25 Years Later: Evolutions in Federal, State, and Local Counterterrorism Efforts Since 9/11

Without objection, chair made it clear, committing recess at any point. Purpose of today's hearing is to examine the evolution in state and local counterterrorism preparedness and response efforts in the twenty-five years since nine eleven and to see where Congress can provide further assistance for this critical mission and I'll recognize myself for an opening statement. Twenty-five years ago, our nation was forever changed. The terrorist attacks of September eleventh, two thousand one, represent the worst act of terror on US soil in American history, claiming two thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven innocent lives. Thousands of first responders ran toward danger, launching the largest emergency response mobilization in New York City history. More than four hundred of these first responders made the ultimate sacrifice that day, and many more survivors and responders have passed or continued to suffer due to the nine eleven related illnesses. As a New Yorker representing a district forever marked by this tragedy, I carry the responsibility to never forget with me every day. Just last week, I led members of Congress to Ground Zero to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of September eleventh, alongside the families of those we lost, first responders, and members of the nine eleven community. We must ensure an attack like nine eleven never happens again. Following the attacks, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security to unify federal security efforts. The bipartisan nine eleven commission released its final report which included forty-one recommendations to address identified vulnerabilities and strengthen U. S. national security. In its wake, our nation undertook a robust effort to increase information sharing and coordination among federal state and local law enforcement. The federal government also worked to provide essential support for these entities as they prepare for respond to and work to prevent terrorist attacks across the nation. America's security successes in the last two decades are due in large part to the to this close coordination. As the committee tasked with conducting oversight on the Department of Homeland Security, and the only standing House committee established in response to nine eleven, we recently repl- released a report evaluating America's progress in strengthening our homeland security posture, and outlining more than twenty recommendations to better support DHS's no-fail mission. Committee recommends improving information sharing processes across federal and local law enforcement partners, stabilizing grant administration, and strengthening core preparedness in incident management capabilities. Committee also recommends continuing funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant and ensuring sufficient funding for special events in advance. As the only member of the intelligence community required to share intelligence with federal and local partners, the DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis plays an essential role in ensuring law enforcement has the information needed to identify and counter emerging threats. And the committee has prioritized efforts to reform and refocus INA to ensure it it is still meeting the moment for our state and local partners. Federal resources also play a critical role in this collective security mission. The fiscal year twenty twenty-six DHS appropriations bill Congress provided nearly four hundred mi- five hundred million dollars for the state homeland security grant program, nearly six hundred million dollars for the Urban Area Security Initiative, nearly a hundred million dollars for the transit security grant program, more than ninety million dollars for the port security grant program, three hundred million dollars for the non-profit security grant program, more than eighty million dollars for the operations for operation stone garden, and more than three hundred million dollars for the emergency emergency management performance grant. And which I will say, uh, this was an increase of what we saw in twenty twenty five, uh, which, uh, was a decrease, um, which I know a lot of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle on this committee were not thrilled with and I hope all the witnesses today will speak to the importance of these grants. As our report states, transparency and collaboration are critical to the successful implementation of these grant programs, and the com- committee will continue to conduct oversight of FEMA's guidance and processes to ensure their success. Our witnesses are here today to discuss the importance of these grants and the role federal s- resources play in helping state and local partners prepare for, and respond to, threats. Even with this success, the homeland security mission is never finished. terrorists have continued to evolve with modern technology, utilizing new tools and tactics to recruit, inspire, fundraise, and plan attacks like never before, from artificial intelligence to robotics and drones. The dedicated men and women who serve our communities every day, including those here today, are on the front lines of an evolving public safety mission. While those who wish to do us harm only need to get it right once, these public servants must succeed every single time. As we continue the as we continue National Preparedness Month, I am grateful for the opportunity to welcome former Arlington County's Fire Department Chief Swartz and former New York City Fire Department Commissioner, Nigram, before the committee today. I also appreciate the opportunity to receive testimony from three current officials who serve the people of New York and Washington DC uh metropolitan area. I want to offer my gratitude to all of our witnesses for collective service. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the progress made over the last two decades and where Congress can provide further support for state and local counterterrorism efforts in metropolitan areas. I now recognize the ranking member, gentleman from Mississippi, Mister Thompson, for his opening statement.

