Securing the Future: Arms Control and International Security for the Modern Age

Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. I'd ask that everybody rise, join me in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. The purpose of today's hearing is to engage with Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security to examine current U.S. policies and strategies on arms control, non-proliferation, and international security, and to provide oversight of all bureaus under the Under Secretary's authority, including Bureaus of Arms Control and Non-proliferation, Political and Military Affairs, Emerging Threats, Counterterrorism, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. I now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Representative Self, for any opening statement he may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today, this hearing focuses on international security and arms control matters that are crucial to U.S. foreign policy. We will hear how the State Department under the Office of Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security, also known as the T family, manages a range of key bureaus and offices to confront evolving security threats, strengthen deterrence, and advance U.S. foreign policy. Secretary DiNanno, Secretary Rubio's recent reorganization of the department has brought new alignment across the T family and represents a positive step toward improving efficiency at Foggy Bottom. As these changes continue to take shape, we would welcome a renewed focus on ensuring consistent communication with Congress. Members of this committee are awaiting information from the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on security cooperation that was due three weeks ago. In addition, it would be helpful to ensure that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provide this committee with the requested briefing on narcotics trafficking in Asia by the end of the month. We would appreciate your assistance in keeping these efforts moving forward and keeping communications with Congress on track. Returning to the broader realignment across the T family, the department merged the Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation with the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability to form the new Bureau of Arms Control and Non-proliferation, or ACN. This change brought together the team that negotiates arms control treaties with the team that works on treaty verification mechanisms, where they were previously housed in separate bureaus. This is just one example of the common-sense benefits of the reorganization. In addition, several bureaus, including the Political-Military Affairs, Counterterrorism, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the newly established Bureau of Emerging Threats, now report directly to you, the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. These changes streamline decision-making and enable faster, more efficient responses to both ongoing and emerging threats. The new structure positions the Under Secretary to tackle these challenges, including the question of strategic stability and the next era of arms control. As Under Secretary DiNanno emphasized in February before the Conference on Disarmament, arms control must evolve to be verifiable, enforceable, and responsive to technological change and strategic competition. The need is urgent. Russia continues to deploy advanced nuclear systems, including the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, the Poseidon nuclear torpedo, the SSC-X-9 Skyfall cruise missile, and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. In addition to the challenges the U.S. is facing from Russia in this field, China is rapidly expanding its own nuclear arsenal. The Pentagon projects it will reach 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade, up from just 600 in 2024. For the first time in the nuclear age, the U.S. faces two nuclear-peer adversaries, Russia and China, while also confronting rising threats from smaller, unpredictable nuclear powers, including North Korea, which continues developing its own strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities. During Under Secretary DiNanno's address to the Conference on Disarmament, he provided details about China's history of nuclear weapons testing. In 2020, the U.S. detected a nuclear explosion near the Lop Nur underground test site at a magnitude of 2.7 seismic event, identified through seismic data from primary seismic station 23 of the International Monitoring System network at Makanchi, Kazakhstan. This information shines light on China's nuclear activities and helps spur a critical international discussion on responsible nuclear testing. Modern arms control must account for such behavior to maintain peace and stability. At the same time, we are entering an era of fifth-generation gray-zone warfare. Adversaries, including Moscow and Beijing, exploit hybrid tactics to undermine the U.S. and its allies. Across Europe, we see threats once unimaginable: airspace violation, weaponized mass migration, infrastructure sabotage, cyber intrusions, all blurring the lines between war and peace. This type of warfare blends military and non-military means, overt and covert, to destabilize societies and threaten U.S. interests across the globe. These tactics intersect directly with the T family's duties and responsibilities, complicating the strategic environment that we must navigate. To address these challenges, I introduced the Strategic Hybrid Activities Defense and Operations of the West Act, or the SHADOW Act, which establishes the State Department's first-ever coordinator for hybrid warfare. Accountability to align our diplomatic, interagency, and allied efforts, enabling better information sharing, clearer attribution, coordinated responses, and stronger resilience across NATO. I also introduced the Biodefense Diplomacy Enhancement Act, which strengthens U.S. diplomatic engagement with allies and partners in the areas of biodefense, biosecurity, and biotechnology. I look forward to the committee markup of these bills tomorrow. There is no doubt that the threats we face are interconnected and fast-moving, spanning nuclear deterrence, terrorism, transnational crime, and emerging technologies. This hearing provides an opportunity to examine how the T family organizes and prioritizes its efforts across the department and interagency. Specifically, we will discuss the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-proliferation. It negotiates and enforces arms control agreements. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages a broad range of strategic cooperation and assistance programs with our partners and allies. The Bureau of Counterterrorism serves as a central hub for U.S. diplomatic efforts to combat terrorism abroad. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs leads efforts to counter transnational crime, combat drug trafficking, and coordinate with international law enforcement. Finally, the Bureau of Emerging Threats focuses on some of the most cutting-edge and forward-looking security challenges facing the United States, including lethal autonomous weapons and risks in undersea and outer space domains. Let me be crystal clear. Our adversaries are developing and employing advanced technology in disruptive ways that threaten our core national interests. It is therefore essential to sustain a Bureau of Emerging Threats that can anticipate and address these risks. In conclusion, this hearing is an opportunity to examine how the T family aligns resources to address both enduring and emerging threats, advancing U.S. security and diplomacy. I thank you, Under Secretary, for joining us, and I look forward to the substantive discussion that we will have with you today, how you strengthen your department's effectiveness and how Congress can support it in delivering results for the American people. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chair now recognizes ranking member from New York, Representative Meeks, for any opening statement.

Thank you, Chairman Mast, and thank you to our witness for joining us today. Mr. Under Secretary, your work and the work of the many diplomats you oversee informs the United States' response to nearly every single foreign policy and national security crisis in the world today. Russia's unprovoked, illegal war of choice against Ukraine. Countering terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Disrupting the flow of deadly narcotics. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and much, much more. The T family's work is also proactive, promoting U.S. energy interests and supporting and equipping allies and partners with the weapons systems that they need to defend themselves. It includes strengthening institutions for our allies and partners so that they are more resilient and more reliable. These are serious matters that require serious oversight from this committee. So, I think you can understand my frustration that this committee is expected to address all of these matters in one single hearing. All while Chairman Mast has yet to hold a single hearing, not one, on the most urgent matter of international security before us today. The war that Donald Trump chose to start in Iran, which is now in its 26th day. We've not heard public testimony on this administration's goals. We've not examined its strategy. We've not had the opportunity to ask why the administration is funding both sides of this war, lifting sanctions on Russia and Iranian oil simultaneously, even as it prepares to ask American taxpayers to foot a $200 billion bill. The American people have not had the opportunity to hear public testimony at this committee. Why? Because my Republican colleagues, I believe, are scared to let the American people see the truth of what underpins this war. The American people deserve transparency and accountability on a conflict of this magnitude, and this committee has the responsibility to provide it. The consequences are real. Tens of thousands of American service members are deployed halfway around the world. Americans are glibly told to skip a coffee run so they can afford gas to get to work. And America's closest partners are absorbing costs for a conflict that they were never consulted about. Some are having their infrastructure attacked. Regional instability is growing. The pattern extends far beyond Iran. The Chairman has similarly failed to hold a single hearing with the administration on Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine, which is now in its fifth year, or on the status of negotiations that will shape its outcome. The Chairman has failed to hold a hearing on the expiration of the New START treaty, a cornerstone of nuclear stability for decades, and what comes next. That issue alone warrants sustained attention. No one has benefited from Donald Trump's decision to start this war in Iran more than Russia. This administration's decision to ease sanction on Russian oil to offset skyrocketing gas prices that have increased because of Trump's own policy is helping fuel Putin's war in Ukraine. Beijing couldn't be happier to watch the United States strain its alliances, destabilize energy markets, and direct its attention away from the Indo-Pacific. Both China and Russia demand serious sustained focus, not least from the bureaus you oversee, given the urgent need to address arms control and non-proliferation. Mr. Under Secretary, with the expiration of New START, I expect to hear from you today what plan, if any, this administration has for putting constraints back on the world's most destructive weapon. And I'm grateful to our witness for his presence here today. The Under Secretariat you are leading manages a range of important issues: non-proliferation, arms control, regional security, and defense relations, and arms transfers and security assistance. All these issues touch upon the war on Iran, but your testimony alone will not give us a complete picture of this war and its justification. We have many outstanding questions, and if this committee cannot hold hearings on a war involving U.S. forces, the diplomacy around it, and its impacts on our allies and partners, then we are not meeting our most basic oversight responsibility. Not because of you, Mr. Under Secretary, it's the majority refuses to give these consequential matters the time and security they demand. We must do better. So with that, Mr. Chairman, pursuant to clause 2(m) of House Rule 11, clause 2(k)(6) of House Rule 11, I move that this committee issue subpoenas to compel the testimonies of Secretary Marco Rubio, of Mr. Steve Witkoff, and Mr. Jared Kushner at a public House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing before the end of April 2026, so we, members of Congress, and the American people can hear from them directly on the most pressing international security matter facing Americans today: President Trump's war of choice in Iran. And with that, I yield back.

The motion will be held in abeyance until the end of this hearing. We will have a vote at that point. I would say you're going to need a number of hearings to go through all of my faults and flaws, so you can ask for a few more, maybe you can make motions for those as well. I would encourage you, if you want to know more about what's taking place with the activities in Iran or any where else, feel free to attend any one of our fly-in day classified briefings, which you basically don't attend at all. And we had a classified briefing just last week with INR. You showed up 45 minutes late to that. Had you been on time, you might know a little bit more. I'd also encourage you that when we have the classified briefings with Secretary Rubio, Secretary Hegseth, General Kane, Director of the CIA John Ratcliffe, which we've had numerous ones with, you might want to take a few notes because clearly you're forgetting every single thing that they've told you, which has been every detail that you want to know about this conflict. So that would be my advice.

There have not been numerous, there's been three.

That's numerous. I might need to get you a dictionary. I can use my phone and...

One with the Gang of Eight. I was not at the Gang of Eight. One meeting with the Gang of Eight.

You're in the Gang of 16. Semantics matter. Numbers matter.

One meeting with the Gang of 16 and one with the full committee, and we did not get answers there.

You're getting answers every time.

And this committee has the responsibility of oversight and having hearings in the committee so that the American people can hear clearly what the reasons, what's the rationale, and what the end result is.

I know you want a good YouTube video, you want a good Facebook video.

I don't go on... I just want you to do your job. I just want you to do your job.

You might want to go to the classified briefings. That'd be an important part of your job.

I want you to come so that the American people can hear. I want the American people, every time that I've been in this committee for a long time, we've always had, when it's a matter of war, there's been public hearings in the Foreign Affairs Committee. We've not had any.

You might want to go to the classified briefings.

You might want to do your job.

There are very important information.

Do your job and lead this committee and let the American people and have some transparency.

Just so you know, standing every week that we fly in here...

You need some transparency for the American people. We need to have public hearings.

Goes on every week. I can let you know when it happens in advance. You can put it on your calendar and you'll know, hey, the day we fly in.

We have not had any public hearings. Why not? What are you hiding? What do you not want the American people to know?

You have a hearing going on right now. You had several last week.

What do you want the American people... and I'm going to... I've not had the three people that have been doing all of the information, all of the negotiating, is Mr. Kushner, Mr. Witkoff, and we need the Secretary of State. And those are the individuals that need to be...

You'll see Secretary of State in March.

And those individuals should be subpoenaed here and that's why I'm asking to have a subpoena to have them in this room so that the American people can see them and hear them and they can get questions asked by Democrats and Republicans. That's who we are. That's the responsibility of Congress.

Don't forget our classified briefings that you must have forgotten about.

That's the American people need to have public hearings. You know, Colin Powell and every other administration has had their people, top people, here to testify in the public to justify a particularly a war. It is our job.

You should be thankful. You should be thankful we have Under Secretary DiNanno. I don't know if you remember Bonnie Jenkins, who was under the Biden administration, but probably one of the dumbest witnesses we've ever had in Congress.

I know, I know that you want to protect the President. And the way you want to protect him is by not calling his people present. You just want to give him a check just like the Dumas does for Vladimir Putin. No responsibility, no oversight, no public oversight. It's time for that to stop.

I would again, I'd encourage you, attend the hearings and the briefings that we have. You'd learn quite a bit and even consider showing up on time. You'll learn a lot.

Stop covering up for the administration and do your job as a as the chairman of this committee for oversight of the executive branch of government and don't be a rubber stamp.

You have somebody here before you. I'd encourage you, you know, ask some questions.

I will ask him some questions.

I'll look forward to hearing it. I'm sure we all will. Very good. And again, I'll make sure to update you on when our classified briefings are every time that we fly in just so you know when they are.

I want some public hearings so that for the American... I want transparency for the American people.

Hopefully we don't see any more excuses of why you don't show up to classified briefings. They're pretty important. There's a lot of great information in classified briefings.

Do you believe in transparency? Do the American people deserve transparency, Mr. Chairman? Does the American people deserve transparency?

They deserve to know that anybody involved in their national security apparatus is actually paying attention to the issues instead of, I don't know, sitting in their office fundraising and things like that. Whatever you're doing instead of instead of showing up to classified briefings.

The American people are asking about $200 billion. $200 billion you're asking the American... the President's going to be asking the American people. Do they deserve transparency to know how their taxpayer dollars are being spent?

Sounds like you're coming up with numbers that they haven't asked for, but you can speculate on that. You haven't seen a request come in, right? You're just speculating on what...

They... the President has said he wants $200 billion. Are you paying attention to what he said?

I'd encourage you again, show up to our classified briefings so that you can be a well-informed individual that's a part of the national security apparatus. That would be a very basic function. You should show up to the classified...

Have public transparency hearings for the people. Do you respect the American people? Do you respect the American people? Do you respect the American... do you believe the American people deserve transparency?

Beyond anything, the the we the people of the United States of America deserve every bit of transparency, but they also know that loose lips sink ships. United States Navy number one, we sink a lot of other people's ships, but loose lips, and that's why you don't get...

What I believe, what I believe is that the American people deserve transparency. The American people deserve to know what their government is doing. The American people needs to know why the President has taken us into a war.

I do. I'm being very transparent in letting them know you don't show up to classified briefings.

So I'm being transparent and they can see that you're trying to hide the truth from the American people.

I'm not trying to hide it from them that you don't show up to classified briefings.

Then let's do public hearings. Then let's do public hearings.

Just something that I think everybody should know. It's very important that they know you're not showing up for your job.

Often times I can tell you some of those hearings that you having, I've already know about it in the press. And you hear nothing more than that. Let the American people have transparency. I believe in it.

You ready to talk about this?

I'm ready as soon as you stop... you the one that started the conversation. I just asked for a subpoena of those three individuals.

Okay. Let's do it. Anything else to point out? You good? Very good. All right, other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Thomas G. DiNanno before us today. You are infinitely better than the last Under Secretary for International Security that we had before who could not answer basic questions like, you know, what is something objective. That was an embarrassing hearing for us all. Your full statements will be made a part of the record and I'll ask you to keep your spoken remarks to about five minutes in order to allow time for member questions, and I now recognize you for any opening statement that you may have.

Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the T family of bureaus, what we do to advance U.S. national security, and the challenges we face in today's ever-complex security environment. I am honored to be the first Under Secretary appointed to lead what is known as the new expanded T family since the State Department was reorganized in July of 2025. The reorganization consolidated the department's international security functions, expanding the T family from three to five bureaus and assigned three offices to our broad portfolio. The T family includes the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Bureau, Political-Military Affairs, the Counterterrorism Bureau, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, the new Emerging Threats Bureau, and our AUKUS coordination office. As Under Secretary, I serve as the senior advisor to the President and Secretary of State for U.S. policies on non-proliferation, arms control, and international security. Our team works on critical national security matters, ranging from preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countering terrorism and international drugs to approving arms sales and security assistance to U.S. partners and allies worldwide. As a nominee almost a year ago, I committed to seeking verifiable and enforceable arms control agreements that enhance America's national security. I have used each day of my first months as Under Secretary to advance that very goal. Perhaps less publicly known than other State Department roles are the vast responsibilities that fall under the office of the Under Secretary. We oversee nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons issues, oversee export controls, sanctions enforcement, and treaty verification. We manage security assistance programs worldwide to counterterrorism and the international narcotics trafficking. We drive interagency policy processes, coordinate with the War Department and other federal agencies, and represent the United States in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings, including the critical trilateral AUKUS arrangement between the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. T family personnel largely consist of civil service experts. Our staff possess deep knowledge and technical competence relevant to a vast range of international security concerns. We leverage our in-house expertise of technologists like seismologists, nuclear physicists, counter-drone experts, aviation experts to fulfill an extensive array of T family responsibilities. We also negotiate, implement, and rigorously verify an array of international arms control and disarmament agreements on behalf of the Secretary of State and President Trump. One such arms control treaty at the top of mind is New START, which expired last month. The treaty was ineffective and only constrained the United States while allowing Russia to build and maintain a vast theater-ranged nuclear arsenal. New START was a bilateral treaty that had no impact on the nuclear weapons programs in China or other nation states. New START no longer served the national interests of the United States and its expiration opened a new era for us to pursue President Trump's vision for improved and modernized agreements. Although the work of our team may often be invisible to the public, our wide-ranging responsibilities are essential to keeping Americans safe at home and abroad. The T family implements President Trump's national security strategy to protect the homeland, support U.S. industry, and prioritize U.S. security interests worldwide. We work day in and day out to make America safer, more prosperous, and more secure by modernizing arms control, countering adversaries, and protecting American technological and military advantages. We will continue to deliver measurable results to the American people. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Under Secretary DiNanno. I now recognize chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Mr. Self, for five minutes of questions.

