An Update on DoD’s Struggling Background Check System

Good morning. Uh, the uh subcommittee on government operations will come to order and I'd like to welcome everybody uh to this important hearing without objection uh the chair may declare recess at any time and I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement. We welcome today's hearing on the modernization of the federal government's background investigations and security clearance process. In particular, the Department of Defense's national background investigative services system, all known also known as IMBIS. If the topic of today's discoverna- discussion sounds familiar, it should. As a matter of fact, we're getting to know each other rather well in this room. This subcommittee first examined issues related to this back in June of twenty f- twenty four when Congress raised serious concerns about persistent failures in personnel vetting. Unfortunately, the need for continued oversight has only grown more urgent, and I must say that it is a welcome uh, seemingly welcome thing for the administration and GAO to want to tackle this issue. But it also leads us to today's hearing. Unfortunately, the need for this continued oversight has grown more urgent and as I said, both all three sides are willing to come together for this discussion. I want to thank the gentleman, Mister Nfume, for his insistence that we continue down this pathway. During our initial hearing we heard from um um uh the gentlewoman, Miss Siz, the same gao witness that we will hear from today gao has been tracking problems with our nation's federal personnel vetting process since as far back as two thousand and five we also heard from them dcsa director david ketler who in this same hearing room was brand new to the job at the same time to speak about the program's significant management and oversight poor scheduling, poor cost planning, and dozens of cyber security risks, which many of them have become true. At the time our witnesses offered recommendations and commitments to correct action. Today our focus remains squarely on NIMBUS and whether the program is on track to support the administration's stated goals of accelerating ground investigations and security clearances. Specifically, we want to know whether the system is progressing as discussed, what additional steps may be necessary to deliver a modern, reliable, personnel vetting platform that is long overdue, that exists in law. NIMBUS was env- env- envis- envisioned as the one-step shop for all phases of federal personnel vetting by providing modern tools for investigators. Once again, not a mission being met. It has become especially critical after the twenty fifteen OPM data breach in which the personnel data and sensitive information of over twenty-one million current, former, and prospective federal employees and their families were exposed. Yet today, Imbiss has deployed only limited capacities and capabilities, and the program is now more than eight years behind schedule, with completion delayed from twenty nineteen to twenty twenty eight. This has cost the American taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars and has wasted valuable government resources. I will note before I turn the page, it would be simple to blame the people who are here today, and I don't intend to do that. I intend to work with the people who are here and to move forward, but we're going to take seriously what is done today with the need to correct that action. In addition, it is called into question the safety and reliability of all aspects of the federal uh personnel vetting system. It's also showed the broader government-wide initiative to reform personnel vetting policies and processes known as in the law trusted workforce two point O zero. The federal workforce and the government's industrial partners deserve better. That was why we have held so many hearings and that's why the law was made. Without these vetting reforms in place or the promised information technology like Imbus, that serve as their backbone, security clearance providers, and recipients like advanced tools and the assurance that their personal information is guarded and safe. Agencies and contractors are left struggling with the same persistent challenges, slow and delayed onboarding, delaying their access to facilities and inefficiencies that underni- undermine mission readiness that people like Mister Nfume and the administration need to make sure that they have the assured people in place. As was clear from our last hearing, concerns about Imbus are shared by members of Congress on both aisles. This is not a partisan issue. This is a national security issue. We must continue to work together to ensure the security, ef- efficiency, and accountability of these personnel vetting systems and process which play an increasingly vital role in safeguarding our national interest comes to fruition. I'm hopeful that our witnesses who have taken place uh who have provided this uh subcommittee with data and information over the last few weeks recognize that the progress that has been made over the last eighteen months must continue. Last September, after Director Kettler's retirement from DCSA, ranking member of whom I wrote the DOD to express our concerns about this leadership. Strike that, Department of War, DOW. We encourage swift action to put a new director in place, especially given the ongoing problems that AMBASS has and the need to effectively place leadership in that role. We will probably hear today some of the follow-up to that, but it it comes with a lot of uncertainty and a lot of frailties attached to it. We're still gonna have the hearing, and while I have no doubt that this administration will find another leader with necessary commitment, passion, qualif qualifications to guide this full and successful successful implementation, I remain deeply concerned. Now, over seven months since Mister Kessler announced his retirement, DCSA remains without a permanent director. And part of the discussion today will be to put on record that needed desire for this administration to accomplish this. I'm confident that that my friend and colleague, Mister Mfumez, not only shares my concern, But I wanna thank him for his professionalism in addressing these issues. Today I look forward to hearing more about the progress, bringing the new director on, as well as status of the National Background Investigation Service program because this hearing will further develop because uh GAO is here, lots of other ideas that they've got that are challenges that must be met. I look forward to hearing how we conti- continue to use this relationship that we share with the administration and GAO and I would now yield uh to the ranking member Mr. Nfume for his opening statement the gentleman is recognized.

