Hearings to examine the NTSB final report on the DCA midair collision.

Good morning. Senate Commerce Committee will come to order. We will begin with the markup. Before we went into recess, the question was on Senator Cantwell's amendment number three to S. 3639, the SAT Streamlining Act. We were able to find a compromise and will now move to process the legislation on today's agenda. With that, I recognize Ranking Member Cantwell for a motion.

Mr. Chairman, if later I could submit a letter for, I mean a statement for the record on all that, but yes, we did reach agreement. So, I move that S. 71, Maybe Changing Onboard Act as amended by Blackburn substitute as modified, S. 1898, ORBITS Act of 2025, S. 2585, MAP for Broadband Funding Act as amended by the Fischer substitute as modified, S. 3199, 988 Lifeline Location Improvement Act of 2025 as amended by the Lujan substitute as modified and Lujan one as modified, S. 3266, USMMA Athletics Act of 2025 as amended by the Wicker substitute, S. 3468, National Programmable Cloud Laboratories Network Act of 2025 as amended by Young one, S. 3639, SAT Streamlining Act as amended by the Cruz-Cantwell substitute as modified, and S. 3700, FAA SMS Compliance Review Act of 2026 as amended by the Cantwell substitute as modified, be favorably reported.

Is there a second?

Second.

All those in favor say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] All those opposed say no. The motion is agreed to, and the bills are ordered to be reported favorably. I recognize Ranking Member Cantwell for another motion.

Mr. Chairman, I move that PN 620, Coast Guard promotions, be favorably reported.

Is there a second?

Second.

All those in favor say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] All those opposed say no. The motion is agreed to, and the nomination is ordered to be reported favorably. I ask for unanimous consent that staff are authorized to make technical and conforming changes. Without objection, so ordered. Are there any members wishing to make remarks on any of the agenda items?

Mr. Chairman, I would like to request on the record for the nomination of Ryan McCormick, PN 730-46, that Senators Peters and Baldwin would like to be recorded as a no. I would also like to request to correct the record for the nomination of Robert Harvey, Senator Peters would like to be recorded as a yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Without objection. If there are no further comments, that concludes the markup, and we'll move on to the hearing. [Gavel sounds.] Good morning. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order. Before I begin my opening statement, today marks the 17th anniversary of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident in New York. We remember the 50 lives lost as we somberly meet to discuss another deadly aviation accident. Aviation safety relies on the Swiss cheese model to mitigate and manage risk. Layers upon layers of human intervention and technology are meant to close any vulnerabilities or figurative holes left by the previous layer. Unfortunately, just over one year ago, that safety system failed just three miles from here at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. For more than 15 years, pilots, controllers, and reams of aviation data detected at least one near midair collision each and every month at National Airport. In 2013, after a helicopter and plane on approach to DCA nearly crashed into each other, controllers and helicopter operators formed a working group to improve coordination in the local airspace. That group met often and at some point even elevated recommendations to revise and improve mapped flight routes to show known hotspots. But their suggestions were ignored. That's one of the many failures uncovered by the NTSB that, had people responded differently, tragedy would have been avoided last year. I want to commend NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy and all of the NTSB staff for their efforts. They did yeoman's work to complete the DCA crash investigation in just 12 months. In addition to examining the causes of the DCA accident, the NTSB made 50 recommendations to improve aviation safety. One of those recommendations, arguably the most impactful one, should be familiar. For the 18th time, let me repeat that, for the 18th time, the NTSB is urging aircraft in busy airspace to have ADS-B on board. Had the Black Hawk and Bombardier CRJ been equipped to receive ADS-B location signals on January 29, 2025, the pilots would have been warned of each other's exact position nearly one minute before impact, and 67 people would still be alive today. Instead, the CRJ's pilots didn't see the helicopter until a split second before impact, while the helicopter crew, it appears, never saw the CRJ. The NTSB review revealed another major safety loophole. Military aircraft were routinely ignoring rules that required aircraft flying in busy airspace to transmit ADS-B signals. Although planes don't share locations with each other via ADS-B, they must broadcast such information to air traffic control. But the Army uses a special carve-out so that it didn't have to consistently comply with the broadcast mandate. Moreover, the NTSB discovered that this particular helicopter's ADS-B Out wasn't even configured correctly. After the January crash, the FAA eliminated the military's blanket exemption. But just a few weeks ago, a brand new loophole was tucked into the annual defense authorization bill, making it easier for the military to continue flying without ADS-B around DCA. If we learned anything from the DCA crash, it's that you can't have a safe airspace when operators are following different sets of rules. That's why our committee authored and passed the bipartisan ROTOR Act. The ROTOR Act, which passed the Senate unanimously in December, rescinds that new defense bill loophole and it enacts the central NTSB recommendation of this investigation. The ROTOR Act requires all aircraft in congested airspace to broadcast their location to each other via ADS-B. The ROTOR Act ensures a commercial airliner landing in a major airport has visibility, in daytime or in darkness, to any nearby aircraft, whether it's a military helicopter or a general aviation pilot, and vice versa. No more flying blind. The ROTOR Act will begin to protect the flying public now, which is why the House should pass it and put it on the President's desk for a signature. Now, I've heard some faint grumbling from stakeholders and others who want to put the same kind of loopholes into the ROTOR Act that caused the DCA crash. Some want exemptions for private jets, while a few airlines quietly carp about the cost of safety-enhancing technology. These criticisms aren't valid, and they are, frankly, disturbing. Flying can only be safe when everybody follows the same standards. Why would we want to exempt regional airlines from ADS-B given that Flight 5342 was a regional airline? I hope my House colleagues don't wait for another accident or for the NTSB to have to come back and recommend ADS-B for the 19th time before acting. And the notion that somehow private jets should receive a blanket exception makes no sense whatsoever. I don't know how anyone can look in the eyes of the victims' families and justify that argument. I also hope the House doesn't try to resolve the dozens of other safety recommendations from the NTSB because we know this particular one on ADS-B can start now and save lives. Today, there are planes taking off from Ronald Reagan National Airport. Today, there are planes landing at Ronald Reagan National Airport. There are planes that may have your loved ones on them or my loved ones on them. And every single day we delay, we are putting our families in danger for no reason whatsoever. In the room with us today are loved ones of the 67 men, women, and children who were killed in last January's crash. I'm encouraged and inspired by your tireless advocacy for safer skies. It pains all of us to know that your lives have been irreparably changed. There's nothing we can do to bring back your spouses, your children, your parents, your cousins, or your friends. But I hope that we can turn your grief into action. Thank you for working so hard to make sure that no other family has to suffer the kind of tragedy that you're feeling the pain of each and every day. I now turn to Ranking Member Cantwell.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is a very important hearing this morning. I feel like it's almost a culmination of years to finally get a report so crisp and clear about the failures of the FAA and what it needs to do to change its culture. I too want to remind and remember the individuals here about the Colgan Air crash. Our heart still goes out to the families affected by that incident, including people from Seattle. I also want to say that the Colgan families have been a constant presence in this room. And while that is not the way the political system is supposed to work, where the victims have to come and be the biggest advocates for safety, that is certainly what the Colgan Air families have done. So we certainly remember them today. And I want to also just say, Mr. Chairman, that yesterday's incident at El Paso reminds me of why this interagency coordination is so important. If we can get into this kind of conflict where the FAA is saying that we're going to shut down airspace for 10 days, and then another agency is saying something different, and there's concern about what is happening in the airspace, it just seems to me that we have a real problem of coordination between DOD and FAA. So we need to resolve that. I hope that your calls for an interagency briefing will be heeded and that we will get to the bottom of this. Not one more day needs to go by without that kind of information and oversight for the public. But we are here today to thank Chair Homendy and the NTSB and to thank them for their recommendations and findings after a thorough, long investigation into the tragic crash in DCA last year. The loss of 67 souls when an Army helicopter collided with American Airlines 5342 has weighed heavily on many of us, but certainly the families who are most affected. Our hearts go out to you. Many of the family members are here today, and I know they will be following today's discussion very closely. You have stood with us to make our aviation system safer, including your support for the ROTOR Act, which was critical in trying to push this legislation through the United States Senate and hopefully to get it to the President's desk. I want to thank Chair Homendy again for her work with her team tirelessly delivering answers to these families. I know that you deliver a lot of answers and information to us. I think no one knows how hard that is in delivering the information to the families. I know from our own air accidents with the seaplane in Seattle how trying to find the victims of that crash, there's just so much work that goes into communicating with the families, and so we thank you for that as well. These answers demonstrate that this tragedy was a result of many systematic failures and that that failed everyone on Flight 5342 and the Army helicopters and the air traffic controllers. And so this is part of a larger trend where we have to be the ones that put a stop to this finally. We have witnessed multiple near misses between commercial airline flights and military flights, including a helicopter flying too close to DCA traffic last May, exposing communication failures between the Pentagon air traffic control tower and the DCA tower, and a near midair collision between an Air Force tanker and JetBlue flying from Caracas back to the United States. These incidents are just unacceptable. So we look forward to the 14 recommendations that you are making today, especially the issue of NTSB and the larger FAA reforms. I am concerned that the NTSB found that the FAA and Army are dangerously over-reliant on pilots to see and avoid. How can a congested airspace rely on see and avoid? Other traffic around National Capital Region, the NTSB found these practices created an unacceptable risk, especially without the help of a key safety technology that we've already implemented in so many other aspects of our airspace, ADS-B In and ADS-B Out. NTSB has also emphasized having TCAS is not enough. Not enough. The CRJ pilots did not get air traffic alerts at lower altitudes below 900 feet, and pilot alerts are more limited if ADS-B In data is not feeding into this system. Last week, the NTSB issued their 18th recommendation in 20 years on this type of technology, ADS-B In and Out, that basically is the alert system that we expected in the digital age to be implemented 20 years ago. So recommending that all aircraft are required to fly in a controlled airspace with this to ensure pilots have real-time awareness and traffic alerts both in the air and on the ground is just the last piece of an aviation safety system safeguard that has been recommended for years. And the question is why hasn't someone been doing it? Money cannot be the answer because the cost of lives has been too great. The bipartisan ROTOR Act also is key in the NTSB recommendations, and it will help to save and strengthen the oversight. NTSB reinforced that the FAA and Army had access to safety data in years leading up to the crash that warned of heightened risk of midair collisions in DCA, but the FAA failed to act on that, as did the Army. So NTSB's investigation of the DCA collision and the Air Alaska door plug accident showed that the FAA's safety management system has been superficial at best. While the FAA has mandated SMS, a safety management system, which means when you have a safety problem, you have to stop and fix it. That's all that safety management system means. It means you have to stop and fix it. It means don't keep going on production, don't keep going on your system until you fix the safety risk. But if you don't have a real SMS, then it really doesn't stop to fix the safety concerns. That is why the legislation we passed this morning is a start. We will hear from experts about why the FAA needs to do this, similar to the expert witnesses that provided us so much information about the MAX crashes. With the committee's vote on this today, I think we are one step closer. And we certainly know that controllers who voiced safety concerns about helicopter routes and stressful controller workloads were also ignored by FAA managers. So we have to fix this as well. Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to work with you on getting the ROTOR Act onto the President's desk. This is critical legislation that will help now. And we also have more work to do because this sequence of events and the events at El Paso show us that we have real communication issues and we must do our oversight role. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to Chair Homendy's important testimony this morning.