Thank you, Chairman. In your written testimony, you stated that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is responsible for preserving the United States' technological advantage through rigorous enforcement of export and acquisition controls, as well as defending our technology from exploitation, diversion, or misuse. So now that we are selling AI chips to China, can you tell us your role in preserving our technological advantage in AI chips specifically, and how do you interface with BIS in safeguarding this very vital technology?

Thank you, Congressman, for the question. As you probably know, the administration's AI dominance plan and program calls for the U.S. to maintain an economic advantage over our adversaries. I think what you're referring to is the direction that we received from the President to support sales of H200 chips to China. Part of that direction that we received from the President was to ensure that there are strong national security controls in place. And that's exactly what we do inside our Nonproliferation Bureau. We review every license application. We review extensive potential derogatory information and essentially oversee that there are the appropriate national security guardrails in place.

So how do you do that? How do you ensure an end user of these very advanced microchips once we sell them into China?

Look, there's an extensive vetting process that we go through before we would be part of the licensing process. To answer your question on BIS, we work very, very closely with them day in and day out at the working level, and also my counterpart at the Commerce Department I'm actively in touch with. Again, they're the final decision-maker, but we have access to all the information and intelligence on each applicant, and any information that we would be concerned about, we absolutely flag as part of that process.

Okay. So I have a bill that would codify the Department of Commerce's affiliates rule that ensures subsidiaries of blacklisted companies cannot evade restrictions designed to protect national security. You sometimes have to go four levels deep to figure out who owns 50 percent of any company, as you well know. How do you work with the—how does the T family work with BIS, the Department of Commerce, to make sure that we go that deep to stop the—to make the affiliates rule effective?

Thank you, sir. Look, I don't know the specifics of your bill. I'd welcome to look at the details of it. But again, we work extremely closely on a day-to-day with BIS. And again, it runs all the way up the chain. Again, my counterpart, Under Secretary Kessler, we're on the phone all the time. I was exchanging emails with him again the last couple days. So it starts at the top, this sort of integration, and really working into the—the analyst teams also work very closely together. And I think at the core of what you're getting at is having as much better and more information, intelligence, whether it's open source or through acquiring through classified ways, so that we have better derogatory information so our analysts can make better decisions.

Okay. So we are in hybrid war today. We're in gray zone war today with Russia and China both and more. But with your new Bureau of Emerging Threats, how are you going to participate in countering hybrid warfare, which Europe—and I chair the Europe Subcommittee—is involved in every single day through the mass migration that I mentioned in my opening remarks, cyber attacks? Hybrid war is real and active in Europe. How are you going to work through the Bureau of Emerging Threats to counter that?

Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. I noticed in your opening statement the notion of a fifth-generation gray zone battle space. Admiral Aquilino in front of the Armed Services Committee last week talked about the advanced threats, even though they may not be new in the sense of cyber threats aren't new, they are advancing, they are more complex, there are multiple new actors, not necessarily nation-states. The Emerging Threats Bureau's job would be to interface and provide the diplomatic overlay so that any of this type of information, next-generation threats, that we work very closely with our partners in the intelligence community, that that information is shared across our alliances and partnerships. Again, at the State Department, our goal is diplomacy and in managing those alliances. And the other piece of that is to acquire information from overseas, whether it be in research labs or different parts of our partners and allies, those alliances, share that information back to the United States so that we can address these fifth-generation, these next-generation threats.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Ranking Member Meeks.

Mr. Under Secretary, you know, I'm just looking and I think that President Trump is picking up right where he left off in his first term by walking away from existing arms control frameworks without a viable plan to replace them. He allowed New START to expire without even attempting to negotiate a successor. He refused to maintain nuclear limits on Russia, and he's threatened to resume reckless and unnecessary nuclear testing. I think the President is plunging us back into the darkest, most dangerous days of the Cold War and another costly and reckless arms race. In Trump's first term, the push for a trilateral agreement with China failed in part because China refused to participate. And today we appear to be heading down the same path with even higher stakes. So in the time that we have, this shortness of time, I've got a few yes or no questions that I want to ask you. Has the administration formally invited Russia or China to talks on frameworks for strategic stability on arms control?

Thank you, Ranking Member. We have an ongoing arrangement, multilateral arrangement through the P5 process—

No, no, no. But just the yes or no. Has the administration formally invited Russia and China to talks?

It's not a yes or no question, sir. I'm happy to answer your question, but the context is important if I could just answer the question.

But first it's answered. Yes, are there going to be talks, or no, there's not going to be talks?

Again, we have ongoing engagements through the P5 process, which is ongoing. We do have sensitive and ongoing diplomacy that probably isn't appropriate to talk about in an open forum because that is ongoing. But I will say that our engagements with both the Russians and Chinese, again, as well as our P5 partners, that's an ongoing process. We met at the P5 several months ago. I think it has to be more effective. I think we need to drive—

I just want to know, sir, because these agreements, many of them like New START, has expired. And so my question is simple. Are we or are we not having some of these dialogues about that with Russia or China?

So—

So let me move on since you're not answering that one. Has anything about China's disposition toward multilateral arms control substantially changed since 2020, yes or no?

So again, it's not a yes or no question. And again, I'm happy to answer—

It either changed or it didn't.

Again, if you'd like me to answer the question, I'm happy to answer it, but I'm not going to answer yes or no.

So you say you can't say whether it changed or you can't say whether—

What I can tell you is that our approach has clearly evolved. As you pointed out, the President's calling for multilateral arms control. And I think the other important point here about New START, New START expired because the date had expired. There was no extension available to the United States and Russia bilaterally.

We could negotiate. Well, let me—is there any evidence, sir, that would suggest that China will accept any additional arms constraints?

So again, China was present at the P5 several months ago. We expect that they'll be there again. There's another engagement, I think, next month. So we continue to engage with Russia and China as part of our multilateral course of business at the P5. And I think it's important to note that the P5 is a multilateral body that we'll use—

So China is going to be involved in multilateral talks again? Is that what you're telling me?

Sir, they currently are through the P5 process.

Well, will you pursue also bilateral talks with Russia and China separately?

We've not closed the door on any option to implement the President's vision of a new and better treaty. I think it's important to again in perspective that although New START expired and we can talk about—I mentioned in my opening statement the deficiencies of New START—that the President at the same time that New START expired called for a new treaty. So I see why this is difficult.

Will there be bilateral talks with Russia?

Again, sir, it's not a yes or no. I'm not going to answer yes or no, sir. I'm happy to answer your questions—

You're not answering my question.

I am, sir. If you'd let me, I'm happy to do it. We've not—

Do you know—I want to know if bilateral direct conversation is if the United States is going to sit down with Vladimir Putin and have a conversation again about arms control.

Sir, again, what I—

Or China. Would that be part of the conversation when the President meets President Xi?

Again, I can't speak to what the President will or won't say to President Xi. And again, I don't think it'd be appropriate for us to discuss those type of details here. What I can tell you and I'm happy to commit to is that if there are and we plan on having these engagements, that those engagements in a more private setting would be happy to come back and talk to the committee about what happened and share what we know.

So you kind of answered the question. You said if they are.

Gentleman's time has expired.

You don't know whether they're going to have it or not.

We went over this already though. He doesn't really prefer to have conversations in classified settings, so Representative Wilson is recognized.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your leadership standing firm with our President. Additionally, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service. And I am concerned that transparency could be unintentionally construed as revealing to war criminal Putin and the murderous Khamenei the plans of America and Israel to courageously respond to 47 years of war against Western civilization. President Trump is succeeding uniting our Arab allies to support President Trump in denying Iran a nuclear capability to vaporize Americans and Israelis. This is a war today that began 47 years ago, not last week. And now we have a President who is courageous to stand up and promote ultimately peace through strength, and you're part of that team. And so thank you very much. With that in mind too, since the beginning of the second Trump administration, the State Department has worked tirelessly to secure new partnerships around the world for U.S. civil nuclear companies, creating new jobs at home and abroad, securing American energy dominance internationally. This includes 123 agreements, which enable the exploitation of U.S.-origin nuclear material to partner countries. In 2025, President Trump signed an executive order tasking the State Department to formulate 20 123 agreements by the end of 2028. And I'm really pleased because I represent Savannah River Site, and I see the opportunities for small modular reactors. As China and Russia seek to expand their ability in commercial small modular reactors, we must be working together. With that in mind, what is the status of the 123 agreement with our valued ally Saudi Arabia as you work carefully with Secretary Marco Rubio?

Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Yes, so the requirement is to try to sign 20 123 agreements. We think we have an active and good plan to get through them. We have one that's been signed and four that have been initialed. Specifically to the Saudi Arabia agreement that's been initialed, I can't disclose the details of it because the president hasn't signed it. As you know, consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, once that signature, the president signs it, which he hasn't, all of those details are required to come to Congress, and I'm happy to, when that happens, if that happens, happy to come back and share all those details, but I just can't get into the details because he hasn't signed it. They're not done.

Well, we wish you well, and indeed another country that is taking a lead is Romania. And so again, I hope as we work with different countries around the world, what this can mean for energy independence around the world. Also, Mr. Secretary, you have an incredible challenge of arms control. America's enemies see negotiations as an opportunity to have time to regroup, rearm, and advance technology. Sadly, the USSR, Russian Federation, and war criminal Putin, from my view, have never lived up to any agreement. Years ago, I visited Chelyabinsk, the sister city of Columbia, South Carolina, in Siberia, which had been a secret city surrounded by secret unnamed research cities to develop nuclear capability. Can you identify any agreement upheld by the dictators in Moscow who oppress the people of Russia?

Congressman, thanks for that. Just real quick before I answer your question, I met with the energy minister of Romania two weeks ago. It's extremely high priority for us, and we talked extensively about the program there, so just wanted to mention that. Look, you're right about the serial violations. I think the answer to that needs to be verification mechanisms that work. New START had some verification mechanisms. In my view, they weren't robust enough, but I think there are some things there that we can build on should the opportunity present itself. But again, it's not just nuclear arms control, as I'm sure you know, Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, we have problems with the Russians across the entire array. Of course, their commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing, we've been very public about, actually back to 2019, General Ashley, the then head of DIA, came out and talked about that. I was with him when he made that announcement. So it's an ongoing problem. We have to continue to engage where the opportunities present themselves, but we must have verification mechanisms that work and are robust.

Well, you've got an incredibly difficult job. We wish you the best for success. Thank you.

Thank you, sir.

Representative Keating recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here. In the current war, and it is a war in Iran, is bringing many things to light that we knew and lessons that we learned in Ukraine. Now, under your agency, you fund mobile fire teams. You fund support for mobile fire teams in Ukraine. I've been there, as many of our colleagues have been. I've seen what they do. I've seen what a handful of people just given meager support are able to do with their guns, machine guns, or drones. They're taking down these Russian drones that are killing thousands and thousands of Ukrainians a week, including innocent civilians and children. So I've seen the effectiveness of this, but yet you are not giving that the support it needs. You're not giving them the support that they need to continue to expand and to move forward in this very cost-effective way. And at the same time, Ukraine, despite what the U.S. is doing with Russia, and perhaps I'm sure you know that the president has taken the sanctions away from Russian oil, and that amounts to several billions of dollars a month, a month, for Putin's war machine, very much against our own interests as well as Ukraine. So we have a very effective agency here, and you know what they're doing in spite of what President Trump is doing fueling Russia's war machine and Putin's war machine? They've agreed to help us in Iran. So they're taking the expertise that they have from these mobile fire teams and other things, and they're taking that training, that expertise, and they're helping the U.S. fight in this war to try and save the possibility of American lives being lost anymore than the 13 that have been tragically lost now. So why aren't you doing more to support this kind of effort in Ukraine that is coming back not only to help defeat Russian aggression and the illegal war there, but helping us in now in Iran?

Thank you, Representative, for the question. The United States continues to maintain a tremendous amount of resources and support to Ukraine. I just met with the Ukrainian ambassador a few weeks ago to make sure that our, the programs that we have in place continue. Specifically to your comment about supporting the theater of operations in the Iran area, I'd have to refer you to Admiral Cooper and the War Department. I'm not...

Okay, but it's public. That's not in a classified session. Yes, sir. And we can talk about it because we weren't in the classified session, perhaps those of us that didn't go or weren't invited. So we can have this discussion now for the American public, but I want to just tell you, you answered the question the best you could, and you were telling me what you couldn't answer. So let me deal with another issue because my, I have one minute and 54 seconds. Okay. Please, I apologize for cutting you off, but this is important too. You're also cutting the support we have for the general prosecutor in Ukraine that's prosecuting war crimes. Is Vladimir Putin a war criminal, sir?

Sir, I'm, again, that's well outside of my purview as the T Under Secretary.

Well, what, no, no. How about as an American? No, as an American person and a citizen and someone who cares about... Is Vladimir Putin a war criminal?

I understand that I'm both. Yes or no? No, sir, I'm not going to answer yes and no.

No, sir, I'm not going to answer yes and no. That's quite an answer. Yes, that's right. Oh, yes, now it's yes or no or yes. You can't even ask a simple question like that. We have to know because we have cut, under your agency, sir, you're cutting support for the prosecutor general. And you know what that support has been doing? It's been preserving evidence and training so these war crimes, including sexual assault of young girls in front of their parents and grandparents by Russian soldiers, which is tens of thousands of young people being taken from their families, maybe never to come back and put in Russian families. Definite war crimes. We are supporting that, and you're cutting that support in the guise of reorganizing for the prosecutor to preserve the evidence and to move forward on these war crimes, these horrific, heinous war crimes that Russia is committing. So what I want to ask you, sir, this is under your purview. You should be doing more.

No, sir, it's not.

Yes, it is, by the way.

No, sir, it's not.

Funding the prosecutor general's office is, by the way, it is. I know everything's new to you.

No, no, it's not actually new to me, right?

You have funds to help train and move forward with the prosecution and help the prosecutor general in Ukraine.

If there is a specific program that you feel or that you know that...

Funded a legal advisor in the office.

I don't know about any specific...

Well, then you should know about it, with all due respect. I've got eight seconds. Do your homework, come back here, let's deal with it.

Representative Barr is recognized.

I yield back.

Mr. Under Secretary, would you like a little bit of time to correct the record about what the Trump administration is doing to assist the Ukrainian resistance?

Well, sir, thank you for the opportunity. I'm not sure there was a question embedded in there, but if there is a program that we're funding that has been cut, I'm more than happy to address it and go back to it. I oversee thousands, billions of dollars of programming, hundreds of programs, thousands of federal employees. So if there's a specific example, I'm happy to look at it. But obviously, the administration continues to support in a robust fashion the Pearl initiative to support the Ukrainian government. As I began to say, there are a tremendous amount of workstreams inside the administration supports inside with Ukraine. I think one of the most compelling meetings that I had was with the ambassador to Ukraine, where she handed me a, it was actually, she turned it into a keychain, it was actually a part of a Russian cruise missile. And with that piece, she also handed me a stack of legal paper with all the Western parts embedded inside Russian cruise missile. So where I sit as the nonproliferation executive, as the Under Secretary, those are the programs that I oversee that we need to do better at, right, to deny our adversaries Western technology. Again, if there's specific programs on the security assistance that we need to address...

Security, the bottom line, Mr. Under Secretary, security assistance continues to flow to the Ukrainians. Thank you. You say in your testimony that the president has been incredibly clear and consistent on his ultimate objective of a world with fewer nuclear weapons, although some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle may want to deny this. Epic Fury has been objectively an extraordinary success in degrading the military capabilities of the Iranian regime, and President Trump has taken decisive action against the most dangerous country that is aimed completing a nuclear weapon for over 40 years and has stated numerous times that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon. To the extent you are able, Mr. Under Secretary, in this unclassified and public setting, can you offer the State Department's current assessment of Iran's nuclear infrastructure?

