States on the Frontlines of Counterintelligence

Thank you all for your tolerance of my tardiness. I appreciate it. Good afternoon everyone. I call the committee to order. Without objection, the chair made it clear we'll committee in recess at any time. Before we begin today's hearing, I would like to provide a few important reminders. First, today's hearing is being broadcast live on the committee's YouTube channel. This open hearing will be conducted entirely on an unclassified basis. All participants are reminded to refrain from discussing classified or other sensitive information protected from public disclosure. For this event, members will have five minutes with the witnesses. I would ask each of my colleagues to keep both your questions and witness answers within those allotted five minutes. Time permitting, we will conduct a second round and any remaining questions will be submitted for the record. Additionally, in the same manner in which the House Permanence like Committee on Intelligence has conducted itself in past hearings, I expect that we will continue to act in a bipartisan and I'm confident all members can treat each of our witnesses today with due respect consistent with past practice. Today's hearing is focused on understanding the counterintelligence fight facing our nation from the lens of the states. Today we examine the role of uh state fusion centers in supporting counterintelligence. Further, we'll also hear from our fellow state government officials on what they are doing to address expanding pervasive and entrenched foreign threats embedded across the whole of society it's my pleasure to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. President of the National Fusion Center Association and Northern California Regional Intelligence Director, Director Mike Sina. Director of the Alabama Fusion Center, Jane Mosley. Senator uh Elliot Bostar, Nebraska's twenty-ninth district from Lincoln. Representative Daniel Alvarez, Florida's sixty-ninth district, Hillsborough County. And Founder and CEO of State, Armour Michael Lucci. The People's Republic of China has embraced a whole of society's strategy that extends beyond traditional espionage. Beijing leverages legal investments, supply chains, research partnerships, cyber intrusions, influence operations, and economic coercion to position to position itself for advantage long before any traditional conflict ever begins. This is not limited to espionage. Its preparation of the environment and our homeland has become an increasingly contested domain. The scale is staggering. Former Director Ray testified that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was opening a new China-related counterintelligence case every twelve hours with over five thousand active CI cases nationwide, half of which were tied to the Chinese government. This also includes transnational repression reaching into our own communities. In two thousand twenty-three, the FBI arrested two men running a secret Chinese ministry of public security police station out of a Manhattan office,

Mm.

