“An Update on DoD’s Struggling Background Check System”

[Gavel sounds.] The Subcommittee on Government Operations will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of the subcommittee at any time. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Today, we are here to discuss the Department of Defense's ongoing efforts to modernize its background check system. For years, the GAO and this committee have highlighted the significant challenges and delays in the security clearance process. These delays not only impact our national security but also the lives of thousands of dedicated public servants and contractors who are waiting to serve their country. The transition to the National Background Investigation Services, or NBIS, was intended to streamline this process and provide a more secure and efficient system. However, as we will hear today, the implementation of NBIS has been fraught with technical difficulties, cost overruns, and schedule delays. We need to understand why these issues persist and what the Department is doing to address them. Our witnesses today are on the front lines of this effort, and I look forward to their testimony on how we can ensure that our background check system is robust, reliable, and ready for the challenges of the 21st century. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Mfume, for his opening statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this important hearing. The security clearance process is a critical component of our national security infrastructure. It ensures that those who have access to our nation's most sensitive information are trustworthy and reliable. However, the current system is clearly broken. The backlog of background investigations has reached unacceptable levels, and the technology supporting the process is outdated and inefficient. The Department of Defense has a responsibility to provide a system that is both secure and timely. The delays we are seeing are not just administrative hurdles; they represent a real risk to our national security. When talented individuals are forced to wait months or even years for a clearance, they often look for opportunities elsewhere, and our government loses out on their expertise. I am particularly concerned about the impact of these delays on small businesses and contractors who may not have the resources to wait out a lengthy clearance process. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the steps being taken to modernize the system and reduce the backlog.

Thank you, Mr. Mfume. I would now like to introduce our witnesses. Ms. Alissa Czyz is the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. Justin Overbaugh is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Acting Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. We appreciate you both being here today. If you would please rise and raise your right hand, I will swear you in. Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

I do.

I do.

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated. Ms. Czyz, you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAO's work on the Department of Defense's efforts to modernize its background investigation system. For decades, the federal government's process for determining whether individuals are eligible for a security clearance has been on GAO's High-Risk List. While DOD has made some progress in reducing the investigation backlog, significant challenges remain in developing and deploying the National Background Investigation Services, or NBIS. NBIS is intended to be the primary IT system for end-to-end background investigation processes. However, our work has identified several areas of concern. First, DOD has struggled to define the full requirements for NBIS, leading to uncertainty about the system's ultimate capabilities and cost. Second, the schedule for deploying NBIS has slipped repeatedly. Originally expected to be fully operational by 2019, the timeline has been pushed back multiple times, and a full deployment date remains uncertain. Third, DOD has not yet developed a reliable cost estimate for the program. Without a clear understanding of the costs, it is difficult for Congress to provide effective oversight. Finally, there are ongoing concerns about the system's cybersecurity and its ability to protect sensitive personal information. Our reports have made numerous recommendations to address these issues, including the need for better project management and more transparent reporting. While the Department has agreed with many of our recommendations, implementation has been slow. We continue to monitor the situation closely and will provide updates to this committee as our work progresses. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Ms. Czyz. Mr. Overbaugh, you are now recognized for five minutes.

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on the Department of Defense's efforts to modernize the background investigation process. As the Acting Director of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, or DCSA, I am responsible for ensuring that our nation's workforce is vetted thoroughly and efficiently. We recognize that the current system is not meeting the needs of our customers or the expectations of this committee. The transition to NBIS is a complex undertaking, involving the migration of millions of records and the integration of multiple legacy systems. We have encountered significant technical hurdles, particularly in the areas of data integration and system performance. However, we are making progress. We have successfully deployed several core components of NBIS, and we are seeing improvements in the speed and accuracy of our investigations. We are also working closely with our partners at GAO and across the federal government to address the concerns raised in their reports. We have established a more robust project management structure and are improving our cost and schedule estimates. Cybersecurity remains a top priority, and we are implementing rigorous testing and monitoring to ensure the security of our systems. We understand the urgency of this mission and are committed to delivering a modern, secure, and efficient background investigation system. I want to thank the dedicated professionals at DCSA who work every day to protect our national security. I look forward to your questions and to working with you to improve this critical process.

Thank you, Mr. Overbaugh. We will now move to the question and answer portion of the hearing. I will recognize myself for five minutes. Mr. Overbaugh, you mentioned that the deployment of NBIS has been delayed several times. Can you give us a specific date for when the system will be fully operational? And what are the primary factors that have contributed to these delays? It seems like every time we have one of these hearings, the date gets pushed back another year or two. At what point can we expect a finished product that actually works as intended?

