greenland, whether through acquisition or even potentially by force. Just the suggestion of invading a sovereign NATO ally has raised serious concerns amongst our partners. From a military standpoint, isn't it our strongest strategic advantage in the Arctic, the fact that we already have trusted allies who allow the United States to operate critical defense infrastructure on their soil?

Congressman, I have great appreciation and respect for the leadership of Greenland and also my counterpart in Denmark that allow us to operate out of Pituffik Space Base, excuse me, that you just mentioned, as well as other locations throughout Greenland that not only give the space capability that you described, but we can also operate the fighter aircraft and the tanker aircraft that give us that first line of defense against any adversary that might approach us from the north.

And Mr. Humire, I think I pronounced your name wrong, I apologize. Would you agree?

Yes, I agree, Mr. Congressman. And just to say...

I'm going to, I don't have a lot of time, so I'm going to keep going.

Sure. Mr. Congressman, just to say on the point on Greenland, just the fact that we have the 1951 treaty has allowed us to give through partnership with Denmark capabilities to enhance and refurbish not just the Pituffik Space Base, but other locations that we used to have during World War II to harden that security.

But those strategies, or those partnerships, are one of our greatest strategic assets, if you will.

Correct, Congressman. And my understanding is that those conversations are still ongoing.

And let me turn, I'm going to reclaim my time. Let me turn to another critical partner that this administration has repeatedly treated with hostility. The United States and Canada share one of the most integrated military partnerships in the world through NORAD, where two sovereign nations jointly defend the skies of North America. General Guillot, would you agree that the US-Canada partnership is the cornerstone of continental defense and that maintaining that level of trust and coordination is essential as we modernize NORAD to address threats like cruise missiles, hypersonics, and unmanned systems?

Congressman, the relationship in the binational command has been the only one in the world since 1958 where, and in this case, US and Canadian military members work side by side. The mil-to-mil relationship is outstanding. And as you mentioned, we have some very challenging threats to address and the NORAD modernization program, which is both a US and a Canadian program, are instrumental to making sure that we stay ahead of the adversary.

And Mr. Humire, would you agree?

I do agree. I think we've gotten historic increased commitments from Canada at the Hague summit for 5 percent of GDP on national defense as well as 3.5 percent on core defense. And our department has been working very closely with the Canadian counterparts to to review at the technical level where those defense dollars are being spent. And Mr. Congressman, I'll just say to to the broader question, and I appreciate that you saying that national security is a bipartisan issue, absolutely I agree 100 percent, also being one of those individuals that have served in uniform for eight years. I think that a lot of the issues that we're dealing with transcend politics, but I will say that having that Latin America...

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. McGuire.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here. Thank you for your service. You know, we have the best military in the world and the whole world has been watching our I've had former veterans I served with tell me they're just proud to be an Americans watching the professionalism with Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Resolve, and Operation Epic Fury. Most of my time in the SEAL teams was in SOUTHCOM. So I guess, General Donovan, I just got a message from some of those warfighters and they had a message for you for the cartels and they said give no rest for the cartels, let's wear them out, no safe spaces. I'm sure you can concur with that. This question is for Mr. Humire. We talked earlier about Nogales Pass, I went to go visit. When I was there, I talked to the 10th Mountain Division general in charge of our security. I talked with Tom Homan and everyone else and we talked about counter-U.S. policy. And I understand that we in the last NDAA gave four permissions. One of the things we identified was a 2020 DOJ advisory and we made a recommendation to this committee and entered into the record that advisory and an oversight committee that they rewrite it. And President Trump put out an executive order giving the DOJ 30 days to rewrite that. Do you know the status of that right now?

I don't, Congressman, but I'm happy to take that back and get a response for you.

That sounds good. And talking about SOUTHCOM again, Mr. Humire, should we expect changes in military presence and tempo in SOUTHCOM right now?

Well, I would defer to General Donovan on that, but I would say that we are we are looking to engage SOUTHCOM, and this is in reference to my previous response, in ways that we haven't. That theater has been neglected for many years. I've looked at Latin America for 20 years and the level of engagement that we have today, and this is by testament to the partners, is unprecedented in in recent history.

I'm so glad President Trump puts a priority on protecting the homeland and with the help of the military, we've secured our border in just a matter of weeks. Border crossings are down to pretty much zero. And of course, we are working you guys are working really hard securing and stop the cartels. General Donovan, given everything happening in the Middle East and the demands being placed on joint forces elsewhere, are you confident you will have the forces you need to successfully execute theater campaign plan?

Congressman, thank you. Right now, I believe we have the forces we need for the current Operation Southern Spear. As I mentioned in the opening comments, we're going to look at creating the right force structure tailored for the mission sets. And with your background, I think you'd be aware what I'm thinking about, Congressman, those right those light expeditionary forces that can maneuver very quickly through the operational space, specifically in the maritime domain, where the sea is maneuver space and and the SOUTHCOM is a maritime domain. So the right mix of land, air, and maritime surface assets to maneuver around that space and inject with partners, partner operations throughout the region is where we're going to find our success.

Yeah, General Donovan, I talked to the commandant of the Marine Corps and he said I think four times amphibious ships, amphibious ships. And I think you would concur to the benefit of that. I think you just alluded to that. So we're seeing China expand its footprint through ports, space facilities, and other dual-use infrastructures across the hemisphere. General Donovan and Guillot, are NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM working together to track and counter that influence?

I'll start off with we absolutely are. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has led a series of exercises called Elite Constellation where we're looking at looking at the PRC, the Chinese threat throughout all the GCCs and through the exercise series we're able to come together with different options, aligned, and in NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, how do we look at that threat more holistically, not just through that, you know, unified command plan boundary. So I believe these exercise series we're on are helping us look at this in a again more holistic way.

Congressman, I agree with General Donovan and I would just add that the unified command plan that he mentioned puts lines on a map. And we General Donovan and I know that the cartels do not adhere to those lines on a map and so therefore he and I do not.

Again, last question for anyone who wants to answer is what potential threat does Cuba pose in enabling our adversaries to have a foothold in the Western Hemisphere and are recent developments changing that?

Happy to take that, Congressman. Cuba historically has been one of the strongest intelligence adversaries that we've had in the United States. They not just have penetrated our government, they penetrated other governments, partner governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. And I think that's a testament to the fact that when Operation Absolute Resolve was carried out, it was mainly Cuban military officials that were defending Nicolas Maduro inside Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas in the compound.

What you gentlemen are doing is very important. We're very supportive and we'd like to know how we, especially as we work on the next NDAA, what can we do to help you better do your job to keep the homeland and American citizens and military personnel safe at home and abroad. Thank you.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Vindman.

Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Ranking Member. So in your testimony and the statements provided, there are a number of terms that have been mentioned. There's FTO, foreign terrorist organization, DTO, designated terrorist organization, narco-terrorists, narco-traffickers, transnational criminal organizations. And so this is this is complicated even for somebody like myself that spent 25 years in the Army and a JAG Corps advisor. What criteria does SOUTHCOM use to determine when a criminal organization or vessel qualifies as a terrorist rather than a law enforcement target? And how do you ensure that this expanding definition does not blur the lines between military operations and traditional counter-narcotics policing?

Congressman, thank you for that and and I appreciate you highlighting the number of definitions. This is 41 days in and I have my cheat sheet because I'm learning the definitions and specifically my authorities as a combatant commander. I can designate OTOs and we have designated a number of of the other terrorist organizations inside the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. And in they once they're designated as OTOs, I have the ability to use what we call the CT, the counter-terrorism EXORD to apply different authorities and different capabilities against those threats. So that's where it starts for me as a combatant commander is OTOs.

So you've you have the authority to designate terrorist organizations has been delegated down to you from the SecDef?

Per our current EXORD, delegated by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CT EXORD, I can then I go through a process and the process includes submitting that request up for approval all the way to SecWar and above and then back down if I if I choose to designate them OTOs.

