Annual Worldwide Threats Assessment Hearing (OPEN)

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Morning everyone, I call the committee to order. Without objection the chair may declare the committee in recess at any time. Before we begin today's hearing I would like to provide a few important reminders. First, today's open portion is being broadcast live on C-SPAN and streamed on the committee's YouTube channel. This open portion as part of the hearing uh will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis. All participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified or other sensitive information protected from public disclosure. I will adjourn this open session following completion of one round of questions and will then move into a closed session where such questions can be asked. Second, I want to welcome the audience and inform them that while I fully support cont- uh constitutionally protected rights of speech and protest this is not the time or the place. Any would-be disruptors in the audience who interfere with the committee's business will not be tolerated. For this event members will have five minutes with the witnesses. I ask each of my colleagues to keep both your questions and complete answers from the witnesses within that allotted five minutes. Any last minute questions or responses that can't be completed in time will be submitted for the record. We do expect a vote series at ten o'clock this morning. The vote will be held open so we don't plan to recess. We'll uh address that when the time comes. Additionally, in the same manner in which the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has conducted itself in a recent worldwide threat hearings, Again, thank you for being here today. The worldwide threats hearing provides the American people the opportunity here directly from our intelligence community leadership on the threats that face our nation. It's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. Director of National Intelligence, the Honorable Tulsi Gabbard, Director of Centel- Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable John Ratcliffe, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Honorable Kash Patel, Acting Director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General William J. Hartman, and Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General James H. Adams, the third. Thank you all for being here. It's a gross understatement to say that a lot has occurred since we met at this hearing last year before I addressed the issues I had planned I want to address Iran. Once it was clear that diplomacy would not stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon or holding the world under threat through ballistic missiles and terrorist networks, President Trump took decisive action to eliminate the threat. Make no mistake, Iran is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. It's been their policy and it is their intent. Anyone who thinks we weren't on borrowed time is refusing to acknowledge the failure of prior policies. It's a simple fact that the consecutive that consecutive administrations had exhausted all other options to end this threat. Our witnesses here are tasked with providing intelligence to informed decision makers. There's only one person in America who has the responsibility and the obligation to act when he believes there is a clear and present danger to our safety. The Commander-in-Chief has that duty, and I commend his decisiveness in his most difficult of decisions. I've been in briefings that the administration provided to all members, to this committee, and to the gang of eight. The classified case is clear even if it can't be fully discussed in the open. The President made a difficult but necessary decision. My Democrat colleagues have made it clear that they don't agree. What we shouldn't disagree on is that the United States has effectively been at war with Iranian regime for the last forty-seven years. Death to America is not just a slogan on a T-shirt that you buy at Tehran International Airport, or at the campus bookstore at Columbia University. It's their ethos and their policy. They are responsible for the deaths of countless Americans. I want to thank the many service members and intelligence officers involved in Operation Epic Fury for their selfless service. For those who have lost loved ones in this fight, please know that you are in our prayers. Most sincerely, your loved ones died in service to the United States of America. We honor them and you for their service. Freedom loving people everywhere are thankful for their sacrifice. That said, there are a few other topics it's important for me to address. First, after four years of Biden's wide open borders and anemic foreign policy, in just one short year the Trump administration has secured our borders and reasserted America as a decisive leader that commands respect on the world stage. This administration has secured a stunning number of wins for the United States, including reasserting the importance of the Western hemisphere in disrupting China's predatory Belt and Road activities in our neighborhood, negotiating a ceasefire in Gaza resulting in the freeing of the hostages held by the bloodthirsty Hamas terrorists, and working with our NATO partners to more than double their Russ- their uh defense spending against pressing threats from CCP and Russia. I thank each of the witnesses here today for their parts in the reassertion of American leadership. Second, our role here is to both authorize your authorities and resources and oversee their implementation. One of those authorities is FISA seven O two, which expires in just over a month. The president is seeking an eighteen month clean extension to provide more time to assess the implementation of the fifty-six reform measures included in the last reauthorization. I'm working with the ranking member, House leadership, and Judiciary Chairman Jordan to support that request. We look forward to an update from the panel today on compliance RISA implementation and mission value. Third, last year I made clear my expectation that we would work together to end