Thank you very much, Mister Chairman. Uh, good morning and welcome to our witnesses. Uh, thank all of you for being here. This month marks twenty-five years since the deadliest terrorist attacks in our nation's history. In some ways, September eleventh, two thousand and one seems like it was just yesterday. We remember the horrors of hijacked planes flying into the World Trade Center, smoke billowing from the Pentagon, and debris thrown across a field in Pennsylvania. We recall the heroism of first responders who ran into burning buildings, the pleas of family members looking for loved ones and the grief of mourners following the attacks. But a third of Americans have been born since nine eleven, and millions more were too young to have any memory of the attacks. With the passage of time, even though uh those who lived through the tragic day may have forgotten some of the lessons it taught us, As a member of this committee since its creation, I believe the most critical of these lessons is that we have a shared responsibility to keep our homeland safe while protecting our rights and freedoms as Americans. Unfortunately, the President has forgotten that lesson, and maybe he never learned it. Recently, after being told that he could not speak at the twenty-fifth anniversary ceremony in New York, He attended the Pentagon uh observance where he dozed off in a chair as the name of the victims were read. Even worse, as president, Trump has dismantled national security programs, stood up in the wake of nine eleven, and weaponized the Department of Homeland Security against the American people. He's also politicized counterterrorism grants to communities, withholding them from blue states to punish them for opposing his policies. His administration tried to slash by eighty-six percent Homeland Security Grant program funding for New York, which remains the biggest terrorist target today. Federal courts stepped in to restore that money, but DHS still owes New York eighty-seven million dollars meant to fund critical counterterrorism efforts. Last week, New York Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services wrote to FEMA, which administers the grant, asking when the money will be restored, saying, and I quote, "this prolonged uncertainty impedes New York's ability to plan and allocate resources for critical counterterrorism efforts." Governor Hochul also weighed in on the safety threat, saying the president continuing to withhold the fund amounts to defunding the police, since the NYPD is slated to receive the lion's share of New York's allocation. On that, I agree with Governor Hochul. Without these funds, New York is more vulnerable to other terrorist attack. not just with New York's money, but with the security of our country. As a committee established after nine eleven to prevent another large-scale attack on our country, we have a unique responsibility to ensure that Americans never forget. That includes all Americans, even the president. Make no mistake, Democrats will hold the administration accountable for its actions. with dishonor, which dishonors the nine eleven victims and distracts from current threats facing the homeland. This morning, we are absolutely honored to have with us leaders who were on duty the day of the attack, as well as those currently in those roles. I hope to discuss with them the counterterrorism efforts of the last twenty-five years, as well as what first responders need to prevent, prepare for, and respond to persistent security threats. Please know that we stand with you, the brave men and women you represent, and your colleagues across the country. Uh, thank you again for being here, for what you do every day to help our communities and protect our homeland. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. Today's hearing will consist of two panels, with the first panel providing opening statements, sharing their experiences responding to the attacks on nine eleven, as well as the efforts undertaken by their respective agencies to improve home homeland security resilience before and after. Second panel will discuss how this work has continued over the last twenty five years and will take questions from the committee. I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses for the first panel. Mister Daniel Nigro is the former Commissioner of the FDNY, serving in this role from twenty fourteen to twenty twenty two. Commissioner Nigro served as FDN F as the FDNY's Chief of Operations during during nine eleven and responded to the World Trade Center. Following the death of the Chief of Department Peter Gansi on nine eleven, Commissioner Nigro was appointed Chief of the Department where he oversaw the rescue and recovery operation at ground zero. Commissioner, very happy for you to be able to join us today and um thank you very much for your your service. Um, Mr. James Schwartz is the former Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department. On nine eleven, Chief Schwartz led the unified command effort for the department's response to the Pentagon attack. Chief Schwartz has previously served on the advisory council for the inter-agency threat assessment and coordination group, and the joint counterterrorism assessment team at the National Counterterrorism Center. As a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Chief Schwartz also chaired the Association's Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, and was designated the lead for their DHS FEMA reform guest force. I thank it would I thank you uh Chief also for being here today and for your service on that day. Pursuant to Committee Rule eight C, I ask that the witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Please be seated. And I recognize Commissioner Nairo for his statement.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and uh I'd like to start by thanking you and the members of this committee for having this hearing and for your diligence in this very important task. Our members, the members past and present of the FDNY uh appreciate it as do their families. Terrorism as defined by the Department of Homeland Security is nothing new to the City of New York. From the eighteen sixty-four attempt by eight Confederate operatives to burn a large area of the city which ironically accelerated New York's establishment of a paid fire department, now the FDNY, to the Wall Street bombing of nineteen twenty which killed thirty-eight, wounded more than a hundred, to the mad bomber of the forties and fifties, anti-war bombings and the FALN of the nineteen sixties and seventies, to the attacks on the World Trade Center in nineteen eighty-three and two thousand and one. In the twenty-five years since nine eleven, terrorist attacks in New York City, albeit on a smaller scale, have continued, some involving groups, others involving individuals. The weapons used have varied from improvised explosive devices, to firearms, knives, hatchets, and vehicles. What weapons will be used in possible, or should we say probable, future attacks, drones, chemical, biological, cyber