U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command – Challenges and Resource Priorities for Fiscal Year 2027

I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to declare recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered. Today we will hear from our witnesses on U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command on challenges and resource priorities for fiscal year 2027. The optempo for special operations continues to put demands on the force, even with the major force drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan almost five years ago. Recent consolidation and downsizing of forces in Syria and Iraq bring only minor relief as our special operations forces continue counterterrorism efforts against violent extremist organizations, military proxies, and non-state actors in both of those countries, as well as an increase of optempo on the continent of Africa, ongoing operations in the Western Hemisphere, and now requirements related to the ongoing operations supporting the fight in Iran. Special operators have adapted to meet the challenges of an evolving landscape of great power competition in every corner of the globe, while continuing to aggressively attack violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal networks, all in an effort to protect the homeland. Our adversaries are using cutting-edge technology, economic incentives, and illicit activities to attempt to gain footholds in every geographic combatant command's area of responsibility, and the battlefield has become increasingly contested and denied by the proliferation of peer adversary capabilities and malign influence. All while our crisis response force has been called upon repeatedly over the past few years to execute exquisite challenging missions that only they can conduct. Special operations continue to be one of our most valuable tools in our toolbox, used to showcase our dominance, to impose cost on our adversaries, to reestablish deterrence, and to provide the nation with a position of advantage should deterrence fail. We ask a lot of our special operations forces, and the demands both on and for them will only continue to grow. It is critical we provide these elite operators and all that support them with the resources that they need. I was disappointed in the fiscal year 2026 budget submission for SOCOM from the Department of War. This committee worked diligently with SOCOM to provide critically needed resources to fill the gaps from over a decade of stagnant flat budgets through the reconciliation process, only to have then have the department submit a budget with a reduction to SOCOM, making the budget a wash and still flat. SOCOM's purchasing power has been reduced by 14 percent since 2019, despite increasing demand for support worldwide. I am, however, optimistic about President Trump's direction to include a significant increase in the fiscal year 2027 defense budget and what this will mean for SOCOM in the future. I look forward to reviewing the budget and putting SOCOM on a path that increases to get them to a steady state of at least $20 billion annually in their budget. We look forward to hearing how Congress can best support SOCOM such that you can continue to provide the high return on investment the nation requires while simultaneously modernizing for the challenges of the future. Our witnesses today are the leaders in the special operations community. I want to welcome the Honorable Derek Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of Secretary of War, and Admiral Frank Bradley, Commander of the United States Special Operations Command. In the interest of time, I am going to ask the witnesses to keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less so we have sufficient time for questions and answers. I think you may have a combined opening statement; if so, then make it 10 or 15 minutes. With that, let me thank our witnesses again for appearing here before us today and for your time, and I now recognize Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks he might have.

Thank you, Chairman Jackson, and to all the witnesses today. And for the record, we're not short; these chairs are just very big. Want to get that out there. In previous years, we've opened this hearing by acknowledging how dynamic the global security environment is, and I would just want to say to state that it is dynamic right now would be a massive understatement. The U.S. is facing an increasingly turbulent global world order, trained by accelerating strategic competition among major powers, more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges, and multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications. The bar to access advanced technology like AI, drones, and complex cyber tools has never been lower, allowing non-state actors and violent extremist organizations to punch above their weight, enabling them to destabilize countries and negatively influence our partners and our allies. And those are just the things we know to be true today. Who knows what challenges tomorrow will bring? The challenges and threats of today and tomorrow demand the full attention of this administration and the Department of Defense. I urge them to especially consider how we support the unique capabilities of the special forces community, who are called upon to assist combatant and functional commands in their campaigns at a rapidly increasing tempo. For more than 20 years, the special forces community has served as the primary tool in the fight against terrorism and countering violent extremist organizations. That was the mission required of us in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a mission that I carried out as an Army Ranger. And while we still need to maintain that capability and not lose sight of those hard-won gains, we must also prepare to face future challenges. One, how is the special operations community postured to support this effort? Two, do they have the right training, manning, equipping, institutional support, funding, and professional military education system? Another crucial question for this committee to address is SOCOM's budget, which has been relatively flat over the past decade. I share the chairman's concerns in this regard, given the tremendous amount of strain and resourcing that's been placed on your command. It simply has not kept pace with inflation, resulting in a 14 percent reduction in buying power since 2019, though SOCOM's requirements have certainly not diminished, as we've pointed out. Despite this stagnation, there has been a 35 percent increase in combatant command demand for special operations capabilities. So in a rapidly changing threat environment, a special operator is one of the country's greatest advantages and remains so today. It is our job to ensure we continue to hone and support this highly capable and agile force, including resourcing critical gaps in SOCOM funding. So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how they are prepared to do this, what is needed for deterrence, and how we're going to meet this increasing challenge of skyrocketing demand while diminishing resourcing for our capabilities. So Assistant Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I want to thank both of you and your teams, not just for this hearing, but the engagements that have led up to this, the briefings that you've given to both the chairman and I. It is actually refreshing in this environment the amount of engagement and collaboration and information that you provide through your command. You're setting the standard, in my opinion, with the Department of Defense, so we look forward to that continuing, and with that, I yield back.