one of more than a hundred such outposts identified worldwide used to surveil and coerce dissidents living on American soil. The PRC is so emboldened and comfortable operating in the US that it established brick-and-mortar establishments to conduct repression of its critics within our borders. Iran and Russia, too, have escalated toward violence. Since two thousand twenty-two, the Justice Department has unsealed multiple state-sponsored assassination plots on US soil, including Iranian schemes to kill a presidential candidate and an Iranian American journalist and a Russian-linked attempt against a CIA informant. These are not espionage in the traditional sense, foreign intelligence services treating American streets as battle space. To win without firing a shot, the PRC for two decades has extended their penetration efforts beyond targeting Washington circles, endangering our states, our communities, and our universities, often gaining access to airspace and critical infrastructure. Much of this activity unfolds in the gray zone, below the threshold of armed conflict or even criminal activity. Put simply, often their activities are legal and deliberately structured that way. Adversaries cloak these efforts as commercial hybrid threats, shell investments, front companies, and seemingly ordinary transactions blending state intent with private cover. This is why we're holding this open hearing, a format not often available in the Intelligence Committee. I'm deeply concerned our next nine eleven level event has already been set in motion in the counterintelligence domain. Our adversaries have pre-positioned capabilities inside our critical infrastructure and telecommunications networks that could be activated at the time of their choosing. Campaigns like Volt Typhoon are not hypothetical, they are evidence of preparation happening today. The American people need greater awareness of these threats to freedom, security, and our way of life that the federal and state governments, the private sector, and the people are to effectively counter these threats. Our panelists are vital to this because the first indicators will rarely appear in Washington. They may surface in a co- a county zoning office, a university research partnership, a port authority, a sheriff's investigation of suspicious drone activity, or a fusion center connecting threads no single agency has seen alone. State, local, and tribal elements are indispensable partners. Our efforts must complement each other's to deny adversaries the permissive ambiguous operating environments they depend on. Last week I held the committee's fourth counterintelligence related round table discussing at the state level in Huntsville Alabama preceded by round table events in Florida Pennsylvania and Arkansas. These events are part of the committee's ongoing efforts to bring the US counterintelligence threat discussion to the state and local level. The federal government cannot solve it alone. Winning this fight requires a true national effort. I thank our witnesses for their service and look forward to their testimony. With that, I'd like to yield to the r- distinguished ranking member Mr. Himes for his opening statement.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and a big thank you to our witnesses for being here to share your expertise with us. In the same way that efforts to counter terrorism threats to the homeland are shared are the shared responsibility of the federal government, and state and local governments, efforts to identify and disrupt foreign intelligence threats to the United States must be a joint federal-state endeavor. with each partner bringing its unique understanding of the threat and its dis- distinct legal authorities to the fight. In a country as large and varied as ours, facing a complex array of intelligence threats from multiple countries, counterintelligence simply cannot be the exclusive province of the Department of Justice, the DHS, and in the intelligence community. The title of this hearing captures the fundamental reality that states truly operate on the front lines. Two of our Witnesses today represent state-operated, federally supported fusion centers, part of a nationwide network of eighty fusion centers that bring federal, state and local officials together to identify, share information about and disrupt threats. The writ of these centers, which were stood up after nine eleven, has since expanded beyond counterterrorism to cover counterintelligence. I hope our fusion center witnesses will describe with as much precision as possible in this unclassified setting the types of foreign intelligence threats they are observing in their jurisdictions, how they share information about those threats with the federal government and whether they are getting the federal support that you need, in the form of funding personnel and the timely passage of actionable intelligence. Two of our other witnesses today are state legislators who are leading actors on the counterintelligence stage. I hope they will describe the legislation they have filed or enacted to address foreign intelligence threats within their states and the lessons they have learned from that experience. Finally, I would ask all our witnesses to help us understand how they, and we, can strike the right balance between the need to protect the American people from genuine foreign intelligence threats, and the need to attract foreign direct investment to promote foreign trade and to encourage visits from international tourists, and above all to treat citizens, legal permanent residents, and visitors fairly regardless of their aneth- uh their ethnicity or national origin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

I thank the ranking member for his comments, and we are ready to move to witness statements. I ask that you keep your statements to under four minutes. And now, Mr. Sina, I'll start with you. You're recognized for four minutes.

