Defense Intelligence Enterprise – Challenges, Priorities, and Resourcing for Fiscal Year 2027

All right, good afternoon. Subcommittee will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered. Today we will hear from our witnesses on the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and how the enterprise is postured for fiscal year 2027 and beyond. This year, I am pleased to include the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or NGA, with our panel of leaders from the defense intelligence community. Welcome, ma'am. The U.S. intelligence community is comprised of 18 organizations, nine of which are elements of the Department of War, that provide a variety of capabilities supporting national defense and intelligence requirements and their missions. Intelligence enables leaders to make informed decisions, especially now in the increasingly complex world that we live in. We continue to face challenges with threats that span the entire globe, including non-state actors, well-known terrorist organizations, the narco-terrorists right here in our own Western Hemisphere, and the ever-evolving threats from our traditional adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Our warfighters and policymakers depend on validated, actionable intelligence to execute their missions and return home safely. And the men and women who support the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, civilians and service members alike, need the requisite tools, resources, facilities, and support to deliver on our intelligence requirements. By ensuring our Defense Intelligence Enterprise has what it needs and our intelligence efforts are synchronized, we increase our warfighters' lethality, survivability, and capacity to provide for our nation's defense and counter whatever threats may arise now and in the future. This is a challenging task at hand and one that we look forward to working with the department on. That is why we are here today, to learn from key representatives of this critically important community about our current posture and how we can work together to better support the enterprise. Understanding each of your roles in this effort will help us ensure that your organizations have the capabilities that you need and the resources required to accomplish your mission. I'd like to welcome today's witnesses from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise: Mr. Bradley Hansell, Under Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security; General Rudd, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director of National Security Agency; Lieutenant General Adams, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Lieutenant General Michele Bredenkamp, Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. In the interest of time, I ask that the witnesses keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less so that we'd have sufficient time for questions and answers. And we're hoping that some more members show up here in a minute. I apologize, we're starting anyways here, but it's been a hectic day and no one's actually sure what's going on with the votes throughout the day, so that's part of the issue here. But with that, I once again want to thank the witnesses for being here, and I'm going to turn it over now to Mr. Crow for any opening remarks he may have.

Thank you, Dr. Jackson, and thank you to our defense intelligence leaders for being here today to provide testimony. Today's hearing is about whether our Defense Intelligence Enterprise is resourced appropriately, postured effectively, and operating as a cohesive unit. We ask a great deal of our intelligence professionals. They are expected to anticipate adversary actions across all domains while integrating vast streams of data into clear, decision-ready insights. That mission is only getting harder. Adversaries are more agile, more networked, and more willing to exploit any vulnerabilities in our own system. The global security environment is testing our defense, security, and intelligence apparatus in unprecedented ways, with challenges ranging from cyber threats to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to force protection in an active conflict in the Middle East. Intelligence is our first line of defense against these and many other threats. It supports our operations, prevents strategic surprise, and ensures the safety of our service members. The need for an agile, capable, and synchronized Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and one that works closely with allies and partners, cannot be overstated. That's why I consistently and must again stress the importance of our alliances. Our ability to collaborate with global partners, including sharing relevant intelligence across agencies and enterprises, is part of what makes us better and stronger than our adversaries. Make no mistake, these are turbulent times that demand serious people. We built a system with deep expertise across multiple agencies and commands. That specialization is a strength, but it can also be a weakness if those entities are not fully aligned, information is not shared in real time, priorities are not coordinated, and if resources are not allocated with a unified strategy in mind. So today, I want to better understand three core issues. First, resourcing. Are our defense intelligence agencies funded and staffed to meet the demands of the current threat environment? Are there critical gaps in analytic capability, collection capacity, or emerging technology investments that this committee needs to address? Second, posture. How are you positioning your organizations to respond to the most pressing challenges we face today? Are we structured to compete effectively in a world where threats are increasingly transregional and cross-domain? And are we agile enough to adapt as those threats evolve? And third, integration. Perhaps most importantly, how well are you working together? Are there barriers, cultural, bureaucratic, legal, or technical, that still prevent seamless collaboration across agencies and with our partners and allies? What steps are you taking to break down silos, and where do you need additional authorities or support to do so? I remain committed to working with all of you to ensure your organizations have the resourcing and authorities required to conduct what the nation asks of you. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on these and other issues today. Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you. All right, well, we'll now hear from our witnesses, then we'll move into a question and answer session. Immediately following all the questions that we have, we will reconvene for a brief classified session. It will take place in Rayburn 2337 immediately after this. So we will begin with opening statements, and Mr. Hansell, we'll start with you.

Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to testify on the fiscal year 2027 budget and the posture of the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise in its support to the 2026 National Defense Strategy. As the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, I am honored and humbled to represent the men and women of the DISE who serve our nation. I appear before you today alongside the generals we entrust to lead our combat support agencies. With President Trump's support, we have the right leaders for the moment. In implementing the President's National Security Strategy, the NDS established the department's strategic approach along four lines of effort. The Intelligence and Security Enterprise stands ready to support each. First, defend the homeland by investing in the intelligence capabilities necessary to detect and counter adversary threats in the Western Hemisphere, from countering narco-terrorists to strategic deterrence, and to ensuring the DISE is postured to support all efforts to secure our borders. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific by funding survivable ISR capabilities, improving our targeting capability, and dramatically enhancing our collection in the theater. We also make necessary investments to ensure we can operate at the speed and scale needed in the Pacific. Increase burden sharing, as mentioned by you, Congressman, by leveraging established and emerging intelligence sharing relationships with our allies and partners to better coordinate our operations, activities, and resources, maximizing our return on investment and our ability to buy down shared risk. Supercharge the U.S. defense industrial base by strengthening the integration of the intelligence and acquisition communities, enhancing intelligence and security capabilities to protect critical technologies and supply chains, and mitigate key security risks while transforming the security strategy. To support these lines of effort, the FY 27 President's budget request for the department intelligence and security mission leverages the combined resources of the Department of War and the National Intelligence Program in a coordinated fashion. While many of the specifics are classified, but I'm happy to share in the follow-on session, I can share here that the DISE is making major investments in space-based ISR to meet the challenge of deterring China, stabilizing and expanding permissive airborne ISR to support immediate and enduring combatant command requirements, transforming the human enterprise to operate in a world of ubiquitous technical surveillance, and investing in the CSAs to accomplish the no-fail mission of adopting AI and leveraging our vast amounts of intelligence data to scale against all threats. To accomplish all these efforts and meet our mandate, I have found it necessary to ensure all enterprise operations, activities, and investments support three foundational principles. First, realign the enterprise to a new risk paradigm. We must effectively measure and assess relative risk for warfighters and policymakers. We must also ensure our posture is laser-focused on supporting NDS priorities. Secondly, maximize enterprise effects from our current investments, which will require the DISE to be outcome-focused and exceptional in measuring ROI to adequately inform opportunity costs. To achieve these effects demands we are all mission-focused and apply an enterprise lens to our activities. Lastly, we must aggressively modernize the enterprise to ensure we are not only taking care of today's warfighters, but also the warfighters of tomorrow. This will require new technologies, new ways of thinking, and the right workforce aligned to the challenges we will collectively face in the future. In conclusion, the President's budget request postures the DISE to begin the transformation needed to deliver the timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence and security needed to successfully execute the NDS. The support and partnership of this subcommittee will continue to be critical in achieving the President's vision of peace through strength. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to answering your questions here and in our follow-on closed session. Thank you.

Thank you very much. General Rudd, you're recognized for five minutes.

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I'm honored to represent the men and women of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. I'm grateful for your support. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today alongside my Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise colleagues. The strategic environment we face today is dynamic and complex, defined by great power threats and simultaneous flashpoints of crisis and conflict. While the nature of war remains unchanged, the character of warfare is evolving at an ever-increasing pace. Influencing all of this is the rapid advancement of technology, including artificial intelligence, that is central to this transformation of warfare. The nation and adversaries we face, the nation and the adversaries we face demand speed and agility in our signals intelligence and cyber capabilities. Foreign intelligence, harnessing the power of our data, strategic campaigning, and a bias to action are essential to supporting the warfighter, shaping the environment, and strengthening partnerships. The men and women of the National Security Agency alongside the United States Cyber Command are the world leaders in this arena. Recent events, including our support to operations Epic Fury and Absolute Resolve, make it clear that the powerful combination of signals intelligence provided by NSA and cyber effects delivered by U.S. Cyber Command continues to have outsized impacts in protecting the homeland, delivering deterrence, and providing support to combat operations. Our foremost priority is to defend the U.S. homeland. NSA has made a priority, made it a priority to protect America's interests throughout the Western Hemisphere through our efforts to produce foreign intelligence that can be used to prevent narco-terrorists from trafficking lethal narcotics into our country and to deter and defend against cyber threats to the U.S. homeland. As we maintain strategic discipline in our focus on our number one priority, NSA remains vigilant to our global challenges, including efforts to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. Operation Epic Fury demonstrates the incredible warfighting support that NSA and U.S. Cybercom deliver on behalf of the nation, on behalf of the joint force, and against our strategic priorities and threats. In support of U.S. Central Command, NSA has played a critical role in our ability to deliver insight into the adversary and generate strategic advantage on the battlefield. Emerging technologies and increasing global interconnectedness continue to drive change at an unprecedented rate. As a technically oriented foreign intelligence organization that supports the intelligence community and warfighter, NSA must posture itself to succeed through speed, scale, innovation, and integration. The research and development of technology is a constant, not an exception. It helps us stay ahead of foreign adversaries who are also working feverishly to develop capabilities to be used against us. This requires a highly skilled workforce, a workforce that embraces innovation and a broadened approach for agile collaboration across government, the private sector, and our partners around the world. In closing, I'd like to emphasize the importance of intelligence derived from Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to the missions that I mentioned. This authority, which allows NSA to collect foreign intelligence on non-U.S. persons located overseas that use U.S. communications infrastructure, is vital to keeping the nation safe. I look forward to continuing the conversation with Congress about 702's importance and the rigorous compliance program that guides our use of it. Maintaining the trust and confidence of our nation's leaders and the public remains our top focus. Thank you again for inviting me today. Your support is what allows us to achieve positive national security outcomes for the nation, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Thank you, General. Lieutenant General Adams, you're recognized for five minutes.

Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of its challenges, priorities, and resourcing. I'm honored to testify alongside the Honorable Hansell, General Rudd, and Lieutenant General Bredenkamp. The United States confronts an increasingly complex threat environment characterized by adversaries who are modernizing their capabilities, cooperating in unprecedented ways, and seeking asymmetric advantages against the joint force. These adversaries aspire to shape the international order in their favor. To meet these challenges, the Defense Intelligence Agency is dedicated to providing timely, actionable intelligence to support the warfighter, our national leaders, and the department. The over 16,500 men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency serving in over 140 countries around the globe are focused every day on delivering that intelligence that it strengthens the defense of our homeland, enhances warfighter lethality, and counters foreign intelligence threats as well as strengthens intelligence sharing with our partners and allies. Over the past year, DIA has provided critical intelligence enabling hundreds of operations, demonstrating the value of our partnerships, and delivered thousands of intelligence products directly to the combatant commanders. Let me begin with the threats to the U.S. homeland. Along our borders, transnational criminal organizations, drug traffickers, and terrorist groups are attempting to circumvent U.S. law enforcement and harm U.S. citizens. DIA continues to leverage its analytic, collection, scientific, and technical capabilities to support both the department and law enforcement efforts. Beyond our borders, our adversaries, particularly China and Russia, are developing long-range and novel power projection capabilities to target the homeland. They continue to seek new avenues to threaten our cyber networks and our critical infrastructure. DIA supports homeland missile defense across core intelligence functions focused against the threat spectrum from pre-launch to post-conflict. These threats to the homeland are compounded by unprecedented adversarial cooperation across multiple domains. Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran are enhancing ties to undermine the influence of the U.S. and our allies. Chief among these adversaries is the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Communist Party is rapidly developing military capabilities across all warfare domains designed to seize Taiwan by force while deterring U.S. intervention. China's military modernization continues at an alarming pace. China now operates more than 1,200 satellites on orbit, enhancing its ability to ubiquitously survey the globe. Its nuclear warhead stockpile surpassed 600 operational warheads with projections exceeding 1,000 by 2030. Beijing also continues dangerous and aggressive actions in the South China Sea, particularly against the Philippines, using water cannons, ramming, and other coercive tactics. Russia remains both a strategic threat to the U.S. and an immediate and aggressive threat to its neighbors. Despite sustaining over one million casualties since the start of its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow maintains the economic, industrial, and demographic means to sustain the war at least through this year. Russia is also dramatically expanding its use of unmanned systems and integrating lessons learned from Ukraine. Importantly, Russia's nuclear arsenal remains the world's largest and most diverse. Turning to the Middle East, DIA continues to support an active conflict environment. Iran and its proxies remain engaged in operations against U.S., Israeli, and partner interests. Despite significant degradation of Iranian military capabilities through coalition strikes during Operation Epic Fury, Tehran retains thousands of missiles and one-way attack UAVs capable of threatening U.S. and partner forces throughout the region. Iraqi Shia militias have conducted hundreds of attacks against U.S. forces since the operation began, demonstrating their commitment to Tehran despite suffering operational limitations. North Korea has strengthened its relationship with Russia, deploying more than 150 ballistic missiles and has sent more than 12,000 troops to support Russian operations. Pyongyang is using this cooperation to gain combat experience to advance military technology and economic benefits. North Korea also continues developing its nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities, including a new solid propellant ICBM designed to challenge the homeland. Underpinning all of these threats is an accelerating technological competition that represents a fundamental shift in the character of warfare. China and Russia are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum sciences, and advanced microelectronics, all of which are foundational to future military innovation. China is already integrating AI into uncrewed systems, decision support, ISR, and cyber ops. The proliferation of unmanned systems globally combined with AI advancement creates ever-expanding threats to the U.S. critical infrastructure. Chairman, Ranking Member, meeting these challenges demand an intelligence enterprise that is agile, innovative, and integrated. It also requires sustained congressional support. I'm honored to lead the Defense Intelligence Agency, representing its talented and dedicated global workforce. While these threats are serious and complex, I'm confident that the men and women of DIA, working alongside our intelligence community partners and with your continued support, have the expertise, dedication, and innovative spirit to meet this moment. I look forward to your questions and to working together to defend our nation. Thank you.