Chairman, I understand your frustration. We are working as quickly as possible to bring NBIS fully online. Currently, we are targeting a full operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2025. The delays have been caused by a variety of factors, including the complexity of the legacy data we are migrating and the need to ensure that the system meets all security requirements. We are also dealing with the challenges of integrating new technologies into an existing infrastructure. We are taking a phased approach to deployment to ensure that each component is stable and secure before moving to the next. This approach, while slower, is necessary to avoid major system failures that could compromise our investigations.

Ms. Czyz, in your testimony, you mentioned that the Department has not yet developed a reliable cost estimate for NBIS. How can we be sure that the money being spent on this program is being used effectively if we don't even know what the total cost is supposed to be? And what impact does this lack of transparency have on your ability to conduct oversight?

Mr. Chairman, the lack of a reliable cost estimate is a major concern. Without a baseline, it is impossible to measure progress or identify cost overruns. It also makes it difficult for Congress to make informed decisions about funding. In our work, we have found that the Department's estimates have often been incomplete or based on unrealistic assumptions. This lack of transparency hinders our ability to provide the kind of rigorous oversight that is needed for a program of this size and importance. We have recommended that the Department develop a comprehensive cost estimate that follows best practices, and we will continue to push for more transparency in this area.

Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Mfume, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I want to follow up on the issue of the investigation backlog. We've heard reports that some individuals are waiting over a year for a top-secret clearance. What is the current average wait time for a secret and a top-secret clearance, and what specific steps are you taking to reduce these times? It's not just about the technology; it's about the people who are waiting to start their jobs and serve their country.

Ranking Member Mfume, reducing the backlog is one of our highest priorities. Currently, the average time for a secret clearance is approximately 100 days, and for a top-secret clearance, it is about 180 days. While these numbers are an improvement over previous years, they are still higher than our targets. We are taking several steps to address this, including hiring additional investigators and using automated tools to speed up the vetting process. We are also working to improve the quality of the initial applications to reduce the need for follow-up investigations. The full implementation of NBIS will also play a critical role in streamlining the process and reducing wait times.

Ms. Czyz, you mentioned cybersecurity concerns. Given the sensitive nature of the data being handled by NBIS, a breach could have devastating consequences. What are the most significant cybersecurity risks you've identified, and is the Department doing enough to mitigate them? We've seen major data breaches in the past, and we cannot afford another one.

The cybersecurity risks are indeed significant. NBIS will contain highly sensitive personal information on millions of individuals. The primary risks include unauthorized access to the system, data breaches, and the potential for insider threats. While the Department has implemented many security controls, our work has identified gaps in their testing and monitoring processes. We have recommended that the Department conduct more frequent and comprehensive security assessments and that they improve their ability to detect and respond to cyber incidents. It is essential that cybersecurity is integrated into every stage of the system's development and operation.

Thank you. I yield back.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I'm a little confused. We've spent hundreds of millions of dollars on this system, and we still don't have a clear idea of when it will be finished or how much it will ultimately cost. In the private sector, if a project was this far behind schedule and over budget, people would be fired. Why should the American taxpayers continue to fund a program that seems to be a bottomless pit of money with very little to show for it? It seems like we're just throwing good money after bad.

Congressman, I understand your concerns. The development of NBIS is a massive and complex undertaking, and we have certainly faced challenges. However, I believe that the progress we are making justifies the continued investment. A modern background investigation system is essential for our national security, and the legacy systems we are currently using are increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. We are committed to being good stewards of taxpayer dollars and are working hard to ensure that NBIS is delivered as efficiently as possible. We are also implementing more rigorous oversight and accountability measures to ensure that the program stays on track.

...and the transition to NBIS. Mr. Overbaugh, in your testimony, you mentioned that DCSA is working to modernize the legacy systems while simultaneously building NBIS. How are you ensuring that the legacy systems remain secure during this prolonged transition?

Thank you, Congressman. That is a critical priority for us. We have a dedicated team focused on the sustainment and cybersecurity of our legacy environment. We are applying continuous monitoring and regular patching to those systems. However, the age of the underlying infrastructure does present challenges, which is why the migration to the more modern, cloud-based architecture of NBIS is so vital for our long-term security posture.