Thank you very much Chairman Sessions and uh good morning to all of our witnesses I wanna thank you Mister Sessions for your partnership on this issue and a lot of other issues that have come before this. committee that really require a bipartisan approach. Uh, you've been very clear in that regard, and it has been clear, I think, also, uh, to the full committee and to others who've watched us over the last couple of years. Uh, again, my thanks to the witnesses. When it comes to national security, I think we all can agree that partisanship stops at the water's edge. At least that's what I was taught long ago. And it's important to underscore that because our goal is straightforward, deliver a background check system that keeps the United States of America safe. That also gets qualified people to work without delay and continuously verifies that they deserve and have earned our trust. America, in my opinion, cannot hope to maintain our technological advantage in the national security space if we make the best engineers, scientists, linguists, analysts, and others spend months, if not years sometimes, in limbo before they can serve. And if we can't clear people, we can't complete our missions. It's very, very simple. The National Background Investigation Services, or NBIS, program was launched, as we all know, to replace the outdated cumbersome legacy systems and to reduce backlogs and to harden cyber security. However, successful implementation is still far from a reality and the current plan is for technical capabilities in fiscal year twenty twenty seven, full implementation in twenty twenty eight, and continued rigorous oversight if necessary to get us across the finish line. Now, since twenty seventeen, The government has spent about two point four billion dollars on NBIS and legacy sustainment to keep outdated systems up and running. That is an awful lot of money, two point four billion dollars. And the department projects that about another two point two billion is needed to finish the job so we're far off the mark of where we had hoped to be. It's an enormous amount of money for the government to spend on anything, and have so very, very little to show for it. I understand that this project reached a state of disarray and that after eight years of implementation it had to return to a planning phase to restructure the entire acquisition strategy. This has left contractors in my district and districts all across the country stuck with unclear instructions and increased cost as they juggle various systems. In a region where roughly nine percent of jobs require a security clearance, this really is not a small problem, it is a huge, huge problem. It is a direct hit to workers and employers in my city of Baltimore, and cities and towns and hamlets all over this country, east to west. They depend on a functioning clearance system to be able to do their jobs. And so the consequences do not stop with my district or the chairman's district. This is chaos and in many respects it's also come with system outages that have stopped work on ground operations and have caused things come to a halt all over the globe. These are more than just teachable moments, I hope, and these issues have real mission

Yeah.

