Examining Best Practices for Strengthening Election Security

The subcommittee on elections of the Committee on House Administration will come to order. The title of today's hearing is " Examining Best Practices for Strengthening Election Security." I note that a quorum is present. Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time. Also, without objection, The hearing record will remain open for five legislative days, so members may submit any materials they wish to be included therein. Thank you, Ranking Member Sewell, members of the committee, and our witnesses for participating in today's hearing. Today, the subcommittee on elections will discuss the different ways that states can strengthen election security. The best practices that we'll cover today include enhancements to physical security and to cyber security. Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it prevents an issue before it arises. I look forward to discussing best practices for securing elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts. I'd first like to highlight the different resources the federal government makes available to elections administrators for election security. The resources include federal grants, testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance Commission. One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers voluntary security standards and evaluations for non-voting systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or other election supporting systems not covered by the voluntary voting system guidelines. The EAC's voluntary voting system guidelines serve as a baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate functionality, accessibility, and security. There's also great work that many states and localities are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against threats to their elections. For example, in twenty twenty four, the University of South Florida hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of elections, the FBI and local law enforcement to strategize responses to potential threats to election cyber security. To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats, North Dakota uses a whole of government approach, which allows agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to the same statewide system. In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond to cyber threats. To respond to physical threats, several states have implemented common sense integrity measures, like tamper seals for ballots, monitoring systems, and back-up power sources at polling locations. What's great about these physical security upgrades is that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very interested in hearing more about how these grants are administered and what the results of past grants have been in states across America. Another important measure that increases voter experience and voter confidence is access for election observers. The Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff to serve as election observers for U S House races, and ensure elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and individual candidates also deploy observers because their presence at polling places builds trust with voters, and allows for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties. While no two states administer their elections the exact same way, one thing should be universal. Election officials must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure elections. They should consider every factor to minimize security risks. By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and transparency. And when voters feel confident in elections, turnout increases. That's a good thing for our democracy. The best practices we'll discuss today can help every state improve their election security efforts. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our conversation. With that, I yield to Ranking Member Sewell for an opening statement.

Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee and those witnesses who are gathered here today for your testimony. As Ranking Member of the Election Subcommittee, I take very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our elections are fair and secure. Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self-government. Every American, regardless of race, religion, party, or ideology deserves confidence that their votes will be counted accurately, and that their election will be administered fairly. Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted. while whether by uh hostile state legislatures or really aggressive courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from radical groups at home and abroad. Moreover, our president and his allies have spread wide widely spread debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed to undermine our collective belief in democracy. And now the conservative Supreme Court, recent decision in Louisiana versus Calais, has ignited a fire alarm, a five fire alarm to the votes, to the voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican state legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the sou- south are frantically redrawing Jim Crow era maps that would erase black political representation at all levels of government. And as this administration continues to perpetrate the lie that the twenty twenty presidential election was stolen, Voter suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch. Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer finance slush fund for January sixth insurrectionists who violently tried to overturn the results of the twenty twenty election. I think this is hypocrisy at its highest degree. We are here today doing important work to guarantee that election workers have the financial resources they need to do their jobs effectively. all while this president uh is paying out to people who committed horrendous cr heinous crimes money out of uh taxpayers' dollars. During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election officials across the country are being asked to administer elections while Republican state legislatures change the rules of the game in their uh in their scramble to consolidate power. Our election officials must navigate these changes while also from inconsistent and often inadequate funding streams. In my home state of Alabama, local election administrators and county officials are responsible for running elections across sixty-seven counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated equipment that must still meet modern security standards. Federal support through the uh Help America Vote Act has helped Alabama and other states improve voting systems, strengthen cyber security and modernize election administration. Since Congress passed that act, billions of dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election administration improvements. But even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained federal funding would provide Alabama and other states with much needed assistance to better support county elections. Congress has the responsibility to act before vulnerabilities become crisis. The cost of prevention is far lower than the cost of repairing public trust. Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we have, not just as members of Congress, but as American citizens. Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in American history with resolve. As primary elections are currently underway, and we are getting closer to the midterm elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair and secure. Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the truth. uh, vot- voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let us provide every state with the tools, resources, and sustained federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote. I look forward to the hearing, a hearing from our witnesses today, as well as, um, the work that this committee, this important subcommittee will continue to provide. I wanna thank Chairwoman Lee and yield back the balance of my time.