Thank you, sir. Lieutenant General Bredenkamp, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored to testify before you today representing the men and the women of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and alongside my Defense Intelligence Enterprise colleagues. Thank you for your steadfast support of NGA and the critical mission we perform for the nation. In alignment with the National Defense Strategy, NGA provides critical geospatial intelligence to national leadership. And as a combat support agency, we deliver accurate, timely, and decisive GEOINT that enables the warfighter's decision advantage. NGA's professionals provide the foundational geospatial intelligence that supports operations across all domains and informs national security decisions. Supporting homeland defense is paramount to NGA's mission. We provide intelligence support to border security operations, countering narcoterroist networks, and maintaining maritime domain awareness throughout the hemisphere, all essential capabilities for defending the homeland. NGA also supports deterrent operations in the Indo-Pacific. We enable denial operations along the first island chain, support posture decisions, and provide the geospatial foundational intelligence necessary for operational planning. China challenges us across all elements of national power while coercively seeking to expand its influence, and GEOINT is essential to countering that challenge. Even as we maintain focus on priority areas, NGA retains the capability to respond to emergent crises globally. We continue to provide indications and warning from Russia's activities in Europe to emerging threats in Africa and throughout the Middle East. NGA has consistently delivered mission-critical GEOINT to the joint force and our partners across the globe. Our fiscal year 27 budget request reflects our commitment to the National Defense Strategy priorities through investments in ground infrastructure to support new sensors, artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities to process exponentially increasing volumes of geospatial data, and technology to accelerate GEOINT collection, processing, and production. To keep pace with the ever-changing global environment, NGA must transform our capabilities and operations. We are pursuing cutting-edge technology to achieve integration at operational speed and scale. Artificial intelligence is constantly evolving, and we are committed to leveraging AI with advanced data analytics, computer vision, and automation to maintain our competitive edge to rapidly deliver actionable intelligence. Our workforce must also transform, and as a data-centric agency, we're building the skill sets and the capabilities necessary for modern GEOINT operations. We're developing a highly skilled workforce with a culture that truly embraces emerging technologies and innovation. Partnership remains essential to our mission success. We leverage capabilities across the intelligence community, our allies and our partners, and increasingly with commercial industry and the private sector. Commercial GEOINT capabilities are a force multiplier for NGA, expanding our capacity to meet mission demands. NGA stands ready to deliver timely, actionable GEOINT in support of the warfighter and for the security of our nation. We remain mission-focused and committed to transforming our capabilities to meet the demands of the future environment. I would like to thank the subcommittee for your leadership and your unwavering support to NGA, and I look forward to answering any of your questions in this session and in our closed session. Thank you very much.

Thank you, ma'am. So we'll go to questions now, start by recognizing myself for five minutes. And what I'd like to do, I think Lieutenant General Bredenkamp, you just addressed part of my question in your opening statement, so I'll go to General Rudd and Lieutenant General Adams with this particular question. But my question revolves around the amount of information that our intelligence analysts sift through continues to grow exponentially. How is the Defense Intelligence Enterprise incorporating advancements in artificial intelligence in order to assist our intelligence personnel? I know Lieutenant General Adams, you talked about what the Chinese are doing. How are we using AI to assist our intelligence personnel in making sure they are delivering timely and accurate analysis while still providing the same level of analytic rigor and integrity? We'll start with you, General Rudd.

Chairman, I appreciate the focus and emphasis. This is, as we all know, critical technology that we have to, as America and as our defense intelligence community, we have to master it, we have to understand it, we have to be able to look offensively, defensively, what are the applications with it. And I can tell you that that's what the men and women of NSA are doing. We've got a robust effort around this across a number of of our efforts in the enterprise. And and we, I again, day in and day out, have have put a very robust effort around that. The one of, you know, one of the keys to this is really making sure that we can understand it first, figure out where the application of as as General Adams mentioned, the adversaries are going to leverage it, and we have to we have to be faster, we have to be able to scale it across the entirety of our our department warfighting efforts, and it's got to enable how we see, sense, and understand where the threats are and then how we enable direct support to the warfighters. Thank you.

Thank you. And Lieutenant General Adams, I'd ask you kind of similar, but also to ask you also an additional question of are we, I'm sure that probably within the department, the intelligence communities are working together in sharing information. Is that happening throughout the entire the entire IC? Are are efforts and advances in artificial intelligence being routinely shared so that we're not duplicating efforts and in one, you know, one component's not learning something that would benefit everybody else that they haven't that they haven't shared with them?

Hey, Chairman Jackson, thanks for the the question, and I I echo General Rudd's comments. I would say at Defense Intelligence Agency, as our mission is to incorporate and consolidate a whole picture of intelligence, not just one single INT, but the the foundational military intelligence collective, we take SIGINT, we take GEOINT, we take HUMINT and merge it all together. That is a massive amount of information, and and we have very, very good, talented analysts, but they need tools for them to process all that information and produce the output that's demanded of our warfighter by our warfighter, by our policymakers, and by those who acquire systems. And so at the Defense Intelligence Agency, we recognized this a number of years ago and actually organized last year an effort, it was a a pilot, it was called Task Force Saber, and we isolated a group of folks, talented folks from across all directorates inside of DIA, who had expertise in analysis, expertise in collection, expertise in science and technology, expertise in integrating with the combatant commands, and put them together and gave them the resources they need and access to through commercial available capabilities and some capabilities that had been piloted and pioneered at the NSA, some that had been piloted and pioneered at the CIA, and looked to them to define the path for the Defense Intelligence Agency. There was a great deal at NGA that they did with with their their systems there in AI. And so we merged all that together and to answer your question that that was at the tail end of your question, there's constant sharing and constant integration. And I think the department has done a very good job in consolidating in the CDAO the ability to access services to prevent vendors who have very good capabilities out there that would tend to go and sell General Rudd the same thing that they sell me, that they sell General Bredenkamp in different transactions for the same thing three times. It's been consolidated through the department, so I applaud the department in that effort. But we have since graduated the Task Force Saber and we've now moved it into the Defense Modernization Accelerator, and we will be talking to you in the budget hearings coming up and as we proceed through this next budget cycle, we're looking to to bump that up in a hub and spoke model where we'll have a centralized repository inside of DIA for all the tools and capabilities and then the spokes go out to the different applications. And so the analysis folks in DI will come and say we need a better way to process our finished intelligence, what tools are available. And so I'm excited about it. It does require not just access to technology but upgrading, upscaling, and in improving the knowledge of the workforce, and we have initiatives to do that as well. But it's an exciting time to be in the intelligence agency as we take advantage of these capabilities, sir.

