Summary
- The subcommittee examined Lebanon's stalled Hezbollah disarmament and cash economy, with witnesses urging conditioned U.S. aid and sanctions to restore state sovereignty.
- Hanin Ghaddar (Friedman Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy) said Hezbollah survives via unregulated cash economy and institutional capture, not just weapons.
- Rep. Lawler pressed Hanin Ghaddar on IRGC's $1 billion transfers and how unlicensed money exchanges sustain Hezbollah's illicit financial networks.
- Both parties backed LAF disarmament, but Democrats criticized Trump aid cuts while Republicans emphasized economic reforms and conditioning future assistance.
- Witnesses warned upcoming 2026 parliamentary elections and March French conference will test whether conditioned aid can accelerate disarmament north of Litani River.
Topics Discussed
Transcript
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hmm The subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to discuss key issues for US policy towards Lebanon. This includes efforts to strengthen state institutions, advance economic reform, and ensure Hezbollah's disarmament. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good morning. I want to begin by thanking my colleagues for being here today and our witnesses for taking the time to share their insights on this critically important issue, which frankly hasn't received sufficient scrutiny. Lebanon is at a crossroads. The November twenty twenty four ceasefire agreement that brought conflict between Israel and Hezbollah to an end has provided the international community with an unprecedented opportunity for Lebanon. Right now, we have the chance to help this government break free of the shackles of Iran's malign influence. Hezbollah's influence is vastly diminished, thanks in large part to decisive Israeli action. But difficult choices now need to be made to permanently block Hezbollah's path to power. The stability, sovereignty and long-term security of Lebanon depend on the Lebanese armed forces' ability to act as the sole legitimate military authority within the country. While the LAF has made initial progress towards ensuring Hezbollah's disarmament implementation of the LAF's five phase disarmament plan has been haphazard at best. Moreover, now more than ever it is absolutely vital that Lebanon delivers on long-promise economic and structural reforms, including the stipulat- those stipulated by the IMF in a real and meaningful way. Since twenty nineteen, Lebanon's banking sector has all but collapsed, thanks in no small part due to prolific cor- corruption. In that same period, the country's currency, the Lebanese Pound, has lost over ninety-seven percent of its value relative to the dollar, leading to unprecedented hyperinflation. This has given rise to a dollarized cash economy, one in which corruption thrives and Hezbollah's malign influence persists. So long as Lebanon's economy remains weak and unregulated, Hezbollah and their Iranian backers will retain access to cash flows. This will allow them to quietly rebuild their power base as well as their military arsenal, that threatens the stability of the entire region. Delivering on economic and structural reforms cannot just be an option or a second thought. These are vital, necessary conditions to set Lebanon on the right path, free from Hezbollah's malign influence. Not least because successfully implementing these reforms will open up Lebanon's ability to access much needed financial support from the international community including in areas formerly under Hezbollah's control. To be clear, no one wants to see a power vacuum emerge along Lebanon's border with Israel. I think we can all recognize how important it is for the Lebanese state to step up and start to deliver basic services there. But reinvesting in the same failed system that enabled Hezbollah's rise would be pure insanity. We'd merely be providing Hezbollah with an open door to undermine stability across the region at the expense of Lebanon's future. The international community needs to meet the moment. We cannot lose sight of the need to ensure the government fully delivers on long-pledged reforms. The stakes are too high. Ultimately, our goal is to ensure that American policy supports long-term stability and security across the Middle East. And that can only be achieved by closing the financial and regulatory loopholes that have allowed Hezbollah and its Iranian backers to thrive for far too long. I look forward to the day when these goals come to fruition, where Lebanon is a true partner in the Middle East, where they can join the Abraham Accords and seek normalization. And with that, I now recognize the ranking member for his opening remarks.
Thank you, Mr. Since its founding in nineteen eighty-two, Hezbollah, with Iran's backing, has waged a campaign of terror against the United States. against Israel and against the people of Lebanon. That has been deeply destructive for the entire region. Just a year after its founding, Hezbollah per- perpetrated the nineteen eighty-three Beirut Marine barracks bombings, murdering two hundred and forty-one brave US uh service members, as well as fifty-eight French military personnel. For decades, Lebanon has had to deal with this uh diminution of its own sovereignty. And Hizballah has targeted Americans, Israelis, and Jewish communities abroad, such as the nineteen ninety-four bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed eighty-five innocent people. Joining uh the uh Hamas massacre of October seventh, Hizballah launched thousands of rockets uh against Israeli civilians. uh bringing uh Lebanon into an unnecessary conflict. Uh fortunately however, and surprising some of the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah did not uh use all of its military power at the outset of the Hamas war against Israel. Hezbollah's terror campaign has contributed to the decline of Lebanon from what was once the Paris of the East, to a country suffering from prolonged economic and institutional collapse. And it is the Lebanese people who have paid the price. However, there is an opportunity for a new day in Lebanon. Thanks to the ITF taking out uh Hezbollah's arch terrorist Nasrallah Nasrallah in September of twenty twenty four, and the toppling of the Assad regime, uh the significant weakening of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the creation of a new Lebanese government. There is a historic opportunity in Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and remove its grip. on the Lebanese state, and particularly southern Lebanon. That window of opportunity, however, is narrow. Hezbollah is working hard to rebuild, rearm, and to re-constitute itself as a a major terrorist organization. Yet at a time when there is a historic opportunity to solidify American security interests by weakening Hezbollah's grip on Lebanon, there is a lack of urgency and a lack of the necessary support to anti-Hezbollah actors by the Trump administration as part of dismantling the US foreign assistance program. Uh, the Trump administration has cut non-security funding that the US has has historically provided to Lebanon. In practice, that means that instead of coordinating US support to uh help stabilize the government that is making progress on US interests, the administration began providing less support to Lebanon at the exact moment when this government was formed in February, twenty twenty five. Comments by Trump administration's special envoy have uh often sent the wrong signals particularly when special envoy uh Tom Barak downplayed Hezbollah and described it as a political party that is also has a uh let me quote him exactly a political party that also has a militant aspect to it. As a new Lebanese government considers uh necessary reforms and Lebanese armed forces uh make gains, uh aga- uh toward uh Hezbollah uh uh disarmament. Uh, this needs to continue and the United States must seize this uh historic opportunity to shore up security, economic and humanitarian assistance in support of the new Lebanese government and Lebanese armed forces. Such assistance of course must be contingent on continued timely progress on disarming Hezbollah and implementing necessary financial and election reforms particularly ahead of the parliamentary elections this year. they could either strengthen or undermine the anti-Hizballah government. Of course, uh, all support must be tied to real progress on disarmament in, uh, of Hizballah, including, uh, uh, going after weapons, uh, that are hidden in private res- residences in the south and beginning disarmament north of the Litani River. We must make no mistake, Hizballah is aggressively working to, uh, rearm and reconstitute the United States, Lebanon and the region have a generational opportunity in this moment to keep Hezbollah weakened, and we should not squander that opportunity. I yield back.