Without objection, all other members' opening statements will be made part of the if they are submitted to the committee clerk by five p m today. Today we have one witness panel. I will now introduce our witnesses. First we have Election Assistance Commissioner Chairman Tom Thomas Hicks. Next we have EAC Vice Chair Christy McCormick. We also have the third EAC Commissioner, Benjamin Hovland. And finally we have former EAC Commissioner, Don Palmer. Each witness will have five minutes to provide an opening statement. I now recognize Chairman Hicks for the purpose of giving an opening statement.

Thank you, Chairwoman. I ask that my full statement be uh accepted into the record.

So, ordered.

Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the election security work of the United States Election Assistance Commission. As an independent bipartisan agency, the EAC often uh offers trusted sources t for the ground grounded in federal law and responsive to the practical realities of state and local election officials. We appreciate the subcommittee's important oversight and your close engagement with the EAC. Election officials have been the first line of defense against escalating security threats and cannot be expected to defend their election systems alone. These are our neighbors, PTA members, and part of our congregations, armed not with guns or bullets, but with the law and the constitution. Many officials describe their work as increasingly technical and security focused, even though they do not have dedicated cy- cyber security personnel, and their budgets have been, remain stagnant. In recent years, the demand for assistance has grown significantly, since the establishment of the agency under the Help America Vote Act. The EAC has engaged with officials from jurisdictions of all sizes to support ongoing election security work spanning four core areas, physical security, cyber security, personal security, and contingency management. Election officials work daily to meet the demands of an increasingly complex security environment. As the public profile of elections have grown, election infrastructure has become an active target for a broad range of bad actors. Physical security and cyber security measures focus on the protection of infrastructure and the backbone of election security. These measures include chain of custody, bipartisan teams, and protections against phishing and other cyber attacks. Election officials across the country have also gro faced a growing number of threats to personal safety, in- in- cr- including swatting incidents, suspicious packages, and bomb hoax threats uh targeting election officials and polling places, even yesterday with the incident that happened in Pennsylvania. A twenty twenty-four national survey of election officials found a third have experienced harassment in connection to their work, while half knew of someone who had left the profession due to safety concerns. The EAC has helped to facilitate a sharing of best practices between state local and federal government partners. to improve the overall security of U. S. elections. These efforts promote safe, secure, accurate, and accessible elections for every voter. While we offer on-line and in-person training on topics such as chain of custody, physical security, of election facilities, and contingency planning, for many jurisdictions, especially smaller and rural offices, these trainings are the only source of nationally recognized non-partisan election security guidance. So far, more than seven thousand officials accro who serve more than one hundred million voters have participated in EAC training. This direct no-cost support represents about one point six million dollars in savings for local offices. One of our most popular resources is the election scenario test decks, which provide real-world scenarios to election officials so they can use to participate in training and evaluate their incident response. To date, more than fifty-five hundred decks have been distributed nationwide. The common thread through all the work is the human element. Election officials are the best tool for ensuring elections are secure. While HAVA was enacted with security in mind, the threat landscape and the presence of malicious actors has grown. Today, state and local officials are incorporating cyber security protections, and physical security measures into nearly every aspect of election administration, even under significant staffing and funding constraints. For the United States to continue to be a world leader in election best practices, the federal government must support and invest in our election infrastructure. I have full faith and confidence in election officials to carry out their duties. The EAC will remain dedicated A the EAC will remain a dedicated federal partner through twenty twenty six and beyond. So thank you for convening this important hearing and for your ongoing support. I look forward to continuing our work for the American people, and I'm here to answer questions you may have. Thank you.

I now recognize the Vice Chair McCormick for the purpose of giving an opening statement.

Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome the chance to highlight the ongoing work of the Election Assistance Commission the EAC to bolster election security. This hearing demonstrates your commitment to election integrity across America, and we thank you for your efforts. The EAC partners with states to support secure effective administration of federal elections. Strong election security depends on proven practices like pre-election testing, auditing, and paper ballots, along with constant vigilance against evolving threats. Through practical tools, best practices, and direct support, the EAC helps election administrators protect the systems and processes that sustain public confidence in our democracy during the twenty twenty-six midterms and beyond. HAVA funds help states in this endeavor by allowing them to invest in security resources that strengthen election infrastructure. Grant reports show that states use funds to support sustainable security practices, such as network monitoring, endpoint protection, multi-factor authentication, automatic system backups, physical security, and cyber security efforts. Over the past year, the EAC's Election Technology Office modernized the nation's voting system infrastructure by certifying two voting systems to the latest voluntary voting system guidelines VVSG two point zero. And we have five additional systems under test. Some of the enhanced security requirements of VVSG two point O include use of paper ballots, increased support for auditing, improved cyber security requirements like air-gapped systems, enhanced access controls, and secure system updates. Upgraded physical standards limiting o- unauthorized access and what can be connected to the systems. And preventing undetectable changes in the software that could alter results. VVSG two point O also emphasizes transparency, reflecting what election officials are already doing to secure systems, and managing risk through measures like tamper evident seals, two-person integrity, chain of custody procedures, and continuity planning. The Testing and Certification Division has also drafted VVSG two point one. This initiative reflects the agency's commitment to continual improvement of election systems and the modernization of guidance centered around election integrity. Realizing the value that the VVSG certification process has provided a value to States, the EAC launched the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, or E-STEP, in twenty twenty three. This started a focused EAC effort to research best practices around election supporting technologies that are used year-round, such as electronic poll books, electronic ballot delivery, voter registration, and election night reporting systems. In May twenty twenty four, the EAC launched the nation's first federal voluntary electronic poll book certification program. The program has already certified three systems with two more systems under test. The value of this process is proven by the fact that just weeks after certifying the first electronic poll book system North Carolina adopted the agency's certification requirements for its own certification program. As jurisdictions continue to modernize their equipment, the EAC is analyzing emerging election technologies and translating those findings guidance such as list maintenance, grants, and physical security. In all of this, we strive to be transparent while ensuring the safety of all involved in the electoral process from administrators to poll workers, to observers. With security top of mind for election officials, the EAC will continue to move forward in our work to protect the election infrastructure that supports America's representative democracy. We are a small agency, but one exclusively devoted to fulfilling the promise of the Help America Vote Act. and meeting the evolving needs of election administration across the country. Thank you for your support of the EAC and your tireless commitment to state and local election officials and to election integrity. We look forward to collaborating with you on these and other important matters, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you have. Thank you.

I now recognize Commissioner Hoveland for the purpose of giving an opening statement.

Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and members of this subcommittee. Uh, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important topic and the work of the US Election Assistance Commission. When Congress created the EAC with the Help America Vote Act of two thousand two, it charged the agency with a clearing house function to look at best practices across the nation. The EAC has embraced this part of our mission in recent years, particularly as election administration has evolved. My colleagues and I work with state and local election officials from all fifty states five territories, and the District of Columbia. From that experience, I can confidently say that no one cares more about the security and integrity of our elections than the Americans who run them. The challenges faced by election officials today would have seemed nearly unimaginable to the officials serving when HAVA passed. The reality is that administering elections is harder, and more expensive than it has ever been before. Our state and local election officials do an amazing job with limited resources. In the years since HAVA, Congress has provided significant funding, which helps support essential aspects of elections such as secure and accessible voter registration, accurate ballot tabulation, auditable results, and safe and secure election facilities. Federal funding, however, has covered less than five percent of the estimated total cost of running elections during that time. Similarly, the EAC tries to help fill some of those gaps, but is often limited by our level of funding. Last fiscal year, the EAC saw a fifteen percent reduction in agency funding at a time when demand has only increased. We've been doing our best to respond by sharing best practices, creating resources that help election officials, and offering technical assistance where possible. In fact, this past month we held meetings with our advisory boards, made up of election officials from across the country and other key stakeholders. We heard resounding enthusiasm for the EAC's work and the direction we are heading. But the agency is nearing a point where funding cuts will impact what we can accomplish and the support we can provide election officials, especially related to election security. My colleagues spoke about our election technology, and field services team. They are doing amazing work, but they're a team of only ten people. With over eight thousand election jurisdictions in the United States, there are limits to our capacity, but not to our desire or our commitment. We continue to work creatively and thoughtfully to respond to election officials' needs. We are piloting a number of efforts, including those to enhance election security and technology in a way that informs future programs, and allows for rapid scaling if appropriate funding is provided. This is also part of why we designed the EAC's learning lab to release new content on a rolling basis and provide asynchronous trainings accessible to election officials, anywhere in the country at no cost. Additionally, one of the agency's most significant accomplishments was the development and adoption of the two point O version of the voluntary voting system guidelines. As Vice Chair McCormick noted, there are now two systems certified to this standard and five more in the testing process. A report that we shared with Congress this week notes that much of the voting equipment in the in use is nearing the end of their recommended life spans, and conservatively estimates a cost of two point seven billion dollars for jurisdictions across the country to make this transition. I mention this because we must consistently invest in our election administration infrastructure. Too often we are bailed out by the innovation and hard work of the public servants that run our elections. Many seasoned election officials have left the profession, taking with them valuable institutional knowledge. To fully meet the challenges of this moment and ensure our elections remain secure, there needs to be greater support for elections at the local, state, and federal levels. We know this investment matters. Since twenty eighteen, states report using HAVA security grants to replace paperless voting systems, harden statewide voter registration databases, increase cyber security training, and enhance physical security. Many of these improvements to election security were made possible because of the federal funding and congressional support. At the EAC, we are committed to continuing to do everything we can