Ms. Czyz, GAO has expressed concerns about the lack of a reliable schedule and cost estimate for NBIS. Without these, how can Congress effectively oversee this program and ensure it doesn't become a bottomless pit for taxpayer dollars?

Congressman, that is exactly the concern we've highlighted. Without a baseline that includes a realistic schedule and a comprehensive cost estimate, it's very difficult to measure progress or hold the department accountable. We've recommended that DOD develop a solution that follows best practices for scheduling and cost estimation so that there is a clear roadmap and a way to track whether the program is meeting its milestones and staying within budget.

Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Mfume, for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I want to go back to the issue of the workforce. We've heard about the backlog in the past, and while numbers have improved, there's still a significant amount of time it takes to get someone cleared. How is the delay in NBIS implementation specifically impacting the speed of background investigations today?

Mr. Mfume, the current legacy systems are largely manual and siloed. NBIS is designed to automate many of those processes and allow for better data sharing. While we have made significant strides in reducing the backlog using our current tools, we are reaching the limit of what those old systems can do. NBIS will allow us to move toward continuous Vetting more broadly, which will eventually replace the need for periodic reinvestigations and further streamline the entire process.

But until NBIS is fully operational, are we essentially stuck with the current timelines, or are there other efficiencies you're finding in the interim?

We are constantly looking for efficiencies. For example, we've implemented some IT enhancements within the legacy framework to speed up certain data checks. We've also optimized our investigator workflows. So we are not standing still, but the quantum leap in efficiency really depends on the full deployment of the NBIS capabilities.

Ms. Czyz, in your review, did you find that the department has a clear plan for decommissioning the legacy systems once NBIS is up, or is there a risk we'll be paying for both for years to come?

There is a high risk of that, Congressman. Currently, the plan for decommissioning is tied to the successful deployment of NBIS modules. Because those modules have been delayed, the timeline for turning off the legacy systems has also slipped. This results in what we call 'double-paying'—maintaining the old systems while trying to build and run the new one. Without a firm end date for NBIS, the costs for legacy maintenance continue to mount.

Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett.

Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I'm a simple guy from Tennessee. If I hire a contractor to build a house and they keep moving the move-in date and telling me it's going to cost more than they said, I'd fire them. Why shouldn't we feel the same way about this NBIS project? It's been years, and we're still hearing about 'modules' and 'transitions.' When is the house going to be finished?

Congressman, I understand the frustration. This is a massive undertaking involving the security of the entire federal workforce. We took over this program from OPM in 2019, and we've had to re-architect much of it to ensure it meets modern security standards. We are delivering capabilities now—it's not all in the future. We have thousands of users already in the system. But to get to the full 'move-in' date you're describing, we have to ensure every security protocol is perfect.

Well, 'perfect' is the enemy of 'good enough' sometimes in government. Are we over-engineering this thing? Is that why it's taking so long?

I wouldn't say over-engineering, but the threat environment has changed. The cyber threats we face today are much more sophisticated than when this project was first conceived. We have to build a system that can withstand those threats, or the entire background check process is compromised.

Ms. Czyz, does GAO think they're being realistic about these cyber requirements, or is it just a convenient excuse for the delays?

The cyber requirements are certainly real and necessary. However, our concern is that the department hasn't integrated those requirements into a cohesive project management framework. When you change requirements mid-stream without updating your cost and schedule baselines, you lose control of the project. That's what we've seen happen here. It's not just the complexity of the task; it's the management of that complexity.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlewoman from North Carolina, Ms. Foxx.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I'm concerned about the impact on small businesses that contract with the DOD. They often can't afford to wait months or years for their employees to get cleared. How is the current state of the background check system affecting the industrial base, particularly the smaller players?

Congresswoman, that's a very important point. We recognize that for a small business, a delay in a clearance can mean the difference between winning or losing a contract. We have a dedicated office that works with industry to prioritize those cases where possible. NBIS will eventually provide a more transparent portal for companies to track the status of their employees' clearances, which should help with their planning and reduce some of that uncertainty.

But 'eventually' doesn't help them today. What are you doing right now to ensure that small businesses aren't being squeezed out because of these bureaucratic delays?

We've worked to stabilize the investigative timelines. For most secret-level clearances, we are meeting the goals set by the Reform Board. Top secret clearances still take longer, but we've seen those times come down significantly from the peaks of a few years ago. We also encourage the use of interim clearances where appropriate, which allows individuals to start work while the full investigation is completed.