Thank you and I know you're probably working on this as well but some of the other entities I've visited I think one of the biggest areas for AI is obviously you mentioned the sources of intelligence that you're gathering from everybody but is open source just a massive amount of stuff out in the open source now that I think would go unnoticed without the assistance of AI.

Absolutely and and we've seen it work go into overtime during this conflict in terms of the availability of relative important open source intelligence and we have through our S&T directorate a specific entity that's that's designed to to accelerate that. Postman is the kind of development developmental tool that they built. It's taking what was kind of a ad hoc type of approach to open source intelligence and defining the tradecraft defining the collection strategies the requirements and then organizing it and serializing the outputs of that open source intelligence and it gets woven in with all the other intelligence on a daily basis.

Thank you sir I appreciate that and agree I think the policy has to keep up with the with the capabilities or else we won't be able to compete. And Mr. Hansell on the on the same topic here could you describe how your office you and your office work with the Department of War's Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office to develop AI policies so that the needs of the enterprise are incorporated into these department-wide policies and does recent department-wide guidance on AI allow for our intelligence components to meet the potentially unique intelligence needs that they have.

Thank you for the question Congressman. Just to the the last point and to Congressman Crow's point about collaboration and why one of my priorities is to making sure we have an enterprise lens on the on the AI front specifically. Definitely your point about how we address in the department but the amount of money we're spending and the criticality of of the effect is such that we have to coordinate seamlessly across the USG and in my my dual hat role as the Director of Defense Intelligence I I do feel like we are we are doing that effectively across the IC. To your point within the Department of War this is certainly a focus you'll see a major effort in our budget that would be reflected in the department's budget. And I would say absolutely yes the policy is there today but the the cycle rate of which we will have to readdress policy issues will be unprecedented. So right now I think the biggest challenge is making sure that we can truly share our data in a secure way that can allow us to exploit the best insights. If we do not if we are unable to provide multi-INT AI-enriched insights we will not be able to operate at the speed and scale necessary for the future fight. And so to answer your question directly yes today but I think it's a it's a continued focus that that will have to remain throughout the adoption of the technology.

Thank you I appreciate that and I agree I think the policy has to keep up with the with the capabilities or else we won't be able to compete. And with that I recognize Mr. Crow for as much time as you might need.

Thank you Chairman. Director Adams I'm going to go back to you. I know the DIA does a lot to support ongoing operations. One of that is you one of the the functions you all perform is involving in in the targeting process specifically. So can you just describe very briefly the role that DIA plays in the targeting cycle in more specifically these ongoing support that you provide to combatant commands during contingency operations in targeting.

Yes sir and with regards to targeting it is a very specific and defined process. It's it's outlined by two specific Chairman of the Joint Chiefs instructions. One is targeting the other is the development of no-strike and collateral damage methodologies. The overall and I'll just kind of hit it at an enterprise-wide view and then but I can deep dive on any of the specific portions of it.

Just the top level.

Yes so we maintain the foundational military database of all infrastructure and order of battle that is the the reference that everyone leverages. And everyone ties into it and uses it and pulls from it. In that database the instructions allow us to create a model each record has a certain BE number and it has all the the defined properties and things that you would need to know about that that item. And it's updated regularly depending on the priority of the theater or the type of target it is.

And do the combatant commands do they give you guidelines to develop those those packages? Like how do you what's the request what's the the the pull so to speak you're responding to?

So the overall pull comes from plans that are out there in terms of what types of targets might be needed to achieve the operational goals of the commander and then from that the database is built and then it's maintained regularly.

So the the database is responding to or or lays over like OPLANs for example.

Correct. And so with that database when a plan is beginning to be executed that database is used by the combatant command to to pull what what is in that database to to leverage. And then there's a process a deliberate process by which the Defense Intelligence Agency does not do targeting we do support to targeting. And so the targeting occurs at the combatant command they go through their process of lining up through a variety of defined steps of how they're going to leverage the data from the database. They can once that data is used and those lists are developed they can request from us vetting not required but but what the vetting would provide and it's not just to us vetting can be provided by the CIA DIA NGA NSA and it reviews and responds to the lists that they've developed on their targets. And in that we assess intel gain and loss based on what their operational plan is as well as potential collateral damage from that.

And is there any type of regular update interval or is that only in response to a request from a combatant command to update or to to vet?