Well, sir, that would be beyond my purview as the Under Secretary.

Well, Midnight Hammer, Epic Fury, what we see is a nuclear infrastructure that's under rubble. Can you...

What I think is most important to point out is that the president's policy did not start three weeks ago. He laid out as soon as he took office very clearly the nuclear policy of the administration. He laid out a policy that Iran's nuclear program and nuclear-capable missiles pose an existential threat to the United States. That is from as soon as he was sworn in, NSPM-2. That's exactly what he's executing against today.

And what is the State Department's assessment in terms of the extent to which Epic Fury and Midnight Hammer combined have degraded the nuclear infrastructure and capabilities of the regime?

Again, sir, that would be outside of my purview as a manager of the programs that I oversee. I think you may have, or there is an intelligence office, the INR Bureau would be the best State Department office to offer the State Department position. I'm not trying to avoid your question.

Understood. I think it's really not my role. I think Congress will continue to want to know once this operation concludes and with no boots on the ground, what will be the diplomatic work of the State Department with the IAEA to make sure that the enriched uranium or the plutonium facilities within Iran are never reconstituted.

Yes, sir. I think we can speak to that when and hopefully soon combat operations cease. We would, the Nonproliferation Bureau is the policy office that works very closely with the IAEA. I met with Director General Grossi two weeks ago to make sure that we maintain that close connectivity. We share information. We fund the IAEA through our Arms Control Nonproliferation Bureau. So we have an ongoing, we have a permanent representative, ambassador-level executive in Vienna who will be the liaison there, currently have a chargé in place. So we have the infrastructure, the diplomatic infrastructure. And again, once the theater of operations transfers from CENTCOM, our diplomatic footprint will be active.

Well, my time has expired, but I think objectively we can say the world is a much safer place today because Iran's nuclear infrastructure is buried under rubble. Thank you, President Trump.

Agree, sir.

I yield back.

Representative Bera.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the ranking Democrat on East Asia, I spend a lot of time with our allies in Korea, talking to the Korean National Assembly, their government, and others. One thing that's been concerning over the last few years has been the sentiment within the Korean public about obtaining their own nuclear deterrent. You see polls that show over 60 percent, perhaps sometimes over 70 percent of the public being concerned about obviously the threats from North Korea, stability on the nuclear, on the Korean Peninsula. It's part of the reason why I was very supportive of the Washington Declaration under the Biden administration, which did step up our rotations of nuclear-armed submarines and other assets to reassure the Korean public about our commitments and our deterrent strategy. Mr. Under Secretary, could you give me an update on the status of our commitments under the Washington Declaration, if we still are seeing those rotations of nuclear-armed submarines and our commitments for nuclear deterrence both on the Korean Peninsula but also in East Asia with our Japanese allies?

Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. So as I'm sure you know, the Trump administration's and the President's visit there laid out a comprehensive set of policies across economics, the military, as well as our civil nuclear cooperation. Specifically my role to your question on extended deterrence commitments. To the point about the potential chatter or rumors about or discussions of the ROK having their own nuclear deterrent, the strongest way that we can prevent that is by being committed to the U.S. extended deterrence.

So you're reassuring me that our commitments to extended deterrence to the Korean Peninsula are as ironclad as they have ever been.

Well, sir, yes, I mean, take the President's word for it. I mean, we do that.

Another question. The Koreans have asked for the ability to have their own nuclear-powered submarines. I think the President has addressed that in the affirmative, that he's willing to work with the Koreans to create some of the nuclear-powered submarines as part of our alliance. Can you give us an update on that?

Just real quick back to extended deterrence and then I'll just get to the second question. The President himself on the peninsula was very clear in his commitment to the U.S. extended deterrence umbrella. So there can be no clearer message. One other point there is I as Under Secretary am planning a trip that we continue to engage with the Koreans. You can't just say it once and walk away. We have to continue to work on it and we do. Specific to nuclear submarines as part of the joint fact sheet, we're going through a pretty extensive process interagency. It's very active on building teams, who would go, what our deliverables would be because they're extensive. One work stream there is nuclear submarines. That's a really a shared responsibility, more so the War Department on the infrastructure, on the actual the State Department piece of that, my piece of that would be on any potential nuclear fuel.

And again, if you can keep Congress informed on the progress of those talks, obviously it's important for us to continue to support our Korean allies and continue to have those assets and capabilities.

It's very robust, it's ongoing, and we're planning to go.

And just switching to your INL role in international narcotics, I have spent a lot of time in the Pacific Islands and did not expect one of their biggest concerns at this point is narcotics that are coming from the West Coast on its way to Australia, particularly methamphetamines, and seeing some of the real challenges, been in Fiji, been in Tonga. Can you give me a brief update on how your bureau is interacting in the Pacific Islands to combat the narcotics trafficking that is starting to impact those islands and how we in Congress could work together and would love for you to come brief the Pacific Islands Caucus on things that we could do to support them.

Yes, sir. We actually just had some senior folks from INL out in the region and I'd be happy to have them come up and talk to you some of the details on what we found. And I think it was exactly what you're pointing out. I'd also point out our Deputy Secretary was just there and had extensive conversations about maritime domain awareness, other law enforcement support, which would be an INL potential INL programming. So that's again, I'm happy to share any of that, but these are very ongoing active discussions and very, very recent. So we'd be happy to come back.

So we'll make that request.

Yes, sir. Happy to do it.

Representative Moylan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing on arms control and international security. I appreciate my colleague's questions as well regarding the Pacific Islands. Mr. Secretary, I represent Guam, the most western part of the United States, closest to these aggressors that we're trying to make sure we're way ahead of the game. I want to really thank you and the T family for doing the best that they can regarding the terrorism and the drugs and the nukes, all that responsibility that you have to do. Guam follows these situations really, really closely. North Korea, Russia, and China. We're a target no matter what. So your success is so important to us, for the first island chain and the territories in the second island chain. So Under Secretary, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission of 2023 reported focused on the unique challenges of deterring both Russia and China as nuclear peers. While this dynamic imposes new challenges for arms control not present during the Cold War, what new opportunities now exist for arms control in current security environment?

Thank you for the question, Congressman. Look, I made a comment earlier, I think it's appropriate, certainly as officials inside the administration, listen to the President. I mean, he couldn't have been clearer just before I went to the Conference on Disarmament in the run-up to the New START expiration, that he wants to see a new agreement. In fact, he said he wanted to see a better agreement and a new treaty. So the President himself sets the direction, sets the policy, Commander-in-Chief, and those opportunities come from that sort of commitment. And again, not necessarily coming from me, but when it comes from him personally, adversaries and allies listen. And it has tremendous credibility and it's a tremendous forcing function. So I think the world's on notice that he's serious about it. I don't remember a president in my lifetime that has been more passionate or clear about his desire to see fewer nuclear weapons in the world. And that comes right from the top. So the opportunities come from that, from his commitment, and obviously my role is to try to bring something to bring that to life.

Thank you. Also, Mr. Secretary, I introduced a measure, the China AI Power Report Act, to establish regular process for monitoring and reporting on the advanced artificial intelligent capabilities of China. How do you think improved clarity on China's AI capacity capabilities could shape policymaking in the future?

It's a great question, and thank you, sir. I think one of the AI is present across every single program that I run and probably don't run, whether it's through extensive discussions on LAWS, right, lethal autonomous weapons systems, cyber, advanced persistent threats in space, the STRATCOM commander talked about. And I think this is one of the reasons why it really made sense to try to have a hub for us to get at the national security implications around artificial intelligence. And this was some of the thinking behind this Emerging Threats Bureau. That if we have sort of onesies and twosies spread out across the government, it's really hard to make progress. But I think having the new bureau where we have a senior executive who would be in charge, an Assistant Secretary overseeing a specialized team. Again, our role at the State Department is diplomacy. So we would work very closely with the operational components of the military as well as our foreign partners to try to identify those risks and then introduce them into perhaps as an export control program that inside the bureaus that I run or a program at the War Department or Cyber Command. So I think part of the reason to get at it is you have to organize yourself to address the problem. And I think that's really what we've been trying to do around AI.

I thank you. For about 20 seconds left here, sir, can you please tell us how important your job is for the first island chain and the deterrence of what the CCP wants to do to Taiwan and the protection of U.S. soil in the Pacific?

Well, sir, my, you know, again, I'm only part of a much bigger machine here. I think again, leading the nuclear diplomacy is important. One of the prior questions was about our commitment to our extended deterrence commitments, number one, I think allows the War Department to show some sort of flexibility in how they address force posture in and around that theater of operations. So again, my role as the chief diplomat, if you would, in the nuclear role is to...

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm out of time, but appreciate it.

Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Representative Dean.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. How are you? I'm Madeleine Dean from suburban Philadelphia. An issue I care deeply about, and I believe this administration cares deeply about, is stopping the flow of illicit drugs into our country. As we all know, there was a chaotic reorganization at the State Department. You now oversee the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. It worries me a little that in your conversation with Mr. Keating, it didn't seem like INL was on your radar, and that is some of the questions that I have. So number one, INL is responsible for developing, implementing international narcotics control activities, supporting international criminal justice objectives abroad, and combating transnational crime. Given the many changes made at INL over the past year, I have some questions about its current operations. How is INL supporting partner governments in identifying and dismantling illicit financial networks tied to drug trafficking? What are you doing?

Thank you for the question. First of all, I'm not sure I agree with your premise about a chaotic activities at the department. What I can tell you is that...

What are you doing specifically on tracking the financial piece of illicit drug trafficking?

Number one, we had a comprehensive security assistance review that normalized both our counterterrorism funding and our counterdrug funding, reprioritized into dismantling criminal drug cartels. That is the number one focus of the INL Bureau.

That review, you want to share that with us? Number two, do you have that review and could you share it with us?

I'm happy to do it. Yeah. I mean, I don't think there's a piece of paper I can share, but I'm happy to come up and tell you about it.

The review was not documented in any way?

I don't have a report to share, but I'm happy to come back and tell you.

Was somebody in the room taking notes?

Oh, I'm sure there were. Yeah. I'm sure people take lots of notes at the State Department.

Well, great. Share those notes with us if you would. Do you want notes or a briefing or both? We'll take a briefing. Yes, I'm happy to do it. We'll take both. Yes, ma'am. How is INL supporting judiciaries in countries where democratic institutions are under threat to ensure that behind illicit drug trafficking is being prosecuted? And I'll tie to that, what data, what evidence do you have about the so-called drug trafficking in the speedboats that the administration has been murdering people, blowing up the boats, when we know it's not fentanyl? What data do you have on that and what are you doing with other countries?

Let me address what are we doing with other countries. INL has a worldwide footprint. And just to your earlier comment, I think I need to address about not doing enough with INL. I spent an hour and a half or hour yesterday with all the INL country directors personally, understanding what their programs do, understanding how I can help them do their job better. So I reject your premise that I am not doing anything to support INL. These people are among some of the most talented, creative federal employees that I've worked with. No, hold on. Let me say one more thing.

I trust that, but the time is mine, so please excuse me. I understand it's your time, but the answer's mine. So let me give you the answer. But in the six months that you have been at the helm here, including at the helm of INL, we haven't seen a press release about any of these reviews or high-level meetings, nothing, which is evidence of showing the American people you care about this. So we haven't seen any evidence of that. You're having an hour and a half conversations, that's great. You need better staff work. Thank you. Give me the information on the drug boats, the speedboats, what evidence do you have?

Yes, ma'am. So I think to put in context is most important. Since President Trump took office, designating criminal cartels as...

I'm aware of that. What evidence do you have? I don't need the context. I need the evidence. What evidence do you have that fentanyl was on these boats where you murdered people?

Well, first of all, the answer is well outside of my purview as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. Any of that operation was run by the War Department because these organizations, instead of being treated as a...

I would think State Department has the data.

Instead of being treated as a criminal problem, the administration, the President, rightly treated them as a terrorist problem. We have designated 15 foreign terrorist organizations...

Mr. Under Secretary, I'll just make a request. Would you please somebody speak to the President and remind him that it's not fentanyl in those boats and it's not fentanyl coming to the United States? That was all a false set of premises. We all know it. And the fact that you're trying to put it under the Secretary of Defense, it's not the Secretary of War, it's the Secretary of Defense, is just wrong. You can't hide it in a war that is not existent. So thank you. I yield back.

Representative yields back. I don't know if you have or have not attended or missed the same classified briefings as the counterpart to my left, but you have been briefed on the numerous triggers that have to be met for interdiction versus law enforcement activity versus a strike as it relates to drug boats. You've been briefed on it numerous times. I would encourage you to attend those classified briefings if you have not, but they have been in detail.

I've asked for the data and have not...

And I would also point you to the fact that if you're looking for documentation of questions about INL, it was in his written testimony about all of the INL helicopters in Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru that have interdicted tens of thousands of acres and hundreds of metric tons of cocaine and other things. It's all very clearly written in the testimony. If you didn't read it, you can go back and read it.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Representative Huizenga.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Under Secretary, appreciate your time today. The Missile Technology Control Regime is in my opinion an antiquated Cold War era agreement that imposes a presumption of denial on certain types of technology. Unfortunately, as our defense technology has advanced, our laws have failed to keep up. Last year I introduced HR 3068, the Missile Technology Control Review Act, which would allow the United States to more easily share defense technology with our AUKUS partners by creating an AUKUS exemption to the MTCR. Unfortunately, not a single one of my Democrat colleagues voted for that bill during markup. There is an April 9, 2025 executive order that required a review of the MTCR, and last week the principal deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs testified before this committee that the State Department continues to review the Missile Technology Control Regime as part of the arms sales reform process. So yesterday you testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that you are personally overseeing the MTCR review within the department. Could you please elaborate on the progress of the review and what role should Congress play in codifying the results of that review?

Thank you, Congressman, for the for the question and for the work that you're doing around this. I can tell you in the almost six months that I've been in this job, this is probably one of the most important things that we can do. I think in the broader sense, as you know, and I agree with everything you said in the preamble in your in your preamble, these are mechanisms, the MTCR is 40 years old, 1987.

And our relationship with Russia is now very different and our relationship with other countries is different.

Right. So again, and we're modernizing, right? We are, we need to modernize our nonproliferation architecture the same way as we're modernizing our nuclear deterrent, for example. So I think the MTCR, there's a good, it's a good start, some of the policy reforms.

Where are we on the review?

So the review, actually the political-military bureau, it would be the Arms Control Nonproliferation Bureau manages that specific program. We just met last week and went through sort of the sort of the next steps. We'll meet monthly. I just recently assigned another senior executive to kind of oversee that at the at the staff level to make sure that that we have ongoing progress here. I think the, you know, one of the... Go ahead, sir.

But would you, do you see any problem with having an AUKUS carve out in this? Does that cause any concerns? I mean, that was, that was what was expressed by some on the other side of the aisle.

I don't think it goes far enough. I agree with with your going-in assumption that we have to do a top-to-bottom review of understanding what what problem are we trying to solve. If we're trying to solve for missile technologies and prevent the technology from getting into our hands of adversaries, we haven't done a very good job. I think the challenge, and as you point out, the the presumption of denial has turned into a policy of denial. And we can't get let anything get in the way of equipping our allies with these sort of systems, ballistic strike, UAVs. So the this AUKUS experiment is good, it's important, it's a good first step. I think there's a recent CSIS report that talks about a good first step is is great, but we really need to be sprinting here.

So what what does that sprinting look like? You had said earlier that you didn't think it went far enough. And so I mean, I'm hearing that you don't think there's going to be any significant negative impacts if we were to do that, but you had also mentioned it didn't go far enough. What what does that look like?

Yeah, look, I think we need to, first of all, I don't I don't want to presume the outcome, right? I want to I want to go through a little bit of a process here and and understand that I'm sure there are things that we need to continue to preserve. But again, trying to take a 2026 or 2030 problem set and stuff it into a 1987 mechanism, you know, the business model's wrong, right? And so are we trying to modernize something that's not fixable? Do we need a new regime? So I look forward to...

Would it would it make sense to do some sort of periodic review? In other words, have I don't want to say sunset specifically, but something that would cause and trigger a a review, in-depth review that would allow us to modify it so that we don't find ourselves stuck in this, you know, loop of 40 years and and having to battle through the politics of who happens to be in the in the executive mansion seems more makes more sense to me to have a clear-eyed view that we need to review these these parameters on a on a reasonable amount of time.

I agree with that statement, sir.

