"U.S. Universities Under Siege

The committee will please come to order. A quorum is present. The committee meets today pursuant to notice. Without objection, the chair may recess the committee at any point. Dominating global research rankings, American universities remain among the top academic institutions in the world, and that's how it ought to be. They're entrusted with hundreds of billions in taxpayer funding, research dollars, and federal student aid to help develop the next generation of leaders and drive cutting-edge scientific discovery. I just left a meeting starting in my office on myeloma research that has some very promising things taking place, and that's what we're looking for through the research that goes on at our institutions. The free exchange of ideas is a core American principle and a cornerstone of higher education. International collaboration, whether through welcoming international students or creating international research partnerships, can, when done right, have a very positive effect for our country. However, it would be naive and reckless to ignore the serious dangers facing our higher education system. Foreign adversaries, particularly geopolitical rivals like the Chinese Communist Party, CCP, are actively competing against our nation's interests on the battlegrounds of our university campuses. They're unafraid to exploit American good intentions for ill-gotten gains. I'm proud that this committee has been a leader in combating malign foreign influence on college campuses. Last year, the House passed the DETERRENT Act, which was a strong bipartisan vote for a second Congress in a row. DETERRENT would bring much-needed transparency to foreign gifts and contracts under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, and I'll continue working to get it signed into law. This committee's oversight has brought to light troubling partnerships between American universities and the CCP's defense-linked institutions, including joint research institutes operating with American campuses. As a result of this work, many universities have taken steps to shut down these programs. The Trump administration and Secretary McMahon have also taken this issue seriously. The Education Department has launched multiple Section 117 compliance investigations, improved the usability of disclosed data, and just last month announced an interagency agreement with the Department of State to incorporate the State Department in national security expertise. Despite this progress, recent events make it clear that the threat remains active. Last summer, there were multiple disturbing instances of potential foreign espionage on U.S. campuses. At the University of Michigan, students, employees, and faculty have been charged and sentenced for conspiracy and smuggling-related crimes. At Stanford, students were approached by foreign nationals posing as peers in an effort to get students to travel to China and share research. These instances must not be swept under the rug, and I'm excited to discuss them more in depth today at this hearing. Institutions must be proactive in addressing these threats. They should not wait for a congressional inquiry or hearing before taking a hard look at their campus culture, vetting processes, and compliance with the law. Openness is one of our great strengths, but it cannot become our greatest weakness. We can and we must ensure that academic collaboration strengthens America, not our adversaries. With that, I yield to the ranking member, the gentlelady from Oregon, Ms. Bonamici.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. A college degree remains a sure path to the American dream, and it's the most reliable engine of economic mobility we have. With job numbers falling and the cost of living rising, it's vital that we protect and uplift paths to economic opportunity. College graduates earn more, they experience lower unemployment rates, and they're better positioned to support their families and contribute to their communities and the economy. Right now, our country is in the midst of a college affordability crisis. Students and families are being forced to take out crushing loans that may take them decades to repay. Today's hearing is ostensibly about espionage and foreign influence in higher education, something we have discussed in this committee numerous times. Unfortunately, I fear that today's discussion will once again focus on xenophobic conspiracy theories and culture war debates instead of addressing real barriers that college students are facing. Allow me to be blunt. The greatest threat facing students today is not foreign influence or espionage in higher education. Although these problems may exist, we can't easily quantify how or even whether they affect student life. And according to the testimony submitted today, which I have read, the processes are in place to address any foreign threat. They seem to be doing a decent job, I read your testimony, and there doesn't seem to be anything close to a university under siege, which is what the title of this hearing portrays. What we can quantify, however, is the enormous and detrimental effect of the Trump administration's attacks on higher education, on student borrowers, on their families, which is why committee Democrats have invited a representative from the Government Accountability Office today to provide us with real data and facts. Since the Trump administration returned to office, Secretary McMahon has been trying to carry out President Trump's stated goal of dismantling the Department of Education to devastating effect. To date, the department has signed at least 10 interagency agreements to transfer its programs away from the experts at the department to other agencies. These moves have proven to be inefficient, wasteful, and harmful to students and families who are now being forced to deal with multiple agencies. These programs have been thrust upon agencies that do not have the knowledge or the expertise about complex topics like student financial aid, and they do not understand the importance of successful programs like TRIO and GEAR UP that increase the educational success of first-generation college students. Recently, the GAO released a report showing that the department's Office of Federal Student Aid has actually stopped key oversight on loan servicers. In its oversight of the $1.6 trillion student loan portfolio, the department is required, I think it's trillion, the department is required by law to ensure student loan servicers provide borrowers with accurate information about their loans. And when they do not, borrowers can either overpay or be placed in the wrong student loan repayment program. So the department's refusal to conduct robust oversight of student loan servicers is a dereliction of duty. Importantly, when the department conducted oversight during the Biden administration, it issued penalties to four out of the five servicers because they failed to meet accuracy standards. And now without that oversight, the government is likely paying servicers for subpar or even illegal performance. And just last week, the department transferred its portfolio of defaulted student loans to the Treasury Department. Borrowers in default need support, but now they will have limited access to the department's subject matter experts. This transfer means that student borrowers who may be eligible for discharge or other relief will need to discuss their situation with people who frankly don't have a clue about how the program works. The department has also announced that it intends to hand over other student aid responsibilities to Treasury despite its lack of expertise. It certainly looks like the Trump administration's goal is to intentionally create chaos and confusion for these borrowers, many of whom are already in dire financial straits. Furthermore, the big ugly law is about to make major changes to income-driven repayment, changes that will affect millions of Americans. But because of the reductions in force, the RIFs, there are not enough staff left at the department to implement these changes and help borrowers navigate them. Starting on July 1, millions of Americans will be left in the dark with no resources to help them. And to make matters worse for students, the Trump administration's dismantling of the Office for Civil Rights has undermined our ability to address discrimination in schools. In March of 2025, OCR's staff was cut in half, seven of its 12 regional offices were forced to close. This move was not only devastating for students seeking resources for discrimination on campus, it was also inefficient and wasteful. A recent GAO report revealed that these layoffs may have cost U.S. taxpayers more than $38 million. If that doesn't qualify as waste, fraud, and abuse, I'm not sure what does. So it is irresponsible and shortsighted for this committee to focus on vague threats of espionage, which seem to be addressed by the universities, and instead of addressing the real problems in front of us. It's time for Congress to step up and do its duty to protect students and families from the overreaches and abuses of the Trump administration. So I urge my colleagues to listen to the unbiased reporting of GAO and consider whether blind loyalty to this administration is worth the costs outlined today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

I thank the gentlelady. Pursuant to committee rule 8C, all members who wish to insert written statements into the record may do so by submitting them to the committee clerk electronically in Microsoft Word format by 5:00 p.m. 14 days after this hearing, and without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 14 days to allow such statements and other extraneous material noted during the hearing to be submitted for the official hearing records. I now turn to the introduction of our four witnesses. And in light of the Sweet 16 success thus far, go blue, it's a delight to welcome Dr. Domenico Grasso, the interim president of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, who certainly took over the interim position in a very interesting period of time, and thank you for the service you provided to the institution. To introduce our second witness, I would like to recognize the representative from Florida, Mr. Fine.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's always great to be able to introduce somebody from Florida, where I would note that we have passed bills as I'll talk about in my five minutes to deal with what is a real problem. I want to just introduce Cassandra Farley. She's the senior director of research integrity, security, and compliance at the University of Florida, Florida's preeminent institution in Gainesville, Florida. She's got an MBA from the University of South Florida and a BA in economics from the University of Florida. She's also a certified compliance and ethics professional and an active contributor to national organizations supporting research integrity, export controls, and research security, and I'm excited to hear her comments on how we are doing things right in Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, and I thank the gentleman. Our third witness is Ms. Melissa Emrey-Arras, the director of education, workforce, and income security team at the Government Accountability Office in Washington, D.C. Welcome. Our last witness is Elsa Johnson, the editor-in-chief of the Stanford Review in Stanford, California. Welcome. We thank the witnesses for being here today. Pursuant to committee rules, I would ask that you each limit your oral presentation to a three-minute summary of your written statement. The clock will count down from three minutes. As committee members have many questions for you and we would like to spend as much time as possible on questions. However, pursuant to committee rule 8D and committee practice, we will not cut off your testimony until you reach the five-minute mark. I would also like to remind the witnesses to be aware of their responsibility to provide accurate information to the committee. Having said all of that, I will now recognize Dr. Grasso for your testimony.

Thank you, Chairman Walberg. Chairman Walberg, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about research security at the University of Michigan. My name is Domenico Grasso, and I have the privilege and honor of serving as a president of the University of Michigan since May 2025. My term will end this coming May. As an engineer and an Army veteran who currently holds a top-secret security clearance, I am deeply committed to protecting our nation's security and ensuring that the university continues to support the research, talent, and partnerships that help make Michigan special. The University of Michigan is one of the nation's largest and most prominent research universities. It comprises three campuses and nearly 75,000 undergraduate and graduate students and 60,000 faculty and staff. We have more than 110 programs ranked in the top 10 across the nation. With a $16 billion budget, the university engages in a broad range of activities driving our mission of academic excellence, innovation, and public service. University is involved in a remarkable array of noteworthy activities. To give you a sense of the scale and national scope, not including sports news like the Sweet 16, which Chairman Walberg just mentioned, last year, the University of Michigan was covered nearly 600 times in just the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. There's a lot to follow. The university is a world leader in scientific and technological advancement. In 2025 alone, Michigan researchers developed more than 600 new inventions, launched 30 new startups, and received more than 1,600 research awards. These milestones are made possible by Michigan's ability to attract the best and the brightest from every corner of the United States and the world. One example of the university's advanced research capabilities, and one close to my heart as an engineer and former Army officer, is our work towards keeping our country and the world safe from nuclear proliferation. The University of Michigan researchers have developed the first-ever imager that can detect both gamma rays and neutrons, an astonishing breakthrough in our nation's ability to detect material capable of producing nuclear weapons. Housing some of the world's greatest minds makes the University of Michigan a potential target of threats such as research espionage, unauthorized technology transfer, and foreign talent recruitment programs. That is why the university has established a comprehensive program to safeguard our research from America's adversaries. We share this committee's commitment to research integrity and have no tolerance for behavior that may risk the security of our nation. In isolated but serious incidents, a small number of university students and researchers from China have been arrested for unlawful activities. In each case, individuals carried out their unlawful acts without the university's knowledge. Once alerted, we acted swiftly and decisively, working with federal law enforcement, promptly terminating student work visas, and severing all ties with those individuals. The university has a comprehensive research security and compliance program, which includes risk management for international collaborations, mandatory training, and data security protocols to ensure secure and safe research. We are meeting the increased threat with increased security. We are setting university-wide standards for visiting researchers and expanding use of background checks. We are enhancing oversight of biological materials entering or leaving university labs and strengthening physical security. And we are working to open more regular lines of communication with federal regulatory, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. Safety and security is a team effort, and at Michigan, we know how important it is to be a team player. We stand committed to protecting the interests and security of the United States. This commitment is illustrated by our decision to end a relationship with a university in China that is seen as a potential threat to America's interests. We made this decision after discussion with this committee and the House Select Committee on the CCP. We have a special bond with this committee as three of our close Michigan friends and neighbors, Chairman Walberg and Congresswomen McClain and Stevens, serve on it. We look forward to continuing our dialogue with this committee to ensure that the interests of Michigan and of the nation are protected from both known threats we face today and those that may occur in the future. I look forward to our conversation. Thank you.

