Corrosion, Collapse, and Clean-Up: Examining the Potomac Interceptor Collapse.

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will now come to order. The chair now recognizes himself for five minutes for an opening statement. Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing titled " Corrosion, Collapse, and Cleanup: Examining the Potomac Interceptor Collapse." Today's hearing will examine the collapse of DC water's Potomac interceptor a fifty-four mile sanitary sewer system that runs through parts of Virginia, Maryland, and DC. The collapse, which occurred on this January nineteenth, resulted in hundreds of gallons of untreated sewage overflowing onto nearby land and down the Potomac River. This incident raised serious concerns about the resilience of critical wastewater infrastructure, and the impact that collapse or break like this can have on our communities, including on safe drinking water, public health, the environment, local businesses. The Potomac Interceptor is a vital component of the region's critical wastewater infrastructure. When it failed, it caused over two hundred forty million gallons of wastewater to overflow into the Potomac River, threatening water quality, ecosystems, and the health of surrounding communities that rely on this river for recreation, fish and shellfish harvesting and safe water drinking water once it has been treated. Fortunately, because of where the collapse happened, the incident did not affect safe drinking water. But, if the break had happened just a few miles upstream, it would have been a completely different story. Still, the collapse had far-reaching impacts on the region. From a public health perspective, exposure to untreated wastewater can carry harmful pathogens and pollutants posing serious health risks, to anyone who might be near the affected areas. Environmentally, wastewater discharge can degrade aquatic habitats, harm wildlife, and have impacts on native species. Economically, the effects ripple outward, impacting local businesses, tourism, fisheries, some of which claim they have lost thousands of dollars of revenue due to public perception of the cleanliness of the river following this incident. This incident raises questions about the management and oversight of this critical infrastructure. What led to the collapse? Was this failure preventable? Were there warning signs that were being ignored or even missed? Did permitting requirements create unnecessary delays in moving forward, with needed repairs? Given the age and the condition of the Potomac interceptor, what is known about other vulnerabilities in the pipe and what is being done to prevent another break or collapse from eventually or possibly happening? Equally important is understanding the roles and the responsibilities of other entities as it relates to the Potomac Interceptor. DC Water owns and operates the Potomac Interceptor, but multiple agencies and jurisdictions have roles and responsibilities with respect to permitting and regulatory oversight or have helped respond to the collapse, including federal partners such as the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Park Service. as well as state and regional authorities. Today's hearing is about identifying failures or gaps, strengthening oversight, and ensuring that our infrastructure systems are equipped to protect the public and the environment in face of growing demands and aging assets. We owe it to the American people to fully understand the causes and the consequences of this failure, and to take meaningful steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. While this hearing will focus on the Potomac Interceptor, aging wastewater infrastructure is a nationwide problem. A thorough investigation into this led up to this incident and the response following it is critical to establish how best to prepare similar infrastructure and to prevent another large-scale spill. The facts established by this hearing can help us protect the health and the safety of communities that all of us represent. I wanna thank our witnesses for being here today. We look forward to hearing from you to learn more about the incidents and the lessons learned. With that, I now recognize our ranking member of the subcommittee, Miss Clark, for her opening statement.

Thank you, Mister Chairman. On January nineteenth, part of the Potomac ins- in interceptor collapsed, releasing more than two hundred million gallons of raw sor- sewage into the Potomac River resulting in one of the worst sewage overflows in US history. Thankfully, DC water and federal partners quickly contained the overflow and made emergency repairs to stop the spill. So far, the emergency response appears to have been successful, but there are important lessons that need to be Such learned to prevent crises like these in our communities. Unfortunately, there appears to have been an avoidable emergency. It has long been known that segments of the more than sixty year old Potomac Interceptor was corroding and needed repairs. Like many other water utilities with aging infrastructure, DC water was aware that the Potomac Interceptor needed repairs and had a plan to make those repairs. But it did not get done in time. The Potomac Interceptor collapse is not unique. It represents a common problem in America, crumbling infrastructure. EPA records tens of thousands of sewer overflows each year that release raw sewage into our communities and waterways. EPA does not even count how often sewer backups spill raw sewage into Americans' homes and businesses. Any pollution released into the Potomac River risks significant local, regional, and even national consequences. The coordinator response appears to have been addressed have addressed the mess that was caused by the collapse. However, they have ignored the the President Trump's decision to demolish the east wing of the White House to make way for a golden ballroom and look away as Trump dumped the rubble, which contained lead and other toxic metals, in a national park surrounded by the Potomac River. Republicans have even defended the president's budget request, which proposes enormous cups cuts to the very EPA water programs that have prevented incidents like the Potomac Interceptor collapse. President Trump's pro-pollution agenda is creating harmful messes all over the place. We do not have the luxury of ignoring pollution in our communities or our national parks, whether it is dumped there by the president, the result of sewage spill of a sewage spill or due to administration giveaways to polluters. We will not prevent another Potomac interceptor collapse or any other sewage spills by cutting the EPA programs that help prevent them. And we're not doing enough by having a hearing on this one collapse. We should have we should be having oversight hearings on all the ways that the Trump administration is allowing polluters to make

Thank you. The L- General Leader yields, the Chair recognizes, the Chairman of the full committee, Mister Guthrie, for five minutes for an opening statement.

Thank you. Uh, good morning, good morning to everyone and thank you Chairman Joyce for convening this important hearing, thank you, Ranking Member Clark, we appreciate it. Also wanna thank our witnesses for being before us today as we examine the Potomac Interceptor collapse and its consequences for public health, environmental safety and infrastructure reliability. The collapse of this critical ra- wastewater system was not a minor incident. Uh, it resulted in the release of more than two hundred and forty million gallons, the equivalent equivalent of rough roughly three hundred and sixty Olympic-sized swimming pools of untreated sewage into surrounding land and into the Potomac River which is a vital resource for the national capital region. This event raised serious public health concerns, disrupted ecosystems, and highlighted vulnerabilities in aging infrastructure that serve millions of Americans. While emergency actions eventually contained the overflow of wastewater and repaired the pipe and remediation efforts are still underway, significant questions remain about what was known, about the condition of the pipe leading to the collapse, what was being done to address known vulnerabilities to the pipe, and whether there are other similar or more urgent vulnerabilities in other sections of the fifty more fifty mile pipe. A key question today is whether there are lessons learned that can be applied moving forward to prevent something like this from happening happening again. Incidents like this that rob public trust, just as fraud undermines confidence in federal health programs, failures in critical infrastructure undermine confidence in the systems Americans rely on every day. When infrastructure fails at this scale, consequences extend far beyond the immediate area. They can impact public safety, environmental resilience, and economic activity. Today's hearing is about oversight, accountability, and ensuring good stewardship of essential systems that the public relies on. Doing so ensures that infrastructure systems are properly maintained, and risks are addressed proactively. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and working uh towards solutions that strengthen oversight and protect our communities. With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Thank you. The gentleman yields, the chair recognizes the ranking member of the full committee,

Thank you, Mister Chairman, the January collapse of a segment of the Potomac Interceptor led to hundreds of millions of gallons of wastewater flowing into the Potomac River. And while the collapse did not threaten the capital's drinking water supply, this is yet another reminder of our nation's aging infrastructure and the risks of failing to address it. This hearing is an opportunity for us to examine what happened here and how we can work to prevent and address infrastructure failures across the country. The Potomac Interceptor collapse received lots of attention due to its size and proximity to the nation's capital. But many of our nation's towns and cities continue to experience similar issues as infrastructure ages. Decades of underinvestment in our water systems have created a vicious cycle that plays out beneath our feet and out of sight. The reality is that addressing aging infrastructure requires resources and attention that it does not always receive. So the EPA most recent needs assessment found a massive shortfall. Water utilities need more than a hundred and fifty billion dollars just to repair aging pipe systems like the Potomac interceptor that transport sewage to waste treatment facilities. Uh and I ask if I could, Mister Chairman, unanimous consent to enter into the record the President's two thousand twenty-seven budget requests for EPA and EPA's most recent clean watersheds and drinking water needs survey.

No objections, so ordered.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, but despite these clear needs, just last month we watched Republicans on this committee nod along as EPA Administrator Zeldin argued for the massive cuts to water infrastructure funding, included in Trump's twenty twenty seven budget request. That budget request calls for an eighty six percent cut to the drinking water state revolving fund which helps water systems access low-cost financing. for needed upgrades like replacing lead service lines and upgrading treatment technology. Trump's budget calls for an even larger ninety percent cut to the clean water state revolving fund, which provides essential support for wastewater and stormwater projects that protect public health. Overall, the president's budget requests a sixty-seven percent cut to EPA's office of water, meaning water infrastructure would receive less funding and communities will continue to grapple with aging infrastructure and contaminants. Now America's water systems are struggling, and Trump's budget proposals would only make that worse. EPA did good work in helping to address the serious issues created by the Potomac interceptor collapse, but an effective emergency response does nothing to prevent future incidents. Unfortunately, massive cuts to EPA programs that help prevent water infrastructure from failing would almost guarantee a future with more emergencies where EPA simply lurches from one preventable water crisis to the next. Trump has made crystal clear what his priorities are. While Americans struggle to make ends meet, Republicans are planning to give a billion dollars in taxpayer dollars to Trump for the White House ballroom, that he touted would be privately funded. When Trump was asked how the c- economic toll on American weighs on him, he responded, and I quote, " I don't think Americans, I don't think about Americans' financial situation." So his reckless war of choice against Iran has now racked up about thirty billion dollars in direct cost, and countless more in damage to our economy and expense to Americans at the grocery store and the gas pump. And now the Trump administration has created a one point eight billion dollar slush fund to pay off Trump's friends and followers potentially including those who stormed the Capitol, and assaulted Capitol police officers. So the president has proven time and time again that his priorities are not in the best interest of the American people. Rather than gutting our water infrastructure programs, we should be investing in them so that incidents like the Potomac Interceptor collapse are less common than they already are. But that's not what's happening with this president and this administration. They simply don't care about infrastructure or about the public's financial situation. It's unfortunate and hopefully we can change that. And with that, I yield back the balance of my time, Mister Chairman.

The gentleman yields. That concludes members' opening statements. The chair would like to remind members that pursuant to the committee rules, all members' written opening statements were made part of the record. We wanna thank our witnesses for being here today and for taking the time to testify before the subcommittee. You will have the opportunity to give opening statement, followed by a round of question from members. Our witnesses today are Jessica Kramer, Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, US Environmental Protection Agency. Colonel Francis Parra, Commander, US Army Corps of Engineers, the Baltimore District. And Edward Wenchoff, Acting Superintendent, Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Historic National Park Service, US Department of Interior. We appreciate all of you being here today, and I look forward to hearing from you. You are aware that this committee is holding an oversight hearing, and when doing so, has the practice of taking the testimony under oath. Do you have any objection to testifying under oath? Seeing no objection, we'll proceed. The chair advises you that you are entitled to be advised by counsel, pursuant to House rules. Do you desire to be to be advised by counsel during your testimony today. Seeing none, please rise. Raise your right hand. You promise to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. So help you God. Seeing the witnesses have all answered in the affirmative, you are now sworn in and under oath, subject to the penalty set forth in title eighteen, section ten O one of the United States Code. You may be seated. With that, I now recognize Assistant Administrator Kramer for five minutes to give an opening statement.

Good morning, Chairman Joyce, Ranking Member Clark, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Jess Kramer and I'm the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water at the US Environmental Protection Agency. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about EPA's role in leading a successful coordinated federal response to the Potomac Interceptor collapse. On May sixth, the federal government completed its remediation of the Comto- Potomac Interceptor collapse area, and fully demobilized its presence on site. The goal of this federal assistance was to expeditiously remediate the collapsed site and surrounding area. I'm proud of the work EPA, along with our federal partners did, to ensure this was completed in time for the America Two-Fifty festivities and deliver on the agency's commitment to restore the Potomac to pre-collapse conditions. Throughout this process, EPA maintained open and transparent lines of communication with our partners at all levels and with the public. As you are likely aware, several weeks ago the Department of Justice, on behalf of the EPA, also filed a civil complaint in federal court against DC water and the District of Columbia, for clean water act violations. In keeping with long-standing agency practice, EPA does not comment on pending litigation. The Potomac Interceptor is a sanitary sewer line managed by DC Water that conveys up to sixty million gallons of wastewater every day from parts of Virginia and Maryland to DC Water's Blue Plains Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant. On January nineteenth, twenty twenty six, a portion of the pipe, which was seventy-two inches in diameter, collapsed, causing an estimated two hundred and forty million gallons of raw, untreated sewage to flow into the Potomac River. Following the collapse, EPA's Mid-Atlantic Regional Office, Region Three, performed inspections in coordination with state and local partners and issued a Clean Water Act section three O eight information request to DC Water. EPA took on a heightened role in coordinating and leading the federal response to the collapse in mid-February, when DC Mayor Muriel Bowser declared a public emergency and requested federal assistance to address the pipe collapse. President Trump immediately approved Mayor Bowser's request and, on February twenty first, twenty twenty six, assigned EPA as the lead federal agency to respond to the emergency. I was designated as the senior response officer overseeing the effort. Senior officials at EPA, including Administrator Zeldin and myself, have been consistently engaged and onsite as appropriate. Throughout the repair and remediation process, EPA actively coordinated with partners at all levels, to ensure appropriate and expeditious measures were utilized to protect public health and prevent additional overflows. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers installed a wastewater diversion system, which allowed crews to remediate the collapse through wet weather while ma- mitigating further contamination from stormwater runoff. Additionally, federal partners led the remediation and rehabilitation of soil impacted by the overflow with soil sampling beginning on March ninth, twenty twenty six. Thanks in part to the coordinated federal actions on site, wastewater flow was returned to the Potomac Interceptor on March fourteenth, a full week ahead of projected schedule. This allowed the focus of ongoing work to fully center on the remaining environmental remediation. EPA continued to lead the federal components of that remediation in coordination with FEMA the US Army Corps of Engineers the National Park Service, and other federal partners. Remediation and rehabilitation activities included, water and soil sampling, raking and removing contaminated material, including sewage impacted soils, covering disturbed soil with seed mix and erosion control blankets, removing branches, fallen trees, brush, and debris, and flushing the CNO canal with fresh water from the Potomac. Additionally, on March sixteenth, EPA assumed responsibility for water quality s- quality sampling, previously conducted by the DC Department of Energy and Environment. The daily sample results were processed at EPA's Environmental Science Center located at Fort Meade, Maryland. The results for each day's sampling were evaluated, quality assured, before being posted on publicly, excuse me, posted publicly on DOEE's Potomac Interceptor Monitoring web page. A top priority for EPA throughout this response was ensuring continued drinking water safety. Fortunately, the sewage overflow occurred downstream of the Washington Aqueduct's primary drinking water intake. In addition, other than the aqueduct's secondary intake, which has been closed since fall of twenty twenty five, there are no other drinking water intakes along the Potomac River downstream of the overflow site. As a result, the overflow did not significantly threaten safe drinking water. From the onset of this response, we made clear that EPA would be on the ground working at full speed until the Potomac Interceptor site and surrounding area were fully remediated. Thanks to President Trump's decisive action and leadership and a coordinated effort across federal agencies, We kept that promise and restored the Potomac River to pre-collapse conditions. Thank you again, Chairman Joyce, Ranking Member Clark, and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss this important issue, and I look forward to answering your questions today.