Okay. Well, with that, Mr. Chairman, appreciate your time here today and I'll yield back.

Representative Mfume.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member for holding this hearing. Obviously its importance is underscored by the sort of questions and inquiries that have been coming from members here on both sides of the aisle trying to get information that is not always forthcoming. Mr. Under Secretary, in your testimony, you mentioned efforts to combat malicious uses of artificial intelligence technology and other sort of emerging threats. Can you take a minute to talk about that?

Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. I think trying to start to get at the problem of artificial intelligence really impacts across almost all of the bureaus and offices that I oversee. I think one of the challenges that we have is that there's the efforts are spread across the government. And one of the reasons, so I think number one, we have to organize ourselves to address the problem.

Well, what is your assessment of the biggest AI-related threats? I don't have much time, so I want to specifically narrow in on a couple of things.

Yeah, look, I don't think I can answer this threat versus that threat. I think the point I was trying to get at earlier is we have to organize ourselves to address the problem. And one of the things that we have done in the Trump administration is organizing ourselves into this new bureau so that there is a central locus of expertise that has staying power.

Right, but wouldn't you also prioritize what are the most malicious threats? If you're going to organize that way, how would you know where to go?

Sir, I don't think my job would be to give you today a list of prioritized threats one versus the other.

Well, it's not, but it is the expectation of the American people that if you are focusing in on malicious threats, that you have some sort of priority as to what the most important ones are that affect this country and affect the people who live here and who expect some sort of ranking. You're saying you don't have that, no one has put that together for you?

I'm not going to provide you a ranking of AI threats to the United States.

I would assume that that's what you would be doing.

I'm more than happy to have an organized process by which to do that. So let me try to answer your question.

No, no, no. I appreciate it, but you're not going to filibuster on me on this.

I'm not going to filibuster. I'm going to answer your question.

Well, if I had more time, I would try to indulge some of this. I'm trying to get to specific points. You have these emerging threats, but you don't know what order or priority they are most malicious.

Well, I'll give you one.

Let me, this is my time, with all due respect. As part of Secretary Rubio, sir, this is my time and I reclaim it.

Yeah, you can reclaim it. I'm reclaiming my answer.

You do not have the right to do that.

Yes, sir, I want to answer your question.

No, sir, you don. Mr. Chairman, this is my time, I reclaim it.

Last week at the Senate Armed Services, House Armed Services...

Sir, sir, this is my time and I hope that it's not counted against me. I hope that the clock is stopped. Thank you. So this is what I mean about filibustering my time. I reclaim it and I'd like to proceed with the clock running. Mr. Under Secretary, although it's been U.S. policy to avoid civilian deaths while conducting military strikes, there have been repeated and credible accusations that U.S. allies around the globe have used our weaponry to attack innocent civilians and carry out human rights abuses. That kind of senseless violence is something that weakens our foreign policy. I'm going to ask you a series of yes or no questions and I would appreciate a response. Do you agree that U.S. partners should not use our weaponry against innocent civilians, yes or no?

Of course.

Of course what?

You asked for yes or no, I gave you an answer.

You said of course. That didn't say yes or no. Is it of course yes or is it of course no?

We would never do that against innocent civilians.

Do you agree that if U.S. partners...

Next question, sir.

Do you agree if U.S. partners are using our weaponry against civilians in ways that violates U.S. law, that our government should know that these incidents have occurred, yes or no?

The government does have a process by which we would certify that any programming would violate administration policy and law.

Do you agree that our government should have a formal system to report, review, and prosecute cases in which U.S. arms recipients are using weaponry that violates U.S. and international law, yes or no?

U.S. conventional arms transfer policy is consistent...

Yes or no?

...that requires...

Yes or no? It's amazing that you can't answer these questions with a simple yes or a simple no. I yield back because I don't have any more time left, but I am absolutely shocked that in your role you want to play this game with this committee and with me, sir. Thank you.

Representative Kim.

Thank you, Chairman Mast, and I want to thank Under Secretary DiNanno for testifying today. The fiscal year 2024 NDAA directed the Secretary of State to designate a senior advisor to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the AUKUS partnership. And the senior advisor is charged with aligning both pillars of AUKUS with the State Department's broader arms control and security cooperation architecture. So can you describe the senior advisor's unique role at the State, particularly how it differs from the parallel AUKUS implementing counterparts at the Departments of War and Energy? And can you walk us through the current interagency coordination process for executing AUKUS activities?

Thank you for the question. The AUKUS senior advisor reports to me as the Under Secretary. He is, the program office is extremely active. I was just with our director a week or two weeks ago in the United Kingdom where we met with our counterpart, the AUKUS coordinator in the UK. And just this past week, we met with the AUKUS coordinator for Australia. So the coordinators themselves have a very, very close engagement. To answer your specific question on how we work with the War Department, daily. I look at the AUKUS engagement as a critical canary in the coal mine, if you would, on our broader defense industrial base and FMS reform efforts. And as we go through the process, there was earlier questions about MTCR, you know, we continue to sort of run into some of these these knots and problems. And if we can sort of disentangle them or get identify them through the AUKUS process...

But can you talk about the performance metrics that the senior advisor's office is using to track the progress of the AUKUS pillar one, pillar two?

Yeah, so I can tell you certainly, I think the most important metric is the president himself. I think full steam ahead, I think was what he said very recently. We've had, so that again, and again, I answered an earlier question when the president himself gives that sort of guidance to the interagency, the interagency moves out extremely smartly. So pillar one and pillar two, we are extremely optimistic. This is a lot of some of these decision processes lie in the War Department, so for example, the capabilities...

I want to talk about some of the reforms that have been taking place since we created the office of senior advisor for specific to implement the AUKUS. Can you talk about the additional authorities or resources, whether it's in personnel, regulatory flexibility or more, that is needed at the State Department to accelerate the AUKUS pillar one and pillar two?

Well, I think, you know, I think one example is the U.S.-Australia-UK ITAR exemption. That, there are other specific examples of regulatory reform. I mentioned earlier on MTCR where we now treat unmanned aircraft, heavy drones, as manned aircraft instead of into an MTCR one capability. That alone will allow us to try to get more capabilities out to both partners in the U.S. and UK. So those are those are two specific regulatory pieces, but the point I think is really important to make is the more we wade into this, I don't want, this is not going to be easy and it's not going to take, it's not going to happen in weeks or months.

Thank you. Let me just talk about quick demining issue. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has a proven track record of conducting rapid and targeted conventional weapons clearance operation in high-threat environments while maintaining the strict humanitarian and non-proliferation safeguards. And the U.S. mission to the UN recently hosted a Security Council session on the importance of locating and destroying the remnants of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal. The session noted that the active minefields and unexploited conventional weapons are currently preventing chemical weapons inspectors from gaining access to key sites. So how does the department plan to leverage the expertise and resources of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement to support the clearance of the landmines and other conventional explosions in Syria that would enable inspector access?

Thanks for the question. Look, I think that that specific question highlights why it makes sense to have our Political-Military Bureau aligned with our non-proliferation bureau in the new expanded T family. So the both of those offices work underneath my purview and would work hand in hand. We work very closely with the OPCW. We have extremely robust program to address specifically what you raised. And certainly the landmine issue, the Political-Military Bureau and the non-proliferation bureau would work seamlessly. I mean, these are these are neighbors, these are colleagues. So that I would expect that to be a seamless integration.

Thank you. My time's up. I yield back.

Representative Latimer.

Thank you, Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks. Thank you to the Under Secretary for your presence. Want to reinforce that we are having this conversation now four weeks into a war with Iran and this committee still hasn't had a dedicated public hearing on a war that's costing both American lives and tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. We still don't even know what exactly the actual goal is. So my constituents are frustrated and so am I. We have a lot of unanswered questions, but what is clear is that Iran's nuclear capabilities are a central issue of the war. Sometimes we're told by this administration the nuclear threat was imminent. Other times we're told that it was obliterated. Just this week, U.S. officials reportedly said we're now unlikely to put a nuclear weapon permanently out of Tehran's reach. The president, Secretary Hegseth, Secretary Rubio, Steve Witkoff, all of them have found plenty of time to go on television to discuss the war and negotiations. That's why they should be willing to come and speak to Congress in public, not only on the state of Iran's nuclear program, but their plan for what comes next. Because even in classified settings, such a plan is murky at best. That's probably being very generous. Under Secretary, pivoting more specifically to your work, you are on the front lines of a new reality where energy infrastructure and fuel flows have become primary targets and a pressure points in crises. We're seeing that play today. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have caused a historic energy crisis and China's maritime militia have threatened to blockade Taiwan, using energy dependence as leverage. I want to focus on that today. When I visited Taiwan last year, I saw how critical reliable energy is to the island's security and economic stability. Taiwan imports more than 95 percent of its energy and has very limited on-island storage. That means the PRC could threaten Taiwan's resilience long before any shots are fired. Although Taiwan shut down its last nuclear power plant last year, it spent decades developing advanced civilian nuclear energy expertise. As Taiwan works to diversify and stabilize its energy supply, it's worth revisiting how modern nuclear technology together with other energy sources can strengthen the island's energy resilience. That's why I'm proud to partner with Reps. Harrigan and Lawler to introduce the Taiwan Energy Security and Anti-Embargo Act to strengthen that energy resilience by diversifying U.S. energy exports and encouraging greater cooperation on civil nuclear energy. I hope that work complements—the work on that bill complements your efforts, Under Secretary, particularly the vision you outlined at the Nuclear Energy Summit in Paris a few weeks ago where you emphasized America's readiness to lead in advancing nuclear power in partnership with our allies. With that in mind, I wanted to ask how you see Taiwan fitting into this broader agenda that you outlined in Paris. What would effective civil nuclear cooperation with Taiwan look like and how can it enhance its energy resilience?

Thank you for the question, Congressman. As I laid out, the president's energy dominance strategy, I think is worldwide. We're working on, again, we have a goal, I mentioned earlier of having 20 123 agreements. We've got five initialed. Specific to the Taiwan, what our engagement in there is, I would imagine that would be consistent with our policy. You'll have to forgive me, the details of our engagement there, I don't have at my fingertips, but I'm more than happy to come back to you and talk to you about that. I just don't have all those details.

No, and that's fine. We would welcome that as a follow-up. We can have our office follow up with you. I appreciate that. Second question is, the World Nuclear Association reports that 35 countries are considering, planning, or starting nuclear power programs. Russia and China have capitalized on this with aggressive state-backed export programs. So the real question is not whether these countries will choose nuclear power, but which partners they'll choose. So I'm just curious if you could speak a little bit to the State Department's plan to ensure the U.S. remains a partner of choice for those countries seeking reliable, transparent nuclear energy partnerships.

Yes, and thank you for the question, sir. It's a really good question. I think part of the challenge is that the Russians and Chinese do have extremely active diplomacy and, in some cases, coercive diplomacy. To maintain the partner of—to be the partner of choice, we need to be able to provide capability quickly. And I know there's been a lot of regulatory across the government, not strictly a State Department piece to this. Again, I would own the sort of further down the road on a 123 agreement and moving those faster. We've got a very efficient team that does that work. But the other parts of the government, we work very closely with the Department of Energy. I was just in Paris, as you pointed out, with my colleagues from the Department of Energy as well as folks from the White House, the Chief Technology Officer of the White House. So it has a lot of attention in the administration. And just one additional data point, moving quickly also means we have to move safely. And again, these are—we can't sacrifice one for the other, but the commercial benefits are tremendous, and they're a tremendous instrument of state power.

I appreciate that. The technology is important, the partnerships are important. I hope this committee keeps that in mind as we do our work and think about our engagements around the world. But I thank you for your time, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I now recognize the representative from Washington, Mr. Baumgartner.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for being here. You have a very important job. I'm a new member of Congress, and one of the things I sort of always find interesting is that sometimes these types of conversations do a little better when they are in the classified briefing just because there's no television cameras and we seem to have more substantive debate and less performance in some respects. But in any event, I wanted to ask you about arms control and specifically related to China. What needs to happen in your view to get to increase leverage on China so that they would enter into more meaningful arms control discussions in the nuclear space? You know, countries don't do things because they're altruistic, they do things that are in their national interest. China doesn't feel it—seem to feel it's in their national interest at the moment. So what would it take to make it in their national interest to be involved in meaningful arms control in the nuclear space?

Thanks for the question, Congressman, and welcome to Congress. Look, I think number one, and I answered this question—a different question the same way earlier, when the President himself makes very clear that he's committed to a certain outcome, both adversaries and allies listen. So I think his personal commitment, again, it's been very clear to me that he wants to see this happen. Number one. Number two, the Chinese do have an obligation to negotiate in good faith under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI. So it's their obligation. We have a review conference on the treaty, actually, next month, and we'll be talking to them about that. So as part of being a responsible actor of being a nuclear weapons state, this is certainly a requirement. And three, the other leverage points probably rest outside my responsibilities at the State Department and rest in the War Department. And I know STRATCOM commander was up in front of the Armed Services Committee last week and laid out a very detailed plan about a modernized deterrent that the United States will vigorously compete, and that we will not negotiate from a position of weakness. So that, again, that's slightly outside of my remit, but we work very closely with the War Department. So I think there's a couple of leverage points there. And again, we expect them, as part of their obligation under the NPT, to negotiate in good faith.

Thank you. About—well, little less than 20 years ago, I was a contractor in Afghanistan on an INL-funded Afghan government counter-narcotics team in a place called Lashkar Gah, Helmand, and would love to share some of the experiences from that. Obviously, that phase of our war in Afghanistan was a little different and quite expeditionary. I have a real interest in trying to see State Department develop more expeditionary and counter-insurgent type capabilities, maybe outside the remit of traditional FSOs. And I think our traditional FSOs do a fantastic job, so don't want to lose that capability. But, you know, we weren't as an institution, I don't think State was well-prepared for where it found itself in the after the immediate invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. And I think there's going to be more challenges like that ahead. So I'd like to talk to you at some point about that experience. I just wonder if you have a comment about INL and the future on some of these more challenging spaces.

I'd love to hear that feedback at some point and figure out if there's a place in our programming. In regards to INL, we did go through a pretty comprehensive review. I think it had lost its sort of laser focus on law enforcement support and started to get into places that this administration didn't feel was appropriate for our war against cartels, both terrorist and criminal cartels. So our refocusing on core capabilities to dismantle cartels. Now, that's not strictly in South and Latin America. I think that's important, even though we reprioritize, it doesn't mean we deprioritize or unprioritize, if you would. So we still have a robust and critical engagement in that part of the world as well as in sort of the East Asia-Pacific as well. So as I said earlier, I met with the country directors of INL yesterday worldwide. We have a footprint, and they are our eyes and ears. Again, having targeted security assistance that we think meets the America First security assistance objectives, that it doesn't go wayward into diversity programs or gender programs. Again, reprioritizing, laser focus on dismantling cartels, and again, it's worldwide is what those folks do, and they're terrific.

Thank you for your service. The de-wokifying stuff is fantastic. We just need to think about expanding the toolkit for challenging places.

Yes, sir. Look forward to it.

Okay.

I now recognize the representative from Illinois, Mr. Jackson.

Thank you, Chairman Self and Ranking Member Meeks. We convene today under the banner of securing the future, a phrase that invites both ambition and sobriety. Because the truth is the future is not secured by aspirations alone, it is secured by clarity of purpose, strategic purpose, discipline, vision, and a willingness to confront what we wish to be. Arms control at its best would lead us to make sure that our idealism is not detached from power. It has been about managing power, ours and our adversaries, in a way that reduces risk without indulging illusions. It is not an act of trust, it is an act of verification. And yet we find ourselves in a moment where the architecture that once provided a measure for predictability for treaties, norms, guardrails is eroding. Not accidentally, but deliberately. Russia violates, China expands, rogue states observe and learn. The result is not stable and equilibrium, but a gathering instability. We must therefore ask ourselves, are we adapting to this new strategic environment, or are we clinging to frameworks built for a world that no longer exists? Because arms control without enforcement is theater. Agreements without consequences are invitations to cheat, to advance, and to dominate. At the same time, abandoning arms controls altogether would be equally reckless. The absence of structure does not produce freedom, it produces chaos. The task before us then is not to choose between strength and restraint, but to integrate the two. To pursue arms control that is hard-headed, verifiable, and rooted in American strength. This requires our investing in relationships, negotiating from a position where our adversaries understand that non-compliance carries real cost. It also requires intellectual honesty. Not every adversary seeks stability, not every negotiation leads to peace, and not every agreement serves our interest. If we are to secure the future, we must first abandon the comforting fictions of the past. Mr. Under Secretary, given the repeated violation of past arms controls agreements by major powers, what specific enforcement mechanisms is the department prepared to pursue to ensure that future agreements are not merely symbolic, but binding in practice?