Thank you. We will now hear from our witnesses. Once this is done, we're going to move into the question and answer session, and immediately following one round of questions, which won't take long since many of our members were not able to make it today, we will reconvene for the classified session, which will take place in Rayburn 2337. Please be advised that we may have to break in the middle for votes on the floor; we will wait and see. And I understand you both have statements to give, so I will start with Secretary Anderson. We will begin with you; you're recognized for five minutes.

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our nation's special operations forces. I'm honored to testify alongside Admiral Mitch Bradley, Commander of United States Special Operations Command. I'd also like to take a moment to recognize the dedicated professionals from the SOLIC team who are here with us today. Mr. Randy Harvey, who leads the secretariat's strategy, forces, and integration portfolio, and Ms. Cara Teeter, who leads the secretariat's capability, resources, and analysis portfolio. The SOLIC team, together with their USSOCOM counterparts, bring invaluable expertise, leadership, and insight as we advocate on behalf of the SOF enterprise, our service members, and their families. People are the foundation of SOF and of the joint force. They are our competitive advantage against our adversaries. We are thankful for those who have volunteered to serve, those currently in harm's way, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including the 13 service members we've lost during ongoing operations. We honor their lives and legacy and will never forget their sacrifice in defense of our country. Today's security environment is defined by simultaneity, convergence, and speed. State adversaries, terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal networks are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active across domains and regions. To answer these challenges, the National Defense Strategy marks a fundamental shift, directing the Department of War to implement a flexible, realistic approach to protect America's interests. Purpose-built for this era, SOF provides capability and optionality. Comprising only 3 percent of the joint force and less than 2 percent of the department's budget, roughly equivalent to the procurement cost of a single aircraft carrier, SOF delivers outsized strategic value. SOF provides senior leaders with scalable, tailorable, and asymmetric options across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Leveraging persistent global presence, generational relationships, and unique authorities, SOF shapes the operating environment, strengthens partners, and imposes cost on our adversaries. Every major operation has a SOF component to it. Operations like Southern Spear, Rough Rider, Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and Epic Fury have demonstrated our nation's prowess and commitment to confront our adversaries wherever they may be. From the Western Hemisphere across the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and beyond, SOF has been decisive in defending the homeland, deterring China, and enabling our partners and allies. Should deterrence fail, SOF is postured with the joint force to prevail in high-end conflict. SOF also creates opportunities across all domains, buy down risk, and serve as pathfinders for the department. With our culture of rapid adaptation and agile problem solving, SOF accelerates the adoption of disruptive technologies, seeding investments in unmanned and autonomous systems, counter-UXS, cyber electronic warfare, and rapidly delivering tools to warfighters at the point of need. In accordance with the law and congressional guidance, of which we are immensely grateful, the department has taken decisive and concrete steps to institutionalize SOLIC's oversight and advocacy role and strengthen the governance of the SOF enterprise. Over the last year and a half, we have transformed the secretariat for special operations to provide direct civilian oversight across organize, train, and equip responsibilities, not to duplicate or disrupt the operational execution of USSOCOM, but to support, sustain, and strengthen it. This transformation moves us beyond the old advisory construct to a true exercise of authority, direction, and control through an analytical, disciplined, data-driven, and strategically sound approach. While the maturation of these initiatives is ongoing, these foundational changes fulfill congressional intent and provide the oversight mechanisms needed to shape force structure, guide budgetary and planning processes, and forge the future of SOF. The optionality that SOF delivers requires resourcing and investments. To maintain our competitive edge, SOF needs sustained partnership, predictable resourcing, and continued modernization. We greatly appreciate the support from this committee. I commit to continued collaboration with Congress and to make full use of my position in the department and alongside the services to ensure SOF remains resourced, ready, relevant, and accountable, and to ensure they can meet today's mission while transforming for tomorrow's challenges. I'm honored to lead the SOF enterprise and invite you to visit our special operators and their families across the globe to see firsthand the great work they do and the challenges they face. Our service members and their families represent the finest that America has to offer and are something we as a nation should be proud of. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, thank you very much. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the men and women of the United States Special Operations Command. I'm honored to testify here today with Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict, Honorable Derrick Anderson. In SOCOM, we rely upon the SOLIC oversight, support, and advocacy to succeed in all of our global missions. I'm also joined today by the SOCOM Command Sergeant Major, A.J. Krogman, who exemplifies the professionalism, the leadership, and the backbone of our non-commissioned officer corps, the greatest in the world. On behalf of our entire community, I want to thank you for your enduring support. And to any of our nation's finest who are listening to us today and considering a life of service in uniform, I want you to know that we are looking for critical thinkers who can fight and creative makers who can solve the hardest problems. And if you are one of those people, then it's you that we are looking for. Distinguished members of this committee, we meet at a crucial moment. As you've said, today's security environment is defined by state adversaries, terrorist organizations, and criminal networks that are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active across every domain. Our National Defense Strategy highlights the potential of simultaneity as a central problem, and your SOF is the key component of its prescription. Today's environment rewards forces that can operate persistently and decisively, often below the threshold of armed conflict, generating irregular effects by, through, and with our allies and partners in order to produce a whole effect that is much greater than the sum of its parts. Your Special Operations Forces provide that capability. Comprising just 3 percent of the joint force and 2 percent of the budget, as has been stated, your SOF enables and delivers an outsized strategic return by providing our nation's leaders with scalable, tailorable, and those asymmetric options that come across the spectrum of competition to conflict. Our purpose is our mission. This means we are laser-focused on maintaining the readiness required to protect the homeland, to deter aggression from our pacing challenge, China, and to enable true burden-sharing by enabling and empowering the growing capacity of our allies and partners. But that mission is not accomplished by technology and equipment alone. It is executed by the most decisive advantage that we have, our people, empowered by a culture of meritocracy. Supported by critical programs that you have helped manifest, like the preservation of the force and family, the health of your SOF formation is strong and it is getting stronger. To ensure that these exceptional men and women can succeed in the complex environments of tomorrow, increasingly encroaching upon today, we are making transformation our imperative. We must adapt faster than our adversaries. We must be able to project force through the most dangerous environments, and we must evolve to leverage the ubiquitous information environment that presents both a challenge and an opportunity. We must evolve our force design, accelerate capability development, and strengthen our partnerships with the services and allies to stay ahead of emerging threats. As the department's lead for experimentation and autonomy, we are not just adapting, we are driving change. We are working with the services to incorporate next-generation capabilities, systems that are precise, autonomous, affordable, consistent with the law of war. The goal is to deliver these tools with the element of surprise from unwarned access and placement at scale, ensuring our forces maintain a decisive advantage against any adversary. You see, SOF defends the homeland by dismantling threats far from our shore, disaggregating terrorist networks. We deter aggression by strengthening the resilience of our alliance, illuminating and exposing adversary malign behavior that preys upon our partners and allies. However, our ability to accomplish this is not guaranteed. It requires accelerated modernization and your continued partnership. Predictable resourcing for our programs' modernization is a strategic necessity. SOF was purpose-built for this era of competition, and we can provide an indispensable asymmetric advantage for the joint force and the nation. And with your continued support, we will meet today's missions while transforming to ensure that we are ready for the challenges of tomorrow. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, thank you very much. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the men and women of the United States Special Operations Command. I'm honored to testify here today with Assistant Secretary War for Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict, Honorable Derek Anderson. In SOCOM, we rely upon the SOLIC oversight, support, and advocacy to succeed in all of our global missions. I'm also joined today by the SOCOM Command Sergeant Major, AJ Krogman, who exemplifies the professionalism, the leadership, and the backbone of our non-commissioned officer corps, the greatest in the world. On behalf of our entire community, I want to thank you for your enduring support. And to any of our nation's finest who are listening to us today and considering a life of service in uniform, I want you to know that we are looking for critical thinkers who can fight and creative makers who can solve the hardest problems. And if you are one of those people, then it's you that we are looking for. Distinguished members of this committee, we meet at a crucial moment. As you've said, today's security environment is defined by state adversaries, terrorist organizations, and criminal networks that are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active across every domain. Our National Defense Strategy highlights the potential of simultaneity as a central problem, and your SOF is the key component of its prescription. Today's environment rewards forces that can operate persistently and decisively, often below the threshold of armed conflict, generating irregular effects by, through, and with our allies and partners in order to produce a whole effect that is much greater than the sum of its parts. Your special operations forces provide that capability. Comprising just 3 percent of the joint force and 2 percent of the budget, as has been stated, your SOF enables and delivers an outsized strategic return by providing our nation's leaders with scalable, tailorable, and those asymmetric options that come across the spectrum of competition to conflict. Our purpose is our mission. This means we are laser-focused on maintaining the readiness required. Thank you, Admiral. And with that, we will start with the questioning, and I will begin with my question. Admiral Bradley, I know you've only been in command for a little over five months now, and I suspect you are most likely still assessing various aspects of the command, but what would you say the top three challenges are this fiscal year to sustain your three SOF lines of effort, which are win, people, and transform, and what do we need to do here in Congress to help you succeed in that?

