“Before the Whistle: Assessing Information Sharing and Security Collaboration Ahead of Major Events”

[Gavel sounds.] The Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection and the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from the Kansas City Missouri Police Department, the National Fusion Center Association, and the 2026 FIFA World Cup Miami Host Committee regarding information sharing and security collaboration ahead of major events. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. In just a few months, the eyes of the world will be on New Orleans for Super Bowl 59. Shortly after, in 2026, the United States will co-host the FIFA World Cup, with matches spanning 11 cities across our nation. These events are more than just games; they are massive undertakings that require years of planning, thousands of personnel, and a level of security coordination that is truly unprecedented. As we have seen from past events, the threat landscape is constantly evolving. From physical security concerns to cyber threats targeting critical infrastructure, the challenges are significant. That is why information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, and local partners are so vital. We must ensure that the right information gets to the right people at the right time to prevent and respond to any potential threats. Today, we will hear from experts who are on the front lines of these efforts. We want to understand what is working well, where the gaps are, and how Congress can better support the mission of keeping these major events safe for everyone involved. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for their service to our country. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman, for his opening statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. Securing National Special Security Events, or NSSEs, and other major gatherings is a core responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security and its partners. As we look ahead to the Super Bowl and the World Cup, it is clear that the complexity of these events requires a seamless flow of information. We need to be certain that our fusion centers are fully integrated into the planning process and that local law enforcement has the resources they need. I am particularly interested in hearing about how we are addressing emerging threats, such as the use of drones and the potential for cyberattacks on stadium systems or local utilities. We must be proactive, not reactive. I look forward to a productive discussion on how we can strengthen our security posture for these high-profile events. I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for his opening statement.

Thank you, Chairman Garbarino, and thank you to our witnesses for being here. As a former first responder, I know firsthand the importance of clear communication and coordination during large-scale operations. When thousands of people gather in one place, the margin for error is slim. We need to ensure that our emergency management systems are robust and that all stakeholders are operating from the same playbook. The collaboration between CISA, FEMA, and local agencies is the backbone of our domestic security. I am eager to hear from Deputy Chief Mabin about the lessons learned from the Kansas City Chiefs' victory parade and how those experiences are informing future planning. We must take every opportunity to learn and improve. Thank you, and I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for his opening statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. As the Chairman mentioned, my home city of New Orleans is preparing to host the Super Bowl. We are no strangers to hosting major events, but we never take security for granted. The success of these events depends on the strength of our partnerships. We must ensure that federal resources are accessible to local municipalities and that there is a shared commitment to public safety that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. I look forward to hearing from Mr. Martinez about the unique challenges of hosting a multi-city event like the World Cup and how we can ensure consistency in security standards across different regions. Thank you, and I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. Other members of the subcommittees are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Our first witness is Joseph Mabin, Deputy Chief of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department. Next, we have Mike Sena, President of the National Fusion Center Association. And finally, we have Ray Martinez, Chief Operating Officer for the 2026 FIFA World Cup Miami Host Committee. I thank all of you for being here. I will now swear in the witnesses. If you would please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

I do.

I do.

I do.

Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Please be seated. I now recognize Deputy Chief Mabin for five minutes for his opening statement.

Good morning, Chairman Garbarino, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Goldman, Ranking Member Carter, and members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the Kansas City Missouri Police Department's experience in planning and securing major events. Kansas City has recently hosted several high-profile events, including the 2023 NFL Draft and multiple Super Bowl victory parades. These events bring immense pride to our city, but they also present significant security challenges that require meticulous planning and collaboration. The foundation of our success lies in our strong relationships with federal, state, and local partners. We work closely with the FBI, DHS, and our regional fusion center to share intelligence and assess potential threats. This collaboration begins months, and sometimes years, before the event takes place. For the NFL Draft, we established a multi-agency coordination center that allowed for real-time communication and rapid response to any incidents. However, as we saw during the 2024 Super Bowl parade, even with extensive planning, tragedies can occur. The shooting that took place at the end of the parade was a stark reminder of the unpredictable nature of public safety. In the aftermath, we have conducted thorough after-action reviews to identify areas for improvement. One key takeaway is the need for even greater integration of technology, such as advanced surveillance and gunshot detection systems, to enhance our situational awareness. We also recognize the importance of community engagement. Our citizens are our eyes and ears, and their cooperation is essential for a safe environment. We continue to refine our communication strategies to ensure that the public is well-informed and knows how to report suspicious activity. As we look forward to hosting matches for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, we are applying these lessons to ensure a safe and enjoyable experience for all visitors. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Deputy Chief. I now recognize Mr. Sena for five minutes for his opening statement.

Chairman Garbarino, Chairman Strong, Ranking Members Goldman and Carter, and members of the subcommittees, thank you for the invitation to testify today. The National Fusion Center Association represents the 80 state and major urban area fusion centers across the United States. Our mission is to facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence to prevent terrorism and other threats to public safety. Fusion centers play a critical role in the security of major events by serving as a central hub for data analysis and dissemination among federal, state, and local partners. Ahead of events like the Super Bowl or the World Cup, fusion centers conduct comprehensive threat assessments, monitoring everything from domestic extremism to cyber threats. We provide actionable intelligence to law enforcement on the ground, helping them to allocate resources effectively. The strength of the fusion center network is its ability to connect the dots across different jurisdictions and identify patterns that might otherwise go unnoticed. However, we face ongoing challenges. The volume of data we process is staggering, and we need continued investment in advanced analytical tools and personnel. Furthermore, the sustainability of federal funding through the Homeland Security Grant Program is vital. These funds support the core operations of fusion centers and allow us to maintain the high level of readiness required for major events. We also emphasize the importance of the 'See Something, Say Something' campaign and other public awareness initiatives. Information sharing is a two-way street, and the input we receive from the public and private sector partners is invaluable. By working together, we can create a more resilient security environment. I appreciate the subcommittees' support for the fusion center mission and look forward to our discussion.

Thank you, Mr. Sena. I now recognize Mr. Martinez for five minutes for his opening statement.

Good morning, Chairmen and Ranking Members. Thank you for having me here today to discuss the preparations for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The 2026 World Cup will be the largest and most complex sporting event in history, with 48 teams and matches held across three countries. In the United States, 11 host cities will welcome millions of fans from around the globe. As the COO of the Miami Host Committee, my focus is on ensuring that our city is ready to provide a safe and secure environment for this monumental event. Security for the World Cup is a collaborative effort involving FIFA, federal agencies, state and local law enforcement, and private security partners. We are working closely with the U.S. Secret Service, which has been designated as the lead agency for the event's NSSE status. This designation is crucial as it brings a high level of federal coordination and resources to the table. In Miami, we are building on our experience of hosting 11 Super Bowls and numerous other large-scale events. We have established a robust security committee that meets regularly to discuss planning, logistics, and threat mitigation. One of our primary goals is to ensure seamless communication between all host cities and federal partners. We are developing standardized protocols for information sharing to ensure that we are all working from a common operating picture. We are also heavily invested in technology, including cybersecurity measures to protect our digital infrastructure and fan data. The scale of the World Cup presents unique challenges, but it also offers an opportunity to showcase our nation's ability to host world-class events safely. I want to thank the subcommittees for your oversight and support as we work toward a successful 2026 World Cup.