Okay. Gotcha. Please proceed.

So at the same time, the term DTOs identified by the president of the United States is a term we're using now against cartels, non-state armed groups are now designated as as DTOs. Their actions constitute an armed attack against the United States and the U.S. is in a non-international armed conflict with these DTOs. These and any action we take, whether that's enhanced counter-narcotics or a maritime strike, are tied to the DTO definition.

And is that tied to their activity, like are they directly participating in hostilities or just on their status?

We base that on the actual definition of a terrorist organization and we have, you know, those armed groups that are are impacting a threat to U.S. personnel, a threat to our partners.

So that's designated that's hostile act, hostile intent, that's status-based targeting. Is this status-based targeting or is this sorry, that's action-based targeting. Is this status-based targeting or action-based targeting?

Well, Congressman, I want to make sure I understand the question because in the targeting process that we execute right now under the law of armed conflict, we have a certain criteria we go through for the actual targeting process itself. Is that the question, Congressman?

Yeah. Let me let me because I'm running out of time here. Do you have lawyers that are advising throughout the targeting process, correct?

Absolutely, Congressman.

So and this is from Mr. Humire's testimony. There were 45 total kinetic attacks killing 157 members and 47 narco-trafficking vessels. How many survivors in those strikes?

Congressman, so for just to clarify on the designated terrorist organizations, that's a legal...

The boat strikes, how many survivors out of the...

I defer the operational aspects to the SOUTHCOM, but just if you want me to clarify a little bit, the designated terrorist...

No, I just want to know the number. Any any sense?

Congressman, I'm tracking the numbers you've offered and what I'm focused on ever since I took command 41 days ago, the I would have to get back to you on the number of survivors, Congressman, I don't have that in front of me.

Let me let me two is my understanding. And so my question is this. We heard Secretary of Defense this weekend talk about no quarter, no survivors. Has an order been issued to you on no quarter, no survivors? General Donovan?

Congressman, that is no.

No. And would you consider such an order lawful?

Congressman, I'm personally responsible for upholding the core principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity, and that's part of my targeting process.

General Donovan, I mean, this is a sort of like basic question. Is a no quarter, no mercy order lawful or unlawful?

Congressman, I would not follow an unlawful order.

Okay. Well, that's an unlawful order.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gooden.

Thank you. Gentlemen, I appreciate you all being here. Thank you. General Guillot, what is the feasibility of deploying space-based interceptors and what operational advantages and risk are associated with deploying space-based interceptors as part of the Golden Dome?

Thank you. Gentlemen, I appreciate you all being here. Thank you. General Guillot, what is the feasibility of deploying space-based interceptors and what operational advantages and risk are associated with deploying space-based interceptors as part of the Golden Dome?

Congressman, I would have to defer part of that to General Guetlein, who is actually developing the architecture for Golden Dome. As I understand it, it is feasible and we're well on the way to developing those. The advantage, though, would allow—it allows us to shoot down threatening ICBMs at a different phase of flight than the midcourse system that we rely on today. And so what Golden Dome will have is it'll have a space-based to get it earlier, midcourse in the middle, and then an underlayer to get it in more of the terminal phase to give us more opportunities to catch any ICBMs that would be threatening North America.

Thank you. I appreciate that. And General Donovan, I've got just two quick questions for you. The Chinese Communist Party has invested in ports, including a $1.3 billion investment in Peru, as well as cyber infrastructure and space facilities across Latin America. How concerned should we as this committee and Congress be that these so-called commercial projects could become dual-use facilities supporting Chinese military operations in our own hemisphere?

Congressman, thank you for highlighting that. We are very concerned. I consider them all dual-use. And specifically, whether they're built with a military infrastructure background or they're just a functional device that could be used to support Chinese actions, I consider them all dual-use. And right, we're tracking 23 port projects and 12 space-based enabling projects.

I'll also ask, our defense systems rely on critical—not criminal minerals, but it's criminal how much they cost—critical minerals for electronics, batteries, and advanced weapons. Do you believe China's growing role in mining and processing those resources in Latin America pose a long-term risk to our defense industrial base?

Congressman, yes.

Do you have anything to comment, just kind of a vague throw it out there with respect to Brazil and their seemingly close proximity to China? It seems as if China has quite a bit of a presence in Brazil. They've got some of the heads of their Southern Hemisphere operations that are camped out in Brazil. Former president is living in China heading up a bank. What's the thinking with respect to China's relationship with Brazil?

Congressman, I'd focus—I'll focus on the military aspects of our relationship with the Brazilian military. And I believe we have at the lower levels very good relationships. Matter of fact, we've seen some positive actions. Last year, Brazil was going to put on an amphibious exercise called Formosa, inviting the United States. We did not attend because the Chinese were participating. And so this year planned, the Chinese are not participating and we are attending. So there is movement there that those relationships, and a lot of those relationships to China's military are built over years, generational years of relationship with military leaders. And so we believe that's our path forward. And I'd defer anything else as far as the overall strategic or diplomatic approaches to the Secretary.

Well, that's promising. I hope the progress continues. And thank you all for your service to the country. We appreciate you very much. Yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here today. It's good to see you, General Guillot. I want to start by recognizing the extraordinary bravery and professionalism of our armed services serving both in the Middle East and around the world. And I join with all of those on the committee who are mourning the families of those who have been lost in the conflict in the Middle East. Mr. Humire, two weeks ago I asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who I believe is your boss—

Correct.

—whether the department had forecasted how high gas prices could get during the Iran conflict. He said he didn't know, but he said he'd check back. We haven't heard anything. Have you done any analysis or are you aware of anyone in the department who has looked at how high gas prices could get?

I have not, Congressman, but I'm happy to take that question back to Under Secretary Colby.

Okay. We heard that two weeks ago and we haven't heard anything. And the American public, I think rightfully, needs to know how high gas prices are going to get during this conflict. So I hope you can get back to us soon. Can you commit to a date by which you can get back to us?

No, Congressman, because this is the first time I'm hearing about it. So I'm happy to take that back and get back to your office.

Recently, the department labeled a leading provider of artificial intelligence tools—tools which have been used in the administration's own high-profile military deployments—a supply chain risk, in large part simply because they did not commit to making the tool capable of mass surveillance of Americans. Mr. Humire, is mass surveillance of law-abiding Americans a capability that you have identified as necessary for ensuring the security of Americans?

No, it was not.

Is the Department of Defense currently targeting American communications in bulk, whether through the Defense Intelligence Agency or otherwise?

Not that I'm aware of.

You would be aware of it.

I imagine so, but I'm not aware of any program of that nature.

Are you aware of recent reports that a DOD employee allegedly made off with millions of Americans' Social Security records in a USB key?

No.

The databases called Numident and the Master Death File include records from more than 500 million living and dead Americans, including Social Security numbers, places and dates of birth, citizenship, race and ethnicity, and parents' names. Does the Department of Defense think it helps U.S. national security to seek to destroy the American company that is now the leading U.S. provider for enterprise AI and AI-guided coding?

Congressman, this is the first time I'm hearing about this issue. I'll consult with the team. This is the first time it's been brought to my attention, so I lack the specifics on this specific case.

Okay. General Guillot or General Donovan, do you work with the National Counterterrorism Center in your work?

Yes, sir, we do at NORTHCOM.

You're aware that the NCTC is the primary organization in the U.S. government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the government pertaining to terrorism?

Yes, sir.

You're aware that unlike many other intelligence agencies, the NCTC has the unique authority to draw upon and analyze intelligence collected both inside and outside the United States?

I was not aware of the latter point.

Are you aware that the director of the NCTC, who would have access to basically all data related to terrorist or other threats to the United States, just resigned, saying that Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation?

Congressman, I was not aware that he resigned.