Thank you, the ranking member. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic the Honorable David Schoenecker the Taub Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Miss Hanin Gadar, the Friedman Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Miss Dan- and Miss Dana Struel, the Director of Research and the Shelley and Michael Kasson Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us, and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks, to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Mister Schenker for an opening statement.
Chairman Lawler, I recognize Chairman, it's an honor to testify before you today on US policy on Lebanon and the ongoing efforts to disarm Hezbollah. Today marks the fifth anniversary of the murder of Lokman Slim. Slim was an outspoken Lebanese critic of Hezbollah, an analyst polemicist, historian and filmmaker who ran a US funded NGO teaching Shiite women English. He was assassinated in South Lebanon in two thousand twenty one, almost certainly by a Hezbollah hit squad. He was a a dear friend of mine. Lokman is just one of the dozens, if not hundreds of Lebanese victims of Hezbollah. There are thousands more in Syria and many in Israel as well. Uh, Israel's campaign to in two thousand twenty four to degrade Hezbollah, provided Lebanon with an unprecedented opportunity to restore state sovereignty. President Allen and Prime Minister Salam appear to have embraced this opportunity to end Hezbollah's decades-long domination and to implement reforms. The November twenty-four cease-fire agreement is going relatively well. With Hezbollah's permission and with the intelligence information provided by Israel and the United States the LAF has collected a lot of weapons in the south, but it took seven months for the government to make the decision to do so, and the pace of disarmament is too slow. Hezbollah is obstructing operations, and there have been reports of LAF collaboration with the organization. The government and the LAF also remain extremely deferential to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Israel is filling the gap. A division of labor has emerged where Israel is targeting Hezbollah and its assets, the assets and the individuals that the LAF can't or won't. The South is not yet completed, and disarmament in the North will be even more challenging, given Hezbollah's opposition. LAF reticence to confront Hezbollah is understandable, given the its track record of murdering Lebanese, including LAF soldiers. The LAF needs salary support, continued flow of US equipment, but at this point, the question of disarmament is not a matter of capability, but of will. Alas, disarmament is necessary but insufficient to end Hezbollah's domination, and establish state sovereignty. Hezbollah thrives amidst Lebanon's financial crisis and benefits from the state's systemic corruption. Economic and political reforms are urgently required to restore confidence in the banks and curtail the cash economy. The government's made some headway, but much more needs to be done. No doubt, disarmament is Washington's number one priority, but reform shouldn't be an afterthought. The state will not end Hezbollah's chokehold on the country without reform. To help Leb- make Lebanon great again, the Trump administration should one, build a bigger international coalition against Hezbollah. The EU has designated the IRGC. Washington should press its partners to designate the entirety of this IRGC proxy. Two, cleanse the LAF and security institutions of Hezbollah. Lebanese institutions continue to collaborate, collude and de-conflict with Hezbollah, undermining disarmament. Officials need to be removed. Three, support the LAF based on performance. Washington should stand by the LAF as it carries out its mission. The LAF can and should do more, but the US support should be conditioned on performance. The division of labor is working. And less than until the LAF makes serious progress on disarmament, Israel will remain a partner in the disarmament project, helping Lebanon to meet its cease-fire obligations. Israel should, uh, if the LAF makes progress, Israel should withdraw from positions it occupies in Lebanon. Six, condition reconstruction on disarmament. Much of the South was destroyed during Hezbollah's war on Israel, but the war isn't over yet. Premature reconstruction will undermine disarmament, um, and rebuilt areas are likely to be destroyed again. Seven, exclude Hezbollah from the reconstruction progress process. In two thousand six, exploited reconstruction to embed military assets in civilian centers, this mistake should not be repeated. Eight, don't perpetuate corruption during reconstruction. Inexplicably, Beirut and the World Bank are channeling reconstruction funds through the Council for Development and Construction. Nabi Berri's egregiously corrupts organization. This is also a mistake. Um, and last, it's time to sanction Lebanese again. Washington should help Lebanon to help itself. by resuming the practice of designate and corrupt Lebanese and those who obstruct reform and impede progress toward reform in the state. Um, thank you for your time and I appreciate uh the opportunity to do and look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Mister Schenker, I now recognize Miss Goddard for an opening statement.
Chairman Loeffler, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much for this opportunity. My central argument is simple. Hezbollah is not sustained by weapons alone. It survives through an economic and political ecosystem that protects cash flows penetrate states and institutions and enables military rebuilding. Even in a best-case scenario, where Hezbollah were to surrender all its weapons tomorrow, the group would still retain the capacity to rebuild from scratch. As long as its ties to Iran remain intact, And as long as its ecosystem of power endures, Hezbollah will survive, regenerate and rearm. Today, Hezbollah is operating in a survival mode. Despite severe losses, it has not collapsed because it has redirected its efforts toward protecting the financial and political systems that generate money and immunity. The most important of these systems in is Lebanon's cash economy. Since the country's financial collapse in twenty twenty, the banking sector has been replaced by an unregulated cash-based financial system dominated by money services business businesses, exchange houses and informal transfer networks. This transformation has fundamentally altered the counterterrorism landscape. Cash is harder to trace, easier to launder, and far more difficult to regulate than the formal banking system Hezbollah once relied on. Hezbollah and Iran have fully exploited this environment. Funds generated abroad, from oil sales, front companies and private networks are moved to the exchange houses and informal systems and then injected into Lebanon outside overs uh effective oversight. The same at the same time, Hezbollah benefits from the proliferation of domestic cash businesses and commercial fronts that blend illicit activity with legitimate commerce. In this environment, terrorism financing becomes indistinguishable from the broader economy and accountability collapses. This cash ecosystem is reinforced by institutional capture. Hezbollah and its allies continue to secure key appointments inside the institutions that affect borders, customs, security, and public spending. As a result, disarmament efforts faced a structural problem. Weapons can be collected, but money keeps flowing. Disarmament without dismantling the cash economy and the institutional shield around it will not be durable. It will simply buy time. On disarmament, Lebanese leaders have articulated A state monopoly on arms, but words are not strategy. The absence of a timeline beyond the initial phase south of Litani has produced a de facto freeze. The Lebanese armed forces will not initiate confrontation, and Hezbollah will not voluntarily disarm. Without external pressure and incentives, the process could stall. The United States has leveraged to change this dynamic by requiring the Lebanese government and the LAF to submit a plan for the rest of the phases, with clear deadlines, objectives and deliverables. Also, the Unite the US security assistance should be delivered promptly, but sequenced, with additional support tied to concrete progress south north of Litani. At the same time, the United States should treat Lebanon's economy as a national security battlefield. Treasury advisories and sanctions should escalate against money service businesses and individuals facilitating Hezbollah's cash network. Reform pressure must extend to include custom authorities, unreformed state entities, such as the Council of the South, which is responsible for reconstruction, and the judiciary. Impunity remains Hezbollah's greatest political asset. As the twenty twenty six parliamentary elections approach, Hezbollah will seek to delay disarmament, suppress dissent dissent and block mechanisms that threaten its dominance. Targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure against those who use violence, obstruct reforms, and undermine electoral integrity are essential. Finally, the United States should recognize that peace between Lebanon and Israel is not separate from this effort. It is what sustains it over time. Hezbollah's military defeat has shattered the mythology of resistance. The idea of peace is no longer taboo. Peace raises the political cost of rearmament, strengthens state legitimacy, unlocks economic recovery, and deprives Hezbollah of its courteous justification. Without a credible peace horizon, disarmament and economic reform will be temporary, with one, they become structural. In short, dismantling Hezbollah's economic ecosystem is key to sustainable disarmament, and peace is what locks it in. Lebanon is closer to that moment that many may assume, but only if US policy is firm, comprehensive, and willing to raise the cost of obstruction. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Miss Goddard. I now recognize Miss Struel for an opening statement.
Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the committee. I could not agree more with your opening statements about the historic and time-limited opportunity that the current situation in Lebanon represents for the United States and regional engagement. To take a broader scope, there are multiple shifts at the regional and level that have converged to create this opportunity. First, as you heard from my colleagues, Hezbollah is profoundly weakened. The group no longer imposes imposes a stranglehold on Lebanon's sovereignty. But the process of disarming the Iran-backed terror group is incomplete and insufficient without addressing the political social and economic system, within which Hezbollah has thrived. Second, the Iranian regime is profoundly weakened. It cannot currently sustain the regional ecosystem in which its proxies, like Hezbollah and others, have undermined Arab governments, specifically in Lebanon and held back the Lebanese people from realizing their own aspirations for sovereignty. And third, there is promising leadership in Beirut. Under the leadership of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, the government formed in early twenty twenty five is saying the right things and doing some of the right things. This should be vigorously encouraged while demanding more. For the past year, US policy has focused on Hezbollah disarmament, which is critical, but on its own is only a partial strategy. In order to consolidate the gains from Hezbollah's weakness, the United States must broaden its engagement beyond the security file. Importantly, we must do more to engage other governments meddling in Lebanon's messy politics, ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections and offering assistance without conditions. Briefly, I want to make a series of recommendations with my remaining time. On security assistance, US policy s- policy to support the LAF with funding and equipment should continue, but with conditions. The LAF have made important progress in implementing the first pa- first phase of the ceasefire now that work must be accelerated. Hezbollah is rebuilding, increasing its indigenous weapons production, and its illicit regional networks still exist. There are two near-term opportunities to underscore US focus on Hezbollah's disarmament while supporting the LAF. First is the visit this week of the LAF Commander Rudolf Heichel, and second is the French-hosted conference in early March. The message should be that the United States has expectations for the performance and transparency, continued assistance is important but not assured without continued performance. Second on elections, the US must do more than insist that elections take place on time. Signaling US interest in a parliamentary outcome that demonstrates a break with the pre-October seventh, governmental paralysis is critical. The worst case outcome would be a parliamentary makeup that leaves in place Hezbollah affiliated politicians. In the absence of visible leadership on this issue, the risk is the internationalization of Lebanon and counter-productive external meddling. The United States should make clear it will not support a government that does not prioritize the needs of all Lebanese, and fails to back the le- the mandate of Lebanon's president to bring all weapons under state control. On reconstruction, it is time to articulate our expectations for US support that expands beyond the security file. Washington should pair concrete steps on Hezbollah's disarmament with support for reconstruction quick impact projects and longer term livelihood programs, to assure an inclusive post-Hezbollah future. Without something tangible on the table from the United States, we are ceding influence to others and risk re-empowering ministries and local government that are still under Hezbollah influence. And finally, leadership. If the current President of Syria, Ahmed al-Shara, a former US military detainee from Iraq and formerly designated Al-Qaeda affiliate can be a hosted in the White House with a warm embrace, surely we can find time for President Aoun. Signaling US support for President Aoun this year is important if we want to see progress and further reform. And finally, on Israel, this is a government who is sincere in wanting to maintain dialogue and move forward toward eventual peace with Israel. This is something that the United States plays a continual continuous and important role in and should encourage. Thank you.
Thank you, Miss Struel. Uh, I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter testimony from the President of the American Lebanon Peace Advancement Council into the record. So ordered. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Uh, in recent months there's been optimism about Lebanon joining the Abraham accords in the future. Uh, what needs to happen before this can be a real conversation conversation? Ms. Goudar.
Thank you. So, there are a number of steps that can be done bef- while Lebanon and Israel start a dialogue. One of the, one of the main things that needs to be done today, there is a s- basically easing Lebanon's anti-normalization law, which is basically bans dialogue between Lebanon and uh Lebanese and Israeli citizens. This one, at least in practice, what matters because they criminalized people to people contact and protect Hezbollah's forever war narrative. In order to reach a point where people can actually start conversing freely about peace, we need to start looking at this law. And one way of doing it, the United States should Apply both pressure and incentives to encourage restraint and enforcement, and open space for civic engagement, economic integration, and regional normalization. One of the tools that can be used is re-in- make sure that the the Hezbollah and its allies in the state institutions do not actually use this law, and use uh uh all the punitive tools including sanctions against everyone in the judicial system that would enforce the anti-normalization law. There are many things that can be
Mr. Gendar, Mr. Gendar, the the Treasury Department has reported that the IRGC has transferred over one billion to the the Treasury Department has reported that the IRGC has transferred over one billion to What are the primary means by which Hezbollah and its Iranian backers maintain access to these cash flows? Uh, and what role do unrelated or unlicensed money exchanges and exchange companies in Lebanon play in sustaining Hezbollah's illicit financial networks?
Yes. Thank you very much for this question. Hezbollah has been working very hard on its economic infrastructure and the cash economy. Um, the estimation in general of the cash economy after the ca- collapse of twenty twenty-two is around eighteen billion dollars, not all of it is Hezbollah or illicit financing, but it is it constitutes a big uh a good infrastructure for Hezbollah to move store uh and store money and make money. So they use this economy, uh the cash economy, which is basically the the the only economy functioning in Lebanon today, uh in order to uh bring money from abroad, especially that the customs in Lebanon are still not very much monitored. They have a lot of their allies appointed in very high-ranked custom uh and border uh appointments. They and uh um they they ease smuggling from Syria to Lebanon, from all ports and entries. The airport today is very much monitored, but the ports are not. So customs is a very big uh uh uh big thing here. It's very important to note also that Hezbollah runs a lot of businesses, including construction, telecommunications, gas stations, supermarkets, pharmaceutical sectors, and they also use a lot of cash companies that are uh there are four cash companies uh maybe more now that have replaced sixty banks in Lebanon. Some of them have informal uh deals with the Lebanese government and some of them have licenses, but they are not monitored. These companies should be more monitored, there should be observation, there should be some kind of treasury uh uh observe uh treasury warnings, at least before sanctions to these company to make sure that Hezbollah cannot use them, because this is where they're making and moving their money. So this is one of the things that can be done.