attacks, et cetera, must be constantly planned for. The challenges are immense. While the fire department has always stood ready to protect life and property in New York City, and has responded to acts of terrorism throughout its history, its focus on terrorism has been somewhat minimal prior to the attack on the World Trade Center in nineteen eighty-three. In February of that year, terrorists parked a van filled with explosive material in the garage under the towers. A long fuse was lit, allowing the perpetrators time to escape. The terrorists' intention was to bring down one terror tower into the other, causing the collapse of both and the death of thousands. While this detonation caused considerable damage and numerous deaths and injuries, the towers survived. Following this attack and the extensive response and operations of the city's fire and police departments, planning and preparations in our city increased. Efforts were undertaken to better prepare both agencies for future acts. In nineteen ninety-six, the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management, OEM, under the effective leadership of the late Jerome Hower, was created. OEM was tasked coordinating the response of city agencies to all forms of emergencies. OEM planned inter-agency training and drills and helped improve coordination and communication. While OEM proved effective in improving the overall response and coordination at emergencies, in September of two thousand and one it was still a work in progress. The morning of September eleventh, two thousand and one began much like today as a brilliantly clear and bright late summer day. In the hour between eight and nine, FDNY members and firehouses throughout the city were in the midst of a shift change, with members preparing to head home while others were relieving them. At headquarters, the work of the day began with the department's leadership engaged in the business of managing the busiest fire department in the world. FDNY headquarters is located across the East River from the World in the Metro Tech complex of Brooklyn, between the Brooklyn and Manhattan bridges. I was Chief of Operations, second in command, to Chief of Department Peter Ganci. Our offices on the seventh floor had windows facing the towers. Just before eight forty seven I entered my office when I heard a loud noise and felt the building shake. At that instant, Chief Ganci shouted out, " Dan, look out your window." A plane just hit the World Trade Center. We did not know what type of plane it was or why it had struck the the building. We later learned it was American Airlines Flight Eleven, a large Boeing seven sixty seven, recently taken off, bound for California, with its fuel tanks full of jet fuel. Chief Ganci and I responded together over a miraculously traffic-free Brooklyn Bridge. From the bridge we had a clear view of the impact area, seeing what appeared to be ten floors of intense fire, one thousand feet up. I said two things to Chief Ganci, although I'm sure he was already thinking the same thing. This will be the worst day of our lives, and we cannot put out that much fire on the upper floors of the building. Chief Ganci immediately transmitted a fifth alarm, bringing two hundred and fifty department members to the scene. We arrived and established our command post on West Street at the foot of the North Tower. Units commanded by Battalion Chief Joe Pfeiffer were already inside the tower. At nine O three, a loud noise caused me to look up just as United Airlines flight one seventy-five, another seven sixty-seven, bound for California, traveling at over five hundred miles an hour, struck the South Tower. Two World Trade Center, floors seventy-seven to eighty-five, now are somewhat impossible task, had doubled in size. The two tallest buildings in New York City had been attacked by terrorists, were seriously damaged and burning out of control. A second fifth alarm was tr- transmitted eventually, followed by a third fifth alarm. An unknown number of people were trapped at or above the damaged floors in both towers. and many others below the stricken floors were having difficulty exiting the buildings. The impact of the hijacked airliners caused the elevators, all but two serving lower floors, to become damaged and inoperable. The standpipe systems, designed to allow water for firefighting to be pumped to the upper floors, had also been damaged and presumed to be inoperable as well. Although as I stated early, I believe the extinguishment at this point was beyond our capacity, that did not mean we would just stand by. Nine one one calls from occupants trapped in the towers answered at our dispatch center were unimaginably frantic, and heart-wrenching. All our dispatchers could do was to tell the callers to hang on, we are coming for you, and we were. Without elevator service. Reaching the upper floors was exceedingly difficult and time-consuming. But we would do our absolute best to climb to the impact area and try to reach those trapped. In the South Tower, we know from members' communications captured by recording devices that our members had reached the impact area and were preparing to advance up one partially obstructed stairway when suddenly that communication ceased. At nine fifty-eight, fifty-nine, the South Tower collapsed. Total collapse took only eleven seconds. While we were prepared for an expected localized collapses within the towers, this was not anticipated, certainly not at this stage in our operation. Chief Ganci issued the order for our members to remove themselves from the North Tower. Many were able to get out, while others were either too high up or assisting occupants. The North Tower later collapsed. Gancy and First Deputy Commissioner William Feehan, while assisting in the rescue of members in the South Tower, were struck by debris and killed. We discovered their bodies later that afternoon. The collapse caused damage to and numerous fires in surrounding buildings and vehicles damaged our water supply system. Our surviving units and the other units brought in were tasked with finding ways to deal with that as well as searching for survivors. As the afternoon wore on, world trade sent to seven, a forty-seven story building just across Vesey Street, began to worry us. We ordered our members out of the building and cleared a collapse zone, and at five twenty that afternoon, seven world trade collapsed. At some time that day, we learned that American Airlines flight seventy-seven had struck the Pentagon, and United Airlines flight ninety-three crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. A total of two thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven innocent people were killed on that day. Two thousand seven hundred and fifty-two three in New York. That includes three hundred and forty-three members of the fire department, thirty-seven from the Port Authority Police, and twenty-three from the New York City Police. Hundred and eighty-four people died at the Pentagon and forty in Shanksville. Books have been written about