Chairman Cro- Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, and members of the committee. Uh, thank thank you all for the opportunity to testify today on the counterintelligence threats facing our nation at the state and local level. My name is Mike Sena. I'm the president of the National Fusion Center Association and also the executive director for the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. and the Northern California high intensity drug trafficking area. Every day, over thirty-two hundred personnel across eighty fusion centers work with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to detect threats, analyze intelligence, and support investigations as well as coordinating operations. We support a nationwide architecture that provides analysis and information sharing that complements federal entities and information sharing partners, such as the FBI's Counter Intelligence Task Force, Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Homeland Security Task Forces, DHS's Office of Intelligent Analysis, real-time crime centers, high-intensity drug trafficking areas, and the Regional Information Sharing System. Fusion centers provide something that is irreplaceable, the ability to fuse local operational context with federal intelligence to ensure accurate information reaches the right people at the right time. The counterintelligence landscape has changed drastically. Foreign intelligence services, most pro- uh prominently the PRC, the People's Republic of China, along with Russia, Iran and others, and i- e- are increasingly targeting state and local governments, universities, critical infrastructure operators, and private industry. As a result, state and local partners are often uh the first to encounter indicators involving espionage, cyber activity, foreign influence, supply chain compromise, economic targeting. These threats are not theoretical. In California, a former Google engineer was recently convicted of epi- economic espionage, stealing proprietary AI technology uh for the PRC, making it the first conviction involving AI-related espionage. A former mayor in California uh admitted uh to secretly acting at the direction of the PRC spreading pop- propaganda and reporting back uh to the PRC on the activity and the outreach that that propaganda was doing. These cases underscore how foreign intelligence operators uh now actively exploit the gaps where federal visibility is limited. States are building their own counterintelligence capabilities because current federal information sharing mechanisms and classification barriers often prevent timely access to critical intelligence. Key DHS and FBI systems remain disconnected and cannot support real-time, multi-juris- jurisdictional CI threat coordination. Delays in security clearances, inconsistent grant funding, and insufficient access to federal systems reduce and impede operational readiness. These gaps require modernization. Despite these challenges, state and local partners are rapidly adapting. The NFCA's new counter intelligence subcommittee brings together more than a hundred and ten members from twenty-three s- uh states to coordinate CI threat reporting. shared analysis and training. Embedding additional DHS office intelligence analysis and FBI counterintelligence task force personnel can also significantly enhance coordination and information flow something I have seen firsthand during the San Francisco twenty twenty-three APEC summit, the twenty twenty-six Super Bowl, and currently during the FIFA World Cup games that we've been having in Santa Clara. Cyber and criminal networks are also increasingly blending with CI threats. from North Korean IT worker schemes, Chinese narcotics money laundering networks, to unauthorized drone activity over sensitive infrastructure. To strengthen uh our national CI posture, I I respectfully recommend establishing a national CI information sharing framework, that revitalizes the program manager for the information sharing environment and the suspicious activity standards for counterintelligence, adding federal CI personnel diffusion centers, improving clearance reciprocity and processing, ensuring predictable, uh, you know, capabilities for funding and grant funding, enhancing C- uh, our counterintelligence, uh, cyber integration, and also the FBI's administrative subpoena authorities to help us speed up the process of acquiring the data that we need, and strengthen training through the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. Foreign intelligence services are adapting more quickly than we are. And we must leverage every available resources to fight this egregious threat to our nation's security. States are responding, but they cannot and should not do this alone. Fusion centers can play a central role in connecting real-time local insights to federal intelligence, but only if they have the authorities, access, training, and resources required. Thank you for your attention to this critical issue and to your continued partnership. I look forward to your questions and to your share our shared work to strengthen America's counterintelligence posture. Thank you, sir.

Mister Mosley.

Thank you, Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, distinguished members of the committee. It's an honor to appear before you today and an extra thank you to the chairman for coming down to Huntsville that was a great event last week. My name is Jay Mosley and I serve as the Director of the Alabama Fusion Center and Governor Kay Ivey's Homeland Security Advisor. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the increasingly important role state and local partners play in protecting our nation from foreign intelligence threats. Counterintelligence is no longer confined to Washington. Foreign intelligence threats increasingly target our states and communities, making state and local agencies a critical part of the nation's counterintelligence enterprise. When people think about counterintelligence, Alabama is probably not the first place that comes to mind, but it should be. Alabama is home to the Port of Mobile, Redstone Arsenal, Fort Rucker, the Air Force's fifth generation fighter, the F-thirty-five, world-class universities, and a strong defense industrial base. These strategic assets make our state an attractive target for foreign intelligence services and demonstrate why states across the country are increasingly on the front lines of counterintelligence. The Alabama Fusion Center is not an investigative agency. We don't duplicate the work of the FBI or the intelligence community. Our mission is simple, to get the right information to the right people at the right time, so they can make informed decisions. But information sharing doesn't begin with technology, it begins with trust. Technology helps to move information, policies establish authorities, but relationships determine whether critical information is shared quickly enough to matter. Those relationships are built every day, not during a crisis. We invest in partnerships with the FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement, the military, emergency management, critical infrastructure owners and the private sector so that when something unusual happens people know who to call and trust that someone will answer. One example that illustrates why those partnerships matter, an Alabama State Capitol employee observed an individual photographing building access points and other security features in a manner that appeared un- unusual. The information was shared with the Alabama Fusion Center and then with the FBI, DHS, and fusion centers across the country. What began as a single observation became part of a broader national picture, demonstrating how timely reporting and trusted partnerships can help identify potential counterintelligence threats before vulnerabilities are exploited. This case and others included in my written testimony show that effective counterintelligence depends on identifying vulnerabilities early, sharing information quickly, and acting before an adversary can exploit them. Success is often measured not by arrest but by the threats that are prevented. I also want to thank this committee for its bipartisan efforts to strengthen DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Continued implementation of reforms that improve two-way information sharing, strengthen engagement with fusion centers, and expand field-based intelligence capabilities will make our home-land security enterprise even stronger. As Congress considers the future of our nation's counterintelligence enterprise, I respectfully offer two recommendations. First, continue strengthening the partnership between DHS, INA, and the national network of fusion centers to improve two-way information sharing. Second, sustain investments in fusion centers through homeland security grants, training, technology, analytic capabilities, and counterintelligence awareness. Investing in these capabilities and the federal, state, and local partnerships that support them is an investment in prevention. Foreign intelligence services exploit gaps between organizations and jurisdictions. Fusion centers help close those gaps by connecting information, people, and capabilities across all levels of government, helping ensure threats are identified, shared, and addressed before they become crises. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to be before you today. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, sir. Mister, uh, Senator Bostar.