Chairman, thank you. Our first priority is always to maintain readiness for the current threats that are out there. Crisis response is that top priority for us, being able to respond agilely to wherever it might present. And of course, the demands on that, as have been mentioned, have been 300 percent increase over these last five years. That pace continues. You'll remember a year ago when General Fenton was testifying and I was here supporting him as we were telling the story, that pace of growing usage but diminishing resources was causing us to have to eat into our modernization budget to be able to cash flow those current operations. That's still the case. And so today, the modernization priorities that I would tell you are very similar to those from a year ago. Number one, to be able to project force into increasingly contested environments where our adversaries are posing threats against us. Number two really is to take advantage of the fact that there is this ubiquitous information environment, ubiquitous technical surveillance that's out there. Many people see it as a threat, and it certainly is, but it's also an advantage, an opportunity that we could leverage. The cyber and the virtual domain are critical maneuver spaces that we must take advantage of. Of course, another aspect of the rapidly evolving, changing character of warfare is the emergence of abundant lethal autonomy. And yes, that is a threat that we have to contend with, but it's also one that we can leverage. And so that's also an area that we will be looking to prioritize modernization. And then finally, though this is the foundation and as Secretary Anderson alluded to directly, our people must continue to be our foundation, ensuring they are trained, ready, supported, and educated for the future.

