25 Years After 9/11 - Reviewing the 9/11 Commission & Intelligence Reform Impacts (OPEN)

The select committee on intelligence will now come to order without objection. The committee may res recess at any point. The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony from a panel of expert witnesses to review the policy impacts of the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States in the twenty-five years since the nine eleven attacks. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Uh twenty-five years ago on September eleventh, our nation endured an unprecedented attack, leaving profound loss, devastation and confusion in its wake. All of us over a certain age remember clearly where we were on that day, and the overwhelming emotions we experienced. The images will forever be etched into our national memory. Not since Pearl Harbor sixty years prior had an attack like this shocked the collective American conscience. Americans wanted to know who did this, why did they do this, and how could this happen to the most powerful country in the world. In the aftermath of the nine eleven attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States was commissioned by Congress to answer those questions. The nine eleven commission subsequently published its findings in a report in July of two thousand four. In this report the commission offered a forty-one recommendations to address the existing security gaps that were exploited by Al Qaeda. As a result of the nine eleven commission's work, sweeping reforms to the intelligence community were adopted to combat the threats posed by radical Islamic terrorism. Perhaps most notably the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center were created by Congress as a result of the Commission's recommendations. Other recommendations were adopted in whole, uh some in part and others not at all. Twenty-five years after the nine eleven attacks, this committee is re-examining the Commission's final report to inform our decision-making about our national security policy priorities today. We have three primary objectives as we conduct our review. First, how effective were the nine eleven Commission's reforms? on our nation's intelligence enterprise and what areas require further attention. Second, how has the threat landscape evolved over the last twenty-five years? And last but certainly not least, what recommendations can we offer to address new and emerging threats that undermine the safety and security of the American people? As previously stated, the threat landscape has shifted dramatically. Consider the advancements in technology since nine eleven, in AI, quantum computing, drones, cyber and asymmetric warfare, bio-threats, the list goes on. On top of that we now live in the era of great power competition that presents significant national security challenges with China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. The reemergence of great power competition, combined with an age of rapid technological advancement has created an unprecedented threat environment. In the aftermath of the nine eleven attacks we learned a hard lesson that a failure of imagination paired with a reactive defensive national security posture was insufficient to combat the emerging threat of terrorism. As then CIA Director Tenant said at the time, the system was blinking red, but the proper national security measures weren't in blend to uh in time to thwart the terrorist plot. We find ourselves in a similar blinking red situation today. To combat emerging threats in the dynamic world in which we live, we must have a proactive and offensive strategy. We must be prepared and forward-looking about the threats we face. Today we kick off our efforts to learn from the policy failures of the past in order to safeguard our nation from new and emerging threats. We are fortunate to hear from three witnesses with deep expertise across intelligence, counterterrorism, homeland security, and national security law. The Honorable John Pistole served as uh Deputy Director of the FBI during a critical period of post-Nine eleven reform and later, led the Transportation Security Administration where he saw oversaw major aviation security initiatives including TSA PreCheck. Doctor Bruce Hoffman is one of the nation's foremost experts on terrorism and counterterrorism. His decades of scholarship and service, including on FBI nine eleven review commission provided important perspective on how the threat landscape has evolved since the original nine eleven commission report. Mister Jamil Jaffer brings extensive experience in national security law, intelligence policy, cyber issues and congressional oversight, including prior service on this committee and in the White House. Together these witnesses will help the committee assess what reforms have worked, where gaps remain and how the United States should adapt to today's emerging threats. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and examine the nine eleven commission report. and the profound impact it's had on our national security policies and the intelligence community. Your perspectives and insight will prove invaluable for the work of this committee. I now wanna recognize ranking member and gentleman from uh Kinetic Mr. Himes for his opening statement.