I now recognize former Commissioner, Mister Palmer, for the purpose of giving an opening statement.

Thank you. Um, thank you, Chairwoman Lee and Ranking Member Sewell. Um, as you know, I've recently moved to the Heritage Foundation as a senior legal fellow And um the the views expressed today are my own and should be reflected on the Heritage Foundation. But I really do appreciate the opportunity to talk about cyber security and the election security of uh of uh the voting systems and the and the election systems that we use, election officials use. Uh we want them to be able to concentrate on administering the election and not worried about the back-end security of those systems. And that's why Um, I really appreciate the work uh that my colleagues uh to my right have done uh over the last uh decade. But as I sit back and I think about um, you know, since I've moved on, what are some of the recommendations that I would provide to the committee? And I I have a few. Um, I would number one, support the existing secure IT concept that would add a formal vulnerability testing program. Um, there's great work that's done on the testing of voting systems. Um but there needs to be um we need to add to that concept. Um this cure IT act was made a part of the National Defend Author Authorization Act. Uh it required uh penetration testing um and it was the first step to simulate real world attacks on election systems and voting systems at where you tabulate votes. Um unfortunately there was no appropriation attached and obviously that's going to slow the work um And in my mind, things need to be going quicker, not slower. Um, the work is way too slow to stay ahead of our adversaries in this area. Um, the window to secure elections and and increase voter confidence, it's urgent on your mind, it, it, that window could be closing. And that's why this is the most rapid approach, using a vulnerability testing program, um, to, to do that. So, um, I think there should be a fully funded, uh, vulnerability testing program. that it should be the highest priority, and that uh every voting machine needs to go through that process. The second um uh recommendation is that we heard a lot of great information on the E-step program both from the chair and from the M- EAC uh commissioners. Uh that's a very positive program that really should be expanded. Um uh the Congress should look at expanding that. There's huge success stories with the certification of electronic poll books. That's been a concern of the Congress for a number of years, and now there's actually a functioning program with systems being reviewed, that should be expanded. Third recommendation I would make is that we prioritize voter registration system, security uh and modernization. Um, as y- as the community's aware, um, voter registration system is really one of the core functions of the Help America Vote Act. Um, it holds all the voter registration data, of the of the citizens that will vote. And we wanna make sure that's secure and and it's accurate. So there has been bipartisan concern over the years over the security of those voter registration systems, uh both from the Congress and from outside groups. Um and even more so there's been documented instances of vulnerabilities being identified and those i and those vulnerabilities being exploited. Now we know, and most of uh the Breaches of a voter registration system that's outward facing to the internet doesn't necessarily mean results are gonna be changed, but the impact on the on the public uh could be uh very negative. And so we need to do everything we can, I say we, the country needs to be uh what do we can to secure those voter registration systems. Um but I can tell you right now, we are not doing everything we can. We should be doing everything c we can, but we are not doing everything we can. My next recommendation is that we encourage coordination between the federal partners and EAC. Um, that just makes a lot of sense, uh, that there be a sharing of responsibilities on coordination that would save tax tax dollar money. Um, CISA has reduced its footprint in elections, but election officials want more election focus on the products. And I think the EAC realizes that and has tried to step up to the plate and provide scenario training and coordination with other federal partners. So I think uh targeted funding to the EAC which would allow additional coordination would be helpful in provide additional cyber security offerings that are election related. My last recommendation is obviously local governments and local enforce law enforcement are the m- most critical aspect of sec- of physical security of local election officials. Um the FBI has really stepped up with trainings and it it and the significant trainings, particularly on bomb threats, for example. So how can Congress help? I would just use you one example. Targeted assistance to increase the accessibility of of pulling places, that was a congressional initiative, and I think the same can be done for the physical security of pulling places and election offices. Thank you.