Thanks for the question, Congressman. Look, I've been crystal clear since I've taken this job and also in my prior service that any arms control agreement has to be enforceable and verifiable. One of the challenges I think we had with New START, as you point out, the Russians were serial violators. And I think the verification regime was not strong enough. It had some pieces that I thought were good and predictable, and that's all good. But that was a treaty signed in 2011 and simply not appropriate for the security environment of today. And at the end of the day, as that treaty expired, the President called for a new one. So a modernized one that meets all of those thresholds that I've laid out about enforceability, verifiability, and it has to contribute to the security of the United States.

Thank you. Can you provide any additional insight how in our current conflict in Iran, I believe we've declared an act of war without the Congress's approval, how the most sanctioned part of the earth, that the military of the Republican, the Iranian Guard, can have some of the most advanced weapons? How were they able to acquire this material without our military's knowledge, or did we simply underestimate them?

Thanks for the question, sir. I think I agree with the premise of your question. As I mentioned earlier in the hearing, our non-proliferation regimes, although may have slowed our adversaries' weapons programs and arrested them, they certainly didn't stop them. And I think we have to have a clear-eyed, honest conversation on how we improve them. But to do that, again, I think it's across, as I mentioned earlier, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is from 1974. The MTCR, as I mentioned earlier, is a framework established in 1987. The Australia Group, I think, in 1985. So these are modern-day problems that we have a sort of generational architecture problem. And I think we absolutely have to look closely at how we modernize it, how we apply technology, so that we deny our adversaries precisely the capabilities I think you're talking about.

And thank you for your time. Thank you for presenting before the committee today. I yield back, Chairman Self.

Thank you. And I now recognize the representative from Illinois, Mr. Schneider.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And before I begin, I know it's been brought up by others, in particular the ranking member, this is not a hearing about the war with Iran, but the war is something that this committee needs to, should be, has to talk about. It would be nice if we were doing it now. We need to understand what is the goal of the war. What are we trying to achieve? What's the strategy for achieving those goals? What's the end game? And what's the off-ramp? All of which is important to the American people. As we speak, American service members, including every enlisted sailor who comes through my district at Naval Station Great Lakes for basic training, our sailors, our soldiers, our marines, our airmen, all our service members are part of a military campaign against Iran, putting their lives on the line on behalf of our nation. And as they carry out their dangerous mission, we owe it to them, not only our gratitude and prayers, but a clear integrated strategy for what comes next. Why are they there? Why are they taking this risk? We must always pray for their success in their mission and their safe return home. Among that mission, obviously, is Iran's nuclear program. And this hearing today is about arms control and international security. And in that context, I want to focus on the Iranian nuclear program, specifically not just the goal, but the imperative to first block and then ultimately permanently close Iran's nuclear program and end Iran's nuclear ambitions. The international legal framework already exists. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and the Additional Protocol, which authorizes the IAEA inspectors to verify declared material and detect undeclared nuclear activities. These tools were built precisely to stop the kind of breakout we fear from Iran. But they only work when they are enforced. Iran suspended the Additional Protocol five years ago in 2021, expelled designated inspectors, and has long restricted access to key sites. The June 25 strikes and the intensified U.S.-Israel campaign that began last month have further degraded Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Yet they've also deepened the verification process. As the IAEA's February 27 report made clear, the agency has been locked out of affected facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. It cannot confirm the current size, composition, or location of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, nor verify whether enrichment has indeed resumed. That is a proliferation emergency in the middle of an act of war. The hard numbers are sobering. Before the June 25 strikes, the IAEA verified that Iran had accumulated more than 440 kilograms of enriched uranium to 60 percent. Sixty percent represents roughly 99 percent of the work necessary to separate and achieve weapons-grade uranium and is theoretically enough for about 10 nuclear devices. Much of that enriched uranium is believed to remain underground at Isfahan. IAEA Director General Grossi has stated that to the best of the agency's knowledge, the stockpile has not been moved. But impressions are not verification. Especially amid ongoing strikes and rubble at these sites, every additional day without inspectors on the ground heightens the risk of diversion, the loss of continuity of knowledge, or even unintended radiological consequence. This cannot be handled by the U.S. alone. Our European allies, our Gulf partners, and the IAEA Board of Governors must be central to any solution from the outset. The E3 has already triggered the snapback of UN sanctions, providing important leverage. But sanctions and airstrikes are merely tools, not the permanent answer. We need a coordinated, verifiable plan to secure or neutralize that highly enriched uranium, whether through removal, downblending under IAEA supervision, or verified conversion while the military campaign continues. So Secretary DiNanno, what is the administration's plan for locating, securing, and neutralizing Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium?

Thank you for the question, Congressman. Look, I think it's important that we understand that the policy of the United States since February 2025 is to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and in an intercontinental ballistic missile plan. Currently, the uranium that you refer to is, the decisions being made around that would lie with the combatant commander, Admiral Cooper, in the area of operations.

Wait, are you saying that Admiral Cooper is the one driving the strategy? It's not coming from the administration directly or coming from your office?

Well, he is the administration. My role, that decision process is outside of my purview as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security.

Doesn't nuclear material fall under your authority?

Currently, and I confer with my War Department colleagues often on this specific issue, Admiral Cooper would be the, as the combatant commander, given the ongoing hostilities, in the event of cessation of hostilities, our office as a liaison to the IAEA...

Has he been given orders to secure the nuclear material? I mean, we're talking about enough material for 10 nuclear weapons. Is it Admiral Cooper's responsibility to secure?

Gentleman's time has expired.

Sir, I'm not trying to dodge your question, but you really would need to, I'd have to refer you to the War Department.

Gentleman's time has expired.

I yield back, but not satisfied.

I now recognize the representative from South Carolina, Ms. Biggs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. DiNanno, for your testimony this morning. It's very important to all of us. Last September, President Trump stood before the United Nations General Assembly and called for the permanent elimination of biological weapons development worldwide. His words are a call to action in the face of growing threats to our national security. While the United States ended its biological weapons program over 50 years ago, we cannot ignore the reality that state and non-state actors around the world continue to pursue these capabilities. Most concerning is the PRC's rapid advancement in biotechnology, including gene editing, synthetic biology, and dual-use technologies that pose significant threats to our national security and military superiority. That's why I will be introducing legislation to counter biotechnology threats from China that would require our government to take these threats seriously. China's military-civil fusion strategy deliberately integrates civilian biotechnology research with military applications, enabling the development of enhanced soldier capabilities, bioweapons, and other threats against the United States. We cannot allow China's dominance in global biotechnology supply chains and strategic investments in American biotechnology firms to undermine our innovation, our security, and access to critical resources. So my first question, what concrete steps is the State Department taking to fulfill President Trump's call for eliminating biological weapons development globally?

Thank you very much for the question. Look, obviously the president's commitment, as I've said a couple times in the hearing today, helps jumpstart the interagency and also sends a message to our partners and allies. That message was extremely well received in Geneva where the Biological Weapons Convention Secretariat is housed. So our job is to try to make that treaty, it's had a lot of challenges, it's very difficult to verify, it has some structural problems. The review conference next year, we look to hopefully bring the tools that the president outlined at a high level to bear. There are some things through technology, right, through AI, that we're working in the interagency, not just the State Department, with our colleagues at HHS as well as the War Department. We had a whole team go out there to address the Biological Weapons Convention so that we can begin to identify perhaps vulnerabilities in the supply chain or dual-use technologies that we currently don't have our arms around and be able to use the treaty mechanism. It would actually be through Article 10 to share that information to all states parties. So the treaty mechanism is one part of it. The sort of the other side of the arms control piece here, I think, is important is the nonproliferation side. As an aside, I think that's also sort of one of the reasons why we merged the Nonproliferation Bureau and the Arms Control Bureau. In my prior years at State Department, those were separate in separate bureaus answering to separate executives. Now they're merged so that nonproliferation and arms control have to work hand in hand. I think one of the challenges, again, I mentioned earlier, and I'm really interested in your legislation and your thinking on this, is again the Australia Group. And again, I know they do a lot of really good work, but these are mechanisms from years ago. I think the Australia Group is 1985. Right? So basically my entire adult life are we trying to fit a modern 2026, 2030 problem into an outdated nonproliferation architecture. And it's not just bio, right, across the WMD spectrum, across dual-use technology spectrum. So we again, we have robust ongoing programs. My concern is that we know what we know. How do we turbocharge these? How do we enable them with AI that the president called for or other tools or technologies? I think that's one of the reasons why the Emerging Threats Bureau, to have specialists that really follow the next generation technology and so that we can try to update our programs. The government tends to move slow, laboriously, and in stovepipes. And I think some of these reforms, organizing ourselves to get after the problem, is a big part of it as well. I hope that answers your question.

Thank you. I would love to continue our conversation. I'm out of time, though, so I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Now recognize the representative from Texas, Mr. Castro.

Thank you, Chairman. Under Secretary DiNanno, I wanted to follow up on some questions that Representative Schneider asked. This war has a nuclear dimension that we have to address and that the committee and the Congress can't avoid. In the first week of the war, the United States and Israel struck Iran's nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. Last week, Iran claimed that a projectile hit a structure about 1,000 feet from Iran's nuclear power plant at Bushehr. The IAEA Director General called it, quote, "the reddest line of nuclear safety." And just a few days ago, Iranian ballistic missiles struck the city of Dimona, injuring more than 180 people, penetrating Israeli air defenses near Israel's main nuclear research facility for the first time. Iran said explicitly it was targeting the Negev Nuclear Research Center in retaliation for Natanz. And yesterday, Iran claimed that their nuclear power facility at Bushehr was hit again. Nuclear facilities on both sides have been targeted. That's where we are in this war, and that's how far it's escalated. If a nuclear reactor like Bushehr were hit, there's a significant risk of a meltdown and release of extremely dangerous radioactive materials that would affect all countries in the region and, of course, millions of people, including Americans and American service members. You are the main government official overseeing nonproliferation and arms control for the United States government. If there were a nuclear emergency, you would play a leading role in the international diplomacy to address that emergency. My question to you is, what is the administration's assessment of the risk of nuclear escalation or radiological disaster in this war? And what steps is the United States taking to prevent it?

Thank you, Congressman. As I answered earlier, those operational questions specific to the theater of operations would rest with Admiral Cooper. I will tell you that all resources inside the Nonproliferation Bureau would be made available and are available should they warrant it. I've had conversations with my colleagues in the War Department specifically to this issue, and operationally the War Department would address the type of things that you're getting at.

And I appreciate that, but I mean, you're the main person in the government in charge of nonproliferation and overseeing nuclear weapons. Do they not share this information with you?

Well, no, again, sir, the...

I know you said they're responsible for generating it, but do they share it with you? Can you share it with us?

In the current situation, Admiral Cooper would be the decision maker on how that any hypothetical situation would be addressed. They have the resources, and again, I had this conversation with my counterpart at the War Department to let them know that the nonproliferation experts would be available should...

Sure. Well, let me ask you a follow-up question. The United States is currently engaged in a major war against Iran, of course, a war that clearly already has nuclear consequences. And I don't believe that you've adequately addressed the nuclear risks here. So let's take a step back and establish some basic facts. The administration has said that Iran is or was close to developing nuclear weapons. But what they haven't discussed is what Israel's capacity or capabilities are. So I want to ask you, does Israel have nuclear weapons?

I'm not prepared to comment on that on...

You're not prepared to comment on it? It's a very basic question. We are with an ally conducting a war against Iran. We all know what American capabilities are. The U.S. government has spoken about what Iran's capabilities are. Can you tell us what Israel's capabilities are? The consequences, as you know, are grave. This war continues to escalate. Tell us something, as Congress, as the oversight body, what is Israel's nuclear capability in terms of weapons?

I can't comment on that specific question. You'd have to refer to the Israelis on that.

Does that mean you don't know?

I can't comment on that, sir.

Under Secretary, you're the main person in charge of knowing this and understanding it. Will you not give us an answer? I don't understand why this issue is so taboo when it's a basic question and we're in a war alongside Israel against Iran. We're dealing with the potential for nuclear fallout, and you won't answer this basic question.

Well, again, it would be outside of my purview as the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Under Secretary to discuss that specific question.

Sir, that is a dereliction of duty. I yield back.

Mr. Secretary, I'll help you with that. The official Israeli position is they neither confirm nor deny any existence of nuclear weapons. Now recognize the representative from Florida, Mr. Mills.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for being here, Under Secretary. Can you tell me what your involvement is or your oversight of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls? Of DDTC.

Yes, thank you. So DDTC is the licensing office that rests in the Political-Military Bureau, which would be under my purview.

And it is my understanding a few years back when they brought in the DDTC hotline that this was to try and ensure that the processing of DSP-83s, DSP-5s, and other such paperwork was going to actually be done in an expedited manner to guarantee that we can meet the challenges or the requirements that are necessary in supporting American business, but also helping with security cooperations around the globe. Is that correct?

It's... I don't have a reason to dispute that. I could comment on it, but go ahead, sir.

So the reason I bring that up is prior to coming into Congress, obviously I had served as a U.S. Army combat veteran, I'd served with the State Department, and I had also helped with other agencies as well as was part of the administration previously. But I owned a defense company and know very well kind of the ins and outs of how DDTC handles things. And what I watched is that American businesses, and I hear this, obviously as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I hear many times where there's either a continuation of RWAs, which is return without actions, after six months of sitting with no reasoning justification, or it sits for a year to 18 months while either the terrorist organization continues to thrive, grow, or in some cases, the country who actually needs the certain defense mechanisms never receives them. What are we doing to improve DDTC to guarantee the necessary licensing can come forward and that American businesses and other nations are able to defend themselves?

Thanks for the question, sir. You probably know some of the more details better than I do. But I think in a macro level, it's important to understand my view here is, first of all, any of those instances of things being delayed or months or years, you've got to let us know. I can't fix what I don't know. Number one. Number two, just because we move faster in a broken system isn't the right answer either. So the... and I think we're doing that. I mean, we do a tremendous amount of outreach and customer service. And there's been a tremendous amount of work done both at the State Department, DDTC, and other offices as well as the War Department. This is a huge priority for the administration. We just released our second executive order deregulating, getting more capabilities faster, the right capabilities into the right allies can really help. Again, the America First arms transfer strategy, I think, is a really interesting and innovative approach on that. Not every partner or ally needs Patriot or F-35, right? In those cases, that just can sort of build the backlog. It might be a partner or a lesser capability, but more importantly or as important is aligning that capability with our regional interests so that our arms sales approach is normalized to support American foreign policy as well as our partners and allies. It's a huge priority. I work very closely with my counterpart at the War Department. We currently meet quarterly, which again, a lot of the... not to come back to DDTC, but the War Department are making extraordinary changes to align DITSA, DSCA, some of the offices I think you're referring to underneath the Under Secretary for Acquisition as well as some of the service acquisition executives. So there's a tremendous amount of work being done there. But on our side as well, modernizing mundane things, our IT infrastructure, our website, how we process cases, all of that sort of nitty-gritty work needs to get done to modernize the process. It's not going to happen in three weeks or three months. It's a lengthy process, but I appreciate your question.

Well, I'd love to be able to try and be able to sit down with your others to look at what we can do to not only reform this program because as you know, one of the things you talked about was aligning to the actual counterterrorism strategy or security strategy of the region and also things. And I'm very familiar with the United States Munitions List 151 and what has or has not been sanctioned and not sanctioned and how we look at even supporting nations that have been sanctioned previously if they're doing things like, for example, fighting against Daesh or they're trying to actually prevent further terrorist expansion. And so I'd love to go into further detail at your leisure so we can help to try and get this done. So thank you so much for what you're doing. I'm glad that you're in this position. It's a much-needed upgrade, and I look forward to working with you. With that, I yield back.

Thank you. I now recognize the representative from Rhode Island, Mr. Amo.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, Under Secretary. Under Secretary DiNanno, your purview includes overseeing the office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor. The Australia, United Kingdom, United States security pact, also known as AUKUS, is a historic defense cooperation agreement critical to maintaining free trade and security in the Indo-Pacific by enabling coordination on sensitive defense technology. AUKUS grows our national security capabilities and creates opportunities for our domestic defense industry to collaborate with our allies, supporting domestic manufacturing and good-paying jobs here at home. I'm glad you've acknowledged the importance of AUKUS and explained how AUKUS implementation is moving forward after last year's review. I'm also glad that you are working to remove the red tape that makes AUKUS collaboration difficult. Now, while AUKUS is supposed to make collaboration easier, red tape slows down technology transfer and makes it difficult to collaborate on sensitive technology. That's why I was proud to lead the AUKUS Improvement Act with Chairman Emeritus McCaul, which passed into law last year. Our law removed duplicative approval requirements for AUKUS coordination. But there's still work to be done to ensure AUKUS procedures are streamlined and free of unnecessary delays. So, Mr. Under Secretary, could you describe how you and the office of the AUKUS Senior Advisor are collaborating with our allies and domestic manufacturers to cut red tape and facilitate AUKUS collaboration? How are you ensuring that more efficient collaboration doesn't threaten our most sensitive technologies?