impacts. So here are a few points I'd like to hone in on and make sure are on the record today. First, we need an ongoing sense of vigilance on this project, otherwise we'll be right here a year from now treading water. The DCSA team has provided quarterly plans and gives a quarterly report to the industry. We need that in an ongoing fashion. But I pledge that we here in Congress are not going to get bored or look the other way, and we won't settle for surface level check the box compliance exercises and I think many of you have followed the work of this committee know that that's the case. We're gonna be and continue to be very dogged about trying to bring about change here. We'll make sure that the goals of NBIS uh implementation are quantifiable and that they are very very clear we will be monitoring progress toward each milestone and we will do that quarter by quarter. Secondly, we must insure that transparent cost on tran on taxpayers are just that transparent and so that trust taxpayers can trust MBS and trust also that the cost that they are paying uh since it's more than doubled than what was previously expected will be looked at and looked over. I think all of us here agree whether you're on this panel or in the audience that we owe it to the American people to hold the department accountable for overruns and to prevent such gross mismanagement moving forward, both for the remaining steps of NVIS implementation and for future projects. Finally, I expect that real results from real people uh will be coming soon. We need to know that we are seeing measurable work in progress in bringing down the backlogs. We can't just trust that things are getting better and we will not let up. until we get GAO's uh GAO's seal of approval and can see for ourselves that the prospective employees are on the jobs as fast as possible. I'm gonna repeat what the Chairman just said and that is that the last DCSA Director, David Catler, announced his retirement as you heard from his role in July of last year. I cannot help but to wonder how we are still sitting here seven months later, and we still don't have even a nominee for DCSA. Today we have a Director of uh Defense Intelligence and Security Agency before us overseeing DCSA. Uh that's just one of uh the many duties, Mister Overbaal, that you have. We appreciate your work uh and we expect that you will keep NBIS on track as Acting Director, but it seems like That's a full-time job to me, and so I ask for the following clear on-the-record commitments from the department. One, name a permanent DCSA director and the plan for getting a qualified candidate into the position as soon as possible. Two, a full-cost profile that ties dollars spent on invas to the effectiveness of personnel security reform. And three, a commitment to ongoing quarterly briefings about NBIT's progress toward its stated milestones. And if any of those milestones slip, I would expect, and I'm sure the Chairman would also, that the department will notify the subcommittee in writing within five business days, uh, regarding the cause, the impact, and what the recovery plan is. People in this country expect stewardship of their money. And they expect just and trustworthy persons in and around government to carry that out. And they expect the department and a trusted workforce on board it without delay, will become a reality very, very soon. They expect transparency when things go right and when they go wrong. That is the spirit of this hearing. There will also be transparency in measuring the progress or the lack thereof. So if we do our jobs here, all of us, those of us who have sworn an oath and have the privilege of representing congressional districts and those of you who are working for the the agency or other agencies uh we'll turn plans into demonstrable results and turn intent into real and lasting impact. That's the spirit of this hearing today. Um I want to thank again Chairman Sessions for being as dogged as he is in making sure that as a team we work together to bring about real and lasting change. Otherwise we have just really just failed our jobs and failed our mission. And, Mister Chairman, I would yield back.

Thank you very much. I appreciate the gentleman's comments. Um I know that the people who are witnesses today and and and have been a part of this for quite some time do recognize that you and I are a tempting along with this subcommittee on a bipartisan basis to move a decision making and authority and i concur completely with your comments that this hearing today will be the beginning of that that will increasingly upbeat tempo will be required on both sides um without objection i would uh allow and uh have congressman walkinshaw of virginia a very kind gentleman who's asked to be waived onto the subcommittee for the purpose of questioning the witnesses at today's subcommittee hearing. We welcome him to this subcommittee hearing. Also just to be nice and fair because she's my dear dear friend from the last couple hundred years, we welcome the distinguished chairman of the rules committee, also a member of this subcommittee, My dear friend, Virginia Fox.

I'm glad to see you.

Virginia, welcome today. I'm delighted that you're here.

I'm glad to be in the principals.

Oh, well you didn't make that, Virginia. Uh, for those of you who know, I have told Virginia for the last twenty years or so, every day, I love you, Virginia. And, Virginia, I love you and thank you.

I love you, too.

Yes. I'm pleased to welcome our witnesses for today. Mister Justin Overbaugh is currently serving as both the Acting Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, as well the Deputy Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence and Security. In this important role as acting DCSA Director, he's responsible for leading efforts to protect Americans' trusted workforce, trusted workspaces, and classified information. And uh, he has a daytime job and a nighttime job obviously because this, as Mister Mfume noted, is a heavy lift and we appreciate him, his professionalism in taking time to be with us today. Then we uh uh also welcome Lisa Siss, who serves as the Director in Defense Capac- Capac- Capacit- Capabilities and Management Team at GAO. In her role at the Government Accounting Office, She oversees reviews on the personnel security clearance process, artificial intelligence, intelligence infrastructure, and DOW's approach to business transmissions, among other topics. And we have found her testimony, professionalism, and reliability to not only want to work with this subcommittee, but in the professional attribute that is related to her agency and we welcome her. So thank you very much. I look forward to if I could have both of you stand and raise your right hand for the purpose of administering the oath to the witnesses pursuant to committee rule nine G the witnesses that stand before us uh raise their right hand do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you're about to give in is the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God.