Thank you Chairman Crawford and thank you to our briefers for being with us today in our first public event as part of our bipartisan review of the nine eleven commission report recommendations led by Representative Stefanek and Representative Gottheimer. Almost a quarter of a century ago we experienced the worst terrorist attack on in US history, killing nearly three thousand Americans. Over a hundred and sixty residents of Connecticut were killed in the attacks, many of them from my district. I happened to be in lower Manhattan that day and I remember the horror and the terror uh that permeated the environment as well as the heroism of the first responders, so many of whom lost their lives. I also remember the remarkable feeling of unity. that spanned this country for some period of time afterwards. There really is no more important task for the intelligence community, as well as the intelligence committees, than making sur- certain that we are doing everything we can to prevent such attacks on Americans. The IC, of course, is the first line of defense in counterterrorism. Two decades ago the bipartisan nine eleven commission established by Congress to investigate why we were unable to identify and stop the nine eleven plot before the attack outlined just how important the IC's role is. The commission identified critical failures in intelligence processes that prevented any one agency or analyst from having all the pieces of the puzzle that may have allowed them to identify the plot. The lack of information sharing across agencies was a key problem for uh identified by the commission and it remains a priority today. The commission also highlighted how important it is that we have a team of serious, non-political, deeply expert people looking at this threat who are able and willing to provide insights to senior policy makers even when those insights may be unwelcome or uncomfortable. It is vital that the intelligence community is able to play that role and not be a part of the political partisan morass. The commission also issued a number of recommendations to strengthen the IC, including creating the office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center. Today we'll have a chance to hear from three national security experts who have been tracking these issues for many years. our witnesses have deep knowledge of how the US national security apparatus developed after nine eleven, areas where the IC and the US government more broadly can continue to improve, and the nature of the terrorist threat that the US faces today. With changes across the terrorist landscape, including a decentralized threat from scores of offshoot groups and rising lone wolf radicalization, coupled with novel threats we couldn't have imagined two decades ago, like the potential for terrorists to leverage the advances of AI

I thank the gentlemen. I now recognize the distinguished Chairwoman of the hipsies nine eleven commission review task force, Congresswoman Elise Stefanik for an opening statement.

Thank you to Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes and my co-chair Congressman Josh Gottheimer for working to convene today's vitally important hearing. This is our fifth hearing or brief as a part of this commission which have been conducted in the classified and now today in the unclassified setting. Twenty five years ago, our nation endured the September eleventh terrorist attacks that forever changed the course of American history. In the aftermath of nine eleven, it became clear that our national security and intelligence architecture needed to evolve to meet a rapidly changing threat landscape. The reforms that followed strengthened coordination, intelligence sharing, and our ability to detect and disrupt threats on our homeland. Today's hearing is an opportunity to examine those reforms, assess what has worked, identify areas that require modernization, and ensure we continue adapting to emerging threats of today and the future. The purpose of this commission is to review the effectiveness of the reforms that emerged from the nine eleven commission report, and to evaluate whether our intelligence and national security institutions are fully equipped to address today's challenges and tomorrow's threats. The world has changed dramatically over the past twenty five years. One reality however remains constant. America continues to face determined adversaries who seek to exploit vulnerabilities and undermine our national security. And we are now confronting a rapidly evolving threat environment that includes advanced drone technologies, foreign malign influence operations, cyber attacks, bio-threats, and artificial intelligence developments with profound national security and Congress has responsibility to confront these issues directly. We must ensure that our national security and intelligence institutions remain fr agile, forward-looking, and prepared to stay ahead of the evolving threat landscape before our adversaries can exploit gaps. Today we are joined by a panel of witnesses who played significant roles in strengthening our intelligence community and national security framework, in the years following nine eleven. Thank you for being here today. I look forward to your testimony and to a thoughtful discussion on how we continue how we must continue to protect the American people in an increasingly complex threat environment. I yield back.

Thank the gentlewoman and it's now my privilege to recognize the ranking member of the HPSIS nine eleven commission review task force Congressman, Josh Gottheimer for an opening statement.