Thank you. With that, the chair now recognizes Colonel Pera for his five minutes for an opening statement.

Chairman Joyce, Vice Chairman Balderson, Ranking Member Clark, and members of the subcommittee. I'm honored to testify before you today on the Potomac Interceptor collapse and to represent the US Army Corps of Engineers Baltimore District, who in addition to responding to the collapse, has command responsibility for the Washington Aqueduct, which has provided safe water to the National Capital Region for more than a hundred and sixty-five years. I'd like to deliver a clear bottom-line reassurance to this committee and to the public. The drinking water supply managed by the Washington Aqueduct remains completely safe, secure, and unaffected, as our drinking water system is entirely separate from DC water's regional waste water infrastructure, including the Potomac Interceptor. The Washington Aqueduct collects source water from the Potomac River at two locations, Great Falls and Little Falls. Once collected, this water travels via conduits to our conventional treatment and purification plants before distribution to three wholesale customers, DC Water, Fairfax, Water, and Arlington County. the finished water meets or exceeds all EPA standards. The spill from the Potomac Interceptor occurred several miles downstream from our Great Falls intake and several miles upstream from our Little Falls intake. Because our Little Falls intake had been closed since the fall of twenty twenty-five due to low seasonal demand, the source water was being drawn exclusively from our Great Falls intake and unaffected by the spill. Our operations team confirmed this immediately after notification that a spill had occurred. To ensure the treatability of water at our intakes, Washington Aqueduct personnel sample and test source water at the intakes frequently. In any given year, our EPA-certified testing lab conducts more than sixty-five thousand individual tests for hundreds of bacterial organic and inorganic compounds. We are fully committed to public safety. Beyond the normal operations of the Washington Aqueduct, the Corps of Engineers remains on the front lines of response to flood and disaster events. On February twentieth, The President approved federal support to the District of Columbia's emergency declaration. That evening, the Corps of Engineers activated its emergency operations center. On February twenty-first, we were walking the ground with our technical response team, emergency contractor, and DC water. By February twenty-second, we designed a stormwater diversion system and had the first components installed by that same evening. We completed the full installation within a week. The this diversion ser- system served two goals. First, it safeguarded the pumping site, used to divert wastewater while emergency repairs and remediation could proceed. Forecasted rain threatened to inundate bypass operations, and we were there to prevent that. Second, it safeguarded the environment by inhibiting further pollution from entering the Potomac River. We did this by channeling clean storm water away from the contaminated soil before it entered the Potomac River, at a nearby confluence. Under the leadership of the EPA through the mission assignment process of FEMA, Corps of Engineers facilitated the timely remediation of land impacted by the spill by assuming responsibility for two of the four identified remediation areas. Those areas were known as areas two and three, and focused on the soil underneath Rock Run culvert and the downstream creek bank areas where the runoff enters the Potomac River. With a deference to the ecosystem and to public safety, our crews took an almost surgical approach to removing soil in three-inch layers where visual contamination was present. This material will safely be transported to an approved off-site disposal facility. My written testimony contains additional operational details and a visual reference of remediations for areas two and three. The Baltimore District stands prepared to do what the Corps of Engineers does best, provide world-class engineering solutions to our nation's toughest challenges. We look forward to working with the committee on this issue. Thank you, Mister Chairman and members of this committee, this concludes my statement and I look forward to answering questions, uh, you or the other members may have. Thank you.

Chairman yields, the chair now recognizes Mister Edward Wenchoff for five minutes for an opening statement.

Chairman Joyce, Ranking Member Clark, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the recent break in the Potomac Interceptor sanitary sewer system and the Department of the Interior's

You might wanna pull the mike a little closer.

The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Historical Park contains within its legislated boundary significant stretch of the Potomac Interceptor, managed by the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority, commonly referred to as DC water. Constructed in the nineteen sixties, the pipeline ranges up to ninety-two inches in diameter and conveys up to sixty million gallons of wastewater per day to the District of Columbia's Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Facility. The presence of DC water infrastructure on land administered by the National Park Service is not unique to the CNO Canal Park. Due to the age of the city's infrastructure, a substantial portion of the system lies beneath parkland throughout the district. The NPS has been working closely with DC Water on major initiatives, including the now-completed Anacostia River Tunnel project and the Clean Rivers project, which spans three separate national park units and includes multiple combined sewage overflow projects within Rock Creek Park. On January nineteenth, twenty twenty six, CNO Canal Park staff received notification of an active sewage overflow within park boundaries near the Interstate four ninety-five crossing in Montgomery County, Maryland. The overflow affected an eastbound lane of the Clara Barton Parkway and thro- flowed through parkland, exiting via the historic Rock Run, Masonry Covert, and into the Potomac River. To mitigate further impacts, the NPS permitted DC water to use a section of the CNO Canal to bypass the collapsed pipe and convey wastewater four tenths of a mile downstream where it then was flowed back into the Potomac Interceptor. DC water started using the canal to bypass the break on January twenty fourth, twenty twenty six. DC water completed temporary repairs, removed the bypass pumps, and returned full wastewater flow to the Potomac Interceptor on March fourteenth, twenty twenty six. Following the interim repair, the NPS DC water The US Army Corps of Engineers and the US Environmental Protection Agency initiated remediation across four defined areas, the stormwater channel, the rock wood run stream and culvert, the Potomac River shoreline, and the canal prism from lock fourteen to lock ten. Remediation is complete in the first three areas and continues in the canal prism. Crews removed contaminated soils in the prism down to the clay liner and deeper in some sections where additional contamination was visible. Work crews are removing soil with hand tools from within the locks and using soap, water, and bristle brushes to scrub and clean the hist historic masonry. Once remediation is complete, the NPS will work with DC water on long-term restoration, including replanting of trees and shrubs and understory vegetation, as well as restoring threatened plant species. For, for resources that cannot be restored, the NPS can seek response costs and damages under Title fifty-four of the United States Code. We will pursue cost recovery under the special use permit for monitoring and response efforts. The NPS will continue coordinating with DC water on long-term repair and rehabilitation of the portion proportion of the Potomac interceptor located within the legislative boundaries of the C&O canal park. Mister Chairman, this concludes my testimony and I'm happy to answer any questions you or the subcommittee have.

I thank you all for your testimony, and we will now move to questioning. I will begin and recognize myself for five minutes. A question for all three of you. First of all, please delineate the timeline of when you were first notified of what occurred on January nineteenth. Assistant Administrator Cramer, when was the EPA notified?

The EPA was notified on January nineteenth.

Colonel Pera, when was the uh Army Corps uh notified?

Chairman, the Army Corps was notified on January nineteenth.

And when was the uh Mister Wenchoff When was the National Park Service notified?

National Park Service was notified on the evening of January nineteenth.

So knowing that you were all notified on the day that the uh actions first were uh witnessed to occur what were your first initial enact actions Assistant Administrator Kramer?

Chairman, uh inspectors from our Region three office uh were on site the next day on January twentieth.

Colonel Pero, when was the Army Corps on site?

Chairman, our r- operations department for the Washington Aqueduct was on-site within an hour of notification. Um, our initial look was at the intakes, so we checked two intakes, one at the Great Falls intake and the second at Little Falls, just to validate that we had a level of contamination that was either non-existent or at a treatable level.

Mr. Wenchoff, when was the National Park Service on-site?

The United States Park Police were on-site um around the time of the break. on the nineteenth and then National Park staff from the park went down on the twentieth.

We uh understand that this crosses many jurisdictions, and that's why we wanted to set the table with discussion with each and every one of you of why your involvement and how early that involvement occurred. Assistant Administrator Kramer, recognizing these jurisdictional boundaries, what can impact which entitles uh underlying permitting and oversight and enforcement? What impact do you feel because the location of that pipe is at issue? Where does each of the entities come into play?

Thank you, Chairman. Um, it is a little bit complex. Uh, so I'm gonna start with the with the DC water facility, the Blue Plains facility. Because that is in the District of Columbia, EPA is the permitting authority under the Clean Water Act section four O two, which is the authority that we issue, we EPA issue NPDES.

And let me let me interrupt at that point because you talk about DC water,

Mm. Mm.

and they claim that the last overflow to reach the Potomac River occurred on February eighth. In March, however, it was

Chairman, that is the same. um, that area underneath the Rockwall Covert is a perennial stream that exits and enters the Covert.

Can you speak closer to the microphone? Sorry.

I'm sorry. Um, Chairman, you're correct, that um, that tributary that you're talking about runs underneath Rockwall Covert and enters it's part of a perennial stream that enters into confluence between that stream and the and the Potomac um, at the end of it. So, short answer is yes.

Am I correct that the US Army Corps of Engineers subsequently installed a sandbag dam and pumping operation to divert the water that was coming from the leak.

Chairman, there was already a dam in existence, part of our scope of work.

Did you reinforce that dam?

We we did reinforce the dam.

And what materials did you use to reinforce that?

So it was we had a poly liner, right, to prevent any of the runoff and to contain it, and then it was held in place by sandbags to prevent vertical um control of the water.

Did you feel that was successful?

We did feel that was successful.

Do you feel that it could have been other uh, components that would have made that even more successful from the overflow that you were seeing.

The overflow that we were trying to con- control with the original, um, establishment of that dam was really for the cleaning effort of the rock wall culvert. So that, that goes back to the - the detergent and brushing that Mister Wenchoff talked about underneath the culvert as part of our scope. Once we determined that there was also a leak coming from the CNO canal into that culvert, a couple of things happened. One, we controlled the water coming from the far side and piped it through the culvert so it didn't run within the culvert and then out to the perennial stream. That was the first measure to control wastewater coming out. The second one was installing a bypass pump. So once we pretty much collected the water underneath the culvert in that containment polyline system we pumped it from there back into a contaminated stream within the CNO canal.

Do you feel that those measures protected that perennial stream?

I feel like they did.

Do you feel that additional me- measures could have even protected it to a greater extent?

At that point, Chairman, I think that we took the best measures we could based on the environment that was as it existed that day and the tools that we had available. I'm not sure that there was another option available.

My time has expired. I now yield to the ranking member, Miss Clark, for her five minutes of questioning.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We cannot ignore the disasters happening in our communities, our national parks, or the White House. We do not have the luxury to think small. We must see the Potomac interceptor collapse and place it in the larger context of our country's aging infrastructure and in administration's actions that put polluters over people so that we can act on the lessons learned. Miss Kramer, as the senior response officer, and in your testimony, you this morning, you recounted the inter-agency response in the wake of the sewage spill, I imagine you can offer a cross-agency perspective in thinking about future recovery efforts, what worked here, and what advice would you give to other local governments or utilities facing a similar situation to the ones we're discussing here today?

Thank you. Um, I'm gonna start with the end of your question first. I think that uh everybody um that's spoken today uh on the dais has mentioned aging infrastructure. Uh there's no question that we have an aging infrastructure uh issue facing our drinking water and waste water uh infrastructure across this country. Asset management is more important than ever. We talk about the various funding opportunities that exist, the clean the safer uh state revolving funds, the WIFIA program, various programs that we have that funnel through EPA. Those funds can't address operations and maintenance by law, they're not they're not able to be provided for that. And so it is time for us to look critically across this sector and focus on asset management which is one of one of the biggest priorities that we have in the office of water right now. Um I'll I'll pivot to your second question um or your first question I suppose.

I'm sorry just what do you mean by asset management?