Thank you. I now recognize Chairman Moran for an opening statement.

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I join in supporting and commending your opening statement, you and the ranking member. I appreciate the demands and sentiments that you both expressed. I appreciate the way that you both have carried out this, conducting the hearings of, allowing our subcommittee to take a significant role in pursuing safety measures and really directing the leadership, providing the leadership to this committee to take concrete actions to prevent other accidents from occurring in the future. We continue to mourn the losses of the victims. We express our condolences on behalf of citizens of my state. We express our condolences to the members of the family who are present here today and those who are not. We remember the heroism that was displayed on the night of January 29th at DCA at Reagan National Airport as the heroic efforts were made to find and save lives. And I commend NTSB Chair Homendy and her team for their significant and diligent work. This, the calls for action that have been made by the chairman and the ranking member, it seems to me that I can't remember the circumstance in which we had the factual basis to be more unified in a response than what we have with the presence of what Chair Homendy and her team have provided us. In so many instances in Congress, we get this point of view and this point of view and then we try to hash out who is telling us the truth and what matters in the conversation. And Chair Homendy, I can't find a circumstance in which NTSB didn't do its job in a way that none of us should have doubts about the conclusions you reached and the recommendations you have provided. This, there is no excuse for us not to achieve the goal of those recommendations by passing legislation and perhaps as importantly, maybe even more importantly, to insist that once we pass legislation, that that legislative effort is rewarded by action by the FAA and others so that it is implemented fully in a way that makes a difference. I've been in Congress enough to see the circumstances in which we often pass legislation, we issue the press release and say we've done something. But we haven't done anything until we've done something, and that means the administration, the execution of those laws have to be fully fulfilled. It's our responsibility, our responsibility in this committee and as members of the United States Senate to turn the conclusions of the NTSB report into action. Congress must determine what steps we need to take following those recommendations, and we need to make sure that the FAA, the Army, and all others are following those recommended and enacted safety measures. Following a year-long investigation, NTSB has affirmed again that passing and implementing the ROTOR Act could have, and I would say would have, saved lives on January the 29th, 2025. The passage and implementation of the ROTOR Act is critical to achieving the safety of our skies. I urge the House not to delay in its passage. The chairman made the point that every day that goes by creates a greater risk for others. If there's something that needs to be addressed in the ROTOR Act, don't delay. Let's have the conversation and fix something if there's something missing or wrong. That doesn't mean watering it down. It means fully implementing the ROTOR Act as passed just as soon as we make certain we've got it right. Additionally, Congress must continue to provide the funding, the funding that is necessary to further modernize our aviation system, advance new technologies at the FAA. We were, the FAA administrator was in front of us with a roundtable discussion yesterday about implementation of advanced technologies in the system. And we must continue to recruit, train, and support air traffic controllers. No steps back moving forward. Act on the recommendations and make sure that January 29th never occurs again. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I appreciate the opportunity I've had to work with you, Senator Cantwell, and Senator Duckworth in this regard.

Thank you. Ranking Member Duckworth.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you also to Ranking Member Cantwell and to my chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Moran, who's been a joy to work with as a partner on this issue. Chair Homendy, I want to thank you and the entire team at the NTSB for carrying out your mission without fear or favor to independently investigate the DCA midair collision. You provided FAA, DOD, Congress, and most importantly, the families of the victims of Flight 5342 clear answers explaining how this deadly crash happened, and you've given us a framework to ensure such utterly preventable tragedies never happen again. Many of the NTSB's findings from the DCA midair collision point to issues that have persisted for years. The urgent need to address the air traffic controller shortage, the need for advanced safety technology, and the unacceptable lack of coordinated communications between the FAA and the DOD. I've repeatedly sounded the alarm on these issues, and I haven't been the only one. The NTSB found that in prior years, rank-and-file controllers working in the DCA tower sought spacing of at least four miles in trail, while Potomac TRACON controllers asked for a decrease in DCA's dangerous airport arrival rate. Yet FAA management failed to act on the warnings being raised by an understaffed and overworked controller workforce that was clearly struggling to manage the busiest, most congested runway in the United States. FAA's failure in the face of blaring alarm bells screaming out that it was a matter of when, not if, one of the near misses at DCA would become a deadly tragedy is, unfortunately, emblematic of a chronic crisis that's plagued FAA for years under multiple administrations, an unacceptable culture of complacency. Chair Homendy, 826 days ago, you sat in that very chair in this very room to testify alongside FAA at a hearing I convened on addressing close calls to improve aviation safety. That day, your message could not have been clearer as you warned everyone, and I'm quoting you, "The concerning uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign that the U.S. aviation system is sharply strained. We cannot wait until a fatal accident forces action. We must act before there is a tragedy." And your message was embraced by many in this chamber in a bipartisan way. As I recall, I opened that hearing by stating that our nation is experiencing an aviation safety crisis. Near misses are happening way too frequently, and I refuse to be complacent in waiting to act until the next runway incursion becomes a fatal collision. 826 days ago, we had that exchange. That recognition is why I fought so hard to protect the 1,500-hour rule and to stop Congress from adding more flights to DCA. Unfortunately, on that latter fight, I and the members of Virginia and Maryland delegations were soundly defeated. And as the NTSB report found, the intense traffic demand in the region forced Potomac TRACON to routinely reduce the trail spacing between aircraft, which increased the workload on DCA air traffic controllers. Tragically, the one audience that refused to hear these messages was the one entity with the authority to act, the FAA. And it seems as if the FAA's complacency has only hardened over time, regardless of which political party controls the White House. Again, this is a bipartisan failure. The NTSB report showed that the FAA failed to conduct annual reviews of helicopter routes in the DCA airspace leading up to the DCA midair collision, reviews that would have shown that the helicopter route was too close to an approach runway. A review of helicopter routes would have also potentially prevented some of the 15,000 close calls between airplanes and helicopters in the DCA airspace that took place between October of 2021 and December of 2024. We have long known about the mounting strain on air traffic controllers. That is why I will continue to reiterate that any investment in our ATC system must be informed by and prioritize the most important asset of the ATC system, its people. ...Chairman Moran. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. I now want to introduce our witness, Ms. Jennifer Homendy, the chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB investigates all civilian aviation accidents and other major roadway, pipeline, rail, and marine accidents. We thank Chairwoman Homendy and the NTSB staff for their work to complete the investigation of the DCA midair collision in one year. Chairwoman Homendy, you're recognized for five minutes.