Thank you, Mr. Martinez. We will now move to questions from the members. I recognize myself for five minutes. Deputy Chief Mabin, you mentioned the 2024 Super Bowl parade and the tragic shooting that occurred. Can you elaborate on the specific challenges of securing an open-air event like a parade compared to a stadium event? And what changes, if any, are being made to the planning for future parades in Kansas City?

Thank you, Chairman. Securing a parade route is significantly more difficult than securing a stadium. In a stadium, you have a defined perimeter, controlled access points, and the ability to screen every individual who enters. A parade route, especially one that spans several miles through a downtown area, is inherently open. You have thousands of people lining the streets, and it is impossible to create a hard perimeter around the entire route. The challenge is balancing public access with security. For future events, we are looking at increasing the number of uniformed and plainclothes officers along the route. We are also exploring the use of more advanced technology, such as mobile surveillance towers and enhanced drone capabilities, to provide better overwatch. Additionally, we are working on improving our crowd management techniques to prevent the kind of congestion that can make it difficult for officers to respond quickly to an incident.

Thank you. Mr. Sena, regarding fusion centers, how do you ensure that the information being shared is not just a 'data dump' but is actually actionable for the officers on the street? And how do you measure the effectiveness of the information sharing process?

That is a great question, Chairman. The key is analysis. Fusion centers are not just clearinghouses; we are analytical hubs. Our analysts are trained to filter through the noise and identify the specific pieces of information that are relevant to a particular event or threat. We produce tailored intelligence products, such as situational awareness bulletins and threat assessments, that are designed to be easily understood and used by operational personnel. To measure effectiveness, we rely on feedback from our partners. We conduct regular surveys and after-action reviews to see if the information we provided was timely, accurate, and useful. We also look at 'success stories' where information shared through a fusion center directly led to the prevention of a crime or the apprehension of a suspect. It is a continuous process of refinement based on the needs of the end-users.

Mr. Martinez, with the World Cup being spread across 11 U.S. cities, how are you coordinating the security plans to ensure consistency? Is there a single 'command center' for the entire U.S. portion of the tournament, or is it more decentralized?

It is a hybrid model, Chairman. Each host city has its own local organizing committee and security structure, but there is a high level of centralized coordination through the U.S. Secret Service and FIFA. The Secret Service, as the lead for the NSSE, will establish a Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) that will oversee the entire operation. This MACC will have representatives from all the key federal agencies and will be linked to the local command centers in each city. We also have regular 'All-Host City' meetings where we share best practices and discuss common challenges. FIFA also has its own security requirements that all host cities must meet. This ensures a baseline level of security across all venues. The goal is to have a 'one-team' approach where information flows freely between the local, state, and federal levels, regardless of which city the match is being played in.

Thank you. My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to follow up on the issue of cyber threats. We often focus on the physical security of these events, but the digital threat is just as real. How are fusion centers working with CISA and the private sector to protect the networks that support these major events?

...and the 2026 World Cup. I'm also concerned about the potential for bad actors to use drones to disrupt these events or even carry out attacks. Chief Mabin, how is the Kansas City Police Department preparing for the threat of drones at the 2026 World Cup?

Thank you for that question. We are working very closely with our federal partners, specifically the FBI and DHS, to address the drone threat. We are looking at various counter-UAS technologies and strategies to mitigate any potential risks. We also have a very robust public education campaign to inform the public about the rules and regulations regarding drone use during major events. It's a collaborative effort, and we're leveraging all available resources to ensure the safety and security of the event.

Thank you. Mr. Sena, from a fusion center perspective, how are you sharing information about drone threats with local law enforcement?

Fusion centers play a critical role in aggregating and disseminating information regarding UAS threats. We receive intelligence from federal agencies and share that with our state and local partners. We also provide training and resources to help local agencies identify and respond to unauthorized drone activity. The key is real-time information sharing. During a major event, we have personnel embedded in the command centers to provide immediate analysis and support to the boots on the ground.

Thank you. My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. This is a very important topic as we look ahead to these massive global events. Mr. Martinez, you mentioned the complexity of the 2026 World Cup being spread across multiple cities and even countries. In Miami, specifically, how are you coordinating with the various local jurisdictions that fall under the 'Miami' host umbrella? It's not just one city, it's a whole region.

You're absolutely right, Congressman. The South Florida region is very interconnected. We have established a multi-agency coordination group that includes representatives from Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, Miami Gardens, where the stadium is located, and several other surrounding municipalities. We meet regularly to discuss logistics, security, and emergency response plans. We're also working with the state of Florida and our federal partners to ensure a unified approach. It's a massive undertaking, but the level of cooperation we've seen so far is unprecedented.

That's encouraging to hear. Chief Mabin, following up on that, Kansas City is also a unique situation, being on the border of two states. How does that cross-border dynamic affect your security planning for the World Cup?

It certainly adds a layer of complexity. We have a long history of working with our partners in Kansas, both at the local and state levels. For the World Cup, we've expanded those partnerships. We're coordinating on everything from traffic management to intelligence sharing. The Kansas City Fusion Center, which Mr. Sena is familiar with, plays a vital role in bridging that gap between the two states. We view this as a regional event, and our planning reflects that.

Thank you. Mr. Sena, you've talked about the importance of the 'If You See Something, Say Something' campaign. How do you adapt that message for a global audience that will be attending these events, many of whom may not be familiar with our reporting systems?

That's a great point. We are working with the host committees and FIFA to ensure that security information is available in multiple languages and through various platforms, including mobile apps and social media. We want to make it as easy as possible for anyone, regardless of where they're from, to report suspicious activity. We're also working with international law enforcement partners to understand the different cultural perspectives on security and reporting. The goal is to create a culture of vigilance that transcends borders.

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to go back to the Super Bowl parade shooting. In the aftermath of that tragedy, what were the biggest 'lessons learned' in terms of communication between the different agencies that were on the scene? Was there a breakdown in interoperability, or was it more about the sheer volume of people and the chaos of the moment?

It was a combination of factors. The sheer volume of people—over 800,000—certainly created challenges for communication. However, our interoperability systems actually worked quite well. The issue was more about the rapid dissemination of information in a very fluid and chaotic situation. One of the key lessons we learned was the need for even more integrated command structures and more frequent joint training exercises. We've already begun implementing changes based on those findings to ensure we're better prepared for future large-scale events.

Mr. Martinez, in your experience, what is the biggest challenge in securing a 'soft target' like a fan fest or a public viewing area compared to a 'hard target' like a stadium?

Soft targets are inherently more difficult to secure because they are designed to be open and accessible to the public. Unlike a stadium, where you have controlled entry points and screening procedures, fan fests are often in public parks or streets. The challenge is to provide a high level of security without creating a 'fortress' environment that discourages people from attending. We use a layered security approach that includes visible police presence, undercover officers, surveillance technology, and physical barriers. But ultimately, it relies heavily on public cooperation and the 'See Something, Say Something' principle.