the weaponization of the intelligence community, improve analytic integrity, and fix our broken counterintelligence enterprise. Many in Congress and across our nation have lost trust in the intelligence community. While we have made progress, there's still much work that remains to be done. I hope to continue working with each of you to do the hard things necessary to protect American citizens while regaining their trust. I also remain committed to tackling the issues that allow hostile foreign powers to operate so effectively against us, including within the United States. Specifically, foreign intelligence threats targeting the United States now surpass levels seen at the height of the Cold War in both scale and complexity. These threats include cyber penetrations of critical infrastructure, US government systems, and private sector innovators, as well as surveillance near sensitive military installations, intelligence collection against foreign dissidents living in the United States. Like in the Cold War where conflict often gave way to irregular operations below the level Today's adversary tactics have made the homeland a contested environment. We must properly resource and reform our nation's counterintelligence enterprise to meet that threat. We must transform our approaches in order to confront adversarial intelligence services at scale, driving back operational activities in the homeland and forcing our adversaries to rethink their risk calculus for operating in the United States. Unfortunately, in recent years the counterintelligence enterprise lost a significant amount of credibility. with the American people due to the actions of those involved in cases like Crossfire Hurricane and Arctic Frost. For our intelligence community to best serve America, the CI community and the larger IC must stay out of domestic policy debates and focus on unrelenting aggressive mission execution. For our intelligence community to best serve America, the CI community and the larger IC must stay out of uh those debates. Director Gabbart, I uh Director Gabbart, I wanna particularly commend your efforts in this space. Specifically, I want to thank you and President Trump for working with us to declassify the HPSI majority staff report on the two thousand seventeen intelligence community assessment on Russian plans and intentions in the two thousand sixteen election. The majority staff report, which had been kept from the American people for eight years, proves that the two thousand seventeen ICA, the public genesis of the Russia collusion hoax, was a politicized document. Its key assessment on Putin's hopes for the two thousand sixteen election was built on at best a abysmal an- analytic tradecraft, and at worst, willful political charged int- charged intentions. This was a necessary act of transparency to begin the process of rebuilding trust with the American people and the IC. But please know the challenges facing each one of you uh is that are testifying here is not lost on this committee. Getting a large ship back on the right course is never easy. The task can certainly be challenged by unforeseen obstacles and obstructions. You know you are doing something right when all the weapons in the media's arsenal pointed directly at you. Thank you all for pressing forward. We can walk and chew gum at the same time, and we must. We must have our IC as aggressive as ever in pursuing its mission while holding those accountable who participated in its misuse. I thank each of you for doing this and encourage you to all keep moving on both fronts. Finally, now I want to speak to our remarkable IC workforce. I'm immensely proud of the incredible work that you do, especially over the last year to support critical military intelligence and law enforcement operations. From operations Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, Southern Spear, and Epic Fury, to the many other operations you've conducted in the shadows with no fanfare, Americans will never be able to fully appreciate all you do to protect this nation. I think I can speak for the entire committee when I say we extend our deepest gratitude. America truly has the best of the best in our ranks. It's for this primary reason I would like to address the House Intelligence committee's ongoing investigation into the intelligence community's mishandling of anomalous health incidents also known as Havana syndrome, and the mistreatment of AHI survivors. I'm aware of the drastic increase in media reporting around this issue, and I'd like to first reiterate the c- reiterate the committee's commitment to releasing additional unclassified information. Our team has worked diligently to conduct this investigation with the utmost integrity and we cannot be driven by outside timelines. I commit to the workforce to release additional reports as appropriate. Put simply, it's my clear opinion that individuals in the intelligence community were involved in a cover-up. Manipulating intelligence processes and a breach of intelligence community directive two O three to provide a desired outcome, rather than a forthright analysis to inform decision makers. Our investigation, the vast majority of which remains appropriately classified, continues to show that the intelligence community assessment was constructed upon flawed analytic trade craft. This includes the use of study results from the National Institutes of Health, that were manufactured through highly unethical means and in collaboration with individuals working for the CIA. ICAs carry a great deal of weight. While typically classified, the impact is increased exponentially when declassified and released as part of a public messaging effort, as was done with the AHI ICA. As I have repeatedly stated, since December of two thousand twenty-four, the AHI ICA and its follow-on updates caused real serious harm to some of our nation's bravest. Last month I called for its immediate recall and I reiterate my reiterate my position today according to recent media reporting Director Gabbard, your office has said your review of the ICA will be quote comprehensive and complete end quote and that you remain committed to sharing

