Reforming America’s Defense Sales

Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. I'd ask everybody rise and join me in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. Purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the Trump administration's priorities for reforming our defense sales process, including opportunities for congressional action, progress made on implementation of recent executive orders, and potential future efforts. And I will now recognize Ms. Dean for any opening statement that she may have. By all means.

I thank you, Chairman Mast. And I thank Ranking Member Meeks, who is traveling and will be here in minutes. Uh, and I'm pleased to sit in just briefly, uh, on his stead. I also thank all of you for your work, obviously for coming here today, uh, to help inform us and inform our policymaking and our appropriations, uh, but also, uh, for what we do in foreign affairs. Uh, I'm glad we will hear from both State Department's Political-Military Affairs Bureau along with DOD's Acquisition and Sustainment Under Secretary and the Director of Defense Security Cooperation Agency. All critical components of the United States security assistance enterprise. Our witnesses lead thousands of hardworking civil servants. I want to lift them up. Foreign service officers, uniformed personnel, and DOD civilians in our national security goals of supporting our allies and partners in furtherance of our values consistent with our laws and consistent with congressional oversight. Uh, Representatives Zinke and I had the privilege of leading a arms sales task force. Uh, I was the ranking member on that. I thank Mr. Meeks for, uh, inviting me to do that. And Mr. Zinke served as chair under the auspices of Chairman Mast. Through our work on the task force, we heard from more than a dozen defense industry executives and trade association officials on all manner of process and reforms. It was not until late July that the majority agreed to allow one, I will point out one Democratic panel to explore questions of policy related to arms control and verification, civilian harm reduction, and human rights. Only one Republican attended that hearing, though I do thank her for that. At the self-determined conclusion of our task force work, numerous bills were presented to this committee, in this committee, which were described as the outcome of the task force. And while some provided reasonable improvements to process and systems within the security assistance bureaucracy, others unfortunately significantly undermined congressional oversight and transparency, which I along with Ranking Member Meeks and our committee's Democratic members opposed. While questions of process are important and indeed the mechanisms by which national level policy is made, I am sure we will hear plenty about today. We will not ignore our or divorce ourselves from the broader questions of purpose, intent, and strategy. Namely, our goal must not only be to examine the ways, but indeed the ends for which the US provided arms are used abroad. That's why I must highlight the systemic pattern by this administration, which has ignored, disregarded, and outright blocked appropriate and necessary congressional oversight of US foreign policy, including and especially regarding the use of US provided arms. Just yesterday, I was proud to stand with Ranking Member Meeks and every single one of our committee Democratic members in calling for Secretary Rubio and Hegseth, as well as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, to appear in public before our committee on critical questions facing our country at war, which remain unanswered. This refusal to publicly argue its case for war, as well as provide not only the two cabinet secretaries, but the two main architects of this administration's foreign policy in the Middle East, Witkoff and Kushner, who have not once appeared before a congressional committee hearing, illustrates this administration's ignorance and deep contempt for Congress's constitutional role. It is the willful ignorance and contempt we saw just over a week ago, when the administration abruptly announced it would bypass congressional review to rush more than 20,000 new bombs to Israel worth over $600 million via a little used emergency authority while the administration insists it was totally prepared for this war. Clearly not. All on this on top of the multiple occasions last year, where the administration ignored the ranking member of this committee and numerous Democratic requests for details, answers, and basic matters on its Gaza and Middle East regional policies, instead rushed to authorize to export multiple billions of dollars of arms to Israel. Yet worse than no clarity, we have an ever shifting set of rationales for why this administration launched this war in the first place. As more Americans are put in arms way, harms way, our allies and partners questioning us, and millions of taxpayer dollars are used to pay for these sales to continue this war through foreign military financing. And as we all know, 16 members, excuse me, 13 members of our military are deceased. Finally, on top of disregarding basic constitutional oversight, this administration has pulled back from important arms control agreements and deliberately dismantled civilian harm and human rights abuse monitoring offices and programs. All moves which undermine our own interest in the long run and our standing in the world. I will have specific questions, but broadly speaking, I will need to hear from each of you today how this administration will improve its record of fulfilling this committee's Democratic requests and the basic responsibilities of agencies in to the Article 1 branch. How your bureaus and agencies are squaring the needs and requirements of this open ended ill conceived war with our national interest, as well as why this administration previously refused Ukraine's offer of assistance for counter drone technology as recently reported, when our facilities and installations in the Gulf struggle to defeat incoming Iranian drones. This administration's contempt for Congress, contempt for the law, and contempt for strategies and actions run contrary to our national interest, and it is my prayer that they cease. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Thank you. And before I yield to the member from Montana, Representative Zinke, for his opening statement, I'll just say thank you to the administration for the numerous classified briefings that have been provided to brief members of Congress. And I would say as well a thank you for utilizing the emergency powers to send those weapons systems to Israel so that people like Ranking Member Meeks don't hold up those sales as they've done traditionally in the past, which is essentially sanctioning our allies in times of conflict, which is beyond stupid. I can't believe that that gets done. And so I thank the administration for having the foresight to to work around those incredibly unstrategic acts that end up taking place over and over with my colleagues on the left. I now recognize Mr. Mr. Zinke for any opening statement that he may have.

First of all, I want to thank each of you for your duty and service. It's not easy to serve, um, but thank you for stepping up. The country needs you. And just on a on a comment, there is a reason why we are fighting in Iran. As a former Navy SEAL commander, I've lost a lot of friends due to the actions of Iran in targeting, supplying weapon systems, and many of my friends aren't here today as a result. It took a president, courageous president, for 47 years. And if there's anyone that that doesn't believe that when the former Khomeini said death to Israel, death to America, does anyone believe that he didn't mean it? So when you have nuclear weapons and the capability material, does anyone believe that material wouldn't wouldn't make its way to New York City perhaps or LA or Houston? So the world would be a lot better off without Khomeini and his axis of evil between the Houthis, the Hamas, and Hezbollah, and I thank the administration for finally taking a stand. Foreign military sales. Uh, we went on a journey. I thank the member from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to look at this in depth. And I knew it was bad, but I didn't know it was that bad. Uh, turns out the the foreign military sales initially started with Department of State, primarily for anti proliferation of nuclear weapons. A lot of the components, uh, and systems are targeted for that. Then of course you have Department of War. What happens is the Department of State meets with the country, the country says this is what I want, this is what I need in order to have a piece of the arsenal of freedom because there's no doubt our systems are better than any else anyone else's. So then it it gets passed over to Department of War, which has a different set of priorities, oftentimes not connected to the COCOM commander or related any OPLAN. Then it goes into the acquisition department, unprioritized. And then the the Pentagon, I hate to say it, is 27,000 people over there, mostly fighting for programs. So the country looks at a system, they pay for it upfront, it goes over to Department of War, it goes it goes to acquisition, and is substituted oftentimes because there's program managers that are managing a system and is either obsolete or nearing obsolete. And then of course, it goes over to the commerce that neither looks at the OPLAN nor acquisition, but looks at technology. And as you know, there isn't a database that connects the three. Folders are being hand carried between the departments because there's not a database. And Article 1, we have a primary responsibility of oversight and the power of the purse. Oversight is an impossibility when there isn't a single database where managers, leaders can look at it in form metrics on it. So I applaud you in in reorganizing along the ways of speed, lethality, and organizing a database so you can have a metrics and apply this is who's accountable, when is when is that person accountable, and when can I see a result. So I thank you for that. There's about $250 billion of backlog in the foreign military sales. That amount exceeds our procurement in Department of War on an annual basis. So if we want to rebuild our command and control, rebuild our our supply chain, rebuilding it from our foreign allies' pursuit of our weapon systems, I think is a is a sound and prudent policy. Again, I thank you for your service. I thank you for taking a look at acquisition. Finally, finally, they cut through the bureaucracy. When the President of the United States under Article 2, he's in charge and execution of foreign policy, when he says we're going to deliver a system, that system needs to be accountable, it needs to be metricized so we know when that system will be delivered. I look forward to the questions and again, thank you for your service.

Thank you, Representative Zinke, and thank you for all your work with the Arms Sales Task Force. It's been yeoman's work and really appreciate everything just the way you you undertook it, you grabbed hold of it, and you had the right knowledge base just from your history as a member of SEAL Team 6, your work throughout all of these years in the military. Couldn't have been anybody better to go out there and do that work. So thank you for bringing your expertise to bear. Ranking Member Meeks.

Thank you, Chairman Mast, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. The State Department's Political-Military Affairs Bureau and its colleagues at the Department of Defense and Defense Security Cooperation Agency lead our government's critical work in providing security assistance to our allies and partners around the world in a way that advances our national security interests. Nowhere this has been more critical than in the United States and NATO support for Ukraine in its fight for survival against Russian aggression since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion. The Political-Military Affairs Bureau led allied efforts to help Ukraine defend its territory and serve as a firewall against Russian aggression in Europe. This support has strengthened U.S. strategic interests, bolstered our industrial base, and greatly enhanced such defense tech innovation. Ukraine's role in that innovation is undeniable. Today, several Gulf states have reached out to Ukraine for support in counter-drone technology and expertise in defense against Iranian Shahed drones. Yet the Trump administration has gutted direct American military support to Ukraine, crippling Ukraine's capabilities at a critical moment. That decision illustrates a broader problem. So before I turn to today's witnesses, I want to be direct. What unites every concern I will raise this morning at this administration is this administration's systematic contempt for congressional oversight. That contempt is not incidental. It is a pattern and it has consequences. As recently as last Friday, just over a week after President Trump chose to start an unauthorized war against Iran, and let's be clear, it is a war, the State Department announced it would bypass Congress, not come to Congress in the national and its in the usual procedure, but bypass Congress and what we do to review and to rush more than 20,000 new bombs to Israel worth over $650 million. How did it do it? Because ordinarily you would come to Congress and we would view, ask questions, and oftentimes, if we thought appropriate, we would say, let's do it. But what he did at this time, what he did, it he did so in a rarely used emergency authority which runs counter to the administration's repeated insistence that it was fully prepared for the war before the President started it in February 28th. Simply put, this is an emergency of the Trump administration's own creation. And this is not an isolated incident. It is the latest in what appears to be a pattern. Last year on multiple occasions, the administration refused to engage with Congress or respond to my requests as Ranking Member for information surrounding U.S. policies and the selling of arms to the UAE and to Israel as its plan for Gaza. The administration, you know, claims that the Gaza policy is a success, and if that's true, I don't know why it is afraid to explain that policy to Congress. Despite over a year of requests going back to February 2025, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, the official and most directly responsible for the administration's Middle East policy, never once briefed me or members of this committee or came before this committee. That pattern extends beyond briefings to the administration's deliberate dismantling of civilian harm and human rights abuse monitoring, the effective elimination of the Civil Harm Incident Response Guidance process through reckless personnel cuts and a chaotic and ill-conceived reorganization which undermines U.S. interests and our standing in the world. These cuts cripple the State Department's ability to fulfill long-standing statutory requirements, including comprehensive investigations into gross violations of human rights. Arm sales are one of the most powerful tools in American foreign policy. And we are witnessing this in real time as our Gulf partners rely on American weapon systems to defend against Iranian retaliation. But when arm sales are used without transparency or accountability, they undermine the very alliances and institutions that they are meant to strengthen. Process questions matter. But the deeper problem is strategic. This administration has no coherent strategy governing the use of arm sales. What it has is a posture of contempt for oversight, contempt for Congress, and contempt for the law. That posture has cost and measured in lost credibility, weakened institutions, and the erosions of the very rules-based order that has benefited the United States and our allies for the past 70 years. So I welcome your testimony today and I look forward to hearing how you will work with Congress to meet existing statutory requirements and congressional intent as you consider how to reform the arm sales process, and I hope it's not cutting out congressional oversight. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Recognize myself for a couple minutes. I'm not surprised, you know, to respond to this if the administration has contempt for the oversight that Congress does. Truthfully, I have contempt for the oversight that my colleagues have done in the past when they fund things like queering the map, drag shows in Ecuador, transgender operas, transgender musicals, transgender plays, transgender job fairs in places like Bangladesh, and the list goes on and on of just beyond stupidity programs that were going on. I'm not surprised that every American doesn't have contempt for the oversight that my colleagues on the left were doing to say, let's go out there and fund these ridiculous things. But what's going on right now, what's being worked on right now, there should be no contempt for. I want to thank our witnesses. I'm going to get to who they all are in just a couple of moments here, but I want to thank them for their work in this field. And what we need to be speaking about today is that today's foreign military sales process is a relic. That's why we came together. That's why I set up this arm sales task force to begin with because it's a Cold War relic and it hasn't worked for the requirements of modern times. What worked then no longer meets the needs of what goes on today. Faster, more dangerous world. In fact, in many cases, it actively undermines U.S. national security. It undermines our allies who face years-long lead times for American weapon systems which can force them to look elsewhere around the globe, which weakens U.S. influence, damages our defense industrial base, and it bolsters our adversaries. Those are the stakes of what's on the line right now. Our ability to put weapons in the hands of our allies is at its core about deterring aggression and when needed, defeating our enemies. That's what that emergency notification was about because in the past, my colleague to my left has quite literally withheld arm sales to Israel. And that's something that in this moment has no business going on. I would argue in all of the other moments that this has gone on had no business going on whatsoever. And so it was important that this took place, but we were in fact directly notified about the sales that took place on March 6th, even though I'm sure I'll hear more of my colleagues say there was no notification and this never takes place. This takes place and we were notified on March 6th well before these transfers. But to get back to the point of this hearing, for too long our foreign military sales process has impeded American arms manufacturers from getting advanced weapons into the hands of our allies at speed. That's what has to take place. That's what we have to fix going forward in the future to be as agile as what we need to be. President Trump has recognized that vulnerability. He signed a series of executive orders to overhaul foreign military sales and acquisition systems, prioritizing exactly what I just spoke about, prioritizing speed, prioritizing innovation, prioritizing accountability. Congress and this committee in particular, we have played an important role in advancing much-needed reforms. Like I mentioned, Representative Zinke and his work on this, bringing to bear all of his expertise from a career in the military at our highest level of special operations. Last year I did establish this bipartisan Foreign Arm Sales Task Force led by Chairman Zinke and led by Representative Dean. Because of that work, Congress codified several major reforms outlined in President Trump's April 2025 executive order, but there's still more work to do. And that's what we want to get to as well, codifying more of those executive orders. We are fortunate to have a President in office who understands the stakes and is taking the right steps to ensure America maintains its edge. And what's going on in Iran is a perfect example of that. We have had weakness for year after year, decade after decade, where Americans killed by the hand of Iran have never been avenged, have never been responded to to say this takes place no longer until the first time when President Trump put Qasem Soleimani into about five separate pieces on the side of an Iraqi tarmac. That was the first avenging that took place. And now President Trump saying Iran will not have any system that can reach out and touch an American, our allies, our forces in the region. All of their war against us, and that's what they've been doing against us every single day that they can, looking for an opportunity to wage war against the United States of America. Their opportunity to do that comes to an end, period, full stop. I thank President Trump for having that commitment to defend our country that nobody else has had the commitment to do to date. Again, I would say we are very fortunate to have a President who understands the stakes, is taking the right steps to ensure America maintains its edge, that if we are to go out there and have the greatest soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines anywhere on the face of this earth that take to their core, to their heart, the seriousness of fulfilling their duty to serve this country, defend our people, defend our homeland at the cost of the last breath in their lungs and the last beat of their heart, that he's ensuring they have every single tool that they need to bring that fight to bear and have the best possible opportunity to reach mission accomplished and come home alive. That is what he works for at a higher and harder and faster level than anybody has done before. I look forward to today's discussion. I thank the witnesses for their time. To go to all of our witnesses here, we are pleased to have a distinguished panel before us today on this important topic. Mr. Stanley L. Brown, Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. The Honorable Michael P. Duffey, the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment at the U.S. Department of War. And Mr. Michael F. Miller, the Director at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The committee recognizes the importance of these issues and is grateful to have all of you there here to speak with us today. I would ask unanimous consent that the member from Ohio, Representative Miller, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. Your full statements will be made a part of the record and I'll ask you to keep your spoken remarks to about five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. And I now recognize you, Mr. Brown, for any opening statement that you may have, and I thank you for your work on this issue.

Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Trump administration's comprehensive reform of the United States foreign arms transfer system. I'm Stan Brown, Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State. We appreciate the committee's sustained engagement on foreign military sales and broader security cooperation. I welcome the opportunity to discuss how the administration is modernizing this critical instrument of American statecraft. In the last fiscal year, the Department of State authorized more than $330 billion in arms exports through the foreign military sales and direct commercial sales systems. That demand reflects the trust our allies and partners place in American defense technology and in the United States as the security partner of choice. Despite the strength of our defense industrial base, our system has not always operated at the speed or scale required to meet urgent operational demands. Recognizing these realities, President Trump has directed the most significant overhaul of the arms transfer enterprise in decades. In April 2025, the president signed Executive Order 14268, reforming foreign defense sales to improve speed and accountability. In January of this year, the president issued another executive order prioritizing the warfighter in defense contracting, and most recently, on February 6, the president signed an executive order establishing the America First Arms Transfer Strategy, or AFATS. Historically, our arms transfer system has been largely partner-driven, responding to requests for equipment and capabilities as they arise. Under AFATS, foreign arms sales will strengthen not only an ally's military capability, but also America's manufacturing base and technological edge. It integrates economic security into national security policy and makes clear that our arms transfers to foreign partners must expand the capacity of our defense industrial base so it is able to remain the arsenal of freedom for the United States and our partners and allies. While executive action has established the framework for reform, full realization of these objectives requires targeted legislative updates in three areas. First, congressional notification thresholds governing defense transfers are outdated and no longer reflect economic reality. Several were last adjusted decades ago, and inflation has significantly eroded their relevance. As a result, routine transactions now trigger the procedural timelines that were designated in 2002 for far more strategically significant matters. When approvals are delayed for routine cases, partners and allies face capability gaps and consider turning to alternative suppliers for the capabilities we want to provide them, with long-term interoperability and geopolitical consequences, in addition to long-term consequences for the health of our own industrial base. HR 3616, sponsored by Representative Zinke, shows the way forward on thresholds, and we urge the committee to join the administration in its support. Second, under current law, the Department of State does not have access to foreign military sales surcharge collections to support necessary staffing to execute our statutory responsibilities effectively. Granting access to a portion of a surcharge foreign partners pay as part of their FMS cases would close a statutory gap to ensure that the Department of State, which has oversight and approval responsibility under the Arms Export Control Act, has stable, sustainable resources to perform its oversight mission. Finally, we would like to work with you to expand authorities for foreign military funding loans and loan guarantees. In recent years, FMF loans to Poland and Romania have demonstrated the powerful potential of FMF loan programs to strengthen U.S. national security by enabling key partners to invest in American-made defense systems, supporting U.S. jobs in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas, as well as industry and innovation. Other countries are offering much more competitive financing packages that are steering partners away from U.S. companies. We need to bridge this gap, refocus on competitiveness, and ensure our allies are capable of defending themselves with reliable, proven systems built by the best defense industrial base in the world. The America First Arms Transfer Strategy ensures that arms transfers serve our national interest by strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base, encouraging partner and ally burden-sharing, accelerating innovation, and delivering capabilities at speed and scale. I look forward to working with this committee to implement these reforms fully and effectively. Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

Thank you for your testimony. I would now like to recognize Under Secretary Duffey for about five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I'm joined from the Department of War by Mike Miller, the director of Defense Security Cooperation Agency. I'd like to begin by paying tribute to the American heroes who have made the ultimate sacrifice during Operation Epic Fury, including the airmen we tragically lost last week. The memory of their profound courage and their dedication to the ideals of freedom will endure. I also extend my deepest gratitude to every service member contributing to this vital operation and to all those who stand watch around the globe. Lastly, I want to recognize the allies and partners standing shoulder to shoulder with us in the fight. Their service members have shared in the risk and sacrifice, not only for their own security, but in direct defense of American lives. We are honored by their commitment to our common cause. Our national security is inextricably linked to the strength of both our defense industrial base and our international partners. Amidst the complex threats of today's global security landscape, the convergence of these domains is more important than ever. To that end, my office is now charged with leading a fundamental transformation of our arms transfer enterprise to make this a reality. And I am here today to personally convey my commitment to this mission and to a strong partnership with this committee. The president's America First Arms Transfer Strategy is the engine for this effort. And let me be perfectly clear: America First does not mean America alone. A strong America with a robust and resilient industrial base is the most reliable partner an ally can have. By leveraging arms transfers to build capacity for our most critical systems, we create a virtuous cycle, reindustrializing America while building a more responsive arsenal for our friends around the world. A stronger American industrial base means more reliable and more rapid delivery of the world's best capabilities to our partners. This effort is also directly linked to the department's broader acquisition transformation. By removing unnecessary regulations, empowering greater flexibility for our acquisition professionals, and providing industry bigger, longer deals, we are accelerating delivery timelines and providing industry the certainty they need to invest far more of their own capital, a win-win model for the American taxpayer and the allied warfighter. This transformation is underpinned by generational changes to the department's structure. The realignment of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Defense Technology Security Administration under my organization is a powerful union of our acquisition system, industrial base, and defense sales. The move establishes a single line of authority for the execution of our arms transfers and broader security cooperation enterprise, with a focus on one goal: delivering capability faster while strengthening America's industrial might. A new Assistant Secretary of War for International Armaments Cooperation within the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment will orchestrate these efforts, proactively guiding everything from cooperative development and production to securing allied investment in the U.S. We greatly appreciate Congress's recognition of the increasing importance and scope of this mission in your continued commitment to resource it appropriately. The United States develops and manufactures the most effective weapon systems in the world. And thanks to President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's leadership, we are taking decisive America First action to make the entire defense sales enterprise a strategic driver of our national power. Over the last year, we've made significant progress implementing executive actions and this committee's recommendations to ensure we are delivering capability at speed while empowering our partners to take on a greater share of the burden of their own self-defense. This transformation is a direct result of your efforts to identify meaningful solutions to barriers in the system. And I look forward to discussing how the department is taking a more strategic and proactive approach to reform. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you for your testimony. Mr. Miller.

Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you today to speak about the work of my agency, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, or DSCA. I just have a few brief comments as I certainly associate myself with all of Honorable Duffey's comments. The strategic and economic threats posed by our adversaries underscore the compelling need for deterrence and cooperation in concert with allies and partners. And in today's geopolitical environment, the burden of defense cannot rest on any one nation alone. This principle lies at the core of DSCA's mission: building partner capacity to advance U.S. national security by strengthening global partnerships. Foreign military sales, or FMS, and security cooperation more generally are the mechanisms by which we implement and operationalize burden-sharing with our partners and allies. Defense Security Cooperation Agency staff, located at eight locations around the country and at 136 U.S. embassies abroad, are at the forefront of the administration's national security efforts. These outstanding professionals, both military and civilian, are responsible for processing more than $100 billion per year in arms transfers and billions in security cooperation funding and loans each year; for providing military education, training, and institutional capacity building to our partners so they can shoulder more of their own defense responsibilities; for training and professionalizing our own 17,000-member security cooperation workforce within the Department of War; for centrally managing and enhancing the capabilities of U.S. military groups at our embassies who interface directly with our partners; and for managing the Department of War's disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and demining activities. It is an honor to represent them in front of the committee today. Thank you.

Thank you for your testimony. We're now going to alternate between Republicans and Democrats to ask about five minutes of questions. We will begin by Chairman Emeritus Representative McCaul.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate you having this important hearing. When I was chairman, signing off on weapon sales, I thought was one of the most important duties and responsibilities of this committee. This is a committee of war and peace, and it could not be more relevant than it is today with the actions in Iran, which I fully support. Since 1979, a dark veil of terror has reigned over the Middle East, and thanks to President Trump, that shroud is being lifted. These weapons have never been more important than they are right now at this moment. Mr. Secretary Duffey, I totally agree with you: America First doesn't mean America alone. We do have allies. We help them with NATO, but they need to help us as well. And the Straits of Hormuz is a good example of that. The president has called upon our allies to help open up the straits for the global supply of energy. Unfortunately, the news today is they have denied that assistance, and it's to their own detriment. But when it comes to the sales, I set up the Arms Sales Task Force, headed up by now UN Ambassador Mike Waltz. That was a precursor to the chairman's Tiger Task Force, and I want to congratulate you, sir, on the work of that task force, and Commander Zinke for his great work on that. Because the way I look at the arms sales is it's a great not only from a military defense tool, but also from a diplomacy standpoint. This can be used to gain allies, say in the Middle East like Saudi, against our adversaries like say China. Weapons were withheld in the prior administration to Israel, to my great consternation. I passed AUKUS to get around some of these international restrictions. So there are a lot of problems that need to be fixed. One is the political bureaucracy of Congress that I think the chairman has tackled head-on. The other one is the needs that we have throughout the world. We have several conflict zones, or hot zones if you will, I call them. Started with the invasion, well, started with the implosion of Afghanistan, the Russian invasion into Ukraine, Chairman Xi's unholy alliance with Putin, threatening Taiwan, and the Ayatollah raising his ugly head in the Middle East on October the 7th, which was supposed to be Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran and troops in Syria together to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. So my question is to Mr. Secretary Duffey: as we move the THAAD system, by the way, from South Korea to the Middle East, we are being stretched very thin. And given the myriad of threats that we have, and I know some of this gets outside of your domain, sir, but what do we need to do to backfill these stockpiles? But more importantly, as we look at Ukraine as a laboratory for modern warfare systems like the drones, and I applaud Ukraine for assisting the United States in the Iran conflict to counter these dangerous Shahed drones that were made by Iran and sold to Russia, used to kill Ukrainians, now to kill Americans. What can we do not only to backfill the stockpile, which we'll be passing a supplemental bill to pay for that, but how can we move towards modernization of weapon systems like what we're seeing in the theater of the Ukraine-Russia conflict?

Congressman, thank you for your question and thank you to you and the committee for your leadership on this issue. I think it's imperative for us to be able to make the change that we need for us to have such universal commitment to the need for change. I'd like to talk about the fact that we have agreement for change on both sides of the aisle, both sides of the river, both sides of Pennsylvania Avenue, and that really creates the conditions for us to be able to make change. I think the ability to reform the FMS process is inextricably linked with our need to reform the acquisition process because as you look at what are the constraints in the FMS system, I do believe our industrial base capacity is a key constraint that really inhibits our ability to fulfill the pipeline of FMS orders that we have. And we've been working on that since at least since I first arrived in the administration and certainly following my confirmation last June. Secretary Hegseth rolled out the acquisition transformation strategy on August 7th, and I can get into that detail throughout the hearing today, but I think most importantly, what's emerged from that reform effort are deals that precede these hostilities with some of our key industrial partners, Raytheon and Lockheed, to triple or quadruple the production capacity of key munitions like Patriots, THAAD interceptors, Tomahawks, standard missile, the kinds of weapons that we rely on for the defense of our nation.