The database is updated regularly. And I will say you asked you gentlemen both asked about resourcing that's one of the things that we are most challenged at because it in our old system MIDB it was a very manual process. And so we would have to prioritize using communications with the combatant commands a subset of that. And some would be updated at each target has a category on it and it has a refresh interval of six months one year two years five years no no refresh if there's no anticipated change. And that's where we get behind at times and and that's where we can actually potentially leverage not only the new foundational database MARS which is a modernized database but also automation and AI in conjunction with that process to try to take advantage of of that technology. And then once the vetting if it's chosen as chosen to be done it goes back to the combatant command and then they do the final validation. And then it's the combatant commander who puts the targets from that process on the plan and executes the plan.

So there are public reports about this strike on the girls school in Iran that would have indicated that it was a US strike and it occurred because of outdated targeting right that that it was on an old targeting set that hadn't been updated the US military thought it was one thing it was something else. So I'm not going to ask you specifically about that strike because I know that's under 15-6 investigation and that that process will continue but just generally how would something like that happen? Would that just be a gap between the interval that you just described that would dictate the vetting and the timeline for updating a targeting?

I would say I am fully supporting Central Command's investigation because I want to answer to that question as well because we have built out our targeting plan and process and our orders that manage the process through decades of of work, right? And we I want to ensure if there is a flaw in our system, the I am guarantee the 15-6 will determine that and we will we will fix that flaw. But to as of right now, I cannot guess what the the problem was or or make any guess as to or presume what the investigation might reveal.

Okay. And then the last question is about legal legal elements, like law of war, law of armed conflict. At what point do do targeting sets and packages get vetted for legality with the law of war?

So the the I talked about those steps, the last step I mentioned was validation. That's where operational and legal review takes place. And and whether it complies with the law of war. So that's the final step before it gets approved by the combatant command.

And do you currently have any concerns about the resourcing or capacity for is that done by JAG officers?

It's done by the the combatant commander defines who his cell is that does his target validation. It likely will include and and I don't know I can get you a detailed answer as to like what the composition of that team would be.

So the combatant commanders are doing that legal review element, that final step.

The validation.

Okay. And and sitting here today and I know you're not at the combatant command level, but sitting here today, are you aware of any concerns that have been raised in the last six months by any of those cells, any of those JAG officers involved about the legality of any targeting sets?

I am not, sir. No.

Okay. All right. Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you. Mr. Hamadeh, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. The 2026 annual threat assessment highlights intensifying competition with China and ongoing conflict with Iran. We are positioned to meet these challenges, but it requires fully resourcing our intelligence agencies and aligning every dollar with the national defense strategy. We must make disciplined choices without compromising the presence, responsiveness, and regional coverage our commanders depend on. Many point to AI as a way to to do more with fewer people, and it is a powerful force multiplier, but we know it has its limitations. As we integrate new technologies, we should not trade away the skilled professionals and the human eyes and ears whose judgment and expertise allows us to anticipate and prevent the next global crisis before it unfolds. General Bredenkamp, adversaries like China and Russia now have near instant access to the same commercial high-resolution imagery the U.S. uses. How is the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency evolving its tradecraft to ensure that even with identical raw data, the U.S. maintains a superior decision advantage over its pacing threats?

Congressman, thank you for the question. And absolutely, that is something that we're absolutely looking into and executing changes and transformational initiatives, right, on how we set ourselves apart from how I would say private sector industry are executing their imagery collection operations. The tradecraft that I think specifically for NGA that we're having to leverage is we do have to leverage much more on the technology side than we've had to historically. I know we've had a lot of discussion about AI, ML, computer vision, new technologies, but those critical technologies and elements are essential for the way we execute our mission in NGA, not only today, but I would say even more so in the future. And we have to take those technologies and inculcate those into our tradecraft and our methodologies in terms of how we not only do that for tasking the sensors, but also how we integrate that into our processing, also in our analytics, in and in our dissemination at various classified levels or classified or unclassified levels for not only our warfighters, but for our policymakers and for our partners and allies that are out there. So that's one area that I would say is how we're leveraging those technologies and inculcating that into our tradecraft and how we do more of the high-end national tactical means and geospatial intelligence, whether it's collect, analysis, or production for our agency.

And that'll maintain our competitive advantage?

And some other areas, Congressman, that I would ask if we could talk those in closed session. Thank you.

All right. And General, you've also emphasized that NGA doesn't just look at physical terrain, it also looks at human geography, things like where people get their water, how they vote, religious or ethnic identities. Can you explain why that's important?

Absolutely. Those elements actually provide much of the context that enable not only our warfighters but our nationally national policymakers to understand just the the global perspective and the human dimension that affects whether it's the economy that can impact a nation, whether it's the economic resources that will also impact a nation or a warfighting element for an adversary. And so we do take those particular areas into account and we layer those in with a number of our other geospatial intelligence components to then paint that fuller picture for the warfighters as well as the policymakers to clearly understand the geopolitical environment and I would say the global world that we have to operate in holistically.

Thank you. And Secretary, the intelligence community's 2026 annual threat assessment makes clear that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea all want to undermine America's America as a superpower, but says that their partnership remains shallow, transactional, undermined by competing strategic goals. Now how is our defense intelligence enterprise exploiting our enemies' divergent interests to prevent them from forming a unified military alliance to make it more difficult to stop?