Just have a couple minutes left. After the administration mobilized 4,000 National Guard troops and 700 Marines to Los Angeles, I joined my L.A. delegation HASC colleagues in demanding full transparency from Secretary of Defense Hegseth on the constitutionality and execution of the deployment. In December, the Supreme Court ruled that the president cannot bypass congressional approval or the Posse Comitatus Act simply by labeling it as enforcing federal law. Mr. Humire, will the administration commit to following the Supreme Court's order in this case and not to send troops into our own cities under unconstitutional grounds?

My understanding, Congressman, is that the constitutional grounds that the department has used are both Title 10 or Title 32 authorities that allow the department to be able to deploy forces at the discretion of the governors under Title 32 or discretion of the president under Title 10.

Yeah, I think the Supreme Court disagrees with you. But I appreciate your service and I appreciate all of your service and I yield back. Thank you.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Kiggans.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our panelists for being here and for your service to our great country. I have the privilege of representing Virginia's Second District, so Hampton Roads, home to our East Coast Navy. But this past week, we had a tragedy occur at one of our college campuses. We had a shooter who walked into Old Dominion University and targeted our Army ROTC students there. And we know that this shooter had known terrorist ties to ISIS. And the fact that he was walking around openly on the streets of our city is very infuriating to me. Part of the problem is state law we have in Virginia that colleges and universities cannot vet criminal histories of people who are admitted to their campuses. But the reason I bring this up is because I'm worried about the terrorist cells that are in this country. We saw 14 million people walk across that southern border during the last administration. We know that there are people in this country that want to do our country harm, and that was on full display in Virginia this past week. So I'd like to hear from you. I know we've talked a lot about drug trafficking and cartel activity and how that activity has changed with the change of administration here in Washington. So what about terrorist activity? Do you feel like that has gotten any better or worse? Are we charting that as well? Because I still have those same concerns that not only are they here, but they continue to be in places to the north and to Central and South America as well. So if I could hear from General Guillot and then General Donovan.

Congresswoman, I share your concern. One of the important roles I think that I have as the NORTHCOM commander is to ensure that there is not a seam between homeland defense and homeland security that could be exploited by an adversary. Therefore, that in cooperation with the intel agencies, federal law enforcement, and also Special Operations Command, SOCOM, we host a CT summit every year where we look at that seam to make sure that anything that the law enforcement community knows, the military knows, and anything that primarily CENTCOM and SOCOM know from overseas on operations that could come into the homeland is known by all of us. The result of that last summit that both Admiral Bradley and I co-hosted was that the homegrown terrorist is our—probably our biggest threat because there's so few indicators of those individuals until they actually take action. On those that are actually directed by another terrorist agency, we usually see that, you know, for instance, an ISIS or an Al-Qaeda directed, but the homegrown we don't. And so we work very closely with FBI and others to try to find any indications that we can of that. And again, to close, I share your concern because I think that is our biggest threat.

Great. Thank you.

Congresswoman, thank you. I believe the SOUTHCOM role is to be that forward kind of forward area defense for the United States of America. So we participate in the same types of forums that General Guillot mentioned. We submit on—in conjunction with U.S. Special Operations Command a CT risk assessment where we look at that global risk and then where does that global risk reside? Those entities reside in South America, Central America, the Caribbean, to ensure that we're part of that same discussion and when capable and with the right authorities, we can act on those threats before they actually make it into the homeland. So very much linked through U.S. Special Operations Command.

Thank you. Well, thank you for paying close attention to that issue. In addition to the constant increase of terrorist threats to the north and to the south, we know that China continues to make inroads and we saw their Belt and Road Initiative that's really spread to Central and South America especially. And it was interesting, we visited New Zealand last year and listening to them talk about where China goes in and tries to make these improvements in the communities, but they turn out to be cheap improvements and they are not well-respected kind of at the end of the work that they're doing. So I'm just curious if the progress that the Chinese have made in especially Central and South America where we heard they're trying to come into those communities, are those communities welcoming or are they a little more suspicious now of that kind of Chinese integration into their space?

Congresswoman, thank you for highlighting that. As mentioned in the opening statement, very concerned about their—the Chinese ability to get in and create infrastructure projects that are clearly dual-use. We mentioned we have 23 port projects we're watching right now and 12 space sites—we call them space-enabling capabilities—that are on the—especially in the Southern Cone, the southern portion of South America. I think you hit the nail on the head, Congresswoman, that often as we've seen in places I've served in before, especially in Djibouti, I've watched the Chinese influence in Djibouti and then you see 10 years later that they're very—

Gentlelady's time's expired. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms. Elfreth.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Very proud to represent Maryland, but always proud to follow my colleague from Virginia. It's okay. We have very similar interests. Very similar interests. Thank you. Thank you to our gentlemen for being here. I'm going to take us back a couple years to 2019 when three U.S. Navy sailors were killed in a terrorist attack at Naval Station Pensacola by a Saudi trainee. One of them, Navy officer Joshua Watson, just 23, was a recent graduate of the United States Naval Academy that I am proudly represent. Two others, Airman Mohammed Haitham, just 19, from Florida, Airman Apprentice Cameron Walters, 21, of Georgia, were killed in the attack. The families of the victims deserve answers and some type of resolution for the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not properly vet the trainee that committed these horrible acts. Can you, anybody, give me kind of a status check on the litigation and whether the families have received compensation for their loss?

I'm happy to get you a status check after I go back to the office. But I will say vetting is something that we're particularly focused on, particularly as it applies to military installations. This is something that we looked at specifically when we started creating the national defense areas on the southwest border and now we start to look at protocols that we can apply throughout all U.S. federal installations as well as military installations.

I appreciate that. Could I get that response maybe in a week's time? Is that an appropriate time?

I'm happy to respond.

Thank you. I'm going to move on to Cuba. Yesterday afternoon, the president told reporters, "I do believe I'll have the honor of taking Cuba." When he was asked what he meant by this, he said, "Taking Cuba in some form, whether I free it, take it, I think I can do anything I want with it, if you want to know the truth, they're a very weak nation right now." General Donovan's prepared statements do not mention Cuba, nor does the National Defense Strategy identify Cuba as a threat. Can anybody identify for me or explain or define what "take it" could mean, and then further, what eminent threat the government of Cuba is placing on Americans right now?

As I mentioned before, Congresswoman, Cuba has been involved in pretty much every threat that the United States has faced from the Western Hemisphere, whether it's intelligence, whether it's aligning with criminal groups, whether it's working with external state actors. The Cuban government has been intricately involved in a lot of these threats and fundamentally were involved inside Venezuela and Operation Absolute Resolve.

Eminent threat from the Cuban government to the American people right now?

Through networks working with adversaries of the United States.

So as you probably know, the prolonged blockade has caused as of yesterday Cuba's power grid to go down. Can you please help me understand, are we preparing to go and invade Cuba?

So the shortages that are happening in Cuba on both electricity and power have to do with the fact that Venezuela was subsidizing oil shipments to Cuba at pretty much a fraction of the cost in exchange for security personnel that was identified when we conducted Operation Absolute Resolve.

Are we preparing to invade Cuba?

Ma'am, I'm not familiar with any plans on Cuba. What I am saying is that fundamentally Cuba has provided a significant threat to the United States hemispheric security for decades and close to half a century.

Okay. I'm going to keep going with this kind of theme of a disconnect between the President's rhetoric and what I think we're actually seeing eminent threats on the ground. I'm going to take us back to Greenland, which feels like a decade ago but was only a short few months ago. There is no doubt from anybody on this committee that China and Russia pose significant threats to Arctic security, particularly because they've outpaced us on icebreakers and are far more aggressive. But we can all agree, I hope, that it is too broad of a terrain to monitor and protect on our own. That's why we have allies. That's why we have particularly our NATO allies. Yet again, the President's rhetoric, I'll just quote him, "We are going to do something about Greenland. If we don't do it the easy way, we'll do it the hard way." General Guillot, I imagine that makes your job particularly difficult. I was heartened to hear in your opening statements respect for our allies, our NATO allies, how important Denmark and Greenland are to Arctic security. I guess my fundamental question here is, what do you want to do or what does the President want to do with Greenland that the 1951 treaty doesn't allow us to do?