I now recognize Ms. Farley for your testimony. And I now recognize Ms. Farley for your testimony.

Chairman Walberg, Ranking Member Scott, distinguished committee members, and fellow witnesses. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Cassandra Farley, senior director of research integrity, security, and compliance at the University of Florida, where I serve as the institution's research security officer. I am testifying today on behalf of the University of Florida and UF's research security program. UF is a large public research university, home to 16 colleges and more than 170 research centers and institutes. This past fiscal year, UF had over $1.33 billion in research expenditures. In the same period, UF received more than $817 million in awards from federal granting agencies, with significant funding coming from the Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the National Science Foundation. Our partnership with these agencies helps our researchers solve some of society's most pressing problems in healthcare, agriculture, space, and beyond. Today, I want to highlight how UF protects that research enterprise from undue foreign influence. Beginning in 2018, our federal partners notified universities of increasing concerns about threats from foreign entities, particularly talent programs tied to the Chinese government, in which researchers sign undisclosed agreements requiring them to publish federally funded findings under foreign affiliations and recruit others into these programs. In response, federal agencies clarified their expectations, and President Trump released National Security Memorandum 33, directing the development of research security program requirements across federal agencies. Florida acted swiftly as well. In 2021, the Florida legislature unanimously passed and Governor DeSantis signed into law the Act Relating to Foreign Influence, establishing a series of statutes that are the foundation of UF's research security program today. These statutes require that Florida universities regularly report foreign gifts, contracts, and agreements, have a centralized international review and approval process, and screen all research and research support hires. The statutes also prohibit gifts from entities in foreign countries of concern and bar agreements with such entities without prior approval from the Florida Board of Governors. To build our research security program, UF made significant investments in personnel, technology, and new processes to further improve our compliance posture. This research security program has several core components. Screening all new research hires and visiting scholars through a risk-based review process that evaluates background affiliations and the nature of the proposed research. Reviewing all international agreements regardless of funding source. Maintaining a robust export control compliance operation. Reviewing all international travel in advance and requiring compliance certifications from every traveler. And mandating annual research security training for all federal award personnel as required by the CHIPS and Science Act. Additionally, as a matter of policy, UF will not enter into any contract, agreement, or activity with any entity on a U.S. government restricted party list. Through strategic investments in its research security program and partnership and collaboration at both the state and federal levels, the University of Florida continues to demonstrate that it can support and enable innovative and groundbreaking research while meaningfully working to secure the research enterprise. Thank you.

Thank you. And I now recognize Ms. Emrey-Arras for your testimony.

Thank you. Chairman Walberg, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Education's role in ensuring accountability in higher education. Education's responsibilities include overseeing colleges, federal student aid, and the servicers that help administer the student loan program. My remarks today addressed recent work examining Education's oversight of student loan servicers. I will also address key prior GAO recommendations that Education has yet to implement. Earlier this month, we reported on the impact of recent staffing reductions on Education's oversight of its student loan servicers. Specifically, we reported that in February of 25, Education stopped assessing student loan servicers on accuracy and call quality due to lack of staff capacity, according to Education officials. The two metrics were intended to measure whether student loan servicers were, one, keeping complete and accurate records for borrowers, and two, providing borrowers good customer service. The decision to stop assessing these performance metrics occurred shortly after the administration began issuing presidential directives on downsizing the federal workforce. Education reported that between January and December of 25, the number of staff at its Office of Federal Student Aid decreased 46 percent. Without this servicer oversight, Education lacks reasonable assurance that borrower records are correct. Inaccurate records can result in borrowers being billed for incorrect amounts or placed in the wrong repayment status. Additionally, borrowers need to be given correct information when they call for help. To address these concerns, we recommended that Education assess servicer accuracy and call quality. Implementing our recommendations from prior years could also help Education strengthen accountability. For example, implementing our 2019 recommendations to improve verification of borrower income and family size could help reduce the risk of fraud and error in certain repayment plans and potentially save over $2 billion. Similarly, implementing our 2017 recommendation to update the formula for measuring the financial condition of colleges could help protect taxpayers against the financial risk of college closures. Finally, implementing our 2016 recommendation to improve tracking of borrower complaints could help Education better track trends and ensure the program effectively meets borrower needs. In conclusion, Education should take action to strengthen accountability and better protect borrowers and taxpayers. Thank you.

Thank you. And now back to our topic for this morning, I recognize Ms. Johnson for your testimony.

Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Elsa Johnson, I'm a junior at Stanford University studying East Asian studies with a focus on China, and I serve as the editor-in-chief of the Stanford Review, the independent paper on campus. I'm here because I was personally targeted by a suspected agent of the Chinese Communist Party while conducting research at Stanford. I grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where I attended a Chinese language immersion school from kindergarten through eighth grade. I chose Stanford to deepen my understanding of a country whose language and culture have shaped my upbringing. In the spring of my freshman year at Stanford, I began working as a research assistant at the Hoover Institution, focused on Chinese industry and military tactics. That summer, a man calling himself Charles Chen reached out to me on social media. He had mutual followers with me and photos of Stanford on his profile. Over the following weeks, he asked detailed questions about my background, offered to pay for a trip to China, sent me a flight itinerary to Shanghai, and pressured me to move our conversation to WeChat, an app that is monitored by the CCP. Then he publicly commented on one of my Instagram posts in Mandarin, asking me to delete screenshots I had taken of our conversation. I do not know how he knew I had these screenshots. The FBI confirmed he had no affiliation with Stanford. He was likely operating on behalf of China's Ministry of State Security. I was one of at least 10 female students he targeted since 2020. After my co-author Garrett Molloy and I published our investigation, the incidents worsened. I began receiving intimidation calls where callers would switch to Mandarin, and in one case, the caller referenced my mother. Just this week, I received another call from a U.S. number. After exchanging hellos, the caller switched to Mandarin and asked whether I had finished dinner. I have also received threatening scam emails attempting to convince me to take down my reporting on this issue. This fall, the FBI informed me that I am being physically monitored on Stanford's campus by agents of the CCP and that my family is also being watched. I was fortunate to be at the Hoover Institution when I was targeted. The scholars there connected me with the FBI. If I had not been at Hoover, I don't know how I would have gotten help. There was no university resource to call, no tip line to contact. I was a freshman navigating a foreign intelligence operation with no institutional support. After our investigations were published, Stanford issued a statement saying it was looking into the reports. That was almost a year ago, and nothing meaningful has changed. The university has not established a reporting mechanism for transnational repression. It has not provided resources for students targeted by foreign governments. Stanford has the resources to build these systems. The question is whether the university has the will. I'm testifying today because if this can happen to me, it is certainly happening to other students across the country who do not have a platform or path to law enforcement. American universities are supposed to be places where people can think and speak freely. Right now, for many students, they are not. Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Johnson. Under committee rule nine, we will now question witnesses under the five-minute rule. I will now recognize myself for five minutes. President Grasso, the current director of the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies, Ann Chih Lin, was quoted in 2022 saying this. She said that she believes the FBI, and I quote, "has overstated the threat of technology transfer," unquote, from China because of the type of research that's published. Does this statement by Ann Chih Lin reflect the university's view of threats to research security, and if not, what tangible policy reforms have been made at the university, particularly in light of the multiple incidents last summer?

Thank you, Congressman. My understanding of that statement by Ann Chih Lin is that she has told others that she was misquoted in the statement. Nonetheless, that statement is something that we don't agree with at all. We find threats from overseas to be a considerable point of interest for us that we need to protect against. Research security is absolutely fundamental to our mission. A few years ago, there was National Security Presidential Memorandum Number 33 that was put out with regard to protecting our national interests and security. We actually hired the authors of that memo to help us build a stronger and more robust research program. We have a strong program and it continues to get better. For example, let me just tell you some of the things that we do. We've expanded our background checks, we've increased our channels of communications with federal agencies, we've improved our data security and physical security. We require mandatory training of all of our researchers based on NSF Secure, the NSF Secure website, which is we follow the best practices that NSF has put out. We prevent conflicts of interest through a process where everyone is required to disclose, and we use a form called M-Inform. We have comprehensive research, a comprehensive research security program that also includes risk management for international collaborations. And I might mention that we use NSF's policy on managing international collaborations that was put together with the JASONs and MITRE Corporation. And I just as a point of interest, my brother was president of MITRE Corporation, so national security is incredibly important to both of us in our family, and we are very committed to national security.

Okay. Thank you. Ms. Farley, some argue that research security efforts risk stereotyping and targeting those who come from different racial or ethnic backgrounds. How do research security efforts at the University of Florida protect faculty and students with all backgrounds?

Thank you for that question. At the University of Florida, our new hire screening of researchers and research support positions occurs for all new hires regardless of national origin or citizenship. We are committed to hiring the best and the brightest at the University of Florida, so we use a risk-based review process to review education, affiliations, employment history, and ongoing affiliations, as well as the nature of the research as we conduct those reviews. We also review all travel regardless of destination, and all of those things happen within my office and are overseen by senior leadership.

Comprehensive, common sense, it appears. Thank you. Ms. Johnson, you could write a book about your freshman and sophomore years at Stanford. In your testimony, you mentioned Section 117 of the Higher Education Act as well as DETERRENT, which this committee moved across the House floor last year. How does the public transparency in Section 117 help you as a citizen and a journalist hold institutions accountable?

Thank you. I think the Section 117 funding portal has also been, has already been extremely valuable to myself and my writers as journalists. I think being able to see where Stanford's money is coming from is really important, and I think that we have a right to access that information. I think being able to see where Stanford's money is coming from is really important and I think that we have a right to access that information.

Okay. It certainly gives a target for further information to be gained, doesn't it?

Yes.