I do.

Let the record reflect that both the witnesses answered the affirmative. Thank you very much, and you may take your seat. Uh, we are now going to move to recognizing the witnesses, and we appreciate you being here. Uh, you're not new to this. You know that we've got a, uh, yellow light, a green light, yellow light, red light. Uh, I would ask, as I always do, uh, for the gentlemen to understand that we would like for our witnesses to give us the information that is necessary. And I am not going to stick to necessarily a five-minute rule, if either side goes over. But we are here today to get to the bottom of this because I think that this will be a hearing that whoever you hire will want to know how serious this is, And we'll wanna know that it's been vetted not only by GAO, but the importance to each of these members that are here. And so we're not gonna cut you off. We want you to give full testimony, full hearing. Full articulation on the matter. And I'm delighted that you're here. The gentleman, Mister Overbaul, is now recognized.

Good morning, Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It is an honor and a privilege to represent the over th- thirteen thousand civilians, service members, contractors of the Defense, Counterintelligence and Security Agency. I was appointed Acting Director of DCSA on November nineteenth, twenty twenty five, with a clear mandate from the Undersecretary of War for Intelligence and Security, the Honorable Bradley Hansel. to ensure DCSA finally delivers the critical security capabilities our nation requires. I understand this committee has received testimony from previous leaders suggesting the agency was largely on track. Respectfully, that assessment was too optimistic. The truth is, DCSA has been an agency in the midst of an identity crisis. After it was cobbled together from disparate programs, DCSA never truly self-actualized or forged a unified culture. I contend that this foundational issue has directly contributed to the significant challenges in delivering both trusted workforce two point zero and the national background investigation services program, on time and on budget. It is my assessment that previous agency leadership, in an effort to establish a brand, focused more on marketing than on delivering value and allowing that The agency's original purpose became blurred, drifting towards an intelligence-focused entity, rather than embracing its vital security mission. Instead of focusing on executing its most important functions with excellence, the agency attempted to accumulate more missions to the point that it failed to achieve its core purpose. Altogether, the lack of a viable vision, clear expectations, and leadership accountability from past department oversight allowed DCSA to fail. Under Secretary Hansel dismissed DC- DCSA leadership because the transformation required here cannot be incremental. It must be complete and total. He had little confidence that the leadership he inherited would have been successful in leading the change from a sclerotic, compliance-based bureaucracy to a customer-centric, business-oriented entity the Department of War and the nation need DCSA to be. While the Under-Secretary continues his search to select a new director, with the optimal mix of private sector, technology, and government experience, he directed me and the interim DCSA leadership team to steer toward a business model that mirrors Secretary Hegses's approach of eliminating bureaucratic processes, in favor of speed and innovation. In my short time as Acting Director, I have found what I expected. A dedicated, talented, and innovative workforce, unfortunately shackled by burdensome processes designed not to empower them, but to maintain the status quo and sustain layers of management. Our focus now is on unleashing their potential. To that end, we are designing the agency for purpose, moving it from a cumbersome bureaucracy to an agile organization, that can serve as a model for the rest of government. At DCSA, we will build a workforce of the future founded on a culture of meritocracy, efficiency, creativity, empowerment, and accountability that enables timely, risk-informed decisions. DCSA's struggles to deliver INBIS and implement trusted workforce two point zero are but symptoms of the deeper cultural problems I have outlined. These two efforts are not merely programs. They are the backbone of our national security personnel vetting enterprise. Their delivery is non-negotiable. While the Government Accountability Office rightly noted recent progress on the INBIS program's cost and schedule estimates, we must be honest that this proj pro progress is fragile. Without the cultural and structural reforms we are now implementing, technical gains alone, will not secure success. Absent this transformation and a refocus on its core mission, DCSA would surely continue to fail to meet its targets for Imbiss development and deployment. We look forward to partnering with GAO to give us an objective look at the agency, as we continue to make reforms. Under Secretary Hansel and I share as a top priority the delivery and development of Imbiss by fiscal year twenty twenty eight. He and I are aided in this task by the Under-Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Honorable Mike Duffy, who has designated Imbiss as an acquisition category one special interest program, subjecting it to the highest level of scrutiny. At DCSA, we are overhauling our governance, acquisition strategy, and partnership with industry to ensure every decision serves the core mission. Through the trusted workforce implementation group, we work to validate the policy requirements and make sure that they are mature through the executive agents and are translated into real-world capabilities delivered by Imbiss. These goals are to get people to work faster, eliminate waste, optimize risk management, and improve the experience for our government customers. While the full transition to trusted workforce two point zero and Imbiss will be complete by FY twenty twenty eight, We are accelerating the development of key capabilities now, including adjudicative improvements for public trust cases, expanded use of interim secret clearances, and broader application of vetting services features. Even with a renewed vision, this will not be easy. Imbiss is a massive undertaking intended to replace deeply entrenched legacy systems across the federal government. Getting this right is as important as getting it done quickly. DCSA now has the appropriate oversight, a clear mandate for change, and a leadership team committed to transparency within the department, with partners in the inter- agency, industry, and other stakeholders, and with you here in Congress. The exceptional team at DCSA is the driving force that will make this transformation possible. My commitment to you is that I will continue to foster a culture of innovation and accountability that empowers them, and that I will maintain oversight in my role as Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security. We appreciate Congress's engagement on this critical issue, and look forward to demonstrating through our actions and results that DCSA is on a new and better path. Thank you, and I look forward to addressing your questions.