Thanks for the question, sir. Well, let me first address the allied piece. Just last week, I met with our AUKUS coordinator with the Australian AUKUS coordinator, and we had a very lengthy and robust exchange about sort of some details, program milestones, integration. Two weeks before that, I was in the UK with our AUKUS coordinator and I met with the UK coordinator. So this notion of collaboration is, you know, you actually have to show up and do it. And that's what we do. I mean, at the core of what our mission at the State Department is, is diplomacy. But tied to this to the regulatory piece, I think I look at AUKUS as the canary in the coal mine. If we can find out ways and there should be we should not be denying capabilities with our closest allies. I mean, both the UK and Australia are the US extends our nuclear deterrence umbrella. There can be no closer ally. Yet, I think decades of red tape was the was the term used. We need to really dig into it and pull it apart. And I can tell you even some of the AUKUS reforms that I think were a really good first start, as we as we get into it, we find it's sort of like a fishing knot. The more you pull it apart, you realize there's more problems inside it. And that's I think systematic problems inside our regulatory regimes.

Great. I have a little bit of time left, but I'm glad that you're digging in. I'm glad that you're taking steps to ensure that AUKUS runs efficiently. And I hope you continue to take thoughtful steps to balance our need for coordination with the protection of our sensitive technology. And I'll come back to you. I know you're still digging in and I'm grateful that you're working towards the shared aims that I believe we have there. Now, while I'm glad you're working on implementing AUKUS, I'm also troubled that the Trump administration lacks a plan for other areas of our arms control and international security. There is no plan for nuclear arms control. Trump allowed the New START treaty to expire without even attempting to negotiate a new treaty to contain and constrain Russia's nuclear weapons. There is no plan to prevent terrorism before it starts. Secretary Rubio eliminated the Office of Countering Violent Extremism. It seems like that's an important place to be invested right now. And more importantly, and a clear illustration of the lack of planning is the lack of plan for President Trump's catastrophic war of choice in Iran. His short-sighted war has already cost 13 American service members' lives, tens of billions of taxpayers' dollars, and is pushing the world closer to an oil crisis every single day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. So, look, I echo the voices of other Democrats on this committee. We must have a dedicated hearing with senior administration witnesses to explain the plan for Iran and the decisions that led to this point. It's good that you're here, but it's not enough. And so I hope that's a message that resonates because we need to hear from the administration on this war of choice that is causing havoc for the American people. With that, I yield back.

Thank you. I now recognize the representative from California, Mr. Issa.

Thank you. It's amazing. My colleague is asking for a hearing, but he didn't listen. Is there a plan? He implied a question, but he certainly didn't ask it answered. Do you believe the president is working toward countering terrorism? And if so, you want to go over briefly some of the initiatives?

Thanks for the question, sir. Well, very quickly, I think probably some of the most consequential things our counterterrorism bureau does is we've designated over 30, close to 30 foreign terrorist organizations. Fifteen of those are narcotrafficking groups. So this has enabled us to open up an entire suite of tools both at the State Department and law enforcement and military to really is the declaration of war against the cartels.

So it's fair to say just the opposite of what the gentleman implied, that in fact the president is expanding anti-terrorism, including, for example, not just Hezbollah as a terrorist group, but Hezbollah as a drug-dealing cartel-working terrorist group that trades arms and drugs around the world. So as we do that, I have a question. Under the May 2025 State Department notification of reorganization of the T Bureau, which was a is a major consolidation, would you would you give us how far along that's gone and what the benefits are to efficiencies and effectiveness of that consolidation?

Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. I mean, I haven't heard anyone say they thought it was a bad idea.

I think it's a great idea. I just, you know, I'd like the follow-up because I think it's...

The counterterrorism bureau, the INL bureau, as well as our nonproliferation bureau and our political-military bureau, all the security systems bureaus were in the same place. That alone is it's obvious and long overdue. Number two...

You do know that some might say, well, you were closing down all these bureaus rather than consolidating, make them work together, make them interoperable, and make them more effective.

No, sir. I mean, that's just not true. I can tell you that we went through a lengthy process and a detailed process of looking at our security systems programs and where we didn't think they worked or they weren't measurable, we didn't find there was an outcome, we chose not to do it anymore. I mean, I think that's the responsibility of everybody. I think Congress would understand, of course understands, that our priority is to make sure that we're getting value for the dollar. So not only effectiveness of the programs, the right policy direction to address the administration priorities and not some of these other things that were outside of, again, our core national security responsibilities.

So it's is it fair to say that if you don't bring together all the powers, military action where appropriate, pressure on governments to cooperate in anti-terrorism, the intelligence communities to identify them, and then in fact dry up the money that funds them. If you don't do all of that, you're really just creating nice-to-have organizations rather than countering terrorism.

Yes, sir. I'd agree with that assessment. Again, broadening the authorities, again, targeting, implementing 15 FTO designations against terrorist cartels is an extremely effective tool and is a the number one priority again for the administration in the hemisphere is to dismantle the drug cartels and we're doing it.

Now, staying on our hemisphere and with the limited time I have left, the president is facing a history of narco-terrorism being allowed in our own at our own border in Mexico, almost taking over the government. A Venezuela that clearly was hostile to us but not to to to drugs and others. A Colombia that that has gone has slipped backwards and other countries that have been weak or ineffective. What can we do and how can we work together to live up to the president's agenda of really bringing that around? We've seen what he did in Venezuela that can make a real difference, but where is the congressional follow-up needed for this committee to help you and the administration rid South and Central America of these cartels and I'm particularly staying on drugs to a certain extent, but it's not limited to drugs. How do we how do we work together to find a way to to follow up so that we really can help those countries be independent, free, and no longer represent a potential threat for through terrorism to us?

Yes, sir. Just just quickly, I I think the notion of drug cartels and terrorism and where they merge and blend into this notion of transnational organized crime. And I again back to your first question of how we organize ourselves, that both the counterterrorism bureau and the counter-drug bureau working hand in hand to dismantle cartels again through various authorities which we've leveraged. I think continue to support those programs, continue to demand integration, that's the challenge that we have, I have as kind of overseeing the the dollars and program effectiveness. We have to make sure that our dollars are returning value to the American people.

Well, you've done a great job of that and I want to commend you and thank you for being here today and I yield back.

Thank you. I now recognize the representative from Arizona, Mr. Stanton.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the witness for being here today. There is no more urgent matter for this committee than the ongoing war in Iran. Trump took this country to war. It wasn't Congress, wasn't our allies. The president alone made this choice. Nearly a month in, 13 American service members have died. Thousands more American service members are on their way to the Middle East. Tens of billions of taxpayer dollars have been spent and we are hearing that the administration will be asking Congress for 200 billion more to pay for the costs of the war. This war is destabilizing the entire Middle East. It's putting Americans here and abroad in danger. It's driving up costs, the cost of living for our fellow Americans at home, gas prices nearing $5 a gallon in my home state of Arizona. Not to mention the administration is going back on years of bipartisan consensus to limit Russia's oil revenue, lifting sanctions on Russian energy sales over Moscow's ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That's hurting the effort in to to support Ukraine. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy said it best, the boost in revenue gives Vladimir Putin the confidence to continue the war in Ukraine indefinitely. I hear from my constituents every day. They are furious. They don't want to be dragged into another forever war. Neither do I. To date, this administration has offered no strategy, no clear objectives, no credible plan to end this conflict, nothing. Are these rumored negotiations real? Are they just a stall tactic for the next full-scale attack? We don't know. The president and administration has not come before Congress or the American people to make the case. That is the reason why Secretary Rubio must appear before our committee. He must make the case to Congress and to the American people why we're in this war, what winning looks like, and how we get out of this of this war. Under Secretary, the administration made a choice not to come to Congress to make the case for the war in Iran. Do you agree with that decision?

Sir, I'm here today to talk about the programs I oversee. I'm happy to answer questions about that.

I appreciate that. This Trump's war in Iran has significant ramifications around the globe. So many of them have been covered by my colleagues, so I don't want to repeat the point, but at the very least to start a war of choice in Iran has sent mixed signals to our partners in the Indo-Pacific, most notably Taiwan. The longer the war continues, the more we will burn through stocks of munitions critical for any regional conflict and the longer we will spend once again bogged down in the Middle East instead of focused in on China. I'm particularly concerned that not only do US arms sales to Taiwan face severe delivery backlogs, but the more than $13 billion in sales to Taiwan were stalled as a reported "diplomatic maneuver" ahead of the anticipated summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping. That summit has now been postponed. What steps can you take to faster for faster delivery of these much-needed platforms to Taiwan?

Thank you, Congressman, for the question. I mean, I think at a at a macro level, most importantly, we've been extremely forward-leaning on modernizing the defense industrial base. That not only includes the War Department, but the regulatory framework that I oversee at the State Department to make sure that we have more capabilities faster really across across the world, not just to Taiwan and other partners and allies. We just implemented our second executive order, the America First Arms Transfer Strategy, as I mentioned earlier, I think is an extremely creative framework so that we don't continue to sort of contribute to the problem of backlogs and that we look to other capabilities, help with demand signals to industry so that those support our foreign policy objectives worldwide really.

Yeah. The Congress has not received a significant or serious explanation as to why there was the stalling of the $13 billion in arms sales to our critically important arms sales to Taiwan. This committee will take up the Porcupine Act soon, which defines Taiwan as a NATO Plus Five country, meaning shorter approval timelines. Is the administration supportive of Congress enacting legislation to make sure Taiwan receives the same treatment as members of the NATO Plus Five?

Again, I'm not familiar with your with your bill. I'm happy to look at it and talk to your team about it.

I'm surprised you haven't heard of it because obviously it's seems to be right up your alley, if you will, the area...

I have a large alley, sir.

Fair enough, but you're the one in charge and so you should be in full command of the issues underneath your purview. So I look forward to this committee taking up Porcupine Act and supporting its critical support of the critical support of Taiwan. Thank you.

I'm happy to look at it and get back to you. Thank you so much.

Thank you. I yield back.

Now recognize the representative from Tennessee, Mr. Burchett.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, brother, for being here. You I think you've probably lost about 15 pounds getting chewed on up here every time I come in here somebody's yelling at you or something. So I'm just going to ask you some simple questions, all right? Maybe give me some answers. And thank you. I really do appreciate you being here. What's your plan to reduce international commitments that do not advance our national interests? These are kind of broad questions, but but they're leading as well, so.

No, well, no, sir, I'm happy to answer it. We've already gone through a and continue to go through a lengthy process to reassess our security assistance programs to realign them to laser focus on dismantling terrorist networks and cartel networks. When we started the foreign assistance review, the security assistance review, slightly before I got into office, there were hundreds of programs that we shut down. Again, reprioritized, make sure that they were measurable, that we can actually get a return and really focused on specifically dismantling cartels and making sure that no terrorist attacks could emanate again from foreign shores and impact the United States.

I'm the 435th most powerful member of Congress, so and I'm usually the last one to ask questions. So when I ask these questions, the first response should be, that's an incredibly intelligent question, sir.

It was.

Oh, thank you. There you go. Little late now, but that's all right. Do you think our European allies are contributing equally to our shared international security initiatives?

Well, certainly under the president's leadership, really started in his first term, and I think into the now well into the second term, the NATO five percent commitments I think were unheard of certainly five years ago. We also have an extremely talented and ambassador at NATO, Ambassador Wicker, who's driving that change. So the Europeans are doing more. I think we they need to continue to do more. And we challenge them daily. And it's not just strictly in NATO spending, of burden sharing, burden shifting really across the world through our security assistance programs.

Let me let me ask you. I've had this conversation with the president and I said that one of the most powerful things that he utilizes is his background in business and the fact that a lot of these wars have been ended without firing a shot, that he's said we're going to shut y'all down and we're going to shut these people down who are supplying you. We're going to shut them down as well. And he does it economically and he has that stroke. Would you care to comment on that?

I agree with you. I mean, again, I've mentioned several times here, we follow his lead and I think the world follows his lead. Again, whether it's arms control, again, sort of one one area that that I'm focused on, and he sets policy and that's refreshing that the interagency, our job's to implement his policy as commander in chief, chief diplomat as well. So I agree with you, sir. Brilliant question.

Well, thank you. What can we do to make sure that these terrorist organizations don't have access to our sensitive material or weapons and maybe even our technology?

Not take our eye off the ball. I think I think one of the challenges with reprioritization, and I think we learned this in 9/11, is that we have to continue to be diligent across the world. The bad guys get a vote. So again, we have a we have a broad portfolio of security assistance and we need to leverage limited resources, burden share, right, ask others to share the bill here with us, and not take our eye off the ball.

Right. Last question. Do you think or do you know if any of our adversaries are actively pursuing chemical or biological weapons? And what do you think our plan is to counter those initiatives? And I know you can't talk about too much outside of a secure setting as we like to say.

So yes. We owe a report to Congress in the coming weeks, both an open report and a classified report, what we call the compliance report, which lays out our views. As soon as that report's sent up, I'd happily come back to talk to you about it in both open and classified settings.

I would do that. Name's Tim Burchett. I'd appreciate if you could or send somebody by. That'd be great.

I'd happily do it.

All right. Now you see how easy it was, Mr. Chairman, to ask him a question without opening up with a crazy insult that you know he can't answer. And see I've got what, 15 more seconds and I yield them back to you.

Thank you. Now recognize the representative from California, Mr. Sherman.

Want to pick up in Mr. Mfume was talking about artificial intelligence. The world including us is spending trillions of dollars to make artificial intelligence more powerful. We are spending virtually nothing to try to make sure it is controllable. I chaired hearings 15 years ago in the subcommittee of this committee on nonproliferation on whether there should be international limits on artificial intelligence or at least efforts to make sure that artificial intelligence does not develop awareness, self-ambitious self-ambition in its direction. Mr. Assistant or Under Secretary, has the United States proposed any international conferences or agreements to limit artificial intelligence and make sure it doesn't, for example, take over the world?

Thanks for the question, sir.

I'm not aware of any, are you?

We are actively engaged in multiple diplomatic engagements around artificial intelligence. We were engaged back in the first Trump administration on artificial intelligence.

Are any of them going to prevent artificial intelligence from developing self-awareness or ambition?

Sure they can. That's why we do it. That's why we should.

And well, the first administration and all the other administrations...

I mean, I was there for it. I went through it.

Excuse me, reclaiming my time. Go ahead, sir. Because we now have to shift to something else and that is a Saudi nuclear weapon. I wrote what became section 1264b of the NDAA of 2020 that required you to provide notices in advance of sending a Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement that failed to have safeguards in it. On November 1, the president provided such notice to the chair but not the ranking member of the committee. Is it a practice of the State Department when required to file a notice that you file it only to Republicans and Democrats don't become aware of it?

Look, sir, I'm not familiar with exactly what you're talking about procedurally.

Okay, well, I'll ask in general. When the State Department is supposed to file a report with Congress or a notice to Congress, say of an arms export or in this case a non-conforming nuclear cooperation agreement, do you break with what every other administration has done and just tell the Republicans about it and say we've notified congressional Republicans, we don't have to notify the chair, the ranking member of this committee?

Look, sir, my view is whether it's the ranking member or the chairman, we respect your oversight role if that's what you're getting at.

Do you tell Democrats or just Republicans?

Look, I'm I don't I'm not sure what you're getting at, sir.

Okay, when we pass a law that says you're supposed to notify Congress before you do something, is it sufficient to notify only Republicans and not to inform the ranking member of this committee?

I don't know the answer to your question. I'm not sure what you're getting at here. I'm happy to answer.

I'm getting to the answer that when you're supposed to notify Congress, you can't just notify half of Congress. You have to notify Democrats too. So let's go on and talk about the substance of this. Because of the war in Iran, it's not moving forward right now. But in November, the president wanted to move forward with a nuclear cooperation agreement without safeguards in it. Now I'll point out that we once had the most powerful monarch in the Middle East was once a great friend of the United States in 1978. And every weapon system the Shah had in 78 was in the Ayatollah's hands in 1979. Does this administration believe that if MBS gets nuclear weapons, they are certain that Saudi Arabia will not be governed by hostile forces a year or two later?