Mr. Sena, how are fusion centers helping local jurisdictions identify potential 'lone wolf' actors who might target these soft targets, which is often the hardest type of threat to detect?

You're right, the 'lone wolf' or 'homegrown violent extremist' is one of our greatest challenges. Fusion centers focus on identifying behavioral indicators of mobilization to violence. We work closely with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces to investigate leads and share information. We also provide training to local law enforcement and community partners on how to recognize these signs. It's about connecting the dots—a seemingly minor incident in one jurisdiction might be part of a larger pattern when viewed through a regional or national lens. That's the value of the fusion center network.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the human element. Your officers are under incredible pressure during these major events. What are you doing to ensure their mental health and well-being, both during and after an event like the Super Bowl parade or the upcoming World Cup?

That is a top priority for us. We have a very robust wellness program that includes peer support, professional counseling, and chaplaincy services. After the Super Bowl parade shooting, we made sure that every officer involved had access to these resources. We also focus on proactive measures, such as stress management training and ensuring that officers have adequate breaks and downtime during long deployments. We recognize that our officers are our most valuable asset, and we have to take care of them so they can take care of the community.

I appreciate that. Mr. Martinez, New Orleans is a city that knows a thing or two about hosting major events. One of the things we've found is the importance of engaging the local community in the security plan. How are you doing that in Miami?

Community engagement is vital. We're working with local business owners, community leaders, and residents to keep them informed about our plans and to solicit their feedback. We want them to feel like they are partners in the security effort, not just bystanders. We're also working with local schools and youth organizations to promote a positive and safe environment. The World Cup is a celebration, and we want the entire community to feel a sense of ownership and pride in hosting it safely.

Mr. Sena, we've talked a lot about information sharing between agencies. But what about sharing information with the private sector, like the owners of the stadiums and the hotels where the teams and fans will be staying?

That's a critical piece of the puzzle. Fusion centers have dedicated private sector outreach programs. We share unclassified intelligence and best practices with security directors at major venues, hotels, and transportation hubs. We also encourage them to share information with us. They are often the first to notice something out of the ordinary on their properties. This two-way street of information sharing is essential for a comprehensive security posture. We also participate in joint exercises with private sector partners to ensure we're all on the same page.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Guest, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I'd like to talk about the role of technology in your security planning. Beyond drones, what other technologies are you leveraging for the World Cup? For example, are you using facial recognition or advanced video analytics?

We are exploring a variety of technologies. We currently use a sophisticated network of cameras and license plate readers throughout the city. For the World Cup, we're looking at enhancing those systems with advanced analytics that can help us identify suspicious patterns or behaviors. We're also looking at improved communication tools for our officers in the field. Regarding facial recognition, we are very mindful of privacy concerns and are working to ensure that any use of such technology is consistent with our department's policies and legal requirements. It's a tool, but it's not a substitute for good old-fashioned police work.

Mr. Sena, how is the National Fusion Center Association helping to standardize the use of these technologies across different jurisdictions so that the data can be easily shared and analyzed?

We work very closely with DHS and the FBI to develop common standards and protocols for data sharing. We also provide a forum for fusion centers to share their experiences with different technologies—what works, what doesn't, and what the best practices are. The goal is to create a 'seamless' network where information can flow quickly and accurately between jurisdictions, regardless of the specific technology they're using. We're also very focused on ensuring that these technologies are used in a way that protects civil rights and civil liberties.

Mr. Martinez, from a host committee perspective, how are you balancing the need for high-tech security with the desire to provide a fan-friendly experience? You don't want people to feel like they're being constantly watched.

It's a delicate balance. We want the security to be effective but as unobtrusive as possible. A lot of the technology we use is 'behind the scenes' and doesn't directly impact the fan experience. For example, advanced screening technology at the stadium can actually speed up the entry process while providing a higher level of security. We also communicate clearly with the fans about what to expect and why certain security measures are in place. Most people understand and appreciate the need for security, as long as it's handled professionally and respectfully.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the threat of cyberattacks. Major sporting events are prime targets for hackers who want to disrupt operations, steal data, or even cause physical harm by interfering with critical infrastructure. How is the KCPD preparing for the cyber dimension of the World Cup?

Cybersecurity is a major component of our planning. We're working closely with our city's IT department, as well as state and federal partners like CISA and the FBI's cyber division. We're conducting vulnerability assessments of our own systems and working with our partners in the private sector to ensure their systems are also secure. We're also training our personnel to recognize and report potential cyber threats. It's a constantly evolving threat landscape, and we have to be vigilant.

Mr. Sena, what role do fusion centers play in monitoring and responding to cyber threats during a major event?

Many fusion centers now have dedicated cyber analysts who work closely with their physical security counterparts. During a major event, we monitor for any signs of cyber activity that could impact the event's security or operations. We also share threat intelligence with our partners in the public and private sectors. If a cyberattack does occur, we help coordinate the response and provide technical assistance to the affected agencies. The key is to integrate cyber and physical security into a single, unified approach.

Mr. Martinez, how are you working with FIFA and other international partners to address the global nature of the cyber threat? A hacker could be sitting halfway around the world and still cause major problems in Miami.

FIFA has its own very robust cybersecurity team that we coordinate with closely. We also leverage the expertise of our federal partners who have a global reach. We're sharing information about known threat actors and their tactics, techniques, and procedures. We're also conducting joint exercises to test our response to various cyber scenarios. It's a global effort to counter a global threat. We're also working with our local utility providers and transportation agencies to ensure their systems are resilient against cyberattacks.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the issue of 'insider threats.' This could be anyone from a disgruntled employee to someone who has been radicalized. How are you vetting the thousands of people—volunteers, vendors, contractors—who will be working at the World Cup venues?

Vetting is a critical part of our security plan. We're working with the host committee and our federal partners to conduct background checks on everyone who will have access to secure areas. This includes volunteers, vendors, and contractors. We're also providing training to supervisors and staff on how to recognize and report suspicious behavior among their colleagues. It's a massive undertaking, but it's essential for mitigating the risk of an insider threat. We're also using a credentialing system that limits access to only those areas where an individual needs to be.

Mr. Martinez, how do you manage the logistics of vetting such a large and diverse workforce, many of whom may only be working for a few days?

It's a significant logistical challenge. We've established a dedicated credentialing and vetting center to manage the process. We're using a standardized system that allows us to quickly and accurately process background checks. We're also working closely with our vendors and contractors to ensure they understand and comply with our security requirements. It's a collaborative effort, and everyone involved understands the importance of getting it right. We also have a system for real-time monitoring of credentials to ensure that only authorized personnel are in secure areas.

Mr. Sena, how are fusion centers helping local jurisdictions identify potential insider threats before they can act?

Fusion centers provide training and resources to help agencies develop their own insider threat programs. We also share information about known threat actors and their tactics. If a local agency identifies a potential insider threat, we can help them investigate and assess the risk. We also work with the private sector to help them develop their own vetting and monitoring programs. The key is to create a culture of awareness and reporting where everyone feels responsible for the security of the event.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the role of the National Guard in supporting local law enforcement during major events. Have you already begun discussions with the Missouri National Guard about their potential role in the World Cup?