Thank you. Mister Shankar, how would you characterize the Lebanon Armed Forces' overall performance in twenty twenty five? And do you agree with the LAF's assertion that is it has established total control south of the Latane River.
Um, thank you, Chairman. Um, the LAF has not established total control of the south of Lebanon. Um, it has a presence in Lebanon that it didn't have prior to November twenty twenty four, let's say, seven months after that. Um, it is now present, um, and it is, um, as I say, um, responsive to tasking. When the mechanism informs the LAF of intelligence information about where weapons may be, arms caches, um things it should check out, it responds. Um, but it does not respond when it is obstructed. So oftentimes groups of of women will be brought out to prevent the LAF from going into a site. They'll come back, the weapons will be gone. Um, so they are present, um, but they are not in control. um, as well as still controls the region. And frankly, um, the LAF has not met, um, what the president promised in the beginning of the ceasefire, that there would be ten thousand LAF troops in the south. There should probably be even more, given the nature of the the threat.
To, to that, to that end, what is your assessment of their capacity and political will to pursue Hezbollah's disarmament, in this area?
So there are there are something like seventy-five thousand men and women under arms in the LAF. Granted, they are underpaid. The currency has been devaluated ninety five, ninety seven percent. Um, they have equipment, they have arms, Hezbollah has been degraded. This is not a matter of capability, right? They need support, salary support, um, uh, fuel, et cetera, operating costs. Um, but they have weapons. They have individuals. CENTCOM, uh, long ago classified the LAF as pound for pound the best um, best Arab army, the soldier for soldier. Um, what they're lacking is, um, to a large degree, uh, until now the political will. Um, and this is risky because they have been threatened with clashes, attacks. Um, and of course, six LAF soldiers were killed near the very beginning of the the start of this campaign to disarm them with a, with a, a booby trap by Hezbollah. So, um, understandably reticent, but, um, this is the nature of of the business when you're in government you have to take these tough decisions
my time has expired i now recognize the ranking member uh mister sherman for about seven minutes
uh perfected uh cash smuggling informal financial uh transactions over decades but we are in a new decade where cryptocurrency also can fill this role To what extent is Hezbollah using uh cryptocurrency uh to uh deal with its money laundering and financial transactions?
Thank you. Uh, to my information, they definitely are using cryptocurrency in Lebanon. They're focusing a lot on cryptocurrency because they understand that most of the pressure is coming today on the cash flow, their cash flow, and especially that their cash flow has been by uh uh the the the you know they're they lost Syria they're losing Venezuela they're afraid they're gonna lose Iran so there's a lot of cash flow uh hard currency flow that they're not getting anymore and they're worried about uh you know they did they might have gotten one billion this year but one billion is definitely not enough for uh this group in order to not only pay salaries and provide benefits, but also provide compensation and rent uh for those who lost their homes, and also to for deconstruction. So the cash is not happening.
And uh and then my dad, and graft for the t for the top leaders as well, isn't he?
Yes, absolutely.
An expensive part of Hesbollah's operation.
Absolutely.
I'm gonna I'm gonna i- interrupt you there,
So, cash is not
I don't know if the other witnesses have anything more specific to say about crypto, so I'm gonna go on to uh Uh, Mister uh, Schechter uh, uh, Representative uh, Tenney and I have been uh, leading an effort here in Congress. This is uh, uh, to try to push uh, Europe to uh, designate the Iran uh, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization. Uh, we've long championed that. Uh, there are other who have of course pushed the EU and it looks like that will happen. Uh, France has uh, taken uh, an interest in Lebanon for well over a century and played a uh a substantial role in Lebanon for uh well over a hundred years. Uh, do you see any potential to build on the momentum of the EU designating the IRGC and get France to change its policy and designate all of Hizballah, not just the military wing, as a terrorist organization?
Uh, thanks for the question. Um. Representative Sherman, um. You know, France has long viewed Hezbollah as having two wings, the political wing and the military wing, and and this is a useful carve-out for their engagement with Lebanon. Um, uh, uh, to be fair, uh, that same formulation is what Tom Barak, the special envoy of the administration has used. Right, he said it's a political party, as he said earlier, with a militia. or with a a militant element. Um, no, this is, you know, this is a terrorist organization. Um, it's a bird. It needs both wings to fly, right? Um, and so whether France will go in that direction? I think it's, uh, gonna be a stretch for them. Um, for me it's obvious. Um, uh, but France likes to have, I think, all doors open with Lebanon, and this would close off doors. for them, um certainly, and perhaps ultimately like Americans, put their people on the ground at risk. Um, so I I don't think they're they're gonna be so inclined to take that step.
Miss uh Stroll uh uh What tools does the US have to incentivize uh faster, more aggressive action uh on Hezbollah disarmament? Um. eh from the uh Lebanese government and armed forces.
Thank you for the question. So the United States has a variety of tools. The one that it has relied on for years before October seventh and now with the ceasefire, is security assistance, both uh security aid like FMF, equipping, training, and the drawdown presidential drawdowns of US military equipment to support the LAF. It can also support the disarmament process providing actionable intelligence, uh through working through the US military mechanism with significant uh leadership to both verify the steps the LAF have taken and validate when certain steps are not taken um which i- as you know with the uh November twenty twenty-four ceasefire there's a side agreement where the United States acknowledged that Israel would continue to take military action in Lebanon, even though there was a ceasefire, if it saw concerning Hezbollah activity, which has continued to this day. And again there, the US military role is quite important.
Gonna s- try to sneak in one more question uh. Uh, can any of our witnesses identify specific additional sanctions measures, including secondary sanctions on financial entities, uh, that would uh target Hezbollah's financial networks? Any, any, a, a, any specific advice on additional sanctions?
Yes, absolutely. On the uh in addition to the financial companies that I mentioned before, uh that are helping Hezbollah with the cash flow, uh there are definitely uh additional sanctions that need to be made especially in the judicial system. Hezbollah has been doing what it needs to be done because it has immunity, because it has never been held accountable, whether for assassinations, money laundering, illicit activities, drug production, you name it. Today, for example, the biggest drug dealer in Lebanon, has been released and the government didn't do anything to keep him. They have been never held accountable in Lebanon. Judiciary system definitely needs to be targeted with sanctions. There are certain judges that needs to be targeted. And the only way to help to ho- to stop Hezbollah is to hold them accountable for their crimes.
Thank you. I yield back.
Thank you, the ranking member, I now recognize representative Zinke for five minutes.
Thank you, uh we talked about, we talked about Hezbollah, talk to me about the Muslim Brotherhood. How influential is the Muslim Brotherhood? And uh David, if you'd, if you'd uh
Uh certainly um Lebanon was pleased with the US designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the in the north of Lebanon um this is an increasingly important actor, um uh and believed to be um backed in part um by Turkey, um but Qatar as well. Um they uh
So the money would go from Qatar to Turkey and then distributed? Is that a fair assessment?
I believe so. Um the in any event, they've not done particularly well on the the nationwide um elections, uh in Lebanon historically, um and even in municipal elections. Um, uh, but they're making, appear to be making slow but steady progress in gaining adherence.