Congressman, in this in this session I would just say that we are constantly ensuring that the intelligence collected informs our diplomatic process with globally and informs all of our strategies and and in a follow-on session I'd be happy to provide details.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. Ryan, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being here, the work you're doing, and the work you've done over each of your careers in in service to our country. I want to start with you, Under Secretary. Something I've been working on that I know is a priority for you as well is SCIF accreditation, speeding up getting great the best of American commercial technology to serve all of all the mission needs that we've talked about and everybody's sort of alluded to this. We've been trying to work on this in the NDAA last last year we had a provision to address this, ultimately directing the department to report on the feasibility of accelerating construction of SCIFs and accreditation. And then in 2025 worked on a requirement for a pilot program for access to shared classified commercial infrastructure. I know this is something that rightly the administration is prioritizing as well. How's that going? What else can we do to speed this up? It's one of the biggest pain points that I'm sure you all hear from, that we hear from, and just a quick high-level update on that, please.

Absolutely, Congressman. I would just say it often goes unnoticed, but it's an absolute critical element of supercharging our DIP. Not only will we have to increase the volume of providers, but the the composition of the defense industrial base will have to include more non-traditional players. And so our speed to service we we have to be a good partner in bringing non-traditional players rapidly into the ecosystem. I think I think it comes down to two parts, Congressman. First, we can certainly do more with the existing process. It's a passion of mine to make sure we achieve efficiencies here. I think the synergies between the SAPF and SCIF accreditation process and the synergies are across all the accreditors to make sure we're we're maximizing what we can get out of our current investment. That won't be enough. We have to think innovatively about what options exist between nothing and a full legacy accredited accredited SCIF or FCL. There's a pilot program going on and I think SCIF as a service or some of the commercial options or smaller options are certainly something we will have to integrate in our overall strategy.

Agree. And again, appreciate the leadership on this and anything that we can be doing as a subcommittee and a committee. I know colleagues as well on a bipartisan basis agree on this, so please let us know, especially coming into into this cycle. Shifting gears a little bit, I wanted to ask it is a delicate subject, but I think it is important. I was a very junior military intelligence officer, lowly Army captain, but it was always foundational to us that our our analyses were fully objective and no biases, particularly any political influence in assessments, whether for tactical operations or certainly strategic. Under Secretary, can you talk about why General Cruz was fired on August 22nd of 2025?

I I I am aware of why General Cruz...

You were in the job at that point, right? I think you had just started a month prior.

Yes, Congressman. I I am aware of the circumstances surrounding that, but I don't think it'd be appropriate in an open hearing to discuss the details.

Well, the only reason I'm asking in the hearing and I'm happy to follow up in a I guess classified even though it shouldn't be classified, but there's been no explanation provided. And I think given what then followed after the the best public explanation we have heard was that there was concern about an assessment from the agency related to the level of destruction or as the President said obliteration of Iranian nuclear sites in June. Obviously a very delicate complex assessment, but the timing there I think for a lot of us sowed concern about sending messages about assessments. And then of course what's going on now bleeding into that. So maybe I'll just ask each of our uniform leaders to just reaffirm on the record, please, your your commitment to ensuring that your analyses are objective, apolitical, and that you're giving your best military advice when it comes to these matters, particularly as we're engaged in combat. General Rudd.

Congressman, that's exactly what we're doing.

Absolutely, and it's written in our tradecraft and it's and it's followed by our people. Absolutely.

Absolutely, Congressman.

Thank you. And again, I'm asking I've heard a multitude of concern from folks in the force about this and would encourage that, you know, I'm sure you're handling this at some level internally in your formations, but it's just foundational to our safety and to the trust. And I would welcome further clarification. We in Congress have been given none, including in classified briefings, and I think that should be a concern that's not partisan but that is objective. So thanks and happy to follow up and I'll yield back.

Thank you. Mr. Van Orden, you're recognized for five minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions for an open session. I yield.

Thank you. Mr. Tran, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member, for today's hearing. Thank you for all the witnesses for being here. And General Rudd, it was great speaking to you last Thursday. I would like to again begin my testimony by acknowledging the service members who have been killed in Iran and the hundreds more who have been injured as a result of this war. My thoughts remain with their families and the military families missing their loved ones. When our men and women in uniform are sent into a conflict, it is the responsibility of our military leaders to protect them. And that cannot happen without the intelligence community. The fundamental purpose of our defense intelligence enterprise is to keep our people safe, either to give our service members the best possible picture about what they're up against or to neutralize threats that everyday Americans never had to know about. Most of this work is behind the scenes, but is essential part of what our national security and national defense does. That is why it is so important that our national security officials have the best possible information and why I introduced along with my colleagues Rep Harrigan, Strickland, and Bacon the Combating Chinese Communist Party Influence Act. This bill would require the intelligence community community to produce a comprehensive report about the CCP's growing presence across the world and provide our intelligence community with a clear evidence-based picture about the CCP's threat to American security, our alliances, and our economic interests. My first question to Lieutenant General Adams, how would a comprehensive interagency report on the growing threat of the CCP improve coordination among the defense intelligence enterprise and support special operations moving forward?