Okay. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our investigation of the midair collision that occurred just over a year ago near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. As we discuss NTSB's thorough fact-finding, extensive analysis, and comprehensive safety recommendations, I want to make one thing abundantly clear: we should not be here today. In this room sitting with us or watching online are family members of the 67 people who died on January 29. We are so sorry for your loss. You should not have to be here because, as I've said many times, this was 100 percent preventable. It was preventable. In fact, now that our investigation has concluded, I can say without a shadow of a doubt that we've seen this before. We've investigated similar midair collisions going back decades, and we've issued safety recommendations like ADS-B In over and over and over again aimed at preventing just these kinds of collisions, recommendations that have been rejected, sidelined, or just plain ignored. As Chairman Cruz and Congressman Onder recently wrote, last year's crash was not an isolated incident, it was the fatal result of years of unheeded warnings. Years. 57 years ago, in 1969, we investigated a midair collision between Allegheny Airlines Flight 853 and a small Piper Cherokee outside Shelbyville, Indiana. 83 people died. Soon after, the board held a hearing and issued 14 recommendations aimed at preventing future midair collisions, including our first ever recommendation for FAA to expeditiously develop and implement a collision avoidance system in all civil aircraft. For perspective, that same year, we put a man on the moon. And yet it took another two decades and a congressional mandate for FAA to finally implement TCAS. TCAS didn't prevent this accident, but there are technologies that are readily available that could have. If I could pull up my slide while that's coming up, with ADS-B In and what I'm— maybe I'll give it a second. With ADS-B In, hopefully it'll come up. Little technical difficulties. I'll continue on, and when it comes up, I'll explain. With ADS-B In—

I don't do the AV.

Yeah, me too. There we go. So on the left side is the PAT25, and on the right side is Flight 5342. We did a laser scan of exemplar aircraft, and so the gray around is the structure, and then of course you see the night vision goggles on the left side. With ADS-B In, the helicopter pilots would have gotten an audible alert if it was in their headset at 48 seconds prior to collision when they were over Hains Point, allowing them to take action. They never got a single alert. They had no idea that 5342 was coming from the left, and we can talk about that in the hearing if you'd like. On the right side, looking out of 5342, the CRJ would have gotten their first alert with ADS-B In at 59 seconds prior to collision. [Video plays.] Instead, they got a TCAS alert that just said, 'Traffic, traffic.' And what they need to do is look out and figure out where that traffic is and take action, which is very difficult to see in many circumstances, and we can talk about why that is too. But 'Traffic, traffic' 19.5 seconds prior to collision. They didn't actually recognize that the helicopter was there until one second, one second prior to collision. Had they gotten ADS-B In, they would have gotten something more along the lines of 'Traffic, 12 o'clock, two nautical miles, 500 feet below.' Then they could have taken action. What we're talking about here is life-saving information for pilots. It's information. In 2008, we again called on the FAA to implement ADS-B In. We stated the safety board believes that the benefits of ADS-B technology warrant rapid adoption and that the equipage of aircraft with ADS-B In capability will provide an immediate and substantial contribution to safety, underline, especially in and around airports. We said that in 2008. What if the FAA had acted? I want to be clear, though, what happened at DCA could happen anywhere in our airspace. The NTSB has for years, long before this tragedy at DCA, been sounding the alarm about the safety risks of see-and-avoid. Yet we continue to rely on see-and-avoid to separate traffic throughout the national airspace when technology is available to provide pilots with the situational awareness they need and deserve to ensure safety. See-and-avoid is exactly what it sounds like. A pilot has to visually acquire an approaching aircraft, recognize a collision course, decide on action, execute the control movement, and allow the aircraft to respond in a matter of seconds. Since 2008, we've investigated 211 aviation accidents and incidents resulting from a midair collision or loss of separation, which killed 281 people and injured 12 others. In almost half, we raised concerns with see-and-avoid. These include many in your home states, and I know not all the senators are here, but I'm going to pretend they are because we've investigated since 2008 where we stated our concerns: 16 in Texas, one in Kansas, 15 in Alaska, including the 2019 tragedy in Ketchikan where six people died and 10 were injured, and I was the board member on scene and we discussed at length in that report the lack of ADS-B In requirements for Part 135. Two in North Carolina, one in Missouri, two in Utah, one in Ohio, one in Wyoming, one in Michigan, two in Wisconsin, one in Illinois, 12 in Nevada, seven in Colorado, two in Pennsylvania, four in New Jersey, and now one in DC. The fact is our aviation system is the safest in the world for a reason. Thanks to the work of you all, the work of the entire Congress, our work at NTSB, the work of our partners at FAA, redundancy has been built into the system to prevent catastrophe. But that doesn't mean system flaws don't exist. Our aviation system is complex. The national airspace system is complex. But it is generally safe, which means many, many things have to go wrong for a tragedy like this to occur. And we have an obligation to fix those vulnerabilities. The question before us is how many more people need to die before we act? How many more people need to die before we act? I've heard others say it can't be done, it's too expensive, the technology isn't available, the risk is only at DCA. None of that is true. Absolutely none of it. The technology is available with an iPhone or an iPad, a headset, this is mine, and a cable, and a few hundred dollars for a receiver. That's what this is, ADS-B In receiver. Even the oldest general aviation planes can be outfitted with ADS-B In. The gentleman behind me from our office who is the director of our Office of Aviation Safety, he has no electricity in his plane. This is what he has. He has ADS-B In with an iPad. In commercial aviation, American Airlines has equipped its entire fleet of more than 300 Airbus A321 aircraft with ADS-B In. I was in the cockpit to look at it, flew to Phoenix from here. You know how much it cost them? I asked the COO: less than $50,000 per plane to retrofit. Boeing offers it on new planes, Airbus offers it on new planes, Gulfstream includes it. It is possible. The technology is available, so we can solve this problem and save lives. We should not have to be here, and we wouldn't be if the NTSB's warnings had been heeded. Exactly 17 years ago, Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed in New York. 50 people died. In response to that accident, we issued 25 new safety recommendations to the FAA. 10 were closed unacceptable action because they weren't going to do anything about it. In the letters, they told us don't ask anymore. One is open unacceptable. We cannot allow this to happen again. Every single one of the 50 safety recommendations we issued in response to the DCA catastrophe must be acted on immediately. The FAA has had multiple, multiple opportunities to implement NTSB recommendations. Time after time, they've declined. Now we need action, whether that's through the FAA, and they can implement a lot of the recommendations we just issued, some of them are simple and we can talk about that, Army, Department of War, or an act of Congress. We cannot accept having to be here years from now lamenting yet more inaction. Not only must we do this for the 67 people who died on January 29, we must do this for all those who lost their lives in accidents that the NTSB has investigated. We must do this for their families. We must do this for future generations, lives we can still save. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, I am immensely grateful to you and the members of this committee for your robust advocacy via the bipartisan ROTOR Act. Not only do I want to thank you for your incredible leadership, but I mean this from the bottom of my heart: thank you for your willingness to stand up and do what's right for safety. I look forward to working with you to create a future where no family ever has to endure such tremendous loss. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair. In just a moment, Chairwoman Homendy is going to play a short video simulation that the NTSB produced that includes the transcript of the cockpit voice recordings along with air traffic control transmission. And I will say right before this hearing began, the chairwoman played for the members of this committee in the back conference room the video along with the audio of the cockpit voice transmissions. Under federal law, we're not allowed to play the actual voice transmissions publicly. But I will tell you, watching and listening, and for any members that did not see that, I'm certain the chairwoman would be happy to give you the opportunity to see it and listen to it. It is positively horrifying. And watching it and listening to the voices of the pilots makes you sick to your stomach. After watching it, it is indisputable that ADS-B In and Out could have prevented and likely would have prevented this accident. And we have an obligation to prevent the next accident. I do want to give a moment if any of the family members wish to step out and not watch the video, we'd certainly understand that, and so I want to give you an opportunity if you would prefer not to watch it. And Madam Chair, you can play the video now.