Mm-hmm.

findings from your review with the American people thank you for that. And separately, D- Director Ratcliffe, your team has also quoted in recent media reporting saying that you support the ODNI review and look forward to the report thank you so much for that, Director. I thank both of you for your commitment to this review's completion and and publishing. This i- issue is complex and the underlying facts are not as simple as often portrayed in the public. No fully informed analysis will make everyone happy. That said, today I call for this review to be provided to the committee and strongly urge you to release the public whatever portion of this review can be made unclassified this is vital to rebuilding trust moving forward. I want to thank our witnesses again for being here today and with that I want to recognize the distinguished ranking member Mr. Himes for his opening statement.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and a big welcome to all of our witnesses. I hope that whatever else is said today that you will convey to your workforces, our deep admiration and appreciation for their diligence, their commitment and their sacrifice. Sometimes this moment feels a little bit like that old Billy Joel song, we didn't start the fire, North Korea, Red China, War on Ukraine, Greenland, Cuba, terrorism, burning drug boats, and of course the massive fire that we did start, our latest Middle Eastern war. Where to begin? Our national elections are about seven months away, and plenty of Americans are worried that President Trump may indeed, as he said, take control. Meanwhile, we are not receiving the traditional indications or warnings of foreign intelligence efforts to interfere in those elections. There have been several terrorists to tax in recent weeks, and meanwhile the FBI, our premier counterterrorism agency, has pivoted hard to immigration enforcement. But I can't begin today with any- anything other than that fire that we did start, Iran. The constitution to which every single one of us swears an oath reser- reserves decisions of war to the representatives of the people. And that's not ink on parchment. There are good reasons for that. First, let's start with why. Why did we and are we risking our blood and treasure on a deeply risky venture, one that the President of the United States and the Director of National Intelligence have spent years telling us is a terrible idea. The President has said that Iran was preparing an imminent attack on the United States. That is not true. As awful as the regime is and always has been, not one of your agencies has produced a single report saying that Iran posed an imminent threat to the United States. The president also claimed that Iran would soon possess a nuclear weapon, perhaps in weeks. That is also not true. It is not supported by a single report from your agencies, and it is certainly belied by the repeated claim that Iran's nuclear capability was obliterated mere months ago. Second, let's consider the consequences, as the Congress should have done. The Congress, not one man, should consider whether our constituents in uniform will live or die. The Congress, not one man, should decide if Americans will spend an additional thirty dollars a week to fill their gas tanks. the Congress, not one man, should consider if it is wise to allow the Russians to sell their oil to India so that they have millions of dollars with which to kill the Ukrainians that we are now begging for help, to defend ourselves against Iranian drones. Finally, had the administration chosen to abide by the constitution, Congress might have considered the answer to General Petraeus's all-important question. Tell me how this ends. When the Iranian navy is sunk and the missile launchers are destroyed, and we have re-obliterated the nuclear infrastructure, do we declare victory and sail away? How do we feel about a new supreme leader who is more extreme and vicious and dedicated to the development of a nuclear weapon than the last one? Do we do a deal with him? How do we get him to open the Strait of Hormuz? Do we bomb more? And if we sail away and declare victory, are we back there nine months from now to re-sink a rebuilt navy and re-bomb rebuilt missile launchers? Is this gonna be an every nine month thing or is it going to be annual? The very core purpose of the intelligence community is to answer these questions for the president, for us, and for the American people. Right now, as we watch the dignified transfer of lost American patriots at Dover, as we watch gasoline approach five dollars a gallon, as we watch our allies mocking us on the world stage, we need to know. Were those questions asked? How did you answer them for the President of the United States? And did he listen? I understand that the administration may come to the Congress to ask for funding of two hundred billion dollars for this war. As you answer those questions for us today, I'd ask you to remember that old saying, "If you want me there for the landing, Make sure I'm there at the takeoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thank the gentlemen for his comments. Um, before I turn it over to Director Gabbard, I would like to thank General Hartman for nearly four decades of service. I know you're retiring, I think, tomorrow. Uh, you are here, I I just uh applaud your service of uh to this nation and your leadership at the NSA, and thank you and wish you all the best in your retirement.