Um physical infrastructure management, assessing uh vulnerabilities that exist uh earlier uh and in real time. by by the municipalities that own and operate the infrastructure um ensuring that uh their so technical managerial and financial capability which is a requirement for operation that we as epa look at uh across drinking water and wastewater um systems ensuring that that tmf capacity is sufficient to to be projecting out what actions should be taken and how do you apply the funds that you have in a way that not only allows for operations and maintenance, which again can't be provide can't be covered by those federal funds, but also is is a real true forward-looking projection of the assets and the physical infrastructure that you have ahead of you so that you are addressing vulnerabilities before something like a collapse happens. So it's that strategic holistic look um that to be f- to be frank is challenged right now not only because of the aging infrastructure but also because of the workforce crisis that we have in the drinking water and the wastewater space you have aging um a workforce that is aging out you have a wide range of different types of facilities and different workforces that are needed and so especially um building up that workforce force around that technical managerial and financial capability to be able to do these projections and really focus on on um the management of these physical infrastructure uh pieces that is so vital right now and so um this is this is a critical moment for us to be having that discussion and for us in the office of water at epa to be really focused on that through the training and technical assistance that we provide

thank you luck played a large part in keeping d. c.'s drinking water safe if the potomac interceptor collapse had been further upriver the capital's water supply could have been contaminated we're not we cannot rely on luck that's why in twenty twenty two congress ordered the Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a feasibility study to identify a secondary water source for the Washington DC area and provided funding for that study in twenty twenty four earlier this year however the Army Corps of Engineers testified to Congress that it was narrowing that feasibility study to only a twelve hour expansion of the existing reservoir to find a quick win that addresses some of the near term issues Colonel Pera if the Potomac interceptor collapse had contaminated DC's drinking water. How would twelve more hours of contaminant contaminated drinking water been useful to add to the impacted residents?

Representative Clark, I I would agree that the additional twelve hours would be of limited utility. The the secondary water source effort that we're looking at right now within the Corps of Engineers does provide a capacity for additional drinking water. If you think about of the fact that we that this has been in existence for a hundred sixty five years getting to a point now where we acknowledge the requirement for a secondary source is important but larger regional solutions will take time to develop and they will be multi-billion dollar efforts what we are doing is two efforts in parallel we are looking at a first federal effort to be able to produce an actionable item that can have some sort of meaningful impact within the short term and that was what was briefed um to you ma'am so that is that twelve hours that we gain immediately In parallel, we are working with federal partners, state partners, non-federal entities, to look at other ways to be able to source a l- a secondary solution outside of what we're doing right now with the federal government. And that effort is being taken on by the Washington Suburban Sanitation Commission and other partners um who are in the water space. And what we are doing is we're pairing those efforts and we're approaching them simultaneously so that as we create that short wind we're also working toward the engineering, designing, and then the funding for that larger effort that's gonna take more time to get in place. So, I agree that the initial effort that the Corps of Engineers is approaching is a smaller effort but it is part of a larger solution.

Very well. I yield back, Mister Chairman.

General Lady yields, the Chair now recognizes Chair of the Committee, Mister Guthrie, for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mister Chair. And and mine's gonna be focused on Superintendent Feidler and Lynch off if if uh my questions be directed at you and and it's with the spirit of we have to figure out what happened and how we fix it going into the future. I actually represent Mammoth Cave National Park and the boyhood and birthplace of President Lincoln so uh the National Park Service is very important in my district and things like this we wanna make sure uh are done correctly and great respect for but I wanna start there was an article in the Washington Post in April that described how concerns so I'll quote concerns about the removal of trees and vegetation along with other environmental impacts, postponed repairs to the Potomac interceptor. The article also notes, however, the DC water repeatedly proposed changes to its repair plans, which forced National Park Service to restart its environmental assessments. And as I said, if you got, you know, karst, so all water goes to the lowest point, so that's uh so we always have to protect Mammoth Cave. But it gets to the point where you look at what we saw as a disastrous um failure versus, and I'm a tree person, versus uh trees and vegetation. So would you wanna talk about that article and was it fair in saying that there was seemed to be some minor some some minor environmental concerns seemed to delay repair what became a major environmental concern. Would you like to comment on that? That's the way I read it.

Thank you. Thank you for your question. Um. So we review uh applications for projects and the environmental review assessment review timeline begins when we have a clear and complete and well-defined proposal to review, which has a clear goal and can be meaningfully evaluated.

Well, it sounded like the the water would propose you would give a a per- the permit, give them some change, they make a change and then restart the process. Is that what happens? And so it just seemed like what I've read and studied that everybody knew this needed to be fixed, we just could never get to a place to get the permit to fix it? Is that a fair statement of what happened?

The the process the process can accommodate some design changes after it begins, but if there's a wholesale change in the project's scope and goals, that precludes a meaningful analysis and it creates a new problem.

Well, we moved with speed once that happened, cuz we saw the result of not getting the permit. So, so what changes once there's an emergency declared?

Well, once uh an emergency is declared like um the the collapsed pipe,

Right.

we were able to um we worked with DC water to verbally and via email correspondence to approve their emergency actions uh within the a short time frame within that first week so they could return the wastewater flow into the canal prism per their request.

So obviously the collapse exposed the problem. I mean, well, we were looking, you could see it. But it it it it seemed like we could have had some kind of reaction quicker based on what was gonna ha- what we thought could Did I did the Park Service just kinda look at it and go, well, the, we don't think this is gonna collapse? Uh, did and did did DC water say we think this is this is critical? I mean, it gets to the point where it seems we spent a lot of time trying to get a permit, didn't get the permit in time to fix the problem. The problem happens and it becomes an en environmental problem or disaster, I guess we could even use those terms. And so I'm trying to say what do we need to fix to to to say we need to get a permit when we think this is go- when we think this is gonna happen not after it happens. How do we do it quicker? Uh, would that be the core or is that through the National Park Service? I think it's the National Park Service is what the hang-up was.

Yeah, for, for construction permits that are proposed by utilities, those could be from six months to a year for a c- construction type permit, uh, a general request. Uh, there are others that are identified as high priority, where there may be an imminent issue or, in this case,

Was this never considered imminent?

an emergency.

Was it never considered imminent? I mean, did, when you were reviewing the permits, was it ever considered an imminent threat to the environment or

I think the specifics of that sit- situation are uh subject to the litigation the things before the collapse.

Okay. Well, so, so in general, cuz I understand, I I appreciate that, is is that it appears to me, or appears to a lot of us that over the want of getting a permit, we're removing and I and I'm not dismissing moving trees and vegetation, that's important. Mammoth Cave is as beautiful above ground as it is below. Uh, but it gets to a point where you're gonna, there's threads out there, and there needs to be a way to make sure that what we're trying to save doesn't be cause a bigger problem down the road environmentally. It is, it was environmental disaster, so we're trying to save vegetation and trees, create an environmental disaster down the road. That's what we're trying to fix. That's when we'll get the answer. So what is there any Comment you'd like to make on that?

Well, yeah, thank you, again, the the Park Service is focused on resource protection of the natural and cultural resources, and we conduct the legally required compliance that we have to do for historic resources, cultural resources, archaeology, uh tribal consultation, as well as uh visitor visitor safety and visitor

But the pipe was already, I can understand if I was gonna go build a pipe through Mammoth Cave. But the pipe was already through there. And so well they just needed to fix it. That's that's the problem. And so it gets into all of the, well I know I'm I'm out of time, but that's the the frustration, frustration from my perspective is that And and your people, I just wanna finish, well I'm I'm I gotta yield back to the people in Kentucky, the Park Service people are fantastic to work with, I found that. Uh so I'll say that, but it just seems frustrating that we got all these processes and here we are people having to deal with the sewage dumped into the river and their, you know, affects their drinking water and it's frustrating for all of us. I yield back.

Gentleman Nils, chair now rank uh recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mister Pallone, for five minutes for his questions.

Thank you, Mister Chairman. The uh Potomac interceptor collapses an unfortunate reminder of our aging border infrastructure, much of which desperately needs increased investment to help pay for repairs and system upgrades. And Trump is ignoring these needs and putting our infrastructure at greater risk while prioritizing his ballroom and this latest corrupt slush fund to pay off its followers, including those who stormed the capital. His proposed budget would gut the clean water and drinking water state revolving funds that provide water systems with resources to make necessary repairs and improvements. And our water systems need more support, not less. Otherwise, incidents like the Potomac Interceptor collapse will only become more common and communities will be left cleaning up the mess. My question is to Miss Kramer, uh, EPA's last needs assessments collectively found that more than one point two trillion dollars is needed to improve and repair our water systems. Is that correct?

I believe so, yes.

And then um Trump's budget request for the next fiscal year proposes an eighty-six percent and ninety percent cut for the drinking water and clean water state revolving funds. Is that correct?

That amount does not include the congressionally delegated spending. And also, um, I think it's important to offer um one of the one of the pieces of information that I've learned over the last few weeks is that there is, uh, approximately fourteen point eight billion dollars of excessive uncommitted funds in the the both the drinking water and the s the safe, uh, drinking water and clean water SRF. And what that means is that the money is getting to the states, but the states aren't getting it out the door. And so excessive uncommitted funds are determined are, um, categorized as those funds that have been sitting essentially in the state coffers for a year or greater. And so, with respect to the amount that we have determined is sitting there, um, that is a huge priority under Administrator Zeldin's leadership, that we are gonna work with the states to get that money out the door, because it doesn't do any good to get the money to the states if the states aren't actually getting it out to the communities that need it.

All right, thank you. Now, EPA's own assessment found water systems need billions more than they currently get. So how are water systems going to make needed capital investments if the President's budget nearly eliminates the EPA program that helped meet that need?

So I think exactly what I was just talking about. Um, it we need to insure that the money that is in the state coffers and continues to go out to the states actually gets from the state program into the drinking water and wastewater systems hands and so we've been doing um a robust analysis not only of the clean water and and uh drinking water s. r. f. but also um of the uh lead service line replacement grant dollars that have gone out. Um we're doing the same kind of assessment for the emerging contaminant small and disadvantaged communities grant program. Um and so ensuring that the dollars that are already there, the dollars that are ready and able to go out to those communities get there so that they can not only be making those capital improvements that are necessary but also ensuring that we're pairing that with the technical assistance um initiative that I was um that I was referencing when I was speaking with the ranking member before about ensuring that communities have the the the technical managerial and financial capability to understand how to apply those funds

Well I appreciate that and I'm not suggesting you shouldn't do that but I still think that we're never gonna get to anywhere near this one point two trillion dollars that's needed that you said is needed to improve and repair our water

Right.

systems and You know, the problem is that Trump's proposals, its cuts go far beyond simply suggesting cuts, it actually guts some of these programs. So, like it or not, um, you know, um, if you really want to prevent incidents like the Potomac interceptor collapse from happening, uh, you just can't cut infrastructure investments. And I understand you'd get some of that state money out, I appreciate it, but cutting infrastructure investments, in my opinion, only leads to a future where more of our water systems are at risk and communities are left cleaning up the mess um and i just think that with which you when you look at trump's budget um it's not only uh you know it goes way beyond um whatever money you gonna you know get that's already out there i mean i think we need more funding if we're ever gonna get to address this one point two trillion dollars in uh in funding that you uh that you that you say that uh uh that that we need um so again i i appreciate everybody's um input today this is certainly important hearing but there's a lot more that needs to be done and and providing more funding at the federal level is clearly an important part of that so thank you mister chairman i yield back.

so no one yields the chair now recognizes the vice president of the committee the gentleman from ohio mister bollison for five i meant vice chairman not vice president

as i said i appreciate the

i i just promoted him

motion, Chairman.

Um,

Thank you, Mister Chairman.

recognized for five minutes.

Um, good morning everyone. Thank you all for being here. Uh, Colonel, I'm gonna direct my questions, uh, to you first. Uh, your testimony notes that the Washington Aqueduct's regional drinking water supply, which produces drinking water for approximately one million people in DC and parts of Virginia, remains safe and unaffected since the collapse and spill was fortunately downstream from the Washington Aqueduct's primary water intake at Great Falls. To help give folks a sense of the intake sites as compared to where the Potomac Interceptor collapse was and spill happened, how far upstream is the Great Falls water intake from where the Potomac Interceptor collapse occurred?

Vice Chairman Balchert, it's about five point eight miles north of where the spill occurred.

Thank you. And how far downstream from the collapse is the secondary Little Falls water intake site that was thankfully not in use at the time.

Vice Chairman, I believe it's just shy of four miles.

Perfect, thank you. Colonel, as as we know, the Potomac Interceptor is a fifty-four mile pipe, much of which runs either along or under portions of the Potomac River. How would safe drinking water be impacted if a break in a Potomac Interceptor occurred upstream from the Great Falls and Little Falls intake sites? That's the first question and then follow-up is, is there a possibility that the region's drinking water could be impacted?