Chair Crawford, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to come before you today. Over the last four years, in partnership with national security experts and practitioners, Nebraska has passed a slate of laws to safeguard our state against foreign adversaries. We are filling gaps in America's broader security posture, and we believe all states, including Nebraska, must take additional action. Our work in Nebraska began when U. S. Strategic Commander off at Air Force Base reached out to my office with a clear warning. Huawei equipment had become pervasive near critical defense infrastructure, such as our nuclear missile silos, posing unacceptable risk to our national security. The U. S. government formally designated Huawei a national threat in twenty twenty, but years later its equipment was still in use and, alarmingly, being newly installed across Nebraska. We responded by introducing legislation in twenty twenty three to prohibit telecommunications companies from receiving state funds if they use or provide communications equipment designated a national security threat. The law also cleared bureaucratic red tape for removing the prohibited equipment. These common sense reforms nonetheless triggered robust lobbying to keep the Beijing-linked technologies in use. It was our introduction into how foreign adversaries wield influence through their investments including embedding themselves in trade and business associations using these respected organizations as both a weapon and a shield with each passage of legislation the same pattern recurred. We would introduce a bill to address security threats, foreign adversaries would exert their influence, often in unexpected ways that revealed something new about their use of economic entanglement political power and coercion. We would come back the next session with legislation to address those newly identified tactics and the cycle continued. As we worked to remove Huawei equipment, we learned of another approach being used by the company to compromise our security. Critical Infrastructure executives in Nebraska had been receiving special promotions for free Huawei smartphones, no strings attached. To the executives it looked like marketing, but it functioned as access, placing adversary-owned hardware into the hands of the people running our grids, water systems, and communications. That episode caused us to take a harder look at Nebraska's procurement policies. We needed to close access to foreign adversaries. We addressed this with the passage of the Foreign Adversary Contracting Prohibition Act, blocking companies controlled by foreign adversaries from state procurement involving communications technology, network systems, and critical infrastructure. In working to pass this law, we again experienced foreign adversaries' extensive lobbying power. Trade associations went to bat for our foreign adversaries, warning that the proposed common sense guardrails would damage the economy and stifle innovation. So we had to demonstrate that such competitiveness concerns were a smoke screen. The issue of potential economic harm is important to address because it is frequently invoked as a talking point to oppose efforts to strengthen security. Our experience in Nebraska demonstrates that we are already facing economic harm that could grow substantially if we do nothing to disentangle our critical infrastructure and our economy from our adversaries. For example, as we worked to pass legislation to shine a light on malign influence and lobbying activity, Smithfield, a company under foreign ownership, made veiled threats to state leaders that if Nebraska moved forward with our transparency legislation, they could shut down food production in our state. With agriculture serving as the backbone of Nebraska's economy, and Nebraska serving as the state that helps feed the nation, that was a clear economic and security threat. As our work advanced, additional coercive efforts came into view. Local officials reported direct outreach from CCP-linked actors. Victims of transnational repression began to speak up. Reporting emerged of an overseas service station operating in Omaha, an unmistakable sign that foreign intelligence and coercive activity was occurring in our state. Despite the the varied tactics utilized to prevent Nebraska from taking action, we have passed landmark legislation every year. These laws have positioned Nebraska as a leading state protecting our people from foreign adversaries. Even so, we are moving too slowly and have much more to do. This is even more true as we look across the nation. While some states have taken serious action, others have done very little, and none of us have done enough. States have power and responsibility to strengthen national security, but states are most effective in coordination with our national partners. That's why today I ask you to deepen the federal government's investment in subnational security work, increased investment in our nation's fusion centers, and established more formalized systems of coordination with policymakers, will help states across the country across the country more quickly and effectively identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and contribute fully and comprehensively to the defense of the American homeland. Further, we must take a coordinated nationwide approach to decouple from foreign adversaries. We must strengthen our in- our industries right here in the United States and build stronger partnerships with allies to reduce dependencies on foreign adversary nations. This can only happen with leadership from both our federal and state governments. With that, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Senator. Representative Daniel Alvarez, good to see you. Thank you, and you're recognized.