Well, I wish you well. My time has expired, so I now recognize the gentlelady from Oregon, Ms. Bonamici, for her five minutes of questioning. I move to represent Representative Takano from California for your five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For decades, scholars, researchers, and intellectuals have come to our research institutions because the United States is a global powerhouse scientifically and academically. We take the best and brightest from our allies and adversaries alike and bring them to study and work for the United States. Our higher education system has been our greatest soft power asset. The benefits are significant. Over a third of Nobel Prizes won by the United States were won by foreign-born researchers and professionals. Among Chinese-born students, over 85 percent of PhD students stay in the United States long after completing their programs, and international scholars contribute tens of billions of dollars a year to our economy. There is no disputing that we are in the midst of intense competition with China. China is the number one global leader in trade, manufacturing, STEM graduates, automation, critical minerals, biotech, pharmaceuticals, and an array of other fields. I agree that the risk of CCP-related intellectual property theft is significant and concerning and it will continue unless we remain vigilant. However, China is not surpassing us in these areas because they are stealing our technology. China is exceeding us because they have spent years investing in research and development, studying other countries' adopting technology, and building universities. They have invested heavily in education. And while they rapidly develop and expand their research infrastructure, this administration and this majority have hobbled ours. Our universities and colleges have been attacked, demeaned, stripped of their research funding for merely disagreeing with the administration. International students have had their visas arbitrarily revoked without explanation. Researchers have been targeted, investigated, and publicly accused of crimes they did not commit. And if that sounds like the tactics of an authoritarian CCP, that's because it is. This administration is adopting the very same practices that we decry China for. In the past, students and scholars came to this country because American higher education was an arena where free speech was not just protected, it was encouraged. Students and professors alike can study, innovate, debate, and collaborate freely. Approaches like the SAFE Research Act, which would restrict colleges from accessing research grant funding if they or their researchers have any affiliation with China, openly attack that model. The proposal is the legislative equivalent of cutting off the nose to spite the face. If we entirely cease all forms of relationship with China in the immediate term, as this administration favors, we give up a significant proportion of our best minds and the workforce in our university researchers and labs. We put forth an authoritarian response to combat authoritarianism. We also attack some of our best innovators. The unmitigated failures of the China Initiative prove that this heavy-handed approach is not only ineffective, it is incredibly harmful and highly racially biased. In 2021, Dr. Gang Chen, the former head of MIT's engineering department, was arrested, investigated, and publicly accused of being loyal to China. He had lived and worked in the United States for decades and been a citizen for 20 years. After two years of investigation, the charges were dismissed, but not before his research had been halted and his grants had been lost. Years later, he went on to head the development of what is now recognized as the best semiconductor material yet discovered for its speed and durability. Had the China Initiative succeeded in sending Dr. Chen back to China, the U.S. would not have that technology. The China Initiative has had incredibly tragic consequences as well. In 2019, Dr. Jane Wu was targeted by a China Initiative investigation. Dr. Wu was a neuroscientist studying cancer and ALS that had been in the U.S. for 40 years and a citizen since the year 2000. Dr. Wu was cleared after two years, but in that time she lost access to her lab, her research, and her funding. She committed suicide in 2024. When it comes to policymaking, vehemence does not equal competence. And rather than chest-beating and name-calling, we must pursue solutions that balance both academic freedom and national security. We should strengthen the bipartisan proposals that have been put forth and treat this issue with the gravity it deserves, not use it as another opportunity for political grandstanding. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Stefanik, for her five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Chairman Walberg. Mr. Grasso, last year facing congressional pressure, Michigan ended its partnership with Shanghai Jiao Tong University after five Chinese students were caught spying at night and taking illegal photos of U.S. military drills and equipment on the remote Michigan installation Camp Grayling. These students lied and misled U.S. law enforcement about their motives and later conspired on the CCP-controlled messaging app WeChat to clear their phones and cameras of photos and evidence. Has the university conducted a full audit to determine what intellectual property or federally funded research was compromised?

Congresswoman, we are unaware of any research that was compromised by these individual students. What they did was at Camp Grayling, miles and miles away from campus, and they were arrested for taking pictures of a military installation and they were...

But while they were students, though, did you do an audit on whether there was any access to any research being conducted on the university campus? I understand Camp Grayling is off campus, but was there an audit conducted?

Well, they were not researchers. They were undergraduate students. So we did not do an audit, but I suspect that they were not, unless they did something nefarious, they did not have any access to any of our research.

Well, they did do something nefarious off campus. I think it would be important for the university to ensure that there is a full audit conducted to make sure that no research, that they didn't take any nefarious acts there. Are there currently any Chinese nationals at Michigan involved in research funded by either the Department of War or any federal agency?

We have many Chinese students and scholars on our campus. I don't know what all their projects are. To your previous point, we will, I will take that back to our team and ask them to look at potential access of those students on our campus. But I do not know what all of our researchers are involved in and whether they are, I would suspect that some of them are on federal grants. The military and Department of Defense has very strict requirements as to who can participate in their research. So if they're not U.S. citizens, they would not have access.

There were also multiple cases of Chinese nationals connected to the university who were charged and arrested for attempting to smuggle biological materials into the United States last year. What is Michigan doing to vet foreign students? Specifically, what types of reviews are taking place on students from foreign countries who will have access to sensitive research?

So, Congresswoman, we have improved and we're continuing to improve our background checks for all of our researchers and students that come into the country. But we also have to partner more closely with our federal intelligence community to make sure that these students are vetted before they're allowed to get visas to enter our country as well.

What percentage of students are foreign nationals at Michigan?

We have about 8,000 foreign students or international students out of 75,000.

Okay. I want to turn, Ms. Johnson, your testimony is extremely concerning. Thank you for being here and sharing your experience. You mentioned that some of the frustrations you had in Stanford's lack of action to combat the threat of Chinese espionage towards students. Can you characterize your personal interactions with the university? Were they cooperative or was the university reluctant to engage with you?

Thank you. The university was very reluctant to engage with me. After we published our first article, there was some outreach, you know, a little email saying they're taking our concerns seriously and they're looking into it. And we met with some administrators and they, you know, sort of said there's nothing they can really do about it. So I have definitely sensed that.

Did they refer it to law enforcement?

No, I had to go to law enforcement myself.

Mhm. You also, was there any retaliation or backlash from the university against you or Stanford Review, where I understand you're the editor-in-chief?

Yeah, I think among the student body, we're not popular at times and, you know, especially this is definitely one of those cases. But it wasn't, it wasn't terrible. Beyond the transnational repression that I was facing, campus was okay.

The transnational repression, though, that should not be happening to American undergraduates who are studying, learning their research, putting together their academic portfolio. Again, thanks for being here and bravely sharing your story. Yield back.

I thank the gentlelady. I recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for your five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, if it hasn't already been stated, again, just for the record, you know, this committee last Congress held a hearing and markup on a number of bills regarding this issue. In this Congress, we've gone through the same drill, already a hearing and a markup. I've actually voted with the majority in a couple of those measures. I would just note that they are far from through all the wickets in terms of getting through both the House and the Senate. In the meantime, you know, we have a hurricane out there right now with student loan borrowers, which we have not held any hearings to really conduct oversight, which is within the jurisdiction of this committee. In 2025, student loan delinquencies skyrocketed, with nearly 25 percent of borrowers, roughly 7.9 million Americans in this country, becoming delinquent in the first three quarters alone. By late 2025, over 5.5 million borrowers held 140 billion in defaulted federal loans, with severe delinquency rates hitting 9.6 percent this year. Again, this is all happening at a time when there's a cost of living crisis and when this administration let the payments snap back when they took over. Again, it has just been pouring gasoline on the fire. At the same time, we have a situation over at the Department of Education, as our witness, Ms. Emrey-Arras, has testified, where the whole structure of the Federal Student Loan Assistance Office is being gutted. And there're also, because of the president's executive order, there's been this sort of quasi-transfer of authorities outside of the Department of Education. Again, the announcement that they're shifting jurisdiction and control of the portfolio, which is about two trillion dollars, out of DOE into the Treasury Department, I think really deserves our attention in terms of as a committee to get to the root of this in terms of, again, the trends that are happening in terms of default that are, again, just really going to trap people in a debt trap, particularly young Americans who are starting out in life in terms of just, you know, being in a place where they can buy a house or start a business or, you know, again, pursue their dreams. So, Ms. Emrey-Arras, again, your report, which, again, I think is was very relevant in terms of, again, what's happening over the Department of Education, can you talk about, again, the staffing issues at the Office of Federal Student Aid at a time when delinquencies are going through the roof?

Certainly. Thank you for that question. We found that between January and December of last year, FSA lost about half of its staff, specifically 46 percent. That constituted a drop of 656 staff members.

So, again, you know, when our constituents, you know, are, again, falling into delinquency, the ability of even our members of Congress to be able to sort of try and provide assistance is really going to, you know, be affected and limited by the fact that there're just not people there to answer the phone. In terms of the transition to Treasury Department, again, can you talk about sort of what we know so far, whether they're just going to shift that office over to Treasury or is Treasury going to set up its own mechanism? So, again, it's, I think, may in some sort of conversations at a bar, you know, people could say, oh, that sounds like something Treasury can handle is handling a portfolio. But the fact of the matter is it's like a big bank, you know, in terms of, you know, a loan department that DOE has had for for many years. And certainly, I think all of us can attest the fact that they can always be improved and, you know, the confusion that's out there for borrowers in terms of just what income repayment plans they can qualify for, you know, they need help that's there. But the bottom line is somebody needs to be there to answer the phone, okay, in terms of helping borrowers in the predicament that they're in right now. That really should be the focus of this committee given the fact that we've been over this ground before in terms of the topic of today's hearing. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, we are going to get real, clear, professional testimony and documentation so that we can help the people we represent. Thank you. I yield back.

We haven't looked into that issue and the department has not discussed it with us.

I thank the gentleman. Now back to the topic at hand, I recognize Ms. Miller for her five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the gentleman. Now back to the topic at hand. I recognize Ms. Miller for her five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our universities and colleges house vast centers of research and technology that contribute to our national security framework. The very nature of these centers make them prime targets for espionage, theft, and exploitation. And yet these universities have repeatedly failed to properly vet foreign students and faculty who seek to gain access to these facilities. These institutions have also accepted monetary gifts from foreign countries without asking about the strings attached. This committee took a big step forward last year to force donor transparency by advancing the DETERRENT Act, which later passed the House. Similarly, the Trump administration has also taken action to ensure further compliance of Section 117 of the Higher Education Act. But there is more work to be done. Because many universities fail to self-report, there must be stricter civil and criminal penalties for improper vetting of foreign students and faculty. The same is true for foreign gifts. In fact, universities should have to report all foreign gifts regardless of the amount or the nation it was received from. Safeguarding our national security involves holding these colleges and universities accountable. My first question is to Mr. Grasso. Last year, two Chinese nationals who worked in a lab at the University of Michigan were charged with smuggling a dangerous fungus into the United States. What steps have you taken to prevent foreign agents like these from infiltrating your college again?

Thank you, Congresswoman. We are, have been developing stronger background checks for all of our scholars and researchers. We require our mandatory training in terms of research security of all of our researchers. Research security is fundamental to our mission. We take these these breaches very, very seriously. We have improved many of our research protocols. We have very strong protocols and we continue to improve them along with annual training as I mentioned. We also rely heavily on our federal partners to help us identify individuals that are coming in that could pose threats to to our national security when they issue visas. And we continue to look at export controls, foreign engagements. As I mentioned, we check all of our foreign engagements and we do all of our reporting according to Section 117 of the Higher Education Act.

Okay. Well, we're going to hold you accountable for that. My next question is to Ms. Farley. In your written testimony, you mentioned several Florida laws designed to reduce undue foreign influence in colleges and universities. Could you talk about the effectiveness of these laws and how we might implement similar policies on a federal level?

Thank you for that question, Representative. I would, of course, have to defer to policymakers to as to the best approach to regulating institutes of higher education. But at the University of Florida, we have a highly compliant program. We have fully committed to complying with all state and federal regulations related to research security. The statutes in question require that the University of Florida screen all new research and research support positions prior to hire. Our institution also has implemented an international travel review program in which travelers must report their travel prior to traveling. It must be reviewed by my office and they must certify compliance with relevant policies and regulations. And in addition to that, there are several reporting requirements in which the university reports foreign gifts and contracts to the Florida Board of Governors on a regular basis to include any agreements with countries of concern.

So what enforcement policies are in place?

In in what sense?

Well, if a college or university violates those.

Oh, absolutely. So the the Florida Board of Governors requires reporting of these agreements on a biannual basis, and then there are consequences in place. I don't have the exact language of the statute in front of me if there is a lack of reporting or transparency. So the Board of Governors is highly involved in oversight and monitoring of compliance.

Do you know of any situations where you've had to force some kind of compliance or fine a university or take some kind of punitive action?

So I can only speak for the University of Florida, but our program is highly compliant and we've had a variety of outcomes from the reviews that we do in compliance with the Florida Board of Governors regulation.

Well, thank you. Florida's been such a light in the country. I appreciate what you've all done. My last question...

Gentlelady's time has expired.

Okay, thank you.