Thank you Chairman Crawford, ranking member Himes, and Co-Chair Stephanec for your leadership. Thank you to our witnesses for being here with us this morning. September eleventh was one of the darkest days in our nation's history, and we all share a solemn responsibility to honor the victims and their families, many of whom, many of the victims continue to suffer from nine eleven mil illnesses today. We have to do everything possible to make sure an attack like that never happens again. I think many of us remember exactly where we were when the towers were struck. On that awful day, my home state of New Jersey lost seven hundred and fifty of our own. including many in my district, the second most of any state. Today's briefing marks our first public event as part of this bipartisan review of the nine eleven commission report as uh Chairman Stefanik mentioned we've had many other hearings in a classified setting we're taking a hard look at where the commission's recommendations succeeded where gaps remain, how the threat landscape has evolved and what our intelligence community and broader national security apparatus needs to confront the threats of today and tomorrow. We're grateful to hear from leading national and counterterrorism experts about the current state of the intelligence community and our broader counterterrorism efforts. The world has changed dramatically over the past twenty-five years. The question of course for all of us is, are we prepared today, uh there were gaps then, are there gaps now? Terrorist organizations and lone actors now have access to more sophisticated technology more advanced weaponry and global on-line platforms that allow them to spread hate and radicalize individuals from half-way around the world without ever crossing a border. We continue to see the persin- persistent threat here at home. Earlier this year we saw multiple terrorist related plots and attacks, including a bombing attempt in New York City and an anti-semitic vehicle ramming attack to Temple Israel in Michigan while one hundred and forty preschoolers were inside. At the same time entirely new threats have emerged from cyber attacks targeting our critical infrastructure to bioterrorism to the growing misuse of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies by our adversaries. That's why this review matter so much. We need to ensure our intelligence community has the tools, technology, coordination, and authorities necessary to stay ahead of evolving threats while protecting the freedoms and values that define us as Americans. We look forward to hearing your perspectives on the current threat environment where our vulnerabilities remain and what more Congress and the administration can do to strengthen our national security posture and keep the American people safe. We're very grateful for your time today. I wanna again thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for affording this committee the opportunity to for an in-depth uh real analysis on on the report. Thank you so much.

Thank you gentlemen, and again I wanna welcome our witnesses today. I'm I'm pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very important topic. I ask that our witnesses now please rise, raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you'll give before the Permanent Select Committee on the Intelligence of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth the whole truth?

Thank you Chairman Craw Crawford and Ranking Member Hines and the distinguished co-chairs of this initiative and the rest of the distinguished members of this committee. In my past life with almost twenty-seven years with the FBI and then Uh I I had the opportunity to testify for this committee almost always in closed sessions so this is an um an unusual opportunity and I thank you for that and then of obviously my time at TSA um that other opportunities to to testify in different committees in looking at the nine eleven commission which I testified in front of three times the the two takeaways that I think everybody is aware of which really impacted the FBI and I think the US government as it looked at how we could best not only identify put uh potential attacks, but mediate uh uh and uh and mitigate, and then prevent if need be, and then respond to if need be, was that they f found that the US government had a failure of imagination, that phrase, a failure of imagination. How is it that we did not envision such an attack as the nineteen hijackers on nine eleven? And then what they said was needed was a quote " unity of effort". And so that unity of effort was unfortunately sorely lacking on nine eleven. Again, I I had been in the FBI for eighteen years when nine eleven happened, and it was something that the FBI frankly was not focused on in terms of f foreign terrorists coming to the US and doing things such as hijacking planes and using them as as weapons as in missiles and so what stemmed from that a number of executive orders from President Bush and then the joint inquiry between This committee and the select uh committee the Senate s committee on intelligence, CICI, uh which published a report in December of O two, just uh l fifteen months later, which predated the nine eleven commission's excellent work, really set the stage for what should the government be doing, and it wasn't like the FBI or the agency or NSA or any other components were waiting for things to happen uh so it there was much being done behind the scenes. I'll summarize the rest of my statement by saying the nine eleven commission recommendations were thorough and they were accurate and they were timely. And so the e the changes that we made in the FBI um when I became the Deputy Director in in the s fall of two thousand four a senior career position uh working with Director Mueller was a matter of how do we best position ourselves for not only the collection of intelligence based on the new DNI, the Director of National Intelligence as it was referenced, but how do we analyse that and share that on a timely basis and then action that as appropriate here in the homeland. So those steps, those recommendations that have been made uh that were made uh w were timely, and I believe that we are better served today than what we were then. That being said, the the threat serves are still out there and the risks are high, and so for example the creation of TSA is one of those steps that would prevent another nine eleven from happening, but what other s steps uh or or threats are out there that so have been referenced in some of your um opening remarks. So with that, I'll yield back my time. Thank you, Miss Chairman.