Thank you, Admiral. And I will work to get you additional resources because one thing I've learned on being this committee the short period of time that I've been the chair and a little bit prior to that is that we absolutely in this particular community cannot eat into your research and development, testing, evaluation, modernization efforts because that will quickly affect your ability to fight in the months and years to come. So we will take that seriously. Secretary Anderson, you've been in the seat a few months less than Admiral Bradley, and I'm sure you're still assessing your priorities as well. SOCOM's budget, as we mentioned, has been relatively flat for the past decade. In your combined written statement that was submitted, you state that SOCOM comprises only 3 percent of the joint force and less than 2 percent of the department's budget, delivering, quote, "an outsized strategic value." I personally believe SOCOM's budget needs to increase to a steady state of at least $20 billion a year. How are you using your secretary-like position to advocate for a higher budget for SOCOM? What do you think the future budget looks like for SOCOM? And how do you quantify this outsized strategic value in your budget submission?

Mr. Chairman, I'd first want to start off by thanking the committee for those 907 authorities in the NDAA a few years ago that gave us that service-like ability. What I can tell you is within the department, having that service-like ability allows us to work with the other military departments hand-in-hand. Specifically when we talk about the resources not only that we are being provided but the other services are being provided, it gives us an opportunity to go service-to-service, from chief-to-chief, and have those conversations about modernizations and where we might be overlapping or where we can combine forces. So I think that 907 capability and authorities that you gave us gets us in the room with the other services. As far as echoing what Admiral Bradley spoke about in our modernization, as we continue to modernize, we see that technology typically, and I've heard various different ranges, but technology ends up being obsolete within six months. So our operators that are operating on the ground, not only utilizing the technology that they have internal to the department but also training by, with, and through our partners and the technology they have, that is an absolutely other critical part of this and ensuring that we are staying up to speed with technology. So that investment, as Admiral Bradley said, is absolutely crucial. And then one of the other priorities I'd just like to highlight, Mr. Chairman, is the POTFF program, the preservation of the force and family. That investment that you made in the SOF community absolutely increases our readiness and allows us to take care of our soldiers and sailors and airmen, and happy to get into more detail on that.

Thank you, I appreciate that. I have one last question here, Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Section 863 of the FY26 NDAA required the establishment of the SOCOM Urgent Innovative Technologies and Capabilities Initiative with funding that was allocated in the 2025 Budget Reconciliation Act. When do you expect to begin implementing this requirement, and how does it nest with SOCOM's transformation imperative?

Chairman, I'll start and just say that the appreciation for that investment and for the recognition of the agility with which SOCOM already operates. So in many ways, those capabilities inside the SOCOM unique acquisition process give us unity of command to be able to both see a requirement, to identify it, articulate it, move resources to be able to execute against it, field it, and get it out in a very rapid manner to be able to test, evaluate whether it's credible for the combat situations it might have to face. The authority given in 863 and the resources to be able to allow that to happen makes us able to execute that more quickly. As we look to the other initiatives that have come both from this chamber, from the Senate, and from the President, all in acquisition reform, Speed Act, the Forged Act, all of those are really looking to take advantage of some of the pathways that SOCOM and SOLIC have been able to chart over the years and then extrapolate them out across the broader joint force. And so the leadership that Secretary Anderson's talking about inside the Pentagon at the secretariat level is a critical part to be able to harness some of that new authority that you've given us and be able to help the other services to be able to use it in the same way.

Mr. Chairman, echoing what Admiral Bradley said, the one thing I would make a point of is when we talk about the military department-to-department relationships, Admiral Bradley and I are 100 percent working with the other departments not only to give our lessons learned to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force so that their acquisitions processes get better, but also learn where we can get better. There's certainly some lessons learned that we can get from the services, but we will continue to work with you and this committee to ensure we keep you up to date on how we're exercising that authority.

Thank you, I appreciate that. And as you know, the focus of the NDAA this last year was to reform acquisition and procurement, that process altogether. This money was intended knowing that SOCOM is already very good at that, better than most in the military, you already have some area of expertise in there, but to refine that process so that it could then be used as an example for other areas in the military so that they can kind of mimic what was going on in a lessons learned way. So I hope we get that done, and I hope it turns out to be really successful and everybody learns a lot from it. But thank you, I appreciate it. With that, Mr. Crow, I recognize you.