Ma'am.
Yeah, I agree totally with David. Turkey and Qatar play a very bad role in Lebanon in terms of, uh, supporting, uh, Muslim Brotherhood. And what what what I would add to that is that before even October seven, and we witnessed this during the war between Hezbollah and Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood, uh, branch in Lebanon, which is called Islamiyah, has fought with Hezbollah during the war against Israel. So today they are seeing them, Hezbollah sees the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon as a strategic ally, and I will not be surprised if they uh join them or uh strategically align with them during the next parliamentary elections because they need more allies. Uh and and uh today the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon, that specific branch, during their last par- uh internal elections, uh the sin war basically the hamas branch one and this is what drives them today they i would say that the muslim brotherhood in lebanon that branch specifically is hamas uh lebanese uh the lebanese hamas branch and it's very it's a very dangerous phenomenon i'm very glad that you asked about this because it's evolving and they're getting stronger with the money that is flowing in and has ballast lines
yeah
i would add this is why i think y- more US attention is needed, or the risk is the internationalization of external meddling in Lebanon. So what we've seen in the past year is significant announcements of financial assistance for reconstruction from the government of Qatar. We've seen more Turkish involvement in Lebanon and others, but this is without conditions and without the United States putting anything on the table other than security support for the left. So, while very important, we need to broaden and expand our, engagement in Lebanon in either in order to counter these concerning trends and developments.
And second question, uh, should there be a regime change in Iran, uh, how would that affect, uh, Lebanon?
Oh, well, regime change in uh in Iran would change everything in Lebanon. Lebanon is, uh, b- an a country that has been occupied by Iran, uh, since the mid eighties. Um, uh, the a proxy army of Iran has dominated the country's politics and made decisions of war and peace and murdered um countless numbers of Lebanese citizens over these years um without the support the ideological support, the financial support, um the provision of of weapons um uh Hezbollah would be cut down to size. Now, Hezbollah is entrepreneurial, right? They they sell Captagon, they have car dealerships, they have economics, they have uh foreign supporters to send them money. Um Iran has been the keynote and without this regime um Hezbollah wouldn't disappear, but it would wither on the vine.
Do you share that same assessment?
I do, because I believe also that uh Hezbollah is not just another proxy of Iran in the region, it's not like the Iraqi Shia militias, Hezbollah is actually part of the Quds Force, which is part of the IRGC. It is really a gen- an organic part of it. So when something changes there, Hezbollah will immediately and directly be affected before other proxies. They do have their own sources of funding that I talked about earlier, but the impact would be one on their arms, definitely, but two, I think it would also reverberate very, very directly to the Shia community, which is today their main strength in Lebanon. If you, if the Shia community today wakes up tomorrow with a big regime change in Iran, and Hezbollah totally weakened, even if it's still present, this will impact the elections, the upcoming man uh parliamentary elections, and then we can see some kind of independent uh non-Hezbollah uh uh uh penetration in the uh parliament otherwise if the Iranian regime does not fall, and nothing really changes, Hezbollah might be able,
I yield. Thank you.
Thank you, Representative Zinke, I now recognize Representative Latimer for five minutes.
Thank you, Mister Chairman, uh, in deference to the time and my other colleagues, one very uh simple question, and I'd like each of you to answer it. Can you identify two or three specific things that you'd like to see the United States do to address this?
Sorry, to, to
To address this problem, one or two,
Um
two or three specific things that we can do, United States government, to address the problem that you've identified.
Yeah, I I think first, uh, condition the funding, right? To actually really press and set benchmarks for LAF performance. Um, uh, Lebanon has a, uh, a tendency to, um, kick the can down the road, defer difficult decisions. Um, they did so with disarmament in the south. I, I fear they will do so in the north. And every day, um, Hezbollah continues to, it attempts to rearm, it's, it's necessary to have some sort of timeline and benchmarks, um, with this. Um, the other, um, is to Goodness. Um. I think that would be a good start. Um. It's always hard to go first. Um, but uh, no, uh, listen, I think um, uh, the conditioning of the funding is most important. I think um, it's also important to really, I think, clean house within the LAF, um, and the other security forces in the country. Um, you know, Hezbollah uh this disarmament is being disrupted um by uh collaborators, by uh collusion, by uh de-confliction um uh it's hard enough to do this work without being undermined from the inside. And I think um the US um has insight into the LAF, Israel has insight into the LAF, um the LAF should take it upon itself, we're I'm not talking about bathification here. um what I'm talking about is actually
With with no disrespect intended, I wanna make sure everybody answers it.
Yep, thank you.
I have no other questions in my five minutes, so we have condition funding and cleaned out the LAF.
Yeah.
Thank you.
Same question?
Yep, yeah, for everybody.
Yes. So, in a I agree with David definitely, I would add three more, which is the financial uh warnings and sanctions that I talked about earlier, definitely uh issue for the treasury to issue advisories and sanctions against corrupt politicians, uh, cash companies that are helping Hezbollah with the cash flow, et cetera, et cetera. It's all in my written testimony. Uh, I can go further later. But to - to - to - to - to make sure I go to the second one, the judiciary reform. For me, this is one of the most important reforms that can be made in Lebanon because one, it holds Hezbollah accountable, uh, uh, if - if the judiciary is reformed, then the jud- judiciary system in Lebanon can hold Hezbollah accountable, protect dissident and free speech, and make sure that those who are helping Hezbollah with their uh uh shadow economy are held accountable. But last but not least, it's a there's a very rare opportunity in Lebanon today to make sure uh very rare opportunity today to actually start the peace process between Lebanon and Israel. And for Lebanon to join the Abrahamic cause because one, it is ready, everyone in Lebanon want to end war and that's the only way to sustain uh a ceasefire uh for for a very long term and the Lebanese street is ready. Peace is no longer taboo and there will be some dissent uh dissent but I would say it's a great opportunity and people should start thinking about starting this process between Lebanon and Israel. It's a it's it's important to do it now.
OK, just so I summarize, this is how we leverage our funding to accomplish each of these bullets that you've mentioned. It's our leveraging of funding that you're advocating for to make
Two two uh different comments from my colleagues. The first is we uh risk locking ourselves in a trap of no reconstruction until disarmament is complete, of Hezbollah. I think we in the United States can be more nuanced in our policy approach here. If we do not proactively articulate the conditions and what reconstruction our role and our support package would look like, There's no reason for the Lebanese people to expect more from us, and the risk is that they think we are only focused on Hezbollah's disarmament. So we don't need to pledge assistance and start transferring, transferring it now, but we can articulate the conditions and our expectations for what our support for reconstruction, our advocacy with international financial institutions, and our willingness to convene other external actors that are also interested in Leb- Lebanon's reconstruction. And secondly, um, expand the US policy team. We've had a rotation of different US, uh, senior envoys, all of which have done very important work. The current US ambassador in Beirut, Michael Issa, is doing very important work. But what we need right now is technical assistance experts, diplomats, the very people that are not working and empowered to do their jobs in the State Department and the dismantled US agency for international development.