Thank you. I'll now begin our questions today, followed by the ranking member. I now recognize myself for the purpose of witness questions. Chairman Hicks, I'll begin with you, from twenty twenty to twenty twenty three, the largest share of election security grants d were dispersed for cyber security. Can you share with us some of the uses of those grant funds uh in your assessment of whether that investment in cyber security was valuable?

Thank you, Chairwoman. I do believe that that investment was valuable. I um the one criticism I would have is that it was not enough. Um the fact is that most of these c um jurisdictions use this money to protect I IT systems against foreign attacks. I don't wanna remind the um committee how we are in conflict now with a very dangerous adversary, and that adversary attacked our um systems back in twenty sixteen, twenty twenty, and twenty twenty four. Um that's nothing that's secretive to anyone. Uh there are also other foreign actors that are out there who wanna do the US harm. Uh so we provided the um jurisdictions with with money for to strengthen and harden their systems, but that was not enough. Um they've updated their voting systems in certain jurisdictions. They've improved the accuracy of their voting roles. um, and other activities as well. But I do believe that, um, in order to ensure that we, um, combat this foreign threat over and over again, uh, more, uh, resources will be needed. Thank you.

And in twenty twenty four, the EAC authorized the use of HAVA grants for physical security. Can you share with us some of the expenses that would be covered under that new guidance?

So, um, I beli We also authorized things in twenty twenty two for the personal safety of election officials overall, similar to what Congress did um to insure that se that their members are remain secure um and safe. Um so in twenty twenty four we basically offered more trainings for for um election officials, but we also insured that they can use this to upgrade systems that they have. um basically hard-nose systems whether or not that's two step authentication or other aspects as well.

And Vice Chair McCormick, you discussed VVSG two point O during your testimony. Would you share with us some of the key distinctions between two point O and one point O?

Yes, thank you for the question, Chairwoman. Um VVSG two point O includes major improvements to cyber security guidelines, including requiring uh air gapping from any kind of public network. Uh we have uh prohibited wireless technology in the machines. We've also provided that uh there must be a multi-factor authentication for all the systems. Uh another thing we have done is that we've required physical security and data protection requirements. Uh those are sp uh strengthened uh significantly uh to make sure that there's no intrusion on the systems that cannot be detected and as well that goes to uh our software independence which is now required. Uh software independence uh helps us identify whether there's been any compromise to the systems. We also now are requiring penetration t- penetration uh testing before the systems even come in for test. Uh so we've done a number of uh upgrades to the VVSG two point O. Uh as I said we have two systems that have gone through this process and have been uh certified by the EAC now uh s- those are f- now hitting the market for the first time. We have uh five systems under test, and we're also looking to uh upgrade uh f from two point O to two point one, and looking at things such as bar codes and wireless technology and and other other ways we might be able to continue to strengthen uh the security aspects of our guidelines.

Mister Palmer, you just mentioned during your testimony you you gave several really interesting recommendations, uh, but one related to

Thank you, uh, Madam Chair. I I bu I think that, uh, CISA is reducing its footprint and I think that, uh, CISA is reducing its footprint and Uh the EAC because it's the agency that focuses on elections primarily or solely uh uh in its core mission, that we have a responsibility to provide services uh across the board to election officials. And so uh many of those services um have been picked up by the EAC. Sometimes it's the federal agency coordination or it's um uh trainings that have been going on across the country um in discussions with CISA that I've had Um those services are still available. Sometimes I think the EAC could serve as a translator and work with this as a um in coordination with CISA to provide those services because um election officials um like it, they like to have election-centric uh services. EAC has former election officials that serve on it. Many of its commissioners have been involved in elections. Um and so a very professional group of former election officials. that can you know sorta translate uh for the rest of the federal government what uh we they they want from the federal government so um

Thank you Mister Palmer, we are out of time.

thank you

I now recognize the ranking member uh for five minutes.