Congresswoman, we are working with Denmark through the Department of State to expand some of the authorities that are in the 1951 treaty to give increased access to different bases across Greenland as we look at the increasing threat and the strategic importance of Greenland. But everything that we're doing through NORTHCOM is through Greenland and through Denmark.

So I'm hearing we could have achieved all of this diplomatically through our NATO alliance without threatening to take or to invade Greenland by force.

Well, I can speak to the mil-to-mil portion and we have a very strong relationship with Denmark.

And I want to commend you for maintaining that relationship despite what some of the news or what the President may say. I think the mil-to-mil relationship is essential here despite that rhetoric. With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlelady from the great state of Maryland yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. General Guillot, I know you've been heavily engaged with General Goutline and his team on the development of the Golden Dome architecture. What systems or most important requirements for Golden Dome to focus on to fulfill its strategic mission?

Congressman, I view Golden Dome as a layered series of systems and to me the most important layer is the domain awareness layer because regardless of how sophisticated and capable the interceptors are, if they're not first, the threat is not first detected, tracked, and queued to those interceptors, we have no chance of hitting them. So I would say the domain awareness layer.

Okay. Thank you. You've previously stated that you predict capability will arrive sooner rather than later. Are you still confident that that'll happen?

Yes, Congressman, I'm still very confident.

Okay. Thank you. General Guillot, as threats to the homeland continue to evolve, how is NORTHCOM adapting to emerging challenges such as hypersonic weapon systems of our adversaries?

Congressman, through Golden Dome of America primarily, with space-based and ground-based systems to detect and track the hypersonics, which present us challenges that ballistic missiles don't. And then the defeat mechanism because they can be engaged as a traditional ballistic missile or more in a terminal phase. It's the most destabilizing and challenging threat that we see and it's through our work with General Goutline, I think it's very well integrated into the Golden Dome for America plan.

Okay. Thank you. General Goutline, reports also indicate Russian submarines have been increasingly active in out-of-area patrols near the U.S. coast, including the deployment of a submarine in January to escort a sanctioned oil tanker, Marinara, across the Atlantic amid U.S. enforcement efforts. What are the specific requirements for NORTHCOM to effectively track these advanced submarines and hold them at risk?

Congressman, we have a series of capabilities that I call part of our maritime homeland defense package that looks under the sea, so subsurface, surface, and through the air to detect and track all submarines that would be considered a potential threat to the United States. To do this though, we have to have strong partnership with EUCOM, with SOUTHCOM, and with INDOPACOM because the adversaries don't necessarily follow the lines on a map that we do. And so we traditionally, what will happen is one of those commands will activate the forces and then we'll transfer command and control of those forces as they prosecute the potential adversaries across the water. And then that way we don't have to put more ships on it, we just keep the same ships and then the command and control will go from EUCOM to NORTHCOM to SOUTHCOM and back. And we find that to be very effective and efficient.

Okay. Thank you. How might the New START Treaty end enable more aggressive nuclear signaling and what role could SLCM-N play in that deterrence?

Congressman, I have to tell you I would have to defer to STRATCOM on that.

Okay. Thank you. General Donovan, multiple sources have mentioned containerized munitions as a growing Indo-Pacific threat, but media reports also suggest Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere could enable similar tactics here. How can SOUTHCOM adapt its force posture to counter these?

Congressman, the containerized munitions, I'm not tracking that threat directly in SOUTHCOM, but it maybe did make me think of our relationship with many of our partners. I think Costa Rica, the advances Costa Rica's made in advanced scanning systems for their ports that are obviously used for scanning for narcotics and other illicit... the same kind of scanners we would build to identify those containers. But it is a problem because of just the ease in which those containers move around the theater.

Okay. Thank you. Also General Donovan, transnational criminal organizations remain a major driver of narcotics trafficking, violence, and instability across the region. What authorities does SOUTHCOM need the most from Congress to more effectively counter these networks?

Congressman, currently I believe we have the authorities we need to counter these networks and I believe we are moving forward with Operation Southern Spear to do just that thing.

Okay. Thank you. Would expanding cyber operational and assistance authorities to cover transnational criminal organizations be of use?

Congressman, absolutely.

Okay. Thank you. And with that, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Sorensen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome General Guillot, General Donovan, and Mr. Humire. Mr. Humire, I just wanted to give you another chance to be completely truthful to this committee concerning Congresswoman Elfreth's question. You're saying that there are no plans to invade Cuba at this time, March 17, 2026, correct?

I'm not aware of any plans, Congressman, and I defer to the White House on those decisions.

Great. Thank you very much. When we talk about what is necessary for our warfighter and their mission, we often focus on munitions, on strategy, and on capability. But as we've seen earlier this year in Operation Absolute Resolve, the weather played a significant role in the capture of Maduro while allowing every service member to come home to their family. As the only meteorologist serving here in the United States Congress, I know firsthand how accurate weather data is essential to keeping our military safe as well as our neighbors back home. So to both of the generals here today, could you discuss how important accurate weather data is to the effectiveness of our missions and keeping our homeland safe?

Congressman, I'll start if it's okay with General Donovan. It's the opening part of any one of our mission briefs is weather.

I was going to bring that up.

It certainly is and every time we do a mission brief, we have a contingencies and the first contingency we talk about is the weather. And I'll point out over the weekend there was a an airliner with a bomb threat that was flying in towards the United States and the most and we talk about three dimensions, you know, the two dimensions laterally and altitude, but the fourth dimension was the weather that was affecting us to be able or tried to affect us to go make that intercept. So the weather is central to everything that we plan for and execute.

Great. Sir?

Congressman, thanks for that. As being a geography major talking to a meteorologist type person, I really enjoyed hearing your comments. And I think from a from a aviation perspective to a ground or maritime perspective, I think of the impact of the weather not only when we plan but actually through execution and track very distinct weather data through execution. If I'm returning ship back to an aircraft carrier, aircraft carrier inbound, the ship if we increase 10 knots of wind, two feet of sea height, we end up having a problem recovering our aircraft. And so the key is it plays into everything we do and no amount of technology is going to diminish the weather. We have to be able to predict it and act with it every single day.

My grandfather when I was a kid, he was in the United States Navy in World War II and he, my Grandpa Sorensen, is the reason why I'm a meteorologist today. And if he was alive today, he could understand how important it would be to sit in this chair and talk about how important it is that cutting NOAA and the National Weather Service, not only does that impede accurate forecasts for meteorologists during times of severe weather, but I believe the Navy, the Air Force, the Space Force will be at greater risk as our country loses its meteorological supremacy. To Mr. Humire, could you please tell me your understanding of weather forecasts and how they keep our service members safe?

My grandfather when I was a kid, he was in the United States Navy in World War II and he, my Grandpa Sorensen, is the reason why I'm a meteorologist today. And if he was alive today, he could understand how important it would be to sit in this chair and talk about how important it is that cutting NOAA and the National Weather Service, not only does that impede accurate forecast for meteorologists during times of severe weather, but I believe the Navy, the Air Force, the Space Force will be at greater risk as our country loses its meteorological supremacy. To Mr. Humire, could you please tell me your understanding of weather forecasts and how they keep our service members safe?

Well, I think that's an operational question, but fundamentally, I mean, the weather is in all kinds of operations, whether it's related to inclement weather and we have hurricane season that often hits the Caribbean and a lot of our partners ask for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief. So weather's a critical component.

Are you aware of the lifted condensation level?

I'm not.