Thank you, ma'am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Thank you, Representative Latimer, I now recognize Representative Schneider for five minutes.
Uh, thank you uh, Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. It's good to see the Washington Institute so well represented. Uh, Miss- Mister Shankar, in your opening remarks you noted that um, I think what you said exactly is perhaps expectations were too high, but the first year of the uh on the administration was a disappointment. Uh, my first question for the panel is Uh, despite the disappointments, are there still reasons for optimism?
Um, yeah, I've got a quick answer. The, yes, I think there are reason for optimism. Uh, Lebanese are um resilient people and they've got a team in place um that is unusual, um actually unprecedented, not corrupt, um see uh at the highest levels, um uh committed to reform, western oriented, um, and understand that this opportunity may be fleeting. This is unusual and, uh, it may, it may be very fleeting because we have elections going on.
All of that talk is I'm gonna come back to. That's, that's, that's where I'm going. Uh, Miss Guenther.
Definitely. Hundred percent more than any time before, because simply that internally, as my colleague David said, that uh there are certain people that you can work with. Uh the new government is uh definitely uh not ideal. There are so many mistakes that they've done, but it's better than the ones before it. So it is it it it's it's it's a government that can be that you can work with, the president as well, it's someone that you can work with. But again, there should be communication, direct communication, clear communication, as my colleague Dana said, this is very important. Two, the region is changing. The uh links that Hezbollah had w- through Syria, uh, today in Iran and Venezuela, it's changing. They are losing everyday a bigger, a big ally, economic ally, political allies, and they are losing allies in Lebanon as well. So definitely it's an opportunity if we use it.
That's true.
Absolutely. Uh, as a, um, long-time follower of US policy toward Lebanon, to imagine a situation in which Hezbollah is so weakened, Politically, economically, and from a security perspective, and we have a willing partner in the political leadership in Beirut, who is saying the right things and working to do the right things on dis disarmament. Contemplating publicly the potential for peace with Israel. This is not any policy opportunity that before October seventh we could have imagined. Tremendous op- reason for hope.
So I'm gonna try to frame what's really a statement into the form of a of a question, but we've defined, as you said, there is this moment, there's reasons for optimism, but the moment could be fleeting. And so are there ways that we can create guardrails to keep them focused on the moment, to provide stepping stones to help them get to where they need to go, uh, to identify milestones so we can measure progress along the way, and to put back stops so they don't fall back to where they were, but we keep h- helping them move forward. Um. That's my broad question and I've got a minute fifty second left. Maybe I'll go the other direction. I'm with Struel.
Absolutely. The US policy approach should be a combination of incentives tied with conditions for performance uh and an and transparency. So a lot of the announcements we see from the left right now are number of houses cleared, number of of weapons seized, these sorts of issues. Important, but not a that is not the only benchmark for performance we should be looking at. what happens to the weapons once they're disposed off, what are we doing to dry up the illicit networks of support, what are we doing to stop the rebuilding, but beyond the security file, um, what are our expectations for the reform agenda with this current government in Beirut? What are our expectations for a free, fair and credible electoral cycle? What are our expectations for reconstruction that does not re-empower corrupt Hizballah affiliated institutions in Lebanon?
Ms. Guider.
Very briefly, I'm not gonna repeat what my colleague said, and I agree with them hundred percent. It's very important to look even within the security uh uh apparatus, there are certain things that needs to be monitored as well, including border points of entry, border control. Uh, in addition to the airport, the port, the border to Syria needs to be demarcated, which has hasn't happened yet. Uh, there are smuggling happen happening. Uh, the cash economy is not monitored, unregulated. Uh, these are things that not are are not very difficult to to handle, but you need to have a strategy in place. And uh, I can go into details, but it's all in my written testimony, you can get like look at that.
Great. Thank you. And uh, Mr. Shankar, can you last word?
Uh, yeah. Three, three quick points. One, we we should be sanctioning leaders right now. There is a sense of urgency that leaders that are in parliament elsewhere who are obstructing reform they should be sanctioned, period. Um, we should be looking at the electoral law, talking with Lebanese about um, how they're disenfranchising four or eight million Lebanese who are living abroad. Um, uh S- and that, that will have a real impact on whether this government stays or whether, whether it goes or whether we go back to business or us- as usual. Um, finally, um, in this period of time when money is flowing into Lebanon, they just passed their budget, um, we should really be um quite critical of providing uh the provision of funding to the same old corrupt organizations that we know are corrupt. This is not helping matters.
Uh, thank you. I I appreciate the extended time. I yield back.
Gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize Representative Kane for five minutes.
Uh, thank you, Mister Chairman. And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here today. Stability in Lebanon is critical to safety and security throughout the eastern Mediterranean. As our hand-backed Hezbollah maintains a stronghold in Lebanon, it is crucial that the United States examine various means to continue dismantling Hezbollah. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding how America can most effectively partner with our allies throughout the East Middle Eastern Mediterranean to dismantle Hezbollah and to secure peace in the Middle East. Mister Schenker, Hezbollah has long been a proxy of Iran, targeting America's ally Israel in the Middle East. In your testimony, you stated that Israel is filling an important gap, preventing Hezbollah from re-arming and targeting militia locations and personnel. The LAF seems too sensitive to engage. Can you share how the partnership between Israel and the Lebanese armed forces is critical to dismantling Hezbollah?
Um, absolutely. Um, they are critical. Israel is, the work that Israel is doing, um, Lebanon would look a whole lot different without what's happening now, what has happened since the ceasefire. There hasn't really been a ceasefire. There's been a less fire, right? A more concentrated uh targeting uh by Israel. And there's and the the Lebanese sovereign forces is doing work, but they're just not gonna be able
Miss Gader, the three plus one partnership between United States, United States, Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. is an important alliance in efforts to counterterrorism across Eastern Mediterranean. The American, Hellenic, Israel, Eastern Mediterranean Counterterrorism and Mar- Maritime Security Partnership Act, which I co-led with bipartisan colleagues, recognizes the importance of working with American partners, such as Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to counterterrorism. How do you believe the three plus one partnership can be best be leveraged to to bring stability to the region in account of head blot.
Thank you very much. Uh, this is definitely have been a very good partnership in terms of not only in terms of economic partnership but in terms of security and I remember at one point, you know, Hezbollah itself started uh attacking Cyprus itself because of this alliance between Israel and Cyprus knowing that Cyprus have been doing bo both uh uh legal uh and security measures against Hezbollah uh uh Cyprus has been a victim also of Hezbollah's uh terrorist activities there been some some some issues there so this partnership has been very very important Hezbollah tried to use Cyprus as uh uh for its terrorist activity activities and this alliance stopped it so i believe at one point you know like we are moving this is this is a moving topic this is not something that is done this is this is evolving everyday and i believe that Uh, there will be more escalation if Hezbollah is not disarmed, if the Lebanese uh, uh armed forces, the Lebanese government did not uh, initiate uh, you know, uh, uh serious uh, measures again, uh, uh when it comes to disarmament. Israel, Israel will probably escalate. Israel might have another war with Hezbollah. There might, we might see a different kind of cease-fire agreement. And these allies in the Mediterranean are key in securing this agreement.