Thank you, Chairman. I wanted to begin on something that I think that Special Operations Forces are uniquely equipped and trained to do, and that is working with civilian populations, building trust. You're known as force multipliers, and the genesis of that, as you know better than anybody, is that you work with those local populations, you build public sentiment, public trust, and you build foreign forces. And a part of that is this understanding, and I worked in the community, this understanding that you're going to do everything possible to protect local forces. That built in the mission planning process is protecting civilians, reducing civilian casualties. Because nothing sets back years sometimes of trust building and relationship building than an errant strike, than killing civilians, right? It's not just inefficient and immoral and unlawful in certain circumstances, but it actually makes it harder for us to do our mission, which is why this committee in Congress in the FY19 NDAA required DOD to develop a comprehensive policy for preventing civilian harm, which it did. And in fiscal year 23 NDAA, I helped create a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence because I learned that you can actually accomplish the tactical element of a mission but then lose the end game if the people that you're fighting with and working with actually don't trust you and support you. Those efforts have been slashed in the last year. 80 percent of the CPCOE and the resources have been cut. The personnel that have been embedded in the combatant commands have been largely taken away. And it seems like a terrible missed opportunity, but also a strategic error to not equip our operators and our forces with the tools they need to comprehensively address our adversaries and build the trust in our alliances. In that vein, Secretary Anderson, on February 28th, there was a girls' elementary school in Iran that was struck. Public reports say that 175 civilians, many of them children, were reportedly killed or wounded in that strike. It's my understanding that there's been a preliminary investigation and that you might be aware of that. Is that preliminary investigation complete and was there a 15-6 that came out of that?

Congressman, first to answer your second question first, currently the incident is being investigated by CENTCOM. I wouldn't want to get ahead of the investigation. And in the closed setting, I'm happy to give you some of the dates and details as to how that's progressed, but it is currently being investigated. And what I can say is that the investigating officer is a general officer outside of the CENTCOM chain of command. So there will be an unbiased, impartial investigation that's conducted. And Congressman, to your point, to be very clear, you're absolutely right. There is no strategic benefit for the United States or for the department in civilian harm. And that's what makes us different and separate from our adversaries. We continue to have a Center of Excellence, a Civilian Harm Center of Excellence, and continue with those reports. But I think you bring up a good point is what we've done within the command structure. If you look at from when a SOF operator is training at the ground level all the way through a general officer, they're taking civilian harm and ensuring that it is mitigated throughout the entire process. And I think that has shown a world of compliance to culture. And I think that is where we've been heading. And again, I'm happy to have more conversations and discuss some of those things in the closed setting.

I appreciate that. And I appreciate you saying the strategic importance of this. And I don't doubt in any way that you're committed to that because I know you live this and you understand it, obviously as a part of what you do downrange. Can you clarify, and this isn't a gotcha, I'm just honestly asking the question. So there has not been a preliminary investigation that's been completed? The initial investigation by CENTCOM is still underway?

No, Congressman, as you're well aware with the civilian harm mitigation, there'll be an initial investigation to determine whether or not a 15-6 should be opened.

And that's been completed.

Correct.

And now there's a 15-6.

And there's a 15-6 open that's going to be a full investigation, Congressman. And you have my commitment, as we have in the past, that once that investigation is complete and finalized, that we'll make sure that we're available.

So the 15-6 is the one that's underway.

Correct, Congressman.

Okay. And the preliminary investigation, did it determine that U.S. armed forces carried out the strikes on the elementary school?

I have not seen it, Congressman. Again, I'm happy to have conversation in closed. Right now, I have the fact that a 15-6, a full-on 15-6 has been investigated.

Okay, but you haven't seen the results of the preliminary investigation.

I have not, Congressman.

Have you, Admiral Bradley?

No, sir, I have not.

You haven't. Okay. All right. I wanted to go to one of your comments about lethal autonomous drones, right? It's happening, right? Our adversaries are doing it. There's been a lot of debate about the morality, the legality of taking a human outside of the kill chain and making that decision ourselves. You had mentioned, Admiral Bradley, you said lethal autonomous authority is happening, we need to leverage that ourselves. What did you mean by that? Are you saying that there's been a decision within the administration that we will allow lethal autonomous authority with drones?

Congressman, I believe we employ lethal capability that has an amount of autonomy in it every day. Any of our IR guiding missiles has an amount of that baked into it.

Can I drill down on that? Is there, sitting here today, is there a human in the kill chain?

There is always a human in the kill chain.

Okay. And is there a debate about taking a human out of the kill chain?

I do not believe there is.

What do you personally believe?

That the law of armed conflict and the law of war requires a human to be the decider about where and how lethal, any lethal force should be delivered. No matter the vessel of that lethal force, it should be a human that's making that decision.

I'm very relieved to hear you say that. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you. Mr. Scott, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. And I too have the concerns about the budget constraints and what it's doing to modernization. I want to get to the proposed 3,000 billet reduction in forces. And Secretary Anderson, I understand it's predominantly intelligence analysts, logistical staff, and psychological operations that you intend to make the reductions will come from, is that correct?

Congressman, that's correct.

I want to ask, in the psychological operations, does that include what we would refer to as information warfare?

Well, Congressman, I would say that there is information operations, there's psychological operations. And I'm happy to again talk a little bit more in detail on the close session, but we are doing a revamp within the Special Operations Command, specifically in USASOC, to ensure we have those capabilities readily available.