Okay. That's the base of any cloud. Okay. So anyone flying with the Navy or the Air Force has an essential understanding of keeping aircraft away from a line of sight. Every, as you mentioned, General, every ops briefing begins with the weather. And maybe it's not just meteorological understanding. Mr. Humire, do you understand what happens when we cut funding to an already lean NOAA? You know, why would you believe that we could ever be in a better situation today with less accurate data?

I'm not aware of that funding cut.

Well, this administration clearly wants to cut NOAA and the National Weather Service. They put it through the DOGE meat ringer in the last year. And I saw so many of my former colleagues in the meteorological enterprise get thrown out to the curb. We've seen degradation of weather models. I was talking with leaders at the Weather Channel today and they said, "Congressman, can you protect the data?" But let's also understand, it's not just the data that is used in weather forecasting, it's the data that we're using for warfighters. And so it concerns me that you're not aware that weather data is being impeded.

Well, I would defer actually on the operational aspects as both General Guillot and General Donovan mentioned, you know, weather's a critical component of operational planning for all kinds of operations, whether they're combat operations or they're support operations during peace environments. So if they have the authorities and they have the capabilities and tools that they need, then I think that's where my responsibility lies. But as I said, I wasn't aware of the cuts that are going to NOAA, but if they tell me that they don't have the authorities or the resourcing that they need to conduct those operations, then we would elevate that.

Gentleman's time has expired.

Gentleman's time's expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Finstad.

Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith. Thank you for our testifiers for being here. Thank you for your service. General Donovan, good job wearing green today. [Laughter.] Might have to pinch the other two guys because I don't see green on them. [Laughter.] Throughout your testimony today and throughout your answers to the questions of many of my colleagues, we've heard much about the many ways which NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM ensure our global security and help maintain stability throughout the Western Hemisphere. The importance of a strong NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM has been made abundantly clear. General Guillot, as you know, effective operations in the Arctic require specialized training and equipment under the best of conditions and there's no substitute for real-world experience and training in the region. It's critical to have designated Arctic units that are specifically trained and equipped to execute their assigned missions in all conditions. For example, my home state of Minnesota, we experience it all. We're hardy folk. Unfortunately, we're known for a few other things right now, but we definitely are known for our weather and we're experiencing that right now. Minnesota offers this unique environment for testing these capabilities with the cold climate and the presence of Lake Superior. The lake's vast expanse, deep cold waters, and extreme winter conditions closely mimic harsh environments of the Arctic. There's only so many places in the homeland that offer that and we're proud to have that and be that in Minnesota. So General Guillot, what are the primary challenges NORTHCOM faces in conducting military operations and testings in the Arctic environment?

Congressman, I would focus on two. One of them you just mentioned, which is the ensuring that all the forces are trained and equipped with the equipment that it takes to operate in those harsh environments. The other is we have to actually do that training. And so we just completed Arctic Edge, which is an exercise in Alaska, which is traditionally held during the period of the year with good weather and I intentionally moved it back into February, March so we would have the aircrew and the maintainers operating and preparing aircraft to work in those harsh environments and we're learning a lot. The second part is the forces that are in Alaska, in Minnesota, in Michigan, upper New York are all very good at operating in that environment, but if they push forward in a conflict to another region, their backfill is probably a unit that is not used to that. And so I'm trying to identify within the services the specific units that require that type of training so they can do that. And the last thing I'll point out very quickly is I'm working very closely with General Steve Nordhaus, who's the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, on increasing in the U.S. our training opportunities so we don't always have to do it in Alaska, so we can do it in Minnesota, Michigan, and New York and expand the opportunities for stateside units to get that Arctic-type training.

I'm great to hear that. So a little bit more depth on this. So how do you, how does NORTHCOM assess the effectiveness of its current Arctic training and testing programs? Can you describe the importance of improving these capabilities? You alluded to it a little bit, but you know, we in Minnesota are looking forward to continuing to grow and work with increasing capabilities, testing range. We have the resources, we have the deep water, we have, I mean, it's on the homeland, right? So this is something that we can control. And so just maybe a little bit more about, you know, kind of what are the metrics that you use to measure the effectiveness?

Congressman, what I use is their ability to come quickly and operate inside of one of our operational plans. And I would say the best we have is our special operations forces. We have identified units that go up there and train regularly and expand their mission, not only in Alaska or in the northern part of the U.S. but also into Greenland. And I don't mean this as a criticism, but the Air Force is probably the most challenged because so many of the bases are in the southern part of the U.S. and so many of the U.S. Air Force units have been on rotation in the Middle East for years and years and that's the environment where they've gotten their most training. And so I'm working very closely with General Wilsbach and his staff to get more of the Air National Guard and regular Air Force units trained in the Arctic environment.

That's great to hear. Minnesota is open for business. We welcome you. You bring the jets, we'll bring the cold weather and the climate that will provide our warfighters the awesome opportunity and training. Thank you again for being here. Thank you for your service. And Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Vasquez from New Mexico for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, General Donovan, and Assistant Secretary Humire, thank you for being here today. Over the past month, there have been several incidents that have caused myself and other members of Congress to question the Department of Defense's ability to coordinate effectively with other U.S. agencies. On February 11, the FAA shut down the El Paso airport and airspace with no warning to local officials, residents, or lawmakers such as myself. The FAA said the airport and airspace would be closed for 10 days, citing special security reasons. As the southern New Mexicans that I represent woke up to this sudden news, absolute chaos and confusion ensued. The public, myself, and other members of Congress were left in the dark, wondering if there was a more serious threat that we were unaware of as was originally indicated, which led to widespread speculation and misinformation. After Representative Escobar and I launched a congressional inquiry, the airport quickly reopened, but for multiple days we received conflicting information from the Department of Defense, Fort Bliss officials, DHS, and the FAA as to exactly what had happened. FAA staff told my office the temporary flight restriction was pre-planned, but the FAA administrator instead tweeted that there was an active threat. Then we learned it was related to DOD technology in the hands of Border Patrol after an explanation of shooting down a party balloon. Meanwhile, nearly half of the flights out of El Paso that day were canceled with thousands of people affected by this incompetence. Overnight, medevac flights were suspended. A similar incident happened only two weeks later when the DOD accidentally shot down a CBP drone after CBP failed to notify the department of an ongoing exercise. This led to the FAA issuing a temporary flight restriction over Fort Hancock that still remains in place today. Assistant Secretary Humire, can you explain where exactly the breakdown of communication was between the Department of Defense and the FAA?

Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Over the last 14 months, the department has had several iterations of communications and coordination with the FAA specifically on the capabilities that you're referencing. Those consultations have to do with the capabilities, the risks, the associated vulnerabilities that can be associated with that system. In respect to the specific instances that happened recently, a lot of that was in lack of coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. Now, I'm happy to report that since that incident, we've been able to streamline a lot more of that coordination between the three agencies, Department of Homeland Security, Department of War, as well as the FAA, and looking to improve on that process as we move forward.

Well, thank you, Mr. Humire, but let's zone in on that lack of coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. That's what I was looking for. What failed? What was the lack of coordination?

Well, that I'd have to defer to the Department of Homeland Security because that's their coordination with the FAA, not ours.

Okay. I want to move briefly now to talk about some of the counter-UAS technology that is being tested. Both of these incidents involved counter-drone high-energy lasers, which is technology whose effects on people, the environment, and other U.S. assets aren't completely known yet. I believe this is what the FAA was concerned about and what likely contributed to them issuing these shutdowns and flight restrictions. Reporting suggests that these tests are some of the first known domestic use of a counter-drone laser system conducted outside of a controlled environment. Assistant Secretary Humire, how has the department determined that these types of drones were ready at the time to be tested outside of a controlled environment and what are the possible risks to civilians and other U.S. assets?

So the high-energy laser system, Congressman, that you're referring to is something that detects at a very meticulous level whatever aerial threats that can be presented, particularly as they relate to unmanned aircraft systems. So in the case of the incidents that you're talking about that happened in recent weeks, the system worked. It actually took out what it detected could be a potential threat, not mitigating any vulnerabilities or mitigating any vulnerabilities that would be present to larger aircraft for civilian uses of other...