If you wouldn't have explained about Florida so strongly. [Laughter.] Remember Michigan. Okay. Now I recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Wilson, for five minutes of questioning.

Thank you. Thank you, Chair Walberg and Ranking Member Scott. But I just have to ask, what problem are we actually trying to solve today? Why are we here? Where is the evidence that America's universities are under siege by foreign espionage at a scale that justifies this level of alarm? And while we're asking questions, why aren't we holding hearings on the real crisis facing students? This is the Education Committee, and we should be ashamed that we are not examining how by dismantling the Department of Education, slashing oversight, and gutting federal student aid in the so-called big ugly bill, Republicans have made college less affordable, less accessible, and harder to finish, especially for low and middle-income families. Who is truly putting students at risk? This hypothetical foreign actor or policies that gut federal student aid and undermine the Department of Education? How does slashing support for Pell Grants and loan programs strengthen higher education or our workforce? Instead of chasing xenophobic conspiracy theories that risk stigmatizing international students and distracting from real problems, this committee should be focused on holding the administration accountable for the chaos and confusion it is inflicting on borrowers and on institutions, and on advancing serious legislation that ensures every single student in this country who wants to can access and complete a quality degree. With that, I have a few questions. Ms. Emrey-Arras, how have the changes to the federal student loan access and repayment in H.R. 1, the so-called big ugly bill, affected the affordability of higher education for low and middle-income students who depend on federal aid to enroll and stay in school?

Thank you for the question. We have not studied that issue, but we would be happy to do so in the future.

Okay, well last week the Department of Education announced that it will transfer the Office of Federal Student Aid to the Treasury Department. Do you know how this shift of student loan management responsibilities affect students' day-to-day lives as borrowers? For example, the clarity of information they receive, the quality of customer service, and the ease of navigating repayment and default?

That is a good question. We have not studied the issue and we do not know the answer.

But you're here at this committee and you don't know the answer to nothing?

I can tell you about the work that we've done.

I yield back.

Gentlelady yields. I thank the gentlelady and now I recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. McClain.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses who are here today. I think the purpose of this hearing today is to make sure that if we are engaged with foreign countries, especially foreign adversaries, that we want to make sure that our country and our students are safe from espionage. We don't want our intellectual property to be stolen, and we want to safeguard the institutions in which the taxpayers spend a lot of money funding. So I believe that's what the purpose of this hearing is for. So let me ask a general question is maybe let's start with this. Why do you believe foreign relationships at the university level are important? Right? We have a lot of taxpayers paying money for taxes for their students to go to our universities. Why are the relationships with foreign countries, especially foreign adversaries, why are those relationships even needed? And I'll ask both the university presidents. We'll start with you.

Thank you, Congresswoman. First, it's not about foreign talent in isolation. At the University of Michigan, we are one of the greatest universities in the world and we want to attract the best talent from around the world to come and work with our researchers and study with our students to the benefit of humanity. And we understand that the majority of the university is funded through Michigan taxpayer dollars. That's why if we invite students from other states or from overseas, they pay a differential to compensate for the difference that taxpayers get a discount on. But we are not necessarily existentially dependent on international talent, but it is to the university's benefit and to society's benefit to attract the best and the brightest to the university to develop the best technologies in the future for the United States.

Ms. Farley?

Thank you for that question. At the University of Florida, in compliance with state statutes, we review all international agreements regardless of funding source. At our institution, we're committed to finding the appropriate collaborators for our research, but all agreements go under a thorough review by the appropriate office. But as a matter of statute, we do not enter into any agreements with foreign countries of concern without the prior approval of the Board of Governors.

Is it necessary to have foreign countries in these relationships, in these partnerships, knowing that there is a risk of espionage, of intellectual property being stolen? Is it really necessary?

Thank you for that question. In my role as the research security officer, I am responsible for reviewing these agreements, ensuring the risk is as minimal as possible and when at all possible ensuring that that risk doesn't exist.

So you can't really comment on my question. Okay. All right. What I'm curious about is what happens and can you walk us through to give us a little peace of mind, what happens today if a researcher fails to disclose a foreign affiliation? We'll start with you, Ms. Farley. We'll go in reverse order.

Thank you for that question, Representative. At the University of Florida, our policy on conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment prohibits participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs. That's an explicit prohibition. But and all employees are required to disclose outside activities.

But what happens if they don't? What happens?

So if they violate our policy, our institution follows our policy to do a thorough review to determine if there was a violation of our policy and then there is a process in place to conduct that review.

Is there a zero tolerance policy?

If there's a violation of our policy, then we would follow the laid out disciplinary actions within that policy, yes.

And what would that disciplinary action be?

Depending on the scope of the... depending on the scope of their non-compliance, disciplinary action can be anything from counseling to up to termination.

Counseling. Okay. Mr. Grasso?

Thank you, Congresswoman. I think our program would be similar. We would do an investigation if there was an oversight in disclosure of a conflict of interest and the penalties would be commensurate with the oversight. If it was a simple oversight of perhaps an honorary title at a university that was not listed on someone's disclosure form, we would have a conversation with the individual. If there's compensation associated with it, it could be up to termination, which we did do in a particular instance that we found.

Thank you very much. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the gentlelady and I would note that we concur with your desire to encourage higher education. We may see different approaches. I thank the gentlelady. Now I recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Stevens.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our witnesses here today and great to see you, President Grasso. Go Blue. We know we're all in challenging times for higher education, as many of my colleagues have pointed out. Faculty, administrators, researchers, and most importantly students have been caught up in the current administration's reckless dismantling of federal agencies as well as cuts to research funding that have changed the landscape of university and academic life dramatically. I also have the privilege of sitting on the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee and the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. And so this hearing today is cutting across a lot of the policy work that I have engaged in in Congress and that the committees of jurisdiction that I also sit on have tackled. We know that the research ecosystem across our universities is one of the crown jewels of this country and that American national security, economic innovations, critical health breakthroughs, and so much more often start at the university research level or technology readiness one or zero through five. So the research is going to be a target, and we know that for our adversaries and our competitors. However, the response is not to close off our universities to the world, we know that. We don't want to be launching xenophobic attacks against particular student communities or cut off critical federal research funding. And instead, we should adopt common sense protections like the ones codified in my United States Research Protection Act that passed the House on voice vote last year. And we want to give our universities the tools to protect themselves and secure important research without jeopardizing the funding and collaborations they need to remain on the cutting edge. And most importantly, we do want to protect academic integrity and research from foreign influence, which is somewhat in the camp of espionage, but we don't want to have the influence. And so when we see the current administration firing workers and shuttering directorates at the NSF, the National Science Foundation, many of those fired were experienced professionals in managing federal research funding securely and they were attuned to the risks posed by maligned foreign actors. And so it's safe to say that eliminating that institutional knowledge made it more difficult for universities to maintain their security of their research operations. And to that end, Mr. Grasso, what more can we do at the federal level to help the University of Michigan secure the critical research happening on your campus?

Thank you, Congresswoman. We appreciate our partnership with federal agencies, both our funding agencies and our security and law enforcement agencies, and we appreciate any information that can be shared with regard to interactions with foreign entities that would help us better protect our policies.

Yes, and do you have any research highlights that are going on at the University of Michigan right now to make sure that our state is on the cutting edge of new innovations, anything you'd like to share right now?

Oh, we have a lot of research highlights. As a matter of fact, just recently, the first awards by Sony and Nature Magazine for the top women in technology and science were awarded. They awarded three of them, two were Michigan scholars, and they happen to also be of Chinese origin. So that was terrific. And one of those was for work that was done in the development of a technology called histotripsy, which is a treatment of liver cancer and it does surgery without heat or scalpels. So it uses ultrasound and it was just sold for almost $3 billion. So that's one of the terrific things that we're doing on campus.

Well, holy smokes, because we know we want these innovations and this productivity here in our country, particularly as we face enormous challenges with our debt proposition. And it's only when we innovate and grow our economy that we will be able to pay off our debt. So thank you so much for being here and sharing, and with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

I thank the gentlelady. I recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Allen. Excuse me, from Georgia. It's down south there somewhere, right?

Yes, it's close to Florida. Right next, we neighbor Florida. When I get wrapped up, we are proud to neighbor Florida. Thank you. And thank you, Chairman, for holding this important hearing today. And I want to thank the witnesses for your attendance and expertise in helping us understand what's going on in American universities as far as the engine of innovation, collaboration, but those strengths obviously have been exploited by foreign adversaries who work to undermine our institutions and democratic values. You know, we are the innovation giant in the world. The problem is that much of that innovation, intellectual capital, is being stolen and used against us, particularly from an economic standpoint. President Grasso, according to the University of Michigan's export control training, only one module named export control is labeled required. Nine other modules are deemed optional, including export compliance and biosafety, export compliance for international shipping, and export compliance and the United States sanctions program. Do you believe having those trainings only be optional for university faculty and staff is taking a strong and proactive approach towards research security?

Congressman, thank you very much for that question. Research security is our fundamental basis for doing our research. And I will actually take your comment back to our team in Ann Arbor and I will look at those other modules that are labeled as optional and we will look to see if we can make those required as appropriate. Thank you.

Thank you. Ms. Farley, you noted concerns about undisclosed participation in foreign talent programs, particularly those linked to the People's Republic of China, which includes taxpayer-funded research dollars. How does the University of Florida's screening process identify and mitigate risk associated with undisclosed foreign affiliations?

Thank you for that question, Representative. At the University of Florida, we require all new research and research support positions to go through a screening process. That screening process looks for a variety of indicators, some of which can be indicators of malign foreign government talent recruitment programs. So our office looks at things such as employment history, foreign affiliations, publication history, as well as education and training. And we also consider the nature of the research and the scope of the research for the researcher we are looking at.

Okay, good. And you think that's working to satisfactorily protect the security of what you're doing there at the great University of Florida?

At UF, we believe our program is in compliance with the statutes and that it is effectively implemented, yes.

Great, thank you. Ms. Johnson, you mentioned student groups such as the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations that are utilized as arms of the Chinese government. Can you talk about what type of events these organizations hold and how they influence other international students on campus?

Yeah. So Stanford has an Association of Chinese Students and Scholars. It receives, I think last year it received $64,000 from Stanford as club funding. And they host a lot of networking events across the Bay Area, and their big event every year is their Lunar New Year party. And the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars has been used to use for peer monitoring and reporting back to the Chinese Communist Party, which I think creates an unsafe environment for a lot of Chinese students.

What about the influence they're having on other international students and meaning are they trying to recruit other international students into this effort or how has that influence caused a problem?

I'm not sure if they're trying to recruit other international students. However, I have heard stories from people in our business school who are also in the U.S. military who have attended events hosted by Chinese clubs where they've been invited to, you know, go to China for free, have been approached about what they're doing with the U.S. military. So definitely is affecting American students as well as Taiwanese students because oftentimes there will be a stance against...

So this would be an espionage effort by that group. Okay. All right, well thank you very much. I am out of time. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I thank the gentleman and I do apologize, how could I think of moving you out of the home of the Masters tournament coming up in a couple weeks? Maybe it's jealousy.

Yes, well, yes, it's two weeks away and we're looking forward to it and it's 80 degrees in Augusta, Georgia today. Thank you.