Thank you Madam Chair. Again I wanna thank all of our witnesses for your testimony. You know I truly believe and we hear over and over again in this subcommittee that we're not funding the Election Assistance Commission and election security and integrity infrastructure enough. And I wanted to ask you, Chair Hicks, um, I know that administering the federal election security grants is one of the biggest responsibilities uh that you all have, uh, and am I correct am I correct that the Congress has gone from providing a high of four hundred and twenty-five million in recent years to a low of fifteen million in twenty-twenty-five in those grants?

Yes.

Uh you are a correct ranking member.

And so how has that decreased? That's a big decrease. How has it manifested in s itself in our states? What are you seeing in terms of what um uh is not going uh funded, that should be going funded because of this reduction?

States are um basically trying to make sure that the federal government um pays its fair share in terms of um having the biggest footprint on the ballot. and and so forth uh for elections overall. But I believe that election the um officials that I've talked to have said that they were are gonna have to cut back on a few things in order to ensure that things uh remain safe and secure for the the elections moving forward.

Uh Miss McCormick um I know that we uh appropriated about forty five million dollars uh in twenty twenty six. And uh s- I'm hearing from lots of secretaries of state, so that's simply not enough, um and directly from election administrators, so that's simply not enough. What are you seeing is going undone because of the decrease in the amount of funding?

So, uh forty five million dollars has to be distributed between the fifty states and the territories, and so we hardly even meet the minimums.

That turns out to be about what, two hundred thousand per state?

I'm sorry.

That forty five million turns out to be about two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per state. The total is forty five million, right?

Right, it's it's a minimum amount of money,

Yeah.

and uh states can't use that money to do things like purchase new voting systems,

Yep.

which a lot of them are in the position of needing to do at this point, uh to strengthening the s- systems that they already have, to provide training for their personnel. Uh they need to do physical security as well, physical barriers, uh cameras, uh card readers, uh secure transportation for voting systems and ballots. uh cyber security risk assessments, uh incident response, uh s- threat testing, uh threat m- threat monitoring on social media, uh and again securing their voter registration system,

And all that costs money, right?

right? Yes it does, and and the federal government,

And right now we're not funding that.

this is just a drop in the bucket.

Yeah. Um you know, Mister Palmer, you um I know you're a former commissioner, but um I think hindsight's twenty twenty vision, right? So um what would you recommend um to uh this committee and to Congress in terms of funding, adequately funding uh the commission, and what do you see as the biggest threat?

Well, uh we're talking about the commission, I think that um uh many of the programs that we've talked about, like the E-step program and the vulnerability testing program, there's already a framework to do that, the Congress has set that up. Um we're w- I mean I know the EAC's p-

Are we funding it?

N- no, it's not being funded and um it's coming out of the nickels and dimes that we're finding in the uh the EAC is finding in the sofa, trying to keep that uh um alive. And so I just think that um that's a critical piece of national security, of vulnerability testing, um that it it just makes a lot of sense. Um it it's a it's an investment for the rest of the election community, a very small investment, uh that would to have huge dividends.

Absolutely. Uh Commissioner Hovelin, um what would you say is the the mostly central um function that the commission runs and whether and and how do you see the reduced funding affecting that mission

Uh thank you for the question, ranking member. I think that uh you know again we have our four core mission areas uh but as we look to expand the clearinghouse function uh as well as our election technology initiatives uh there is really a need again we've provided uh information to congress to appropriations on how many of these programs are sort of ready and turnkey because we've done pilots, because we have done the work to see how best to spend this money, and how it can have an immediate impact. Uh and again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, uh when you look at the eight thousand jurisdictions across the country, really the scale that we're talking about is significant. Uh and so right now, it

Do you think that two hundred and fifty thousand dollars is enough per state to uh be able to adequately fund elections?

Well, on the grant side, uh again I don't think that's sufficient I know from election officials that every every dollar matters but again when you're talking about capital purchases whether that's replacing voting equipment or upgrading the security of statewide voter registration databases uh you know one of the things that we often hear about from Congress is the unspent funds and often when the amounts are lower uh

Yeah.

they're waiting the states are waiting to make those capital purchases like replacing their statewide voter registration database. or making those significant investments.