the day that f- day that followed. but I'll try to briefly sum it up. The entire area that was the World Trade Center looked otherworldly. Fires burned for ninety-nine days beneath what remained. While the first week to ten days was referred to as a rescue operation, few people were rescued and none after September twelfth. After the rescue effort became a recovery operation, work continued until May thirtieth of two thousand and two. FDNY members, their counterparts in the NYPD and PAPD, as well as many others, remained on the scene searching for the victims' remains, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, until that final day. To date, of the two thousand seven hundred and fifty-three victims at the World Trade Center, the remains of roughly forty percent have not yet been identified. Were we prepared for the attack on the World Trade Center on September eleventh? As John Miller, a former deputy commissioner at the NYPD, is quoted as saying, "using commercial airplanes as missiles being flown by trained pilots" wasn't on anyone's frame of reference. That being said, all of us on the federal, state and local level have made great progress in studying, planning and thwarting current and future terrorist attacks. At the Fire Department, we've always reviewed our actions following fatal fires, complicated operation, and unusual responses. What did we do right? What mistakes were made? What could we have done better? And what needs to be changed to make us even better? No response in our history had more fatalities and was more complicated and unusual than what I just summarized. We believed it would be helpful to ask an expert to help in our review and critique. So we contacted the consulting firm McKinsey and Company, and they agreed to work with us. Some important suggestions contained in the final report of the review have made us a better department, more able to meet future challenges. One is rooted in the assistance we received from the US Forest Service immediately after the attack. When I first heard that they were coming to assist us, I was quite skeptical. What do forest fire specialists have to do with our urban environment? The Forest Service manages events that may last for weeks and months. FDNY generally puts out the fire, returns the property to the owners or the NYPD and gets ready for the next alarm. The operations at the World Trade Center site would be ongoing, and the Forest Service taught us how best to manage a long-term incident. Afterwards, we decided to form our own incident management team, the IMT, now consisting of over three hundred trained members. When I returned to the department in two thousand fourteen, I find I found the IMT to be one of the biggest improvements. They'd helped manage many events here and across the country. Our response to COVID crisis is a perfect example. They were invaluable. It was suggested that we needed a more ro robust hazmat capability. Five haztech engine companies were created with highly trained members, giving us the ability to respond to and mitigate multiple. incidents. A new bureau was created to ensure we were prepared for the challenges of the ever-changing world. The FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness works with our federal, state and city partners, staying up to date with current threats and planning and conducting response scenarios and drills. Members of this unit have high level security clearance, as do ranking department members who are regularly apprised of threat environments. Many of the large and small adjustments were made to our department, such as the addition of two state-of-the-art fireboats, drones, robotics, improved communications, changes in our counseling program and family assistance, as well as a World Trade Center health program, monitoring all members impacted by their response to the attacks and their work in the day after. We certainly have depended upon and continue to depend on federal funding that has made these improvements possible, and we certainly look forward to continued support. Thank you for all that you've done and for conducting today's hearing.

Thank you very much, Commissioner Naira, for sharing that with us and for uh your statement. Um, I now recognize Chief Schwartz for his opening statement.

Chairman Garbarino.

Ranking Member Thompson, thank you all very much for uh conducting this hearing today and listening to some of our thoughts about the events of twenty-five years ago. On September eleventh, two thousand and one, a hundred and eighty-four people lost their lives at the Pentagon, fifty-nine on the aircraft and a hundred and twenty-five in the building. They ranged in age from three to seventy-one. And as we reflect on that day twenty-five years ago, our first thought should be with those families who lost lost loved ones. and recall that they don't need an anniversary to remember those lives cut tragically short. It's also useful to observe that but for the fact that the area where the airplane struck the building at the Pentagon that day was virtually empty, otherwise the losses at the Pentagon would have been significantly greater. We also cannot forget the heroes of the Pentagon that day, the military and civilian members alike, who acted with great courage and resolve to save their coworkers, in some cases re-entering the burning building. The nine eleven commission in their landmark report observed about the response to the Pentagon that while no emergency response is flawless, the response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons. First, the strong professional relationships and trust established among the responders. Second, the adoption of the incident command system, and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to emergency response. None of what the commission observed was the result of happenstance or luck. For decades before nine eleven, public safety leaders from around the Washington metropolitan area, actively supported by elected officials through the council of governments, collaborated on issues that were often hindered o- that are often hindered by parochial approaches to government services. Mutual aid agreements were struck with the knowledge and expectation that when events overwhelmed a locality it could depend on neighboring jurisdictions to come to its aids. Regional plans for mass casualty events were developed and tested. The ability to communicate across public safety radio systems, so that responders from different jurisdictions and professions could communicate with one another had been achieved by several jurisdictions, and was well on a way to complet completion for the remainder of the National Capital Region. However, incomplete the nine eleven commission's observations about the Pentagon response, their framing provides an opportunity to consider important factors for both successes and shortcomings, but also a way that we have applied those lessons over the last two and a half decades and where we should concentrate our attention now. Relationships and trust. The