Thank you, Chairman. I think tomorrow was well.

All right. Thank you. Uh, Director Gabbard, you're recognized.

Thank you very much. Good morning, Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, members. I'm here today to present the twenty twenty-six annual threat assessment and joined by my colleagues, the directors of the CIA, the DIA, FBI, and NSA. This briefing is being provided in accordance with ODNI's statutory responsibility. What I'm briefing here today does not represent my personal views or opinions, but rather the assessments of the intelligence community, of the threats that facing the United States, our homeland and our interests. In this assessment, we're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the President's national security strategy starting with threats to our homeland, then shifting to global risks. The defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance to the American people, and efforts by this administration over the last year to bolster homeland defense have yielded significantly positive results. For example, the strict enforcement of US policies at the US-Mexico border and regionally have served as a deterrent and drastically reduced illegal immigration. Based on Customs and Border Patrol data, January twenty twenty-six's monthly encounters are down eighty-three point eight percent compared to January of twenty-twenty-five. The drivers of migration are likely to continue. Potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba and Haiti risk triggering migration surges. Smugglers who often operate as transnational criminal organizations view chaos as an opportunity for profit and will likely continue to profit from these illegal immigration flows. These TCOs continue to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and safety of millions of US citizens primarily by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President Trump's leadership, fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a thirty percent decrease from September of twenty twenty-four to September of twenty twenty-five. His agr- aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational criminal organizations and reduce the inflow of fentanyl precursors has already had a significant impact, which is likely to continue. Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New Generation Cartel dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine into the United States. Columbia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and the National Liberation Army are responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine into the US and European markets with some indicators that they're that they are now attempting to expand to the Asia-Pacific region. Columbia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine and Colombian criminal groups have expanded their trafficking relationships with neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs. MS thirteen is well established in cells in the United States and uses violence to intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora, engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, firearms offenses and prostitution, fueling increased violence and instability. These and other TCOs present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent crime to everyday Americans. and contribute to regional instability. As the president increases counter-drug and counter-cartel pressures, they're likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting and decentralizing production locations and trafficking routes and methods. The United States continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans. even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS organizationally remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. The the spread of Islamist ideology in some cases, led by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, pose a fundamental threat to freedom and foundational principles that underpin Western civilization. These Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist groups and individuals around the world, and to advance their political objectives of establishing an Islamist caliphate which governs based on Sharia. There are increasing examples of this in various European countries. President Trump's designation of certain chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against this threat. In response to setbacks of their capabilities of conducting large-scale complex attacks the IC assesses that Islamist terrorist groups have towards focusing on executing information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in or with access to the West. US counterterrorism operations are ongoing, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Syria, and have removed key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to quickly reconstitute its leadership and launch large-scale attacks against the homeland. Strict U. S. border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed some potential sources of future terror attacks. Since January, U. S. officials have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups. This is a positive trend. However, our inter-agency coordinated efforts to identify, locate and remove known or suspected terrorists who are already in the U S continues with vigilance. In twenty twenty five, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the U S. Law enforcement disrupted at least fifteen U S based Islamist terrorist pro- plotters. Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some on-line contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat. to US interests overseas in parts of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia where these groups operate. In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia and ISIS in Syria are among the most likely groups conducting external plotting. ISIS in Syria specifically is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks and solicit funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS detainees, and thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who escaped or were released from prisons and displaced persons' camps. Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. The US secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic threats. However, the IC assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range. The ICSS's that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than sixteen thousand missiles by twenty thirty-five, from the current assessed figure of more than three thousand missiles. The ICSS's that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems, meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing US missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can already reach US soil. The ICSS's that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with a range capable of striking the homeland. The ICSS's that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before twenty thirty-five. should Tehran attempt to pursue the capability. However, these assessments will be observed and updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Furies' devastating strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles and launch capabilities is determined. Shifting to the cyber domain, the ICSS says that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and non-state ransomware groups will continue to seek to compromise US government and private sector networks as well as critical infrastructure to collect intelligence and create options for future disruption and for financial gain. The ICSS's China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and are continuing R and D efforts. North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. In twenty twenty five alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole two billion dollars, which is helping to fund the regime, including further development of its strategic weapons program. Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold with ransomware groups shifting to faster high volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate. Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence will likely accelerate the threats in the cyber domain. It will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. For example, in August of twenty twenty five, cyber used an AI tool to conduct data extortion against international government, health care and public health emergency service sectors and religious institutions. Shifting to the Arctic, the ICSS's that Russia and to a lesser extent China, aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of its quote-unquote " polar great power" status, and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. China, though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its strategic and economic interests. On the technology front, artificial intelligence capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape. As this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines to simulate human learning comprehension, problem-solving, creativity and autonomy, it'll be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is used and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American people, across all domains. The ICSS is that China is the most capable competitor in this field and aims to displace the US as the global AI leader by twenty thirty. AI adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design and has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamlined decision-making, underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield. Early developers in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technology technological advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance health care, and government information. The global security landscape is volatile and complex, with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against US interests. The space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counter space capabilities to challenge US space efforts. The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities continues to grow. Turn now to the Western hemisphere, where flagging economies, high crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking present a broad spectrum of risks to US interests, and where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region. The ICSS says that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hot spots of volatility in the coming year, with the potential to undermine or distract from countries some countries from improving economies and living conditions and tackling illicit drug flows and cartels. The US-Mexico-Canada agreement review in twenty twenty-six will likely increase uncertainty in many Latin American countries especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the US. China, Russia and Iran are seeking to sustain economic, political and military engagement with Latin America. The ICSS's that China's demand for raw materials is likely to drive continued economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. The ICSS's that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military and technological power to increase its own regional positioning, global influence, and to fend off threats to their interests. While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi have enabled progress on areas where mutual interests align. The ICSS's that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains, in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring US and allied forces in the region, and to achieve their stated objective of having the capability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the ICSS is that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict. An increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally. Its weapons of mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities, and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to the US and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing, and in twenty twenty five Kim took steps to improve ties with China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. The ICSS's that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has increased North Korean capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience in twenty-first century warfare, along with equipment. Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including missiles that can evade US and regional missile defenses. Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge US interests globally by military and non-military means. The ICSS's that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the US is an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict, such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including the deployment of nuclear weapons. The ICSS's that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the U. S. homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons. The ICSS's Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles and undersea capabilities, designed to negate U. S. military advantage. Russia is also building extensive counter space capabilities to contest US space dominance. Its development of a nuclear counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture. During the past year, the ICSS says that Russia has maintained the upper hand in its war against Ukraine. Ongoing US-led negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv continue. Until such an agreement is met, if an agreement is found, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition until they view their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, political and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. The ICSS says that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region that began with Hamas's attack on Israel on October seventh, twenty twenty three, continued with the Twelve Day War last year, resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies. The IC assesses that the regime in Iran appears to be intact, but largely gr- largely degraded due to attacks by Israel and the US on its leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, leaving limited options. Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded. The US-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions added additional pressure, to an already bleak Iranian economy, resulting in mass protests earlier this year that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, internal tensions are likely to increase as Iran's economy worsens. Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack US and allied interests in the Middle East. If a hostile regime survives, it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military missiles and UAV forces. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the IC assesses Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the twelve day war. Iran maintained the intention to rebuild its infrastructure and nuclear enrichment capability, and continued to refuse to comply with its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, refusing them access to key facilities. The IC assesses that China, Russia, Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. Iran has long viewed the US as an adversary and has engaged in active conflict with the US as of this writing. These four countries are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to US interests more broadly. However, these curr- currently these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, divergent sovereign interests, and in some cases concerns over directly confronting the US. These factors are likely to constrain their relationships. Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through twenty twenty-six due to poor governance economic demands and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which could rapidly accelerate to conflict. Contentious national and federal elections in Somalia, could distract the federal government away from counterterrorism actions against al-Shabaab, which continues to s- conduct terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. The civil war in Sudan continues even as external negotiations occur, and ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of their attacks against local security forces expanding their areas of operation and moving closer to cities with the US presence. African governments will use their wealth and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put US and citizens at risk and cause further instability. In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, we remain committed to providing the president and policymakers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to ensure the safety, security and freedom of the American people. Thank you.