In my time limit, if the chairman would allow me one quick question. So it's asymmetric warfare now in the Straits of Hormuz. You know, we spend millions of dollars on interceptors to take down a drone that's worth maybe $2,000. That is what I'm talking about, the modern warfare that is happening in Ukraine, and Ukraine is the laboratory. What are we doing to advance that cause? Because we're not going to win certainly in terms of pricing as well when we're paying millions of dollars to take down a $2,000 drone.

Yes, sir. So we do have a partnership with Ukraine and some of their counter-UAS capabilities that are effectively low-cost, that are effective in combating the Shahed drone. We also have developed with partners the VAMPIRE system, APKWS, which is a low-cost rocket that has a high probability of kill for counter-UAS. So I do think we have emerging technologies, and then we're always working, I think we're not quite there yet, but we're putting a lot of effort into directed energy, which is a very low-cost option for counter-drone.

Excellent. Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you. Ranking Member Meeks.

I just find it ironic, just listening to Mr. McCaul, talking about Ukraine, who we don't fund, who the president has decided to end sanctions or stop or suspend sanctions on Russia, giving them billions of dollars so they can attack Ukraine, which is why President Zelenskyy has said the money that is going to now Russia as a result of the president's decision to suspend sanctions on Russian oil is going to cause more death of innocent Ukrainians. And in the testimony that I've heard thus far, not once did I hear anyone talk about what Congress's role is. Maybe we want to be more like Russia because guess what? In Russia, the Dumas have no role in oversight of Vladimir Putin. In Congress, we do. And simply what is asked is if you have a plan, if you're going to use weapons, if you're going to start a war, come to Congress because we don't have a king. We have a Congress that looks overseas and decides when to go to war. And if you're going to war, as this president has done, a war of choice, it was no imminent threat, no urgency, bring it to Congress. And yes, Congress has a right to ask questions. And when I was the chair of this committee, no matter whether it's a Democratic president or a Republican president, I had questions. And when the administration reacted in a timely fashion and answered the questions that we had, then my conscience was clear that no human rights violations were taking place. I knew what the plan would be. I knew how we were moving forward. Only in this administration is it at every single time that they can avoid coming to Congress, and maybe my Republican colleagues don't want them to come, just give all of the authority that the United States Constitution gives to Congress, give it away. Give it to the executive branch. No oversight. I heard no statements, no testimony about Congress's right to ask questions of the executive, to make determinations of whether or not and who we're selling what to and for what reasons. None. Congress has no authority, no way, the president comes up with no plan if you're talking about the current war because he's doing exactly what Vladimir Putin, Vladimir Putin tries to say that the war in Ukraine is not a war. What we're hearing now often is the administration says this is not a war. It is a war. Come to Congress. The Constitution gives one body the authority to declare war. But in this instance, we have no plan, no strategy, none that was articulated to Congress, no end game. And apparently, the administration was not prepared for this war because now, after insulting our allies, our NATO allies, insulting them and saying you're basically on your own, now he's asking for help. Where was the preparation? None. These are questions that should have been brought to Congress. So we're supposed to give up all of the authority that we have to an administration who thinks Congress shouldn't exist basically at every exchange. I don't think and I've ever heard one time in this administration we talk about what the authority is supposed to be with reference to human rights, for example. You know, the Arms Executive Sale Executive Order says, you know, it says end-use monitoring coordination group with the directive states that ensures allies and partners are complying with U.S. requirements and reducing the risk of diversion. But this coordination group is not directed to assess whether or not the U.S. origin weapons have been used to commit human rights abuses or egregious civilian harm. It seems as though the administration has deprioritized and minimized civilian harm and the monitoring of human rights abuses by foreign partners using U.S. origin weapons. I can recall a member telling me visiting one of the countries saying they were happy to be there and were looking for a good relationship, and then they talked about a bomb, and the bomb said made in USA. And he wanted to know whether or not we were made in the USA because it killed a lot of individuals, innocent civilians, etc. Yes, I want to know. And so if we're going to do some reform, the reform can't be the reform of cutting out Congress. And we could have had the weapons on a timely fashion if an administration comes back to us and let us know what the plan is, let us know what these weapons are going to be used for because that's who we are and that's our reputation. I yield back.

Ranking Member yields back. I would thank again the administration for the multiple classified briefings that they've given us from Gang of Eight to the whole of the whole of our congressional body. Looks like you want to say something.

Three.

Yes, thank the administration for all of the classified briefings, but I would also talk about the authority very briefly here because there was a question that was brought in about this. And here's what my colleague who was just speaking voted for. Use all means necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to reorganize and support the freedom of action of partners and allies including Israel to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. So I along with you voted to give the administration, any administration, the direction. Go out there and do this. We told them. We voted on it. So maybe you didn't read the resolution, I couldn't say, but I'm going to read it one more time because we voted on it. Use all means necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to reorganize and support the freedom of action of partners and allies including Israel to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. So I want to thank the administration for fulfilling what it is that we directed them to do.

We didn't direct them to go to war.

We directed them to do this.

at the rectum to go to war.

We directed them to do this.

No, we did not.

Yeah, we did. I mean, we can debate about it all day, but just damn good work. I couldn't be more proud of the work that they're doing and our service members are doing in that. I want to recognize Representative Issa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have the pleasure of sitting next to Chairman McCaul, who actually authored those words. And it's not the only time we voted that way. When Ranking Member Meeks came here in 1998 and I came two years after, Iran was a terrorist state and we were regularly, either by resolution or in the NDAA and in foreign affairs activities, urging that we use all measures necessary. And we did. For more than half a century, or almost half a century, we've used all means except the one we're using now, which has for the most part not been used practically since Ronald Reagan. And he only sunk two ships, but they built a lot more in the meantime, Mr. Chairman. I'm frustrated a little that Ranking Member Meeks, only because I'm pretty sure that particularly the representatives of DOW here today would find out there's only two things that he objects to what you do: that which you do and that which you fail to do. If we fail to stop Iran, it is our fault. If we stop Iran or try to stop Iran, it is our fault. That is true in foreign affairs and it is true at the Department of Defense, now War. My concern today is one that goes beyond just the scope of this hearing. The fact is, there's a chair empty here, not because we invited somebody and they didn't show up, but because it's outside our normal jurisdiction. The Department of Commerce is effectively not here. The BIS is not sitting in that chair. And the fact is that you all have shared jurisdiction. The definition of dual-use, and that's going to be my one and only one question, is the evolving dual-use means that almost anything, including a toy originally made in China with a chip that might come from here, can in fact kill our soldiers on the battlefield. A program that was originally devised for weapons of mass destruction now has to look at the latest ChatGPT as a possible weapon of mass destruction. In the news lately, we've been hearing in fact about AI and whether or not even American companies are going to allow us to use it to defend our nation. So I have today, and I'd ask that it be placed in the record, a statement from the SEMI, or semiconductor if you will, trade association, which estimates that there are currently $25 billion in licenses pending. Oddly enough, the Chamber says it's over $50 billion. In fact, what we have right now is a BIS over at Commerce that seems to be stalled and won't even tell us that there are in fact pending applications. I had to go to companies to find out that defense is not the problem. The problem is in fact that over there they won't tell you when you're going to get them. In fact, the haphazard nature is one in which when you put a request in, you have no idea when you're going to get it out. Can you imagine trying to sell products from the ever-greater manufacturing base in America and not knowing when you can tell your customer or if you can tell your customer they'll be able to receive it? So although last year your organizations approved $117 billion in military sales, the question I have today is, if we streamline the process, if in fact we do the right thing and make sure that Commerce is doing their job, that you're doing your job, that your coordination system, which is extensive, has timelines, and I'm repeating, timelines for every single application and secondly, whenever possible, transparency. So I'll start with you, Mr. Miller. Those are my questions because to me this is bigger than just the three of you here today.

Thank you, Congressman, for your question. The President's executive order of April last year that was cited had a specific request that we establish metrics and also a means to achieve accountability throughout the entirety of the foreign military sales system. So we have set about that in setting metrics for each step of the foreign military sales process, going back to the very beginning of whether or not what a partner has asked for is something we can reasonably action and putting a clock on that, and then walking through the entire process from when the request is made all the way out to the end of life, the closure of an FMS case after everything's been delivered and paid for. And then setting that against an end-to-end look, as Representative Zinke had mentioned, looking across that from an IT perspective that again we can have accountability and insight and data, real data, throughout every single element of that. So we are pairing both the establishment of metrics and then an IT system to track them, which is going to be a game changer for foreign military sales so we can know exactly where interventions are needed to keep the process moving. Thank you.

Chairman, I realize there isn't time for everyone to answer, so I'll ask them to put it in the record, but I'd also ask them to opine on whether in fact those timelines are implemented with your partners at Commerce. Appreciate that and ask the rest be placed in for the record. Yield back.

Representative Bera.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Folks have heard me say this a lot. I'm proud of the United States of America and what we were able to do in the 75, 80 years post-World War II in terms of rebuilding Europe, creating relative peace and stability around the world, our men and women going and protecting democracy on the Korean Peninsula. There's a lot for us to be proud of in those 80 years. I also recognize this is my 14th year in Congress on this subcommittee. When I think about the 21st century, I do think about the threat in the Indo-Pacific and in Asia and through whether it was Obama administration, Trump 1.0, Biden administration, Trump 2.0, the recognition that our greatest threat today comes out of Beijing and Xi Jinping in terms of conflict and challenging that rules-based order that we put in place in the 21st century. That's why I've focused most of my time on peace through strength, building alliances in the region and so forth. And that's why I share the Ranking Member's view on the conflict in the Middle East. Iran is a bad actor. They've been a bad actor for four decades and the Ayatollah is a horrific person and his human rights, so we're not shedding any tears there. I do want to focus a little bit on how the conflict in the Middle East is impacting Asia, but also want to ask some very direct questions. I see the Taiwan Straits as one of the biggest threats to ignite conflict. Recently, on February 26, President Trump told reporters that he was considering what to do about arms sales to Taiwan given that Mr. Xi opposes them. And he said, "I'm talking to him about it," is what he was quoted on Air Force One. I won't ask any of you to interpret what the President meant by that. That wouldn't be fair to any of you, but I would like to ask a direct question of both State and the Department of War. And remember, you're testifying in front of Congress. The six assurances going back to Ronald Reagan in 1982 have been our diplomatic strategy with regards to arms sales to Taiwan in addition to the Taiwan Relations Act. That's guided us. We don't negotiate with Beijing with regards to arms sales. In this committee, Mr. Chairman, I'm proud that in the State Department Reauthorization Act, we moved to start to codify the six assurances and I would hope that that gets taken up and codified in law. I guess I'll start with you, Under Secretary Brown. Are you aware of any move within the State Department to change the six assurances as they pertain to arms sales to Taiwan?

Representative Bera, thank you for your question. I am not aware of any move to change the six assurances. As part of those three communiques and six assurances, we have stated that we will provide Taiwan what they need for their own self-defense in that regard. Just in the last 90 days in December, we notified $11.1 billion in arms sales for Taiwan. So we continue at pace and as we discussed.

And again, I'd ask the same of the Department of War, Mr. Duffey. Are you aware of any change to our strategy with regards to the six assurances?

I'm not aware of any change within the Department of War.

Okay, great. Let me shift to the redeployment of THAAD batteries off of the Korean Peninsula. Again, I applaud the first Trump administration when we saw conflicts and saber-rattling from North Korea for the deployment of those THAAD batteries. Our friends and allies in South Korea paid a real price for it because China did use their economic coercion tools to directly impact the South Korean economy, which they're still struggling to recover from. I do have real concerns at a time where we still see North Korea saber-rattling and I understand the need to protect American assets in the Middle East and redeploy. Can either you, Under Secretary Brown, or Under Secretary Duffey, comment on how long these redeployments would be if we have an intention to restock the defensive capabilities and protection of our allies on the South Korea with THAAD?

So I think I'm not aware and can't speak to any duration of any particular redeployment of an asset. But I will say, one, I think our flexibility and our ability to redeploy assets to ensure that they meet the most poignant and urgent need across the globe is a tremendous strength of our system. Secondly, I think there's a full commitment for us to maintain the alliance with South Korea and provide whatever capability that we can. And I'll go back to what I mentioned in my opening remarks with respect to the efforts that we're making to extend the defense industrial base so we can grow our ability to acquire these weapons and ensure that we have them available wherever that need may be across the globe.

Yield back.

There's been some liberal use of the time. I didn't know if you had more. Very good. We'll go to... oh, looks like Representative Kim, are you ready or you want us to go to Representative Self? Are you ready or you want us to go to Representative Self?

Thank you very much for convening this hearing. Thank you, witnesses, for joining us. You know, last month I convened a defense industry roundtable in Orange County, California, my district. That included small and medium-sized businesses across the entire supply chain. These are the companies that are producing highly specialized components and innovative technologies that are critical to both the U.S. and our allied capability. During that roundtable, there was a consistent message that these firms want to have a seat at the table in foreign defense sales, but they lack any clear, dedicated pathway into the U.S. government or our allied ecosystems. So when I asked whether any company had a single go-to advocate inside the U.S. government to navigate the defense acquisition export process, the room went silent. You know, Mr. Miller, as the primary implementer of foreign military sales, does DSCA have or plan to have a SMB advocate office or portal so that small and medium-sized businesses can quickly identify the various opportunities in ongoing FMS cases and AUKUS-related procurements?

Thank you, Representative Kim, very much for your question. Yes, in our office, in my agency here in the NCR, we do have an industry ombudsman function where we take regular meetings and queries from industry and can help them point them in the right direction and how to engage in FMS. Be that and often times it may be that it's something that may be referred to the Commerce Department and they have abundant resources here in the United States, both here in Washington and geographically distributed. So we do have that function here. And we also engage in trade shows and other engagements, including with industry associations that represent small, medium, and large companies. Thank you.