[Video plays.] This animation presents a simulated view from the right seat of the helicopter. A dark gray structural mask generated from a three-dimensional laser scan of an exemplar aircraft is overlaid on the scene. A light gray mask depicts the mounting structure of the night vision goggles positioned for the instructor pilot looking straight ahead. The green tint mimics a green phosphor visual effect, but the actual behavior of the night vision goggles has not been simulated. Crew communications transcribed from the cockpit voice recorder are shown as text at lower left. Audio recordings of air traffic control communications on the helicopter frequency are synchronized with the animation, with corresponding transcript text displayed in the center. Radio interference blocked some transmissions from the local controller and other helicopters. Transmissions that were blocked are indicated by striking through words in the transcript. A moving map depicting the locations of PAT25 and Flight 5342 and synchronized with the view from the cockpit will be shown at lower right.

Jazz 789, winds are 320 at 15, gusts 25. Traffic two out, no delay, runway one cleared for takeoff.

Blackjack one landing assured, boardwalk good night.

Blackjack one, roger, frequency change approved, good night.

PAT25 Memorial.

PAT25, roger.

Alright.

Lots of right pedal, ma'am.

Okay.

There we go, now we can make the turn.

American 3130, Washington Tower, winds are 310 at 14, gusts 25, runway one cleared to land. Traffic will depart— may depart prior to your arrival.

Clear left.

Clear left, crane, no factor.

You're at 300 feet. Come down for me.

Yeah. Go down 200.

Crane out the right, no factor.

Okay.

Jazz 789, contact Potomac Departure, good day. American 3130, slow to final. PAT25, traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge is a CRJ at 1,200 feet circling runway 33.

PAT25 has the traffic in sight, request visual separation.

Visual separation approved. American 1630, Tower, runway one line up and wait. Traffic three out circling runway 33, this traffic on six mile final.

Tower, Muscle 7 approaching Springfield, request route three to zone six.

Muscle 7, standby.

Ha ha.

Ha.

Bluestreak 5307, keep rolling out to November, ground point seven, good day.

He's got 'em stacked up tonight.

Yeah, kinda busy. Alright, 330, so now we've pretty much got a right quartering tailwind going to be pushing you.

Yeah.

National Tower, good evening, AirCare 1's with you, a single medevac—

American 1630, winds are 320 at 14, gusts 25. Traffic two mile left base from runway 33, no delay, runway one cleared for immediate takeoff.

Crabbing.

Yeah. Better not to fight the wind.

Right pedal.

Muscle 7, say request.

Yeah, Muscle 7 request route three to zone six.

Muscle 7, you say route three to zone six?

A-firm, Muscle 7.

Muscle 7, approved.

This animation presents a simulated view from the right seat of the CRJ. A dark gray structural mask generated from a three-dimensional laser scan of an exemplar aircraft is overlaid on the scene. Crew communications transcribed from the cockpit voice recorder are shown as text at lower left. Audio recordings of air traffic control communications on the airplane frequency are synchronized with the animation, with corresponding transcript text displayed at lower right. A moving map depicting the locations of both aircraft synchronized with the view from the cockpit is shown at upper left.

Jazz 789, winds are 320 at 15, gusts 25. Traffic two out, no delay, runway one cleared for takeoff.

Cleared takeoff, runway one, no delay, Jazz 789.

Let's see... approaches... approaches... I dunno.

Blackjack one, roger, frequency change approved, good night. PAT25, roger.

Washington Tower, American 3130 with you, runway one.

American 3130, Washington Tower, winds are 310 at 14, gusts 25, runway one cleared to land. Traffic will depart— may depart prior to your arrival.

Visual 33. That's me, I got 10 plus.

Okay, cleared to land, runway one, American 3130.

All checks.

We're configured.

Yep.

What'd ya say?

Yeah, we are configured. You want me to clear the flight director and everything?

Sure, why not.

All right.

Jazz 789, contact Potomac Departure, good day.

Have a good day.

American 3130, slow to final.

Slowin', American 3130.

PAT25, traffic just south of the Wilson Bridge is a CRJ at 1,200 feet circling runway 33.

I gotta level off.

All right.

Visual separation approved. American 1630, Tower, runway one line up and wait. Traffic three out circling runway 33, this traffic on six mile final.

Line up runway one, American 1630.

American 472 by KATRN, runway one.

Muscle 7, standby.

1,000.

Bluestreak 5307, keep rolling out to November, ground point seven, good day.

November, 5307.

Stable, spoilers stowed, confirm missed approach altitude set.

Uh, 2,200 set.

American 1630, winds are 320 at 14, gusts 25. Traffic two mile left base from runway 33, no delay, runway one cleared for immediate takeoff.

Number one cleared for takeoff, American 1630.

Muscle 7, say request.

At 59 seconds, this is where Flight 5342, had they had ADS-B In, would have gotten their first alert. That would have been their first alert had there been ADS-B In. And I know there's— there's been statements made, but the helicopter wasn't transmitting ADS-B Out. Even if this aircraft had ADS-B In, it wouldn't have mattered because at DCA you have something called TIS-B. It's Traffic Information Service Broadcast. They have ground radar stations that take information from transponders and other aircraft in the air that have ADS-B and relay it back up to aircraft that have ADS-B In. So they would have gotten their first alert, and it would have sounded something like 'Traffic, 12 o'clock, two nautical miles, 500 feet below' or low altitude. What you're going to hear in a minute— in a few seconds at 19.5 seconds is what they actually did hear. And that's— we'll go ahead and play.

Muscle 7, you say route three to zone six? Muscle 7, approved.

American 472, Mount Vernon Visual one.

500.

Five hundred feet on top of the bug, sinking seven stable.

Checks.

I got two white, two red.

Cool.

PAT25, do you have that CRJ in sight? PAT25, pass behind that CRJ. Visual separation.

Plus hundred.

American 472 by BADNN, Mount Vernon Visual.

American 472, Washington Tower, winds are 320 at 17—

Oh #.

Ohhhh ohhhh.

Yeah, so sorry, you didn't hear 'Traffic, traffic' at 19.5 seconds because the CVR audio isn't on there. But that would have been 19.5 seconds. And then at that point at 'Traffic, traffic,' you're looking out trying to figure out where the traffic is. Helicopter's down in the lights. Pilots are told when it's a traffic advisory, you're not to take any sort of evasive action because you need to be looking at and acquiring that traffic. Resolution advisories, which is part of TCAS that you can get, resolution advisories would have provided them with a climb, descend, except below 900 feet across our entire airspace, resolution advisories are inhibited, meaning they are quiet. All you get is 'Traffic, traffic.' What we're talking about is timely information for pilots.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The NTSB conducted a thorough investigation into this accident. What did the NTSB investigation show about what would have happened if both aircraft had been equipped with ADS-B In?

The accident wouldn't have happened. At 48 seconds, the helicopter crew would have gotten an oral alert, they could have taken evasive action, and the flight crew of 5342 at 59 seconds could have had an alert that allowed them to take evasive action. So we have recommended ADS-B In everywhere there is ADS-B Out for all aircraft.

As you know, the bipartisan ROTOR Act, which passed out of this committee and which passed the Senate unanimously, every Republican, every Democrat has voted for it, mandates ADS-B In and Out on aircraft flying into congested airspace. In your professional judgment, if the ROTOR Act had been the law at the time of this accident, would the accident have occurred?

No. It wouldn't have occurred, though this helicopter route shouldn't have existed, but that's another story. No. I don't believe that it would have occurred.

Well, and as you know, that's another component of the ROTOR Act is mandating a reassessment of helicopter routes as well. ADS-B Out and In is not new technology. Today, the FAA only requires ADS-B Out, which sends signals directly to air traffic control. In 2010, the agency chose not to require ADS-B In, which would have given pilots those same signals. Nonetheless, some aviators voluntarily use ADS-B In, receiving weather, traffic, and other information in the— ...cockpit. American Airlines, for example, has equipped nearly 30 percent of its fleet with ADS-B In. More than 80 percent of private pilots use some form of ADS-B In. It is clearly a popular technology. I've heard a handful of special interest groups, however, want carve-outs from an ADS-B In requirement. I don't think a private jet or a charter flight flying into DCA or Dulles or DFW should be able to adhere to a lower safety standards than a passenger airline. Special treatment for them would put everyone else's lives at risk. Others have said that all of general aviation should be exempt, even though pilots in rural areas are already exempted and the ROTOR Act protects general aviation's ability to use portable transponders. In your judgment, should different aircraft be flying into congested area using different ADS-B safety rules?

No, absolutely not. It's a shared airspace.