I thank the gentleman and I recognize Doctor Bruce Hoffman for five minutes.

Uh thank you Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, distinguished Co-Chairs and Committee members. I am immensely honored and humbled to testify before this committee. not least since I appeared before the committee twenty-five years ago, just two weeks after the nine eleven attacks, and when I then also provided testimony on the subject of counterterrorism policy, threats and intelligence reform. First, let me state the obvious, the United States has not experienced another major terrorist attack like nine eleven, nor anything even close. This is a towering achievement. During the dark and fearful days following nine eleven, and the early years of the war on terror, such a result was then a matter of faith and hope, and was far from certain. It is proof how important the nine eleven commission's recommendations in two thousand and four intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act, have been in keeping our country safe from another massive terrorist attack. But today the superstructure of the security architecture that emerged is either fraying, being dismantled, or falling into disrepair. We are losing the expertise, knowledge and institutional memory assembled over the past twenty five years. In terms of the reorganization of the USIC that followed the nine eleven attacks, the criticisms of and concerns about the ODNI are both long-standing and well-known. On the tenth anniversary of the nine eleven attacks, the nine eleven commission's co-chairs expressed dismay that the DNI was still not, and I'm quoting, the driving force for intelligence community integration, that the commission had envisioned. And they also noted that the DNI's role over budget and personnel remained lamentably ambiguous. These concerns have arguably not abated. The NCTC with its narrower narrower remit is perhaps more easily assessed. At the time of its creation, the preeminent threat to Americans came from abroad. Today the threat is as much domestic as it remains foreign, with the line between what were once two separate and distinct phenomena having eroded. Yet the principal agency responsible for the analysis and synthesis of terrorist threats and implementation of coordinated counterterrorism strategic operations is legally barred from taking action to counter domestic terrorism. This seems a dangerous anachronism. More than a decade has passed since the review that I co-led, which assessed the FBI's transformation from a law enforcement agency, to one with enhanced intelligence and counterterrorism missions. Our basic conclusion was positive. The FBI we found had made measurable progress between two thousand and four and twenty fourteen in developing end-to-end intelligence capabilities and significantly improving information sharing and collaboration with partners, both at home and abroad. The FBI's evolution in this regard we found had continued to protect the homeland against another catastrophic terrorist attack. But the report also identified areas of improvement. Foremost among these was in human intelligence, which the commission concluded had not kept pace with other significant advances in law enforce in the law enforcement dimension of counterterrorism. Hand in glove with improved human capabilities, the report had argued, were related training opportunities. In this respect, the commission had cited the FBI's expansion of new age and training from sixteen weeks to twenty-one weeks, per the nine eleven commission's recommendations. Recent open source reports however, recent reports however, that the duration of new agent training has returned to the original sixteen week time frame, inevitably raises questions about whether the national security branch and specifically intelligent skills training was reduced or perhaps even eliminated and how the shorter training period may have affected acquisition of this enhanced and critical accompanied skills. The commission was also concerned about the FBI's analytical cadre. We concluded that the FBI still needed to professionalize this key dimension of its intelligence operations and responsibilities. The effective integration of analysts with agents in the field we found had then yet to be achieved. More than a quarter of a century has passed since nineteen terrorists hijacked four passenger aircraft and changed the course of history. Every US president since nine eleven has declared victory over Al-Qaeda or ISIS. But as General James Mattis, then Commander of the US Central Command, famously cautioned in twenty thirteen, and I quote, "No war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it is over, we may declare it is over, but in fact the enemy gets a vote." Close quote. And America's enemies have incontrovertibly chosen to continue this war, regardless of our declarations, plaka