Uh, Madam Chair, thanks for indulging me for uh going a little over. I would like to request a unanimous consent to submit uh for the record a letter from eighty-four voting civil rights faith labor environmental and disability rights organizations led by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the leadership conference that call on Congress to allocate to allocate considerably more funding for election administration in FY twenty-seven.

Without objection so ordered.

Thanks.

I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, uh, Mister Murphy for five, or Doctor Murphy for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chairman. They gave me a cheat sheet coo for your names, cuz I'm too old and I can't read everybody's name down there. Um, thank you very much for convening this uh the committee subcommittee hearing. Obviously this is a bipartisan issue. We want people to have access to uh to what is a tremendous uh right that we're given here in the United States to vote.

Well, Well, I I mean, I I mean, uh, uh, I saw some of the conversation about that, I saw some of the conversation about that, sir, sir, and I would say that, and I would say that, um, um, you know, i it it's a mistake, it just cannot happen. That type of mistake cannot happen.

Five hundred thousand.

It's it's a lot, sir, and it's a b it's a b it's a very um i i it's a huge mistake. I I know the people that you know, and then obviously you can point at the vendor and say, well, the vendor made the m mistake, but the buck stops with the election officials and and I and I and I'm you know,

It's exactly right.

I I have sympathy for them, I've been in a position where one mistake can have an impact on election. But it it's that type of thing that hurts confidence. And so um I I have um I I have hope that continued training and professional training will um you know sort of avoid a potential

Well, thi- this is where, again, this committee and Congress, it's better, you know, one way or the other, supposed to provide oversight. And their response is, well, we'll send another five hundred thousand out. What could go wrong there? No, there's just it just shows that there are problems with our election system, and it's OK for us to question it, it's OK for us to do due diligence on these type of things. So um it just uh amazed me. Uh I've known some patients of mine who've come in and said they got mail-in ballots and they've got them for people that lived in their residence three and four years, or five times before. So there're there're obviously problems that go on with this. I wanna talk a little bit about cyber security. We live in a world, a a digital world where now there's AI, there's quantum physics that are pushing out insane amount of data and um uh really jeopardizing our systems. We live in a dangerous time, they're world, they're enemies that wanna de-stabilize, divide us at home. We've seen this in so many different instances. So, uh Commissioner Hovland, I just wanna ask about the EAC. Um how does it work to stay informed of the constantly evolving cyber threats? What does it do to not only figure these out, but also to communicate to, you know, state local levels to to to make sure that people know what's going on?

Thank you for the question. Uh, you know, it is a real challenge, often one of the biggest challenges when you talk about the uh the scope and scale of eight thousand plus jurisdictions across the country is communicating to that last mile. Uh, one of the ways that we've been doing that, uh we communicate a number of things, but but really so much on cyber security is about the basics. You know, even when we look at threats from artificial intelligence and AI, uh so much of the prevention comes down to being good at the basics. And so that's why we address that with uh both uh resources that we provide, uh various uh you know training guides et cetera, but also uh pieces of our learning lab. Uh some of the trainings in that platform, a walk through best practices, and again help

And you guys communicate state and local as literally as currently how often do you guys do that? What is your relationship with those folks?

Uh we have regular contact with election officials all across the country in a number of ways.

What i what does regular contact mean?

Uh every day.

Okay.

Uh you know again it depends, but we have a monthly newsletter uh dedicated to election officials. We have a platform to communicate with election officials. Our board meetings that I mentioned earlier are have state and local officials from every state and territory in the country. Uh and so through those processes we get uh very wide-spread feedback, small jurisdictions, large jurisdictions, state officials, local officials. Uh, and that really helps inform our work, uh, and makes it better.

OK, great. Uh, Mister Hicks, just one question, I, and I, uh, cuz I never understand what, I don't know what the answer to this is when people say pay their fair share. I've never had an id idea when, you know, taxation, this, that, and the other stuff. It, how much is, in your opinion, does, should the federal government be paying versus what should the state be paying as far as elections? What is the fair share number?

That's a hard question to answer, Congressman, but I'm

Well, you're the one that brought it up.