Those same skeptics like to claim that ADS-B In is too costly. Major airlines like American Airlines have figured out how to install ADS-B In. Every new Gulfstream has ADS-B In. And of course, the ROTOR Act only requires ADS-B In for planes flying into busy airspace. A crop duster flying in Arkansas isn't going to need it and won't be affected. But if that crop duster decides to land at DCA Reagan, then it should have the technology and not be endangering the lives of passengers flying into and out of Reagan every day. In your judgment, is it too expensive for planes to install ADS-B In?

$400. Everybody's got a phone. Everybody's got a headset. $400. Maybe you get an iPad, it's a little more expensive, but that isn't costly. American Airlines, less than $50,000 a plane to retrofit. The plane was out of service, they told me, one or two days when they retrofitted each plane.

So I want you to repeat that because one of the concerns people are raising is this is some onerous government mandate. A private pilot can get the equipment necessary, A, to keep himself or herself safer, B, to keep everyone else flying into that congested airport safer. They can get that equipment for $400.

You already have a headset. Everybody has a phone. Some people have iPads. $400. This is the receiver.

Another objection that has been raised is the claim that somehow the military should be exempt, that the military should be able to fly in congested airspace and not be subject to the rules everyone else is. Does that make any sense?

No, it does not.

Well, 100 members of the United States Senate agree with you. The Secretary of War agrees with you. The Secretary of Transportation agrees with you. And I am hopeful that within the next two weeks, the House of Representatives will put the ROTOR Act on the floor, will pass it, and will put it on President Trump's desk for signature. We owe it to the families of those who lost their lives, the 67 souls who should be with us today, if only Congress had listened to the first 16 times the NTSB recommended ADS-B In. Thank you.

I know you don't have any more time, but can I...

Sure.

I know you, yeah. Can I have one thing to point out?

You could have two.

Okay, thank you. In 2001, the FAA had a rulemaking on fractional ownership. And they stated in there that passengers who are transported under parts 121 and part 135, quote, "exercise no control over and bear no responsibility for the airworthiness or operation of the aircraft aboard which they are flown." I would also say that applies to part 91 revenue-generating passenger operations. The FAA concluded that the appropriate level of public safety is provided by very stringent regulations and oversight under part 121 and part 135. In Ketchikan in 2019, we stated that aircraft without ADS-B In do not demonstrate the appropriate level of safety for passenger-carrying operations conducted under part 135 regulations. And we also stated that there's shared airspace between 121, 135, and GA. We've conducted numerous investigations between part 121 airlines and GA aircraft, or GA aircraft carrying passengers who paid for a service with other GA aircraft, or between 135s and 121s, or 135 and GA. The fact is everyone should be under the same rules. One level of safety. Because it doesn't matter if you're in a private plane, a commercial jet is also operating in your airspace. Sorry.

Thank you. Ranking Member Cantwell.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Homendy, you, in my opinion, have become a sentry for aviation safety. And that means that you're standing guard over our system, which I believe should be standing guard over by the FAA. And you should play a role on the details that then jointly this works together. But somehow, the industry has too much influence over this process. And I don't know if the FAA just thinks that it can't keep up technologically, I don't know. But these recommendations have been on the table for a long time and they've never been implemented. And so I want to ask several questions about your 14 key recommendations. But first, on this issue of ADS-B In, we you just talked about the issue of what it would take to implement. But isn't there a cost? General aviation is saying this is too expensive and you just refuted that. But isn't there a cost for not doing it? NTSB data show that between 2006 and 2025, they investigated 153 midair collisions involving general aviation operators compared to one midair collision and four near-midair collisions involving commercial jets. So these general aviation accidents have cost 198 lives. So there is a huge cost to general aviation for not doing this, isn't that correct?

That's correct. Unfortunately, when you do a rulemaking, the DOT puts the price of a life at $11.6 million. The NTSB considers all life priceless. You can't put a price tag on a life.

How many times did you or your individuals listen to the audio tapes here?

Quite a number of times.

Hundreds?

If I combined everyone, yes.

So I think that's the difference. You're listening to this, analyzing this, and you are steadfast in your recommendations. And somehow these guys are listening to other voices and saying we don't have to do it because there's a cost. And I got news for the FAA, in the digital age, that's not going to stand because we all can see this information and we need an FAA that basically is on top of this and will push through the regulations to implement. So on this issue, a safety management system, which is basically part of the requirements, you're basically saying that they didn't integrate a system. Would a safety management system with the number of near misses that you said were alarm bells going off in the cockpit demanded that this route no longer exist?

A safety management system, a properly implemented safety management system should have identified the risk. But it is pretty clear from our investigation that did not occur.

Well, it would not only identified it, but would required once identified to fix it.

Yeah, once you identify, then you look at your mitigations and then you implement those mitigations and monitor those mitigations and reevaluate for change. But in this case, there were numerous warning signs from people within the FAA saying we have a problem here. Then there was their own data that they weren't even looking at, 15,214 close proximity events. I can tell you this much, you know, the FAA requires a lot of data. They've got 10 different systems just for midair collisions. But they don't actually have a definition for what they consider is a midair collision, a near miss. Not one single definition. So then you have people who aren't looking at the data, then you have the tower who was trying to raise concerns over and over again, year after year and not being heard, told to go away. And I have to tell you, this same scenario that occurred on January 29 also occurred in 2013 between a military aircraft and a private commercial jet. It was averted. Same thing happened.

So we need an aggressive FAA in this air traffic control office and safety office on aviation safety to actually collect data, report on data. And my guess is we're going to have to get some of this data and review it and require hearings because otherwise this job isn't getting done, it appears to be. So if you could just comment on El Paso for us about this newest event.

I don't know a lot, I don't know anything about El Paso other than what I read. It's not something that we handle. However, you know, from the what little I know, I will say there has been miscommunication or no communication between at least the Army and FAA for years. Now the Army, the 12th Battalion participated in the helicopter working group, but in general they weren't having conversations.

Which this is in this accident the key issue as well. The conversation should have been happening and and we obviously had a rule that somehow got changed that allowed this to happen and that it wasn't an accurate assessment even after the rule was changed. So.

Yeah, and if I if you don't mind me mentioning, listen, the reason why the NTSB has the party system, when we do an investigation, we invite entities who are technical experts into our investigation like FAA, like the Army, like a number of others, PSA, you name it, in order for us to get the evidence we need to conduct our investigation. They're not part of the analysis, right? But during that time, it's been a year. During that time, parties get that information in real time and can make change immediately. They don't need to wait for our final investigation to come out with 50 recommendations. You know what the best result of an investigative report is? It's the best thing that has happened in years at the NTSB. In Missouri, actually, in Missouri, actually, I wish Mr. Schmitt was here to hear it. We had at the end of a terrible train derailment, I was on scene, went to meet with a farmer in his barn who said he'd been talking about, you know, this terrible accident that could occur for years on Facebook doing videos. I met with him in his barn and said what's going on for like two hours. And he said to me, I said, "I'm going to fix this before we leave." And he's like, "Sure you are." I don't blame him, you know, he'd been facing a government bureaucracy for years. So I got everybody together before we left. I said, you name it. And I said, "We are facing this crossing." And you know what happened a year later? We issued our final report on a deadly train collision at this terribly designed grade crossing. And Governor Parson not only fixed that crossing, he fixed 49 others. And we issued no recommendations. The failure in this report is that we had to issue recommendations. Now I'm going to get a briefing from FAA on their reorganization, but we can't be just shifting around the deck chairs. ATC didn't contribute to this. We need reform.

Well, other people here need to listen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. Senator Wicker.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And and also thank you Ranking Member Cantwell, former Chairman Cantwell, for for asking that question about El Paso. Senator Cantwell and I were leading this committee during the time we were investigating the 737 MAX 8 tragedies. And this is this is the most heart-wrenching and gut-wrenching issue that we could possibly ever investigate. And I just don't have the words to to tell the families how how awful this is and how terrible I realize they must feel. And thank you, Chairwoman Homendy, for for your leadership in this. Since the accident in January of last year, what what has changed at Reagan National Airport between the FAA, the towers, and the National Guard in the interim before our act can be passed by the House?

Well, one thing that did change is that within we issued two urgent safety recommendations for immediate action in March of this past year, just a couple of months after the accident occurred, calling on the Secretary of Transportation to take action about the helicopter route itself, Route 4. And within two hours, it's the fastest we have ever had an entity implement our recommendation. Within two hours, he did so. He prohibited mixed traffic between Hains Point and Wilson Bridge, which is now in an interim final rule before him, but he's continued that prohibition on mixed traffic and has required ADS-B Out in the airspace. He has authorized additional personnel in the tower. However, the tower is facing some challenges. The numbers are lower because a lot of people are going through training. But a number of other measures need to need to take place.