Thank you, Assistant Secretary. And I think that's the important thing where the coordination has to be in place with the respective agencies, with DHS and FAA, just what you mentioned, if there is no imminent threat, especially to commercial airliners, that needs to happen before we shut down international airspace. It's been about a month since Representative Escobar and I sent a letter requesting a specific briefing on this issue and what led to the sudden closure of the El Paso airport. We have not received any response. Is this something you can commit to, a briefing for myself and Congresswoman Escobar?

Congressman, happy to take that back and get back with your office within an appropriate time.

Is that a yes?

Yes.

Okay. Thank you. Lastly, I'd like you to pay special attention to a recent letter submitted to state and federal offices by five Texas sheriffs regarding the proposed border wall project in Big Bend National Park. Please take heed from local law enforcement and consider their advice. Mr. Humire, does the Department of Defense or the administration plan to dignify these sheriffs with a response?

Again, I'm happy to take that back. This is the first time I'm hearing about it, so I'd have to coordinate with my office and have a response for you in short time.

Thank you, Mr. Humire. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wittman from Virginia for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman, and gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. General Guillot, I want to start with you. Last year when you were here, we talked a lot about drone incursions there at Joint Base Langley-Eustis and you talked about coordination between NORTHCOM and DOD and making sure joint agency responsibility was clear and making sure that things could happen. You also talked about purchasing flyaway kits to make sure that they were mobile and they could go to places where we had these issues as well as having resident capability at some of our most important bases. I want to get an update from you on that and also want to ask you too about the importance of proliferated sensor networks. In last year's NDAA, I was able to get a section in there that talked about using the sensor networks that are already at our civilian airports and making sure that we integrate them into DOD data systems so we have a much broader perspective about what's happening, especially in our efforts to counter unmanned aerial systems. Can you give us an update on where NORTHCOM and NORAD are in using that sensor data that comes from our civilian airports through the FAA in order to get a more complete picture of counter-UAS efforts and UAS threats?

Yes, Congressman. On the sensors, I would point out also in El Paso, they're the leaders, I think, that we've seen in taking a variety of sensors and tying them together into a comprehensive picture. And so I think it's through the University of Texas El Paso, they have a really great system that we are using as a baseline to get us first in the southern border area of the 1,954 miles that constitute the southern border and tying that together for the first time. Obviously with radar and manned aircraft, we have that, of course, all over the world, but for UAS along the border. And so we'll continue to work with that. We've made a lot of progress in the last year and I would expect that to continue exponentially in the future. Regarding the flyaway kit, thanks to this body and others in Congress, we have a flyaway kit. It's, I won't say where, but it's currently deployed in the U.S. to defeat threats to a Department installation that are seeing incursions and it's operating very effectively. Also last year, I asked for four improvements to counter-UAS authorities, all of which were granted over the year. So at this point in time, I have zero requests for additional authorities and we should get two more of the flyaway kits in the next month.

Perfect. Thank you. Thank you, sir. General Donovan, we know how important ARG/MEUs are. That's presence around the world for emergency response, for human needs, you name it, disasters, we're there on station. And we know that the ARG/MEU 3.0 requirement, that is being able to generate three ARG/MEUs, is incredibly important. Our amphibious ready groups, Marine expeditionary units, are key to our ability to project power around the world. We've seen that happening now there in SOUTHCOM. We see there with the 22nd MEU and the Iwo Jima ARG, how important that presence is. I wanted to get your perspective on how things are underway there with this ARG/MEU. We know that ARG/MEU deployments, like everything else, are limited, so there's only so long they can stay before we have to bring those Marines and sailors back home. The challenge is needing that presence there. What's going to happen when the 22nd MEU comes back home and the Iwo Jima ARG comes back home? Will there be another ARG/MEU to replace that? How important it is for that replacement to take place and what will happen if we don't have an ARG/MEU that can replace the current on-station Iwo Jima and the 22nd MEU? Perfect. Thank you. Thank you, sir. General Donovan, we know how important our ARGs and MEUs are.

Congressman, thank you for highlighting and recognizing the importance of that ARG/MEU team. Really, if you think about off the coast of Venezuela at 12 nautical miles out, like you mentioned the Iwo Jima, I think about the capabilities we all focus on. It could be strike aircraft or it could be that quick reaction force. I think about a role two surgical suite that is available to respond to the ambassador's needs at any time. That's unique. So as we look at the end of time, if we extend that ARG/MEU, which I've asked to extend the ARG/MEU for a couple more months, after that, what are the creative tailored solutions we can make to make up for a lack of, like you said, that 3.0 ARG/MEU presence we call heel-to-toe, when one goes out, one comes in. Now, until we get to that point, we'll have gaps and those are significant gaps because that ARG/MEU is the true Swiss Army knife inside the Department.

Fantastic. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Cisneros.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here today to answer our questions. General Donovan, look, I've always been a proponent of showing the flag and I always thought we should send more ships down into the SOUTHCOM area there to kind of build up relations, kind of similar things that we've done around in different parts of the world, including Asia. You know, I think we do need more ships down there. We do need to have more visits into our Latin American countries there to make sure that we keep up good relations. It's always important to do that. Although I'm not sure that we need them to kind of be carrying out law enforcement missions as what has been doing, especially with these kinetic strikes, which, you know, has varying legal issues attached to them. At the same time, using very expensive munitions to kind of carry and take them out when there are other alternatives I think we could be doing. So General Donovan, how much would a larger Coast Guard presence there actually in the area help benefit in kind of work towards that mission of actually, which is their probably their duties, carrying out law enforcement? How could that serve to deter the drug problem that we are trying to solve here of drugs coming into the United States? Would you support a larger Coast Guard presence there?

Congressman, absolutely. And the Coast Guard Commandant and I have been talking about that very thing because the Coast Guard is such a powerful capability with that both law enforcement capability and an operational tactical that we can bring and partners really want to have that Coast Guard touchpoint. So we're in active conversation with Coast Guard to do so, Congressman.

Well, thank you for doing that. And so Mr. Humire, hopefully I said that right. You know, Secretary Rubio, Secretary of State Rubio, had said that a lot of these kinetic strikes, they're really, they're a deterrent. It's helping propel the drug trafficking coming into the United States from these Latin American countries by doing so. Now look, we could shoot suspected criminals dead on the streets here in the United States and that would be a deterrent to reduce crime here in the United States, but it doesn't necessarily make sure, mean that it's legal in order to do that and neither are these strikes. So how is the Department justifying these kinetic strikes at a time when we should be using the Coast Guard who has the authority to kind of do law enforcement, to do investigations, could seize, you know, could seize the phones, could seize ledgers, could seize, you know, look at GPS data, could get the drugs that are actually there, right, and take this as evidence in to prosecute individuals later on down the road? Why are we not or why have we not been using the Coast Guard more in order to do this mission?

Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question. We have been using the Coast Guard. Interdiction's been going on for decades inside Latin America. Last fiscal year, we had record seizures on interdiction, but interdiction is necessary...

I know, but we've chosen, we've made a decision to blow these vessels up, boats up, rather than to kind of pursue the legal, you know, Coast Guard...

Right, and I can explain that. Interdiction is necessary but insufficient. Deterrence has an additional effect, a signaling effect on narcoterrorists to raise the risks associated with movements. And we see 20 percent reduction in the Caribbean and a 25 percent reduction in the East Pacific.

But deterrence, you can make the argument for deterrence this whole time about like, oh yeah, we're deterring them, but that does not make it legal. So I think this is something we need to go back, the Department needs to reevaluate, right? Just because we can deter a crime by doing a certain thing and blowing up a vessel, that does not necessarily make it mean that, okay, it's a legal way of action that we can pursue. And so that needs to be kind of continued to be reevaluated, which is why we need this larger Coast Guard presence.