So, in your testimony you spoke uh about Hezbollah's efforts to empower the cash economy in Lebanon.
Mm-hmm.
What mechanisms should the United States pursue to disable the cash economy that is funding Hezbollah?
OK. So, uh, the only entity in Lebanon today is that is addressing this in terms of issuing circulars circulars that are actually trying to regulate this cash economy, is the central bank. But the central bank alone cannot do everything. Lebanon's government needs to have a very clear strategies when it comes to cash economy. So far they are pushing reforms within the framework of the IMF, but the IMF uh reforms are very technical, they do not have a bigger socio-economic political uh strategy that addresses the root of the issue. It's much more technical and it's targeted against a certain part of these of these reforms. I think the Lebanese government should be pressured to have more an overarching uh reforms financial reform sector sector, including uh for ex I'll give you just one quick example. The Council of the South has been getting funding from the Lebanese government for reconstruction. The Council of the South is the most corrupt Lebanon's entity, which has been in getting money for reconstruction and it's the only entity that has no oversight. This is an this is an example of how to re- regulate the funding from the government, and the cash economy, the cash companies as well.
Thank you, and I I'll give back.
I thank the representative. I now recognize representative Wilson for five minutes.
Thank you very much, Mister Chairman, and thank each of you for being here, and I was uh away a moment ago because this is uh Ukrainian week, uh and to me uh to recognize the courage of people in Ukraine standing up. And it all relates, and that is that we're in a worldwide conflict of dictators with rule of gun, invading democracies with rule of law. And so what a opportunity we have in the Middle East today. And I'm grateful to be here with Chairman uh Lohler. Uh he uh is a proven friend uh of uh those standing for freedom. Uh he even did better, his wife is from Old Dova. So he he he has proven himself. Uh with that in mind, I uh grew up appreciating the success of the Syrian Lebanese community in South Carolina, who've made extraordinary achievements in business, professions and public service. In fact, we have a living example, not from South Carolina, but from some remote state in that called California, Daryl Issa, of uh Lebanese American heritage. As we seek for the people of Lebanon peace and prosperity, it's clear that the greatest threat are the mullahs of Tehran financing Hezbollah and I have faith President Donald Trump will work to cease the financing of murder across the Middle East. With that in mind, under the tremendous leadership of Ambassador Tom Barrack, Lebanese American, uh with President Donald Trump, the Middle East is transforming from conflict to opportunity. I was grateful in August to join with Sarah-Jean Shaheen, Democrat of New Hampshire, bipartisan, to see firsthand the transformation in Beirut, Damascus and Amman. Additionally, we can recognize uh that in Lebanon Hezbollah wields significant power to control military courts and prosecutors. I recently spoke to a prisoner inside of the Al Ramayah prison in Lebanon, where Hezbollah prosecutors and judges jailed thousands of of persons, Lebanese and uh Syrians, the vast majority who have been political prisoners who have been jailed for opposing the former murderous regime of dictator Assad. Uh, in November a year ago, dictator Assad correctly identified me as an enemy of the state. Three weeks later he moved to Moscow to be with Wokril Putin. And then eight months later I was in Assad's office with President Alsh- the new President Alshara who I I'm really grateful to President Donald Trump has said, give Syria a chance. And so what what progress is being made? With that in mind, for each of you, and we'll go from uh this direction, OK? Uh and uh what can, for each of you, what can be done to push Lebanon to release the political prisoners not only Syrians but the innocent Lebanese who are there uh in the prison, and how can the Trump administration further push the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah to meet the objectives that were set forth last year?
Thank you, this is a really important issue. We should make it a priority. We should very clearly publicly state our expectation that political prisoners be released and re- Assad regime uh era people who are held in Lebanon should be returned to Syria and held accountable there. Um, and with respect to Sue, uh, pushing the current government in Beirut to complete the additional four phases of the cease-fire, um, with Israel, we should make clear our expectation that our support is not unlimited by time, and has expectations for performance. The Trump administration has taken the correct, I believe, uh, approach in providing continued support, equipment and encouragement to the laugh, but it should make clear that it has expectations for timeline, enhanced and accelerated performance.
Hear, hear. Thank you.
Thank you very much. Uh, just uh two things briefly, uh, which is the political, political prisoners in Lebanon, political detainees, uh, whether Syrians or Lebanese or other, uh, are mainly uh, uh, there's one main tool that is used against them, which is the military. Thank you.
I agree with my colleagues, I think actually one of them had a problem with the military court at one point in time, a civilian in Lebanon who was charged um uh this has to end um I think there's a whole bunch of new opportunities here um vis-a-vis the political prisoners but also uh because of the the new cooperation between the Lebanese uh government and the the government of Ahmed al-Shara in Syria um you have um uh, talks between the court systems about, uh, Syrian government providing information on, um, uh, Lebanese that the former government of Assad regime helped assassinate in Syria, uh, in Lebanon. Um, uh, information being provided. There's a lot of room here. You also, uh, you know, the the idea of, uh, Lebanese missing in Syria, who have been missing for decades. This is something I, I mentioned earlier, my friend, uh, uh, Lokman Slim, who was was killed by Hezbollah. he worked on this a a great deal. There there's a lot of room here, but the United States government has to be clear. There there's no there's no room for political prisoners, um, in uh ostensible uh democracies.
Thank you s- uh thank all three of you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Representative Wilson, I now recognize Representative Issa for five minutes.
Thank you. Hopefully that's the Lebanese five minutes. I'm on the clock. Um. OK, I'm gonna, I'm gonna start by asking uh an overwrite writing question. Officially, is Lebanon a parliamentary democratic republic?
The answer is yes.
And is the structure, although it's a unusual one, perfectly acceptable if fully implemented as a functioning parliamentary democratic republic, including the fifty-fifty make up of the hundred and twenty-eight uh parliamentarians and so on.
Uh, per- I'm sorry, perfectly acceptable to whom?
To the world. I mean, in other words, when we look at democracies around the world, is the constitution of Lebanon, for all practical purposes, a functioning reasonable constitution if implemented?
Um, from where I sit, yes.
OK. From where you sit, is it fair to say that the speaker of Parliament does not implement that Par- that constitution, but it said, distorts it so that it doesn't function.
Uh, the Speaker of Parliament is incredibly problematic and has been for thirty-four years now.
Right, I've only been here for twenty-six, but yes, he's been there longer. As a result, I heard earlier, so but I'm gonna rhetorically ask you the same question, do you support sanctions sufficient to make changes so that it can in fact be a functioning parliamentary democratic republic. I'm seeing a yes here. Can I get a yes from you, David?
Um, I said earlier that the United States government should be sanctioning um individuals in Lebanon who are obstructing reform and promoting corruption. I dare say he fits into that category.