success of emergency service organizations is the result of many efforts, not all of which come within the come from within the organization. Public safety leaders today should recognize that the boundaries that separate professions or jurisdictions are useless during a novel crisis. The investment in developing such relationships can help decrease difficult operational challenges, especially when they present conflicting priorities. Developing trusted relationships and mutual understanding before the crisis will better aid the si those that the system was created to serve. The attack on the Pentagon made clear that no one agency had all the resources, experience, or expertise to bring the event to a successful conclusion. Acknowledging the interdependence among dozens of agencies and professions was essential. And developing relationships to work on common understanding before the crisis is a major factor in successfully managing any complex incident. One of the strongest and most valuable partnerships on nine eleven was between the FBI and the region's fire departments. Nine eleven tested for the first time the nineteen ninety-five presidential directive that places the FBI as the lead law enforcement agency for all acts of terrorism. How would that work in the face of a major disaster had not yet been tested. Fortunately, we and the NCR had established a strong relationship with the FBI's Washington field office and their National Capital Response squad. The NCRS had participated in regional exercises as recently as three days before the attack. And on the morning of the attack, we're training with all of the fire department's heavy rescue squads from around the metropolitan area, in preparations for large-scale demonstrations that we were anticipating later that fall. The Bureau's first agents arrived at the Pentagon minutes after the first fire department units arrived, and collaborative decision-making through unified command was initiated immediately. Because of our investment in building a professional relationship and mutual understanding there was no battle for turf. Both the Bureau and the Arlington County Fire Department knew that success would only occur if we worked together and applied the knowledge and respect that we had gained from each other over the previous three years. Incident management. The nine eleven commission observed that the use of of the incident command system was another positive factor at the Pentagon. ICS was implemented by the first arriving unit four minutes after the airplane struck the building, and unified command, including the Arlington County Fire and Police departments, and the FBI was established eight minutes later. This was before the federal government incorporated incident command as national doctrine through the national incident management system in two thousand and four. Under NIMS, ICS is a standardized process for managing a crisis across jurisdictions and professional disciplines. It's hard to imagine a better framework that unifies response agencies under shared objectives, common terminology, and that is scalable to the size and complexity of an incident. FIRE and EMS use ICS every day for every incident. Unfortunately, NIMS has not gained universal acceptance as evidenced by too many after-action reviews in the last two and a decades that have identified a lack of effective incident management as a leading cause for suboptimal outcomes. After more than twenty years as a national doctrine, it's time to assess where we are with NIMS, make improvements to the doctrine as necessary, assess how we teach it, and stop pretending that because we ask grant recipients to certify that they use NIMS, that we are any closer to a truly national approach to incident management than we were twenty-five years ago. Regionalism. Lastly, the nine eleven commission observed the pursuit of a regional approach to response as an asset. That pursuit began long before the attack. Prompted by the nineteen seventy-three collapse of a high-rise apartment building that was under construction, fire chiefs in Arlington, Alexandria, and Fairfax began collaborating on automatic aid. In nineteen seventy-five, they signed the no-vote agreement that essentially dropped jurisdictional boundaries for the purpose of allocating resources. The closest units are assigned to a request for service, regardless of jurisdiction. The benefits are faster service to those in need and faster backup and increased safety for our responders. Over the years, additional jurisdictions have been added to the agreement and the region further benefits from standardater standardat standardized operating procedures, and complete communications interoperability. Last year, the NOVA agreement celebrated fifty years of continuous operation. The Northern Virginia localities are also members of the Mo- Washington Metropolitan Area Councils of Government. COG is used as a forum to collaborate on regional problems that are not confined by jurisdictional boundaries, and is overseen by a board of elected representatives from each of the twenty-four member jurisdictions creating legitimacy at the policy level. The Region's Fire Chiefs have a long have long had a committee and several technical subcommittees at COG. Through NOVA and COG, the chiefs have recognized that they are building capacity that goes non-routine emergencies, but that by using such a system every day builds strength, furthers collaboration and trust, and can be exploited when the big one comes. Soon after the nine eleven tragedy, there was a discussion about developing a national system of response. This one was in recognition that for some incidents, even a region as large as the NCR still need outside assistance. The International Association of Fire Chiefs developed a fire service mutual aid system to improve Interstate Mutual Aid. The effort later transitioned to the National Mutual Aid System. Its purpose is to address some of the concerns with the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, where because of the bidding system, the closest available resources are often not deployed thus delaying support during a crisis. Additionally, local and fire EMS departments must wait years for financial reimbursement after deploying to a major incident. We urge Congress to examine the issue of interstate mutual aid to ensure that the resources are deployed efficiently during a disaster. I just want to take a moment to say that those of us in Arlington in the National Capital Region and dare I speak for the entirety of the American Fire Service stand with our brothers and sisters and have stood for twenty-five years in our brothers and sisters in New York for their tremendous losses on that day and the losses that they have suffered as a result of occupational diseases since then something that we too here in the National Capital Region are experiencing every day. I want to thank the committee for taking the time to hold this hearing, and I look forward to the continued conversation on these important topics. Thank you.