Congressman, we've been using interdiction for the last 20, 30 years and they haven't had the same results as we have...

I'm good with that. We're done. All my questions are done. I'm reclaiming my time here. General Guillot, I asked this question last year and I'm going to ask it again. You know, the Russians continue to kind of test the ability of kind of flying into the Alaskan airspace there. They're continuing, you know, trying to push us to see what we can do and how far they'll go. And at the same time, the ice melting, opening up sea lanes in the northern polar regions there are continuing to increase traffic into that area. So over the last year, what is the increased threat in that area with the increasing of the opening of the sea lanes, the Russians continuing to push this? How are we deterring that?

Congressman, you're right. The number of incursions by Russian aircraft into the ADIZ has increased over the last year. It's on a trend...

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ryan.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being here. General Guillot, I want to thank you for following up aggressively with our team, specifically around issues that I know have been brought up on drone and UAS. Your team has been phenomenal working with us on the incident that happened at Stewart Air National Guard Base in my district. Your testimony last year, we talked about the 130i and I just want to commend you and your team and everyone on the committee, all working together to address that issue and we appreciate that. I want to thank you for that, sir. Obviously, there's a lot more to do, but let us know what you continue to need on that. I want to use the remainder of my time to talk about something that a few colleagues have hit on, but I think is deeply concerning to a lot of folks, which is the continued deployment of U.S. troops, both federalized Guard troops and active duty troops, domestically, which I think we all know if we're honest with ourselves, is not only legally wrong but just wrong in our guts. Assistant Secretary, since June 2025, the administration has deployed over 10,000 federalized Guard troops and active duty Marines to six American cities: LA, DC, Memphis, Portland, Chicago, and New Orleans. I would note that half of them were directly over the objection of local law enforcement, elected officials, governors in those areas. I would also note that the CBO puts the total cost through December 2025, I'm sure it's higher now, at $496 million, half a billion dollars of hard-earned American taxpayer dollars. A Senate committee report estimates the DC deployment alone will cost $332 million through February of this year, 2026. In LA, and I think this merits special note and I know Mr. Whitesides hit on this, this wasn't just the Guard. The administration made a very deliberate decision to deploy about 700 active duty Marines into an American city to repeat deploying U.S. troops against U.S. citizens on American streets. Then building on that, despite multiple courts at every level blocking and saying that those deployments were not lawful, the President released an executive order 14339 that directed every state to form a quick reaction force with the express intention of, quote, "quelling civil disturbances." The Washington Post reported these QRFs would be composed of hundreds of Guard troops tasked with rapidly deploying into American cities facing protests or other unrest, with 600 troops on standby at all times so they could deploy in as little as one hour. As I'm sure you know, DC actually just stood up this unit, the 260th Special Purpose Brigade, specifically designed to deploy these troops domestically. Again, I want to note throughout each of these steps, the third branch of our government outlined in our Constitution over and over has said these are not lawful deployments in many cases. Despite that, on September 30th at Quantico, and I'm sure at least one of the two of the senior military leaders were here, the President told a room full of senior military commanders, quote, "We should use some of these dangerous cities as training grounds for our military," and described America as facing, quote, "an invasion from within." Thankfully, on December 23rd, the Supreme Court by a wide margin of six to three upheld the lower court ruling specifically in the Trump v. Illinois case and specifically said the administration lacked legal authority to federalize the Guard under section 12406. Three conservative justices, including the Chief Justice, as well as Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh, joined that majority, did the right thing, and said the administration, quote, "failed to identify a source of authority for the deployment." I want to ask you, starting with you, Assistant Secretary, and then each of you Generals, especially you, General Guillot, do you recognize, yes or no, the validity of that Supreme Court ruling as it relates to domestic deployment of troops? In February 2026, President Trump said Republicans should, quote, "nationalize the voting," quote, "at least many 15 places in as many as 15 places," arguing some states were running, quote, "crooked elections," which is a lie. With midterms elections, I'm running out of time, but with midterm elections approaching in November, will you commit on the record to not deploy U.S. troops at polling sites in the United States of America in these elections?

Congressman, I recognize the validity of the operations under Title 10 and Title 32.

Congressman, we do recognize and we've followed all court orders.

I concur with General Guillot.

Gentleman's time has expired. Chair now recognizes gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. In December of 2025, the Department of Interior transferred jurisdiction of roughly 760 acres of public land along the California-Mexico border in San Diego and Imperial Counties to the Department of the Navy. This land is now designated as a National Defense Area, an NDA. My staff recently conducted an oversight tour of this new NDA and I'm left with many concerns. First, we heard that cartel activity along the border has increased following the killing of El Mencho in Mexico and service members are being targeted, their phones are being hacked, they are receiving personally threatening messages. Second, the terrain these Marines are traversing is treacherous. I'm grateful no Marine has died in these mountains, but I am genuinely terrified of that happening in the future. General Guillot, are you tracking and concerned about these two threats to the safety of service members operating in the NDA and what are you doing as Commander of NORTHCOM to work with Joint Task Force Southern Border to ensure their safety?

Congresswoman, yes, I'm aware of the threats and and of course any threat to any of our forces is something that not only concerns me but takes a great deal of attention to make sure that we're addressing it properly. As you mentioned, we work this through JTF Southern Border and I'm very pleased with the not only the initiatives that General Gardner has taken and and General Nowland before him, but also down to the echelon levels, the commanders on the ground that are working with the Border Patrol agents there. We try to use more unmanned aerial vehicles to do the patrolling as opposed to on foot like we do in other parts of the border because of that treacherous territory. But as as I think you probably learned when you were there that there are still illegal activity coming across so having that right posture is extremely important to ensure that we can maintain the seal.

All right. Well, I just want to state for the record that I'm very concerned about this operation and the safety of our Marines. Our service members did not sign up for immigration enforcement and this political stunt is putting their lives at risk. Now I want to talk about Operation Southern Spear. By SOUTHCOM's own count, the United States has killed 157 people in 45 strikes on boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific since September. General Donovan, how many of those 157 people has the department publicly identified by name?

Congresswoman, I do not have an answer for that.

Okay. Do you have an answer on whether SOUTHCOM has conducted a single post-strike investigation into whether any of the 157 people killed were in fact carrying drugs at the time they were struck? Not before, not based on route patterns, but actually carrying drugs at the time they were struck.

Congresswoman, thank you, and and actually in front of me is your note you sent to the command which I've actually used in not only the prep for this testimony but actually to understand our counter-narcotics program and and how we're going about this. I I will hold that we mitigate all harm through our targeting and planning process but as far as names, specifics, release, I I can't tell you right now. I'm learning the process but I will tell you that I have I have reviewed and that's why the question back to you Congresswoman, are you speaking OSS or OAR, the number of casualties, is that combined or are you parsing those out?

I'm parsing them out.

Okay. So what I could tell you is that after I actually received your letter, I looked back at the OAR specifically because I wanted to read, I read every single one of the actual quick looks that the the JTF did and know that we have two 15-6 investigations underway. So that's that's what I know about those those operations specifically.

Okay, well, I appreciate you doing your work on it. I look forward to getting your answers. I will just say pre-strike legal review is not the same as post-strike accountability and and we expect there to be post-strike accountability. I wanted to follow up on my colleague Mr. Vindman's exchange with you General Donovan about the targeting process for Southern Spear. Mr. Vindman asked how you distinguish between a criminal organization from a terrorist target. What I didn't hear you clarify and is the most important question in this entire operation is, are you conducting status-based or action-based targeting?

Congresswoman, I appreciate asking that. Status-based and this is I'm not not pushing back in any way, but those two definitions are not definitions I technically use in our own targeting process. If you if you could give me your definition I can pivot off that.

Sure. Are you striking these boats because the people on board are members of a designated terrorist organization or because they are engaged in specific hostile act at the moment of the strike?

I would say at this point Operation Southern Spear for enhanced counter-narcotics in these maritime strikes, both apply.