Thank you for your comments, Director Gabbard. We appreciate that. We'll now move to member questions, five minute increments. Uh, with that I recognize myself for five minutes. Um, Director Patel, our state and local officials are on the front lines of increasingly dangerous unrestricted warfare activities being undertaken by Chinese national such as marijuana grow operations protected by armed militants secret police stations engaged in transnational repression, Chinese operated SIM farm sites crypto mining facilities and land purchases near strategic locations. The CCP is exploiting legal gray areas and the lack of awareness at the state and local level to establish strategic footholds. Uh, two states, in fact, New Hampshire and Florida, are now advancing legislation to establish offices of counterintelligence, which would bolster uh state's ability to confront foreign adversaries without relying on the federal government. Um, do you support that, what can be done to uh better support the states and local s- local officials?

Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, we have um infused um uh funding into our entire entire program taking on the CCP. And while we are well versed in the fact that we have our capabilities with uh folks like CFIUS when it comes to the purchases of land around military bases, that only extends one mile under the current law, so the FBI had to get creative. So what we did was directly engage with our state and local partners. And I'll give you two examples. Uh, a four hundred acre farm in the state of Texas was owned by a C. official. But because he was outside the reach of the CFIUS law, the FBI uh executed a unlawful possession of firearms, uh a criminal complaint and r- received it. We seized the land in in its entirety and that C- CCP National is back in mainland China and we are working to get them back here. In another example off the coast of Louisiana, we worked with Governor Landry's team on um drilling sites off the coast of Louisiana because again they were outside the whole of CFIUS in the one mile radius. And with the intelligence we were able to provide our state and local authorities, they shut down that CCP uh drilling center, which we believed was actually used to provide and steal data and intelligence from American lives. So that's just a little bit of an example. On the marijuana grow houses, we have six active ongoing investigations in six multiple jurisdictions for specifically taking down CCP avai- affiliated grow houses from Maine to Georgia and across the country.

So it sounds like uh from your characterization of CFIUS it's inadequate at this point. Maybe we could do something legislatively here in this body to provide some uh broader authority to address that challenge.

I would love that.

OK, great, excellent, thank you. Director Ratcliffe in January of twenty twenty one um in your role at DNI as the director you sent this committee a letter outlining your concerns about an intelligence community assessment in which among other things analysts tailored their uh analysis towards a preferred policy outcome CIA management pressured analysts to withdraw their support from an alternative viewpoint and the full body of intelligence reporting wasn't considered Now in your role as CIA director, you have retracted several reports for political bias and not meeting IC analytic standards, which that's good progress. Retracting faulty reporting is a critical step, but I remain concerned about that it maybe doesn't get to the root of the problem. How many analysts were involved in the products you recently retracted?

I don't know the specific number, Chairman.

Um, um, what remediation actions have taken place as a result?