Thank you, sir. Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Danny Alvarez and I represent district sixty-nine in the Florida House of Representatives, covering Hillsborough County. I'm a lawyer, which I hope you won't use against me, a veteran of the United States Army, chair of the Florida House Criminal Justice Subcommittee, and vice-chair of the Florida House Security and Threat Assessment Committee. I'm here today with a simple message. Florida will not wait for the federal government to defend our people, period. We respect our federal partners more than you can understand. We value the coordination, but when threats are already touching our communities and state leaders are there, we have an obligation to act, and we will. Counterintelligence is often discussed as if it only happens here in Washington, inside federal agencies or classified spaces, but the targets are not. only in Washington. The targets are in our states and they're in our cities, our seaports, universities, our defense communities, water systems, they're in our agriculture fields. Every part of the state of Florida is vulnerable. And Florida is one of the clearest examples that we could give. Florida is not simply a large state. It's a national security state. We are home to major military installations, defense contractors, the Coast Guard operations, special operations equities, maritime infrastructure, aviation's assets, and the space coast. Florida's defense economy is enormous. The threat is not theoretical for us. Earlier this year, federal authorities charged a Florida man in connection with alleged attempted bombing at MacDill Air Force Base, an actual bomb at one of our bases. That incident is a stark reminder that Florida is not merely adjacent to national security it's part of the target set our adversaries and hostile actors. study. Florida's also the gateway to America's future in space. Take Patrick's space, Air Force Base, Cape Canaveral, the Eastern Range, are all central to national security space launch operations, and that makes Florida an extremely attractive target, not just in the military domain, but in the civilian, commercial, research, and space domain as well. In plain terms, Florida is an exceptionally high value target. Our adversaries know that, and we should know it as state lawmakers just the same. That's why the state rule matters. In twenty twenty six, I introduced House Bill nine forty five, a statewide counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism unit bill. The bill would have required the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to establish and administer a statewide capability, focused on detecting, identifying, assessing, and countering threats from foreign adversaries, terrorist actors, insider threats, corporate threats, and hostile intelligence activity. The bill was not designed to duplicate federal government. It wasn't meant to be. uh the Florida CIA. It was designed to close gaps that the states are already seeing. Florida's openness is one of our greatest strengths. It's also the reason that we are targeted so much. We are a global state. We welcome investment, tourism, innovation, immigration. We want Florida to remain that way, Florida to remain open, free, and prosperous. But openness without awareness becomes a vulnerability. The answer ladies and gentlemen, is not fear. The answer is disciplined security. It's not targeting lawful speech or lawful association. The answer is identifying conduct, coordination, access, intent, foreign direction, exploitation, and threat-linked behavior. I need to be very clear on this point. State-level counterintelligence cannot become a license to monitor Floridians for who they are, where they come from, who they love, what they believe, or what they lawfully say. That is not what I support, nor does anyone else I know. That is not what Florida should build. A serious counterintelligence capability must protect civil liberties while protecting the state. Those are not competing missions. Those are both essential to the legitimacy of our cause, and they are the DNA that makes us the United States of America. The answer is also not a state acting alone. There's a answer in a Florida state partnership, a federal and state partnership that recognizes the states as the front-line censors. So, that's why I believe Congress can act in five practi- practical ways. First, Congress should strengthen the flow of timely, usable counterintelligence information to state and local leaders. Not every threat briefing needs to be classified. States need more unclassified, controlled, and actionable information that can be shared with relevant team members. Second, Congress should s- support state-level training and best practices. If states are expected to help defend the homeland against foreign adversaries, The state and local officials need the training on what foreign intelligence activity looks like in the real world. That includes procurement risk, insider threat, cyber-targeting, influence operations, transnational repression, research security, land use vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure access. Third, Congress should help define the guardrails. States need to protect their people without infringing on constitutional rights. That means clear standards focused on behavior, threat activity, foreign direction, and exploitation. not political viewpoint, religion, ethnicity, or lawful expression. Fourth, Congress should encourage better integration between federal agen- agencies, state domestic security structures, and fusion centers. Florida does not need a disconnected intelligence bureaucracy. We need coordination that is timely, lawful, practical, and most importantly, trusted. And finally, Congress should recognize that adversaries exploit the seams. They exploit the seam between us and you. They exploit the seam between the public and private sector, law enforcement and intelligence, between the economic development and national security, between our openness and our strategic negligence. Our response has to focus on closing the seams. HB nine forty-five unfortunately didn't become law that time, but I'm not done. Florida will continue to b- working building the most proactive capability that protects our citizen strengthens our public safety and safeguards critical infrastructure. while supporting our federal partners in the fight together. We will continue refining the model and improve the safeguards, but we will never pretend this threat is theoretical. America's adversaries are coordinated, patient, and strategic. Our response must be the same. The federal government has unique authorities, collection capability, and global reach, and states, they provide proximity, local visibility, and constitutional responsibility for public safety. We need both. The lesson I hope the committee takes from Florida is straightforward. State governments are no longer peripheral to national security. We are part of the front line. Thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir. And finally, uh, Mr. Lucci.