Thank you very much. The gentleman is now recognized.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify again on GAO's work on personnel vetting, and specifically the National Background Investigation Services System, or NVIS for short. As you know, the U. S. government relies on over four million personnel with security clearances to protect our nation. Personnel vetting helps ensure a trusted workforce. but the government has struggled with managing this process for years. This issue has been on GAO's high risk list since twenty eighteen, due in part to challenges with IT systems. Reform is urgently needed. The federal government is taking too long to grant security clearances to essential personnel. For example, it takes over two hundred days to grant a top secret clearance. This is eighty percent longer than the government's goal. As you know, after a massive cyber security breach of OPM systems in twenty fifteen, the President tasked DOD with building a new IT system to manage personal vetting. The department began developing INVIS in twenty sixteen. My statement today focuses on the department's progress with INVIS and what actions are still needed to ensure its success and achieve personal vetting reform. First, the good news. DCSA has made progress addressing our recommendations. It now has a reliable cost estimate for INBIS for the first time ever. A reliable estimate should help the program better manage expenses, avoid unexpected increases, and promote transparency. However, the government is years late in delivering INBIS. This failure happened in part because DCSA had not developed a reliable schedule as we first recommended several years ago. DOD had originally planned for NBIS to be fully functional in twenty nineteen, and has changed its deadline several times since then. In twenty twenty four, DCSA paused NBIS development while it drafted a recovery plan. Just last summer, the department began development again. DCSA now projects it will finish NBIS development in twenty twenty seven, or FY twenty twenty eight according to DCSA's statement. This is nearly a decade after its original goal. The latest NBIS schedule shows some improvements in key areas, but overall we find that it is still not reliable, putting NBIS at risk of further delays. Notably, DCSA has not done a risk analysis and thus cannot determine where slippage is most likely to occur. Without implementing this best practice, it cannot effectively target actions to milestones there are that are at the most risk. We are making new recommendations in our written statement today for DCSA to address these and other deficiencies. Having a reliable schedule is a basic program management principle. We agree with Mister Overbaugh, DCSA needs to get this right, given the program's history of missed milestones. Further, while DCSA has a reliable cost estimate for NBIS now, delays have caused the price tag to balloon. The department has already spent at least two point four billion dollars developing new NBIS systems and maintaining OPM's legacy systems. It now projects spending an additional two point two billion to finish NBIS, bringing the total cost to the taxpayer to about four point six billion dollars. This is a one hundred percent increase over DCSA's previous projections. Finally, strong and sustained leadership is critically important, especially with high-risk government programs like this one. When I last testified, INBIS had been failing. Since then, DCSA has taken some important actions to try to get things on track, but shortcomings still persist. This at a time when DCSA does not have a permanent director and the time it takes to get a security clearance continues to far exceed goals. Strong leadership and oversight, like the important work this subcommittee is doing, are essential for the program to continue to make improvements and ultimately deliver what it has promised. Simply put, personnel vetting reform has the potential to better protect our country. But the IT must be in place for this to happen. Mister Chairman, Mister Ranking Members and members of this subcommittee, thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much. Uh, detailed information about what needs to be accomplished I think is very clear from your constant reports, and I appreciate that. We now move to our members, and I will move to the distinguished gentlewoman