Well, uh, I've made the focus of, uh, as you as you pointed out it mmm mmm both as DNI and now as CIA director focused on um, the importance of uh, analytic objectivity uh, as you, as you pointed out when I was the, when I was the DNI when I saw um, a conduct from Russia and China, the exact same conduct result in different assessments, uh, that's not a good reflection on the uh, the analytic judgments. Um, uh, what you referenced in my role as CIA uh, withdrawing reports that we went back and looked that, that didn't reflect, uh, the analytic standards that we would expect. Um, I retracted those, uh, judgments because they, they show bias and, and influence for political reasons or otherwise. So, that has continued to be a focus and, and will be. Um, I think that that message has been received within our analytic, uh, community within the CIA and really across the, the CIA because this administration has put a focus on, taking politics out of our uh analytic judgments.

Excellent. Thank you, Director. Appreciate that. I wa- I wanna um, as I made clear in my opening statement, I'm just I'm trying to get this done in the little time that I have remaining, uh, uh, the intelligence community assessment on AHI is deeply flawed and - and I've called for its recall immediately to start for a - for a fresh start, similar to my quest- my question in last year's session, but w- um, I'd like to get a yes or no answer from each of you on whether you agree this ICA should be retracted. Director Gabbard.

Yes.

Director Ratcliff.

The the IC the s say it again, the question point.

The AHI ICA?

Yeah, so uh for the ICA I understand that Director Gabbard is um is is reviewing that, and I've deferred uh all AHI investigations to to her review, so if in her judgment that is something that should be retracted, then um then uh then I would agree with that.

Then yes. OK, Director Patel.

Yes.

Thank you, uh uh General Hartman

Yes.

and General Adams.

Yes, sir.

Thank you, I appreciate that. Thank you all for your um for your responses. I'm gonna recognize the ranking member for five minutes.

Uh, thank you, Chairman. Um, Director Gabbard, as was well covered yesterday in January, you were present at the execution of an FBI warrant at the Fulton County Georgia election office, uh, at the direction of the president and to all appearances and connection with the president's false claims about the twenty twenty election. The unsealed affidavit submitted by the FBI made zero reference to foreign powers or outside interference. I don't want to relitigate the reasons why you were there, but I do want to know whether as a result of your visit there is credible intelligence in your possession pointing to foreign interference in Georgia, in the twenty twenty election.

Uh, thank you for the question, uh, ranking member. Um, as you know, over each of the previous elections, there is an ongoing effort by different foreign entities to try to inter interfere

Ma'am, it's a very specific question. It's a,

in our elections.

is there intelligence in your possession relative to foreign interference in the twenty twenty elections? Very simple, straightforward question.

We are continuing to look at previous attempts to interfere in our elections and any ongoing threats that may exist for the upcoming elections.

OK, but can I assume that the answer to the qu- my question is no, that you have no

The the um we are continuing to look into this matter.

OK. Um Uh, Director, the ODNI has confirmed on the record uh that your office took custody of voting machines from Puerto Rico last May. I'm not aware of any previous DNI taking similar actions. Did your office promptly notify the committee about taking custody of Puerto Rico's voting machines?

Uh, I don't believe we did. However, this was done at the request of uh the Puerto Rico AUSA attorney and in conjunction with the FBI.

Yeah, I mean it's a yes or no question, the answer as you have it acknowledges no, you did not inform the committee about the taking of a territory's voting machines. Is there a specific foreign threat? And I've read the reporting that you were looking for possible foreign threats, but is there a specific foreign threat that drove you to take this action?

There were questions about whether or not there were vulnerabilities that a threat could have taken advantage of, and that was the purpose for, they're requesting us to look into those vulnerabilities.

Where where are those voting machines now?

Uh, I believe they are held in a secure facility at ODNI.

Have you or other ODNI officials taken any other state or territory's voting equipment into custody?

Not to my knowledge.

Um, I wanna turn, in the subject of elections, to a paradoxical thing. You will all be aware that the US government is apparently going to grind to a halt, uh the president is going to sign no more bills, the senate will spend two weeks uh apparently debating the save act, the save act of course would make illegal foreigners voting in US elections which is already illegal, so we are to do no more business because of apparently the existential threat to our democracy associated with foreigners voting in our elections. I am therefore puzzled by the fact that neither the unclassified nor the classified threat assessment makes any reference to risk or danger associated with foreigners voting in our elections. Director Patel, how many non-citizens have been convicted of voting in US elections in the last ten years?