Thank you, Doctor Hoffman. Um uh, Mister Jeffery, I'm glad you're here, I understand you had some difficulty uh on your way. I'm glad you're safe. Uh, before I recognize you, I'm just gonna ask

Well thank you, Mister Chairman, uh and and thank you to you and the ranking member, Mister Himes, uh Chairwoman Stephannik and ranking member Gottheimer,

Mm.

uh for your leadership in holding a bipartisan review of the nine eleven commission's recommendations. I apologize that uh traffic on three ninety five delayed me in getting here, uh but I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee. The reality, Mister Chairman and Chairman Stefanik and ranking members is that the threat to America remains massive. Al Qaeda and ISIS together number thirty to fifty thousand fighters worldwide. ISIS in Khorasan has demonstrated the ability to operate outside of its region against Western interests across the board. We've seen attacks by Iraqi Shia groups. We've seen attacks by Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, you name it, every terrorist group out there in the world today that wants to come after Americans and our allies, remains active, remains aggressive. As if that weren't enough, China remains a ongoing threat to the United States, both here in the homeland and abroad. They operate against their own people in the United States. They employ students, temporary workers. and cyber operations to come after our businesses and our nation's security. Russia is no slacker itself. Iran remains aggressive and in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury, Midnight Hammer, and Project Freedom, remains committed to attacking America both abroad and in the homeland. And North Korea, of course, has ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear weapons that can now reach the West Coast and perhaps further into the American homeland. We are without a doubt at the highest state of threat our nation's ever faced, including and and not limited to the time before the nine eleven attacks. And yet, we may be taking our eye off the ball. How so? A simple example. Section seven O two, the single most valuable intelligence collection authority the US government has by every attorney general, every director of national intelligence, every vice president, president have had that authority, have said that publicly and in testimony for this committee and others. And yet, we engage in a political, an act of political brinksmanship every two to three to four years, where we renew that legislation and we come up right to the edge and potentially don't renew it. We've had times when it's gone out of out of operation, even though we have existing authorizations. We have seen the telecommunications providers and technology companies limit their cooperation in those times of gap. The idea today that we remain operating with a temporary authorization authority is a train wreck, a train wreck in this era of heightened threats. Congress ought to not only reauthorize section seven O two, it ought make it permanent, and it ought reject any effort to impose a warrant requirement on that authority and rebuild the very wall that the nine eleven commission advocated and that we did in fact, dismantle over the last twenty plus years. Beyond section O seven O two, there are a number of other things that we ought do to help protect our nation in this era of great threat. We need to get on the offense, not just against terrorists, but against counter-intelligence threats here in the homeland, to include but not limit it to China and Russia. We need to get on the offense on collection. We need to expand our collection authorities, not limit them. We ought to consider the potential for the need to address the hot pursuit problem, where terrorists and other foreign intelligence threats overseas are being collected upon. They arrive in the United States, we immediately have to go down on coverage and aren't able to restore that coverage rapidly. There are emergency authorization uh a a authorities available under existing FISA. They're ineffectual and don't work. We need better authorities there. We need to up our game on counterintelligence here at home. I know the committee is looking at this issue and the chairman that you've been leading on this effort. We ought to consider it operations center to help the FBI do a better job and interact more effectively with the with the with the larger inter-agency community. And we ought to take advantage of the revolution in artificial intelligence. The intelligence community is best posed with its compute and data collection capabilities to take real advantage of artificial intelligence, but there are concerns and legitimate concerns about privacy and civil liberties. We ought not let those concerns get in the way of using this technology to our advantage to advance our national security. The intelligence community has terabytes and thousands and thousands of paper files of data going back decades that can be consolidated, reviewed, and assessed using its artificial intelligence, And, but to work, we can use compartmented information, provide insights at a lower classification level through the power of artificial intelligence and the compute the IC has. And finally, this committee in Congress oughta take seriously the recommendation made by the nine eleven commission over two decades ago, arguing that our appropriation system when it comes to intelligence is broken. There are a variety ways you might consider it. There's ideas about a joint committee, ideas about combining authorizations and appropriations. All those are hard, I know. um in Congress at the same time there are things that ought to be taken seriously, and consideration ought be given at a minimum to create an intelligence appropriation subcommittee within the House and Senate Appropriations Committee. With that I thank the Chairman and and the ranking member and and the members of the committee for their time and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Jeffra, I appreciate your uh input. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their five minutes of questioning and additional round of questioning may be called for after all members have been recognized I now recognize myself for five minutes. Um I wanna get to this topic and I think all of y'all have sorta touched on it, but how has the counter-intelligence threat changed since nine eleven? That's for any of the three that wanna comment.