And and we sank sanctioned people like Gibran for wanton theft and so on. But we've left the speaker who is has an incredible amount of wealth sitting with his relatives in Dearborn, uh, and we've left him alone for generations.
Um, I'm proud to say that I was the one responsible for sanctioning Gibran. So, well.
Well, and uh, he's a he's an interesting character, but he's still trying to figure out why if he was the last guy to start stealing, he should be the first to be sanctioned. Uh, but notwithstanding that, you do in fact need to sanction. So as a result, uh, two lowly Lebanese Americans, uh Congressman Lohout and myself introduced last night, H R seventy-three eleven, the Safe Lebanon Act, which in fact allows for the president, and we hope to have it considered by this committee, marked up and out before the elections, that in fact the president is able to sanction for all of these types of behavior, but particularly the question I have, the diaspora of Lebanon. I am an eligible Lebanese voter under the law, uh, as are so many, more than ten million around the world. Uh, but for only a fraction will ever vote in those elections. We have been allowed to vote previously. Election law is currently pending. Uh, the, and they effectively, they've changed that in a way that would eliminate the moderate vote that does occur from the diaspora, around the world should we sanction if that if they are not allowed access to a fair absentee voting system.
Um, I wrote about this in my testimony, uh, but and it is Nabi Barry who is obstructing electoral reform. Um, six to eight million Lebanese or ten million Lebanese expatriates are being
A million and a half here and many times that in Brazil.
They're being disenfranchised. Um, and this is something that shouldn't happen. Whether this is the reason he should be sanctioned or whether it's for corruption or whether it's for other um the mis uh malfeasance um
right
we should be talking about that up straight up
now now i called for him to be sanctioned previously uh and it was among other things corruption today though i only have two things that i'm looking at sanctioning for and i'll ask your comments on it the remaining time one is the one that you've already answered which is if people are interfering with the execution constitution that allows for a reasonable facsimile of a democracy, now that many of the outside forces are diminished, should we sanction. And then the second one, quite frankly, is do we need to have a form of tough love, which may include sanctioning, if we cannot get the Lebanese armed forces to risk and I repeat, to risk a civil war in order to disarm a rebellion that has gone on for forty years.
Uh, there is no risk of civil war. There is a threat of violence from Hezbollah if the Lebanese government tries to exert sovereignty. Um, whether we should be sank, well, I don't think we have to sanction the uh Lebanese armed forces.
Cutting off the funding or doing other things, yes.
Um, we have plenty of, we have plenty of leverage.
Anyone else in the remaining time that the chairman might give us?
Um, I definitely agree with everything David said, definitely, and diaspora law is uh will make or break actually the next parliament, so I totally agree with that. Uh, Lebanon is a functioning democracy, but but there's a we have a real problem with the electoral law, so I really need to bring up the electoral law to make sure that Lebanon uh, elections produce a democratic parliament, then we have to revisit the electoral law, and then we have to make sure that the elections in Shia communi within the Shia community are actually uh make sure that Hezbollah doesn't use violence during the elections, because this is why the larger the larger
Which is why the larger the larger Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
This is very important.
Thank you, Representative Weiss. I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Um, is Hezbollah still in charge of the airport?
Hezbollah does not still control the airport. like it used to be. The airport is the main border entry in Lebanon that today is being regulated. There is a lot of uh Iranians uh coming to Lebanon who are not allowed to bring in their bags of cash inside Lebanon. There's a lot of oversight over this. However, the airport is not the only point of entry. You have the port uh of Beirut, and you also have the port of Tripoli, where most of the smuggling happens and you have the borders with syria which the the the the sharia government is definitely stopping hezbollah's shipment iranian shipment to hezbollah but the border is so porous it's not uh demarcated so the smuggling still happens there's still a lot to be done besides the airport but on the airport itself there's a lot of work that has to be done
so but just to be clear you said it's mainly so how much hezbollah is still at the airport and zero percent
no not zero percent but definitely from hundred percent i can't say exactly how much but definitely less than half of it like there's a lot of uh most of the work is actually on the airports uh but it also depends on who is present in from the lebanese uh security apparatus at that shift during that time it's all about officers right
yeah ok
sometimes they depending on the person who's there but they're not they're not controlling the airport per se
well look look yeah well look i love lebanon uh enjoy the country very much i i first went to middle east in nineteen ninety four when i was a current scholar at jordan syria uh spent a lot of time uh there uh very much appreciate the good work the hudson institute all all three of you do do good work and and and appreciate you but uh you know the challenges of lebanon are are many uh as you as you deal with the lebanese diaspora i i never it's just such an interesting group of people cause they love their country so much and yet there is so much corruption in lebanon and the diaspora does so much to keep that country from being successful like in their own way And I really want America to seize this opportunity, the international community to seize this opportunity, to try to suppress Hezbollah and give it a leg up. But I struggle with the use of American taxpayer dollars, uh, with the amount of corruption and these games that have gone on for decades in Lebanon. And, you know, so to the members of the Lebanese diaspora listening to this, uh, I mean, get serious, people. It's your country, it's your future. Uh, act for the good of the people. uh individuals and you all know exactly what i'm talking about i'm not trying to give a lecture but lebanese people know exactly what i'm talking about uh in this instance you know when i was in iraq we uh uh during the surge uh we ran a number of operations to try to suppress uh the uh iranian uh uh supported insurgent groups taking over certain sectors of the economy in inter-agency fashion obviously during the surge we had a lot of uh ability uh to to do that with the amount of resources i look at sort of key metrics in lebanon one of these really being the airport on this thing i mean if we can't even get lebanon out of securing the border uh the excuse me hezbollah out of securing the air points of entry it's really hard for me to say let's put american uh additional american taxpayer dollars into the country so that would be number one but just in the remaining time if you could each give me the single most important thing that america could do to suppress hezbollah at this point in time uh in the country we'll just go down the list Danne do you wanna start?
Maintain as a priority implementation of all phases of the ceasefire and the verified disarmament of Hezbollah, but not just on the security file. We have to put more on the table to neutralize Hezbollah's social and economic penetration across Lebanon.
It's very hard to pick one, but I would say definitely uh um more sanctions on Lebanon. We haven't seen sanctions during this administration, we've seen it before, and Lebanese react to sanctions.
Yeah.
Hezbollah doesn't react to sanctions as much as the Lebanese react to sanctions.
I got forty seconds left.
So
What's next then? And I got one more question.
Yeah, condition the aid to the LAF. I think the uh we can monitor that, we know where it's going, and we have to condition it to base on performance. The other is to have the mechanism that's determining the ceasefire. Let's have them call balls and strikes. Let's see what the the LAF is actually doing and accomplishing.
O- okay, just a yes or no. D- does Lebanon should would America be pressing Lebanon to write a new constitution?
To write a new constitution?
No.
The current constitution, if implemented transparently and effectively,
So that's a no.
it
Yes or no?
Not now.
Not now.
OK. Thank you guys very much. Appreciate your good work. Field back.
Thank you, Representative. I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask you to respond to these in writing pursuant to committee rules all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
Congratulations.
God.
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