Thank you, Chief Swartz. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you both for your service to the United States during nine eleven and the years after, and I appreciate your willingness to participate in today's hearing. The first panel has concluded. The committee will suspend while the second panel takes their seats.

Introduce our second panel. Uh first, Mr. John Donnelly serves as the Chief of the Washington DC Fire and EMS Department, a role he has held since twenty twenty. Chief Donnelly joined the department in nineteen ninety-two, served as a Battalion Chief, Division Commander of Special Operations, Homeland Security, and Apparatus. He also served as a member of the command staff and head of the department's Professional Development Bureau. Chief Donnelly is a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Terrorism and Homeland Security Committee, and the Fire Chiefs Committee for the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Uh, it's quite a resume. Thanks for being here. Second, we have Mister Thomas Correio. Serves as FFTNY's Chief of Fire Prevention. Prior to his current role, Chief Correa, served as the FFTNY's Chief of Training and Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness as well as Fire Marshal, Lieutenant, Captain and Company Commander, Batt- Battalion Chief, and Deputy Chief. And finally, we have Mister Greg Erie, who serves as the Chief Secretary Officer for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a role he's held since twenty twenty two. Prior to joining the Port Authority, Mister Erie served in the Air Force for eight years and is a veteran of Desert Storm, after which he joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During his twenty two year FBI career, Mister Erie served as Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau's New York and Newark field offices, which we all know is an incredibly busy office. And most recently, Mister Erie served as Vice President and Chief Security Officer at the Anti-Defamation League. Well, thank all three of you for being here today in remembrance of that solemn uh day on nine eleven. Um, and with that, I'd like to start with Mister Donnelly.

Thank you, sir. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. As a new sergeant responding back into the city on September eleventh, two thousand and one, it is an honor today to represent Mayor Muriel Bowser, the government of the District of Columbia, the men and women of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, as you assess our nation's preparedness twenty-five years after the attacks of that day. I also want to acknowledge the leaders on the first panel, individuals who carried forward the response, recovery, and resilience missions, and in the immediate aftermath in the immediate aftermath of nine eleven. Their work laid the foundation for the homeland security architecture we rely on today and they were mentors to me. So the perspective of the national capital region, the nine eleven commission report found that although command and control challenges occurred during the Pentagon attack, the overall response was effective because the national capital region had already embraced a formal incident command system. An emphasis that increased after the nineteen eighty-two Air Florida crash. The nine eleven attacks accelerated regionalization, fundamentally trans- transforming how public safety agencies coordinate, train, communicate, and share intelligence. Over the past twenty-five years, DC Fire and EMS has applied those lessons to every major category of incident we face, from mass, casualty events, transit and transportation accidents, large-scale responses at federal facilities, maritime and waterway emergencies, even complex aviation incidents, such as the mid-air collision over the Potomac. Each of these reinforcing the value of unified command, inter-agency planning, and seamless information sharing. As a result, the department has evolved from a primarily operational response agency into an integrated partner in the regional homeland security. complex, designed to meet and scale the comp complexity of the national capital region. We work closely with district, regional, and federal partners to maintain share a shared operating picture and unified response framework. As a non-law enforcement agency in this process, we often serve as the community's voice as security and event plans are developed, reflected, and reflecting this sustained collaboration across jurisdictions. that recognize terrorism and other threats that do not respect borders. Our current preparedness. Today's threat environment is broader and more complex than ever, and our preparedness rests on several pillars. First, inter-agency coordination and regional planning. We participate in large-scale planning through district the district preparedness system and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Second, intelligence and information sharing. Firing EMS relies on the Washington Regional Threaten Analysis Center, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for shared intelligence. Programs like the United States Fire Administration led fire service intelligence exchange and DHS sup- suspicious activity reportin' reporting have strengthened that integration. Third, operational readiness. Our members train continuously and they respond to conventional and unconventional threats, including complex coordinated attacks. In addition to daily refresher training in our firehouses, our operational employees log tens of thousands of hours of continuing education each year. Fourth, technology and communications. Investments in modern communications platforms, including emergency alerting systems, that strengthen situational awareness across the NCR. secure interoperability of radio and data systems through investments in land mobile radios, radio caches, and FirstNet, support rapid information sharing among responders, partners, and the public. So where can we use federal support? While the last twenty-five years have brought enormous progress, there are several areas that remain critically dependent on our federal partnership. Following the events of nine eleven, Congress recognized the critical need for robust intelligence and information sharing systems, not only at the federal level, but also among first responders who are the earliest on the scene when disaster strikes. To fulfill this vision, resources are urgently needed to rebuild the fire and EMS intelligence capability that was lost with the shuttering of the fire service intelligence exchange whether by reestablishing federal mechanisms that support the FSIE, or funding local participation in something like the joint counterterrorism assessment team. These actions will ensure the local authorities have the intelligence support they need to plan for the hazards we will face. We need a commitment from Congress on band bandwidth, satellite, data tran- and data transfer standards. Our operations are reliant on technology. We need to preserve terrestrial bandwidth for our first responders, and plan for the future use of satellite communications. through our regulate regulatory process. And we need stable and flexible grant support. The Urban Area Security Initiative and similar grant funding is essential to the fire service's ability to adopt new technologies and practices. This funding also provides training against national hazards. It funds exercises, cyber security res readiness, and regional interoperability that cannot be funded locally. Proposed changes to two CFR two hundred and the recent threats to major fire service grants, and the National Fire Academy introduced instability and undermines our ability to plan for the long term. And finally, the National Incident Management System. As it was envi envisioned by Homeland Security Presidential Directive five has not emerged as we has hoped, the existing system needs a review and update to see where it can be improved. Finally, I want to acknowledge Mayor Bowser's support for the DC Air Safety Act. Nearly twenty five million passengers travel through Ronald Reagan, Washington National Airport every year, and the twenty twenty five collision over the Potomac made clear that our airspace is operating beyond safe limits. Chairman, twenty five years after nine eleven, protecting our communities from terrorism remains a no-fail responsibility. Our success at the DC at DC fire and EMS is a result of working

Chair now recognizes Chief Correia.