uh thank you mister chairman um no one put in my notes that i should be very concerned about this but i am along with all of you this what our witnesses have said today is very very troubling but let me say last fall the subcommittee was supposed to hear from d. c. s. a. director catler shortly before he left federal service. While I appreciate Mister Overbaugh's attendance here today as acting director, I'm disappointed there's still no permanent replacement for director Kettler. As Miss Shiz just said, steady leadership is important for continuity and accountability. The National Background Investigation Service needs to become operational. Having a permanent director and NCSA would send a strong message that the DOD is serious about the issue. Can you elaborate, Mister Overbaugh, on how delays in the implementation of MBIS impacts other federal agencies that rely on timely clearances?

Representative Fox, I can. It's very clear to me that the entire federal government and all the agencies and partners that rely on DCSA to deliver trusted workforce two point zero um are impacted when employees cannot get to work in a timely and efficient manner.

Well, as a follow-up, based on DCSA's recent review of NIMBA's implementation, what actions are you and others taking to get it back on track? We've just heard it's gonna cost an additional two point two billion dollars and be delayed to twenty twenty seven, twenty twenty, twenty eight. What in the world are you all doing?

That's the exact question that I asked uh Representative Fox when I took over the agency uh in November. I can tell you that the that our teammates at at DCSA have done a fantastic job on establishing the technology required within this to ensure that we can get to trusted workforce two point zero. What the agency had failed to do, however, in the past was match emerging requirements, the business or the mission side, if you will, if you will, with that technology. As a result of that identified failure, the trusted workforce integration group was stood up. That brought together our technology specialists along with our operations and mission side. Together, they produced, over the last couple months, uh, key set of milestones that we can use to judge DCSA's performance on delivering trusted workforce two point zero, moving forward. And those milestones are laid out in the PAC principle, the Performance Accountability Council's FY twenty-six implementation strategy.

You've heard of it.

Now, this is a great step forward and it gives us something that we can sink our tees into to hold ourselves accountable for progress. It's not complete. We need to do more here. We need to to use these milestones to break down um almost a complete work um breakdown structure. So we're then able to identify the things that our GAO partners have have told us are critically important, namely critical paths and the identification of risks. Um that is forthcoming. We're looking forward to producing that document in March uh, April time frame, and would certainly look forward in future interactions with this body, to share the, the work that we've done there.

And the, the Chairman mentioned the issue of transparency and the need for that. Are you committing that, um, the reports and the progress are all going to be transparent?

Without question.

Thank you. Uh, Miss Shiz, In the committee's twenty twenty-four hearing you raised concerns about cyber security privacy protections has DCSA taken concrete steps to mitigate those risk and have have you seen evidence these steps are effective?