You said too much right now. So I thank the gentleman. And I recognize the gentlelady from Oregon, Ms. Bonamici.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again to the witnesses. I appreciate my colleagues' dedication to this issue and I just wish that they brought the same level of commitment to addressing problems in our higher education system like the cost of college and meeting the basic needs of students. Recently the GAO published a report about the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights. That's the office that's charged with enforcing civil rights laws that protect more than 70 million students in schools and universities nationwide. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has slashed this office, laid off about half the staff, closed seven of the 12 regional offices, and then several months later, OCR then recalled about 250 of the laid-off staff to address the backlog of civil rights complaints. Reports in January show that OCR failed to meaningfully resolve a single racial harassment or discrimination investigation since Donald Trump took office in January of 2025. Then more than a month ago, 70 of my Democratic colleagues joined me in sending a letter to Secretary McMahon and Assistant Secretary Richie. We need answers. We asked about the current number of pending cases and open investigations, how many full-time workers OCR employs, how many remain on paid administrative leave, and whether OCR has resolved any cases related to racial harassment or discrimination of students. We requested answers within 30 days, we have heard nothing, it's been 50 days, no response. Ms. Emrey-Arras, GAO released a report in January investigating the reduction in force and restructuring at OCR. What effect did the RIFs have on the caseload of the employees who remained at OCR and what were the circumstances that led to the department recognizing that they needed to reinstate some of those employees?

So as you noted, the department cut about half of the OCR staff during this time dating back to March. And during this period from March through September, they had more than 9,000 complaints of alleged discrimination. They opened more than 600 investigations. They reported resolving about 7,000 complaints and they noted that about 90 percent of the resolutions were through dismissals.

So they just dismiss the cases rather than resolve them, is what you're saying.

There can be many reasons for dismissals and the department has not disclosed what those reasons are.

And what was the cost to American taxpayers of placing OCR employees on paid administrative leave as part of the RIF, and then what was the cost of recalling them later in the year to address the backlog of civil rights complaints?

That's an excellent question and we don't know the answer because the department didn't do what it was supposed to do. The department was supposed to calculate those costs before initiating the RIFs. It did not. However, we do know based on estimates that they had for just simply the benefits and the salaries that between $28.5 and $38 million was spent from March to December paying people not to work.

Yeah, that is not government efficiency when we pay people not to work. And I just want to note, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, that Ms. Johnson, I'm sorry I missed your testimony that you gave orally, but I read through your testimony and you certainly don't agree with what happened to you, but I talk to people all the time about higher education and what I'm hearing is, I don't know if I can afford to go to college. I don't know what's going to happen with my student loans. I have so much student loan debt, I don't know what to do with all the changes in the program, it's confusing, we don't know what's going to happen. Now they're trying to send the student loan collection to Treasury without the appropriate staff or expertise. That's what people are talking to me about. We have, we passed legislation, we've had hearings, multiple hearings on the threat to research security, both here and in the Science Committee. And from the testimony from the institutions as I said earlier, they are addressing those threats. What we really need to deal with is the attack on higher education and we're not doing that in this committee and Mr. Chairman, I hope we can do that because higher education is a path to opportunity and we need to open those doors of opportunity, not close them. I have said that HR 1, the big ugly bill I call it, is a dream killer because there are a lot of people now who just feel like they won't be able to afford to go to college unless they're from a wealthy family. That's taking opportunity away from people, which is exactly the opposite of what President Johnson when he signed the Higher Education Act said, this is to open the doors of opportunity. That's what this committee should be doing, opening doors of opportunity for students across the country and making sure that if people have student loan debt they have a manageable way to pay it back instead of thrusting them into the chaos that is about to erupt at the Treasury. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the gentlelady and I would note that we concur with your desire to encourage higher education. May we see different approaches, but we certainly want to encourage higher education. Let's move now to the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer, for your five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the witnesses for being here today. President Grasso, when universities are faced with potential criminal activity by foreign nationals, cooperation with law enforcement cannot be optional or delayed. Timely action is essential to ensure those that break the laws are held accountable without exception. Yet at the University of Michigan, we have seen a case of at least two foreign nationals on student visas who were able to flee the United States and remain fugitives, this cannot happen again and I hope you agree. I had a provision included on the House-passed DETER Act last March that would strengthen coordination between universities and federal agencies to assure compliance, streamline reporting, and close gaps that let bad actors slip through the hands of law enforcement. What concrete steps will the University of Michigan take to work directly with federal agencies to improve reporting and prevent future cases from falling through the cracks?

Thank you, Congressman. When we get a report from federal agency of a transgression in our laws, we take immediate action and as I mentioned, we've had several instances where federal agents identified students that were doing illicit things, we revoked their visas right away and then they were either arrested or some of them left the country. But we take immediate action when we are faced with illicit action that's reported to us by the federal authorities.

All right, thank you. Ms. Johnson, do you feel like Stanford has support systems in place for students like yourself who are experiencing transnational repression?

No, I don't think Stanford has the proper infrastructure in place. I think they have been sort of helpful with our program for international students, but not on the transnational repression front.

What proactive steps can they take to help students?

I think they should try to set up an anonymous tip line for people to report incidents and I think they should set up even a small office for students to talk to administrators about this issue.

Okay, thank you. Ms. Farley, you described the University of Florida as a model for centralized institution-wide research security and oversight. What advantage is there to having a centralized compliance functions compared to decentralized approaches that other universities might be using?

Thank you for that question, Representative. As I'm sure you can imagine, the University of Florida is a large place with many colleges and centers and institutes. So by centralizing our research security program, we were able to ensure that we could implement an effective and efficient program with minimal numbers of points of contact to make it easier for researchers, faculty, and students to know who their central point of contact is. We've also been able to ensure by centralizing these programs that there is direct oversight from senior leadership, so members of the University of Florida cabinet.

Thank you, that's all the questions I have, I'll yield back my time.

I thank the gentleman, I recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Lee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It feels like this hearing is yet another of the Republicans' latest attempts to villainize the global community and undermine higher education. Universities already put significant resources and efforts into making sure their hiring, enrollment, and research processes are safe. But conservatives would have us believe that espionage is one of the largest issues facing higher education and that we should treat every international student or faculty as a foreign spy. The research universities in my district like the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University are great because, not despite of, the international community. Dr. Grasso, in your testimony you mentioned that your university's achievements are made possible by the ability to attract the best and brightest from every corner of the United States and the world. How does your university benefit from enrolling international students and hiring international faculty?

Thank you, Congresswoman, that is a great question. We attract the best and the brightest from around the world and they come and they enrich our campuses because they not only bring their intellectual power, but they bring different perspectives from around the world and how different cultures and communities look at different problems. And that helps our students learn from them as they sit side-by-side in classrooms and it helps our researchers attack very difficult problems from different perspectives. So we have benefited greatly from an international community of the best and the brightest. And Time Magazine just ranked the University of Michigan the ninth best university in the world. There were only four other American universities ahead of us, they were private, we were the first public, but we were ranked the ninth best and it's in part because we can attract the best and the brightest.

Thank you, so it sounds like diversity, equity, and inclusion do make universities great. I do and I try to be sensitive because I recognize that a lot of our university presidents who have come before our committee, they have brought some concerns about speaking out in front of or around this administration and in front of Republicans. We know that Trump has made it clear that he intends to use the full force of the federal government, including this committee, to go after some of our university presidents and our institutions. This administration threatens the existence of our higher education institutions and perhaps I know you all can't always say it, so I will say it for you, but I am grateful that you have come to share this perspective, that is a really important one. If Republicans want to protect research, they can stop cutting research funding, they can make sure that the NIH and NSF are fully staffed with scientific experts, experts who make decisions based on research integrity instead of fascist ideology and conspiracy theories. Visa delays, travel restrictions, increased security or surveillance, kidnappings from ICE, heightened uncertainty and the chilling effect caused by hearings just like this one are what actually make it impossible for schools to fulfill their educational and research missions. Every bit of innovation that contributes to our position in the world has come from innovation through global collaboration. Congressman Takano mentioned it, but it bears repeating that our ability to attract the best and the brightest from all corners of this country and the world is what comprises America's soft power. It's not just what makes us globally competitive, it's what makes us globally safe. We should be proud of the fact that people all over the world want to come here, that we have built a society that people want to contribute to. If they no longer feel welcome here, they will take their talents elsewhere. They'll use their skills to build up the world around us and we will be left behind. We have an administration that does not value soft power, that does not feel there is a benefit to diplomacy, that doesn't value our country's image as helpers or aspiring peacekeepers in the world. This administration is hell-bent on making America look like a hellscape. This is the trajectory we are on and to add insult to injury, when xenophobic rhetoric about foreign espionage causes students to be profiled and discriminated against, what recourse do they have? Because in January we learned that the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights has been dismissing 90 percent of discrimination complaints and this was while half of the OCR staff were placed on administrative leave thanks to DOE. Very quickly, Ms. Emrey-Arras, can you remind this committee what the Department of Education spent on civil rights staff who were not allowed to work from March to December 2025?

We know it was at least $28.5 to $35 million.

So instead of paying civil rights workers to do their job and process discrimination cases, the Department of Ed spent millions of taxpayer dollars to strip students of civil rights protections. We know that world-class universities and global collaborations are essential to democracy, which is of course what this administration is attacking in the first place. But we cannot allow for xenophobic rhetoric, can't get lost in it. Those of us who are still interested in democracy will continue to fight for international students, for their contributions to our country and we'll continue to fight for the kind of global democracy and diplomacy that so many of our greatest achievements were built on. I thank you all so much for your time.

The gentlelady's time has expired and now I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Fine.

Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I live in the real world, not the world of sunshine, rainbows, pixie dust, and unicorns that we just heard about. So I'd like to give you some examples before I get to my question to Ms. Farley. In 2021, this isn't fictional, a federal grand jury indicted Lin Yang for defrauding the NIH of $1.75 million. He concealed his ties to a Chinese company while he was working with the University of Florida, he fled to China. Between 2019 and 2021, multiple UF researchers resigned or were terminated after internal audits revealed undisclosed connections to Chinese institutions or talent programs. In 2024, a UF research lab employee and several students were implicated in a multi-year plot related to biochemical and toxin shipping. At UCF, four professors between 2019 and 2020 had ties to China, had to be resigned or fired amid concerns of undisclosed relations. At the University of South Florida in 2015, Dajin Peng ran UCF's Confucius Institute, had expense fraud visa issues that had to be dealt with and I could go on and on and on. These are issues in my state that actually take these issues seriously. Again, as opposed to the sunshine, rainbow, pixie dust perspective that we just heard. That's why in 2021 the Florida legislature passed HB 7017 unanimously to deal with these issues and in 2023 SB 846 and I was proud to help spearhead both of those when I was in the legislature helping to run education policy. So Ms. Farley, my question to you is this. Do you believe that the issue we're dealing with, we're talking about here, is a real issue and have policies like the ones we put in place in Florida helped you to be able to make sure that we are protecting our research institutions to advance the interests of the American people?

Thank you for that question, Representative. At the University of Florida, we are fully committed to complying with all policies and regulations related to this important issue. And as you've stated, we had some examples of significant breaches of trust at the university, and we were committed to cooperating fully, and those employees are no longer at the institution. We have implemented...

So these things actually happen. These issues, so they're real. We're not like making it up.

Yes.

And by the way, all the examples I gave were basically China, but these are happening. Like, we need someone to have the job that you have now. Obviously, you're going to say yes, but because you want your job, but we need, we have an issue and we need someone like you to deal with it.

The institution takes this issue very seriously, and we, at the time that the laws were passed, we implemented a task force of senior leaders across the institution. We took it very seriously. The leaders across the institution designed the research security program, which has since grown and evolved to implement the new requirements as well that were passed in 2023. We centralized the program so that there's leadership oversight of these programs, and we've done significant outreach and training across campus to help our campus partners, our researchers, our faculty understand the importance of these issues and the importance of complying with federal and state regulations.