Sure, I understand that. But but things have been done within weeks of this accident based on your recommendations.

Yes, and I I have to say this was his first day on the job. It was his first day on the job. He did this will forever stay with him, which is why he is so committed to aviation safety and he's been an excellent partner on this with us.

Now when you speak to skeptical members of the other body, is is it the cost to general aviation that they mention as the only reason they're skeptical about the bill? What other reasons do they give for not readily passing what's been passed unanimously over here?

I've heard a number of things. I've heard cost. I've heard aircraft...

That would be the cost to the general aviation owners?

I've heard for everybody. Cost for general aviation, 135, 121, regional airlines, major airlines. I've heard difficulty in retrofitting, planes being out of service. I've heard privacy concerns. I've heard and I'm sure Senator Budd is going to raise this, I've heard concerns about tracking aircraft with ADS-B Out where some airports and third-party entities are tracking aircraft, especially GA aircraft, to charge them landing and ramp fees, which is something you all can address. Those are the main issues I've heard about.

Let me ask you let me ask you this. On the headsets, it just strikes me as as so inconceivable that this helicopter had the ADS-B, but the two pilots could not hear it on their headsets. Why was that and how readily could that be fixed?

So it can be fixed. We have issued a recommendation for them have to have an integrated headset so that they can hear any sort of alerting. But we've also recommended better technology on the helicopters so they're not relying on iPads on their legs while they're in a night vision goggle high workload environment. I will say the Army has been very responsive. They have completely replaced their helicopters at the 12th Battalion from the old Lima models to the new Mike models. And they have stated they're going to implement that technology. They're still working on the headset issue and haven't quite committed to that, but implement better technology for ADS-B In and Out by the third quarter of 2027, though they're asking for $500 million. So since you're in charge of that, I will ask for $500 million.

And if the chair will indulge me, should the House pass this bill that has now passed unanimously in the Senate? Should they pass it next week? How soon could it be implemented?

I think certain measures can be implemented immediately. Some measures will take a little bit of time. I don't know how much time, but it would take a little bit of time. And FAA would have to sort some of it out through a rulemaking. In that amount of time, like ADS-B In, but in that amount of time, the risk still is in our airspace. So every day that goes by, we face the potential for another catastrophe to occur.

Well, thank you for your stewardship of this issue.

Thank you.

Senator Duckworth.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As our committee conducted oversight in the aftermath of the tragic DCA crash, I've noticed that the stories from FAA and the Army have gradually evolved over time. Specifically, my sense is that the information provided have come to resemble more of a telling of what should have happened rather than what actually happened. And I fear this pattern is yet another symptom of a complacent culture. For example, NTSB is now officially recommending that FAA and the Army engage in proactive data sharing. The lack of coordination between the FAA and the Army was on full display in May of last year when it was reported that the dedicated direct access line connecting the Pentagon tower with the DCA tower had not worked since 2022. Meaning that for more than 1,000 days, 1,000 days, not a single soul ever used the hotline directly connecting the DCA tower and the Pentagon's Army heliport. Now in the aftermath of this scandal, which itself occurred only months after the preventable deadly DCA crash, FAA issued statements downplaying the impact, implying that the inoperable hotline was really no big deal because, look, controllers could just, and I quote, "call each other on the telephone." But FAA cannot hand-wave away this scandal because FAA's Deputy Chief Operating Officer publicly admitted that FAA had no idea that the dedicated hotline was not working for three years. FAA had no idea until another Army helicopter incident, less than four months after the DCA crash, forced two commercial flights to abort landings at DCA. Meaning that after the tragedy of Flight 5342 civil-military collision, not one FAA employee thought, "Hmm, maybe we should test our direct communications line to the Army heliport from the DCA tower." Chair Homendy, does the fact that the FAA's dedicated direct access line to the Pentagon was literally inoperable for years without anyone noticing serve as an apt metaphor for the sheer amount of work that must be done to improve communications between DOD and FAA?

That one's still under investigation by NTSB, but yes, I I would agree with that.

Just yesterday, the FAA announced a 10-day temporary flight restriction in El Paso, then abruptly reversed it hours later. The conflicting reports that emerged do not inspire confidence that the FAA and DOD have improved their communications either with each other or within their own organizations. In fact, the FAA Administrator yesterday in response to the Chairman Cruz's question about what happened in El Paso said that Secretary Duffy's tweet about a drug cartel drones was absolutely correct, that they knew about the impending the request for closure of the airspace, but he did not know why FAA actually closed the airspace for 10 days. Chair Homendy, the DCA collision, and now we're hearing it's a party balloon that they shot down, so I'm still waiting to hear what's happening. But Chair Homendy, the DCA collision, the May Pentagon go-rounds, the B-52 incident in South Dakota, and now El Paso showcases a severe lack of coordination. What must change at the FAA and DOD to prevent future coordination failures? What is at risk if there is no improvement? And has NTSB been included in some of these meetings with and coordination between FAA and DOD? Because they were keeping you out for a while there.

No, we are not part of that. But we would not necessarily be part of of that. But FAA we can talk about separately because I do have some concerns there. Army actually worked really well with us. What we investigated was between the Army and the FAA and there was no communication. I mean, the Army participated, the 12th Battalion participated in a helicopter working group that was formed by the tower because the tower was saying, "Hey, we've got a serious safety issue here and nobody's doing anything about it, let's try to coordinate." But Army wasn't asking for data, they had their own safety management system problems, and there was lack of coordination. Look, I'm going to tell you, I worked 15 years on Capitol Hill. And we talk about this all the time. When you go to an agency, the lack of communication even within a large agency and between agencies is terrible. I don't understand it. People can't talk? It it is astounding to me. But it's not surprising from what we've seen from the investigation.

Would it be safe to presume that you would support Congress elevating the NTSB recommendations following the DCA midair collision into a statutory requirement?

Yes, and you could do that simply by requiring the entities to adopt the recommendations and reference our report without actually having to do language everywhere. What I will say, though, is we shouldn't wait to move the provisions in the ROTOR Act. This isn't a wait on ROTOR, move this legislation. This is a yes and. Congress can move many pieces of legislation every day. So it's a yes and.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. Senator Moran.

Senator Cruz, thank you. I intended in my line of questioning to reinforce the importance of ROTOR Act, but perhaps that has been accomplished in this hearing. Although one would have thought that 17 other times it may have been accomplished, so maybe it can't be said enough, but I reaffirm my commitment to seeing the passage of the ROTOR Act. A bit along the lines of Senator Duckworth about and you talked about communication. One of the things and I don't have any of the details in front of me, so you'll have to refresh my memory. But the the number of near misses you mentioned in your opening statement that were reported at DCA in regard to potential collisions. But you also in an earlier testimony or in our conversations talked about the number of times that somebody at DCA reported a problem that they thought needed to be fixed, but it never worked its way up the chain of command. And I think the as I recall, like nothing ever made it to the to the folks who actually could implement changes recommended by air traffic controllers or others involved in air traffic safety. Am I saying enough to refresh your memory about what I'm talking about?

...control tower said, you know what, we're going to have to take things into our own hands. So we're going to create this helicopter working group. So they did, not just with the military, but all the private operators, police, you name it, law enforcement. And they pulled together the working group, they did some work, they proposed to their hierarchy, hey, you know, we should move helicopter route 4. Another time they said, we think we should put some hotspots, you know, on the helicopter charts, including at the end of runway 33, which we've seen is an area where we have a great concern, great concern for risk if there's a midair collision. And FAA's response, and then they had numerous reports just coming from the tower, written reports. They also had a report saying, we're getting too many requests from Potomac TRACON to reduce spacing between aircraft landing. There were so many reports and each time it was, nope, or no. And this is the ultimate in bureaucracy when the response to the hotspot was, yeah, we don't put hotspots on maps. The only hotspots we do on maps is for ground movement. Come on. At our hearing, we raised this issue, why didn't you do anything? The person who showed up from FAA said, well, they could have raised it at a symposium. Really? They were raising it so many times in writing, verbally. It's, if that happens at DCA, you know it's happening everywhere else in our airspace.

Thank you for refreshing my memory and putting that on the record today. Let me ask you if there's any indication or what are the indications that the FAA, the Department of Transportation are taking aggressive action to implement recommendations past and present? Has anything changed since January 29th of last year? And I think you made a really important point that you don't, I think there's a tendency, I can see myself thinking the same thing, we'll wait for the recommendations and then we'll know what to do when we know there are things to be done today.