You know, I've had innovative SMBs tell me that they are shut out of the FMS process simply because they lack security clearances or prior FMS experiences. So can you, both Mr. Brown and Mr. Miller, can you talk about what targeted reforms, like such as expedited clearance pathways or sandbox pilot programs, are the State Department and DOD acquisition and sustainment considering to lower these barriers without compromising national security?

Thank you. If it's all right, I'll start and my colleagues certainly may have something to add there. I would just point to the President's executive order 14383, the America First Arms Transfer Strategy, which talks about welcoming new entrants into the market, non-programs of record, and small and medium companies with innovative ideas to make sure that we're refreshing the technologies that are available both to our warfighters and also to our foreign partners. So I think that's a key element that's going to drive us to looking to a commercial-first approach, which Secretary Hicks has also talked about. Thank you.

I would just add to that that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and our Regional Security and Arms Transfer Office does rounds with industry. Basically, they can come in and we can talk about all the different ways they can participate in the system. So we are doing that fairly regularly. Thank you.

I want to have a conversation about AUKUS. The fiscal year 2026 NDAA incorporated core provisions of my bipartisan ARMOR Act that streamlines the expedited review process for AUKUS transfers, retransfers, and exports while eliminating unnecessary congressional notification requirements for certain low-risk items. Under Secretary Duffey and Mr. Miller, hopefully time will allow you to respond to that, since that enactment, what specific measurable reforms have your offices implemented to accelerate AUKUS Pillar II technology sharing and collaboration?

Well, thank you for your leadership on that legislation. We certainly look for every opportunity to streamline the process to help ensure that we can transfer technology to our allies and partners. We have undertaken a review of the excluded technology list to ensure that we've got that right-sized to just the most sensitive technologies. And I think what we're finding is that while the excluded technology list must exist because our most sensitive technologies we must ensure that we have traceability on the use case of those, we're finding industry still coming to terms with what is on that list and there's an over-application for licenses that are unnecessary. So we have some work to do to communicate with industry so that they understand what flexibilities that you all have helped us put in place.

Would Mr. Miller have time to respond briefly?

Thank you very much. I don't have much to add to what Honorable Duffey said, just on his last point. Again, thanks to the leadership of this committee and to yourself personally. We've extended and the administration's efforts, we have extended great flexibility to exports for Australia and the UK. But there's I think concern among industry that they can't make use of those flexibilities. So working with our colleagues in the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and the rest, I think making them more comfortable with that I think will speed licensing that's germane to AUKUS Pillar II. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

Representative Jacobs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Under Secretary Duffey, nice to see you again. I first want to ask about the $210 million contract that the department just signed with Tomer, an Israeli state-owned company to produce the next generation XM1208 155mm cluster munition. I'll be clear, I criticized the Biden administration when it transferred existing U.S. stockpile cluster munitions to Ukraine, weapons that were already in our inventory and given in the context of repelling a full-scale Russian invasion. This is different. This is a no-bid contract to purchase newly manufactured cluster munitions from a foreign government, one that has already been credibly reported to have used this very weapon in Lebanon. No American company has produced cluster munitions in over a decade and more than 111 countries have banned them and the Army's own solicitation says the shells are designed to effectively engage imprecisely located enemies within an area, which is a very weird clinical way of saying that they saturate a zone with nine bomblets, each containing 1,200 tungsten shards and hope you hit something military. What is the intended operational use of the XM1208?

I'm not an operator, so I don't have expertise on how we would employ that weapon.

Okay. Is it for stockpile replenishment or is the department planning to deploy these munitions in an active theater, including the current conflict with Iran?

I'd have to consult with my colleagues and get back to you.

Okay. Well, a reminder that testing conditions and real-world dud rates are very different things. So even though you might try and say that this dud rate meets the cluster munition policy requirements, as we learned in Lebanon in 2006, when U.S.-origin cluster munitions had a 40 percent failure rate. And you're not just restocking, the Army has solicited bids for domestic production capacity of 30,000 rounds per year. That's not maintenance, that's expansion. Will you commit to notifying this committee before any XM1208 munitions are transferred to a foreign partner or deployed in combat operations?

I'll commit to following whatever the legal procedures are for committee notification.

All right. Well, that's not reassuring, Mr. Secretary. Congress has a statutory role in reviewing weapons that pose this level of risk to civilians and we intend to exercise it. Next, Mr. Brown, I'd like to ask you about the civilian harm mitigation. We set up a system in 2023 at the State Department that both PM and DRL managed, called the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance or CHIRG process to investigate reports of civilian harm perpetrated by partner governments suspected of using U.S.-origin weapons and to recommend subsequent actions in response. Mr. Brown, what is the current status of the CHIRG process at the State Department?

Thank you for your question. The State Department currently evaluates arms sales in accordance with the 2018 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. If you look at that policy, it also includes references to evaluating arms sales in accordance with human rights as well as international humanitarian law amongst other things like counterterrorism, non-proliferation and otherwise. That guides our process in which we evaluate arms sales.

Okay. Well, just this last year, this very committee included in the State Authorization accompanying report that the Department of State's end-use monitoring efforts should, to the extent feasible, verify that defense articles transferred to foreign governments are used in accordance with the purposes outlined in the letter of acceptance or other relevant agreements, including that such equipment is not implicated in incidents of civilian harm. So can you tell me how many staff are working on civilian harm and their reporting structure within PM?

As our office of well, we have a number of people that work on arms sales in our Regional Security and Arms Transfer Office. It's the responsibility of all the individuals that process arms sales for the department in accordance with the CAT policy to look at that. As far as other offices, I can't speak to how many they have.

Okay. How many cases are in the review pipeline of the CHIRG?

We are not observing the CHIRG pipeline at this time. We're not reviewing those cases.

Okay. And last year, the Government Accountability Office released two recommendations to improve the CHIRG process. I guess you just said you're not even doing the CHIRG at all, so I can assume that means you are not implementing the GAO's recommendations for the CHIRG process?

We gave appropriate responses to the GAO at the time.

Yeah, I disagree that they were appropriate. Mr. Brown, why do you believe that accepting reporting from external parties would be impractical when the department has experience in processing this very kind of external reporting? For example, for years the department managed the Human Rights Reporting Gateway, which external organizations used to report suspected gross violations of human rights by foreign military units the U.S. partnered with to aid its Leahy vetting process.

In my role as the SBO in PM, we coordinate with the department on these issues, again referring to the CAT policy from the 2018 Trump administration. That is the policy that we're currently using.

Okay. So it's clear that this administration doesn't care at all about civilian harm by both their actions and your answers. That is disheartening and also illegal. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Representative Barr.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend the Trump administration, Secretary Brown, for reforming and expediting military sales. I also commend the Trump administration in its recent decision to allow $11 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, one of the largest in history, including 82 HIMARS launchers, 60 self-propelled howitzer systems and anti-armor and ground combat systems. I'm glad to see that the Taiwan Defense Minister says this review process is proceeding on schedule. This is a historic sale and I think reasserts deterrence in the Western Pacific. However, as you well know, we still have a $21 billion backlog of U.S. weapons intended for Taiwan. Mr. Brown, what needs to happen to expedite the delivery of these weapons to Taiwan? This was a major topic of conversation both times that I've traveled to Taipei with AIT. Obviously, TECRO is raising this with members as well.

Thank you for your question. We continue to look at ways to make sure that we can expedite those sales that are on contract to Taiwan. As you know, much of that is the has been the F-16s to Taiwan. So we continue to work that. I don't know if our DOD colleagues have anything additional to add, but we continue to push that issue.

I think the F-16s are 8 billion, there's 108 Abrams tanks that's 2 billion, there's howitzers, missile and precision strike systems, Javelins, other systems, drones, torpedoes, various munitions. There's quite a bit in this backlog. And outside of Epic Fury, this is a really critical theater and I just I know you all are on it. I just would like to send those signals to the defense industrial base to get moving. My colleague Mr. Wittman, my colleague on the China Select Committee, Mr. Wittman has legislation called the Porcupine Act, which would help expedite the process and ensure Taiwan receives the defense articles it has purchased in a timely manner. Do you view this as positive legislation, helpful? Or are you all tracking that legislation?

Sir, I'm afraid I'm not tracking the legislation, but I'd be glad to take a look at it and provide you our views.

Yeah, we want to work with both DOD and State on this, Mr. Duffey, and it would it would define Taiwan as a NATO Plus country, meaning shorter approval timelines for arms sales to Taiwan and a higher cost threshold requiring approval amongst other things. So thanks for taking a look at that and again, Congress is very, very and this committee, we are very focused on the Pacific theater as much as what we're and let's face it, I mean, the defense industrial base is is strained because of what's happening in the Middle East. Very important national security objectives being accomplished in the Middle East right now, but it it means we've got to redouble our efforts to make sure that we're looking at multiple theaters at the same time. Mr. Brown, let me ask you another question about now back to the Middle East. I do remain concerned about Israel's qualitative military edge given Turkey's increasingly hostile actions toward Israel and its stepped up military presence in the region, specifically in Syria. However, arms sales to Turkey do not have to take Israel's QME into consideration as is the case with Middle Eastern countries. Given the United States' long-standing objective of maintaining Israel's QME, do you believe arms sales to Turkey should be assessed for their potential negative ramifications on Israel's security?

I think in your original statement there with Turkey being a NATO country, we obviously our commitment to Israel is ironclad. We are not assessing Israel's, excuse me, Turkey's sales to Turkey as part of QME. We do for the rest of the region. So we we can take that back and and come back to you on that.

Well, Turkey obviously important NATO partner, but we also have to I think prioritize the QME policy of the United States with respect to Israel, especially given what's happening in the Middle East right now. Finally, Mr. Brown, on ally burden sharing, while many of our European allies have increased defense spending since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, the United States continues to provide a disproportionate share of NATO's overall defense capabilities. What steps can Congress take to encourage our European allies to meet and sustain the defense spending benchmarks?

The President has been very pointed on getting Israel to pay more for their defense. We have pushed them to get to 5 percent, 3.5 in direct capabilities, 1.5 for support. There is a lot more that can be done to invest in the industrial base support of the Arms American First Arms Transfer Strategy is a huge part of that. Some of the legislation that I asked there is part of what Congress can do to make sure that we stay on course. This is a different this is a different effort in different time. I think we can be successful here because of the three-legged stool that's about we're doing the whole of government approach. It is the approval process, it's the acquisition process, and it's the defense industrial base. Anything and any legislation that helps us move the variety of pieces to get to success would be welcomed by Congress.

My time is expired, but I applaud the administration's holding our our NATO allies accountable for their for their obligations. I yield back.

Representative Huizenga.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to take a slightly different tack but a similar similar situation with as Mr. Barr was describing. The Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR is an antiquated Cold War era agreement that was never designed to address the complexities or advancement in today's military technology. As the United States has deepened defense cooperation and burden sharing through alliances like AUKUS, the MTCR has not evolved to meet these needs. AUKUS should be seen for what it is, a case study in how to enhance defense cooperation and it can be a vital tool in the foreign policy arsenal. Since day one, I've been a strong advocate for the AUKUS partnership, including by shepherding in Congress passing my bipartisan bill, the AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act, which laid the groundwork for implementing Pillar One of the AUKUS agreement. This measure took the entire idea of the AUKUS partnership past just press release and photo ops and actually put some some physical enhancements to it here with the submarines. However, MTCR's strong assumption for denial for Category One items to allied countries remains the leading barrier for future collaboration on AUKUS Pillar Two issues. I then introduced a bill, H.R. 3068, to allow for a defense trade exemption for AUKUS partners. However, as we sit here today, we have some Democrat colleagues who can drone on about the importance of having strong partners and securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. Every single one of those people voted against my bill, H.R. 3068, to do just that. And let me be clear, 3068 only applies to AUKUS countries and no one else. The only people cheering alongside the Democrats after that vote were Russia and China because once again, we've deferred our sovereign decision-making process to the whims of a multilateral institution built for a much different era. So our allies and partners tell us the MTCR is a major inhibitor to enhancing defense cooperation, but some would rather sit behind red tape and let American national interests and the defense industrial base suffer. The urgency for Congress to do something about that is cannot be understated. So I too applaud the Trump administration on a few of the things that they've been doing for issuing executive orders 14268 and 14383, demonstrating both the desire and leadership to revitalize the foreign defense sales process by reducing the regulatory burdens of the past, increasing the reliable delivery of American defense crown jewels to our allies, and safeguarding those technologies from America's adversaries. So reforming the MTCR is another opportunity for America to deepen the defense capacity with our closest allies while using American technology and certainly no bureaucratic process should stand in the way of that collaboration. So I'm going to go quickly just go down the line, give you an opportunity. Would you, could you support, do you support the underlying goal of H.R. 3068 to end the legislative requirement for a presumption of denial for exporting MTCR controlled items to AUKUS partners? Mr. Brown.

In collaboration with our ACN Bureau at the State Department, we support we've overcome the presumption of denial in every case in basically Australia and the UK and would support reducing the number of things on the ETL that are created by having missile technology language in that.

I'll interpret that as a yes. Okay. Mr. Duffey.

Yes, support all opportunities.

Okay. Mr. Miller.

I'll defer to my two colleagues and just offer that I would point also to the Department of State's policy change as it relates to MTCR Category One items to treat them as manned aircraft and that will have benefits for Australia, UK, and other partners. Thank you.

Great. Mr. Brown, Executive Order 14268 from April 9 of 2025 required a reevaluation of restrictions imposed by the MTCR in Category One technologies in consideration for supplying specific partners with these items. Can you give us a status update on that analysis?

Could you repeat the question, please?