Ms. Czyz, has GAO looked at the impact on the private sector specifically regarding these delays?

We have heard from industry groups that the lack of predictability is the biggest challenge. It's not just the total time; it's not knowing when a clearance will come through. The legacy systems don't provide the kind of real-time tracking that modern businesses expect. While DCSA has made efforts to communicate better, the underlying technology limitations still create a lot of friction for the industrial base.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentlewoman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Frost.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about the human element here. We're talking a lot about systems and modules, but these are people's lives. People are waiting to start jobs, waiting to serve their country. Mr. Overbaugh, what is the average wait time right now for a standard secret clearance, and how does that compare to where we were two years ago?

For the fastest 90 percent of secret clearances, we are currently averaging around 40 to 50 days. Two years ago, that number was closer to 70 or 80 days. So we have seen a marked improvement. For top secret, we're around 110 to 120 days, down from over 150. We are meeting the current IRTPA goals, but we know we need to do better to meet the more ambitious goals of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative.

And how many people are currently in the 'backlog'—meaning cases that have exceeded those target timelines?

We don't really have a 'backlog' in the sense of a massive pile of unassigned work like we did in 2018. We have a 'steady state' inventory of about 200,000 cases at any given time. Most of those are moving through the process within the expected timeframes. The number of cases that are truly 'overdue' is a small fraction of that, usually due to complexities like foreign travel or foreign contacts that require more investigation.

Ms. Czyz, does GAO agree with that assessment of the backlog? Is the 'steady state' inventory a fair way to describe it?

The inventory has certainly stabilized, which is a positive development. However, the concern is that the 'steady state' is built on a very fragile foundation of legacy IT. If one of those systems has a major failure, that inventory could quickly turn back into a backlog. Also, while the average times are better, there is still a lot of variability, and for the individuals on the long end of that curve, the impact is still very significant.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I want to talk about the data. One of the goals of NBIS was to allow for better data analytics to identify insider threats. With the delays in NBIS, are we missing opportunities to catch people who shouldn't have access to classified information?

Congressman, we are not waiting for NBIS to do insider threat analysis. We have existing capabilities and the National Insider Threat Task Force that work across the enterprise. However, NBIS will provide a much more integrated data environment. It will allow us to pull in disparate data sets more quickly and use more advanced algorithms. So while we are performing the mission today, NBIS will significantly enhance our ability to connect the dots.

But isn't it true that some of the data you need is still stuck in paper files or in systems that don't talk to each other?

There is still some of that, yes. We are working to digitize those records. One of the major components of NBIS is the eApp, which is the new digital storefront for applicants to enter their data. That is already live and is helping us get cleaner, more usable data from the very beginning of the process. But you're right, the full integration of all relevant data sources is a key goal that we are still working toward.

Ms. Czyz, how much of a risk is this data fragmentation while we wait for NBIS?

It's a significant risk. The whole point of the reform was to move away from a 'snapshot in time' investigation to continuous vetting. Continuous vetting requires real-time data feeds. If those feeds are going into legacy systems that can't process them effectively, or if the data is siloed, you lose the primary benefit of the reform. The delay in NBIS is directly delaying the full realization of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 vision.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlewoman from Washington, Ms. Randall.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm interested in the cost aspect. We've seen the budget requests for NBIS continue to grow. Mr. Overbaugh, can you explain why the costs keep increasing even as the timeline slips? Usually, if you're doing less work in a year, the cost for that year should go down, but that doesn't seem to be the case here.

The costs are driven by a few factors. First, as I mentioned, we are maintaining the legacy systems longer than planned, which is a significant unbudgeted expense. Second, the cost of cybersecurity has increased. We've had to implement more rigorous controls than were originally envisioned. And third, we are using an agile development process, which means we are constantly iterating and improving the software based on user feedback. While this leads to a better product, it can make the year-to-year costs fluctuate.

But 'agile' shouldn't mean 'open-ended.' At some point, there has to be a finished product. Do you have a total lifecycle cost estimate for NBIS at this point?

We are currently working on an updated lifecycle cost estimate as part of our re-baselining effort. We expect to have that completed and vetted by the end of this fiscal year. We want to make sure that when we provide a number to this committee, it is one that we can stand behind and that accounts for all the complexities we've discussed.

Ms. Czyz, has GAO seen any preliminary numbers, and are they concerned about the direction they're heading?