Congressman, thanks for the question. And I hope that the requirement for the report allows it to be written in a classified format because there are many reports that are generated along this theme, if you will, that are put together in an unclassified format and you really need to talk at a classified level to get to the true nature. I think to respond specifically to your question, right now the integration is very tight. It would only tighten it and it would allow us to refine our planning, refine our approach to countering China and align efforts to magnify them and also to eliminate redundancies.

Great. And to address what you just brought up, there will be a classified annex to it. General Rudd, how might the National Security Agency benefit from a comprehensive report about the growing CCP threat?

Congressman, certainly anything that took takes a holistic look at the the pacing challenge that we thread is going to be beneficial to to all the members of this this team and the colleagues and certainly we welcome it.

Thank you. I appreciate many of my colleagues in bringing up AI today. I want to build on those questions. While I think we can all agree that AI can be a powerful tool, I hope that we can also agree that guardrails are essential to protect sensitive intelligence information and the service members responsible for executing missions aided by AI. General Rudd, how does Cyber Command protect against AI attacks by our adversaries? Following up on that, how can the defense intelligence enterprise improve cybersecurity specifically as it relates to AI?

Congressman, I appreciate the question. Clearly it's something that you would expect us to be focused heavily on and ensuring that we're ahead of our adversary on their use of critical technologies such as AI and the specifics and details probably more appropriate in a classified setting. But I can reassure you that the principles that I outlined in my opening statement, speed, scale, innovation, and integration, they apply absolutely to this mission space as well as everything that we're doing. So what I can tell you in this setting, we're moving very fast, as fast as we can to address it. We're going to look at the scale of it, both on offense, defense, from a red team, from a blue team, and figure out the most creative innovative ways to tackle the problem. And of course, it's got to be integrated with the entire joint force in support of the warfighter.

Thank you, General. And Secretary Hansell, if an AI-generated intelligence assessment turns out to be wrong and leads to a bad decision that endangers a service member or a mission, is there a policy at the department that tells us who is accountable for that mistake?

Congressman, there's certainly accountability at every echelon for all of our policy decisions. And I would just say that as the capability enhances and we integrate it deeper and deeper into our systems, we are refining the policies because we certainly recognize a new set of issues will emerge that don't exist today, namely in my other hat as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Security, a slew of security issues will emerge as we rapidly implement the technology. And so similar to my prior answer, I would say yes today and we need to continually update it as the structure changes with the technology.

Thank you, Secretary. My time is up and I yield back, Chairman.

Thank you. Mr. Luttrell, you're recognized for five minutes.

Apologies for my tardiness, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to hold off till the classified hearing.

You got it. Perfect. Okay, I actually have one more quick question I want to ask real quick and I would ask this of our active duty General and Lieutenant Generals. I was curious, you know, in the one of the key priorities in the National Defense Strategy is increased burden sharing with our allies and our partners. And I was just curious, is that taking place at the appropriate level? Are we sharing information with our partners and our allies? And equally important, I guess my question is, are our allies and partners sharing intel with us at an appropriate level? General Rudd or whoever wants to start.

Chairman, appreciate that question. I would caveat it with consider the fact that I'm not quite 30 days in the role yet, so the entirety of our relationship to partnership still to be explored. But what I've seen to date and especially as you look at the current efforts to support CENTCOM in this conflict that we're in, really unbelievable teamwork across a host of partners to enable us to do that. So I think the short answer is yes. I think the first piece of that though really is inextricably linked to the relationships. NSA and Cybercom both have a long history of deep relationships with a number of allies and partners across the globe and certainly we'll look to build on that as we execute the priority within the strategy to enable them to do more.

Thank you, sir. Ma'am.

Mr. Chairman, on the 11th of February, I checked into DIA as the Director at 8:00 a.m. At 11:00 a.m., I was on a Talon call with the IDI Director of Israel. And throughout the nearly little over two months time I've been on the job, I have had constant, valuable, important sharing conversations with not just Israel, but our Five Eyes partners and beyond. And it's only been a couple months and we already have plans to visit with additional directors of intelligence around the world. Each of our partners, you talked about burden sharing, each of our partners has a variety of authorities and capabilities that some exceed ours and some are less than ours. And it's the combination and the interwoven mix of all those authorities and capabilities that make us more powerful. I would say this crisis has increased the amount of conversations I've had in the sharing of information both from allies to me and from us to them to ensure that we're successful on the battlefield. I have a two-star General who works for me in my front office who's the Deputy Director for Coalition Integration from Canada. And so I think that it's never been more powerful, particularly with the Five Eyes but beyond that. So yes, sir.

Thank you, sir. Ma'am.

Yes, Chairman. Burden sharing is absolutely happening and I will say depending on the ally and the partner, the scope and the scale is different. But what I have seen especially with the effort coming out of the National Defense Strategy and the guidance and the direction that's been provided to us, it's given us the ability to really engage. And we've seen tremendous results from that. I do have some vignettes and some statistics I can share in a closed forum. But I think the reciprocal approach that we have with sharing with our allies and partners and them also providing with their capabilities, not just on the intelligence side, but even from a commercial side, has been absolutely impactful, especially with some of our most recent operations.

Thank you, ma'am. Mr. Crow, you're good? Okay. Does any other any of the other members have any follow-up questions they'd like to ask? Okay, with that we're going to adjourn and meet for the classified session. This meeting is adjourned.