Good morning. My name is Tom Correia, Assistant Chief for the New York City Fire Department. Thank you for the honor and privilege of providing testimony today. Twenty-five years since the horrific events of September eleventh, the greatest and most meaningful way by which we can respect the memories of those we have lost is by analyzing the lessons of this tragedy and applying our best solutions so that we may preserve life and property as part of our life safety mission. September eleventh, two thousand one, should have been a special day for my family as we were looking forward to seeing my oldest son Brian off to his first day of preschool. I was off duty that day, and as I became aware of the terrible events unfolding, the anticipation of this happening event quickly transferred to disbelief and the need to get to my command to assist in any way possible. In the twenty-five years since September eleventh, two thousand one, the fire service has evolved in our analysis of threats, as well as developing preparedness strategies. One of the main themes is the adoption of an all hazards focus. and improving core tools such as situational awareness, developing a calm operating picture, and inter-agency coordination to that apply to all emergency events. This has become particularly meaningful as funding allocations have decreased, and made the efficient analysis of risk even more vital. Comprehensive risk analysis is predicated on the fire service continuing to have a seat at the intelligence enterprise table, not only as a consumer, but also playing a vital role in the development of threat assessments. At the FDNY, we have been very fortunate to build strong intelligent sharing relationships with the New York City Police Department, as well as the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. This supports the FDNY's counterterrorism efforts, particularly our own very our very own Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. This center regularly develops intelligence products that are transmitted across the entire nation. to share insights as well as lessons learned. We thank the Congress for the many years of grant funding to that support uh have led to the creation and improvement of many FDNY response resources, such as a fire department's operation center, a marine firefighting regional assets, unmanned aerial vehicle and robotics program, and incident management teams. These comprehensive capabilities have proven their tremendous value in fires and emergencies, over the last twenty-five years, as well as most rec- recently within the context of the tw- two hundred and fiftieth anniversary and the FIFA World Cup. It is these types of occasions that the first responder resources that you all have supported come together in a synergistic homeland security enterprise. This homeland security enterprise is vital today to attain comprehensive preparedness. It provides the base to address both traditional threats such as the use of improvised explosives and fire and smoke as a weapon, but also dynamic cyber security threats, digital tools that can undermine public safety messaging by nefarious actors, and potential negative impacts related to artificial intelligence. So what are our higher highest priorities for the future and what recommendations can we offer today? Commit to continued dialogue with the first responder community so that we can jointly support the vital need for homeland security funding. Continue to build upon intelligent sharing mechanisms between law enforcement and the first responder communities. Advocate for increased investment in homeland security education to fully prepare the next generation of professionals. Establish multidisciplinary working groups to study the homeland security preparedness and continuity of operations impact of artificial intelligence, as well as opportunities. Establish a multi-agency working group to study the effectiveness of the national incident management system, and the incident command system with regard to unified fire service and law enforcement operations. As you can see in the twenty-five years since September eleventh, two thousand one, there has been much progress within the fire service, in regard to homeland security and emergency preparedness, but also much to accomplish. Our commitment to our communities, to continually build partnerships, Entirely work toward achieving the highest state of preparedness has never been stronger. That is our unwavering commitment to you. Thank you very much for the honor. Privileged to address you today.

Thank you, Chief Correo. Uh, and by the way, I just uh, Commissioner Naira just said uh, we FDNY couldn't have a better person testifying here today. So I thought that was a pretty good compliment I wanted to share with you. I now recognize Mr. Iri for five minutes to summarize his opening statement.