Okay. Well, either you're in an armed conflict and you're targeting based on status, which there is unanimous support among the international legal community that you're not, or you're conducting law enforcement with lethal force against people who pose an imminent threat, which violates human rights law. So you know, I'm a little concerned that you know, we don't have a clear understanding of exactly how the targeting has happened and as has been emphasized, these strikes are illegal.

Gentlelady's time has expired. Chair now recognizes gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.

Wow, didn't expect that. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to follow up on Mr. Ryan's question this and he specifically were as you might recall recalling the fact that the President said that if the states can't run elections properly that the federal government should intervene and potentially take over. He also mentioned that Republicans should nationalize voting at least in many of as many as 15 places because he believes that we are running crooked elections in various places. I want to remind everybody who's listening to this that U.S. Section 592 and 593 criminalize both having troops at the polls and military interference with voting, conducting elections or election officers. And so I'd like to ask the question that he didn't get an answer to, which is the midterms are in November. Will you collectively representing the people who help decide where our troops are from North and South America, will you commit on the record before this committee that the Department of Defense will not deploy military personnel within sight of any polling places in November of 2026, Mr. Humire?

Ma'am, I'm not aware of any such direction that's coming and I but I reserve the the decision space of the President to make decisions based on threats that are happening to the electoral process.

But sir, if the President if the President told you to send troops to the polling places, would you do that unlawful act?

It would go through the same review process that we get from every request that comes from the White House that we have legal compliance, we have lawyers, we have an opportunity to counsel.

But there is a law already established and court history that says that it is not legal to do this. So you're not willing to say...

Ma'am, I can't speculate on what can happen.

And General Guillot, I keep hearing your name pronounced differently, Guillot, Guillot, I think. Would you commit that you will not send military troops to polling places in November?

Congresswoman, I'm aware that doing so is against the law and I will not follow an unlawful order.

Thank you. I appreciate your honesty and your lawfulness. General Donovan.

I commit to the same, Congresswoman.

Thank you. I very much appreciate those straightforward and forthwith answers and I hope Mr. Humire that you take a look at the law and follow it, a lawful order. I will pivot right now to General Guillot to talk to you a little bit about some of the assets that you have. You have a lot of assets that I would consider to be pretty exquisite in terms of airborne ISR. Very, very important things like P-8s as well as U-2s and RQ-4s are things that are available to you and these are very scarce resources that are I'm sure in demand in other parts of the world. And so many of these resources have been used recently in your command about the border, on the border rather than being used perhaps in the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East or Europe. As much as every commander would want more of these resources, do you think that this is sort of overkill at this point in time and do these resources perhaps need to be redeployed to other areas?

Congresswoman, I agree with the importance of the airborne ISR and I do not think it's overkill for our mission. In fact, we could use more, but I would like to point out that within the authorities that I have under the GFM, I have shared those assets with CENTCOM, with with Southern Command, INDOPACOM and with EUCOM making sure that they're used in the place where they're needed most at the time while I continue to conduct the missions that have been tasked of me to ensure that we have a seal of the border and can counter cartels.

I totally appreciate that and in fact have heard about that as recently as a trip that I took up to Iceland where I know some P-8s have been deployed to other places most recently and I appreciate the sharing. It does feel a little bit that you must feel conflicted though when you have missions and things to accomplish within your own AOR and you're being asked to send your assets other places. How do you reconcile that when when those things are heating up as as much as in for instance Cuba will or could?

Congresswoman, first, I share your admiration for the P-8. It's a fantastic aircraft that has helped us quite a bit. I just try to take a global picture of of the environment and see what homeland implications are tied to the other AORs and sometimes using those assets forward is actually the best defense to to address them further away from from the continental U.S. which is why I'm willing to share when necessary.

And then with my last seconds, these these particular assets have the ability to collect as I've mentioned exquisite information. How do you make sure you don't collect it on U.S. citizens when you're at the border?

Congresswoman, I'm very aware of the intel oversight requirements and we follow them very, very strictly.

Thank you. I yield.

Gentlelady yields back. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Goodlander.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. General, General, thank you for your service to our country and thank you for your very clear commitment to uphold the law and to honor your oath to our Constitution. I hear concerns from my constituents every single day about domestic deployments of the military, particularly in the lead up to the November election and I appreciate your commitment to upholding the law. We have no more solemn responsibility. I want to ask you begin by asking you General about Operation Absolute Resolve. Can you explain the rationale and objectives of Operation Absolute Resolve?

Congresswoman, I'm going to move to Mr. Humire to walk through that. I was not in command at the time. I was in a different billet so I wouldn't want to look back and give you false information.

Understood. Well, Mr. Humire, I read in your written testimony you've described you characterized Operation Absolute Resolve as a law enforcement support operation. The Justice Department unsealed the superseding indictment. Is this indictment the basic legal basis and objective set? Is this what drove the objectives and rationale for the operation?

The Department of Justice released a legal opinion, I am not sure if it is in that indictment, prior to the operation to the White House that characterized the threat that was posed and that there were warrants that were being actioned on by the Department of Justice against indicted criminals, which included Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores.

Yes. So what is the current status of the four Venezuelan nationals who are listed in this indictment?

I have not been directed to any actions that can be taken on those individuals.

Are they still serving in the Venezuelan government?

I am not clear if all of them, but I know at least one or two of them are continuing in the Venezuelan government.

Can you get back to us with a clear status update?

Yes, I know at least two of them are currently serving in the Venezuelan government. I can get back to you with a determination on all four.

So is the operation ongoing?

Well, Operation Absolute Resolve was a law enforcement mission that the Department of War supported.

Is it ongoing?

No. What is ongoing is our engagement with the Venezuelan government to stabilize the country so that these threats no longer emanate.

So is the United States running Venezuela?

No. The Venezuelan government is working with the United States to stabilize the country and evidenced by the fact that there has not been an economic or societal collapse after the operation, things are moving into a steady state.

So indicted individuals in this indictment right here, this indictment which was the basis of our military operation, are still serving in the Venezuelan government.

I am not looking at that indictment, so I do not know what individuals we are talking about, but what I will say is that that is a law enforcement decision, not a Department of War decision. We were asked to support the law enforcement of going specific individuals that were indicted under our laws.

General, do you know the cost of this operation?

Congresswoman, I do not. The cost, being a geographic command, our costs are absorbed by the services and so we do not have our own budget to track.

Can you get back to us with the cost of the operation? Yesterday the President floated the idea that Venezuela should become the 51st state of the United States. This is not the first time the President has made a suggestion about another country becoming the 51st state. Are there any plans to annex Venezuela?

No, I am not aware of any plans. I could say that we are moving very far along on the stabilization efforts with Venezuela in conjunction with the interim Venezuelan government.

General Guillot, I am sorry I have to ask this question, but are there any military plans to annex Canada?

No, Congresswoman, I am not aware of any plans to annex Canada.

Well, that is a relief because as I shared with you last year, my home state of New Hampshire shares a 58-mile border with Canada and I think we all agree that this is a border that matters enormously to us. Last year, General, when you came before our committee, I asked you what the consequences would be for our country if NORAD did not exist anymore or was fundamentally altered. The President's appointed U.S. Ambassador in Canada suggested in January that NORAD may have to be altered, which has caused some consternation. In what ways would NORAD need to be altered? Would there be any justification for fundamentally altering this relationship which, as you have testified powerfully, is so important to our national security?

Congresswoman, I think the Ambassador was talking about having to alter how we employ if they had fighter aircraft that were not interoperable with our fighter aircraft, which we have now. They can share data links, mission planning, execution capability. If they were to buy aircraft that were not interoperable, we would have to alter our operational procedures. But at this point, they are still interoperable.

Thank you, General. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That concludes the open portion of today's hearing. We will now recess for five minutes and reconvene in 2212 for the classified portion of the hearing.