The the short answer is the s counter-intelligence CI threat has become more pervasive and more systemic, given the rise of uh players around the world and as you mentioned, Miss Chairman, the the use of uh AI and the the things that uh machine learning, the things the tools that are available to the counter-intelligence players make it uh much more challenging for us on defense uh unless we can do more offensive actions, which is a different equation. So the short answer is it's more pervasive, more systemic, and more challenging for all of us.

Thank you. Any any further comment on that?

Well uh thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh As I said in my uh oral testimony, twenty five years ago the threat terrorist threats the United States faced were primarily foreign now they've also bled into domestic and they've they've blended together. So that's one dimension that I think has changed, is that we're asking the intelligence community and law enforcement to cover a much wider remit than they had twenty five years ago. Secondly I think is a problem of that Professor Joffe referred to the franchises of the main terrorist organizations. Twenty five years ago the main threat was from Now we face threats from Al-Qaeda, ISIS, but more importantly their franchises, and Professor Joffrey had mentioned ISIS-K. ISIS-K in a very short period of time went from being able to operate in Afghanistan to operate in Turkey in Iran in Russia, and in the United States of course on New Year's Day twenty twenty five. So that's another problem. And then it's just the information overload that we see from activities where local terrorist groups

Mister Chairman,

Okay.

just very short, very quickly, um we've seen the mayor of Arcadia arrested for being Arcadia California for being a Chinese spy. We've seen a Harvard professor not only indicted by the Department of Justice for for working with China, but having gone to China and actually established a operation there now, operating out of China. The Chinese government is a aggressively operating in this country in ways that are hard to determine, hard to assess. The IC has gotta get on top of that. We have to give them more resources and more capabilities. And the Russians remain extremely active. CI is probably, if not the number one threat today, number two to our country.

So are our, you think our current CI efforts are too reactive, focused on individual cases rather than strategic campaigns by foreign governments?

I think that's exactly right. We need a larger operational strategic plan against these threats, particularly China. You know, we had a, we had an operation that we were working really effectively in the first Trump administration at the Justice Department. Unfortunately, that got wound down in the Biden administration. It hasn't really been effectively re-established in the current Trump administration, I think in part because we're trying to do deals with China. That's a mistake. We need to get on top of that, your uh, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask you this. So, uh, in in the post-nine eleven environment, um, as all of you have indicated, the threat landscape has evolved significantly. Um, how do we improve coordination? And I'm thinking about how we integrate other agencies, other departments within uh d into the IC, for example, departments of agriculture, commerce, transportation, et cetera, how we adopt more of a whole of government approach as it applies to our counterterrorism counter-ISR uh our our uh counterintelligence threats and I'd welcome comments from all three of you on that.

Well, it's a a great question and challenge, Mister Chairman, in terms of incorporating those who those departments and agencies that aren't dealing in in the IC world don't have clearances, what how do you protect sources and methods to make sure they have the information that is again timely and actionable? For example, you mentioned the Department of Agriculture, if there is a threat by a foreign actor to do something uh against our agricultural infrastructure, how is that best actioned? And so that's one of the challenges in terms of information sharing and then actioning that. So it's a deep question with lots of responses.

So, you know, for me it's it's not about you know, splitting hairs about title fifty authority, it's about subject matter expertise. And those that subject matter expertise resides in those agencies, but they don't have the connective tissue to the IC. Does that make sense?