Good morning, Chairman Garbarino and members of the committee. My name is Greg Erie and I am the Chief Security Officer at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Thank you for the opportunity to come here to talk a little bit about the Port Authority's preparedness and security operations. Port Authority facilities have the unfortunate distinction of being targeted multiple times by terrorists. In nineteen ninety-three, a truck bomb exploded beneath the North Tower, killing six people and injuring more than one thousand. On September eleven, two thousand one, the Port Authority lost eighty-four people, thirty-seven of which were Port Authority police officers. That remains the worst single day loss of life of any police department in the United States. Since then, we have lost numerous officers to nine eleven related illnesses, and there are many more who are still in the fight. This tragic legacy has shaped the Port Authority's unwavering commitment to safety and security. This is evident as security accounts for roughly a quarter of both the agency's personnel and its operating budgets. Furthermore, since nine eleven, one point eight billion dollars has been invested in capital projects to harden and strengthen our transportation facilities. Twenty-five years later, the transportation sector continues to be an attractive target for terrorism. This threat is particularly acute for the Port Authority, given the scale and significance of the critical transportation infrastructure we operate, including the nation's largest airport system, the busiest terminal, and the most traveled bridge in the world. Since nine eleven, the Port Authority is both a risk-based, multi-layered security program designed to protect its employees, customers and transportation assets from asymmetric This approach includes risk and intelligence informed assessments to identify threats prioritize vulnerabilities and guide capital security investments. Capital hardening and protective design programs, including tunnel hardening, bridge and structural strengthening, bollards and other vehicle threat mitigations. Security technology, including an extensive CCTV system with enhanced analytics, access control systems, perimeter intrusion detection, license plate readers, CBRN detection capabilities, drone detection, interoperable radio communications, and continuing evaluation of cutting edge technologies. Twenty four seven security operation centers and trained contract security officers will provide an additional layer of observation, behavioral recognition, access control, and incident reporting. And I'd be remiss if I did not mention our very highly trained police department of more than twenty one hundred officers with high visibility counterterrorism teams, emergency service unit capabilities, explosive detection K-nineteens. PAPD also participates numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement task forces, including the FBI's joint terrorism task forces in both New York and New Jersey. We also have a dedicated office of emergency management that leads incident coordination, training, and full-scale exercises with regional first responders using the incident command system and the unified command principles. We have a robust cyber security program, including a twenty four seven cyber security operations center, recognizing that physical and cyber security are increasingly inseparable in modern transportation. We utilize the Department of Homeland Security's Safety Act program as an independent third-party validation of security programs and technology. Port Authority facilities and programs that have received these safety act recognitions include the World Trade Center complex itself, the George Washington Bridge, LaGuardia Airport, and our Path train servicing New York and New Jersey. This year served as an extraordinary real-world test stress test for our security protocols, driven by a series of concurrent major events across the New York and New Jersey region. The simultaneous hosting of the FIFA World Cup, the Sailforth operation, and the America two-fifty celebrations successfully drew an influx of over one point two million additional visitors to the area. Last week we gathered to honor and commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of nine eleven. This high profile event was attended by the Vice President of the United States, the Governors of New York and New Jersey, and all former living presidents and first ladies, along with many other dignitaries. Flawless inter-agency coordination and unparalleled security measures ensured this historic event was among the most protected and successful on record. Success of these security operations demonstrates what twenty-five years of investment and partnership have produced. A security enterprise that is integrated, intelligence driven, technologically advanced and operationalized across jurisdictional boundaries. Congress has been an essential partner in building and sustaining our security capabilities. We respectfully ask that Congress continue to maintain its support in several key areas. Increased federal funding of homeland security grant programs. The transit security grant program, urban area security initiative, port security grant program, and other federal funding have supported the Port Authority counterterrorism programs, police training and equipment, emergency preparedness exercises, cyber security, access control systems, facility hardening, and all our other critical security initiatives. These investments allow state and local partners and transportation agencies to maintain capabilities that protect nationally significant infrastructure and power states to work with federal partners to perform advanced mitigation against malicious drones. Transportation agencies need timely solutions to support the appropriate response to unauthorized drones impeding transportation. Continue to support the DHS Safety Act program. Independent validation helps organizations measure security programs against best practices and promotes the adoption of effective anti-terrorism technologies and services. Protect and strengthen intelligence sharing and joint task force capabilities. The ability to move timely, actionable information across federal, state, local, and transportation partners remains one of the most consequential reforms of the post-nine eleven era. Since nine eleven, the Port Authority has achieved significant measurable progress across every layer of our security enterprise. Our facilities are more resilient, our law enforcement capabilities are highly specialized, and our intelligence moves faster. Technology provides tools that did not exist a generation ago. Most importantly, federal, state, and local agencies collaborate in ways that have become routine rather than the exception. On behalf of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, I want to thank the committee and our congressional delegation for their continued support of programs and partnerships. that help us protect our employees, customers, infrastructure, and the region we serve. Thank you.