Thank you, Chairman Crawford, Ranking Member Himes, and members of the committee. My name is Michael Lucci. I'm the founder and CEO of State Armor. We work state by state to help enact protections for critical infrastructure, security measures for supply chains, and work to counter foreign influence campaigns. I'll point to three points to highlight the challenges and opportunities of counterintelligence at the state level. First, counterintelligence gaps exist in our federalist system because of the division of powers between the federal government and states. Second, the CCP seeks to exploit these gaps. The infiltration at the state level is significant and cause for alarm. And third, with your encouragement, the states can and should become fifty bulwarks of counterintelligence to close the gaps exploited by the CCP. These gaps exist because we're a massive continental power, an open society, and we divide power between the federal and state level. Yet federal warnings consistently point to significant subnational threats and the need for state action. Jamestown Foundation in twenty nineteen pointed to China pivoting towards the state. Secretary Pompeo in twenty twenty warned all governors that they are being targeted by the CCP. President Biden in twenty twenty two put out a memo describing how subnational influence operations affect the states. And then Biden in twenty twenty four warned all governors that their water infrastructure was being targeted by cyber attacks. President Trump issued an executive order last year stating that states need to play a greater role in national resilience. And then the New York Times reported last year how the Chinese consulate in New York weaponizes fifty community organizations to work against candidates in New York, who are against the CCP. The infiltration is a serious cause for concern. For example, Laughlin Air Force Base, Grand Forks Air Force Base, Whiteman Air Force Base and Barksdale Air Force Base were all found to have Chinese penetration near the bases and that was all mitigated by state and local authorities. Threats to critical infrastructure are even broader. The Washington Post has reported on Chinese-made solar inverters that could be remotely sabotaged, spread across the country, particularly in my state of Texas, and furthermore in Texas, the Senate Intelligence Committee has reported on Chinese cryptocurrency miners that could be remotely sabotaged to cause oscillations across power grids. That's just one sector of critical infrastructure. Universities are also targeted, and so are state governments and legislatures themselves. Chinese and American businesses lobby in state legislatures for China's interests. United Front-style pressure campaigns flood state houses when states do engage in counterintelligence work. We think that the solution is for states to be empowered to be the first line of defense, to d- to leverage our federalist system, and transform states into these bulwarks of counter-intelligence. A couple ideas, regular messaging from you all p- plays a tremendous role in state activities. I could tell you about just one statement by Congressman Krishnamoorthy that led to a series of protective state actions. Federal-state partnerships with federal guidance to use state powers to amplify your efforts. Increased state lawmaker involvement in homeland security war games so they could understand how these things might play out. encouragement for states to match federal efforts, especially when that encouragement could be made on a bipartisan basis. An ongoing education to recognize and counter both United Front influence campaigns and transnational oppression would be hugely valuable, to state and local law enforcement. In conclusion, we believe that's America's best response to the CCP is to turn our decentralized system into a strategic asset. With increased federal guidance, and encouragement, states will discover and they will solve problems in their backyards before Washington DC even knows about them. I've seen it happen repeatedly. Furthermore, these novel state solutions can then become a a consideration for you all to adopt as national policies. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mister Lucci, and I now recognize Vice Chairman Kelly for questions.