So let's hypothetically assume that we lived in the world of rainbows, pixie dust, unicorns that we heard about where everything's fine and we're all working together and we don't need to take any of this stuff serious. We hadn't passed these laws like we passed in Florida, and we had the kinds of issues. What do you think would be going on in our institutions if we weren't worried about it, if we weren't passing laws like we passed in Florida? Do you believe that our Florida universities would be at risk or everything would just be fine?

I would hesitate to speculate on a hypothetical, but what I will say is that the concerns are concerns we've seen at the federal level as well as the state level. And the university has been committed for many, many years to constantly improving our compliance posture and growing our research security program to protect and be a good steward of federal research dollars.

My last question is this. Do you believe that there are foreign actors that wish to exploit our universities and the funding that we provide to them for the benefit of their countries as opposed to the United States?

I am far from an expert on intelligence, but I can say that based on interactions I've had with my colleagues in professional organizations, we've been given a lot of information at universities regarding the potential threats of undue foreign influence and the best ways to protect the research enterprise, and the University of Florida is absolutely committed to protecting the research enterprise.

And I appreciate the work that you do. These issues are real. We need to accept that they're real. How we deal with them, we can disagree with, but the fact of the matter is we do have the best research universities in the world, and if we don't take these threats seriously, we won't end up having the best research universities in the world. I'm grateful for Florida leading the way as we usually do. Hopefully the other 49 states can follow and we can...

Gentleman's time has expired.

Thank you, Chairman.

And I recognize the gentleman from California with great knowledge about Stanford, Mr. DeSaulnier.

Thank you, Mr. Walberg. Although I used to be a resident and had a restaurant in Palo Alto, I am now representing a district and have lived it for a long time in the East Bay and spend a lot of time with the number one public rated, consistently public university in the United States, the University of California, and have many of their employees and alumni in my district, and I also have three national labs in the area. So this is, in terms of what really happened, and I'm reminded after listening to comments just made that George Santayana's quote about for those who forget history, they're condemned to repeat it. I'm reminded in my area, I have a friend, multiple friends who were interned during the Japanese internment. One in particular who's in his 90s now and tells stories as a kid coming back and asking, where's Dad? And Dad had died of TB. I'm also reminded as a Californian of the Chinese Exclusionary Act. So we need to remember history, Mr. Chairman. And while I absolutely agree and have had conversations within the last two months at the National Laboratory of Berkeley about a lot of work they're doing on AI, remarkable work, but it's also reflective of the diversity in that institution and welcoming great minds irrespective of where they came from in their country of origin. So it's interesting just hearing this that, and I know, Mr. Chairman, you feel the same way, that we want diversity, but we also want to protect these wonderful institutions that I work with and having many friends at Stanford, and I'm sorry you had the experience, and I'd love to know more because they should have been more responsive because it's not about ideology, it's about protecting these resources, and part of that protection is welcoming diversity. So Ms. Emrey-Arras, I have first question is along these lines. As the GAO has reported on a number of things, access to federal student aid, very important that you've done work on that reflects diversity and opportunity and merit. But let me start with the closing of seven of 12 offices of Office of Civil Rights by the administration and the effect that might have on continuing to have people get into our universities who are the best and the brightest irrespective of their country of origin.

We know from our work that they closed seven offices for the Office of Civil Rights regional offices. Those were Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco.

Right. San Francisco is ours.

We also know that they paid people not to work. They did that for many months, and those people were not able to process discrimination complaints during that time because they were prohibited from doing so.

And that cost, according to your report, was $38 million of lost revenue to taxpayers where people weren't allowed to work and 90 percent of the complaints on civil rights were not addressed.

That's true. And I just want to clarify, I misspoke a moment ago when I said it was up to 35 million. It was higher. You are correct. It was up to $38 million.

I always love to correct somebody from GAO. It's a rare occasion. Let's talk about the Office of Federal Student Aid. So getting young students who don't have financial capacity to be able to get into these universities, federal funding by this administration was cut by almost 50 percent, and you've done work on that as well. So could you speak to that in the ability to get talented people to be able to get into higher education, again, irrespective of their background?

Right. So the Office of Federal Student Aid, as its name says, manages everything with student aid. They manage federal grants, loans, work-study funds to support students attending over 5,000 colleges. And we know that between January and December of last year, they cut almost half of their staff, 46 percent.

So Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to conclude, and I don't want to be responsive to the previous question, but being diligent about making sure we protect our institutions, I completely agree with and have had conversations with people at the national labs and at our universities, including Stanford, about how we do that, but we have to be really mindful, and I know you are, Mr. Chairman, about prejudice and racism and how it affects real people and how it affects these institutions in a negative way. So I'd be happy to work with you to make sure that we do both of those things: protect espionage or foreign influence from people who are at maybe, well, our adversaries, but also not do it in a way that we remember our history that unfortunately in our country we have sometimes scapegoated loyal Americans based on their ethnicity. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thank you. Gentleman's time has expired. I appreciate your concern. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Utah, the vice chairman of this committee, Mr. Owens.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's no secret Chinese government is a real potent rival to the United States. They're exploiting openness of our higher education system by manipulating their citizens, influencing our institutions, and steal taxpayer-funded research that often has national security implications. In many cases, institutions and researchers may unknowingly and unwillingly help the CCP by not properly vetting foreign faculty and students that have ties to the Chinese government and military. However, there are some cases where colleges and researchers are willingly to accept the foreign influence and risk national security as a price of doing business with the CCP. They do so in order to advance their research, their careers, or simply out of greed. For those who prioritize wealth, power, and fame by prioritizing our adversary, the Communist Chinese Party, over the health and welfare of our nation, there's one word for that. It's called traitors. They will eventually be discarded by the communist regime once they are no longer of value to them, but it's imperative that those of us who love our country and love the freedom that for our kids and our future, that we never forget who these traitors are. They need to be held legally accountable for the threat they pose to our nation, but we also need to ensure that they're never forgotten to history as their names are read by our children alongside other traitors like Benedict Arnold and the 1950s Rosenbergs. It's time to make the word traitor fearful again. Dr. Grasso, first I want to thank you for your military service and leadership. I think for the small period of time that University of Michigan has you for them, it should be a very good way of bringing us back to old school American loyalty, and I'm excited to see what you can do in the time you're there. In July 2025, the Department of Education opened a Section 117 compliance investigation into the University of Michigan. That investigation found that just in the last five years, $86 million of the university's foreign gifts and contracts reports were submitted late. This totals equals 20 percent of the university's gifts and contracts over that lifetime. Many reports are also mislabeled. Section 117 has been in law for over 30 years. Can you explain how such a high amount of foreign funds were not reported correctly?

Thank you, Congressman. We are also concerned that we were not reporting our funding as required and as appropriate, and we've improved our procedures and protocols, and now we're catching things that we were not reporting, and I think we're getting very close to being caught up. At the same time, the Department of Education was changing their protocols as well, so we were trying to keep up with what they were doing, and we've improved our protocols, so we're caught up. I do want to point out, though, I know that there's a lot of concern about China, but in terms of our foreign funding, China falls into sixth place at our university in terms of funding anything on our campus. So we have countries ahead of China are Switzerland, Japan, the UK, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. So those countries fall in front of China. We only have $86 million that we reported through Section 117 of close to a billion dollars.

Okay. Thank you. Thank you so much. Ms. Farley, you emphasized a top-down approach to research security involving deans and department chairs. How critical is leadership engagement in establishing a campus culture of research security compliance?

We have found it to be very critical to the success of our program at the University of Florida. At each point that we have implemented a new aspect of the research security program, my office in partnership with other offices engaged with deans, chairs, and other leaders across campus to explain the program, its requirements, and the importance of complying with state and federal regulations. We have found that this has helped make sure that employees, faculty, and staff across the institution understand those rules and have the information they need to thoroughly comply.

Thank you. Ms. Johnson, the Stanford has an office of the Vice Provost for Institutional Equity, Access, and Community. The website's office official website says committed to ensuring that Stanford's community members safely thrive in an environment free of violence and harassment. Did this DEI office help in your process as you were getting harassed and intimidated by foreign nationals?

No, they didn't help me.

Did you hear from this DEI office at all during this period of time?

No.

Okay. I just want to say this. First of all, we are so proud to hear from young people like yourself. I want to say I'm sure your parents are very proud to see what you're standing for, and this is what old-school American loyalty and courage looks like. So it gives us a lot of excitement about seeing the future of our country when we see young people like yourself standing the way you are. So thank you so much for that, and I yield back.

I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. Grijalva.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for all of you for being here. While the majority focus is today on hearing on foreign influence, the most immediate threat to the students and families that I represent in Arizona's 7th Congressional District is Trump's administration's systemic dismantling of the Department of Education. Through the big horrible bill and reckless reductions in force, this administration has made pursuing higher education less affordable, less accessible, and far more chaotic for millions of Americans. We should be focused on ensuring everyone can access a quality degree rather than chasing overblown concerns and conspiracy theories that often fuel xenophobic rhetoric on our campuses and target international students and students of color. So as of December 2025, there are 7.7 million borrowers with defaulted federal loans. As this administration continues to make life harder for low and middle-income families, it is critical to provide high-quality, robust support for defaulted borrowers. So I was extremely upset to see that the department's recent announcement to move the servicing of defaulted loans to the Treasury Department as a first step to dismantle the Office of Federal Student Aid, which I know will have an effect on many of my constituents in Arizona's 7th Congressional District. Ms. Emrey-Arras, are you able to speak to any insight you have on how the department typically supports defaulted borrowers?

I can say that typically what happens is a borrower is put into default when they have not made a payment in more than 270 days. And the risks at that point are significant. They lose access to additional federal student aid, they can be reported to credit agencies, which can affect their ability to get a job, get an apartment, get a car. And also they are subject to collections. This is a very serious step. Their wages can be garnished, their tax refunds can be offset. There are procedures that they can take to rehabilitate their loans and come out of default, but they do need guidance on how to do that.

Yeah. When working on your recent report regarding FSA, was GAO made aware that the department was planning to transfer full responsibility of the default portfolio and other student aid programs to the Treasury Department?

No.

I am deeply concerned about further dismantling of the department through this reckless move. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to enter into the record an article titled Treasury Department Struggles to Collect Defaulted Student Loans.

Without objection, it will be entered.

Thank you. Since early 2025, the Trump administration has been laser-focused on dismantling the Department of Education one program at a time. Despite the department's continued claims that no employees working on core functions of the FSA or student loan servicing were impacted by the RIF. And that the RIFs will not directly impact students and families. GAO found that there has in fact been significant changes to the FSA staffing. Ms. Emrey-Arras, how have the staffing levels changed at FSA since the start of 2025?

They dropped by 656 employees.

And do you have any idea what that percentage is?

Almost half, 46 percent.

That's pretty significant. And so the claims that student loan servicing were not impacted by the RIF is clearly inaccurate. I appreciate your time and your answers. I yield back.

I thank the gentlelady. I recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Harris.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all of you on the panel here today. I've enjoyed reading your testimonies as well as hearing you this morning. President Grasso, this committee found that nearly two dozen universities across the country had specialized joint research partnerships with China involving sensitive military technology. Now, I'm concerned by the lack of caution our schools have when partnering with our greatest foreign adversaries such as the Chinese Communist Party. I guess my question for you is what harm does the take money first, ask questions later approach have for our students and our national security in your opinion?