But, nope, nope, I I agree, I agree. Uh, but I would say that elections overall cost close to six billion dollars um per election cycle. I think adding uh two years ago for the Congress to appropriate fifteen million is not enough. So um if if I had my drudgers, I would say the federal government should pay one hundred percent of federal elections. But that's not for me to decide. That's um a member uh that's for Congress to decide.

Okay.

So fair share I think is is a significant amount.

Okay, all right. Thank you Madam Chairman, I'll yield back.

I now recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Miss Miller, for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, for hosting this important hearing.

and to the witnesses for taking time to be here. American citizens deserve secure elections and to know that their votes are guaranteed. They're tired of fraud and their faith in our elections is dwindling. We all know the Democrats want to cheat by not passing the Save America Act, but I will continue to fight every day to get that piece of legislation to the President's desk. In this committee we passed H. R. eighty-seven twenty-one, the Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act, that makes important changes to our election laws by prohibiting foreign nationals from funding ballot harvesting and ballot collection efforts. This common sense bill put forth by my colleague will help the American people gain confidence in their elections while curbing foreign influence, that seeks to undermine our institutions. I look forward to the continuing good work that this committee is doing. And my first question is for Mister Hicks. What steps has the EAC taken in an effort to mitigate illegal voting by noncitizens?

Congresswoman, um, states run the elections. And it's illegal for um noncitizens to vote. And so what we do is we we don't play a an active role into who can vote and who can't vote. The eligibility of the vote voters l relies on the states.

Right. It's illegal for them to vote. It it's illegal for illegals to vote.

Correct.

So my question is, what steps has the EAC taken to make sure that illegals are not voting in our elections? Non-citizens are not voting in our elections.

The EAC does not run elections. So we can't do anything to ensure that. That's a a state issue.

You should be taking steps, though, to mitigate illegal voting by non-citizens. And also, if you want the federal government to pick up the tab for elections, then maybe the federal government could say you have to have a photo ID and you have to be a US citizen. Mister Palmer, how does poll worker training contribute to election integrity and voter confidence And what does poll worker training look like?

Poll worker training is uh, I mean, that is the front lines of of of helping voters cast a ballot. And so that that poll worker training is um imperative and it's what it really means is officials at the county office and as well as uh other poll workers who are who are long term ser have l served a long time they provide guidance on the different missions that take place inside a polling place. If it's confirming the identity of someone, if it's getting them the right ballot, making sure uh that it there's uh calm and no chaos in the uh a polling place, that that's the importance of a poll worker.

I'm just curious, what how do you train a poll worker to um keep non-citizens from voting when they don't have to show an ID?

Well, poll workers um they're gonna follow the rules of the jurisdiction. It's up to us as the policymakers Uh, it's up to the ma- up to the Congress to set the rules, the state legislature set the rules of the eligibility of who's gonna be casting a ballot. We expect the poll workers to follow the instruction of um of the legislature. And so in some ways, I don't wanna put that onus on them. They'll they'll follow the rules and procedures that's provided to them.

Which is why it's so important that we pass the Save America Act. Miss McCormick, as jurisdictions modernize their elections, what steps can they take to proactively ensure the security of their systems.

Thank you for the question, Congressman Miller. Uh, there are a number of things that el- that election officials can do. First thing that they can do is a rigorous testing of the election equipment, both before, during, and after an election. They can also eng- engage in uh stringent auditing practices. Uh, all states now require uh the elections to be audited, and we now have Ninety-eight percent of the country using paper ballots. So the best way to do that is to do a h- uh an eye exam hand examination of the ballots to make sure that they match the results. I agree with you that we have uh a crisis in election confidence right now, and we need to be able to uh uh assure our voters that our election outcomes are accurate, they are fair, uh they are secure. Uh part of that is to allow observers into the polling places to be as transparent as possible. Uh and that are that are are some things that uh election officials can do to strengthen the the security and the transparency of our elections.

And I have to say across the country, Democrats and Republicans want they want election integrity. They want the um people to show voter ID and proof of citizenship. We have to pass um our legislation here to require states and local governments to get prove that you're US citizens before you're voting. So um and with that, I'll yield back.

I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today and sharing your experience, your expertise, and your insight. Members of the committee may have some additional questions for you, and we ask you to please respond to those questions in writing. Without objection, each member will have five legislative days to insert additional material into the record or to revise and extend their remarks. If there is no further business, I thank the members for their participation, and without objection, the committee stands adjourned.