Mississippi has a significant military and national security footprint, including Kemp Shelby, critical work conducted at Stennis Space Center, uh, defense contractors all over the state. As foreign adversaries increasingly operate below the threshold of traditional conflict, state and local partners must be able to recognize suspicious activity, connect seemingly isolated incidents, and quickly share that information with military, law enforcement, and intelligence community partners. Mister Sina, how closely do fusion centers work with military installations, Army CID, NCIS, Air Force OSI to integrate and correlate suspicious activity reporting involving military bases and other sensitive facilities.

Thank you for the question, sir. Uh the the National Network of Fusion Centers' uh primary job is to do that outreach coordination collaboration. So having those uh partners that are in those installations connected to our network as well as understanding what our suspicious activity reporting models are and getting that information. There have been issues in the past where there have been gaps. Uh unfortunately, sometimes it's based on the personalities of the folks in the fusion center, the personalities on the bases. But the goal being is that, um, we all have to be looking out and looking well beyond the perimeter of the base, the installations, the locations that we're trying to protect. Uh, I bring to light the, uh, use of drones and drones that are constantly, um, going over, going near our military installations. Those don't start not necessarily right near the basis. So we've gotta have the ability for real-time information sharing between those installations and folks on the outside. So there is that collaboration, there is there is that coordination. Is that the level that I would like it to be? No, but I think that's something that we should drive to achieve, because they are a prime target for our adversaries.

Yeah, I think that's one area we have to look at real closely, is drones, whether personal, whether a twelve year old kid or an adult or a foreign agent. I think that there need to be either fines or criminal penalties, depending on intent and capabilities of those when they fly over any military or sensitive facility. And if we don't change the laws on this, we're gonna have a catastrophe happen and there needs to be criminal or penal penalties of some sort. It can be fines. If a twelve year old accidentally flies at over camp Shelby, he probably shouldn't go to jail, he or she. But they absolutely, their parents should be fined for allowing them to do that. Uh saying that, are there any classification, authority, technology, staffing issues that we can help with for our fusion centers that that will shore up some of the shortfalls that we have?

A- absolutely, sir. And, you know, a primary issue is the training education and we had a huge kind of push coming up to World Cup to get people trained. Going to Alabama to get the training, to be able to respond to that. uh that counter-UAS threat. But I also have to say that there have been major issues with that regarding the resources the acquisition of the technology uh the deployment of the personnel. And I'm actually gonna defer to my partner from Alabama to talk a little bit about some of the things that he's seeing on the ground.

Thanks, sir. Yeah, some of the things we're seeing on the ground when it comes to the counter-UAS training, uh is only one place for it, that's the schoolhouse in Redstone, although that's great. Uh, we think there should be more training, more ability to get that training. So that's one place where you could probably help out. And I, I don't know the answer to that. Uh, but we need more training and more availability to the training. I think the other piece is the ability to bring a drone down safely. Uh, I know we're working towards that, but there's a big limit there on, uh, what you can actually do. We can detect them, uh, but, you know, the challenge there is to bring it down safely. So I think that's a couple of places where we could work on that.