Yes, we have. The National Guard is a valuable partner and can provide a wide range of support, from logistics and transportation to specialized capabilities like CBRNE detection and response. We're working with them to define their specific roles and responsibilities and to ensure they are fully integrated into our overall security plan. Their presence can also provide an additional layer of visible security and public reassurance. We've worked with them successfully on many previous events, and we expect the same for the World Cup.

Mr. Martinez, what has been your experience in working with the National Guard in Florida for major events like the Super Bowl?

The Florida National Guard has been an outstanding partner. They bring a level of professionalism and expertise that is invaluable. In Miami, they've provided support for everything from perimeter security to medical response. For the World Cup, we're looking at how they can best support our multi-agency effort. Their ability to scale up quickly and provide specialized resources is a major asset. We're also working with them to ensure that their deployment is coordinated with our local and federal partners to avoid any duplication of effort.

Mr. Sena, how do fusion centers coordinate with the National Guard's own intelligence and security units?

Many fusion centers have National Guard personnel embedded in their operations. This allows for seamless information sharing and coordination. The National Guard also has its own network of civil support teams that can provide specialized assistance in the event of a chemical, biological, or radiological incident. We work closely with these teams to ensure they have the information they need to respond effectively. The integration of the National Guard into the fusion center network is a key part of our national security architecture.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Fong, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the issue of 'lone actor' threats, particularly those motivated by extremist ideologies. How are you working with community groups and religious organizations to identify individuals who may be on a path to radicalization?

Community engagement is a cornerstone of our counter-terrorism efforts. We have dedicated community outreach officers who build relationships with a wide range of groups. We provide training on how to recognize the signs of radicalization and how to report concerns. We also work with local religious leaders to promote messages of peace and tolerance. The goal is to build trust so that people feel comfortable coming to us if they see something that doesn't seem right. It's about prevention through partnership.

Mr. Sena, how are fusion centers helping to bridge the gap between local community knowledge and national-level intelligence on extremist groups?

Fusion centers are uniquely positioned to do just that. We take the 'ground truth' from local law enforcement and community partners and combine it with intelligence from federal agencies. This allows us to identify trends and patterns that might not be apparent at the local level. We also provide a way for local information to be shared with the national intelligence community. This 'bottom-up' approach is essential for identifying and disrupting threats before they can materialize. We also work to ensure that this information is shared in a way that protects privacy and civil liberties.

Mr. Martinez, in a city as diverse as Miami, how do you ensure that your security measures are culturally sensitive and don't inadvertently alienate certain communities?

That's a very important consideration. We're working with a diverse group of community advisors to ensure that our security plans are respectful of all cultures and backgrounds. We're also providing cultural competency training to our security personnel. We want everyone who comes to Miami for the World Cup to feel welcome and safe. Our goal is to provide a secure environment that is also inclusive and celebratory. We believe that by working closely with the community, we can achieve both of those goals.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the role of the private sector in providing security for the World Cup. Beyond the stadium itself, how are you coordinating with private security firms that will be hired by hotels, fan zones, and other venues?

We're working very closely with the private security industry. We've established a private sector security working group to coordinate our efforts. We're sharing information about threat levels, security protocols, and emergency response plans. We're also encouraging private security firms to participate in our joint training exercises. The goal is to have a seamless integration of public and private security resources. We also have a system for real-time communication between our command center and private security personnel in the field.

Mr. Martinez, what are the challenges in ensuring that private security personnel are properly trained and vetted for an event of this magnitude?

It's a major challenge. We're working with the state of Florida to ensure that all private security personnel meet the necessary licensing and training requirements. We're also requiring our vendors to conduct their own background checks and to provide additional training specific to the World Cup. We'll also have our own personnel monitoring the performance of private security firms to ensure they are meeting our standards. It's a multi-layered approach to ensure that everyone involved in the security effort is qualified and prepared.

Mr. Sena, how do fusion centers help to facilitate information sharing between public law enforcement and private security firms?

Many fusion centers have dedicated private sector liaisons who work with security directors at major companies and venues. We provide them with regular threat briefings and other relevant information. We also encourage them to share information with us. This partnership is essential for a comprehensive security posture. We also work with the private sector to develop best practices for security and emergency response. The goal is to create a 'whole-of-community' approach to security that includes both the public and private sectors.

...and the local law enforcement agencies. And so, Chief Mabin, I'll start with you. In your testimony, you mentioned that the Kansas City Missouri Police Department utilized the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center to assist with the 2024 Super Bowl victory parade. Can you elaborate on the specific types of information or intelligence that the fusion center provided leading up to and during the event?

Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. Leading up to the event, the fusion center provided us with a threat assessment. They looked at what was going on nationally and locally to see if there were any specific threats towards the parade or the city during that time. During the event, they provided us with real-time information. They were monitoring social media. They were monitoring our camera systems. They were in constant communication with our command post to provide us with any situational awareness that they gathered.

Thank you. And following the shooting at the parade, how did the fusion center support the subsequent investigation and coordination between the various law enforcement agencies involved?

Immediately after the shooting, the fusion center helped us with identifying potential suspects. They were able to take images from our camera systems and from social media and run those through their databases to help us identify individuals. They also helped with the coordination of the multiple agencies that responded. We had over 20 different agencies respond to the scene, and the fusion center was instrumental in making sure that everyone was on the same page and had the information they needed to conduct their part of the investigation.

I appreciate that. Mr. Sena, from your perspective as President of the National Fusion Center Association, what are some of the common challenges that fusion centers face when supporting large-scale public events like a Super Bowl parade?

Thank you, Chairman. One of the biggest challenges is the sheer volume of information. During a major event, there is a massive amount of data being generated from social media, from 911 calls, from sensors, and from officers on the ground. Filtering through that noise to find the actionable intelligence is a significant task. Another challenge is interoperability. Ensuring that different agencies can communicate seamlessly and share data in real-time is always a hurdle, although we've made great strides in that area.

And how does the lack of consistent federal funding impact the ability of these centers to maintain the necessary technology and personnel for these events?

It's a critical issue. Many fusion centers rely heavily on federal grants, such as the Homeland Security Grant Program. When that funding is uncertain or delayed, it makes it very difficult to plan for long-term technology upgrades or to retain highly skilled analysts. These analysts are the backbone of the fusion center, and losing them to the private sector because we can't offer competitive or stable salaries is a major blow to our capabilities.

Thank you. Mr. Martinez, in your role with the 2026 World Cup, how are you integrating the lessons learned from events like the Kansas City parade into your security planning?

Chairman, we are looking very closely at the after-action reports from Kansas City and other major events. One of the key takeaways is the importance of a unified command structure and the need for robust, real-time information sharing. For the World Cup, we are working closely with the South Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, the Florida Fusion Center, and our federal partners to ensure that we have a comprehensive intelligence picture. We're also focusing heavily on crowd management and ensuring that our communication systems are redundant and resilient.