Yes, it does, and that's exactly what we experienced at the FBI on uh prior to nine eleven, and then uh afterwards trying to deal with that.

Anyb anyb Doctor Hoffman.

I would I would agree with everything that Mister Pistole said, but the one thing that I would add that I think is absolutely critical is improving integration and coordination with state, local and tribal authorities, because terrorism has become local. On New Year's Eve in twenty twenty five we had an individual radicalized in Texas who then travels to New Orleans. And I think this underscores how we have to be entirely confident that the whole process not just that there's integration at the federal level but at the state, local and tribal as well.

If I may, Mister Chairman,

Sure.

the one thing I think that we could do that m that probably most effective is to give security clearances to folks in those agencies and allow them to understand the full nature and scope of the threats. And to give security clearance, a lot more security clearance to our state and local partners, to our partners in the private sector. We've been talking for years about the threats to American industry, about the threats to state and locals, about the threats to our agricultural system, whether it's Chinese farmland threats or biosecurity threats. Yet, a handful of people have TSSCI clearances in those departments, in industry. We need to get out to scale, give them the information, and gather from them the information, use them as our assets in the field to understand and really really address these threats. We've never been really good at that when it comes to the IC. We've talked a lot about it. We've never really actioned that idea.

Excellent. Thank you. Uh, Rankin, remember Hybes.

Thank you, Chairman. Um, I've got a bunch of questions, so I'm gonna ask for fairly quick answers. Doctor Hoffman, this one starts with you. You know, I look at the defense that we played in the last twenty-five years and it's worked pretty well that's indicated in the number of terrorist attacks that have been stopped, our ability to reach out and touch terrorist groups around the world. What really troubles me is that um if you compare uh the threat it is much more numerous in many many more places, the Sahel, across to Indonesia, here domestic violence, uh it's uh uh uh domestically uh e- uh extremes here. So my question um, Doctor Hoffman, if we really wanted to be serious about reducing the supply of terrorism out there, that is to say um uh c- compromising the ideology which seems to be attractive to people, doing more to stop the supply, what would we do?

Well, you know, the architecture we had to wage the war of ideas, which is after all President Bush defined the war on terror would be in part a war of on ideas was always in my view incomplete, and that's because there's no clear metrics. When you kill or capture a terrorist you can tick off a box. It's very hard to ever discern if we've changed a man's or a woman's attitudes, if we've re-engineered their uh their drift towards uh extremism. So it's always been hard to achieve, but I would say in the diminution of what's perceived to be the terrorist threat, 'cause we haven't had a major attack, that a lot of the focus on let's say the soft power dimensions of counter-terror terrorism have also eroded and our information capability, our public diplomacy capabilities have also been scaled back, I think, in a way that is not helpful to addressing precisely your question.

So so give us some specific examples. Soft power is a very abstract term. What what is a specific thing that

Well Well, we've never really tried, but, and as I said it's very difficult to mention, but certainly activities of the what was the United States Information Agency, it was so powerful during the Cold War, for example. Um, activities of a US agency for international development that provide a view of the United States strengthening the world. strengthening communities throughout the world in a non-kinetic fashion, um Radio Free Liberty, Radio Europe, um various um newspapers and um radio and television that also c actively counter and combat the narrative that is entrenched and continues to be peddled by terrorist organizations and uh

So I hear you say that here approaching the twenty-fifth anniversary of nine eleven that the dismantlement of USAID and the dismantlement of

In my opinion, yes.

Thank you. Second question, this is for a for for anybody. Um, one of the most controversial topics on this committee and and and in this institution is uh uh the ODNI. So, very quickly, 'cause I don't have a ton of time, I'd just love to hear from all three of you. What is the ODNI doing really well and that we need to preserve, and what could it be doing a lot better and we should focus on? Mister Jeffery, let me start with you.

Well, I think what the ODNA has done well is it's really brought the community together. Uh, what it really needs to do better is really consolidate programs, budget authorities and the like, really do its knitting. Uh, the ODNA has gotten way bigger than I think we ever exp expected it to be. I think narrowing it down, focusing it on a couple of things, budget, authorities, integration, those should be its core rather than all the other things it's got its hands in.