We haven't seen a finalized new estimate. The last formal baseline is several years old and is clearly no longer valid. Our concern is that without a current baseline, the department is essentially spending money without a clear yardstick for success. We've seen other major IT projects in the government fail because they lacked this kind of basic financial discipline. We hope the new estimate will be comprehensive and independently verified.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentlewoman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gill.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I want to talk about the transition from OPM to DOD. It's been about five years now. Looking back, was that the right move? It seems like a lot of the problems we're seeing now stem from that transition and the difficulty of moving a massive IT project between departments.

I believe it was the right move. The Department of Defense has the expertise and the mission focus to handle this. The background check system is a national security asset, and it belongs in a national security department. That said, the transition was incredibly complex. We didn't just inherit a project; we inherited a set of legacy systems that were in much worse shape than was initially understood. We've spent a lot of time just stabilizing the patient before we could start the surgery.

But if the patient was that sick, why did it take so long to realize it? Did DOD not do its due diligence before taking over the program?

There was a lot of analysis done, but some things you only discover once you're 'under the hood.' The level of technical debt in the legacy systems was extraordinary. We also had to stand up a whole new agency, DCSA, at the same time we were trying to fix the IT. It was a lot to take on at once. But I am confident that we are on the right path now, even if it's taking longer than anyone would like.

Ms. Czyz, what's GAO's take on the transition? Was it handled as well as it could have been?

We've issued several reports on the transition. While the logic of moving it to DOD made sense from a mission perspective, the execution lacked a clear plan from the start. There were gaps in leadership, gaps in funding, and a lack of clear requirements. Many of the issues we're discussing today—the schedule slips, the cost increases—can be traced back to those early days of the transition when the foundation for NBIS was being laid.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm concerned about the impact on federal employees, many of whom live in my district. When there are delays or errors in the background check process, it can have a devastating impact on their careers. Mr. Overbaugh, what are you doing to ensure that the data in the new NBIS system is accurate and that employees have a way to correct errors?

Congresswoman, data integrity is a top priority. The eApp system I mentioned earlier has built-in validation checks to help applicants avoid common mistakes. We also have a robust process for individuals to review and contest information in their files. NBIS will make this more efficient by providing a more user-friendly interface for employees to interact with the system. We want the process to be as transparent and fair as possible.

And what about the security of their personal data? We all remember the OPM breach. How can you assure my constituents that their most sensitive personal information is safe in NBIS?

That is the very reason we are building NBIS the way we are. It is built on a 'zero trust' architecture, which is the highest standard for cybersecurity today. We have multiple layers of encryption, continuous monitoring, and strict access controls. We are working closely with the best cyber experts in the DOD and the intelligence community to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. Protecting that data is our most sacred obligation.

Ms. Czyz, has GAO audited the security features of NBIS yet?

We have not done a deep-dive technical audit of the security controls yet, as the system is still under development. However, we have looked at the management of the security requirements. Our concern is that if the project continues to slip and face budget pressure, there might be a temptation to cut corners on testing or security validation to meet a deadline. We will be watching that very closely as the program moves toward full deployment.

Thank you. I yield back.

The gentlewoman yields back. We have a few minutes left before we have to break for votes. I'd like to ask one follow-up question to Mr. Overbaugh. You mentioned that you're re-baselining the program. When you come back to us with that new baseline, will it include a hard 'sunset' date for the legacy systems? I think this committee needs to see a date on the calendar when we stop paying for the old technology.

Mr. Chairman, that is our goal. The re-baselining will include a phased decommissioning plan for the legacy systems. I can't give you a single date today because it will happen in stages as different modules of NBIS come online. But yes, the plan will show a clear path to turning off the old systems and the cost savings we expect to achieve by doing so. We want to be as transparent as possible about that transition.

I appreciate that. We will be looking for that. Mr. Mfume, do you have any final questions for this round?

Just one, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, there have been reports of morale issues within DCSA, partly due to the stress of this transition and the pressure to meet these goals. How are you addressing the needs of your workforce during this time?

It's a challenge, Congressman. Our people are working incredibly hard on a very difficult mission. We are trying to provide them with the best tools and training possible. We've also increased our internal communications to make sure everyone understands the 'why' behind the changes we're making. We know that our people are our greatest asset, and we can't succeed without them. We are committed to supporting them through this transition.

Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you. The committee will stand in recess until the conclusion of the current vote series on the House floor. We expect to resume in approximately 45 minutes. The witnesses are excused for the break but are requested to return for further questioning. The committee is in recess. ...and that is why we are so focused on the NBIS transition. Mr. Overbaugh, you mentioned the legacy systems are still running. How much is it costing the taxpayer to maintain those while we wait for NBIS to be fully operational?