You were required under the executive order from April to reevaluate the restrictions imposed by the MTCR on Category One technologies in consideration for supplying specific partners with these items. So that can you give us an update on that analysis?

Yes, sir. Thank you. I mean, partly what Mr. Miller spoke to this, we in September of last year, we changed Category One items to be able to be treated like manned aircraft. And we've updated our policy throughout the interagency with our DOW colleagues to do that. As we continue the review the policy, we review it in the context of not just that, but also the accepted technologies list and our colleagues in ACN Bureau, they're also looking at this and support the efforts that we're doing. So we continue that, we'll continue to look at this throughout the entire arms sales reform process.

My time's expired, but I look forward to working with you all on this. Thanks.

Representative Jayapal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For far too long, the United States has operated under the false assumption that war is always the answer. There is a very good reason why the founders gave the power to declare war to Congress, not to the executives, so that we could carefully assess and debate the many costs of war and so that the serious decision to undertake war would be made by the elected representatives of this body. It's also why Congress has ensured that we have a role to carefully assess and approve arms sales to other partners and allies, not only the executive, so that we ensure that they are not using our weapons to harm civilians, to commit human rights abuses, or to flout international humanitarian laws. And yet here we are, entrapped in another illegal, costly war of choice in Iran, undertaken by the executive with no authority from the Congress. A war that has already killed at least 13 U.S. troops, displaced millions of people, and driven up gas prices right here at home. Under Secretary Duffey, given that you're responsible for the acquisition of defense articles, can you tell me how many taxpayer dollars have been spent on the war in Iran and how much do you expect that the United States will need to spend to replenish our stockpiles?

Representative, I don't have the figures on the dollars that have been spent or what would be required to replenish those. Where I'm focused on is building an industrial base that will be able to replenish that for our future.

But you don't have an answer on how much we've spent. Let me give it to you just from public reporting. The first week of the war cost over $11 billion and now it's being reported that the administration is planning to request 50 billion in supplemental funding. That's just the first week. A projection from the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates that the war will directly cost American taxpayers $65 billion and will lead to an economic loss of up to 210 billion. Just imagine, for anyone who's listening, just imagine what we could do to bring down the cost of living for Americans at home with that money. 65 billion would be enough to do any one of these things: end homelessness in America, restore the ACA subsidies for healthcare for nearly two years, modernize all our U.S. public libraries, and cover a decade of teachers' out-of-pocket classroom expenses, or cover the daily nutrition benefits for every American that relies on SNAP for each day of the war. Now on multiple occasions, the administration pushed through weapon sales to the United Arab Emirates and Israel without clearance from our ranking member, Greg Meeks, who has yet to receive answers to key oversight questions from the administration. Mr. Brown, why has the administration repeatedly blown through this long-standing practice of seeking clearance from the ranking member before approving sales?

I assume you're discussing emergency notification of arms sales to Israel that happened a couple of weeks ago. As you can see in the Middle East, the emergency exists. Those are capabilities that our allies and partners, in this case Israel, needed for their own self-defense and operations. It is available to us as legislation in the Arms Export Control Act and we notified the Hill as we were doing that.

Mr. Brown, this has happened on multiple occasions and these authorities are only supposed to be used when there is an emergency and when the transfer of weapons is in the national security interest of the United States. They're not supposed to be abused as loopholes for avoiding congressional oversight. So answer me this, Mr. Brown, yes or no, is it in our national security interest to allow weapons to be used against civilians?

We are not using we're not allowing weapons...

I'm just asking you if it's in our national security interest.

National security interest to transfer weapons to our allies and partners. ...allies and partners.

Is it in our national security interest to allow our weapons to be used to perpetrate human rights abuses or commit acts of genocide?

We are, again, we are not...

You're not answering me about whether it's in our national security interest to do those things.

It is our national security interest to support our allies and partners, and that's why we used the emergency declaration to make sure they had the tools they needed to be able to defend themselves and...

Is it in our national, Mr. Brown, is it in our national security interest to allow foreign governments to unilaterally drag the United States into war?

Again, it's in our national security interest to support our allies and partners.

I'm asking you a different question than the one you're answering. Lastly, when the United States becomes aware of a country...

Representative Self is recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

...engaging in repeated violations, it's, it's too bad I didn't get to finish, but I do yield back and I wish you could answer those questions.

Representative Self is recognized.

I want to associate myself with the...

I just want to, you cut Ms. Jayapal off, but you've given other members time, so I think I've given it back to the other side, but her time had expired and I think I gave it back in spades to the other side. So I certainly try to play fair, but not going to lose any sleep over this.

Thank you, Chairman. I will start with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle seem to be awfully concerned about the 13 dead service members and the 65 billion that they keep quoting. I will just comment that we left under the Biden administration some 80 billion dollars worth of equipment in Afghanistan when we left, and then we also left 13 dead at Abbey Gate, one of the most disastrous, despicable moments in U.S. military history. Just a comment to even the scale there. Now, I've been very interested in some of your comments, metrics for FMS process, Mr. Miller, I think that's an excellent idea, and the acquisition process. So DSCA has about 35 feet, if I remember correctly, of wall space in one room dedicated to the FMS process. It shows that we required, and I'm hoping you can update some of my information, Mr. Miller. It shows that we need 19 signatures in order to approve an FMS procurement for non-ally countries. Now, I don't pretend to believe that it takes 19 signatures for us to do one job, the job that one person in Japan can do, for instance. I do believe that we are more risk-averse and that bureaucrats are shielded from the ability to spread the blame amongst 19 people rather than one assuming responsibility. I also note that we had during the Vietnam War 51 prime contractors, defense contractors, 51. Today we are down to five prime contractors. There are virtually no medium-sized contractors because once a small contractor decides not to go through the valley of death and they get procured by one of the five big primes, I don't believe that's fueling innovation, it's feeding bureaucracy. And I will tell you the five primes seem to be content to protect their legacy systems. Look, Ukraine is innovating in real time on the battlefield as they go. So I want to also mention that before we had an acquisition corps, in the 16 years between 1975 when Vietnam fell and 1991 when we took a very powerful military, which we frankly don't have today, to Desert Storm, the Army alone fielded five major weapon systems, the big five we call them, five major weapon systems in 16 years, and frankly, I don't think we could do that today. So my first question to you, Mr. Miller, is the bottom-line question. Given the EOs and the process that we've talked about already for my colleagues, the question is, has there been significant improvement to FMS since the 2025 EO? And examples, please.

Congressman, thank you very much for your question, and I appreciate your interest in the FMS wall walk. It is also available now online, so it is available digitally as well. And I would just second what you've mentioned about making sure we're looking at our process holistically, so we're looking at all steps in it to make sure we're operating efficiently. We were very proud to contribute to both executive orders that have been cited by this committee today because I think the practitioners who are engaged in the system know where it could be improved. And we were really excited to work with our colleagues at the White House and State Department and Commerce Department to suggest some of those improvements, some of which were adopted and we're very pleased by that. So I would offer, again as I mentioned previously, the establishment of metrics has been I think foundational and long needed. The development as we are to an IT tracking system that could look end-to-end at the work that we are doing. We took the FMS...

Mr. Miller, those are generalities. Let me ask you a specific. The Harpoon missile. Saudi Arabia paid, I understand, to restart the production line, and yet so they stand with more priority than Taiwan. Frankly, given the last couple of weeks' operation in the Middle East, there is nothing for Saudi Arabia to shoot a Harpoon at anymore. So why do we have Saudi Arabia standing in line for Harpoons prior to Taiwan, for instance, when Taiwan could use the Harpoon missile as a deterrent factor?

Thank you for your question. In 2023, I signed out guidance to all the implementing agencies for military sales to prioritize Taiwan above all other requirements. That remains standing guidance. So in the matter of whether there was a competition between the provision of Harpoon to Saudi Arabia or to Taiwan, Taiwan would take priority. It is also a capability that they're working to provide to them, and I credit my colleagues across the Department of War and State for the number of authorities and the authorities provided by Congress to facilitate the provision of that capability to Taiwan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To preclude any arguments over time, I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Before I go to Representative Lieu, I want to submit something for the record, and that is simply a copy of House Resolution 559, which I was referencing previously, which does resolve to use all means necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and, to continue on reading it, to recognize and support the freedom of action of partners and allies, including Israel, to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The authorization that we gave them to conduct some of these operations and as well a list of those who voted for it as well, submitting that for the record without objection. And that, now recognize Representative Lieu.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Under Secretary Duffey, thank you for being here today. I have some questions for you. The Department of Defense has a missiles shortage in the war against Iran, correct?

That is not correct. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, President Trump have all declared that we have the munitions we need to prosecute this action.

I don't think you're telling the truth because the President held an emergency meeting on March 6 with all the top defense contractors literally talking about the missile shortage and why we have to quadruple missile production. So let me ask you a question about what the Washington Post recently reported, quote, "The military also is drawing from its supply of sophisticated Patriot interceptors in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere to bolster its defense against Iran's drone and ballistic missile attacks." Is that true?

I'm sorry, can you repeat the question, the statement?

Sure. "The military also is drawing from its supply of sophisticated Patriot interceptors in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere to bolster its defense against Iran's drone and ballistic missile attacks." Is that true?

I'm not aware of any transfer of stock from other combatant commands.

So the U.S. is in fact not taking Patriots from the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere to move to the war against Iran?

I'm not aware of the transfers, no.

I'm not asking if you... Okay, all right. So the Washington Post just got that wrong. There's no transfers of Patriots from other places.

I'm not aware of the transfer.

Okay. Well, I'm just trying, I'm not trying to be difficult here. Is it that you personally aren't aware or that this is not happening?

If I'm not aware of them, I'm not sure how I can speak to whether or not they're happening.

Okay, so it could be happening, just you personally may not know about it.

I'm not aware of the transfer of weapons from other theaters.

So the Pentagon has stated that in the first two days of the Iran war, 5.6 billion dollars was spent on munitions alone. These include Patriots and THAAD missiles and Tomahawks. Do you know what the number is as of today approximately spent on munitions?

I'm not aware of the cost.

Okay. Do you know what the expenditure rate is for these missiles?

My focus is on ensuring that we have the industrial base of the future to supply the weapons that we need for today and future conflict.

Well, then let me ask you this. How long would it take to replace the munitions that we've already spent in the Iran war?

I'm not aware of the number of munitions that we've spent, but I can say that because of the result of the work that we started last summer and that meeting that President Trump held on March 6, which was a continuation of efforts that began long before hostilities started in the Middle East, we have cut deals with industry to triple or quadruple the production capacity.

So that's very, that's very, very interesting. So let's just go through some numbers. THAAD missiles are made at about eight per month by Lockheed Martin for a total of only about 96 a year, correct?

Prior to our, the deals that we cut with industry, that is correct.

Sure. So let's talk about these amazing deals that you keep hyping. How long would it take for Lockheed to actually quadruple production?

They've already started making the investment to increase that ramp.

Yeah, so well let me answer it for you since you don't want to tell the American people. In their own press release, over three years. And let's say they do this three years from now and manage to make 400 THAAD missiles a year. Do you know how many Iranian drones there are estimated? About, just give a ballpark number.

Thankfully, it doesn't require a THAAD missile to shoot down an Iranian drone.

No, I got it. Over 80,000 Iranian drones. So let's talk about Patriots and THAADS right now and how much they cost. So how much is a THAAD missile?

It's about 11 million dollars, I believe.

Okay. Recent estimates are 12 to 15, but we'll go with your 11 million. How about a Patriot missile?

4 million dollars.

Okay. How about an Iranian drone?

35,000 dollars.

Okay, or as low as 20,000. So it's like launching Cadillacs at baseballs. This is completely not sustainable. Not only do we not have enough Patriots or THAADS, they're also massively expensive. And I want the administration and you to come up with a plan as to how we deal with this asymmetry. And then let me now show you a video. [Video plays.] This is a result of an Iranian drone strike on a facility in Oman. Even with our superior weapons, we cannot stop some of these strikes. And let me tell you what Donald Trump said yesterday. "They weren't supposed to go after all these other countries in the Middle East. Nobody expected that, we were shocked." Complete dereliction of duty on the part of the Commander in Chief and the people under him. I yield back.

The chair now recognizes the great representative from Ohio, Mr. Davidson.

Thank you, Chairman. It is a very timely hearing and foreign military sales are a critical part of our strategic posture. Aside from this committee, I serve on the Financial Services Committee where I am the chairman for National Security and Illicit Finance, and one of the most important things we're doing right now is modernizing the Defense Production Act. So we just marked up a bill earlier this month to kind of keep pace with how the administration has been rightly focused on readiness, and frankly, it's a continuation of what President Trump did in his first term to get our supply chains really focused on America's national security and our interests. He's focused heavily on things like really basic things like steel. If you can't make your own steel, you're not really going to stay secure as a country. He's focused on all kinds of things with critical minerals. And when you look at, you know, the use of the EXIM Bank, I mean, really thoughtful on Project Vault. So, Mr. Duffey, could you speak to the administration in terms of what work is being done to increase readiness and to modernize the defense industrial base?

Thank you, Congressman, for your leadership on the Financial Services Committee. The Defense Production Act is an absolutely essential authority that we employ to ensure that we've got a resilient industrial base. I think, you know, the key for us is to ensure that we have awareness of where are those vulnerabilities in the supply chain. Oftentimes it takes a failure of a business or withdrawal of a business for us to recognize that we have a shortage somewhere down the supply chain. And so I think, you know, our effort has been how do we create a commercial model within the acquisition system so that we get the defense industry to invest in their own money, which is what we've done with these munitions deals over the last two months and will extend to other platforms, but also to employ the Defense Production Act and the industrial base assessment and sustainment fund to identify those areas where we have a fragile element of the supply chain, such as a business that's a sole source supplier for a unique or bespoke part, and having that authority and that ability to provide the funds to sustain that business or invest in that business so they can achieve the growth we need to keep a resilient industrial base is absolutely critical.