Thank you. My time has expired. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Goldman, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. This is a very important topic as we look forward to several major international events coming to the United States in the next few years. Mr. Sena, I want to go back to the funding issue. You mentioned the Homeland Security Grant Program. Can you talk about the specific impact of the recent cuts to that program on fusion centers across the country?

Certainly. The recent cuts have forced many centers to scale back their operations. This means fewer analysts monitoring threats, less training for local law enforcement on how to utilize fusion center resources, and a delay in implementing new technologies like advanced data analytics or improved communication tools. In some cases, it has even led to the closure of smaller, regional nodes that provide critical local context to the state-level centers.

And when we talk about the threat landscape, we're not just talking about physical threats, right? We're also talking about cyber threats. How are fusion centers adapting to the increasing threat of cyberattacks on major events?

You're absolutely right. Cyber is a major component of our work now. Most fusion centers now have dedicated cyber analysts who work closely with CISA and the FBI. During major events, we're looking for signs of potential disruptions to critical infrastructure, like power grids or transportation systems, as well as attempts to spread disinformation or compromise the event's own digital infrastructure. It's a constant battle, and it requires a very specialized skill set.

Chief Mabin, in Kansas City, did you see any cyber-related activity or disinformation campaigns surrounding the Super Bowl parade?

We did see a significant amount of disinformation on social media immediately following the shooting. There were false reports about the number of shooters, the motives, and the identities of those involved. The fusion center was very helpful in monitoring these reports and helping us put out accurate information to the public to prevent panic and ensure that the investigation wasn't compromised by false leads.

That's a critical point. The ability to counter disinformation in real-time is essential for public safety. Mr. Martinez, how is the World Cup host committee planning to handle the potential for large-scale disinformation campaigns?

We are working with our communications teams and our law enforcement partners to develop a robust strategic messaging plan. We'll have dedicated personnel monitoring social media and other platforms to identify and counter false information quickly. We're also establishing clear channels of communication with the public so they know where to go for verified, official updates. Transparency and speed are our best tools against disinformation.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Guest, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk a little bit about the coordination with federal partners. During the planning for the parade, what was the level of involvement from agencies like the FBI or DHS?

The coordination was excellent. We had representatives from the FBI, DHS, and the ATF embedded in our command post. They provided us with access to federal databases and resources that we wouldn't have had otherwise. For example, the FBI provided specialized surveillance equipment, and DHS helped with the overall security planning and risk assessment. It was a truly collaborative effort.

And after the shooting occurred, did that federal support continue? How did they assist in the investigation?

Yes, the support was immediate and ongoing. The FBI provided forensic assistance, and the ATF helped with tracing the firearms used in the incident. They also helped us coordinate with other jurisdictions as the investigation expanded. The federal resources were a force multiplier for our department, and we are very grateful for their support.

Mr. Sena, you've talked about the importance of fusion centers. In your experience, what is the biggest barrier to effective information sharing between local, state, and federal agencies?

I think the biggest barrier is often cultural. There can be a 'need to know' mentality that prevents information from flowing as freely as it should. However, we've seen a significant shift in that culture since 9/11. The fusion center model is built on the idea of 'need to share.' Another barrier is the technical challenge of connecting disparate systems. We're working on that, but it's an ongoing process that requires sustained investment.

Thank you. Mr. Martinez, for the World Cup, you're dealing with multiple host cities across the country. How are you ensuring that information is being shared effectively between these different regions?

That's one of our biggest challenges. We are working with FIFA and the other host committees to establish a national security coordination center. This center will serve as a hub for information sharing between all the host cities, as well as our federal partners. We're also using standardized reporting protocols and communication platforms to ensure that everyone is speaking the same language and has access to the same information.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the witnesses. Chief Mabin, I want to touch on the issue of community engagement. How did the Kansas City Police Department work with the community leading up to the parade to ensure their safety and cooperation?

Community engagement was a top priority for us. We held several town hall meetings and used social media to provide the public with safety tips and information about the parade route and security measures. We also worked closely with local businesses and community leaders to address their concerns. Our goal was to make sure that everyone felt safe and informed, and that they knew how to report any suspicious activity.

And during the event itself, how did you utilize the community to help with security? Did you have any programs like 'See Something, Say Something' in place?

Yes, we heavily promoted the 'See Something, Say Something' campaign. We had signs posted throughout the parade route and encouraged people to report anything unusual to the nearest officer or by calling 911. We actually received several tips from the public that were very helpful. The community is our eyes and ears on the ground, and their cooperation is essential for a successful event.

Mr. Sena, how do fusion centers incorporate community-generated information into their threat assessments?

Fusion centers play a key role in analyzing and vetting tips from the public. When a tip comes in, our analysts look for patterns and cross-reference it with other information in our databases. We also work with local law enforcement to follow up on any credible leads. This community-sourced information is a vital part of the intelligence cycle and helps us identify potential threats that might otherwise go unnoticed.

Mr. Martinez, for the World Cup, how are you planning to engage with the diverse communities in the host cities to ensure their safety and inclusion?

We are committed to making the World Cup an inclusive and safe event for everyone. We're working with local community organizations and leaders to develop outreach programs that are culturally sensitive and accessible. We're also providing information in multiple languages and ensuring that our security personnel are trained in de-escalation and community relations. We want everyone to feel welcome and safe at the World Cup.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to talk about the role of the private sector in security for major events. How do fusion centers collaborate with private security firms and venue operators?

That's a very important partnership. Many fusion centers have dedicated private sector liaisons who work with security directors at stadiums, convention centers, and other major venues. We share unclassified threat information with them and, in return, they provide us with situational awareness from their facilities. During a major event, we often have private sector representatives in our fusion centers or command posts to facilitate real-time communication.

And what are some of the challenges in sharing information with the private sector, particularly when it comes to sensitive or classified information?

The biggest challenge is the classification level. Most private sector security personnel do not have security clearances. We have to work hard to 'write for release,' which means taking classified intelligence and stripping away the sensitive sources and methods so it can be shared at an unclassified level. This takes time and effort, but it's essential for ensuring that our private sector partners have the information they need to protect their facilities and the public.

Chief Mabin, in Kansas City, how did you coordinate with the private security teams at the stadium and along the parade route?

We had a very close working relationship with the security team for the Kansas City Chiefs and the private security firms hired for the parade. We held joint planning meetings and shared our operational plans. During the event, we had a unified command post where representatives from all the major security entities were present. This allowed us to coordinate our response to any incidents and ensure that we were all working towards the same goals.

Mr. Martinez, for the World Cup, you'll be dealing with a lot of different private sector partners, from airlines to hotels to stadium operators. How are you managing those relationships?

We've established a private sector working group that meets regularly to discuss security and logistics. We're also working with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Infrastructure Protection to conduct vulnerability assessments of key facilities. Our goal is to create a seamless security environment where the public and private sectors are working together in a coordinated and effective manner.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to go back to the issue of technology. What are some of the emerging technologies that fusion centers are using to enhance their capabilities?

We're seeing a lot of promise in areas like artificial intelligence and machine learning. These tools can help us analyze vast amounts of data much more quickly than a human analyst could. For example, AI can be used to identify patterns in social media traffic that might indicate a brewing threat. We're also looking at advanced video analytics that can help us identify suspicious behavior in real-time. These technologies are force multipliers for our analysts.