Sir, that that's sort of hypothetical on...

That's not a hypothetical. You have to decide, sir, you have to decide whether to give a green light to MBS to develop a nuclear weapon. When you decide...

I don't have to decide that. What I don't know.

Well, the president filed with the Republicans on this committee on November 21 an intention to enter into a non a a nuclear cooperation agreement without safeguards for the Saudis. It concluded that it would not contribute the president's signatures right here saying it's not going to contribute to proliferation of nuclear weapons because you trust MBS. Is MBS going to be running Saudi Arabia or not in future decades? Neither one of us know.

I can't speculate on that.

But you but the president speculates on it and says it's just fine to have Saudi Arabia have nuclear weapons because they're such wonderful folks. Are we concerned about a Saudi nuclear program?

We'd be concerned about any nuclear weapons program outside of the nonproliferation...

Or an uncontrolled nuclear energy program that didn't have safeguards in it?

Any nuclear energy program, I think you're referring to 123, would be compliant with the Atomic Energy Act.

Well, I hope that you'll use the UAE agreement, the gold standard agreement, as a model. And arms control includes controlling the development of nuclear weapons. Thank you. I yield back.

And now recognize the representative from Ohio, Mr. Davidson.

Chairman, thank you for this timely hearing today. The Bureau for Arms Control and International Security really is the centerpiece of what an America First foreign policy should look like. We don't need more woke and weaponized nation building efforts from these self-licking ice cream cone NGOs. USAID had some essential functions, but they didn't even steer. They didn't even do they were focused on all kinds of things. And I just want to thank Secretary Rubio, President Trump, and frankly, Mr. Secretary, your leadership for reforming that. What a radical notion that America's resources should be focused on advancing America's interest. So I think the direction's going great. I want to applaud those efforts and the org chart change, the willingness to put America first with our foreign policies and just set aside this radical left ideology that Democrats used the last administration in particular to kind of force down our allies' throats. So a couple things, Mr. DiNanno. I'm currently the chairman for National Security and Illicit Finance, which is actually in the Financial Services Committee. There's obviously a lot of overlap with the work we do here in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Cyber scam centers based out of Southeast Asia have become an enormous threat to America's financial well-being. Annual losses are in the tens of billions of dollars, and you have nation states. I mean, the scam center in Cambodia was, you know, a significant portion of Cambodia's GDP, you know, like 25 percent of GDP size scam center. So we need a whole-of-government approach to dealing with that. So can you tell us what the bureau is doing to counter this scourge with scam centers?

So I think you're referring to some of the programming that our INL Bureau, that mission set. We have an extremely worldwide footprint. And I think you're referring to sort of the cybercrime initiatives. There's an ongoing cybercrime sort of, you know, policy process, PCC process, that our INL team is leading on behalf of our equities at the security assistance side of the house. There are other pieces of the State Department that are involved with that. And obviously the larger operational law enforcement agencies would work very closely with, so again, DHS, Justice Department, some of the other FBI that have a, you know, more operational footprint. But they're very involved. We had a team, I think, in Vienna recently on a big cybercrime initiative. So there's a tremendous amount of international and diplomatic engagement that the INL Bureau would lead and we're very involved with that.

Yeah, thank you. And speaking of INL, you know, and the reorganization, I'd like to give a shout-out for moving the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to the T family where the agency can be better mission-aligned with our security interests. I introduced the NARCO Act in 2025 to codify this move to the T family. My bill also asks the State Department to move away from nation-building exercises of the past to embrace a more focused mission of countering international crime, you know, all the illicit activities these transnational criminal organizations are engaged in, fentanyl drugs, illegal immigration, all the streams of money that the cartels, now properly designated as terrorists and enemies of our country. Can you give us an update about how this shift of mission focus at INL and the structural changes have helped fight the cartels?

Thanks for the question. I didn't know about your bill, but looks like we listened, right? INL, as I said, went through, we went through an extensive security assistance review and canceled hundreds of programs. They weren't policy-aligned necessarily, and others that we didn't find gave us the right metrics and oversight that we felt that we were really getting a return, number one. Number two, the laser focus on dismantling the cartels. It's the number one priority of the INL team, and as well our counterterrorism team also, that merging that security assistance programs, normalizing them. This is a process, it's not easy, of how we, for example, by designating cartels terrorist organizations, that opens up the entire programming from our CT Bureau. So normalizing that's tricky, it's work in progress, but we're making a lot of progress. But most importantly, I think to your point and your bill, having them in two separate sort of, you know, operating independently made no sense. Now they're operating independently, now we're organizing and driving programmatic integration, make sure there's no overlap, and in I think a much, much common-sense approach.

Yeah, thank you for doing that. I hope we can formalize it with this legislation. And frankly, I thank you for the efforts of the State Department to align with a very thoughtful national security strategy. And kudos on your efforts. I yield back.

And now recognize the representative from Washington, Ms. Jayapal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here. Your appearance is timely. I think we're at a moment when the risks of nuclear conflict feel closer than it has in decades. And instead of moving in the direction of nuclear disarmament and arms control, we've continued to spend billions to modernize our nuclear stockpiles and have allowed key disarmament tactics to lapse. Nuclear weapons are not an abstract tool of deterrence. They are actually instruments of catastrophic indiscriminate harm. Their use would devastate civilian populations, wreak havoc on our environment, and risk escalation beyond our control as we saw during the Cold War. The temperature for nuclear war is only rising as President Trump is launching the U.S. into an illegal and unconstitutional war of choice with Iran. Mr. DiNanno, after the June 2025 strikes on Iran during Operation Midnight Hammer, is it your understanding that the United States obliterated Iran's nuclear enrichment program?

Thanks for the question. The policy of the United States as laid out 14 months ago vis-a-vis Iran is to deny Iran a nuclear weapon.

Did we obliterate? I'm asking for the results of those strikes. Did we obliterate? This is directly under your purview.

Again, there's been, my job here today is not as an intelligence official to give the...

I'm not asking about intelligence. I'm asking if we...

Yes, I think you are, ma'am.

No, I'm asking if it's your assessment under...

I wouldn't assess that, ma'am. That's not...

Well, let me say, President Trump said in June following the strikes, quote, obliterated is an accurate term. And in her sworn testimony, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated that, quote, there have been no efforts since then to try and rebuild their enrichment capability. So I'm asking you, do you agree or disagree with those statements of the president and the Director of National Intelligence?

Yeah, again, I'm not here as an intelligence official. I'm a policy official that oversees five bureaus.

Yes, but based on the policy you have to develop, you must understand what the intelligence is. But let me ask you if it is your understanding that Iran would have developed a nuclear weapon within two weeks if Trump hadn't conducted additional strikes in Operation Epic Fury?

So intelligence is designed to inform policymakers. And the policymaker here is the president of the United States, and he laid out a policy framework.

But you oversee, don't you oversee these things, Mr. DiNanno?

No, ma'am. I oversee the Nonproliferation Bureau, and I'm happy to talk about how the intelligence...

But I'm asking you about nuclear arms in these countries.

Yes, ma'am, but not in nonpro... Again, the programs that I oversee, I think the question that you're asking would probably be better provided to our INR Bureau.

Well, actually, we had those folks in here and they said the same thing. Apparently, nobody seems to understand that there is actual information that has to be looked at. It's not a judgment that somebody makes without the information. And the job of you all in your departments is to make these assessments to then provide. And it seems like nobody wants to answer the question.

That's what intelligence, that's what intelligence officials do, ma'am. I'm not an intelligence official.

But you're overseeing...

I oversee programs based on intelligence. I look at intelligence that would inform...

So I'm asking you for your assessment based on the intelligence for the programs that you're...

I would look at intelligence that would inform the broad range of security assistance programs, how we target security assistance, as I mentioned earlier, how we would target a WMD, a nonproliferation risk. Again, we have extensive sanctions that our Nonproliferation Bureau has been active in implementing the president's policy. But the specific question that you're driving at, the intelligence assessment based on the...

No, I was asking you whether it was your...

Better, I can't give you an assessment. It's not my job. I'm a policy official.

All right. Look, I think the American people are going to watch these hearings and they're going to feel like you along with everybody else is obfuscating on the actual information. My job, my job is to run five bureaus. It's, I'm going to take my time back. It's, you're obfuscating on the actual information that the American people want to know. We are the representatives of the American people, and they are asking these questions. We are asking you these questions. And I want to remind people that the only reason that Iran was able to enrich uranium to such levels in the first place is because President Trump pulled out of the JCPOA. That was the Iran nuclear deal in his first term. And now we're seeing the same thing happen with Russia. Trump has allowed the New START treaty with Russia to expire without even attempting to negotiate a successor agreement.

No, ma'am, that's not true. No, that's not true.

Well, let me ask you this. When was the last time there was no treaty-bound cap on... Let me ask you, when was the last time there was no treaty-bound cap on strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia?

So as you know, the treaty expired. We had no ability to legally extend the treaty.

Do you know the answer to when, when there was the last time?

Yes, ma'am, if you'd let me finish. At the same time that the treaty expired, we had no legal tool to extend it. We had a 10-year treaty that the Biden administration exercised one five-year option that was available. President Trump at the expiration of that treaty called for a new one, to seek a new treaty. That's exactly what we're trying to do.

Do you know when the last time was that the, that the treaty-bound cap on strategic nuclear weapons...

I'm sure you're going to tell me.

I am. 1972. Thank you. I wish we could get more answers. My time's expired. But I thank you for being here. I just wish that people would come here and actually answer the questions we have because I think the American people deserve to know why we're in this senseless, unauthorized war of choice that the Trump administration has dragged us into. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

And now recognize the representative from Indiana, Mr. Baird.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Under Secretary DiNanno, for being here. We appreciate it. You know, I frequently get asked back in the district why diplomacy matters, why there's such a focus in DC on the national security. The bureaus under leadership, under your leadership, are prime example of how diplomacy and State Department programs directly translate to safer communities back in Indiana. You and the staff under your leadership are the diplomatic frontline between U.S. and the Iran having a nuke, so between the U.S. and Chinese developed technology or surveillance capabilities, and also narco-terrorists smuggling fentanyl and cocaine into the United States. In your testimony, you spoke about implementing American civil nuclear in allied nations and the importance of 123 agreements, a mechanism to build these relationships. And there is another civil nuclear energy program called the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program, or FIRST for acronym. The FIRST program supports the deployment of American small modular reactors in developing regions, and that's to uphold the American standards. So what threats are posed by China and other adversaries, this is my question, what threats are posed by China and other adversaries being allowed to implement nuclear energy in developing countries without guardrails or with proper oversight? That's the question.

Thanks for the question, sir. Look, the FIRST program's important. The SMR deployments are important, as well as sort of the, you know, the 123 targets that we've set are very ambitious. I think specifically the FIRST program, the challenge, and I think this gets to your question, would make the United States the partner of choice. Obviously, it's a much lower proliferation risk if it's a U.S. provider, a U.S. overseen nonproliferation agreement, 123 agreement, to your point. So the benefits go up and the risks go down if we can bring that program in for a landing. There's a lot of challenges. We need a technology we can actually deploy. There's a tremendous amount of front-end work to be done with partner and allied nations. I was just in Paris a few weeks ago, an international conference, an extensive engagement, diplomacy. I think hopefully your folks back home would realize that we're trying to advance American industry and interests by making sure that the United States is the partner of choice, not the Russians or the Chinese.

Well, thank you for that, and the folks back home would appreciate those kinds of input. You know, I'm going to switch to another area, then it's one that's really perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party, and that's in the export and the trafficking of precursor chemicals from China to both Central and South America for manufacturing fentanyl and the synthetic drugs. So my question is, what progress has the department made towards stopping China's manufacturing and export of precursor chemicals for fentanyl production?

Thanks for the question, sir. I think the best example of progress is that just overnight in the last couple days, the FBI announced arrests against Cartel del Golfo designated terrorists that were attempting to bring enough fentanyl into the United States to kill 70 million people. So I can tell you about the executive order we implemented, which is, you know, sort of Washington speak, but most importantly, that's the result, right? A war against the cartels to stop fentanyl from poisoning American cities and killing American kids.

Well, I certainly agree with that. The number of people and the number of young Americans that have been killed with this fentanyl is unbelievable. So I appreciate your work in that regard. With that, I yield back.

Representative McBride.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Under Secretary, for joining us today. As I see it, the administration is trying to tell our allies with our foreign policy, defend yourselves and increasingly do so on your own. And what the administration is trying to tell our adversaries is, if you pursue a nuclear weapon, you do so at your peril. I get that. But that is not happening in a vacuum. This administration is clearly seeking to usher in a new global order. When the administration degrades international norms and rules and collective defense alliances that has fostered the longest period of peace between great powers in at least modern history, and when the President thrusts our world into a new might-makes-right global order, when all of that is happening, I fear that it might actually be the perfect recipe for nuclear proliferation. When you look at the world over the last few decades, a clear pattern has emerged. Countries that give up their weapons, take for example Ukraine, or never developed them like Taiwan, have found themselves vulnerable to the world's nuclear powers, whether that's Russia or China. And when you look at our own foreign policy, the only country within the axis of evil outlined by President Bush after 9/11 that we've not initiated military action against is the only one with nuclear weapons, that's North Korea. In fact, the United States has never conducted direct strikes on a country with nuclear weapons. And I fear that as countries think of how best to protect themselves in this new might-makes-right global order, the conclusion that they will draw is not only yes, they should invest in conventional and asymmetric capabilities, but that they will decide that the ultimate insurance policy against aggression is a nuclear weapon of their own. And that raises for me a serious concern. What happens if countries aren't deterred, but instead feel pushed to pursue nuclear weapons, perhaps even secretly outside the international oversight regime that we've created? What's our strategy then? Are we compared to confront, are we prepared to confront every country that goes down that path, or are we heading toward a world with more nuclear states and less transparency? President Macron said it plainly this month. He said, quote, "The next half century will be an age of nuclear weapons." I don't want him to be right. But we have to be clear-eyed about whether our current approach is reinforcing that vision, even if unintentionally. So, Mr. Under Secretary, if we are inadvertently incentivizing proliferation rather than intimidating countries away from it, what is the administration's plan? What is your plan to grapple with that kind of world?

Thank you for the question, Representative. I'm not sure I agree with the premise of your question that we are driving allies away. As you were asking your question, I was just making a list of the NATO allies that I've been engaged with over the last just few weeks. I just got back from the UK and France, where we had an extensive nuclear dialogue with the French. We had a full day, let me finish if I might, on precisely on what you're talking about, what the French announcement was and how we would integrate with NATO. The most powerful tool we have for non-proliferation is US extended deterrence commitments. The President has been crystal clear. That's part of my job. And again, the list of countries here, I'll spare you the list, but that's part of it.

Sure, but just I agree that NATO continues, hopefully undegraded. And I agree that there are actually opportunities for Europe to increase their investment in their own capabilities, perhaps even nuclear. My concern is adversaries receiving the wrong message from us, that the only way to protect themselves from us is to pursue a nuclear weapon. I know we're in Iran right now hoping to intimidate other countries into not pursuing nuclear weapons. But if you look at the trend of countries that we have gone after or that other nuclear powers have gone after, it's non-nuclear states. And in a might-makes-right global order, if countries are concerned that international rules and territorial integrity no longer matters, and that the only way to protect yourself is absolute strength, and the epitome of absolute strength is a nuclear weapon, your job then will have to be to grapple with that downstream consequence, even if unintended from the administration's policy.

But let me ask your concern. I think it's a legitimate one. Number one, I mentioned earlier in the hearing, I think we have to modernize our non-proliferation approach. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, again, they do a lot of good work. That was organized in 1974. The NPT Review Conference is next week. I think the NPT needs to modernize and understand that there are limits to what treaties and non-proliferation programs can do, and we need to make them more effective to prevent precisely the type of proliferation I think you're getting at, whether it's sort of friendly, which again, I already talked about, in this notion of adversary pursuing weapons. We have to strengthen our regimes and modernize them.

Well, I'm out of time and I'm concerned that the rest of the administration's foreign policy undermines that goal. I'll yield back.