Vice Chairman, I I think the short answer is there is a possibility that the drinking water could be impacted. However, we have had recent events, um, starting in twenty twenty four when a algae bloom happened around July third, uh, that really kind of set in motion a very cooperative, um, level of communication among water utilities along the breath. of the potomac river um and as we identify risks to that what we've learned is that getting the water to a treatable level is a top priority when we talk about the amount of time with our water holding how much time that gives us operationally to one stop the water before it enters the intakes make decisions at that point on how we're going to either have the water flow by the great the the great fall intake as it gets to the little fall intake and then restore the great fall intake all of those become operation operational considerations that we can make. I think for us, this really just kind of pushes to the forefront what ranking member Clark brought up, the idea of the secondary water source. Um, this I would not say a doomsday scenario, but it is a realistic scenario that there could be risk to both intakes. And because we haven't had that situation yet, does not mean that it's not possible. And mitigating against that with a secondary source is option is obviously the most direct path. But for uh for right now it's about controlling the water at the intake, getting it to a treatable level, that means close coordination with the other utilities, with EPA, before we start the treatment process. And then also the investment in the Washington Aqueduct to allow it to move from a conventional treatment process to an advanced treatment process, which allows for an ability to treat more um than what it does today through the normal sedimentation filtration disinfection process.

Well done. Thank you. I appreciate that answer. Um, I I have short time left, but I'm gonna try to get this last question in. Your testimony als- your testimony also notes that the Great Falls intake site was able to provide all the necessary raw water to require to meet water demand at the time of the incident which was approximately a hundred and thirty million gallons a day. If a break in wastewater overflow happened upstream from the two intake sites and the intakes needed to be closed throughout

Right, Chairman Ball, and uh when we talk about the secondary approach that uh ranking member Clark brought up that added about fifty-four acre feet of storage capacity we're at about forty-seven acre feet right now in our reservoir. So we're estimating close to that same twelve hours that we would be getting with that additional expansion of the reservoir so it's close to about twelve hours right now um there are some control measures that you can put in through communication strategic communication on you know holding off on water use that we can do through um our PAO platforms but right now it's about twelve hours

ok well done thank you very much Mister Chairman I yield back

gentlemen yield

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mister Wenchoff, the breach we're talking about occurred on federal land under the control of the National Park Service. Is that correct?

The the

Yes or no will work.

Yes, the the the break occurred on Park Service.

Thank you. And all three of the witnesses today, including you, uh were informed of the leak uh on january nineteenth and the federal government was there on january twentieth is that correct

yes for the national park service

thank you now so so um um on february eighteenth so so the so the the federal government was there uh right away but on federal february eighteenth mayor bowser asked for declaration of a federal emergency. Is that correct?

I I I believe that's the case. I I I don't have that specifically.

Yeah. Okay. And on February twentieth, that was when President Trump approved a federal emergency declaration of emergency. Isn't that correct?

Yes, emergency declaration.

Now, Ms. Kramer, when that happened, it changed the EPA's role from supporting the state efforts to leading the coordinated response. Isn't that correct?

That's correct.

Now, um, um, I say this because there's been some confusion about who was in charge and unfortunately, rather than just saying this is this is federal land, we're gonna coordinate it, the president posted that Maryland Governor Westmore was to blame for this incident, but I want to understand how the federal response was being led and i also want to understand what we can do to improve this in the future because a a a national event of this significance which endangers public health should not be used as a political partisan event so um i want to ask a couple more questions um miss kramer you talked about you testified about the aging infrastructure and the needs assessment that we have the this these built-up needs of one point two trillion dollars. Is that right?

Correct.

And so I hear what you're saying about that we need to ensure that money gets out there. And I hear what you're saying that you're trying to coordinate that the states get it out. But at some point you just need enough money. Wouldn't that be fair to say? You can't do something with nothing.

If the money's not getting out to the communities, it it really kind of doesn't matter how much money there is, unfortunately.

Right, but you need you need both. You need the money and you need the disbursement. Right? If you don't have the money, you can't disburse it. And we that's right.

We do right now.

OK.

And in

Mister Wenchuff, Mister Wenchuff, I wanna ask you, isn't it true that in twenty eighteen, eight years ago, DC Water requested fast-track permits to repair widespread corrosion and detached rebar at the side of the of the rupture

we've been working with him on on this initiative for a while the specifics

yeah it it it's a yeah eight years would it do you dispute that

the specifics of the pre-breaker under litigation

ok in in fact d. c. water warned the corrosion could quote result in a catastrophic failure leading to the release of raw sewage into soil groundwater and waterways quote is that right do you know if they said that

i'm not familiar with that quote

ok isn't it true that the permits were delayed due to environmental assessments

again i i that that part is pre break is under litigation but i'm not

ok at the time of the pipe rupture those ea still had not been completed is that right

able to talk on that I would just defer to my prior answer.

Well, I I know it's under litigation, but you can you can I can tell you at the time of pipe rupture, there were still environmental assessments that were not completed. I know there's litigation. I'm not asking you to talk about any sensitive information, but and and I'm a lawyer, but that's the fact. And, Mister Chairman, I would like to um I would like to unanimous consent place in the record an article from the washington post dated april second twenty twenty six which is entitled catastrophic sewage spill followed years of delay on repairs post review fines

so ordered

thank you so let me just say um eight years is too long to wait for an environmental assessment and i say this in a nonpartisan way because over those eight years we had democratic and republican administrations. And one thing, Mister Chairman, we need to do is we need to figure out how to speed up environmental assessments so that we can make sure we don't have these kinds of ruptures that are endangering public health and with that I yield back.

General Lady yields, the chair now recognizes Mister Palmer for his five minutes of questioning.

For the benefit of the committee, um the EPA expended six point two billion dollars for um water and wastewater systems in twenty twenty five of the fifty plus billion that was in the infrastructure investment act uh which brought the total expended up to thirty one little over thirty one billion, I think um Miss Kramer uh Mister Wissenkopf Mister uh Colonel Pera were any of you made aware of the risk uh potential collapse on the Potomac uh interceptor line prior to the collapse

No.

No. No.

So no one talked to you about the that there were potential breaches uh that the uh line had been degraded and that that repairs were needed because there was a potential breach. So you all you all answer no. When did you learn uh that there was a problem? Was it before or after the the breakdown of the line, Miss Kramer?

EPA was notified on the evening of January nineteenth.

So after after the breach.

Correct.

Colonel Perry.

The Army Corps of Engineers via the Washington aqueduct was notified on the evening of January nineteenth by WSSC.

Mr. Wenchkov.

The National Park Service was advised on the evening of the nineteenth to the US Park Police.

Should you have been informed?

That there was a potential breach? That the the line is was so degraded that uh there was potential for a a breach in the line? Miss Kramer?

I believe that there was a reconstruction plan that had previously been

No, I'm asking you uh because if you had knowledge of a pr- a a construction plan, that would indicate that you knew there was the potential for a problem. You said that you didn't know that. So, what I'm asking now is because you didn't You you testified you didn't know. Should you have been informed prior uh to this?

Me personally, probably, yes.

Colonel Parab-

I believe as a as part of the um the Washington Aqueduct working as part of the water community and working with members of the wholesale customer board I believe there is a standing understand- there is an understanding that if anything was threatening water supply that that was the thing.

You sh- you should have been informed.

Yes, sir.

Mister Wenschke- Hoff, this is particularly important with you, um, you testified that you were not informed, you were not made aware of, of potential problems or the potential uh, uh, breach of, of the line. Should you have been informed? Prior to the, to, to that happening.

As uh, I mentioned in my testimony, we've been working on a lot of initiatives with DC water over the last several years. i uh i would have to take questions back to follow up on

at at any point did they tell you that a that that the line was so degraded that

the specifics

that there was a the potential for a breach

not a potential for a breach we're working on rehabilitation permits

ok i i think this is is the famous movie line of failure to communicate because this could have been avoided uh had uh everyone been um on this panel been informed and had the opportunity to take some action, why either the uh funding, if funding was necessary, I don't know that funding was needed for this, but action was certainly needed uh in coordination uh with with relevant parties. Uh, but it didn't happen. Uh. Um, Administrator Kramer, what actions has the EPA taken uh to respond to the release of sewage from the Potomac Interceptor, and particularly in the in the river.

Uh, EPA itself did a number of actions uh pursuant to the emergency declaration. EPA provided technical assistance on site, EPA conducted contaminated soil removal, EPA also conducted water quality sampling, as well as soil sampling.

But we still have some problems. Do you have a potential time line for getting this cleaned up?

So, uh, the remediation of all areas except for the cno canal itself which still has some i believe still has uh a limited amount of remaining contaminated soil in it um the remainder of the area that was impacted has been fully remediated and federal assets have been fully demobilized

what's your level of satisfaction with the response from state and local partners be candid

um i previous to coming and i i am cognizant of your time Previous to coming uh to EPA, I was the deputy secretary at Florida's Department of Environmental Protection. We had a break in a main, um, and as deputy secretary, I had deployed my assistant deputy secretary to be onsite at the the break location, uh, almost every day until the bypass was installed and there was no longer raw sewage that was leaking. I felt in my capacity in that position that that was the appropriate amount of tension and detail that needed was needed in that situation. I found it very interesting that Maryland, given that they have jurisdiction over the Clean Water Act, section four O two specifically, they have primacy, so the uh any unpermitted discharges into waters of the United States, such as what happened here, um I I I found it interesting that uh at least what I was uh aware of, it was not that level of attention.

Thank you for your responses. Uh, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The gentleman yields, the chair now recognizes the gentleman.

thank you mister chair uh during emergencies it is critical that the federal government provide accurate and timely information to the public unfortunately this administration has a history of doing the opposite including after the collapse of a segment of the potomac uh interceptor less than one month after the collapse president trump took to social media to hurl insults and baseless accusations at his political opponents at the time d. c. water

So ordered.

I appreciate that. I would like to go through some of what the President thought was important and appropriate to say at this time, and see if your understanding of the facts lines up with um his. Miss Kramer, you were assigned as EPA's Senior Response Officer for the Potomac Interceptor collapse. a few days after the president's tirade. In his February seventeenth post, President Trump said that, and I quote, "this is a radical left-caused environmental hazard." Is it EPA's position that the radical left caused the sixty-year-old pipe to collapse?

I've spoken a lot about asset management, um, but I do think what I was just speaking about with respect to Maryland, uh, and the lack of high-level oversight that I was aware of, um, I I I I do think that there was a there was a a lapse there of of

But to blame the radical left for the corrosion or calcification of the collapse?

One of the things that we're doing in the Office of Water right now, and I've spoken a little bit about it, but I I will take just a second to get more into it. Um, I've spoken a lot about making sure that the money is getting where it needs to be out to the communities. Um, one of the other things that I learned coming into this office was that uh technical assistance uh in in the prior administration dollars were awarded uh and and scores were given out uh for technical assistance providers uh with an extra set of points given to uh folks that came in that had never had experience in the process and so um I think there was a lapse of judgment in the prior administration as well in terms of ensuring that the right people were getting the folks to provide training and technical assistance to these systems that is necessary uh to to conduct this type of oversight.

Right. Sorry, reclaiming my time. Yeah, I think it's somewhat of a stretch. Did the president consult with EPA or anyone else involved in responding to the Potomac Interceptor collapse, before he started pointing the finger at his political opponents without evidence?

I'm not aware of conversations that occurred.

OK. Thank you. At a March eighteenth press conference you stated that, and I quote, this has been a coordinated response from the beginning. So could you elaborate on EPA's involvement beginning with the time of the collapse?

Absolutely. Uh, so initially, uh, EPA received a notification on January nineteenth that the collapse had occurred. Uh, inspectors and staff from our Region three office were on site, uh, the next day, January twentieth, um, after, uh, and and provided kind of the general oversight that EPA provides under even though Maryland has primacy over these unpermitted discharges within their jurisdiction to waters of the United States EPA maintains an oversight role so we were providing uh kind of that more traditional oversight after uh mayor bowser requested the emergency declaration and that was granted by the authorized by the president and i was uh uh designated as senior response officer um we started using what is um kind of the typical what i would say is kind of the typical process um where fema and colonel paris spoke to it earlier fema provides mission assignments um and then you know that's how we kind of fulfill and and obligate out which which uh agencies are doing what um, scope of work, mission assignment, potential costs, approval processes.

OK, reclaiming my time because we have very little here. At the same press conference you stated that, I quote, " public communication has been re- critical to transparency and restoring public confidence." Did the president's post on TruthSocial provide any benefit to the clean-up efforts or restoring public confidence?

It certainly brought, uh, brought attention to the issue and, uh, made clear that the federal government was gonna be stepping up to the plate.

That statement ensured that the federal government would be involved. I thought it was condemnation, really. How how did it show confidence and restore public uh s- support?

The the true social post indicates that it had gotten the attention of the highest levels of government in this country, and there were gonna be federal actions that would be uh approved. Uh the the emergency declaration requested by Mayor Bowser would be authorized.

Okay. D- sorry, my my time. Mister Weschoff. The president called this a sewer line breach in Maryland and blamed one of the political rivals, the governor of Maryland, but the breach actually occurred on federal land under the control of the National Park Service. Is that not correct?

Yeah, the the Potomac Interceptor is located on National Park Service land.

Yeah, well, hurling insults and accusations during an emergency simply don't help anyone or actually fix the problem. It's shameful I think that the president repeatedly used emergencies and crises as opportunities to try to score political points. rather than help the people and fulfill the obligations of this office. And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Gentleman yields. The chair now recognizes the general lady from Tennessee, Doctor Harshberger, for her five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. Um, Mister Winchcock, uh, for any type of infrastructure that traverses MPS property, what types of permits are needed to access or interact with this infrastructure, and what does the process look like?

OK. The the uh Well, s- some utilities pre-exist parkland, as I mentioned in my my testimony, which is the case with the Potomac Interceptor.

Mm-hmm.