I think it would be a good use of time for our military to study how effective the Russians have been on the continent of Africa with information warfare and how effective they've been at getting the French kicked off of the continent. And it has created significant challenges for us in that continent. And I just, I want to make sure that that part of today's warfare is not ignored because we have to embrace it. We can see what they're doing and know what they're doing, and yet we have not been countering it at an effective rate, and speed matters with that. So sticking with Africa, Russia, Africa Corps now, Wagner Group, used to be Wagner Group, and China, they're both expanding their security roles in Africa. What specific risk does this create for the U.S. national security, for our need for critical minerals, and our ability to operate in Africa?

Congressman, I can take that as a start point and sort of follow back on the previous question as well. I think one of the critical things in the information space that we have to do, and it gets specifically to your point about critical minerals and other threats on the African continent, is lever the high ground in information operations, that is the truth. And in almost every case, our adversaries are leveraging their positions for malign influence against the population's interests. And merely what we can do to be most effective is tell the truth and highlight that.

I agree with you.

So in Africa, that is clearly the case. And again, I don't want to get ahead of General Dagvin Anderson, the AFRICOM commander, who of course owns the strategy and understands this far better than any of us, but we provide support to him through these forces to help him to do just that.

I think it would be a good use of tax dollars for us to get some actual footage, as you said, telling the truth, of what China is doing with the harvesting of fish and exclusive economic zones off of the continent of Africa and show the citizens of that continent just how their natural resources, their food supply is being pillaged by the Chinese. And I think that the Chinese would be much less welcome by the people of the continent if they knew just how much of their food supply was being stolen by China. So sticking to Africa, we lost the key access point in Niger. Admiral, what has that done to the operational impact, your ability to conduct counterterrorism missions in Africa? How has this impacted SOF's ability with regard to speed in a crisis response?

Congressman, West Africa has been a particularly volatile region over the last several years and a number of countries that have changed leadership in particular in the case of Niger as several of the others. I would tell you that our SOF generational long-standing relationships with the professional military-to-military forces there have helped us to maintain some contact in these troubled times. And in fact, we hope that as things evolve and those governments stabilize and new diplomatic connections can be made, they can be leveraged to be able to help us maintain indications and warning, awareness of threats that might be there and ultimately to help them to police their own problems.

Those relationships matter. I agree with you. They're still strong at the mil-to-mil level, and I hope we're able to leverage them to get back into Niger and 101 and 201. I also want to advocate for the ECHO programs on the continent of Africa. And I know Secretary, if I'm not mistaken, you were a Green Beret.

That's correct, sir.

And but I very much believe in the ODA mission and the ECHO programs and hope that we will find the funds to continue to expand them on that continent. With that, I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Scott. Mr. Tran, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you so much, Chairman. Welcome, Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Thanks for being here. Admiral Bradley, the department has emphasized that adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran are increasingly operating through proxies, criminal networks, and influence campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict. How central are special operations forces to countering those activities and do you believe SOCOM currently has the authorities and resources required to compete effectively in that space?

Congressman, thank you. In fact, I'd refer back to those generational partnerships and relationships that we build around the planet. Today, there are more than 6,500 SOF operators and enablers deployed around and in 80 different countries. In every one of those building and sustaining those relationships. To your point about the influence operations that our adversaries are conducting, in most cases, those are designed to prey upon our allies and our partners to be able to use that malign behavior to be able to gain unwarranted access and leverage. Our ability to be able to illuminate that malign behavior and then to pass it and make our partners aware of it, many times through diplomatic channels, but sometimes directly mil-to-mil, security service to security service, is a critical way to be able to help undermine our adversaries' actions there.

I appreciate that.

And to your question about authorities, I would just reckon back to the 127 programs, a critical capability to us to be able to do that, and we do believe those authorities are robust and appreciated.

Thanks, Admiral. Let me ask you this. SOCOM represents only about 3 percent of the joint force, yet combatant commanders continue to request support from special operation forces across nearly every theater. Does the demand for special operation forces currently exceed sustainable levels and also what risk does that create for readiness and retention within the forces?

Congressman, thank you. I would say it, well, to affirm, they are asking for more than we have to offer every year since I've been paying attention to that. This last year was about 70 different asks that we could not satisfy. We are able to sustain because we only do the things that we are able to sustain. That said, because of the work that both of these chambers have done really since 2006 QDR, we have the ability to sustain the level of force and commitment that we are at today. That budget reduction or that budget, the buying power reduction over the last five to six years has limited our ability to be able to modernize and that's really the critical determiner for the future. With the few resources we have that are in higher and higher demand to be able to make them more useful, we need to modernize them for the future.

Thanks, Admiral. To either of the witnesses, and you both may answer. Looking five to 10 years ahead, what do you believe is the greatest strategic risk facing the special operation enterprise and what is the one area where congressional support would have the greatest impact on SOCOM's ability to succeed?

Why don't you take it? I'll take a first stab at it. If you'd have asked me that question 10 years ago, I would have defined the most dangerous crisis of the future probably being in Iran or an Iranian surrogate or proxy force threatening freedom of navigation in and around the Middle East. And so that most dangerous crisis of 10 years ago is the most likely crisis that we face today. I would anticipate that along those same lines, the ability to project force into increasingly contested environments where U.S. national interests are threatened is the characterization of the next most dangerous crisis. And that is why that we have made our ability to do that our top modernization priority. If you look at the operation conducted under Absolute Resolve into Venezuela, I would argue the most sophisticated integrated interagency joint force raid ever conducted, you get a peek at the modernization pathway that the joint force is on, and it is that ability.