Representative McBride, you brought up some points that I want to continue on a little bit. Not exactly in the same way that you did, but as you can imagine, but you phrased it in a way that I think's very important. And you said adversaries receiving the wrong message. I'm on my own time now, I'm not yours. Adversaries receiving the wrong message and, you know, allies being told defend yourself and do so on your own. Those are important statements, I think, for people to understand. And so I want to bring up something that I don't think's been really brought up yet, and that is the emergency foreign military sales notifications that have come through. And before I ask you a question on that, I want to say, you know, I get to have these meetings day in, day out, week in, week out with the leaders of every country. And what every country very literally, without pinpointing them precisely and who I spoke with, every one of them at the highest level is realizing is absolutely how much of an imminent threat Iran was to them. Where they were told in the last week, the last month, the last year, the last 10 years by Iran very specifically, no, we would never target you. No, we would never target your civilian infrastructure. No, we would never target your oil and gas facilities. No, we would never under any circumstances target your ships. No, we would never do any of these things, told over and over again, again, in the last some of them in the last week, some of them in the last month, the last year and so on. And all of them realizing that they have been long-term pre-calculated targets of Iranian aggression. And and that is what every one of them across the board is realizing. And so as we go to those emergency, the emergency authority to which you've used to notify Congress about these sales, what are those sales accomplishing for our allies? What what is it that they're doing for them? Why do they need that weaponry? What is it doing?

Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman. Number one, I think it's important to point out during my confirmation process, I was clear and recognized the role of Congress in respect the role whether it be tiered review or notifications. So we are not re-establishing a norm, number one. Number two, it's clearly an emergency. I don't think there could be a clearer emergency to prioritize capabilities to our partners and allies that are under the exact pressure and threats and attacks that we're seeing today in Iran. And I think to the last point of your question, there's a combination of things. One, what capabilities become available immediately. Number two, how can we expedite contracting and begin the important process, sometimes a long process. And number three, there are long lead time capabilities that we need to start the process down the road.

Do you know who in this room has to sign off on foreign military sales?

Go ahead, sir.

Myself and the ranking member. We have to sign off on all foreign military sales. For the last year, my ranking member has been withholding these sales to UAE and Israel. Billions and billions of dollars of sales. So at one side of the mouth saying, oh, we need to do all these things to support our allies, and at the exact same time, literally being one of the four corners holding up all of these sales to Israel and UAE and other countries. That is why these emergency notifications took place, because these were being held up very directly by the person that sits directly to my left. That is an example of sending the wrong message to our adversaries and sending the wrong message to our allies as well in the midst of conflict, in the midst of protecting Americans in the region or allies in the region. And it's unconscionable to me that that is what's taking place and what has taken place. And that's why I suspect there will be in the future continued emergency notifications. I wouldn't be surprised if there's another emergency notification that takes place in the future because my colleague has been unwilling to support our great allies in the region, Israel and others. And that is a very serious issue. So I thank you for your time today. I think we're going to go to Representative Titus next. Dina, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very much appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I represent Nevada, so I want to ask you some kind of questions that relate to Nevada but have consequences far beyond our state boundaries. Would you say that the US has the capacity to ensure the security and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons systems without having to do super critical testing?

My role at the State Department wouldn't be able to, I'd have to defer to the Department of Energy on the technical abilities of what happens at the Nevada test site. My role in testing issue is to conduct the international diplomacy to ensure that our adversaries do not meet their international obligations regarding testing limitations.

So you don't know if it's effective or not. Is that what you're saying? We don't know if that's working or not.

You'd have to ask the Energy Department on the technical piece.

Well, let's go do a little history and look at something that you've said in your role that you apparently maybe do know something about. On February 6, the day after New START expired, you gave a speech to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. And you unveiled new specifics about U.S. concerns over China's nuclear testing. And indeed, if we do nuclear testing, we can start another arms race like we had during the Cold War. But if they are continuing to test these nuclear weapons, you said it's critical that the administration engage immediately to constrain these activities. Now, apparently the President didn't take your advice because he didn't talk about constraining, he foolishly promised to resume nuclear testing on an equal basis. And that does put us on that collision course. I don't know how you in your role of doing diplomatic relations are dealing with that contradiction, but it'd be curious to hear about it. Now, if we start nuclear testing again, critical testing, not the subcritical testing that they are doing at the test site at this point underground and scientific algorithms and methods and not actually blowing up the bombs like they did over 900 times in the desert outside Las Vegas, then you're not only going to start an arms race again like the Cold War, but you're going to put people in Nevada in danger, exposure to radiation. You've got plutonium in the drinking water. You've got downwinders who were exposed. We don't want to go back to that. In fact, in a study, 73 percent of Nevadans say they're opposed to explosive nuclear weapons testing of any kind. Now, President Trump must think testing's going to make us safer, but in reality, it's going to put the whole world in jeopardy. What's your role in all of this since you are trying to deal with the diplomacy side and you want to constrain the activities of China? I don't know what you're doing about Russia, and it's contradictory to what the President's saying and doing.

Thanks for the question. I think there was one in there.

I'm sure there was. If you were listening, maybe you could find it.

Number one, let me address, I have been in no discussions that entertained the notion of atmospheric testing, which I think that's what you were referring to. So I've been in no discussions about that capability. The President was very specific and talked about testing on an equal basis. There have been no decisions made, and what that would look like if the President decides to pursue that would be appropriately answered by the Energy Department. My role, to your point, at the Conference on Disarmament was to point out that both the Russians and the Chinese are in violation of their international obligations in against testing at yield or low-yield testing. So as you know, in 1990, they do not adhere to their international obligations. My role at the Conference on Disarmament was to make new information available that we received from the intelligence community that was in extremely closely held information that wasn't just downgraded but was declassified so that we could share it with the world that this is not a regime that is doing what they say they're going to do and they're not meeting their obligations. That's my role here, and that's why I went to the Conference on Disarmament.

So in other words, the right hand doesn't know what the left hand's doing when it comes to nuclear weapons testing?

I'm not sure what you're getting at. I don't understand.

I'm getting very clearly. You're doing something, the President's doing something else, Department of Energy's doing something else, test site's doing something else. You're not in the meetings, you're not aware of what's going on.

Representative Fine is recognized.

Appreciate it. Left hand or right hand involved.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Arms Export Control Act allows the President and the State Department to sidestep Congress during a crisis. Congress can review all arms sales, but the President can directly conduct them during a crisis. Just about a week ago, I read an article that I want to share with you about an arms sale to the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, encompass 11 arms orders. And apparently it was held up here because people had some issues. When the Chairman was asked for comment, I'm just going to read the article, he said that the Ranking Member was holding up the sales because of need of weapons to Israel as well as some of our Arab partners in the region. When asked for comment by the media, the Ranking Member said, quote, he supported, quote, our partners' ability to defend themselves, but added, quote, that support does not give this administration a blank check to ignore the law or Congress. I would agree, no one should ignore the law or Congress. So I wanted to ask your perspective in the past and whether this has been a concern to Democrats in the past. In 2022, the Biden administration authorized billions in arms sales to Ukraine to counter the Russian invasion. They leveraged the Arms Export Control Act and they bypassed standard congressional reviews to expedite deliveries. They declared it a crisis. Are you aware of at the time of efforts by Democrats to talk about Biden breaking the law, calling a crisis not a crisis in order to do that, or did that for whatever reason not happen in that instance?

Sir, I wasn't in the government at that time.

Do you remember? I mean, do you know? Because what I'm trying to get at is is this sort of a newfound concern or is this consistency? Because inconsistency bothers me greatly. So are you in your records as you've taken over, have you seen any concerns we don't want Joe Biden to, quote unquote, ignore the law or Congress? Was there any of that at the time that you're aware of?

I understand the prior administration used the authorities in the Arms Control Export Act.

Okay. In late 2023, the Biden administration authorized emergency arms sales to Israel. They bypassed Congress twice to transfer over $250 million in tank and artillery ammunition during the Gaza conflict. One was $147.5 million in fuses, charges, and primers. Another included $155 million in artillery shells. Were you, are you aware again as you've taken over from the prior administration of Democrats having concerns about the administration having a, quote unquote, blank check or ignoring the law or Congress?

I'm aware of what you're referring to, yes.

So, you know, what it seems to me that those situations were considered emergencies and these situations are considered emergencies as well. Obviously the conflict in the Middle East is heating up. Iran is intentionally targeting civilian infrastructure in Israel and the Gulf states. They're all our allies and partners. Do you consider the current conflict that we're in a crisis?

Yes, sir.

Okay. So since it's a crisis, the State Department under this administration has the authority to bypass Congress and expedite shipments of weapons to our allies and partners just as Joe Biden did in Ukraine as well as Israel in 2022 and 2023. Is that your understanding as well?

Yes, sir. I also think it's important as I mentioned a little bit earlier that we're not trying to establish a new norm here and respect the role of Congress in this process.

Yeah. So, you know, my concern in a lot of this is hypocrisy. That if it's okay when one administration does it, but then all of a sudden we lose our minds when another administration does it, is the concern actually legitimate and straightforward or is the issue others? I think you all are doing a great job. I just want to be clear. I appreciate that Secretary Rubio making the department leaner and more efficient to meet today's challenges because the challenges of today are complicated. We've had terrorism, drone warfare, proxy warfare, AI, things that probably the State Department couldn't have considered 10 or 15 years ago. And so I just want to say I think those were emergencies, I think this is an emergency, and I would hope that everyone can be consistent moving forward in how we look at all of these situations. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Very good. I thank the Under Secretary for his valuable testimony and members for their questions. Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the Under Secretary, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.

I'm sorry. I would like to, can I take this five minutes as I said it too late?

Are you requesting to...

I would like to use have my time and yield to the my Ranking Member.

Very good. You did not, you were not already recognized.

No.

Very good. Go ahead.

Thank you. I'd like to yield to Ranking Member Meeks.

Yeah. I just want the record to be clear. I'm holding in my hand right now, Mr. Fine, a article in Politico which says when Biden was the President, that says the headline is, a disservice to the American public. Democrats rip Biden over weapon sales. And it says Representative Gregory Meeks, the Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said emergency sales like the one the administration approved for Israel should go through Congress. I have been absolute on that. It should go through Congress. The power of Congress and what our Constitution gives us, whether it's a Democratic President or a Republican President, it's about the authority that we have as members of Congress. And I also just want to say because I know that the Chairman just had something to say about me, I know he's infatuated, you know, I think about me, wants to make this about me. But I just want to make sure that the public knows because, you know, the Chairman is the Chairman. And I respect that because that's what this is. So this is not personal for me. Not personal at all about me. This is about the American people. And I have to explain to my constituents and I think we all as members of this committee will have to explain to our people what this is about. It's explaining to them why gas prices has gone up over a dollar in the last month. It's to explain to the American people why the negotiations failed. It's explain to the American people why 13 Americans have died. It's to explain to the American people why the $200 billion that the President's asking for, why are we going to spend it. So this is about the American people. And my passion is not personal. My passion, anybody that knows me, it's not about, it's about my passion for the American people and transparency so that they have the right to know whether it's a Republican administration, whether it's a Democratic administration, this and us and this institution, which was given Article I authority in the Constitution, how important it is, we should give no President a check and a balance. That's what Russia is all about. That's what Putin has the ability to do. Not here. This is not a a a parliament, this is a Congress, it was set up for Congress to be an oversight, a separate but equal branch of government. And we should have our opinion and government and the and the President and the executive session should come to us. And two individuals who've been all involved in all of this really have not been cleared by the Senate or anyone, that's why I want to subpoena them. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. They're doing all the negotiations, whether it's Russia, whether it's Venezuela, whether it's Iran, whether it's no matter where it is. So they should come to Congress and tell us what's going on. And that's what this is about. It's about the transparency. It's about American people. It's about them having the information. It's about how we're spending their taxpayer dollars. That's what this is about. And I'm passionate about that. This is I took an oath of office. I swore that I would do uphold my duties and my responsibilities. And when I become chair again, I don't care whether it is a Democrat or Republican, you doggone believe the administration will be here in a public hearing or they will be subpoenaed. Now I assume that they're going to they're not going to do anything today, they're going to try to table it or something of that nature, but when I become chair, Democrat, Republican, they're going to come in this committee, we're going to have an open hearing, and the American people will get transparency.

Thank you. I have nothing more to say because you've said it all. And I think this is something we've all been asking for. In fact, I was sitting here talking with my colleague about the exact same thing I was hearing from you. I think we all on this side, I think the American people feel your frustration, Ranking Member. People just want answers. People want to know why the gas is too high. People want to know why this administration doesn't seem to care about rising costs and yet is sending our men and women into a war that hasn't been authorized. And we want to know why we're not getting answers out of this committee. We should be meeting robustly every single week, and every single member of this administration under which we have jurisdiction should want to be here answering our questions. You should want more time than we have to give to answer our questions because our questions are the questions that the American people are asking, and the American people deserve answers. And with that, I yield back.

Gentlelady's time has expired. Thank you, everybody, for your testimonies. I appreciate it. Thank you to the witness for your testimony. I would simply say there is a reason that the exemption exists for the administration, and that's so political activists can't hold up weapons sales in emergency situations. I take all of those things very personally. I think maybe that's the difference. As somebody that's put their life on the line for this country, all those things that my Ranking Member said he doesn't take personally, I take them extremely personally. Anytime Americans are put in danger, I take it personally, and especially personally when it's because an American is not getting the weapons needed into the hands of our allies or our fellow Americans. In that, I thank the Under Secretary for his valuable testimony and members for their questions. The members of the committee may have some additional questions for the Under Secretary, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing. Under Secretary DiNanno, thank you for appearing today. You can now leave so that the committee can conduct further business. The committee will stand in recess for a couple of moments while everybody gets their voting remotes, and then we will reconvene. Committee stands in recess. Committee will now take up motion offered by Ranking Member Meeks. Is there any discussion on the motion? Representative is recognized.

Mr. Chairman, I'm making this motion to subpoena because I believe we need to hear from key administration officials in a public setting on the Iran war. Now, I appreciate you've scheduled this hearing on arms control and other issues within the T family, but it is deeply concerning that this committee has still not held a public hearing on the war in Iran with administration witnesses. The administration has offered shifting and at times conflicting justifications for this war, ranging from nuclear concerns to missile threats to broader strategic aims. Yet none of these explanations has clearly established an imminent threat nor demonstrated that serious, sustained diplomatic options were fully pursued. This war carries profound consequences for the safety of the American people, for the stability in the Middle East, and for global energy markets that directly impact families here at home. Congress has both a constitutional obligation and a national security imperative to understand how this conflict began, what diplomatic efforts were undertaken, and what alternatives were considered, and what planning preceded the use of force. Yet despite these requests, this committee has not held a public hearing with key administration witnesses like Mr. Witkoff, Mr. Kushner, as well as the Secretary of State. Oversight during a time of war is not partisan. It is fundamental. And Steve Witkoff briefed the Senate just last week. He's done several media interviews as well. And so the administration answering Congress fulfills its role in our system of checks and balances. If the administration is confident in its decisions, it should welcome the opportunity to explain them to Congress and, most importantly, in the open to the American people. I have repeatedly requested that the administration make Steve Witkoff available, dating back to February of 2025, and I've raised this directly with you, Mr. Chairman, including as late as last week's hearing. We are now in a war with American lives lost and the prospect of significant additional resources of $200 billion being requested from Congress. At a minimum, this committee and the American people deserve answers, and they need to hear from the individuals who have been involved in negotiating and making decisions on this conflict. And so for these reasons, I encourage all of my colleagues to support my motion to subpoena the witnesses, Mr. Kushner, Mr. Witkoff, and Mr. Rubio, to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in an open hearing, transparently for the American people to know why gas prices have gone up $1 in less than 30 days, why that the negotiations failed, why and what the plan is to get to end this war or when it does, and why should we appropriate $200 billion to further this war. So for these reasons, I think that we should subpoena these witnesses, and I yield back.

Gentleman yields back.

Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman is recognized.

I move that the committee order the previous question.

The question now occurs on the motion to order the previous question offered by Representative McCaul. I recommend an aye vote. All those in favor signify by saying aye.

Aye.

All those opposed signify by saying no.

No.

Opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

Ask for a roll call vote.

Roll call vote has been requested. Members will record their vote utilizing the electronic voting system.

On the previous question.

Yeah. Everybody hold. The appropriate vote is not up yet.

On the previous question.

It's the motion to table. On the previous question.

He agrees with him. Mr. Rogers agrees with me. He wants more questions too. I didn't get to see this. Hope.

I'm sorry, your time has expired. Sorry. Question occurs on the previous question. Utilize the electronic voting system. There will be one more vote. Have all members voted? Does any member wish to change their vote? We good? Clerk will close the vote and report the tally.

On this vote, the ayes are 24, the nos are 22.

Previous question is ordered. Question now occurs on the motion offered by Ranking Member Meeks. I recommend a no vote. Members will record their vote utilizing the electronic voting system. Have all members voted? Does any member wish to change their vote? Clerk will close the vote and report the tally.

On this vote, the ayes are 22, the nos are 24.

The motion is not agreed to. Committee stands adjourned.

Stands adjourned.