Um, in general the um the two types of permits that a utility would have would either be a a right-of-way permit and a special use permit. The right-of-way permit that is issued generally governs the um the footprint of the utility, the size and uh depth and you know the area that it takes up on federal land and defines that and uh permits it for a period of ten years

ok

a special use permit is issued for construction activities um and and actions that will disturb park resources uh park visitors say traffic uh disturb the soil any type of construction activity

yeah well does the process differ depending on

Oh the the a a general construction permit that's gonna involve substantial disturbance to the park would may take six to twelve months,

Yeah.

but we have uh shortened timelines if we have an an urgently high priority, urgent matter or an emergency situation.

Is the permitting process different from an applicant that's already

It would be the the same process which with each new proposal or re-scoped project.

OK. Alright. Um, does NPS have an internal um expedited or emergency NEPA procedure for critical infrastructure on Parked Service Land? Like an uh uh an internal expedited or emergency NEPA procedure?

Yes, we

Okay.

in in the case of the uh response, that's that's how we we're doing the uh NEPA after the fact.

So, was this expedited or emergency process ever considered with respect to the portion of pipe that collapsed? And if it was, why and if not, why not?

It was for the c- for the collapse.

Okay.

Yeah, we uh We uh we verbally authorized their initial remedial actions while we worked on the permit and compliance after the fact for the emergency situation.

Okay. Yeah. Permitting always gets in the way, doesn't it? Um, uh Assistant Administrator Kramer, how did the uh issuance of an emergency declaration allow for increased access to resources in a more expedited clean-up process?

Uh, on the resources front, uh, it allowed for uh for uh additional deployment under uh FEMA's kind of standard normal process, again back to the mission assignments and scope of work and and and funding and and the split of seventy five percent versus twenty five percent cost share.

Mm-hmm.

Um in terms of uh what it allowed us to do on-site, it allowed us to uh undertake remediation actions concurrently with the emergency repair that was happening uh with the collapse. Had there not been the access to federal resources, both dollars and uh and uh uh people. Um, uh, the the cleanup was projected to go sequentially as opposed to concurrently, and so we were able to move much more quickly.

OK, very good. Well, Mr. Chairman, uh, you're back on that.

General Lady Yields, the chair now recognizes a young woman from New York, Miss Ocasio-Cortez, for five minutes of questioning.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Um, Assistant Administrator Kramer, you are in charge of the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Water, correct?

Correct.

Um, and in your written testimony you communicated a value that I think we all appreciate, which is that a top priority for EPA is ensuring continued drinking water safety, right?

Correct.

And this is a a bedrock foundational value of the EPA, and it's one of the big reasons why it exists. Um, i you know i i i and i also appreciate your commitment uh to clean water specifically in fact you said it very well on a maha action call just last month that quote "when i turn the tap on and when every american turns the tap on there should be confidence in what's in your drinking water" and i think that's a value that we all share um i wanted to ask you uh while i have you here

I am aware.

You're aware. And what are some of the things that you're seeing and hearing?

So, uh, one of I think the biggest concerns, uh, is related to water availability, which is why we recently relaunched the Water U- Reuse Action Plan two point O,

Mm-hmm.

to focus on ensuring that Um, whether it's it's data centers or any

Yes. Any- anything about water quality, though?

Um, I'm not aware of that.

OK. D- do, are there any complain- I mean, are you observing any negative impacts on d- uh data center construction on water quality for Americans?

I don't think anything like that's been raised to my attention.

OK. Um, I, I would like to do so. A few weeks ago, uh, while Congress was in recess, I visited Morgan County, Georgia. where meta is building a massive data center campus. They are clear-cutting forests and began having construction, including explosive blasting, and families in the area are starting to see not only their water pressure decrease to your point about water availability, um, but their appliances are all sto- have all stopped working because it is decimating their water quality. They now rely on bottled water to drink and prepare meals. And nearby residents' water bills are expected to increase by thirty-three percent. In fact, um, I have a jar right here. This is the current drinking water in Morgan County, Georgia. Uh, right after a data center was constructed, the meta data center was constructed. The only difference between the clean water and this was that data center. I have another one as well. So this wasn't just one well. These wasn't just one family's um situation. This is what the drinking water now looks like next to that data center. And I think both of us can agree that neither one of these things are drinkable. These families now have to ship, in a rural area, have to ship water to their house in order to cook and and bathe themselves. Um, now, I'm curious if the EPA plans any investigations on how data centers are affecting water quality and availability. I understand what you said about the rule, but are there gonna be any open investigations on this issue?

So as soon as I get back to the office, I will I will be looking into exactly what you've just talked about, because anywhere,

Okay.

um, whether it is whether whatever type of construction it is, it is a priority to ensure that water

Mm-hmm.

um are being met and so we'll be looking into that uh certainly.

Thank you, I I sincerely appreciate that um because I think this is of utmost importance and we're seeing this happening across the country. I'd also like to ask about the administration's push to build more data centers by fast tracking construction. Um because the administration's been issuing executive orders to fast track data center construction when we know that water quality is encountering major issues. Um, are there any mandates for data centers to do water quality testing prior to construction?

Of of like coming from a public water supply, drinking water supply sampling?

Wells, yeah.

I'm not aware of anything like that. However, it doesn't mean I'm just not aware of it, it might exist,

Yes, of course.

but I'm not.

Um, You know, I I think it's important that uh, you know, you as an agency official, we have to make sure we're doing these investigations, and then us on a congressional level. Uh, I'd like to note that I think it's about most importance that we also launch uh congressional investigations into this matter as well so that we can partner with the EPA and ensure that the uh drinking water for this country continues to be safe and accessible for the American people. So thank you, Administrator.

Thank you.

General Warman yields back and on. They'll recognize

uh Representative Weber for his five minutes questioning.

Thank you ma'am, um thank you all for being here today. So um I'm trying to get caught up on the this what has happened here, January the nineteenth was the failure date, is that correct?

Correct.

Okay.

Correct.

How long have you all been engaged? We'll start with you Miss Kramer.

So EPA was onsite, EPA received the notification phone call the evening of January nineteenth.

Colonel?

The Washington Aqueduct of the Baltimore District received a call on the evening of the nineteenth and responded within the hour.

Same for you all, Mister Windscroll.

National Park Service has been engaged since the nineteenth as well.

Okay. So last night there was a town hall meeting uh last night at seven PM. Did eith- any of you all get to attend that?

No.

No.

No. So it's It was called, I'm and I'm just I'm trying to come up to speed on this, so please don't take exception. What I'm asking, this is DC Water's life off their website. So, I go back to you, Mr. Winscough. As you know, the Potomac Interceptor crosses multiple jurisdictions throughout Maryland Virginia and the District of Columbia with the maintenance and operational authority vested in DC Water. However, the location of the collapse, as you're probably painfully aware of, happened on National Park Service property. With this in mind, what was your relation working relationship with DC water before the fact and now?

We have a an ongoing uh continuing working relationship with DC water with before and continuing now with uh current projects and the current remediation the collapse.

Same same question to you, Colonel, then we'll come up with her.

Representative DC water is a member of our wholesale customer board so there are one of three downstream recipients of the water that's produced from the Washington aqueduct. And as a result of that, they weigh in on decisions on investment decisions at the Washington Aqueduct, and are a contributor to the funding of the operations and the capital improvements at the Washington Aqueduct.

Good, ma'am. Miss Kramer.

Uh, so, when it comes to DC waters, Blue Fl- Plains uh facility, EPA is the NPDES permitting authority under the Clean Water Act.

Are you finding that as you're trying to do repair routine sections of the pipe in your particular jurisdiction, are you finding that a problem to have that kind of job where you're, are you reaching across the aisle, so to speak? Do you do you just stick in your district, stick in in making routine pipe repairs? Who who handles that job and decides who does what?

Okay.

We'll we'll go with you, Colonel.

Representative, for the for the Washington Aqueduct, our relationship with the DC with DC water is limited to the infrastructure of the Aqueduct. It doesn't include this sanitary pipeline that's um considered to be the Potomac interceptor. Um, so for us, eh that would be between DC water and the Washington suburban sanitary commission.

OK. Adam, is it wind scarf, is that how you say that?

Wind shaft.

Wind scarf, that was my next guess.

Sorry. Uh, the National Park Service is is the landowner for about twenty-three miles of where the Potomac Interceptor lies um after it crosses the river from Virginia. So we have the responsibilities of our land owner for permitting and protecting the National Park's resources.

Okay, thank you. And I'm gonna go uh back to you, Administrator Kramer. Uh, thanks for your efforts in coordinating a smooth and dynamic environmental response to that collapse. In your experience, would you say that that particular Potomac Interceptor uh, cepters collapsed and the subsequent contamination of the Potomac River, uh, would you say that constitutes an environmental disaster?

Yes.

What's to be done about that?

I think that we took all remediation actions, uh, for the immediate collapse. Um, I think that forward-looking, not just with DC water, but dealing with water infrastructure across this country, there needs to be an increased focus on physical infrastructure management. Uh, water systems right now, uh, across this country are facing challenges with with aging infrastructure and so um under President Trump's leadership, EPA is stepping up to the plate in the office of water, we are uh undertaking actions through our technical assistance programs uh to engage with communities uh in water systems specifically to start thinking about how they approach asset management, looking forward, ensuring that vulnerabilities that exist are identified and dealt with uh on a timely basis to ensure that collapses like these don't actually occur.

Had you ever seen a bottle like uh Representative Acostio-Cortez showed you?

I have, yes.

You have seen that?

Yes.

From that particular facility?

No, not from that particular facility, from um from a different uh from my days in in the state of Wisconsin, working for the Department of Natural Resources, I have seen water that looks like that.

So you were a cheese head.

I still am a cheese head.

Okay, just checking. Colonel Peire, I'm gonna come to you real close if I, real quick if I can. I thank you and your team for limiting the impacts of that collapse and aiding in the remadiation. In your testimony, you highlighted US Army Corps' eventual response to the emergency declaration and the weight. I want you to, in writing, cuz my time's up, give me an explanation of how the challenges of rapidly constructing a diversion system during the height of winter. If you would respond in writing, uh, Mister Chair, I'll yield back.

The gentleman yields, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mister Allen, for his five minutes of questioning.

Uh, Colonel, I'll let you answer that question.

Representative Allen, Representative Webber, um, there was obviously extreme challenges for us in that diversion system installation. Uh, this was happening at the end of the winter, so you have to imagine that up to that point everything had been frozen. Uh, on that Sunday evening we were n- presidential declaration was on the twentieth, which was a Friday. By Sunday night, rain was coming in, and rain was a threat. Right? That was the the thread of inundate and the pumping system that was used for the bypass. So we really had probably about twenty-four hours to one, identify the scope, identify the materials, and then give our contractor direction to get the system installed. We had to prioritize the action. We had a twelve point system. We prioritized four components of that system that allowed us to get at least those portions of the diversion system in place by the evening of the twenty second.

Wow. Hmm. Wow. Well, thank you, sir. And, um, uh, again, uh, uh, to go back, uh, I wanna thank Dr. Joyce for holding this important hearing, um, on this, uh, Potomac interceptor collapse. And I wanna thank you wit- the witnesses for being here today. Uh, Assistant Administrator Kramer, based on EPA's observation of the collapsed site and the facts that have been shared with it to date, what was EB EPA's initial assessment as to what may have

unfortunately due to the ongoing litigation i am unable to answer that question

ok and so you probably can't answer what you've learned uh to date uh uh to uh since it's initial assessment

that's correct sir apologies

ok alright ok uh can you answer this by your estimate how long will it take to fully real

The so from the the collapse itself?

Yes.

I feel confident that with the exception of the minimal soil contaminated soil removal that is still ongoing by DC water in the CNO canal there's a there's an amount of uh contaminated soil removal that's still ongoing the remaining uh area of impact from the overflow has been successfully remediated at this time.

OK, alright, good, thank you. Uh, Mister Whitcroft, uh, uh, what is the Chesapeake and Ohio ca- canal, also known as the CNO canal, and how has it been utilized following this incident?

Can you repeat repeat the last part?

Yes, yes, sir. Um, what is the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, also known as the CNO canal, and how has it been utilized following the incident?

Thank you for repeating it. Yeah, the uh, the CNO canal park, um, the uh main trail, which is referred to as the towpath, parallels the canal for a hundred and eighty-four miles. That remained open during the uh during this remediation and the emergency response. The um, we we had to close the area around the canal prism, the channel that held the wastewater for the bypass. Uh, for safety that w- area was fenced out, and then the other remediation zones that have been spoken of on the panel were closed uh just for the cleaning of the soil and and debris

ok uh what type of remediation will be needed to restore the cno cno canal after this incident

that d. c. water and their contractors are taking on that work now to uh remediate the the channel which has been removal of the sediment contaminated sediment sewage contaminated sediment and vegetation and any of the clay liner that had been impacted, which they'll have to be restoring, and they are working on that,

Right.

as well as cleaning the historic stone locks, there are four of them.