And that's perfectly reasonable for you all, but for those that were parties to our investigation, the reason why you're parties is because you get privy to factual information so you can take early action. None of that occurred. In fact, the entire time we worked for FAA, and I'm going to be honest with you, I met with the DOT IG at one point to talk about whether we should write a letter about obstruction to our investigation because we weren't, we were repeatedly denied data we requested. What we kept hearing from FAA was, oh, you're not asking for it properly. We did, I audited it, but here's what I'll say on the changes, I don't know of any other than what the Secretary did. And that isn't right.

Message received. I wrote on my notes today that our subcommittee, this committee, we ought to rely, I guess request, GAO, Inspector General, constant oversight on the Department of Transportation and the FAA in particular.

Yes. And on DOT IG, one thing I will say, sometimes they don't get access to their data systems. That's something you should chat with them about because they aren't getting the data, they're relying on people giving them the data.

Thank you.

Thank you. Senator Klobuchar.

Thank you very much, Senator Cruz. And thank you, Chairwoman. Not only do you bring this incredible expertise, you know I've always been a supporter of yours, but you also bring the passion and the anger that I know so many of the families and the loved ones in this room are feeling over what happened. I want to thank your dedicated NTSB staff for all of their hard work. And I want to acknowledge the 67 people who lost their lives, including Wendy Jo Shafer, a mom of two from Mahtomedi, Minnesota. So this committee, as you noted, has worked in a bipartisan fashion to advance the Rotor Act. And I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for their work on this, as well as Senator Moran and Senator Duckworth. So my questions are first of all on air traffic control staffing. We have a shortage of air traffic controllers. Former Senator Braun and I pushed to address staffing shortages by requiring the FAA to conduct maximum hiring of air traffic controllers. While the number of the staff at the time in the tower, as you've noted in the report, was adequate and in accordance with FAA directives, the facility was staffed below its target level. How can lower staffing levels impact controller performance and awareness? Has the FAA increased staffing at DCA to mitigate some of the issues raised today?

So it impacts staff, we didn't find a concern with staffing on that day as you noted, but it does impact safety because it impacts their workload. In this case, you can see two people should have been on position, one on helicopter control, one on local control. And what happened was the local controller was doing two jobs. People were at the, in the tower and on staff and available, but he was forced to do two jobs and taking and handling between seven and 12 aircraft. What I will say as far as staffing today, there are staffing challenges and that is a significant impact on safety. They are authorized at DCA to have pretty high numbers, but they're not at those numbers. On January 6th, right before our board meeting, I checked, we checked the numbers at DCA. There's authorized numbers, but then you have to ask any day what's operational, who's out, who's on medical leave, who's on military leave. It was lower than it was on January 29th.

Okay. Thank you. The NTSB report showed that the flight path for helicopter route 4 comes within 75 feet of the approach to runway 33, and that video was chilling to watch. Are there any circumstances in which 75 feet of vertical separation is safe?

Absolutely not. Not safe anywhere in our airspace.

The FAA is required to annually review these helicopter flight routes. Who was tasked with reviewing helicopter routes and why hadn't this risk been identified previously?

I'm only laughing a little bit because it's so sad because this, DCA has existed since 1940s. Runway 33, 1940s. Traffic certainly has changed. But helicopter route 4 has been there since 1986. FAA is required to do an annual review of those routes. Not a single annual review was done. Not a single one. In fact, they couldn't at first when we asked who was responsible for doing those annual reviews.

Right, you asked NTSB or FAA? Have they been able to identify who has that role?

They finally, they did finally tell us who it was. It was like a terminal operations director, but nobody knows who specifically that is.

And do you know if they've changed this now?

No, I do not.

Okay, well that's a good question for us to ask. Could you talk about how you did this report and got this thorough analysis through all the grief? And I was, as I was watching the video, I was thinking about the hard work of your staff and I was thinking about the grief of the families and I was thinking about how every single day they had to come to work, your staff, feeling that weight of what had happened to these families and then still do their jobs. How many staff contributed to this investigation, how many hours, and what is the funding status for NTSB? Wow. Thank you, Mr. Shin and to all of you.

So the personnel, it's been difficult. I mean, it's a difficult year for them and the shutdown was difficult. It's a strain on all of them, but I have never been more proud of the team than I was on January 27th and every day since I came to the NTSB.

Thank you. I just think this, the findings and the fact that on a bipartisan basis the Chairman and Ranking Member have worked on this, as you noted, focused on this along with Senator Moran and Senator Duckworth. I just don't detect partisanship here when it comes to this, and it is such an example of why we're never going to be able to make things better if we don't get to the bottom of what went wrong. And as I understand already some changes have been made that you've recommended and must continue to be made, every single one of them. Thank you.

Thank you. And I'll also add for the Chairman, this is the same team behind me that helped us, helped me evaluate NDAA before we even did anything. We got, we get together as a group and make decisions as a team.

Okay. Thanks.

Senator Sullivan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Chair, it's good to see you again and I want to thank you as well. You're doing an exceptional job and your whole team. I want to begin by of course expressing my deepest condolences to the families and loved ones of those we lost in the American Airlines flight 5342 tragedy at DCA. And as you know, Madam Chair, also around the same time we had another airplane crash in Alaska, the Bering aircraft over Norton Sound. One year later, these losses remain deeply felt throughout our country with witnesses here in my state in Alaska where as you know aviation is not a luxury, it's a lifeline. And I want to thank the NTSB for its thorough work and I appreciate the work you've done on the latest Bering aircraft, or not, or the latest crash in Alaska. We are grateful for your commitment, we're grateful for you going up to Alaska so soon after that crash. And aviation safety is particularly important in my state where communities depend on reliable air service for healthcare, for commerce. We have over 230 communities in my state that are not connected by roads. And so it really, really matters. So I want to broaden the aperture here. It's been six years since the February 2020 NTSB report that found over a 10-year period Alaska's aviation crash rate was almost two and a half times higher than the national average and the fatality rate was 1.3, almost 1.4 times higher. That led me and the FAA administrator at the time, Steve Dickson, and you to push for what we now refer to as the Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative, the FASI initiative. I was able to get that initiative codified in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, ensuring that it would be in law with the goal that we would reduce fatal aviation accidents in Alaska by 90 percent by 2033, require the FAA to improve maintenance and reliability of weather equipment, and to reauthorize $25 million at a minimum annually through 2028 to carry out this work. We've made significant progress on that. As you know, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act had a huge investment in aviation safety, ATC reform, a lot of that, about 180 million so far is going to Alaska. So given the substantial work and funding we've had since 2020 in the NTSB report, would you agree with me that it's time to take a more comprehensive look at where we are with the state of aviation safety in Alaska and can I get your commitment to work with me on this?

Yes, in fact, I will offer, if you'd like, I will come back to Alaska and would certainly welcome having a robust conversation with you and others about aviation safety and your needs, which are very unique.

Good. Well, I appreciate that. Mr. Chair, one of the things that I'm going to be working on and hopefully with the chair's, you know, and the committee's help is possibly a field hearing with the Chairman of the NTSB who again I think is doing a great job with the FAA on the state of where we are on the FASI initiative because what we're trying to do is preempt...

Can the field hearing coincide with salmon fishing season?

Well, we're still collecting, well, first of all, yes, you have my commitment on that. I was the board member on scene for Ketchikan, it was really devastating. And Bryce Banning was also on that investigation, he's our investigator in charge for DCA. Yeah, you know, so we're still conducting the investigation on Nome, we hope, I need to check in with the team on when that will be completed. But you have a lot of needs in Alaska, infrastructure for one of them, resources. I mean, just to see how different aviation is that you're relying on aviation for everything from mail to prescriptions, life-saving medicine to food. And you need to have that infrastructure there so you can get all of that in, whether it's weather, whether it's runway lights or anything else.

Good. Well, I look forward to that and Mr. Chairman, I look forward to maybe even getting you up there and your team, but that will be an important hearing. And again, thank you for your work, thank you for your work on the FASI initiative. I want to thank the committee on that, we made some really good progress on the Alaska Safety Initiative here in the last FAA reauthorization and the Working Families Tax Cuts Act, which we passed in July. And your work on this, I know it's difficult and again to the families who have lost loved ones, we are very focused on making sure this doesn't happen again either in DCA or in Alaska. Thank you.

Thank you. Senator Lujan.

Our mandate is to investigate after a tragedy occurs.

I appreciate that. Let me ask you a different question, yes or no, is a lack of federal coordination harmful to the safety of our airspace?

Yes.