And what are the privacy implications of using these types of technologies? How do you ensure that you're protecting the civil liberties of the public?

Privacy and civil liberties are at the forefront of everything we do. Every fusion center has a privacy policy that is vetted by DHS and the DOJ. We also have privacy officers who ensure that we are following all applicable laws and regulations. When we use new technologies, we conduct privacy impact assessments to identify and mitigate any potential risks. We are committed to protecting the public while also protecting their rights.

Chief Mabin, did you use any advanced technology like facial recognition during the investigation into the parade shooting?

We did use facial recognition technology to help identify potential suspects from the video footage we collected. It was a very useful tool, but it was just one part of the investigation. Any potential matches were carefully vetted by our detectives and cross-referenced with other evidence. We follow very strict protocols for the use of facial recognition to ensure that it is used responsibly and accurately.

Mr. Martinez, how is the World Cup host committee addressing the privacy concerns associated with the use of advanced security technologies?

We are working with our legal and privacy experts to develop clear policies for the use of any security technology. We'll be transparent with the public about what technologies we're using and why. We're also ensuring that any data we collect is stored securely and only used for legitimate security purposes. Protecting the privacy of our fans and the community is a top priority for us.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to talk about the threat of domestic terrorism. How are fusion centers monitoring and addressing the threat from domestic extremist groups?

Domestic terrorism is a significant focus for us. We monitor open-source information and work closely with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces to identify individuals or groups that may be planning violent acts. We're looking for indicators of mobilization to violence, such as the acquisition of weapons or the targeting of specific locations. Our goal is to identify these threats early and provide local law enforcement with the information they need to intervene.

And how do you distinguish between protected speech and activity that might indicate a threat of violence?

That's a very important distinction. We do not monitor people for their political beliefs or their speech. We only focus on activities that indicate a potential for violence or other criminal acts. We follow the 28 CFR Part 23 guidelines, which provide a framework for the collection and sharing of criminal intelligence. Our analysts are trained to recognize the difference between protected activity and activity that meets the threshold for investigation.

Chief Mabin, in the aftermath of the parade shooting, was there any indication that it was motivated by any particular ideology or extremist group?

At this point in the investigation, there is no evidence to suggest that the shooting was motivated by any particular ideology or extremist group. It appears to have been a dispute between several individuals that escalated into violence. However, we are continuing to investigate all possible motives and are working closely with our federal partners to ensure that we have a complete understanding of what happened.

Mr. Martinez, how is the World Cup host committee preparing for the potential for protests or other forms of civil unrest during the event?

We respect the right to peaceful protest and are working with local law enforcement to develop plans for managing demonstrations in a way that protects both the protesters and the public. We'll have designated areas for protests and will work to ensure that they don't disrupt the event or compromise security. Our goal is to maintain a safe and secure environment for everyone, while also respecting the constitutional rights of those who wish to express their views.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Fong, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to talk about the importance of training. What kind of training do fusion center analysts receive, and how is that training updated to reflect the changing threat landscape?

Our analysts receive a wide range of training, from basic intelligence analysis to specialized training in areas like cyber threats, domestic terrorism, and privacy and civil liberties. This training is provided by DHS, the FBI, and other federal and state partners. We also have a national certification program for fusion center analysts to ensure a consistent level of expertise across the country. We're constantly updating our training to reflect new threats and technologies.

And how do you ensure that local law enforcement officers are trained on how to work with fusion centers and utilize their resources?

That's a key part of our mission. We provide training and outreach to local law enforcement agencies to help them understand what a fusion center is and how it can help them. We also have liaison officers who work directly with local departments to facilitate information sharing and provide support for their investigations. Our goal is to make sure that every officer on the street knows that they have a powerful resource available to them in their local fusion center.

Chief Mabin, how often do your officers receive training on working with the fusion center?

It's an ongoing part of our training program. We have regular briefings from the fusion center, and our officers are encouraged to reach out to them whenever they have a need for information or analysis. We also include information about the fusion center in our academy training for new recruits. We want all of our officers to be familiar with the resources that are available to them and to know how to use them effectively.

Mr. Martinez, for the World Cup, what kind of specialized training are you providing for the security personnel who will be working the event?

We're providing a comprehensive training program for all security personnel, including both law enforcement and private security. This training covers everything from crowd management and de-escalation to emergency response and counter-terrorism. We're also conducting several large-scale exercises to test our plans and ensure that everyone is prepared for any situation. Our goal is to have a highly trained and professional security force that can handle any challenge.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to talk about the role of fusion centers in supporting rural law enforcement. How do you ensure that smaller departments have access to the same level of intelligence and support as larger cities?

That's a very important issue. Many fusion centers have dedicated outreach programs for rural law enforcement. We provide them with access to our information-sharing platforms and offer training and support for their investigations. We also work with state-level law enforcement agencies to ensure that information is flowing to even the smallest departments. Our goal is to ensure that no matter where an officer is located, they have access to the intelligence they need to keep their community safe.

And what are some of the unique challenges that rural departments face when it comes to security for major events?

The biggest challenge is often resources. Rural departments may not have the personnel or the technology to handle a large-scale event on their own. That's where the fusion center and our state and federal partners come in. We can provide the additional resources and expertise that they need to ensure a safe and successful event. It's all about collaboration and leveraging the resources of the entire law enforcement community.

Chief Mabin, did you have any support from rural law enforcement agencies during the Super Bowl parade?

Yes, we had several agencies from the surrounding rural areas provide officers to help with crowd control and security. This was coordinated through our mutual aid agreements and the fusion center. These officers were a vital part of our security plan, and we couldn't have done it without them. It's a great example of how law enforcement agencies of all sizes can work together to ensure public safety.

Mr. Martinez, for the World Cup, how are you working with the smaller communities that may be impacted by the event, even if they aren't hosting a match?

We're working with all the communities in the region...

...and the coordination that goes into that. I'm curious, from your perspective, what are the biggest challenges in coordinating security for an event that spans multiple jurisdictions and involves so many different agencies?

Thank you for the question. The biggest challenge is the sheer scale and the diversity of the stakeholders involved. When you have a World Cup that's going to be in 11 different cities in the United States, each with its own local laws, its own police departments, and its own unique infrastructure, creating a unified security plan is a massive undertaking. We have to ensure that information is flowing seamlessly not just vertically from federal to local, but horizontally between the host cities themselves.

And following up on that, how do you see the role of the fusion centers evolving as we get closer to 2026? Are there specific areas where you think they need more support or resources right now?

The fusion centers are going to be the backbone of the information sharing network for the World Cup. As we get closer, their role will shift from general monitoring to specific threat assessment and real-time incident management. One of the biggest needs we have right now is for sustained funding for the personnel who staff these centers. We need analysts who are trained specifically on the types of threats we see at large-scale sporting events, including cyber threats and crowd management issues.

Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to go back to something you mentioned in your testimony regarding the Kansas City Super Bowl parade. You talked about the importance of 'boots on the ground' and the physical presence of officers. In the context of a massive event like the World Cup, how do you balance the need for high-tech surveillance and data sharing with the need for traditional, visible policing to deter crime and provide a sense of security for the fans?

It's a delicate balance, Congressman. Technology is a force multiplier. It allows us to see things and communicate in ways we couldn't 20 years ago. But it doesn't replace the officer on the corner. For an event like the World Cup, the visible presence of law enforcement is critical for deterrence. Fans need to see that we are there and that we are prepared. At the same time, we're using that technology behind the scenes to monitor crowds and identify potential issues before they escalate. The two have to work hand-in-hand.

And in terms of the communication equipment itself, are you finding that interoperability is still a major hurdle, or have we made significant strides in ensuring different agencies can actually talk to each other during a crisis?

We've made strides, but it's still a challenge. During the parade incident, we had over 20 different agencies responding. While many of our systems are now compatible, there are still gaps, especially when you bring in federal partners or agencies from neighboring states. We spend a lot of time in the planning phases just mapping out radio frequencies and ensuring that our dispatchers can communicate across platforms. It's something we have to test and re-test constantly.

Thank you. Mr. Sena, did you want to add anything regarding the fusion center's role in that interoperability?

Yes, thank you. Fusion centers often act as the 'hub' for that communication. We aren't just sharing intelligence; we're often the ones facilitating the technical connections between agencies. We use platforms like HSIN, the Homeland Security Information Network, to provide a common operating picture. But as Chief Mabin said, the technical side is only half the battle; the other half is the relationships and the protocols that are established long before the event begins.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Fong, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here. Mr. Martinez, I want to talk about the private sector's role. Obviously, FIFA and the host committees have their own security apparatus. How does that private security force integrate with the public law enforcement agencies? Is there a clear line of command, or does it get murky when you're dealing with stadium property versus public streets?

It's a very clear line, actually. We operate under a 'unified command' structure. While the private security teams are responsible for access control and internal stadium safety, they are fully integrated into the overall security plan led by law enforcement. We have representatives from our private security firms sitting in the Multi-Agency Coordination Center, or MACC. If an incident occurs inside the stadium, the transition from private security to police response is pre-planned and practiced.

And what about the sharing of data from private sources? For example, if a stadium's facial recognition software or ticket scanning data flags a person of interest, how quickly does that get to the fusion centers or the FBI?

That's part of our information-sharing agreement. Any data that has security implications is shared in real-time through the established channels. We work very closely with the local fusion centers to ensure that the data we're collecting at the gates is being cross-referenced with their databases. It's a two-way street; they provide us with watchlists, and we provide them with real-time data on who is entering the venue. Privacy is always a concern, and we ensure all our protocols comply with legal standards.

Chief Mabin, in your experience, have you found that the private sector is generally willing to share that data, or are there often hurdles regarding liability or proprietary information?

In Kansas City, we've had a great relationship with our sports franchises. They understand that a security failure is bad for everyone. The hurdles are usually technical rather than a lack of willingness. Sometimes their systems don't talk to ours, or there's a delay in the data transfer. That's why the planning phase is so important—to work out those technical bugs before the crowds arrive. When it comes to liability, we have clear MOUs in place that protect both the city and the private entities.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to talk about the threat landscape. We've seen a rise in domestic extremism and also concerns about foreign influence operations. How are the fusion centers specifically looking for these types of threats in the lead-up to the World Cup? Are you seeing any specific trends that concern you right now?

Congressman, the threat landscape is more complex than ever. We are monitoring a wide range of actors. One of the biggest trends we're seeing is the use of social media to spread disinformation and to coordinate protests that can turn violent. We're also very focused on the 'lone actor' threat—individuals who may not be part of a larger organization but are radicalized online. For the World Cup, we're also looking at international threats, given the global nature of the event. We work closely with our federal partners at the FBI and DHS to monitor intelligence from overseas.

And how do you handle the 'noise' on social media? There's so much chatter out there. How do you distinguish between someone just venting online and a legitimate threat to a major event?

That's the million-dollar question. It requires sophisticated analytical tools and, more importantly, experienced analysts who understand the context. We look for specific indicators—threats of violence, mentions of specific locations or dates, and efforts to acquire weapons or materials. We also look for patterns of behavior. It's not just about one post; it's about the totality of the information. We also rely heavily on tips from the public. The 'See Something, Say Something' campaign is still one of our most effective tools.

Chief Mabin, following the parade shooting, was there any 'chatter' identified after the fact that might have been missed, or was that an incident that truly came out of nowhere?

In that specific case, it was a spontaneous conflict between individuals that escalated. It wasn't a pre-planned terrorist attack or a coordinated effort. That's a different kind of challenge. You can have all the intelligence in the world, but you can't always predict a personal dispute that turns violent in a crowd of a million people. That's why the rapid response and the presence of officers on the scene were so critical. We were able to apprehend the suspects almost immediately because our officers were right there.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to talk about the funding for fusion centers. You mentioned the need for sustained funding. We often see a surge in funding right before a major event, but then it drops off. How does that 'boom and bust' cycle affect your ability to maintain a high level of security and expertise?

It's incredibly disruptive, Congressman. Security isn't something you can just turn on and off. It takes years to build the relationships and the expertise that make a fusion center effective. When funding is uncertain, we lose our best people to the private sector. We can't invest in long-term technology projects. And most importantly, we lose the continuity that is essential for tracking threats over time. We need a consistent, predictable funding stream so we can maintain a baseline of capability across the country, not just in the cities hosting the next big event.

And what percentage of fusion center funding currently comes from the federal government versus state and local sources? Is that balance shifting?

It varies significantly by state. On average, it's about 60 percent state and local and 40 percent federal, primarily through DHS grants. However, the federal portion is often what pays for the personnel and the specialized training. As state budgets tighten, we're seeing more pressure on that federal funding. If the federal grants were to be cut, many fusion centers would have to significantly scale back their operations or close entirely, which would create massive blind spots in our national security architecture.

Mr. Martinez, from the perspective of a host committee, how much of the security cost is being borne by the private organizers versus the taxpayers in the host cities?

The host committee is responsible for the security within the venues and the official FIFA sites. We hire private security firms and pay for the off-duty police officers who work those events. However, the broader public safety—the policing of the streets, the transportation hubs, and the fan zones—is the responsibility of the local and state governments. We work to minimize that burden by coordinating closely and providing resources where we can, but a major event like the World Cup inevitably requires a significant public investment in safety.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on the cyber aspect. We've talked a lot about physical security, but a major event like the World Cup is a prime target for cyberattacks—everything from ransomware on stadium systems to attempts to disrupt the broadcast or spread disinformation. Mr. Sena, how are the fusion centers integrating cyber threat intelligence into their operations for 2026?

Cyber is a top priority for us. Most fusion centers now have dedicated cyber analysts who work closely with CISA and the FBI's Cyber Division. We're looking for threats to critical infrastructure, like power grids and transportation systems, as well as threats to the event's digital infrastructure. We also conduct 'tabletop exercises' that specifically include cyber scenarios. The goal is to ensure that if a cyberattack occurs, we have the same level of coordination and response that we have for a physical incident.