Um, another issue that's uh that's that's happened um uh dealing with water pressure. Uh, there are certain times of day that you cannot take a shower uh in the DC district uh because there's not enough water pressure to pull up the thing to hold so your shower will produce water uh i probably caught you off guard with that but uh are you aware of that problem any of you and what can be done about it

i am unaware of that problem uh but will look into it as soon as we leave this hearing today

ok great thank you so much and mr. chairman i yield back

the gentleman yields seeing that there are no further members wishing to ask questions I would like to thank our witnesses again for being here today. We'll take a quick five minute recess to allow the witness table to be set for the second panel. The committee will come back to order. We want to thank our witnesses for being here today and taking time to testify before the subcommittee. You will have the opportunity to give an opening statement followed by a round of questions from members. Our witnesses today are David Gatiss, Chief Executive Officer and General Manager DC Water, Tom Neltner, National Director of Unletted Kids. We appreciate you both being here and I look forward to hearing from you. You are aware that the committee is holding an oversight hearing, and when doing so has the practice of taking the testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying under oath? Seeing no objection, we'll proceed. The chair advises you that you are entitled to be advised by counsel, pursuant to house rules. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony today? Seeing none, please rise. Please raise your right hand. Do you promise to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Seeing the witnesses answered in the affirmative, you are now sworn in under oath subject to the penalty set forth in title eighteen, section ten O one of the United States Code. With that, I will now recognize Mister David Gattis for five minutes to give an opening statement.

Mister Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am David Gattis, Chief Executive Officer and General Manager of DC Water, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the January nineteenth collapse of the Potomac Interceptor and the response that followed. The Potomac Interceptor collapse was a serious and deeply significant event for our region, our environment, and the communities that we serve. While this incident does not define DC water's decades-long record of environmental stewardship and infrastructure investment it does demand accountability reflection and also continued action responsibilities we fully embrace. From the outset, our commitment has been not only to respond aggressively, but also to communicate transparently, work collaboratively, and learn from this event. as we continue strengthening our systems for the future. We understand the public's concern, the frustration and the difficult questions many have asked, including whether this event could have been prevented. Those are critical questions and as a m- and as a leader of this organization, I believe it is my responsibility to ensure we answer them candidly, transparently and with humility. At its core, This incident is about aging infrastructure in America. The fifty-four mile Potomac Interceptor was constructed by the federal government in nineteen in the nineteen sixties before the many before many of today's construction standards existed and long before modern inspection technologies were available like many utilities across the country DC water is responsible for maintaining infrastructure built generations ago. that remains essential to public health and environmental protection. That reality does not lessen our responsibility, it actually heightens that responsibility. On January nineteenth, DC Water discovered a significant failure in the interceptor near the Potomac River. Under extremely challenging winter conditions, our teams immediately mobilized to contain the release of pr- and protect the public, health and the environment. Working alongside the EPA and MPS, the Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, and numerous state, district, and local partners, DC Water successfully implemented an emergency bypass system on January twenty-fourth that prevented nearly two billion additional gallons from entering the river. As engineers gained access to the damaged pipe, we encountered large boulders and debris weighing approximately eighteen tons. that is roughly equivalent to ten full passenger vehicles located in the in a in in adjacent, and also in impacted the sections of this pipe. These materials obstructed flow within the interceptor and likely contributed to the structural stress on the pipeline over many decades. I want to personally thank our government uh partners for the extraordinary extraordinary uh coordination and collaboration throughout this response, particularly EPA Assistant Administrator Jessica P- uh, Cramer for her leadership during this incident. I also want to directly address the question of whether DC water was aware of the concerns regarding this section of the pipe prior to the collapse. The answer is yes, and that is precisely why this section of the interceptor has already been identif- had already been identified for rehabilitation. It had been part of our long range capital improvement planning process for several years and construction permitting discussions were well underway before the collapse occurred. Since the collapse, extensive water and also sediment testing conducted by DC water and numerous partner agencies and stakeholders has verified that river water quality returned to normal many weeks ago. Today, DC water is accelerating inspection, monitoring, and also rehabilitation efforts along the interceptor, going beyond stand- standard industry practices. We are prioritizing vulnerable sections of the pipe more aggressively and proactively than ever before. DC Water remains committed to addressing this incident responsibly and continuing the long t- the long-term work required to strengthen the resilience of the systems our communities depend on every day. This hearing is an important part of that accountability and we welcome it. Our focus remains where it has been since January nineteenth, protecting public health and the environment, restoring the impacted area, assessing what occurred, and ensuring we apply every lesson learned from this event. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions today.

Thank you. Mister Neltner, you are now recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name's Tom Neltner. I'm the National Director of Unletted Kids, which is a nonprofit dedicated to reducing children's exposure to lead from all sources. I'm a chemical engineer and an attorney. I've worked for Dow Corning and Eli Lilly making drugs, pesticides, food additives, industrial chemicals. I was also an assistant commissioner at the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, focused on pollution prevention, recycling, and small business compliance assistance. For the past twenty-five years, my focus has been on children's health, and that included in the uh in the arts working on trying to reduce sewer overflows back in Indiana to protect those children. It's a privilege to talk to you today, to examine the conditions that led to the Pot- Potomac Interceptor collapse. I regularly enjoy the river for recreation, and I appreciate your efforts to get it cleaned up and your oversight. The Potomac Interceptor collapse that released two hundred and forty million gallons of raw sewage was an extraordinary event. But it was not an isolated insul- incident. EPA estimates that these type of incidents, euphemistically called sanitary sewer overflows, occur twenty-three thousand to seventy-five thousand times each year, resulting in releases of three billion to ten billion gallons of untreated sewage. The vast majority of those are smaller than a hundred thousand gallons. But for the small creek where the kids are out looking for tadpoles, or for the swimming hole where the families are playing like I used to, the riverside trail where you're taking a stroll, the backyards where the pets roam, or the lake which rely, the community relies on for drinking water, in those places, when these overflows occur, the the raw sewage could be overwhelming. Everything that's flushed down the toilet shows up on the trees, on the floats on the water, or shows up on the grass. It is overwhelming to those communities. These sewage overflows often result from aging infrastructure, similar to what happened in the Potomac Interceptor collapse. They also occur because these sewer systems were built fifties and sixties, and they're so old that they weren't designed for extreme weather events and the resulting flooding. While effective coordinated responses to minimize the impact and control the damage and clean up the damage, from sewer overflows are essential, the priority should be on preventing the events, big and small, from happening to the greatest extent practical. That means strong regulatory oversight by EPA and states, as well as vigilance by the municipal sewage tr- treatment systems. It also means investments in the infrastructure necessary to enable water systems to take actions to prevent overflows. Congress does that in three ways, through WIFIA, the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act, and for other systems, smaller systems and rural systems, you'll see if with the Clean Water uh SRF, the State Revolving Loan Fund, or the Drinking Water SRF. Those investments help communities address aging infrastructure, meet regulatory requirements, and support economic growth. Based on EPA's most recent clean watersheds needs survey, communities need six hundred and thirty billion dollars over the next twenty years. with one hundred and ten billion specifically required to repage to repair aging sewers just like the Potomac Interceptor. The need is similarly huge for drinking water systems, where systems need six hundred and twenty-five billion to ensure communities have safe tap water. Given the need, I was dismayed to see EPA's FY twenty-six budget proposal last year, asking Congress to cut those funds by more than eighty-six percent. Thank goodness that Congress enacted a budget that rejected those cuts. I had hoped that with this Potomac interceptor collapse, that would serve as a as a compelling reminder to EPA to restore those funding and not to ask for more cuts. Unfortunately, the agency's FY twenty-seven budget proposal calls for the same cuts that Congress rejected the year before. Worse, EPA reported only spending only twenty-six percent of the WIFIA funds provided by Congress in FY twenty-five. That suggests that staff cutbacks are undermining program success. Congress needs to increase funding for these critical infrastructure investments, and ensure EPA has both the people and the resources necessary to enforce the Clean Water Act. To make that happen, Congress must provide close oversight to fixed breakdowns that occur so the agencies so EPA can do its job. Thanks again for the opportunity to share ideas and concerns. Thank you.

I thank you for your testimony, and we will now move to questioning. I will begin and recognize myself for five minutes. Mister Gattis, you stated in your opening statement that you became aware that the a the problem occurred January nineteenth, that when that breach occurred that you were aware. Were you aware prior to that that this was a vulnerable section of the sewage pipe that could face problems?

Thank you very much for the question. Uh, what we were aware of was back in two thousand eighteen, when we did apply for and uh work with MPS.

Did you recognize the urgency of the vulnerability of this section of the sewage pipe?

Uh Uh, what we did not what made it what made it what it is today is because of the boulders that fell into uh the pipe.

But you just stated in your opening statement that those boulders have been there for a prolonged period of time. Were you aware of the dangerous potential of this area of the pipe?

No, we were not. Because the boulders were outside of the pipe, and when inspecting pipe with a CCTV uh and and those sort of equipment

What did those inspections show? Could you see a rebar that was coming through the pipe? Could you see that there were problems within that pipe?

That the rebar was upstream from where the break occurred.

And so the pipe that you examined showed it was vulnerable or it was not vulnerable? Because you said that yes, you were aware in your opening statement. I'm trying to think when that awareness occurred.

That awareness occurred in two thousand eighteen, uh, is when that awareness occurred.

And was this a priority to repair this pipe?

Yes, it was.

And so what steps were taken recognizing that this was a vulnerable portion of pipe? What had you done? Had had you gone through the permitting processes? Walk us through where you were at this point in time, please.

Uh, where we were, where we were at at this point in time was we did work with N with NPS. Uh, we did uh submit our permits. uh in order for us to

And when were they submitted please?

They were submitted in two thousand and eighteen.

In two thousand eighteen and so we're talking six years prior to this break. Is this an inordinate amount of time to wait to see that the permitting was in place to begin the repairs?

Uh actually uh Congressman it's eight it was eight years uh in advance and uh we we do not uh control the process we have to go through the process we do not and so as a result of that We did have to.

Did you raise concerns that there were areas that you wanted to proceed to be able to repair and necessary to protect the community?

Yes, sir.

And who did you r- ma- make those concerns aware to?

Through NPS.

And what was their response?

Uh, the response was that we had to go through the process, which we did go through the process with them.

And you felt that eight years was satisfactory to be able to be delayed by that period of time?

We we do not feel that uh eight years is satisfactory.

And did you voice that to them?

We did. And we have.

And what was their and what was their response?

That we had to go through the process.

Are there other sections of pipe in the DC water that's been determined to be either equally bad or maybe even worse that you've addressed so far? And are you waiting for a prolonged period of time for a response to begin the those reparations?

So what we what we have done uh at DC water uh to address the rest of the pipe, we have surveyed the fifty four miles of the pipe and with uh with uh cctv and uh lidar and as a result of that, we're also using drones and we're also walking the system. Uh one of the new things that we're doing uh to detect if there is a rock on top of the pipe is looking at drown ground penetrating radar and so we have done that, uh but we have surveyed the entire fifty four miles of pipe.

And with that survey have you changed the scope of the project? that you had initially submitted to the National Park Service?

We ha- we have changed we have changed our CIP program and put other projects ahead of some of the others that we had submitted, but yes.

And how many projects have you had to advance because of what you found with these surveys?

Three.

And is this because of what occurred on January nineteenth?

January like nineteenth we had lessons learned, uh, and so because of January nineteenth, uh, we feel that there are three projects that we do need to

And how large are these three projects that you've uh put to the top of the list?

I do not recall. I'm sorry.

And where are they located?

Uh, I don't kn- I don't have the exact locations,

Can you find that and submit that to us?

but I can I can find that out and uh give that to you in our in a written format.

And in just the last minute that's remaining, what actions have you taken? You've talked about lessons learned. And what actions will you continue to take to ensure that there are no additional failures as what we which witnessed in January.

Well, Congressman, thank you very much for that question, let me say first that we we take serious what happens in the river and we've we've proven that uh in the District of Columbia with the Anacostia River and also with the Potomac River with our deep tunnel project the actions that we have uh continued to take and we will continue to take them is to look at the outside of the pipe versus just on the inside of the pipe. Uh we feel that the uh uh, boulders and the rocks that I uh, uh, talked about at the in my opening statement did contribute uh, to the dam that built up inside the pipe and did not allow the flow to continue, uh, to blue plains for that uh, sewer, sewage water to be processed.

How confident are you that another collapse like this will not occur?

I w- I, you know, Congressman, I I think that's a that's sort of a hypothetical and I

That's what I'm asking you.

Well, I don't

If we're hypothetical with the information, with the drones that you've utilized, with the information that you have in hand from your investigation, uh, how can we tell the public that another imminent situation like January nineteenth won't be occurring soon?

Well, we're hopeful that that it that that we do not have another break like this one, and that is why we're doing all the things that we're doing right now. Uh, but there there are no guarantees when dealing with uh an aging infrastructure that's more than sixty years old.

I thank you for your testimony. I yield now to the ranking member, Miss Clark, for her five minutes of questions.

Thank you very much, Mister Chairman, I thank our panelists for appearing before us today. Um, Mister Gattis, I I'd like to better understand the involvement of the federal agencies in the response to the collapse. What federal agencies were involved in the response to the collapse, and when were they first involved?

Um, the federal agencies were all notified. uh the day of the the day of the collapse uh we actually uh congresswoman we actually for about two two and a half weeks we uh at d. c. water uh continued to after building the bypass uh we built that bypass uh there were no agencies working with us uh approximately two

mmm

two and a half weeks later uh the agencies did come around and we're happy that we that we were able to get the help uh that we that we needed

Understood, but you had to do uh the initial work uh solo f- uh over a two-week period of time.

That is correct.

Um, I'm thinking about future recovery efforts, what worked in this situation and what advice would you give to other utilities facing a similar situation?

I'm sorry, could you repeat that? I'm sorry.