Congressman, I agree with you on concerns about sensitive military data. We do not have any policy that resembles take money first and ask questions later. We are very committed to our national security, and I as a former military officer am very concerned if there is any risk to sharing sensitive military data. And I can assure you we are committed to protecting our research from our adversaries.

Just as a follow-up to that, because we can't, as you know, accept conflicts of interest when it comes to defense research. So what actions would you take if you learned that a Chinese national working at the University of Michigan as a J-1 visa researcher was in fact simultaneously working at a PRC university or company that engaged in defense work related to China?

Congressman, I hesitate to engage in speculation. However, if we had an individual that was working for an institution in China and did not disclose it, we would terminate that individual for deliberately violating our policies of disclosure. So that's what we would do.

Okay. Well, thank you, sir. As you noted in your testimony, right before your tenure, the University of Michigan did terminate a partnership with a Chinese university that helped improve China's development of nuclear weapons. I think that was a great move, and I certainly hope that that sort of common sense will continue to prevail. I had the privilege of introducing the No Contracts with Foreign Adversaries Act, which passed the House as part of the Deterrent Act. And this bill would begin to tackle this problem at the collegiate level by requiring institutions to disclose contracts with China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran rather than enter into these partnerships unscrutinized. So I appreciate your answers. Ms. Farley, real quickly, your testimony mentioned President Trump's 2021 National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 and Florida's simultaneous efforts to crack down on foreign influence in these public universities. Can you tell us a little bit about how did the University of Florida implement the president's memo more specifically, and how has that implementation you believe improved research security?

Yes, absolutely. So NSPM-33, when it was passed, was the first of many steps that we saw among our federal partners to regulate the research security space. The Office of Science, Technology, and Policy was then directed to regulate federal agencies, and federal agencies provide guidance to us. Those clear expectations from our federal agencies related to research security have been very helpful to us. Anytime the federal granting agencies are able to harmonize those regulations, it provides clear and consistent guidance to universities such as the University of Florida so that we can ensure that we are being good stewards of the federal research enterprise.

Thank you. Thank you. Ms. Johnson, real quickly in about 40 seconds. Some may argue that discussing the topic, this topic could hurt international students by stereotyping people based on race or ethnicity. But on the other hand, can you share how malign foreign influences affects international students such as Chinese students who are being targeted by their own government?

Yeah. I have spoken to a lot of people at Stanford about how the Chinese Communist Party exerts control over its own people. They have a national security law from 2017 that requires a Chinese citizen, no matter where they are in the world, to report back information if requested. And their families are often threatened if they don't cooperate. So these are the kinds of threats we're looking at, and it's really heartbreaking.

Well, thank you so much for your courage, as my colleague mentioned earlier. We appreciate your willingness to stand. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Baumgartner. Originally from Michigan too, right?

Parents were from the great state of Michigan.

That's what counts. That's the DNA. There we are. There we are.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing on such an important subject. Mr. Grasso, who owns the University of Michigan?

I believe legally it's the regents that are responsible.

And who do they work for?

They work for the people of Michigan.

For the people of Michigan. So it's the people of Michigan, and there's quite a few taxpayer dollars from the federal government as well too.

Indeed.

Yeah. So it's a public university. What do you think is the public's expectations on transparency when foreign funds come to a university like yours? Excuse me, not federal funds, foreign funds come to a university like yours.

I think that we attempt to be transparent in all our transactions, Congressman.

And you think the public would like that. You think the public wants to know about every dollar that goes, every foreign dollar that goes to the University of Michigan?

I hesitate to speak for the entire public, but I presume that there is a group, a subgroup of the public that would be very interested in that.

And is there any foreign funding that goes to the University of Michigan that you believe should not be disclosed?

Foreign funding, I cannot think of foreign funding unless perhaps we are working with perhaps a pharmaceutical company in Switzerland as by way of an example where they are developing proprietary pharmaceuticals.

Well, let's talk about foreign government funding. Is there any foreign government funding that goes to the University of Michigan that you would think should not be disclosed?

I can't think of any, Congressman, at the moment.

Okay. So we had a bill called the Deterrent Act, which lowers the thresholds for reporting on foreign funding from a current threshold of $250,000 down to $0 for four key potential foreign adversaries: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, and $50,000 for everybody else. That bill has passed out of the House. Do you have any problem with the University of Michigan just implementing that bill on its own?

Congressman, I personally have not looked at that bill and I would...

But we just said that you think every foreign government dollar that goes to your campus, the public has an interest in full disclosure of those public dollars, the same public that owns your university.

I appreciate that, but I would like to discuss that with my team back in Ann Arbor before I rendered an opinion on that.

Did you use outside counsel to prepare for the hearing today?

Yes.

You did. What did you pay for the outside counsel for today?

I don't know.

You don't know. You believe in transparency in your public university by your taxpayers, but you don't know how much you paid for the outside counsel that helped you prepare today.

No, I don't.

Well, they should have prepared you for the question about what is the threshold of foreign dollars, foreign government dollars that came to your university because the public that you work for has a real interest on that subject. Ms. Johnson, when you graduated from high school, did you expect to be targeted by Chinese spies on the University of Stanford campus?

No, never.

So what was your first reaction when you heard that this was happening?

I was really surprised. I grew up learning a lot about China. This was something that I was never really aware of. And I was surprised that it was happening to me because at the time, you know, I was just a freshman research assistant studying China and I was surprised that, you know, I would be someone worth targeting.

And do you think how did Stanford respond? Were they did they illustrate due concern? I mean, did they respond the way that you think your parents would have wanted them to respond?

I was definitely disappointed by their response. It was kind of dismissive. You know, they just said we're looking into this and nothing ever came of it.

So at the same time that universities are spending millions of dollars on left-wing woke DEI political nonsense, they have a student being targeted by spies, by Chinese spies on their campus and rather than having an immediate appropriate response, they were hesitant. Is that correct?

Correct.

Well, Ms. Johnson, I think you're a rock star. I think you have a very bright future in front of you. I think you're the kind of graduate from America's high schools that every patriotic parent in America aspires to have and I'm sure that you have many potential job offers in national security moving forward, but me and my office would certainly be interested to talk to you at some point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.

I thank the author of the TURN Act and thanks for showing how you can acquire new staff members. [Laughter.] And now I am pleased to recognize the gentleman from Guam, Mr. Moylan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Johnson, consider Guam as well. Thank you. Our American colleges and universities, we lead the way, right? We're premier institutions. Our students and because of this, students from around the world, they compete to come to them. And our colleges and universities, because we lead the way, we play an important role in research, experimentation, and innovation. And we're credited with inventing great things: electronic computer, military infrared night vision, NEXRAD radar, countless medical innovations, and even chicken nuggets, credited to Dr. Robert Baker from Cornell University in 1963. So we've got to be vigilant and watch out for our foreign espionage and IP theft. And it's well-documented that students and faculties, espionage does occur. And our American intellectual property ends up in the hands of foreign adversaries. And Congress takes common sense action to increase transparency and safeguard our nation's security. Ms. Johnson, you were the target of a suspected CCP agent and students can be some of our are threatened by this and pressured by bad actors as you've been explaining. You also called for a reporting mechanism for students and putting in proper guardrails and victims, but yet victims remain silent. They don't feel comfortable in reporting. What do you think we can do to help help that so they don't feel uncomfortable about reporting in these incidents and still addressing these serious security threats, please?

I think we need to make sure that whatever reporting mechanism we use is secure and anonymous if needed. I think a lot of students fear that maybe if they report something, it will get back to them and they could get in trouble. And I also think we just need to have a lot more dialogue about transnational repression and how it's affecting students. I think right now it's sort of not discussed and I think if we can bring these things into the light, people will feel a lot more comfortable talking about it.

Thank you very much for what you do and your courage. I appreciate you very much. President Grasso, in your testimony, you mentioned that there's been a handful of incidents that occurred without the university's knowledge and despite comprehensive security and compliance programs. How can the federal government better support colleges and universities to identify these threats and close awareness gaps?

Congressman, thank you. We work closely with our federal partners and the more closely we can work with them on knowledge that they have about individuals that could pose a threat, that would be very helpful to us. But we implement many federal requirements in terms of training and research controls and export and research security has been and will always be fundamental to our mission. So we want to work as closely as possible with our federal partners.

Appreciate that. Ms. Farley, in your position, you've got to ensure compliance every day. It's tough. You also mentioned that your testimony and reporting requirements for cumulative gifts of $50,000 or more per fiscal year being reported by the university. So to be clear, not all large gifts are a risk for national security, but I also want to point out that the bad actors are good at getting around reporting requirements and can go under the radar. So how does UF ensure that it's not missing reporting requirements if bad actors are masking gifts?

At the University of Florida, our institution reviews all agreements regardless of funding levels, so not just those that reach a certain dollar threshold. We review all gifts, contracts, and other agreements at a certain funding level. And in addition to the reporting you have mentioned, the institution is also required to report yearly any collaborations or agreements with entities in foreign countries of concern. So we have multiple levels of review and oversight.

Just as a follow-up, how can Congress support colleges and universities in identifying bad actors who are trying to circumvent reporting requirements and gifts and might put at a security risk, please?

While I can only speak for the University of Florida, what I can say is that the recent efforts of various federal agencies to provide information and resources through such activities as the NSF SECURE Center, through the DOD's 1286 list, those types of resources have been very helpful to the University of Florida in identifying different entities of which we should be concerned.

Thank you to the panel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I thank the gentleman and I please to recognize the gentlelady from North Carolina, the Chairman Emeritus Foxx.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I do have some questions, but I want to start out by thanking Joe Wilson again for many years ago ringing the alarm on this issue and specifically about Confucius Institutes. I'm not sure Joe has ever gotten the credit that he deserves for that. President and I thank our witnesses for being here. President Grasso, I understand University of Michigan had a joint institute partnership with Shanghai Jiao Tong University for over two decades. After a congressional letter from the Select Committee on the CCP pointing out the serious military research done by Jiao Tong, I understand this partnership was ended in January of last year. Is that correct?

Yes, Congresswoman.

So can you confirm there are no longer student or faculty exchanges with this university?

Congresswoman, we do not have a formal relationship with that university. We ended it as you mentioned and it was never a research partnership. It was just an educational partnership where students would study in one institution or the other. So we do have a relationships where our students can do study abroad there just like any students from any universities. It's not a specific program with our university.

So what steps has the University of Michigan taken continually to evaluate its foreign relationships so it doesn't take a congressional letter for the university to end problematic relationships?

We have a we have office an office for international relationships and an associate provost that works in this area and we we've been talking with her about making sure that our relationships do not threaten national security.

Thank you. Again, President Grasso, current law deems adversarial countries like China and Russia as countries of concern. Current law also labels certain entities "foreign entities of concern" which includes entities controlled by countries of concern, terrorist organizations, and entities on specific national security lists. Do you believe the University of Michigan should have close relationships with such countries and entities despite these labels and law?

Congresswoman, are you asking specifically should we eliminate all relationships with the countries of concern or...

I'm just asking do you think you should have those?

I think that we evaluate all of our relationships to make sure that they do not threaten national security.

Okay. And are you committing to the University of Michigan proactively refusing to accept monetary funds from such entities and countries?

We will not accept monetary funds that put any of our national security at risk, Congresswoman.