Yeah, and I think, you know, de-risking our supply chain, particularly with China, but certainly other vulnerabilities has just been such a strength for the Trump administration, frankly, both terms. And it is frankly far broader than just defense. I mean, we saw it used, you know, during the COVID era, for example, for a broader things. And so, you know, the authority ultimately resides in Treasury, but obviously the Department of War administers a lot of these funds and, you know, we look forward to continuing to work with the administration. So if you have thoughtful ideas, we still haven't found a way to get things through the Senate. So hopefully we can resolve that, you know, critical choke point in the defense industrial base in our own sort of product development here in the legislative process. You know, foreign military sales is the real topic of the hearing. And I've worked on that, including with the support of my friend and colleague Mr. Zinke's bills and my own bills addressing with no revolving doors where people can, you know, literally authorize a contract and then go straight from federal government service back to the industry where they authorized the contract. We want to turn those kinds of things off to be good stewards of the American people's tax dollars and frankly the public trust. So Mr. Brown, I wonder if you could highlight some of the guardrails that we might consider putting in place and that we already do have in place on FMS.

In the FMS system, we look at every case on a case-by-case basis. We are trying to energize the foreign military sales system. As I stated at the top, it was $330 billion. About $103 billion of that was the foreign military sales system. We work very closely with our Department of War colleagues on using a variety of tools to make sure that we can accelerate the cases, that we can get the cases out the door, but also provide the capabilities and needs to our allies and partners. That includes the evaluations that I mentioned earlier on the Conventional Arms Transfer Act in accordance with the Trump administration CAT policy. Some of the guardrails in regards to foreign military sales, we want to make sure that they go to the right partners for the right reasons for the right capabilities. If you're looking at it through the lens of the American First Arms Transfer Strategy, we want to be able to deliver the exquisite all the way down to the scalable and can deliver it on time and good enough munitions that we can deliver a capability, especially in the strike areas for our allies and partners.

Yeah, I like the focus on lethality and getting it out to our partners in particular. And when I look at like the exchange you had with Mr. Self, I thought highlighted the human element that needs to be there. What is really the priority? You could make a policy decision about the priority is one region or another or one partner or another or particularly one technology or another. But 19 sign-offs in an age of AI, we can surely automate some of that and streamline it so everybody's more aware. But the human component needs to be there. I really fear that the streamlining is broken except when we want to fast-track something and bypass Congress. I hope that we can make our own streamlined process. And I think that's been the intent behind the committee's work. I thank Mr. Zinke in particular for it and I yield back.

Thank you. And now we turn to the member from Delaware, Ms. McBride.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Reforming America's defense sales is certainly a worthy topic of discussion, but I have to say it's inconceivable to me that we are not having a different hearing today. Two weeks ago, this administration launched the United States into a war of choice without congressional authorization, seemingly without planning, without any concrete objectives, and without this committee conducting any semblance of oversight. This is now the second time that this committee has met since the President launched a war on Iran. So I have to ask, how on earth are we not having a hearing on that today? How do we not have a hearing even scheduled specifically on the most significant military operation in the Middle East in decades? It has been more than two weeks of fighting. Are we not going to have a hearing to even tackle why we are at war? Does the President have any idea? Because it doesn't seem like he does and no one in the administration can give us a concrete, direct, and consistent answer on why Americans are risking their lives overseas right now. Is it regime change? Maybe yes, maybe no. Is it nuclear weapons? It was until it wasn't. Have we achieved our evolving objectives? We have, but also we haven't. This President has all but admitted he could end this war whenever he wants to, but he is keeping it going. That is by definition a war of choice, this President's choice. Just this morning, actually, a loyalist to this President, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, resigned in protest to this reckless war of choice, saying that Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States and that this war serves no benefit to the American people. So why are we not having a hearing on a foreign policy that is spending over a billion dollars a day on that war rather than on needs here at home? We could have a hearing on the fact that we've replaced one repressive supreme leader with another, except this one is even more hardline. We could have a hearing about how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs warned the President that war would likely result in the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, which the President in all of his infinite wisdom dismissed. Now, gas prices for my constituents are up 20 percent since the start of the war. We could have a hearing on the fact that we've already lost 13 service members in this unauthorized conflict. We could have a hearing on the fact that there was an intelligence lapse that resulted in American arms killing 165 schoolchildren and teachers in Iran. We could have a hearing on the fact that this war is boosting Russia's oil revenues, ultimately bankrolling Putin's war in Ukraine, making a peace deal even harder. We could have a hearing about how our war of choice in Iran is giving China, which continues to have its sights set on Taiwan, critical information about our operational capabilities. Or we could have a hearing about how this administration essentially planned for none of these factors in preparation for this war. Our service members, our foreign service officers are showing up to do their jobs and they're doing it without any real answers from the administration. The American people continue to fund this war without any real answers from this administration. The least we can do in Congress is our damn job and get real answers. But since this is specifically the topic of this hearing, the administration requested moving back to Taiwan that this committee expedite our review and approve two major arms packages for Taiwan in January totaling about $15 billion. We followed through with that. Yet following the President's call with the President of China last month, reports indicate the administration is now delaying formal notification of those same packages. So my question for you, Mr. Brown, the administration asked us to move quickly, we did. Why is the administration now delaying and what is the purpose of that delay?

Thank you for your question, Representative McBride. I would say that in regards to Taiwan, in the last 90 days, we have moved $11.1 billion to Taiwan. So in regards to overall have we delayed moving things to Taiwan, we haven't. Over the last 10 years, we've moved $40 billion. As far as deliberation on arms sales and notification for future sales, that's something that we're not prepared to share today, but happy to coordinate and work with this committee in the future as we look to move Taiwan arms sales.

Can you guarantee that conversations between our President and the President of China have not resulted in any planned delays moving forward?

I am not privy to the conversations between the President and the President of China. Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you. A couple questions really quick. Just to remind everyone, in the history of Congress, there has not been one foreign military sale that Congress has ever disapproved. Congress is notorious for delaying, but there isn't one example where Congress has actually been successful in saying no. So the congressional notification process is built around delay. But if it doesn't change the outcome, then why are we doing it? Because when I talk to the industry leaders, they're aghast with the amount of paperwork and bureaucracy behind it, but it doesn't change the outcome. The process would have to be this committee would have to vote on it, it would go to the floor, and the Senate would have to do the same. But and then you'd have to have a number so great that it would override a veto. It's never happened. And yet we have created an enormous bureaucracy. So I'm interested in the IT and the database. To me, when we have a database, one is I'm anxious to know when you think the database will be completed. And your thoughts on whether that database, because Article I, we have an obligation for oversight. And I can't think of a better way to oversight than actually have a database which doesn't exist today, but if it does, I assume that that database will show what system is in place, what office is accountable for it, and when the expectation is for delivery. I would think that would be at least three of the columns. But my kind of thoughts are that if you have a database, then the committees of jurisdiction should have access to that database, as we do with the FMS only list or the US munitions list. And that should suffice because that's the guide. That's the guide that you would use to hold people accountable, to make sure that someone's in charge and held accountable, because that's the tool I think that you would use to manage the system. And I would think this body should have access to that, at least the committees of jurisdiction, the ranking member and the chair, so if they do have questions on it, they can look with some degree of at least certainty. So one is it when do you expect the database to completed be completed and what do we know what do we do what do we need what do you need for us to to expedite it?

Thank you very much Congressman for your question. As you say we're we're quite excited about the development of this end-to-end look at foreign military sales. We already have well-established metrics for certain aspects of the process and that's already completed and that is from when a partner makes a request to when we come to them with an offer so the LOR to LOA process. That's done. Our colleagues at the Army are are this is not a competitive thing but our colleagues at the Army are furthest along. They have provided the most data and we expect to have an end-to-end look at their cases which are about 38 percent of the total in the coming months. We also have a task under the executive order to provide information on our metrics and provide them publicly so we intend to do that as well. I would offer that would be I think an elements of our our development of cases. I think that'll be a useful way to show our progress and how we're doing.

Is is the database integrated between Department of Commerce, Department of War and State?

Thank you. The Department of State has done some of its own work related to the DCS system our colleagues in DDTC under under Mr. Brown. So they already are publishing their metrics for license approval on their website. So they're a bit ahead of us and we're looking to catch up with them. So that but they are separate at this time.

You is it separate because you're on they're on a different system or is the is the vision to integrate into one database?

Well sir they are they are quite separate in terms of the data sources they draw from and candidly the complexity of developing FMS numbers versus direct commercial sales numbers which are licensing metrics which are sort of wholly sort of retained by the Department of State in concert with the Department of War in in one or two systems. So it's more complicated on the FMS system sir.

Is the vision to have one database where someone in charge can can look down at at whether it's an ITAR or FMS only or a system and say this is where it's at?

Thank you for the question. At this time the the challenge I mean we are we are head down focused on making sure we can achieve this for foreign military sales. Certainly that could be something that we look to integrate fully with the DCS system in the future but we're really committed to doing our part on the FMS side for right now.

Was there anything you need from Congress to to expedite it?

Not at this time no. We're able to resource this with our resources from collections from our partners and and a bit of Title 10 resourcing as well.

And lastly would you think it would be a good idea I mean to revamp the congressional notification to use that as a basis to the list?

I would have to defer to to Mr. Brown on the matters of congressional notification.

I'll give myself an extra minute because I'll give I'll give the gentleman from Mr. Sherman an extra minute too.

So first of all as Mr. Miller said we're in the DCS case in direct commercial sales we are already posting the timelines. We have chat boxes you can go into the site and search. You can see how long it takes to process a license. That is out there basically in the DDTC website. You can see that information and we obviously process about 26,000 licenses a year about 2,100 a month and you can see you can see that data that's there. It's almost like a stock market ticker. In regards to congressional notifications if you could give me a little more context to what you're looking for there.

I'm running on my time. Mr. Chairman do you have question?

Well I've got a few and I would hope that we would continue the tradition I've seen in this Congress over 30 years where the Democrats and Republicans would both have equal amounts of of time. I know that you had asked some questions earlier than five minutes here or six minutes here although I realize that I am the only Democratic member currently here and maybe I It is the chair's discretion. I would hope the in my 30 years sir the discretion has always been equally divided and if we're going to It is the chair's discretion. You may ask a question sir. Well thank you. Now Mr. Duffey we're using a lot of weapons first Ukraine now Iran who knows what weapons we'll need to invade Greenland. We need to get our defense plants operating 24/7. That means paying people overtime. Is the defense department paying more per system given the fact that you're going to be asking our defense contractors to work overtime?

We have a standard fixed price contract which sets the cost per missile as fixed and so if the contractor incurs additional costs to pay overtime that that's not passed along to the department.

So wait a minute. So you contract with a defense contractor to make so many missiles. They price that out based on the idea that they're going to be working eight to five and now as a country we need twice as many three times as many they've got to work overtime and you don't pay any more for the overtime cost?

Not only do we not pay more for the overtime cost we've negotiated so that they'll pay for all the expansion required to triple the production capacity of their munitions.

And then we're surprised when we don't have enough munitions.

Well actually the we don't have enough munitions because we didn't have this deal in the first place.

So you say a deal in which we force defense contractors to pay their employees overtime and we don't pay them any more per item. I realize that everybody's on this kick of let's blame Biden oh I'm surprised they're not blaming Clinton or Truman for the problems that we face but it's simple the fact is we don't have the weapons and the fact is our plants are not working 24/7 the way they should be. Now there was a we have they dodged the civilian harm mitigation folks in the defense department then we bombed a school in Iran. Does it make sense well is the defense department even qualified to evaluate the tremendous harm that's done to America when one of our weapons systems is inadvertently used to harm civilians? And can you do that if you slash the civilian harm mitigation unit?

Congressman I regret I don't have familiarity with the office that you're speaking about or the work that it does. I know that our men and women are doing their best to investigate whatever battle damage assessment or civilian...

Doing their best except for the ones that were fired by Elon Musk. And this is the Foreign Affairs Committee and I can tell you our members are very well aware of the harm done to America when we hit an Iranian school. We are hoping that the Iranian people will align with us. That's a an important part of our of our efforts. Now the chair points out that it is rare if ever that Congress actually officially disapproves an arms transfer. I've been here a long time. What happens here is the arms transfer is withdrawn. So Congress never actually gets to vote against it but Congress doesn't just delay it Congress prevents it. And to take Congress which is already being turned into a Russian Duma of 1905 that is to say an advisory body rather than Article 1 of the Constitution to take us out of the arms transfer process would be a grave a grave mistake and an insult to those who framed our Constitution. I would point out that we have a strong interest in making much quicker decisions and we can make those better if the administration works with us in advance. There are times when you're going to notify Congress of a proposed arms sale. Does that notification officially go to both the chair and the ranking member of this committee or does it only go to the chair of the committee?

Notification goes to the chair and ranking member.

Now the rules of the House require the chair to then provide that to the ranking member. There was a recent instance where the chair failed to act and it is that again that's a breach of well over 100 years of tradition in this House. And I refer of course to the notification pursuant to a provision that I wrote requiring advanced notification with regard to a possible nuclear cooperation agreement that didn't meet the gold standards for safeguards. So can we get a commitment from either the acting chair of this committee or better yet from the administration that when notifications are sent to Congress they'll be sent to both Democrats and Republicans both to the chair and the ranking member? Can you commit to that?

We'll commit to the procedures that we continue to follow with the committee.

In spite of the fact that those and I yield back my time and I've given you an extra minute just to be fair.