Sure, I'm thinking about future recovery efforts, what worked in this situation, and what advice you would give to other utilities facing similar situations. You know, across the United States, we we're talking about aging infrastructure.

Mm-hmm.

I happen to come from New York City, and so I'm always on the lookout. Um, but I'd like to hear from you, you know, what what would you say works best here?

Well, this is a great question because I have uh uh since this break, I have been talking to many of my colleagues throughout the country uh in different settings and one of the things that that I do speak with them about, is continuing uh the asset management. uh continuing to use uh cctv and and and lidar but also uh ground uh penetrating rate uh radar as well that is something that is not generally used when inspecting the pipe the pipe is always looked at from the inside versus the outside uh and the uh boulders that were that were big boulders uh as i said earlier uh eighteen tons uh

mmm Let me let me ask you, you know, there there have been a number of um sort of extreme weather events. Um, we've even had earthquakes that we've never had before uh or in recent times, let's put it that way. Do you think that there has to be new protocols put in place when we are experiencing these events and do you take that into consideration in terms of your surveillance of the infrastructure?

Well, I I think we should take those things into consideration. I think the other thing that we should take a look at is having redundancy. Uh, and and that is something that you do not have on a on a sewer, on a sewer, on a sewer pipe. Water pipe, you can shut the water off.

Right.

uh on the sewer you cannot you cannot shut it down so as a result uh to have redundancy uh i think would be fantastic it would be expensive uh but it is something that should be looked at uh and then also slip lining pipes in those areas where you can have redundancy as far as concrete pipe and then also slip lining it and you'll have you'll have uh uh two types of pipe inside of of the pipe and that would give you redundancy as well so i think those are sort of things we should be taking a look at in the future

Very well. Um, Mister Nelter, your experience cuts across a few of the issues we've discussed here today. Sewer overflows, pollu- pollution remediation, how are communities impacted when sewer overflows occur, and what health risks do they pose?

They're impacted as they describe by just everyday enjoyment of the rivers are lost and their creeks and the streams because literally there's toilet paper hanging from the trees, you just, and it stinks. But also, the sewage contains pathogens in it, and it often contains industrial waste water that may have chemicals in it that are discharged on the way to the treatment plant to be treated, but when they're released into the environment like that they can cause a variety of health effects. It all depends on what's upstream. But the bottom line is we need to stop the, we need to go do everything we can to prevent these sanitary sewer overflows.

So our water systems around the country are already struggling to address sewer overflows, and yet President Trump is proposing massive funding cuts to programs to help those systems. Are water systems able to conduct necessary repairs and improvements without the funding that President Trump is trying to cut?

The funding, both WIFIA and the state revolving funds, are just essential to making this happen. Large utilities can often, because of their good credit rating, go out and get their own's. But for the smaller systems, the rural systems, they just don't have access to these funds. especially as interest rates go up. So we really do need those the state revolving loan fund. We also need the WIFIA to be able to provide access to the resources so that the smaller, the middle-sized, even some of the larger cities can take advantage of it.

Very well. I yield back, Mister Chair.

The general lady yields, the chair recognizes the vice chair of the committee, Mister Balderson, for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mister Chairman. Thank you both for being here. Mister Gattis, I'll direct my questions to you, sir. Um. Could you please describe the types of assessments that have been done to evaluate the structural integrity of the Potomac interceptor?

Thank you for very much for that question, Congressman. We we at uh DC water have been using uh traditional uh uh assessments, which would which would be C CTV uh getting inside the pipe and really trying to figure out if there's any degradation within the pipe also we have used uh LIDAR uh to look at the areas where it is wet and that helps us uh from that standpoint. Uh, we're also been using drones as well as uh one of the things that that uh it's it's may seem old school but we walk that pipe. Uh, and so that whole fifty-four miles, we have been walking that to see if there are any sink holes, any things that that gives us something that we would not be able to see inside of the pipe. So we have we have we have been doing that and the new piece that we are doing today is the ground penetration. uh to take a look and see if there are any boulders so we are starting that as well.

ok thank you uh and how often um are the assessments done and are they done by staff there by whom

uh we do have contractors and we do have staff that both work uh work on this uh it also depends on what we what we if we see an area where we think and we do see degradation we do keep an eye on that area uh as we as we uh do our inspections

Okay, thank you. Um, as those method methods widely are are those methods widely accepted uh industry standard for assessing uh wastewater infrastructure so what you're doing is a pattern throughout the country? Like the

Yes, sir, that is correct.

Thank you. Mister Gatiss, when the first time the portion of the Potomac interceptor that collapsed was assessed and had results showing deteriorating conditions, when when was the when was the first time the portion when did you first see indications? of uh potential deteriorating conditions.

Uh My knowledge is would my knowledge for my knowledge would have been two thousand and seventeen two thousand eighteen uh is when we is when uh I was uh when when I knew about this or when we knew about this at DC water and

Okay.

so that would have been two thousand seventeen two thousand eighteen.

Thank you. Can you elaborate on the results of of that assessment and who at DC water was aware of the condition of this section of the Potomac interceptor?

Uh, that would that would have been our operations group, I don't know exactly who the individuals' names uh that would have that would have been able to assess that.

Okay. Thank you. Did DC water conduct additional assessments of the portion of the pipe? First question, and if so, when was the most recent assessment and what did it show?

Yes, we did a we did assessments uh we did four additional assessments uh of this pipe, uh after uh two thousand eighteen. uh because of the condition that we that we saw the pipe in uh so we we did continue to assess this area.

thank you um mister are you satisfied with the current progress of the remediation efforts following the potomac interceptor collapse?

very thank you for that question i i am i am satisfied with with what we've done thus far on the remediation uh think that the uh

good

communities are are are very satisfied as well, so we're moving in the right direction.

Wh- when was the most recent assessment done? That you inspected, the most recent assessment, when was it done?

Oh, we're assessing pipe every single day.

Every single day, OK.

Every every single day on this fifty-four on the fifty-four mile, uh, uh, uh, pipeline, uh, or the Potomac interceptor.

OK. Uh, is there anything that could have been done differently to expedite expedite the emergency repair or cleanup process or steam line operations

thank you very much for that question we we uh as as we look back at this uh and lessons learned i think that we we when we the things that we were able to do uh regarding this uh this break uh were the right things uh the only thing that we wish that we could have done would have been have ground penetration but we did not know that the boulders were there no one would have known that the boulders were there Uh, the clean clean fill should have been put in, and clean fill would be boulders or not boulders, but rock that is no larger than three inches in diameter, would have been would have been placed back on top of this pipe. Uh, but the boulders that were placed back on top of the pipe, uh, did cause a true problem and the break was extraordinary, uh, versus other breaks that we've seen.

Okay, I'm gonna try to get one last question in here. Currently, are there any portions along the Potomac Interceptor that could negatively affect the drinking water of our community? if it experienced a collapse or a similar incident, you have ten seconds, sir, sorry, to the best of your ability.

Well, you know, from from my standpoint and and and what I've seen, uh, the Potomac interceptor does go along the river. As a result, a uh uh another break could cause an issue for the Washington Aqueduct because of the uh uh th- their intakes that they have along the river. Thank you.

Gentleman yields, the chair now recognizes a gentleman from New York, Mister Tonko, for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mister Chair. Um, I'll reiterate a point that has been made uh by others today. Federal funding is critical to enabling water systems to improve their infrastructure conduct preventative maintenance and protect public health. And if those federal resources disappear, as is proposed by President Trump's f- uh fiscal year twenty-seven budget, we're likely to see more incidents like the Potomac Interceptor collapse, around the country, including uh in communities that are less equipped to carry out a fast and effective emergency response. Earlier we heard from uh uh uh from uh the witness uh, Miss Kramer, indicating that uh states need to uh expend their funds, uh disburse those funds from the SRF. But I think if we don't determinously um address the funding that's required of SRF, uh we're not completing our work. So but while the Potomac Interceptor response is behind us, I'd like to focus on a serious active threat to many Americans' public health, and that's lead service lines. Um, let me uh uh uh uh begin with you, Mister Gattis. Uh, uh DC has one of the nation's leading lead pipe replacement programs. Can you discuss DC water's efforts to proactively manage its infrastructure and get these pipes out of its system?

Yes, sir. Thank you very much for that question. Um, we we at DC water, one of the decisions that we made uh a few years ago was that we wanted to be proactive we did not wanna wait uh for a consent decree to occur regarding lead service lines as a result we stood up uh lead free d. c. uh in in in washington d. c. and it has been very very successful there are forty two thousand lead service lines in the district of columbia uh to date and uh we uh we have we are uh attacking this in two phases uh phase one uh we will have twenty nine uh thousand of these lead service lines uh replaced by two thousand and thirty. Uh phase two uh we will have the other thirteen thousand replaced by two thousand uh and thirty seven. Uh we we uh fortunately do have the funding for two thousand and for the first phase, but we are looking for funding for the second phase. Uh so the uh the the uh the the dollars that you're talking about they are needed by us in in Washington DC for us to complete phase two of the lead-free uh DC program.

And has DC water received federal resources to support its replacement program?

That it, we have, yes.

You have. OK, what about the uh east wing demolition? And the debris being deposited? Uh, obviously that might include lead and some other uh materials. And they're going to deposit that near the river, is there a risk to that?

If I am not aware of of of that uh that fact that you just that you just stated, so I can I can research that and then get back to you in writing if that's okay.

I think that would appre be appreciated. All fifty states in DC received dedicated lead aligned replacement money through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act fiscal year twenty-five alone each state received a minimum of twenty-eight point six five million Mister Neltner we know that dedicated lead replacement money is expiring along with supplemental funding for the s. r. f. While that funding was an important initial down payment are there still lead lines in need of replacement across our country?

Yes, there are four million an estimated four million lead service lines that need to be replaced. The goal is to get the vast majority of them out by twenty thirty seven. Those funds are not enough on their own. It's going to increase rates for people to pay for that. And that's gonna increase the affordability challenge for as water rates increase and as we talk about sewer, as we don't get those infrastructure investments.

Right. So those uh those dollars from the feds are critical to holding down uh the bills that people will be paying for for their own systems.

They are absolutely critical. That fifteen billion dollars for lead service line replacement has gone a long way to both finding the problem, and making a difference. And we need states to spend the money, but we need more to make it happen.

Oh, to the earlier point, if we don't continue the funding for SRF for lead replacement. Uh, we're not being real about the entire situation. I don't wanna downplay the seriousness of the Potomac interceptor collapse, but it is a symptom of a larger issue. We have aging infrastructure across our country that needs to be maintained, modernized or replaced, and local governments and water systems simply cannot do it on their own, especially when there are big threats from lead and other dangerous contaminants like PFAS that need to be addressed. We should be working to reauthorize the SRF other water programs at levels that will support critical infrastructure and avoid the next public health emergency. And look forward to the response about the uh debris deposit along the uh along the river uh and any contamination that they may cause that might cause. So with that, Mister Chair, I thank you and yield back.

The gentleman yields. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mister Guthrie, for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you. So, thank you, Mister Gattis. I'll ask you a couple of questions. One, I wanna, it says DC water determined the cause of the collapse, and I know there was a boulder involved, but my understanding is there was a collapse, the boulder had been there for decades. So the, it didn't cause the collapse. There was a collapse, the boulder fell into the hole, and you can assign, appreciate that the boulder caused more damage by that happening, but that wasn't really the cause of the collapse, is my understanding. Could, have y'all determined the actual cause of the collapse? And if not, when do you think you'll be able to determine what that is?

Congressman, thank you very much for the question. We have not determined the uh the cause of of the collapse. Uh, this is uh this is aging infrastructure and it's more than sixty years old, so we uh we we think that may be part of the cause. Uh, but without a doubt, the uh boulders did uh exasperate uh this situation.

The damage or the cause of the actual collapse? Just the damage from the collapse, right? Or do you think it

It would be the damage from the collapse.

cuz it's been sitting there for a while. And then, uh, you know, a budget proposal that hadn't been enacted this year hasn't caused a problem over the last sixty years I don't I don't think so so so um so uh in twenty eighteen, you guys fo- said we need to do repairs here, I think, right? And you applied for permits to the Park Service? Is that when that You applied in twenty eighteen for your first

That is correct.

proposal. So, the I I quoted earlier, I know you're in the audience, from the Washington Post article that states DC Water re- repeatedly proposed changes to repair plans which forced a new environmental assessment. So how many times did DC water change the design and scope of its repair that kicked off a necessitating being necessary to have a another environmental study?

Uh my memory is is that it is it was two times that we uh that we did uh add to um the um the uh plan that we had put forth.

So um I'm just trying to figure out did any change make you have an environmental study or did the chain have to be such level of significance that it had to do that, that you had to have cuz it seems like it seems when we we've talked before that when we talked about this is that it just seems the way it was described, it just the the the permitting process is what's held you from doing the repairs that you needed to do. And I was just wondering why it took so long from twenty eighteen till well, you didn't get one because you it collapsed before you could repair it, why it's taken so long to get here.

Uh, d- thank you for the question, Congressman. I I don't know why it it took so long. Uh, we we still don't have a permit today.

Mm-hmm.

We still do not have a permit today.

But so so you you but you but you you apply for a permit.

Yes.

And then you go back and ask for changes because you wanna do something different, and it requires a new environmental assessment, correct?

For for example, the difference may have been that we said X number of trees and it ended up being a different number of trees. Uh, that was one of the changes.