Thanks, Admiral. Mr. Secretary, can I get your take?

Yes, Congressman. What I would say, Admiral Bradley alluded to this earlier, when we talk about the different threats that are across the world, those relationships that we've maintained not just for years but for decades are how we build that value proposition that SOF brings to the table. Specifically highlighting, and you asked, Congressman, what are one of the things Congress, continued support for those 127 programs are absolutely essential to ensuring that we maintain that value proposition. What one ODA or one SEAL team is able to accomplish is absolutely astronomical for the joint force. And then lastly, again, Admiral Bradley hit it on the head, was our modernization efforts, ensuring that we utilize autonomy and AI to efficiently conduct staffing, all of those things that allow us to focus on operational needs.

Thanks, Secretary. Yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Tran. Mr. Luttrell, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Bradley, thank you for coming today. Thank everyone in the room for your service and continued service. Admiral Bradley, MILCON funding for construction projects is about 509 million, one of which SOF Human Performance Training Center. What is that?

Congressman, that is one of our integrated facilities where we're able to bring together the Preservation of the Force and Family program to be able to provide synchronized and integrated care for our operators who are either returning from service from an injury or who are enhancing their performance to be able to go out on the next missions to be able to provide that continuity of care.

Is it a NICo-like institute?

No, Congressman. It's, there are a number of those in each one of our major force concentration centers that give us the ability to really permeate the care from the POTFF program down to the lowest level possible.

There's more than one? I only see one in Delaware. I don't know how they ended up winning it. I think Texas would have been a better spot to hang it, but we can talk about that later.

Yes, Congressman. I, actually, I'm not aware of the one in Delaware, but those centers we increment through the budget to be able to give each of our force concentrations a component that capability.

What is the, and I'm not, I hate to put you on the spot on this one, Admiral, but what does that look like? I've spent my entire post-military career trying to find the best, I don't want to say pipeline, but training mechanism for the brain and the body combined. Our special operations forces, we demand the boat teams. You have to go faster and has to be there quicker. It's a rugged ride. I don't know a boat operator that retires that can stand up straight. Most of them don't have their kidneys anymore and everything is wrong with them, but we push them harder and we push them faster. SDVs, how deep can you dive, how long can you go, how cold can you sustain, how cold can it be and you can sustain yourself for to be mission capable. We keep going and we keep going and we keep going. Our operators are carrying heavier rucksacks because we keep throwing technology on top of them, just weighs more than anything. Push harder, push faster. And we don't ever, I'm not wire-brushing you, sir, this is a time that I get to vent. Thank you. But we do not, we do not take the time in my personal opinion to take care of you from start to finish, baseline assessment till the time that you quit, retire, excuse me, I should never say quit. Okay? And when we have these performance facilities that we're popping up, I want to know what's in it. Because I don't need a six-pack and a bag of Cheetos. I mean, this is the special operators of the United States of America is the most amazing asset. And I think we have, we've not done our best to take care of them because, and everyone in this room that's wearing a uniform right now needs to listen to what I'm saying to you. Because when you do leave and you fall into that deep dark black hole because you're not here anymore and you're alone, I think there's something we can do to catch the trajectory of change that. Because it's lonely out there and I'm trying to deal with that in the VA, but if we can help inside the DOD, inside the community, inside of our house, I think that is a win.

Congressman, I absolutely agree with you. And I suspect you probably dropped a half an inch of height in your time in the teams.

That's why I'm shorter than my brother because I kept my head under the boat.

Just like, just like most of us. And it is exactly that aim of community that these centers and the POTFF program is allowing us to develop. So I'll just give you a, I'll take you on a small tour of what one of them looks like.

Thank you.

Where a team of either SEALs or ODA or Raiders or our Air Force special tactics folks would come in in the morning to begin to work their PT regimen for that day, in that same facility would be those who are injured but can't work out with their teammates anymore that are going through rehab or going through care to be able to get back up on speed. But they're in the same facility, so there is still that strong sense of community. If they can't go through rehab or maybe at the backside of their physical rehab, they check into the performance enhancement section where cognitive and performance psychologists help them to train their cognitive abilities to be smarter and to be, have better reaction time. All still inside that same facility, so there's still the jabbing and going back and forth with their teammates, they're still part of the team. If some of those individuals in that performance enhancement, cognitive enhancement with the performance psychs find that they have care that needs to be attended to by a clinical psych, there's no shame there. There's no stigma. They are now in a warm handoff through door to a clinical psych to be able to get the care that they need. We've seen that in many cases this holistic care, and it is very much modeled after the lessons from the various NICo facilities and many others that are templated around the world, has been able to reduce the stigma to a point where some 50 percent of our formations in some cases are making use of our behavioral health specialists now. I think that is one of the most important and the most telling statistics that we've got of the success of the program that POTFF has been able to fund for us. But it's not just that, the reduction in the return time for our operators who are injured back to full duty, 75 percent reduction in that time. 70 percent reduction in the amount of time that it takes for somebody to get access to first care. In most cases it's less than two days, in many cases it is same day. And then the thing that really makes all of this hum I think best is the permeating nature of what we've been able to do. We've been able to put our psychs, our behavioral health specialists, our chaplains, and our corpsmen down at the O5 level in almost every formation to be able to give a name to face recognition of the caregivers to the operators so that there's immediate access and you know the case history of the operators and the enablers that are being helped.