Will the NTSB, well, I just asked that as well. My other questions around this, Ms. Homendy, is with what Congress needs to do to make sure that the crash that you are here to share information about just doesn't happen again. The question that Senator Moran asked about how many communications have there been throughout the years, whether it's under a Republican or a Democratic president, it doesn't matter, from air traffic controllers or from anyone else have been silenced. I certainly hope that we're able to demand that that information be shared to this committee, to oversight, and that we have a real conversation about what it takes to implement those changes because no administration has been willing to do this by rule, clearly. From the point that Senator Duckworth made that even a phone that should be used to communicate is not even being utilized. A few years ago, I was in New Mexico at a site for aircraft that was used to put out forest fires at one of the command centers that is under I believe the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Agriculture. And when I was in there looking at this particular tower, they told me the internet didn't work inside the tower. And they were hesitant to tell me. Well, I started calling everyone that I could and we got a bunch of folks on board. Chairman, I think your office might have even helped with this one. Well, now that tower has access to the internet and the people in that air traffic tower are a little more safe than they were before it was out. If it's little things like that that are getting in the way of this because someone's being told you have to stay quiet, shame on all of us. And so as I close here, I know I didn't ask many questions in this area. I just certainly hope that we can get to the bottom of this and that Chairman, we truly can make things safer and that we don't forget the names of those that have been lost not just on this horrific crash but on the others as well and that we do something significant in this space. And I look forward to working with you and doing my part, you let me know how we can make this better. But in the case of what's happened in El Paso, Southern New Mexico, it's not just a briefing in a SCIF. I don't want to hear the spin, I don't want to hear the cover-up, I want to hear the facts, I want to hear the truth. I certainly hope that that briefing doesn't have to take place in a SCIF. There should be information that's shared with the American people as to what happened there because that can't happen anywhere else. We need people coordinating. I'm not suggesting we don't go after bad people or bad things, that's not what I'm saying. But we need to make sure that we're keeping people safe as we're also going after bad things throughout the United States that are endangering all of our constituents as well. Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. Thank you, Chairman.

Senator Budd.

Thank you, Chairman. Flight 5342 was a Charlotte-based flight crew, North Carolina pilot was in the Black Hawk. But wherever folks were from, even outside North Carolina, we never want this to happen again. Thanks for your work on this and that of your team behind you. Chair Homendy, I think you had this in your written testimony, but would you agree that ADSB-In information is most effective when all aircraft are broadcasting ADSB-Out?

Yes, sir.

Should policymakers address incentive structures that discourage the installation and use of ADSB-Out?

We don't have a formal position on that, but I will say yes.

As you mentioned a few moments ago, a couple of questioners ago, some airports are now contracting with third-party companies to use ADSB-Out data to assess landing fees on operators. Would you say that this aligns with the intent of ADSB?

Absolutely not. ADSB is a safety tool and it should be used for safety, not to, not as a revenue generator to charge certainly general aviation pilots and others ramp fees or landing fees. That's not how it should be used, it's a safety technology.

Do you think using it in a manner that you just described, like to generate fees, would encourage pilots, aircraft owners to have them turned off?

Yeah, they turn them off or just not install it at all or use it. That would discourage their use. So I would, and I know I believe you have legislation on this, I hope it moves because I think it should be prevented, prohibited.

Well, to address the issue, I introduced the Pilot and Aircraft Privacy Act, which would prevent airports from using ADSB to assess fees on aircraft operators for that very reason that you just mentioned, I think it harms safety. As you noted in your testimony, if both the helicopter flight PAT25 and flight 5342 had been using ADSB, a collision avoidance system, the crew of 5342 would have had nearly a minute more advanced warning than they received from the TCAS. Now, it may not have prevented the tragedy, but it would have been another layer in this so-called Swiss cheese model. Chair Homendy, I do appreciate the time you gave today, appreciate your team, and I look forward to working with you and with this committee to ensure as many aircraft as possible use the ADSB system and other critical safety technologies. Thank you so much. Thank you.

Senator Markey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Madam Chair, I just want to say that you are one of America's great public servants. You're fearless and you're very smart and very needed at this time, so I just wanted to tell you that publicly.

I'm only that good because of them behind me.

But we need people like you to make them good because there are other people high positions in our government who, as you're saying, they put even their own personnel in a code of omerta where they're afraid to speak the truth, afraid to say the right thing, and you create the right culture to protect the American people. I just want to tell you how grateful I am and I think our nation is whenever they hear you speak because they know you're speaking the truth. And I want to begin just by taking a moment to honor the 67 individuals who lost their lives when American Eagle flight 5342 crashed into the Potomac River. In Massachusetts, this tragic crash hit us especially hard. Six individuals associated with the Skating Club of Boston, as well as Massachusetts native Chris Collins, were on board flight 5342. Chris's brother Matt Collins is in the audience at today's hearing. To Matt and all of the families here and watching, we are committed to honoring your loved ones with more than just words, with actions that we are going to take. And it is because of you, the families, who have turned unimaginable grief into determined advocacy that the Senate unanimously passed the bipartisan Rotor Act in December. Change does not happen without your bravery, without your perseverance, without the families standing up and demanding that something be done. And even as we speak, Matt... ...Narimov, the son of two of the members of the Skating Club of Boston and a Norwood, Massachusetts resident, is honoring his parents' memory right now on the world stage at the Winter Olympics, skating with extraordinary strength, extraordinary grace, which is what all the families are showing right now. So it's time for Congress that it takes inspiration from Max's courageous performance and enacts the ROTA Act into law in our nation. This legislation is the action needed to honor the crash victims and prevent future tragedies so hearings like this are not necessary in the future. Now I'd like to talk about airline accountability. The NTSB's final report concludes that it is vital that all commercial aircraft are equipped with crash avoidance technology called ADS-B In. Despite the importance of this technology, the airline industry has repeatedly said that it would be too costly to implement. So Chair Homendy, is it true that this technology is too costly to implement?

Not by the evidence. American Airlines outfitted, retrofitted over 300 Airbus A321s for less than $50,000 an airplane and only had them out of service for one or two days.

Yeah, it reminds me when the automobile industry used to say, it's too expensive to have airbags, it's too expensive to have seatbelts. We just can't afford it, makes the car too affordable. You know what the American public said? Build in the safety. And it turns out the more you do it is the lower the cost is now to get it done for our airline industry as well.

And that's the cost.

Yeah, without question. It's just an unacceptable price that we have to pay because the industry wants to cheap out in terms of building in the protections that the families of our country deserve. So I believe that an industry that rakes in billions in profits every year can afford life-saving technology for a very small cost. And I want to turn to one final issue, FAA staffing. Soon after the crash, the NTSB examined flight data and identified over 15,000 close proximity events between airplanes and helicopters here at the Washington airport. If an FAA employee had been analyzing this data, they may have identified the risk in this DCA airspace before the tragic crash. Rather than bolstering FAA's staffing capacity, the Trump administration responded by cutting the very FAA staff needed to conduct this life-saving analysis. And that's why last July, I sent a letter to the FAA demanding answers about its staffing levels and capacity to identify similar risk at other airports in our country. And it's also why I fought for and won an amendment in the ROTA Act to ensure the FAA administrator maintains the necessary staffing levels to analyze safety trends before a disaster happens. Unfortunately, over a year later, according to NTSB's report, the FAA is still not analyzing these trends to catch close calls before they occur. It's a year later. This is unacceptable. Chair Homendy, do you agree that the FAA is still not proactively acting to identify these risks at U.S. airports?

They are not doing what we have recommended and we have been urging them to do the entire time, which is to not only evaluate their data, which they're starting to do now, but to develop a simple definition of what a close call is. They have 10 different types of data sources coming in for a near miss and not one single definition that everyone can get around on what is a near miss, and then even the information and data they collect isn't shared with the airlines until about three to six months later.

Yeah, you recommend that there be the creation of an office to collect the data and then to disseminate the information. And that still has not happened.

We had recommended that they develop a standard definition for what a close proximity event is and to improve their data analysis and to share that data with external stakeholders, including federal agencies and the airlines in a very timely manner.

But you recommended the creation of an office in order to track and public report this data and that has not happened.

I don't think we recommended an office.

That was in the NTSB report. Anyway, so we'll I'll double check on that, but that's how I read it.

We did mention an office about doing a safety management system review of air traffic organization. That is one area that we did mention that we needed some work done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we must pass this legislation. It's absolutely critical. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairwoman Homendy, for your testimony here today and thank you for the hard work of your team who does a consistently excellent job. Senators will have until the close of business on February 19 to submit questions for the record. The witnesses will have until close of business on March 5 to respond to those questions. That concludes today's hearing. The committee stands adjourned. [Gavel sounds.]