You had to do an entire new environmental permit for this.

Yes.

That's what we're trying to get. That's what I was trying to get with the superintendent. Uh, understanding he couldn't talk about a lot because of his litigation, I guess. That was the the reason, but it was frustrating when you get a little further with him than that. So, uh, so when you conduct a prepared work on the Potomac Interceptor, does DC water, um Well, let me just get the Do you have to do like Maryland and Virginia, or is it just the National Park Service you have to get permits from?

Well, we we have to we have to get permits from the National Park uh Services, so we do not have any permits for the uh for the entire uh segment of of that pipe.

Okay. But, so n- I, my question, I guess the permits you were awaiting over park service only, you didn't

That is correct.

you didn't have to deal with it wasn't Maryland or Virginia or any where else.

No, sir.

So, so we'll get back. Okay, so we gotta fix the permitting process. It absolutely appears that way. So what steps is DC water taking in the immediate term to mitigate the damage caused by this incident? And while also working to ensure that you have, you have fifty more mi- fifty-four miles of pipe, this is pipe fifty-four miles long, right?

Yes.

So what are you doing now to mitigate? And what are you doing now to, to we need emergency permits or some kind of action because you think this could happen again.

Yes. So, thank you very much for, for that question. We are uh working and trying to get uh the permitting uh changed to where we can we can file for permits and get

Mm-hmm.

in to uh get in to make repairs before an incident occurs. And that is the key, is for us to is is this is for us to identify uh as we've done

That is what we want.

with the three additional three areas that we have identified, uh and we would like for that permitting process to be to go faster than what it goes today. So we are working on that to make sure uh that we don't have to wait eight years uh, to repair uh additional areas along the the uh uh Potomac Intercept.

Cuz what we wanna do is set up a process that reasonable people can say, let's get this uh, it took s- uh twenty eighteen you started. I mean, you're not asking to take out the Sherman sequoia tree that everybody goes to visit. And and and and I'm as tree person as anyone, but when you're looking at well, uh, this tree's versus that, and then end up with sewage in the Potomac River, the the econom the environmental disaster is far bigger way to d- work into the collapse point. So we we just have to be better, and we have to figure out how we can help you and help help the agencies get these permitted correctly. I uh yield back.

Gentleman yields. The chair recognizes a gentleman from Georgia, Mister Allen, for his five minutes of questions.

Uh, thank you, Chair Joyce, for holding this important discussion on the Potomac interceptor collapse. And I wanna thank our witnesses for being here and sharing your expertise today. Um. so um obviously we have an infrastructure problem um we have a a pipe that's fifty four miles long it's been there for sixty years um and all of a sudden we have uh an incident that was tragic and so uh i guess my question is this uh you know well let me just say this from a permitting standpoint and i'll say this with EPA here, we we can't get any pipelines permitted in this country. I don't care whether it's sewage, gas, you name it. We can't even get you know, if I wanted an exit off my interstate, it takes eight years to get a permit. By all by the time all the environmental studies are done. And then this stuff is just deteriorating in front of our very eyes as we sit here with You know, we, so why is the question. But I think the the bigger th- the the bigger thing here to deal with is, in your opinion, does this pipe need to be replaced?

Thank you very much for the question, Councilman. I I it is not the whole fifty-four miles needs to be replaced. Uh, there are there are segments that we feel uh need to be repaired and we've identified. uh three of those segments that does need to that does need to uh be repaired uh we do we do agree with you that the uh that we could move a little bit oh no we we hope that uh national parks can move a little bit faster than what they have in the past uh regarding the permits uh i think that's the key but i think that we will continue to do what we've done thus far and that is uh to perform proper asset management uh and bring to the attention of individuals that there is a replacement that is need on different needed on different segments uh of the pipe uh to replace the entire fifty four miles uh would would be a would be herculean uh and it would be the funding would be out would be very very expensive and so and that would rest on the backs of rate payers uh but we are we are looking at other ways that we can fund these types of projects as well

mmm

ok are you getting outside expertise uh do y'all do your engineering internally uh d c water are you getting outside expertise from engineering and environmental companies on uh on how to uh fix this problem

it is a combination of both so we do have a uh a full-fledged engineering uh uh part of our operation but we are working with outside engineers as well some of the best that there are uh in the industry uh and i think that was proven uh that we do work with the best and that our team is a very good team as well uh as we were able to construct this bypass uh within a five day period

ok so uh so first step is to uh well have we got those areas that need to be replaced identified

we do have them identified at this time

ok do we have a cost estimate on what it's going to take to to do to do that

not not at this point in time we are mobilizing uh at this point in time uh on those on those three areas uh but i'm not sure that we have a cost estimate as of yet

well we gotta strike while the iron's hot here so you know

i agree

We don't, I mean, we've had a major tragic incident and uh and and like I said, the way this place works, you you you gotta make things happen and uh because there's always some reason, this delay, that delay, you you name it, it it's it's unconscionable really. Uh, I come from the construction world. Uh, the other issue that we have, uh, there was a uh a water water main that broke uh just a few weeks ago. And uh, since then, uh, water pressure is an issue uh, in uh, the district. And are you aware of that problem? Yeah, I mean, we we can't even take a shower. And so, uh, cuz we have inadequate water pressure, are you aware of that problem?

I am not aware of that problem,

Okay.

sir, but we do, if if we could, we will identify where that is at and we will get back to you

Okay.

and let you know uh how we're gonna solve the problem because uh

Okay.

uh, you should the pressure is important to us and we know that's important to uh,

Right.

to the citizens as well and yourself.

Okay, I've got just a few seconds. So, so what we need to do is find out how much it's gonna cost, and then we gotta get the permit,

Yes, sir.

and then fix it.

Yes, sir.

Okay. Have you any idea like how long it'll it'll take to fix it? Once we get the permit?

Um. I d- I don't I don't myself have any idea how long w- but we will we will be we will be mobilizing and have

Right.

that number for y- for uh the cost of the pipe within the next thirty days.

Good. Thank you, and I'm out of time, so I yield back. Thank you, sir.

Gentleman yields,

Thank you.

the chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, Doctor Harshberger, for her five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. Mister Gattis, uh when an assessment is complete in the section of the Potomac interceptors identified as requiring improvements, How does DC water ensure those get completed?

I'm sorry, ma'am. Can you repeat that?

When when you have uh identified improvements in in the interceptor, how does DC water ensure that those improvements get uh completed?

Well, one one of the first things that that we do is we we we definitely put a plan together, uh with our engineering and also if we need to bring in any partners to help us uh uh construct whatever may be needed in order to make sure uh that we're able to uh uh satisfy not only meet the requirement from a cost standpoint uh because that's very very important since we have rate payers uh and so as a result of that uh we we then start the construction we always try and come in on time and under budget uh whenever we're constructing something

how um how long does it take on average for DC water to get the required approval and a contractor to begin uh work once an issue's been identified

it it does not take us long from that stand point because we have uh MS uh master service agreements with uh a number of contractors

mmm

and so they are they are very aware and so it cuts down on our procurement process where we've already qualified uh those contractors and we can put those contractors to work

right

the that that same day.

Good. How many contractors are currently working on improvements on the the Potomac Interceptor, do you know?

Uh, I don't know the the the exact number, but there there are a number of partners that we have out uh working on the Potomac Interceptor today.

Well, at least you have a process to to figure out who those contractors are gonna be. Are you satisfied with the current progress of the remediation efforts following the collapse?

Ye- uh, thank you very much for that question. We are satisfied, uh, with - with the progress that we've been able to make. Uh, we - we are staying in close contact with the community as well,

Mm-hmm.

uh, in making sure that the, uh, uh, that the smell and those sort of things are being eliminated. Uh, we're also continuing to test the water in the river,

Yeah.

which is very, very important.

Yes, it is.

And so, uh, in - in doing that we've seen the river, uh, really come back. and and rebound very, very well where the numbers are back to uh normal uh within the uh within the water columns in the river today.

Is there anything that could have been done differently to um expedite the emergency repair cleanup process or streamline any of those operations?

As we as we and and we will we will do a a full-fledged uh investigation on our on the way that we perform.

Yeah.

And we do that all the time when we when we take a look at projects that we that we execute uh we have not done that as of yet so we will do that uh what i will say uh is that we had expected to have the bypass built uh after the from the nineteenth we expected it to take approximately seven days uh seven to eight days and for us to get that done in four to five days

yeah

uh was a great effort uh that was by our contractors and by the the men and women uh at d. c. water

yeah Um, well, what's DC water doing to monitor the remaining portions of the atomic interceptor, uh, that are known to high risk, to be high risk areas, basically?

So, what what we are doing, uh, is and is we are we have taken a look at the entire fifty-four miles, uh, of pipe. And with the fifty-four miles of pipe, we've CCTVed it, uh, we've used,

Yeah.

uh, uh, LIDAR, uh, from uh from that standpoint. We're also using drones, we're walking the, walking the

Do you do this on a regular basis, I guess? You know, I'm thinking of what, you know, utilities in my district do, uh, preemptively, like TVA or some of these guys, or, you know, with pipelines. Do you do that on a regular basis before something happens so you can find those issues?

We do. Uh, and uh, that is, that is something that we do on a regular basis, especially when we identify a area uh that uh that that that may be prone to whatever it may be uh that we're seeing something uh we always make sure we keep an eye on it and we go back uh make sure that the degradation of pipe or whatever it might be uh is not advancing uh and yeah so there are this this pipe is built in a way in which there are dips up and mmm down and and those sort of things and so gases and those sort of things are causing some of the deterioration so we're keeping an eye on all of those areas yeah uh as well uh but the three areas that we have identified we will definitely be keeping an eye on that but as i stated earlier we will be mobilizing and uh executing repairs within the next thirty days

well it's good to always do that after action report so we'll know what to prepare for next time thank you sir and with that i yield back

yes ma'am

the general lady yields votes have been called on the floor so we will now uh recess for the floor votes and resume ten minutes after the last vote is called The committee will now stand in recess. The committee will come to order. We will now resume our hearing on the corrosion, collapse, and cleanup examining the Potomac Interceptor collapse. We now recognize Mister Weber of Texas for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and thank you all both for being here. Mister Gattis, I'm gonna come to you first, please. The Potomac Interceptor collapse was a significant environmental disaster. I know I'm telling no of it. Point being that it's estimated that two hundred and forty million gallons of raw sewage flowed spilled into the Potomac River. In your testimony, you highlighted that DC water became aware of that break the afternoon of January the nineteenth, twenty twenty six. Do you remember that? Okay. Be sure you use your microphone.

All right. Yes, sir.

All good, all good. However, DC Mayor Muriel Bowser did not declare an emergency until February the eighth

Yes, sir.

Okay. Um, according to, did you have interaction with her in that regard? With the mayor? Any interaction with the mayor when when that happened?

If I can, my memory, and thank you for the question, from my memory there was a interaction not directly with the mayor, but with interaction with with her team. uh, but not necessarily regarding that, that uh, that issue or

Okay. So, according to your estimation, how many gallons during that time frame of raw sewage flowed into the Potomac River before the emergency was declared? How many gallons?

Before the emergency was declared?

How many gallons of raw sewage flowed into the Potomac River before they declared emergency?

Um, approximately two hundred and forty-three million gallons.

Two hundred forty-three million gallons in one month?

Well, that was over, that was and that was from the uh that was from the nineteenth until we were able to put the bypass in place. That's that those are numbers that I know.

About how many days was that, would you reckon?

That was about five days.

Five days, okay.

Yes.

Considering DC Water's knowledge of the poor state of the Interceptor, what was your p- specific role in advertising the District of Columbia uh, government on declaring that same emergency. What was your role in that?

I did not have a role in that, sir.

Not at all?

Not not that not not that I can remember, sir.

Okay. Did any of your staff have a role in it?

Uh, they may have, but not that I can remember.

Not that you'll remember?

Yes.

Okay. And I'm gonna come to uh stay with you, Mister Gattis, for a minute. My district home in Texas is home to a significant portion of our nation's energy production infrastructure. Have you been to Texas?

Uh, thank you for the question. I actually not only have I been to Texas, I attended Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas.

Okay, well then where'd you get your education? No, I'm I'm just teasing you. I'm just teasing you. My district produces consumer gasoline, natural gas, military grade fuel, as well as jet fuel in large quantities, uh most in the country in some instances. As a result of these highly technical and and dangerous processes, I will add, I'm deeply aware of the state's r- steps required to prevent such environmental disasters as just happened. Uh, one major or we're talking about just happened, one major preventative measure is addressing aging infrastructure. We keep a close watch on that. Considering the Potomac interceptors' age and criticality to the surrounding area, what measures in your judgment were taken to prevent that interceptors' collapse?

Thank you very much for the for the question, Congressman. You know, we we have uh DC Water, we've supplied more than forty thousand documents to the committee. So, I'm sure that

Forty thousand documents?

Yes, sir. Uh, to the committee, so I'm sure that uh a lot of that is in there that you're asking a question about. But there were a number of things that we have done at at DC Water uh from two thousand eighteen up until the day of the collapse.

But you don't have in mind any of the preventive uh issues that come to your mind today

well we we we we we did what we call well asset management was one of the things that we do uh and we've documented that and we've taken we've taken a look at uh from a a lidar stand point also cctv uh drones uh also walking the uh the fifty four miles and specially that segment of the pipe that we knew uh there were issues uh the