I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Luttrell. Mr. Hamadeh, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I think you guys make an incredible team, so I would just encourage you to continue building that relationship. Admiral Bradley, I know you've talked about irregular triad before, of cyber, special operations, and space. Could you for this committee and for the public just describe what that is?

Congressman, thank you. I talk about it generally when we're talking about the ubiquitous technical surveillance or ubiquitous information environment might be useful to just start there and say what in the world is that? Well, we probably all know that more and more of the world spends more and more of its time in the virtual domain. You only have to look at your screen time indicator on your cell phones to be able to recognize that that is in fact the case. And it is true that that time that you spend in making more of your information available to the world is a vulnerability to you. It's a boon for our adversaries. But it's also an advantage for us looking at our adversaries who adhere and fall into that same trap. And so that reality, that is the ubiquitous information environment. In order to take advantage of that, and we do, through publicly available information, commercially acquirable information, and when appropriate, authorized and within legal bounds, clandestinely accessible information, we can know incredibly more about both our adversaries and the societies within which those adversaries are operating that will allow us to be far more precise and far more lethal in our operations when they're required or far more effective in those operations. But in order to do that, we need to merge those three disciplines that you just described in that new triad. The cyber capability of course, the maneuver in the virtual domain to be able to access and gain access to all that information. In almost every case that information transits through a space segment between one part of the globe and the other. Being able to intersect that or to be able to lever that to control it, to have freedom of maneuver there is critical. And then finally, I mentioned your SOF placement and access around the globe in over 80 countries, some 6,500 operators who have relationships that force multiply out to thousands even more, give us the ability to both lever our physical placement and access with the virtual placement and access that our Cybercom and NSA teammates have through the space segment to be able to lever all of that to our national interest. That's really what we're talking about when we discuss the space-SOF-cyber triad.

Right. And given the Army is cutting 3,000 special operation positions, would this impede in trying to implement this irregular triad?

Congressman, any reduction of course is has to be adjusted and most of those billets that are being adjusted and moved out are in the intelligence, communications, and logistics disciplines. And we completely understand why and how they're doing that because, frankly, the services recognize that they need to build the same kind of capability that SOF has leveraged to be able to manifest this, but it does come at a cost. We're adjusting and working with the services on how we might lever their augmentation from other fielded formations to make up for it, but it is an adjustment.

Okay. And Mr. Secretary, you know, with social media and AI rising right now, and we know that this is a 24/7 information warfare, we can just look at the most recent example with Iran right now. A lot of Americans don't know what's real, they don't know what's fake. What changes from Congress would help improve how we run overseas influence campaigns with the speed of this modern warfare that we're in?

Thank you, Congressman. I'm probably going to sound like a broken record, but when we and Admiral Bradley talk about modernization, that is truly what it comes from. And when Congressman Scott was mentioning the information operations world, we're trying to build information operation warriors, individuals that are specifically honed in on the information environment. And we've done some internal looking at ourselves to see if we're structured the right way, specifically not just within our ODAs and our SEAL teams and our Raiders, but specifically within our information operations spectrum. So we've been working, and as you're well aware, Congressman, a majority of those service members preside in the Army, but we've worked with United States Army Special Operations Command in looking at what that future looks like because as we talk about modernization, autonomy, AI, all those other things, our information warriors, our cyber warriors are at a different type of level than say I or Admiral Bradley. So we need to make sure we're structured properly and we're absolutely moving forward with that, Congressman.

Yeah. And especially, you know, with Iran cutting off 90 percent of the internet access, I think it's important that we don't also lose sight in the most basics, leaflet drops, you know, what we used to always do back in the day. And with that, I yield back.

Thank you. And I would just like to say here as we close, I want to just say, Mr. Secretary, thank you, Admiral, thank you, thank you for what you do, thank you for your leadership, thank you for your time today. Thanks to all of the members here in the audience today that are in uniform, thank you for your service to our country, we really appreciate it. I think the general consensus here, and I've talked to all the members here on both sides of the aisle frequently about this, I think we all agree that you're not resourced properly for what you're asked to do. And so I think that that's going to be a continuing effort on our part to make sure that we get things done, that we get you the resources and we get you the authorities and the 127 Echoes and things of that nature. We are going to work hard to make sure that we are supporting what you do and in what you're asked to do. And with that, Mr. Secretary, do you have any closing remarks?

I'll skip so we can get down to the SCIF.

Okay. With that, we're going to adjourn the open portion of the hearing here. We're going to move to Rayburn 2337 for the classified session and we are adjourned.