Thank you. Ms. Farley, you talk about how the University of Florida has a policy not to enter into contracts, agreements, or activities with entities on U.S. government watch lists. How do you think this institutional decision boosts research security and do you think other institutions should follow suit?

I can only speak for the University of Florida, but we have had a long-standing policy as you've referenced not to enter into any agreement of any kind with an entity with a restricted entity and we have found that policy to be helpful because it provides clarity to our researchers and other employees about our standards as to who they can and cannot interact with.

Well, it sounds to me like that would be a good model for other schools to follow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

I thank the gentlelady and I recognize the gentleman from Missouri, or is it Missoura? Mr. Onder.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chairman Walberg, for holding this important oversight hearing. This year we're preparing for America's 250th anniversary, but this is also the 25th anniversary of the tragic anthrax attacks in Washington, D.C. and New York, which elevated the danger of bioweapons to national attention. We've made significant strides in biodefense since those attacks, but according to recent reports, we're facing a growing threat. China has renewed its pursuit of anthrax countermeasures and has expanded its anthrax bioweapons capabilities. This is concerning because these new countermeasures are almost certainly being developed to protect Chinese warfighters and enable the offensive use of anthrax bioweapons. What's particularly concerning is that the PRC companies producing these anthrax capabilities are affiliated with PRC government entities, including the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and state key laboratories, a doctrinal part of the PRC's governance. One example is China Biological Products Holding, CBPH, whose anthrax-affiliated subsidiary underwent a 192-acre expansion through a multibillion-dollar investment to enable more countermeasure production capability and whose base performance just received PRC regulatory approval. Despite the danger of anthrax biological weapons and amid concerns about antitoxin shortfalls in the U.S. strategic national stockpile, American universities have been complicit in driving investments into hedge funds that are funded and enabled these Chinese anthrax facility expansions. One example is Hillhouse, a leading investor in the privatization of CBPH, whose family of funds invested over $300 million. Universities have invested their endowments into various Hillhouse funds. Stanford reportedly invested $200 million into Hillhouse funds. Yale reported earning over $2 billion from Hillhouse funds. Princeton, MIT, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Texas system are all also Hillhouse investors. It's not just anthrax; Hillhouse investments are also connected to China's Uyghur genocide. Dr. Grasso, Michigan is also implicated here. The University of Michigan invested $1.6 billion across 83 investments into China. Two current Michigan faculty have co-authored papers with faculty at State Key Laboratory of Toxicology and Medical Countermeasures and the Academy of Military Sciences, some of the very same PRC institutions developing anthrax programs. And as Chairman Walberg highlighted last year, Michigan researchers were recently arrested for trying to smuggle biologic materials into Michigan laboratories. Can you confirm that Michigan has backed off from investing in funds linked to PRC's anthrax facilities, including Hillhouse and Centurium Capital?

Congressman, I am not familiar with the specifics of the investments of our endowment, and I can take that question back and look into that. But I assure you that if we had concerns that our investments were being used for this type of development, we would take appropriate measures.

Is Michigan conducting diligence on where PRC investments are going, and do you believe Michigan would commit to divest of PRC-linked funds?

Those decisions are made by our Board of Regents, Congressman, and I will look into whether we do have any investments in PRC entities.

Okay, very good. All right, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman from Virginia, the ranking member, Mr. Scott.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Emrey-Arras, you answered a question a little earlier, failed to answer because I understand that's because you hadn't researched the question and you would give an answer if it was a question that you had been asked by Congress to research, you could give the answer. Is that right?

That is correct.

Now, we've asked you to look at the dismantling of the Department of Education. Have you experienced access issues and delays in working with the Department of Education?

We have, sir. I can provide specifics on the study that we had looking at the reductions in the Office of Federal Student Aid. We faced significant delays in obtaining just basic data. For example, we wanted data on the number of reductions in staff. It's a job about looking at those staff reductions. We wanted to know the number of staff that had been reduced over the course of the year, and we asked for that information at various points. It took us eight months, sir, to receive that basic data. Eight months to find out how many staff had been reduced at the Office of Federal Student Aid. In addition, we faced significant delays in scheduling critical meetings.

Thank you. Now, we've heard about the transfer of defaulted student loans from Education to Treasury. You already mentioned the fact that the overseeing the servicers is already a problem that will obviously be exacerbated if you go over to Treasury. But let me just ask you a question. Is it possible that some students in default might actually be entitled to a total discharge of the loan?

We could look into that and circle back with you, sir.

I mean, if somebody's been teaching for 12 years and just didn't know about the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, they would be entitled to a discharge, and people in Education might know that, but do you think the people in Treasury would know?

I wouldn't be able to comment on that, sir. Thank you.

Okay. What did you say about the, Ms. Arras, what did you say about the number of racial discrimination cases brought by the Office of Civil Rights?

During the time period that we looked at from March through September of 2025, the office received more than 9,000 complaints of alleged discrimination, and they opened additional cases. However, they resolved 7,000 complaints, and 90 percent of those resolutions were dismissals.

How many of those were racial discrimination, do you know?

We don't know.

Okay. President Grasso, you mentioned the value of an internationally diverse research body. What happens if you can't recruit the best and the brightest from across the world? What happens to your competitiveness?

Congressman, if we are limited in our ability to recruit the best and the brightest, our potential will be diminished.

We've heard a lot about the sensitivity of some of the research. Do your students get security clearances?

Our students would only get security clearances if it was required to do work for their research.

On a specific project?

On a specific project.

And so if there's no national defense classification or particular intellectual property rights, students talk about what they do during the day. Why would they be prohibited from talking about some of the research that they're doing?

Congressman, even if it's not restricted in terms of national security defense, there could be commercial reasons that we would ask our students to maintain confidentiality.

But that would be on a case-by-case basis; they would know on that. And so is the research that is in fact sensitive conducted under different conditions than other research?

It would be a case-by-case basis, Congressman.

Ms. Johnson, you indicated a harassment and bullying by the foreign source, foreign agent, and the university did not have a process to respond. Is that right?

Yes, that's correct.

Shouldn't the university have a process to respond for that kind of victimization regardless of the source of the problem?

When I was told by the FBI that I'm being transnationally repressed, the FBI told me that they also contacted campus authorities and administration, and no one contacted me.

But whatever the source, they should have just, I don't think there's anything special about the international intrigue about the thing. If you've been victimized like that, they should have had a response, period. Yield back.

The gentleman yields. Seeing no other members wishing to be recognized, I would now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Scott from Virginia, for his closing statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I think this, we've on this side pointed out a lot of problems in higher education. We've had many hearings on this apparently one problem. We've passed legislation last year to deal with it. People have gone to jail, so not sure that anything wrong with the system as it is, but there are serious problems, particularly in the student loan area where the student loan and the impact of the big ugly bill where there are limitations on the ability, particularly going to medical school, that need to be dealt with, and we're not dealing with them. Moving student loans to Treasury will just make things worse. We haven't had any hearings on that, and I would hope we'd focus on things that the students are actually dealing with rather than continually having hearings on the same subject meeting after meeting. Yield back.

I thank the gentleman, and I certainly recognize the sincerity of your concerns. I would address the fact that today, I thank you to the panel for being here. This at the very least, I would hope could be seen by my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as a hearing looking at outcomes of what we have sincerely attempted to do in dealing with a significant security, research, taxpayer dollar usage, funding problem, international problem that we took significant action on with the DETERRENT Act. I think it's always good to evaluate, and I look forward to evaluating the impact of the IAAs, all of them, including the exciting impact of what we've done with FAFSA, making it work finally after years of not working and not even being in place to work. I think the minority should expect that they will have an opportunity as always to question right up to and including the Secretary of Education. And I'm looking forward to that myself. Today was, I think, an example that we have educational entities that have had challenges in the past that we were concerned with, and now today we see that they've taken significant action. Nothing will be perfect. The other side, the enemy, I think we could call it, just has to be right once. University of Michigan, champions and the best, have to be right every time. And we applaud the efforts of Florida, we applaud the efforts there, and I think it was good to see institutions that are using the means necessary to deal with a significant and sincere problem. Thank you. Stanford, I hope was watching and listening to what was said today by a student, a journalist, committed to getting information and getting it out, and the negative impact that she and others like her most likely have on that campus, and that shouldn't be the case. We would hope that Stanford would see that there's a reason to respond aggressively, at the very least to make sure that alumna of the institution goes away with the desire to send others in the future back to that institution. I would think that that would be something that we'd want to see with students that go to our campuses. So I think today was certainly a good evaluative hearing, not simply saying we did it with the DETERRENT Act. We had a couple of hearings on it leading up to the DETERRENT Act, and now que sera, que sera, as my colleague said, pixie dust. I can't even remember all that he said there. So anyway, that's what it was, and so I thank you for this information. And I hope there are other institutions all around this country that see we're serious about that, and that they don't want to be brought up in front of this panel to be shown as missing the mark in doing what's appropriate, being world-class institutions, doing the research that's necessary to keep us moving forward, using a diverse population of people with the intellect, the desires, and the passions necessary to find, but always for the best benefit of the United States. I don't think that's wrong. I hesitate to move to the alternate hearing that we had today, because it was an alternate hearing. But we've dealt with that. We've dealt with a higher cost of education by trying to put a downward pressure on the high cost of education through the one big beautiful bill, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act. We put caps in place. We also did something to counteract what was done to exacerbate the problem of student loan debt by the past administration that basically said if you wait out long enough, you won't have to pay it back. Oh, the taxpayer will. That's not satisfactory for me, and the majority didn't think it was satisfactory as well. We'll evaluate that too. We also put in means by which these individuals who are out of compliance can get back into compliance. Will it take some effort? Oh, you bet it will. Paying my mortgage off took some effort. Paying any car loans that I had off, that I had in the past, took some effort and commitment. And I think that that would be something that we'd want to see with students that go to our campuses. So I think today was certainly a good evaluative hearing, not simply saying we did it with the DETERRENT Act. We had a couple of hearings on it leading up to the DETERRENT Act, and now que sera, que sera, as my colleague said, pixie dust. I can't even remember all that he said there. So anyway, that's what it was, and so I thank you for this information. And I hope there are other institutions all around this country that see we're serious about that, and that they don't want to be brought up in front of this panel to be shown as missing the mark in doing what's appropriate, being world-class institutions, doing the research that's necessary to keep us moving forward, using a diverse population of people with the intellect, the desires, and the passions necessary to find, but always for the best benefit of the United States. I don't think that's wrong. I hesitate to move to the alternate hearing that we had today, because it was an alternate hearing. But we've dealt with that. We've dealt with a higher cost of education by trying to put a downward pressure on the high cost of education through the one big beautiful bill, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act. We put caps in place. We also did something to counteract what was done to exacerbate the problem of student loan debt by the past administration that basically said if you wait out long enough, you won't have to pay it back. Oh, the taxpayer will. That's not satisfactory for me, and the majority didn't think it was satisfactory as well. We'll evaluate that too. We also put in means by which these individuals who are out of compliance can get back into compliance. Will it take some effort? Oh, you bet it will. Paying my mortgage off took some effort. Paying any car loans that I had off, that I had in the past, took some effort and commitment. And I think that's what we have done with our proposal. Will it work? Mr. Scott, you and I will have the opportunity to ask some of those questions, and I think you're right to ask for it, and I'm right to want to have that when we have the opportunity. But today, I appreciate the discussion we had, I appreciate the answers that were given, the sincerity, and even some that couldn't be given, the promise to get the information further. I'd like to thank our witnesses again, and without objection, there being no further business, the committee stands adjourned.