Thank you, Congressman. It is a significant expense. We are currently spending approximately $100 million annually just to maintain the legacy infrastructure. This includes hardware maintenance, software patches for aging code, and the personnel required to keep these systems secure against modern cyber threats. The sooner we can decommission them, the sooner we can reinvest those funds into modernizing our capabilities.

And Ms. Czyz, from the GAO perspective, is that $100 million figure consistent with what your team has found, or are there hidden costs that the Department might not be accounting for in that estimate?

Our work suggests that the $100 million is likely a floor rather than a ceiling. When you factor in the productivity loss of investigators using slower, non-integrated systems and the potential risks associated with delayed adjudications, the true cost to the federal government is much higher. Additionally, as we noted in our report, the lack of a reliable schedule for NBIS makes it very difficult for the Department to plan for the eventual sunsetting of these legacy systems.

I appreciate that. My time has expired. I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Mfume, for his five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I want to talk about the human element here. We talk a lot about IT systems and software, but behind every background check is a person waiting to start a job, often a veteran or a high-skilled professional. What is the current average wait time for a Top Secret clearance, and how does that compare to the goals set by the Trusted V.2.0 initiative?

Ranking Member Mfume, for the fastest 90 percent of Top Secret cases, we are currently averaging about 110 days. Our goal under Trusted V.2.0 is to get that down significantly. While we have made progress since the backlog crisis of 2018, we recognize that 110 days is still a long time for someone to be in limbo, especially in the private sector where companies may not be able to wait four months for a new hire to start.

It is indeed. And if NBIS continues to face delays, does that 110-day number start to creep back up? Are we at risk of seeing another massive backlog like the one that reached 725,000 cases a few years ago?

We are working very hard to ensure that does not happen. We have stabilized the inventory. However, the efficiency gains we expect from NBIS—such as automated record checks and better data sharing—are critical to meeting the more aggressive timelines of Trusted V.2.0. Without those system improvements, we are essentially running as fast as we can on a treadmill that is starting to age.

Ms. Czyz, do you share that concern about the potential for a new backlog?

Yes, we do. One of the primary reasons GAO placed the government-wide personnel vetting process on our High-Risk List is exactly that volatility. While the backlog is currently managed, it is fragile. Any significant increase in the number of clearance requests or a major failure in the legacy IT systems could quickly lead to another spike in wait times. The modernization of NBIS is the linchpin for long-term stability.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlewoman from North Carolina, Ms. Foxx.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Overbaugh, I am looking at the budget requests for NBIS over the last several years. It seems like we keep throwing money at this problem, yet the GAO tells us that the Department still hasn't established a reliable cost estimate or a realistic schedule. As a former educator, if a student kept asking for extensions without a clear plan to finish the project, they wouldn't pass the class. Why should this committee continue to authorize funding for a project that lacks basic management controls?

Congresswoman, I understand the frustration. When DCSA took over this mission from OPM and then from the previous DOD components, we inherited a very complex situation. We have recently overhauled our program management office. We are moving to an agile development framework which allows us to deliver capabilities in increments rather than waiting for one giant 'big bang' release. This gives us better visibility into what is working and what isn't.

But 'agile' shouldn't be an excuse for not having a deadline. When will the system be fully operational? Not just 'increments,' but when can we finally turn off the legacy systems that are costing us $100 million a year?

Our current target for full operational capability and the decommissioning of the primary legacy systems is fiscal year 2026. We are working closely with the GAO to ensure that our milestones for reaching that date are measurable and transparent. We are committed to providing this committee with quarterly updates on our progress against that 2026 goal.

Ms. Czyz, in 30 seconds, does GAO believe the 2026 date is realistic based on the current pace of development?

At this time, we cannot verify if that date is realistic because the Department has not yet completed the comprehensive integrated master schedule that follows best practices. Until that schedule is finalized and independently validated, any end date remains a best-case scenario rather than a data-driven projection.

That is what I feared. Thank you. I yield back.

...and that's why we're here today. I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony and for their service to our country. I also want to thank the Ranking Member for his participation and his staff for their hard work on this hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these important oversight issues.

Without objection, all members will have five legislative days within which to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. I ask our witnesses to please respond as promptly as you are able. This hearing is adjourned. [Gavel sounds.]