So with that I turn to the gentleman from the great state of Florida.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I've got a question for Mr. Miller. I have questions about why we sell why the Department of War has thought selling certain weapons to certain countries is acceptable. The President of Turkey, President Erdogan has said the following as it relates to Islam. Quote, "The mosques are our barracks, the domes are our helmets, the minarets are bayonets and the faithful our soldiers." He also said less than one year ago, "May Allah make Zionist Israel destroyed and devastated." Why does the Department of War think it's a good idea to sell American weapons to a country whose leader makes these statements?

Congressman thank you for your your question and it is certainly a fact that Turkey historically has been one of our largest purchasers through foreign military sales. I would also point out that my responsibility as the Department of War for the implementation of security cooperation for Department of Defense Department of War program excuse me under Title 10 and also to implement programs under Title 22 on behalf of the Secretary of State and the Department of State. So in terms of the decision of whether or not to take the foreign policy decision to sell through foreign military sales to Turkey that would be the Department of State's direction on behalf of the President.

Okay. Well I'll give you another quote and I'll give you another chance to answer the question. Just a few years ago same guy Erdogan said quote, "Israelis are murderers. Not the Israeli government, not IDF, it was Israelis are murderers to the point that they kill children who are five or six years old. They are murderers to the point they drag women on the ground to their death and they are murderers to the point they kill old people. They are only satisfied by sucking their blood. It is in their nature." So you're saying it's not your call to do. I'm asking you as the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency do you think it's a good idea to sell weapons to a government whose head makes statements like that?

Congressman again thank you for your your question and again I would refer back to my previous response in terms of my responsibilities for the implementation of Title 22 programs through State Department direction on behalf of the President. Thank you.

All right. Well since you're not going to answer the question I'll I'll turn to Mr. Duffey who's the Under Secretary of War also works in the War Department. I've read you three quotes from the President of Turkey to whom we are selling a lot of weapons. Do you think it's a good idea for the Department of War to be selling these weapons to a country whose leadership has made and by the way I got like 20 more quotes. That's just the first three. Do you think it's a good idea to be selling weapons to a country that's made these statements about Jews and Israel and other things?

My response is similar to Director Miller which is my responsibility is to fulfill the orders of the State Department and the my Department of War colleagues about which allies we would sell weapons to.

Okay. If it was up to you would you sell these weapons to a country that said I'll just give you another I'll just give you another one so you have time to think. "Zionism is a crime against humanity." Or here's one more. "The world is watching the barbarity of a psychopath. Netanyahu is a vampire who feeds on blood." If it was up to you do you think as someone in the Department of War this is a country we ought to be selling weapons to?

I don't endorse any of the statements. I think they're atrocious but in terms of making a decision I just it's not within my expertise or knowledge set to make a balanced decision about whether or not that is in the advantage of the United States national security to sell weapons to Turkey.

Okay. Well I'll just I'll conclude my time by by making remarks which is when we sell our weapons to countries we need to make sure those weapons aren't going to be used against our interests or that of our friends. And I think that the comments that I've made by the way the first quote about the mosques being the barracks and the the worshippers being the soldiers that's actually an almost 30-year-old quote. But then the quote about may Allah make Zionist Israel destroyed and devastated is a less than one-year quote. So a 30-year pattern of making these kinds of very very offensive statements. I would just encourage the Department of War because I know I will be taking a look at that as well as other countries that I don't know should be having American weapons sold to them. Mr. Chairman I yield back.

Thank you. Now I turn to the gentleman... Thank you. Now I turn to the gentleman from Maryland Mr. Olszewski.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and I'll just open by reminding my colleague that yes our words do matter and we should be mindful of all those that we put out there. Thank you for this opportunity. Thank you to our witnesses for being here for your many years of government service. I know that we're here to examine defense sales but I have to first state for the record as many of my other colleagues have said today it is extremely frustrating that we are now on the third week of a war with Iran a war that is costing American lives and tens of billions of taxpayer dollars and yet this committee has failed to have a single public hearing on it. U.S. foreign policy depends on clarity consistent coherent communication with the American people. And right now that clarity is nowhere to be found. Among other impacts the Trump administration's decision to circumvent Congress and start this war of choice has had significant consequences across the world including for our partners in the Indo-Pacific. I've been fortunate to travel to the Indo-Pacific region twice during my time so far in Congress first to New Zealand and the Pacific Islands and then to Taiwan. On those trips I heard time and again how important consistent and reliable defense partnerships are to security in the region. I think that's as urgent now as ever. As we've see reports of large scale Chinese military aircraft near Taiwan. On Sunday Taiwan's Defense Ministry detected 26 Chinese military aircraft around the island. On Saturday 26 Chinese military aircraft around the island on Saturday with 16 entering its northern central and southwestern air defense zones. Seven naval ships were spotted around the island. And last week it was reported that the Trump administration had begun the process of redeploying multiple THAAD air defense systems from South Korea to positions in the Middle East. These THAAD missile batteries are critical for deterrence in East Asia and for defending our treaty alliances there. But deterrence only works if commitments are both credible and sustained. I'm concerned that the redeployment of these air defense systems and other assets from the Indo-Pacific sends the wrong signal not only to our allies but also to Beijing. It also undermines the administration's own stated priorities. Barely four months ago its National Security Strategy proudly declared that the date the days quote the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long term planning and day to day execution are thankfully over. Strange. That does not seem at all like what we're doing today. The administration's National Defense Strategy goes even further promising to quote deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength and to quote erect a strong denial defense along the first island chain as part of that effort. I'm failing to see how pulling high end missile defenses out of Asia East Asia to backfill another crisis in the Middle East supports these stated strategies. So again it seems to me to be the exact opposite. It is unfortunately a sad familiar pattern of strategic whiplash. Short term crises in one region hollow out our long term commitments and credibility in another. So I have quite a few questions and Under Secretary Duffey and Mr. Brown if you could give me some clear and concise responses I know my colleague Mr. Lieu talked about the price we're talking about I'm just curious have we assured South Koreans that this redeployment is temporary of the THAADS?

I've not been a participant in those conversations. I don't know.

And I have not been part of those conversations either.

Okay. Based on your best assessment and given the recent Chinese military activity around Taiwan how will the deployment impact short term deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific more broadly?

I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question?

Just on your base based on your best assessment and given the recent Chinese military activity how will the deployment impact short term deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific more broadly? Not having those THAADS.

I mean I'm my focus is on acquisition and industrial base so it my opinion I don't have a strong opinion I'd have to defer my colleagues on that.

Very much the same answer.

Okay. Well Mr. Chairman I would just I guess reinforce the point here that we are going against our own stated priorities of just a few years ago. We appreciate the work that you gentlemen do appreciate your service but in both this space and certainly as we continue this war I hope that this committee will have the opportunity to talk to folks who can answer given the very real concerns that folks are having across this country. And with that I yield back. Thank you.

Thank you. I now yield from to the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Thank the Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for being here. I'm going to start with kind of an example and I'm going to probably focus on Secretary Duffey and Mr. Brown for the answer. We Congress has basically said we want to build two Virginia class submarines per year but I think we're down to about 1.13 as of 2024 and out of 48 attack class submarines only 32 of them were deemed operational which is less than the Navy's goal of 66 submarines. Now that's all in context with us helping out our friends our allies so to speak in AUKUS to sell a proposed three to five Virginia class submarines to Australia by the mid 2030s. And so my question is kind of general. I've seen that and heard the tenor of your answers in the same vein but we're talking about our allies whether it's Turkey whether it's Australia whether it's Great Britain but I'm wondering and look I applaud the administration and your work to to streamline FMS. It has been cumbersome and troublesome ever since I've known about it where we want to help the people that want to help us and make it easy for them to help us. But I'm wondering if you can walk us through the process by which we we continue to consider our allies so to speak. I mean the gentleman from Florida brought up Turkey as an example but things are changing around the globe and I think we can see that right now with some of the responses from our so called allies regarding the current situation. So what is is there a process if you know one that reviews the support from our allies and at what point do allies no longer be are they no longer allies whether they're in NATO or AUKUS or something else? Is there some red line that you're aware of? As American citizens as people in the administration as people that advise the administration and carry out the administration's order orders I'm just wondering if either of you can speak to those to that that question so to speak.

Yes Congressman thank you for the question. I think this is a continual process for us to evaluate you know our our allies and the strategic value of transferring arms to them. I think I might ask for Mr. Miller's help here but in our original executive order in 2025 there was a specific task to kind of reassess who our partners were and what how we prioritized the sale of arms to those partners. Can you elaborate on that Mike?

Thank you I thank Congressman very briefly as Honorable Duffey mentioned there are a couple two executive orders talk about setting priority partners and capabilities and that's also reflected in the America First Arms Transfer Strategy which speaks to the need to prioritize exports to partners who are supporting U.S. interests. I would also point that as has long been an element of strategy it's also reflected in our conventional arms transfer policy to how we review arms transfers and how we view those relationships and it's reflected very deeply in the technology controls that we apply based upon the reliability of a partner do they have the capability and the intent to protect U.S. technology and thereby protect the U.S. military warfighting edge. So these are all elements that that factor into our decision making led by our colleagues at the State Department on arms transfers.

Mr. Mr. Brown do you have a comment before I kind of refine my question?

Totally agree with Mr. Miller and Under Secretary Duffey. Everything is examined on a case by case basis for each country for each sale. So we make independent decisions that can be made at the at a time and also throughout the process.

So is it generally just to protect the technology or is it also does it also include in the in the term ally their willingness to stand with America in you know in in times of consequence and crisis vis-a-vis our shared enemies?

I think what drove the thought behind the reissuance of the prioritization was very much how are they both standing with America and willing to provide for their own self defense.

And you're saying you review that on a case by case basis country by country weapon system by weapon system. I hope that's the case. I'm not sure I believe it but I hope that's is that what you're telling us?

I don't personally but the process has inputs from the combatant commanders the ambassador team in the country and my colleagues at the Department of War.

Well look I know we're in a strategic competition particularly with China and so I appreciate Australia's willingness to be helpful so to speak their need for for the submarines but at the same time when we can't produce what we need to produce and where we can make all the decisions in a in a situation of kinetic activity I'd rather us have them than allies that that aren't always there and I think the current circumstances is a good indicator of when times get tough who's really going to stand with us. With that Mr. Chairman I yield.

Thank you. I now yield from to the gentleman from the great state of Illinois Mr. Schneider.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you to the witnesses for joining us today. Illinois' 10th District is home to one of the largest concentration of manufacturing jobs in the entire country and many of those jobs are deep in the defense supply chain. In particular, Scot Forge in Spring Grove is a 100 percent employee-owned company that has been forging components for Navy submarines since 1995. They recently received a co-investment from the BlueForge Alliance to stand up a new training center so they can double the rate at which we they bring on new machinists. They want to do more. They want to help our service members win. The question, one of the key questions here is whether the administration is doing everything it can, doing what it takes to make sure we win. We're 17 days into Operation Epic Fury. Reports are that the Pentagon burned through $5.6 billion of munitions in just the first two days. CSIS estimates $16.5 billion has been expended through 12 days. We have fired hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles, possibly more in two weeks than we produced in the previous five years. Patriot interceptor inventories were at roughly a quarter of target before the war started. A quarter of our THAAD interceptor deliveries were expended during last June's 12-day war with Iran, and now we are pulling THAAD launchers out of South Korea and shipping them to the Middle East. So we now have to scale, and it's the second and third tier of our defense industrial base, the forgers, the machinists, the precision component manufacturers who actually have to scale. They need contracts, they need workforce, and they need predictability. So here's what I'm hoping to better understand from the witnesses today. What is this administration doing to get those contracts signed, get those production lines moving, and make sure the people building the weapons our troops need are not waiting on bureaucratic delays while our inventories burn down? I also want to understand something more basic. Did the administration engage the relevant agencies, DOD Acquisition, State's Political-Military Affairs Bureau, DSCA, before launching this war to ensure that munitions planning matched the operational plan? Because the decision to invoke the Arms Export Control Act's emergency authority to bypass Congress and rush $650 million in bombs to Israel after repeatedly insisting the administration was fully prepared for this war seems to tell a very different story. As Ranking Member Meeks said, this is an emergency of the administration's own making. So I'll start with Director Miller. After the administration's workforce reductions at DOD and State, how many qualified acquisition professionals are currently processing FMS cases and to what extent is that number meeting the need?

Congressman, thank you for your question. I previously... Congressman, thank you for your question. I previously cited that there are 17,000 members of the broader security cooperation community, and that's something a number we've been able to achieve due to congressional direction to identify and train that workforce through our university. In terms of the number of contracting officers we have, I confess I don't have that number with me. That's something we could follow up on. But again, there certainly is a large contractor workforce working on FMS.

What sense is the capacity up to what the need is? How close are we to meeting what is demanded at the moment?

I think I would have to I don't know if Under Secretary Duffey has any thoughts on on the state of the contracting workforce. But again, we work day in and day out with the implementing agencies for foreign military sales to make sure that we're prioritizing our work and making sure that we're delivering against those contracts for authorized FMS.

Okay. And in my last minute, I'll ask all the witnesses, in the same way that it appears so much of the administration has been caught surprised or even flat-footed at the response of Iran and the burn rate of material and weapons, what are we doing to help the especially the second and third tier contractors, suppliers scale up quickly to meet the need?