Mr. Martinez, what is the host committee doing to harden the digital infrastructure of the venues? Are you working with federal agencies to audit your systems?

Absolutely. We treat cyber security with the same level of importance as physical security. We are working with CISA to conduct vulnerability assessments of our networks and the systems within the stadiums. We're also working with our technology partners to ensure that all our data is encrypted and that we have robust backup systems in place. We know that we are a target, and we are taking every precaution to protect the integrity of the event and the data of the fans.

Chief Mabin, from a local police perspective, do you have the expertise on your force to handle a major cyber incident, or are you entirely dependent on federal partners for that?

We have a small cyber unit, but for an event of this scale, we would definitely be leaning on our federal partners. Our role at the local level is often the initial response—identifying that something is wrong and securing the scene, so to speak. But the deep forensic work and the mitigation of a sophisticated cyberattack would be a joint effort with the FBI and CISA. That's where the fusion center is so valuable; they provide that bridge to the federal experts.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Guest, for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about the 'National Special Security Event' or NSSE designation. Mr. Martinez, has the 2026 World Cup received that designation yet, and how does that change the resource allocation and the command structure for the event?

We are currently in the process of working with DHS on the NSSE designations. It's likely that specific high-profile matches, like the final and the opening matches, will receive that designation. When an event is an NSSE, the Secret Service becomes the lead agency for security planning, and the FBI is the lead for intelligence and counterterrorism. It brings a massive amount of federal resources to the table, including specialized equipment and personnel that local agencies simply don't have. It also creates a very clear, centralized command structure.

Chief Mabin, have you worked on an NSSE before, and what are the pros and cons from a local law enforcement perspective?

Yes, we've been involved in several. The pros are obvious: the resources and the expertise are world-class. It takes a huge weight off the local department. The 'con,' if you want to call it that, is the complexity. You're suddenly working with dozens of federal agencies, each with its own protocols. It requires a lot of meetings and a lot of coordination to ensure that the local officers on the ground know who is in charge of what. But overall, for an event of this magnitude, the NSSE designation is a net positive.

Mr. Sena, how do the fusion centers fit into an NSSE structure? Do you become a subordinate unit to the Secret Service, or do you maintain your independent role?

We maintain our role as the primary information-sharing hub for the state and local partners, but we are fully integrated into the NSSE's Intelligence Subcommittee. We have analysts embedded with the federal teams, and we ensure that the intelligence being gathered at the federal level is being pushed down to the local officers who need it. We don't become 'subordinate' so much as we become a key component of the unified team. Our goal is to ensure there are no silos.

Thank you. I yield back. The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Mabin, I want to talk about the training aspect. For an event like the World Cup, you're going to have officers from all over the region coming in to help. How do you ensure that everyone is on the same page when it comes to use-of-force policies, crowd control tactics, and even just basic communication protocols?

That's a huge part of the preparation. We conduct joint training exercises months in advance. We develop a 'common operating manual' for the event that outlines the specific policies and procedures that all participating agencies agree to follow. We also use 'train-the-trainer' models where we bring in supervisors from other agencies, train them on our protocols, and then they go back and train their own officers. It's about creating a shared culture of safety and professionalism for the duration of the event.

And what about the mental health of the officers? These are long, high-stress shifts. What are you doing to ensure your people don't burn out or make mistakes due to fatigue?

It's a major concern. We build in mandatory rest periods and ensure that we have adequate relief personnel. We also have peer support teams and mental health professionals available on-site for our officers. We've learned from past events that the psychological toll can be just as significant as the physical toll. We want our officers to be sharp and focused, and that means taking care of their well-being. It's something we talk about openly during our briefings.

Mr. Martinez, does the host committee provide any resources for officer wellness, or is that entirely on the departments?

We provide the logistics—the food, the hydration, and the comfortable rest areas within the venues. We also work with the departments to ensure that the scheduling is as humane as possible. While we don't provide the mental health services directly, we certainly support the departments in their efforts. We see the officers as part of our team, and their health and safety are a top priority for us as well.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sena, I want to go back to the issue of information sharing between the public and private sectors. We've talked about the stadiums, but what about the hotels, the transportation companies, and the local businesses? How do they get the information they need to stay safe, and how do they report suspicious activity to you?

We use a variety of platforms to reach those stakeholders. Many fusion centers have 'sector-specific' working groups—for example, a hospitality group or a retail group. We send out regular bulletins with tailored information. We also use apps and web portals where businesses can report suspicious activity directly to us. The key is to make it easy for them. They are our eyes and ears on the ground, and we want them to feel like they are a valued part of the security network.

And are you seeing a good level of engagement from those smaller businesses, or is it mostly the big corporations that are participating?

It's a mix. The big corporations have their own security directors, so the communication is very structured. With smaller businesses, it's more about outreach and education. We work with local chambers of commerce and business improvement districts to get the word out. During a major event, the level of engagement usually spikes because everyone is aware of the potential risks. Our challenge is to maintain that engagement during the 'quiet' times.

Chief Mabin, in Kansas City, how did you engage with the local businesses along the parade route? Did they feel like they had the information they needed?

We had several town hall meetings and sent out regular email updates. We also had officers walking the beat and talking to business owners in the weeks leading up to the parade. Most felt well-informed, but there's always room for improvement. One thing we heard was that they wanted more real-time updates during the event itself. That's something we're looking at for the future—using text-based alert systems specifically for business owners in the event zone.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about the international visitors. We're going to have millions of people coming from all over the world, many of whom may not speak English or be familiar with our laws and customs. Mr. Martinez, what is the host committee doing to ensure that security information is accessible to everyone, regardless of their language or background?

That's a critical point. We are developing a multi-lingual communication strategy. All our signage, our apps, and our public announcements will be available in multiple languages, with a focus on the languages of the participating teams. We're also training our staff and volunteers on cultural sensitivity and how to assist international visitors. We want everyone to feel welcome and safe, and clear communication is the first step in that process.

Chief Mabin, how are your officers being prepared to interact with a global audience? Are they receiving any specialized training in de-escalation or cultural awareness for this specific event?

Yes, that's part of the joint training I mentioned earlier. We're bringing in experts to talk to our officers about the different cultural norms they might encounter. We're also providing them with 'cheat sheets' and translation apps to help with basic interactions. The goal is to be helpful and approachable while still maintaining a high level of security. We want the lasting impression of our city to be one of hospitality and safety.

Mr. Sena, is the NFCA working with international law enforcement agencies to share best practices for managing these types of global crowds?

Yes, we are. We've had several meetings with our counterparts in Europe and South America who have hosted previous World Cups and Olympics. We're learning a lot from their experiences—both what worked and what didn't. That international collaboration is vital. We're not just sharing intelligence; we're sharing lessons learned on everything from crowd flow to counter-terrorism tactics.

...and the local law enforcement. And I think that's what we're all trying to get to. So, I want to thank you all for being here today. I want to thank you for your testimony. I want to thank you for what you do every day to keep our communities safe. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule VII, clause E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Gavel sounds.]