Yes, DCSA has taken swift action to address our recommendations. At the time of our last hearing we put out a report with thirteen recommendations, mostly focused on the management of cyber security making sure that there is current guidance and effective oversight um The previous DCSA director director Catler uh made it a priority to implement all of those recommendations within one year which is very fast for a GAO report to have all recommendations closed in one year so we're we think that that's a very positive effort uh DCSA does need to remain very very vigilant on this this is the whole reason that the department has responded responsibility for personal vetting because of that cyber security breach in twenty fifteen that compromised as uh the chairman mentioned uh data on over twenty two million uh federal employees and contractors we do have work that's not available in the public setting to discuss looking more specifically at INBIS and testing of cyber security controls and issued a re recent report uh in December on that which we have discussed with DCSA but we are confident that they are taking it seriously yes.

thank you very much and thank you mister chairman for um recognize me wait uh yield back

gentleman yields back her time thank you very much the gentleman mister is recognized

thank you mister chairman i want to yield to the gentleman from virginia mister walkinshaw who has waved onto the committee and i'll pick up with my questions at at some other point in the hearing mister walkinshaw

thank you i thank the ranking member and and mister chairman thank you for Having me today and to our witnesses for being here, Mister uh Overbaugh, as you laid out in your testimony, you have many responsibilities in your role as Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security. I know that in your role you serve as Acting Director of DCSA, as we're discussing today. You oversee DIA, NGA, the NRO, the NSA. You serve as an advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense on intelligence-related matters. And given all of that, I guess my question for you is uh well why should the committee and the American people have confidence that you can manage this multi-billion dollar critical modernization while performing your many other duties including safeguarding our nation's secrets from adversaries ensuring proper vetting of individuals with access to classified information and as I noted acting as an advisor to the Under Secretary.

Uh, Representative Walkinshaw, I appreciate that question very much. And the short answer is I'm surrounded by a fantastic group of teammates who are assisting me in this endeavor. I have, uh, down at DCSA as Acting Deputy Director, Miss Tara Jones, who also comes from our office at the, uh, Undersecretary of War for Intelligence and Security. In addition, we have Acting Chief of Staff, Colonel Brooke Carr. Um, our team, uh, down there Um, and they're down there on a permanent basis to assist and lead that, uh, assist me in leading that organization. And I have fantastic teammates as well, uh, up in my office in the Pentagon. And so while I understand from an external perspective, it looks like we are stretched thin, and in all honesty there are times when it feels like it. But I'll tell you that the passion that we have as a group of teammates to get this task right energizes all of us and the entire team. Um, and quite honestly, um, it's an honor and a blessing to be able, um, to do this.

Thank you. In a recent, a January twenty second, twenty twenty six, uh, briefing with committee staff here, I think it's accurate that you said you intended to eliminate what you've called inefficiencies within DCSA and suggested, and you can correct me if this is wrong, that you felt there was a need to eliminate positions at the agency. So are you planning to reduce the workforce at DCSA? And and if so, how will you ensure that those cuts to the workforce don't further derail this critical modernization?

I think DCSA faces a challenge, representative, uh, that the entire government faces and quite frankly, our our society, uh, writ large faces, and that is the impact that technology is having and is going to have on the way that we work. moving forward. Um, DCSA faces this dynamic uh quite acutely with our responsibility to implement IMBIS and trusted workforce two point zero. I can't say at this time exactly what the workforce of the future at DCSA looks like exactly but I know that we have an obligation to empower our teammates to ensure that they can be as effective as humanly possible uh in the future of work.

So you don't have any immediate plans to reduce the workforce Short or medium term.

Quite the contrary, uh, Representative Walkinshaw, we are constantly looking at the DCSA organization and determining where we can find efficiencies. I have no implementable plans at this time, but it is something that we will be looking at moving forward.

Okay. One of the things I understand this committee has asked for previously as an organizational chart for your staffing and any proposed changes is that something you c- can commit to providing to us.

I would absolutely uh be happy to provide that to you once we have a clear understanding of the direction that that we think we need to go in.

OK. Thank you. Um, Mister Everbaub, DCSA's job, as you know, is to vet cleared personnel and ultimately ensure the protection of classified US government information. It is a cornerstone of our national security. I I appreciate the passion that you have for the work and your teammates have. I think I share the concerns on the dais here that the mandate is far too large and critical to function indefinitely under an acting director no matter how passionate we need a director focused on its counterintelligence mission, who has the skills and the bandwidth. I don't question that you have the skills, I question whether you have the bandwidth to keep this project moving forward. I hope you can commit to providing this committee with a hiring plan and criteria for a new director promptly. Thank you and I yield back.