Congressman, thank you for your focus and interest on the defense industrial base. I'll talk to these framework agreements that I mentioned earlier where we have entered into agreements with the primary vendors that manufacture the critical weapons, the Tomahawks, the Patriots, the THAADS, the standard missiles. And part of that agreement that we'd entered into was a result of Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act and the appropriations bill providing the multi-year procurement authority so we can enter into five or seven-year contracts with these suppliers. The reason that's relevant to the sub-tier suppliers is our framework agreement mandates that they flow down that duration of that contract with the subordinate tiers of the supply chain so that the folks in your district can have assurances that they're going to have business for the next five or seven years. And that allows them to do what our vendors have done at the prime contractor level, which is make investments in their factory space and their workforce so we can have a much more stable, resilient supply chain. It's our hope that we could take that model, which we believe is taking a much more commercial approach to the defense industry, and distributing that across multiple platforms, but munitions was where we started with on that.

So I'm over time. Can never answer this in five minutes anyway, but I'd love to engage more. I may submit for writing questions of how do we accelerate that process because I think it's critical not just for the moment we're in right now, but long term as we face more threats around the world. Thank you. I yield back.

I now turn to the gentleman from the great state of Washington, Mr. Baumgartner.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Look, you guys have three of the most important jobs in government, and, you know, we have to prepare our industrial base. We need to add allies, and we do that with speeding up and unscrewing up our military procurement and foreign military sales process. So thank you for your work. Mr. Miller, I just want to return to the subject of Taiwan. How much of a priority is it to get the weapons to Taiwan that they need to potentially ward off an invasion from communist mainland China?

Congressman, thank you. As I stated earlier, provision of security cooperation, security assistance to Taiwan is our top priority.

Okay. So I have a supplier in my state that is trying to sell a component through direct commercial sales to the Taiwanese, and he tells me they keep getting bumped to the back of the line because there's no prioritization for them in the military sales process for direct commercial sales to Taiwan. And so they've they've just been stuck for over a year. So how does how does it get unstuck or is that just a loophole in the law or what are they supposed to do about it?

Thank you, Congressman. I would have to defer to Mr. Brown on direct commercial sales, but it sounds like that your constituent is registered as a as a producer or an exporter of controlled items and maybe has obtained an export license and it may be based on what you're describing, it may be that the partner is not procuring that. That would be a decision by either a Taiwan company or the Taiwan government. That would be something that would be directly from that individual to them and wouldn't have an intersection with my agency.

We would have be happy to assist. Like Mr. Miller said, the individual would require a license. We would process that through the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls at the State Department. We're doing that in 25 to 30 days. So if he's having a problem, it may be with the partner or otherwise, but we're happy for him to reach out to us and and assist in that manner.

Yes, sir. I just wanted to reiterate, so it is a priority to get the equipment to Taiwan that they need.

Yes, it is.

Okay. All right. Then this should be if we can follow up, this should be a solvable issue. Mr. Duffey, did you have a comment on this? Okay. And then I just I just want to use my remaining time just kind of frame this thing out. You know, I'm new to Congress and and frankly, I'm shocked at how important an issue it is to be able to buy the modern equipment that we need to rebuild our industrial base and how bureaucratic and cumbersome it has become. I give a lot of credit to to Congressman Zinke and this administration to trying to fix this situation and I've had a piece of legislation on it, but are you confident in terms of what the administration's done with the executive order and what this Congress is doing? Is that sufficient in what we need to be doing? Is that going to solve the problem or do we need to be doing more?

Are you speaking with respect specifically with respect to foreign military sales or acquisition?

Military sales.

I mean, I'll give you I do think they're they're very linked together, right? So my focus has been on the acquisition transformation, but I believe it's an enabler of foreign military sales because I think what's been an obstruction our ability to fulfill foreign military sales pipeline is ensuring that we have the industrial capacity to support that. So we've been very focused, I mentioned on my earlier comments, about how do we get the industry to pay itself to expand the production capacity and and really triple or quadruple the rate of production of some of these.

So is that a bigger hold up than the 19 people having to sign off on it?

I think they're both require attention for improvement, and I think we're getting after both of them. So and I'll defer to Mr. Miller on the FMS process standpoint, but we've been very focused on.

So just a quick example, just my remaining time. You know, I was out in Nigeria right before before Christmas talking to their government about the issue of Christians being targeted by jihadists. And they said, we agree, it's a problem. We've bought we've paid for Cobra attack helicopters to try to get after these jihadists. You guys won't sell them to us. Please sell them to us. We don't want to buy Russian equipment, but you're leaving us with no example. So what is the hold up in this case with the Nigerians?

Congressman, I Mr. Brown may have a thought. I recall previous sale of major air combat platform to Nigeria and it took quite a long time to to get through the congressional process due to concerns that were bilateral in nature between the United States and Nigeria that may still be in effect, but I defer to Mr. Brown.

It's also part of the process of receiving the payments for the capability. I think there were some delays there that we were able to help.

Okay. Well, thank you guys very much. I mean, anything that my office can do to support you guys in your work, and I would love it at the end of this meeting if you could talk to my staffer here in the back of the room to see if we can can get this thing fixed on this stuff with Taiwan. Thank you.

I now turn the great member from Indiana, Mr. Baird.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the opportunity to be here. You know, the the thing that I see in our foreign military sales process, there's several there's several bottlenecks and you've probably have covered many of them already. I hope not, but but have you had any any suggestion by some of our ally or partner countries that would consider taking Russian or Chinese munitions or equipment? Is that a concern?

In my experience, we are the provider of choice. But I do think that we need to make sure that we're providing we're fulfilling the the pipeline of orders in a timely fashion. I think what we we provide a full suite of capability, not just the weapon system, but the training, the infrastructure. I think that makes it not only do we have the best weapon systems in the world, we have the best sales package. But I think where we have a challenge and where this reform gives us an opportunity is how do we accelerate that process so that we're meeting the needs of those foreign military sales customers as quickly as possible.

So then would that mean that and here's the point I'm getting to is how important it is for us to stay ahead, stay the lead in AI and some of these other things that contribute to the superiority of our weapons. What do you how do you feel about that?

It's critical for us to maintain technological advantage of our weapons. But it's also critical that we have the modern manufacturing and defense industrial base that allows us to scale that technology so that it meets the needs of the United States and it meets the needs of our allies and partners that seek to buy our weapons from us.

So continuing that on, are we are we far enough ahead of China and Russia in these fields to maintain our superiority?

I believe we largely have a technological advantage and continue to maintain that technological advantage. I think we need to put a lot of effort into ensuring that we have that production capacity, that manufacturing capability. And we're very focused at the Department of War on multiple initiatives to ensure we're bringing that manufacturing capability back so we can be reliant on our own industrial base to supply for the future needs of our joint force.

Do either of you other two have any comments in that regard?

I would just echo the Under Secretary's statement. I sit across from ministers of defense and defense ministers, and they all want to partner with the U.S. They want U.S. capability, they want U.S. kit, and it's all about whether we can produce it in the timeframe that they need it.

Same comments, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

I now turn to the gentleman from the territory of Guam, Mr. Moylan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brown, Honorable Duffey, and Mr. Miller, thank you so much. This is an important matter for me and especially for our nation, but this matters a lot to my district in Guam because this unnecessary red tape, of course, weakens the deterrence in places like Taiwan and the Philippines. So Guam being the second island chain, share with us how important our first island chain needs to have what they need to have in order to protect the most western soil as well as their own. These are our allies to protect themselves, but what this means for the territory of Guam if we don't provide these systems that they need to have or the ammunition that they need to have. Guam's also like way out there, would you agree that we are just part of the islands out there too, whether we're the second or the first, but we have no other at this time, no other resources really and as we build our golden dome for the island, but it's not there yet. Take an opportunity to show why reforming this defense sales, defense and getting the ammunitions our allies need for the first island chain especially is so important to the territory of Guam, USA. Start with you, Mr. Brown.

We spend a lot of time focused on the Pacific island countries and Guam and in the work that we're doing in the Indo-Pacific with allies like, as you said, in the Philippines and others. We are working very hard to get the capabilities that these countries need and working through the requests that they have and the capabilities for them to acquire those requests. We have provided a significant amount of foreign military funding to a number of these partners. Part of it is absorptive capacity for them to be able to spend it in their systems and to get the capabilities they need. We are working very closely with them to be able to get them through the process to execute the sales that or acquire the capabilities that they need.

Thank you. Honorable Duffey.

I think I'd point to the recent Taiwan arms sales, the $11 billion package that was announced in December as a demonstration of our commitment. I think the National Defense Strategy also highlights the commitment that we've made to deterring China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation. And then I would say that the work that I'm leading in the department to ensure that we have a defense industrial base that's robust enough to support the needs of the U.S. joint force and to be able to supply the foreign military sales pipeline will be key to ensuring that we can fulfill those orders to our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region who can make their contribution to the collective defense.

Thank you. Mr. Miller.

Not to repeat, but to just add to the comments of my colleagues, certainly we have great appreciation also for Congress's role here in providing authorities for security assistance and security cooperation, both Title 10 and Title 22, including the new TISKI fund available for Taiwan at a billion dollars, I think, in the most recent authorization. Just the vital nature of that foreign military financing, foreign military finance-backed loans and loan guarantees, all of those security assistance authorities that we can bring to bear to support our partners in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere are vital to us. Thank you.

Excellent. So our situation with South Korea and their ammunition supply and where we had to focus, would that be a similar situation for Guam or does anyone know if they heard anything about removing or transferring weapons from Guam for our east situation?

I have heard no discussion on that, no.

Same.

No, sir.

Thank you. That's very helpful because, of course, we have a lot of, I don't know where these experts come from, but you folks are my experts and there's a lot of saying that's going around that the island is going to be next to be removed their ammunition in order to support what's happening in the other conflicts that we're dealing with. So thank you for that assurance. And plus in the NDAA and the FY26 NDAA, we do have a requirement by Congress at least 10 days if anything was to be transferred from the island because of that purpose. So I thank you for that, I thank you for the assurance of protecting our most western soil by helping our allies in the first island chain, especially in the second island chain, what that does for the United States and for our territories. Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now I'll turn to the newest member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the member from the great state of Ohio.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be here. Once again, thank you to the witnesses for taking the time out of your busy schedules to be here today. I'm honored to be joining this committee at such a pivotal moment for American diplomacy and foreign policy. Defense sales are one of the most impactful ways that the United States can conduct diplomacy, strengthen our alliances and partnerships, and improve the lethality of our own armed forces. It also supports the jobs of millions of Americans that manufacture these impressive machines every day, including hundreds of thousands of jobs in my home state of Ohio. Most of these companies I talk to tell me that although they build their best stuff for our military, it's the FMS revenue that they bring in that allows them to maintain the production footprint necessary to adequately supply our armed forces. That's why this hearing is so important. Foreign military sales are crucial to the success of our own combat forces and in this committee's job to make sure that the FMS system these companies are operating within is functioning to both support U.S. national interests and allow for our nation's defense industry to be globally competitive. To Mr. Brown, U.S. defense companies producing or providing defense articles and services controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, ITAR, continue to express concerns that ITAR is outdated, capturing both obsolete and emerging technologies unnecessarily. The President has issued two executive orders aimed at improving United States arms transfers processes. How is the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls implemented these directives?

Thank you for your question, Representative. The ITAR enables us to make sure that we have our that we protect the highest technology and actually facilitates sales in many ways. But we are looking at the ITAR from a standpoint of the rule rulemaking that we can reduce the things that ITAR addresses. Some of the most recent things we have a plan on this, but some of the most recent things are space-enabled technologies and suppressors are rules that are out there that we're looking to make licensing and trade more easy. We are doing that across a number of things in the ITAR. We also are looking at rules and ways that we can reduce and have license-free trade as much as we can and facilitate other exemptions like the exemption for AUKUS, for example, which creates an environment for trade more so than it is specifically on any trade item.

Thank you very much for that detailed answer and I very much appreciate it. Mr. Duffey, Under Secretary Duffey, it's good to see you, worked together previously, I'm really glad you're in this position. It's great to see you serving in this administration.

Thank you.

This administration has clearly signaled that companies that prioritize build-in exportability from day one should be prioritized. What steps are you taking to implement this and are there specific authorities you need from Congress to incentivize industry to prioritize exportability?

Congressman, great to see you again. Thank you for your question and your attention on this issue. I think exportability is critical to ensuring that we have the future flexibility to export systems without needing to invest significant sums of money to redesign them in such a way that we can ensure that they would fit our criteria for export. And so first of all, thanks to Congress for seeding money in the exportability fund that would allow us to invest money within the department to help inform designs of emerging systems to ensure that we're thinking about and planning for exportability in that system. To the extent that we can incentivize industry to create to also be thinking ahead and investing money or at least investing their intellectual capital to design the system for export, I think we owe it to those companies to recognize that investment and to add prioritization to where it fits and where it's in a system that overall adds value to the joint force. That's just added, I think, credit to the company for making that investment and thinking ahead and of course is helpful to the company because it creates a broader customer base by making it available for our foreign military sales customers.

Thank you for that answer, Under Secretary, and from the questions that I've given and the answers that I've received, I feel very confident in what you all are doing in this administration. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thank you. And first of all, I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony today. I know your busy schedule, but I appreciate it. And I think it boils down to on reorganization, someone has to be in charge and someone has to be held accountable. And we look forward to working with you as you go through the myriad of executive orders and sort through them and figure out what works and what changes the goal. I have to tell you, I've talked to the President and I said, you know, I think that from the beginning initiation from the State Department to contract, it ought to be about six months and then we ought to be able to deliver it in about 18 months. And of course, he thought that timeline was too long. But considering where we are, I think that would be a giant step forward. But anyway, I appreciate everything. There will be other questions, no doubt, from other members that are not here, they'll put it in writing and we'll get it to you. But again, we look forward to working with you and from our side to codify as you go through the executive orders what makes sense to codify going forward so we're not so it's, you know, has enduring effect and lasting effect through administrations. So with that, thank you and I appreciate it. This meeting is adjourned.