Do you have a specific example of something that it's doing that we should stop it from doing? You said all the other things that had an end to it.

I I think I think in in large part ODNI has outgrown its size. The it's it's it's become very large relative to what I think its mission oughta be. Um, let me think about, let me come if you come back to me in a minute about what programs it might we might ought uh neck down I'll come up with a couple ideas but in in in writ large, it's a very large bureaucratic institution. It doesn't need to be that. It oughta be a tiger team, smaller, tighter, more focused on integration.

Okay, I I appreciate that, what you're suggesting without identifying units or functions, it's just we should just cut uh every unit there by ten percent. So do think about it. I won't.

So

Doctor Hoffman?

Uh I would agree with uh mis with Professor Jaffer that the ODNI has gotten much larger than it was ever int intended to be. I mean it it's hard for me, I haven't had security clearances now in six years, it's hard for me to discern what the value added nowadays is by the ODNI. It seems that the director of centru the central intelligence agency, my view is the driving force behind counterterrorism policy and operations.

And I would j-

I would just add that I think it was a great idea to institutionalize the uh different aspects of the IC, especially as it relates to the collection and analysis and then uh collection requirements for the e- each of the different agencies. For the last six or seven years I've been on the board of visitors for the National Intelligence University which is now being uh merged into the National Defense University there are some pros and cons of that. but I think I agree with my my colleagues that it is probably outgrown, its usefulness in terms of the size and should be streamlined to focus on those key aspects that will help identify and prevent terrorist attacks from happening in the homeland.

Thank you. Um, I'm out of time, but I I would like to follow up on this issue. I think there is an emerging consensus that is not a lot more specific than what we heard today but that that is an institution that is both critical and in need of reform and right-sizing and I think that's something we're gonna wanna follow up on. Thank you. Uh, yield back.

I thank the Ranking Member and I recognize the Distinguished Chairwoman, Miss Stephane.

Thank you, Chairman Crawford. Mister Pistol, in your opening statement you talked about one of the thematic findings of the initial nine eleven commission was this failure of imagination. When I take a step back and think about this technological sea change that we have undergone over the past twenty five years whether it's AI, quantum, cyber, drones, or this, that needs to be addressed. How can we address these emerging

Thank you for the question, and I think you've uh hit it right on the head um, uh Madam Chair, uh Cong- Congresswoman. And it really gets to that unity of effort issue that I uh that the nine eleven i uh addressed. But the nine eleven commission was focused on unity of effort within the US government. I think it's much more broad than that. It's a public-private partnership in a way that our high-tech companies, especially those who are investing billions in in AI and and all these different things, how can we best leverage what they are doing that we are not doing in the US government to make sure that there are no gaps that there are there's not a failure of imagination to say okay have you considered this and what about this opportunity that could be exploited you know on on j just uh zero day exploits and things things that have happened that we could anticipate uh like we did not do on nine eleven.

Mister Jaffer,

Yeah, uh, Chairwoman, and I think I think you're exactly right that there is a potential threat that non-state actors uh adversaries who don't have capability today will advance their capabilities using AI. There's no doubt that AI has the ability to up-level all, including threat actors to the United States. That's actually all the more reason why we need to use it more effectively and and as effectively as possible. The the reality is that we are going to technological advance is gonna benefit the d the offense as much as it's gonna benefit the defense. If we don't take advantage of it now, we'll fail. We have more capabilities. We have every leading AI company essentially in the world is here in the United States. every leading technology company is here in the United States. We have the ability to take that technology advantage and put it to use for us. The problem is we allow disagreements over politics, disagreements over um which technology is better than the other, to prevent us from using that technology and and fear about how to use that technology and whether it'll work in our classified systems and whether we can use it with compartmented information or not we need to get past that and move down the road um and I do think there's an opportunity here for us to take advantage of that in particular uh taking large amounts of information and necking it down and being able to identify threats in real time. Um on your question about um uh remind me of the question that that you asked Mr. Bissell I apologize.