Chairman yields back his time. Thank you very much. I've been approached by several members who planned to be in attendance today. I would move next to the gentleman, Mister Nfume, for any time he would choose.

Uh, thank you very much, Mister Chairman. I um, let me just be deliberately redundant for a quick second. Um. INVIS and the INVIS project is as you heard repeatedly today ten years behind schedule and already billions and billions over budget. So I'd like to know and by the way this keeps me up at night because America's secrets are at risk the longer we don't do what we ought to do here and the Russians and the Chinese who can tune in to Cspam whenever they want to to be assured that we're behind will look at what we're doing and year year after year get emboldened because we are so transparent about why and when we expect to have this this completed so mister overball when you look as you have been doing since uh november when you came on board at cost overruns which ones are the most apparent to you

Representative, or excuse me, um, ranking member Mfume, to, to me the, the most uh alerting is the, the overall amount of money that we've spent so far writ large, the two point four billion, and not delivering the capabilities that we promised over time to the American people. Um, it's, there are, there are, there are many details within that. The failure to, as I mentioned earlier, to match up the operations and business side with the technical side. There are there are redundancies and inefficiencies in there, but I think that that number overall, the two point four million, uh, correction billion, is inexcusable and one of the things that drives me and the team on a daily basis, um, to fix the things in the past that we have not done well, so that we can deliver for the American people.

Do do you think your predecessor felt the same way, was driven the same way?

Uh, I I won't speak to the the intent or what was going on inside. uh the minds or hearts of any of my uh predecessors i know that the organization today sits ready um and they are excited about delivering for the american people

well and i understand it and i appreciate it but you have to realize what it's like to sit here year after year after year after year and be told the same thing that it's getting better the organization understands we've got the right path we're gonna be transparent And in that process, contractor after contractor is billing the United States government for services that I assume are never fully completed within that caveat saying we couldn't do this, we won't do this, or we need more money for that. That is very, very disturbing. It is not your fault. I'm just giving you the history of how we got to this point and why it is so very disturbing to us. Uh, the - you've heard the term " fat rats", well, a lot of making out with a lot of money. and not providing the kind of service that they are being contracted for and paid for. And, Mrs., if if I could just ask you the same question, uh, were there some identifiable cost overruns that repeatedly, year after year, GAO looks at, identifies, and points out?

Yes. In fact, our previous analysis showed that DCS or DCSA did not have a reliable cost estimate for INVIS. it was not accurate, it was not comprehensive, it was not credible, and it was not well documented. So we can't tell you where where the problems were. It was across the entire estimate. It could not be relied upon for planning. Um, now they have taken important steps, including, uh, conducting an independent cost estimate, uh, to get a better handle on costs. So we're at a better place now. Uh, that estimate needs to be updated annually. And so I advise the subcommittee to stay on top of DCSA as we will uh to make sure that that is updated annually with actual costs. But they are better positioned now. Unfortunately, and if I can kind of veer off a little bit,

Mm-hmm.

um earlier on in the program I think one of the key shortcomings was a lack of oversight, right. So DCSA was really policing itself in its actions. No one broader in the department was taking a look. at what DCSA was doing as INVIS was going off the rails. There were some steps put in place uh for INS uh where Mister Overbaugh is from to be now the program's sponsor and then even higher within the department uh to have milestone decision authority. There were some other mechanisms put in place, the requirements board for example that's supposed to meet quarterly and some other reporting requirements where we do still have concerns is some of these oversight mechanisms are great that they're in place but we're not actually seeing them working as they're supposed to be working so that requirements board that i just mentioned is supposed to meet quarterly we would think it met last friday but before then had only met in june right so maybe once a year so it's good to put those mechanisms in place but you have to exercise the oversight as well too so that's something that we'll be taking a look at as the program moves on making sure that oversight is actually working.

And and what would GAO immediately recommend be done uh as you look at where we are in this process notwithstanding the things you just mentioned.