It's not too long ago where we had a air balloon transit the entirety of the United States, including many sensitive facilities, and we didn't take it down when we had the opportunity. And then we couldn't take it down in other locations because of collateral damage that may have occurred. But I I'm just telling you, we have to really look at the laws in these drones. Uh, most times it's n- uh, it's not nefarious intent. It is just uh a kid out there playing with a drone or an adult But there have to be consequences when they overfly sensitive areas of the United States, regardless of intent. Now they don't all need to be criminal. I'm a former district attorney, so I forgive you for being a lawyer. I was a good lawyer. But uh but that being said, we need to really look at, and I think it's gonna take a lot of local input because we don't have the database of knowing what exactly, and Mississippi is much different than Washington DC and Chicago Illinois, or Western, uh, California or Oregon. And so we really have to have input from the states to make sure that we have, uh, laws that comply but also protect us. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The gentleman yields ranking member Himes.

Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, Mr. Mosley, I wanted to start with you, you said something that intrigued me, um, uh, which was that we need to, cuz I'm always looking, by the way, for the oversight here and it's hard to get what are we doing wrong. Um, but you said, uh, uh we should strengthen the partnership with um uh FBI and with A and I in particular. So so so put some specificity on that. Are you not getting the information you need? Uh g- tell us tell us how we can fix that.

Sure, I love talking about that. So are we getting what we need? Yes, bottom line, yes, we're getting what we need. Uh I'll start with the FBI. We've got two field divisions in Alabama. I'll start with Alabama and then work our way out. So in Alabama, very solid relationships with the FBI and it goes deep. It goes to the intel component, all the way up to our SACs, uh a lot of engagement, a lot of discussions, a lot of meetings, uh working groups, red cell exercises, tabletop exercises, joint products. So we're getting it where we need, but it's not consistent across all eighty fusion centers. So that's where I think uh you could play a part in that as trying to work on the consistency of what I receive in Alabama Virginia should receive it, California should receive it,

So so so how do we how do we um uh Mr. Sennett is nodding there,

all eighty.

nodding. So how do we, how do we, do we survey all eighty d- sh- as a committee, should we survey all eighty fusion centers? How do we fix that?

Well, there, and there was a process that we developed in twenty seventeen, an enhanced engagement initiative to uh kind of calculate where do we have gaps. And it's gone through a number of iterations on the FBI side. But I really think that there should be a focus on that. You know, developing a report card that says are we getting the, and both, it goes both ways, uh is, you know, Are the state, locals, and the fusion center, and the partners that we have uh doing the contribution that we need to the FBI to complete what they need to do? But are we also getting the things that we need? That information sharing, there's a lot of silos unfortunately. Here we are twenty-five years aft- uh getting close to twenty-five years after nine eleven and we still haven't resolved this issue between uh DHS and FBI, and and the information sharing. But when it comes to that information sharing, if people don't have the right clearances, If they don't have the right access.

Would would every fusion center, would every fusion t- center have an individual with the TS SCI or is that rare?

Well, I I do have to say that DHS uh manages the fusion center clearances which are at the secret level and then at request, at the top secret level. But in my center itself, I've had to go the FBI and say, " Hey, I need to get all of these folks" uh TS and in some cases SCI clearance, um and many of them are getting assigned to support, you know, the JTTF support um, our counter-intelligence task force, but it's a, it's an ad-hoc. It's not consistent where people are getting TS and SCI access, where most of the counter-intelligence information lies.

OK, um, speaking of information sharing, Mister Lucci, you gave an example that was of some interest to this committee, these, um, bitcoin mining centers. It was a particular interest to the chairman, uh, I, I have to be oblique about it, but a federal agency did a fairly in-depth investigation of that and arrived at a fairly firm conclusion. It sounds like you have not seen that.

Uh, Congressman, what I've seen is from the Senate Intelligence Committee in a report last year that described them described the company Bitmain as a threat.

No, no, the I'm I'm referring to an investigative uh agency that did some work here, and it sounds like you I'm you you it sounds like you haven't seen that report.

I've not read that report.

OK. I mean, that's an example of, cuz you're spending time thinking about this, that's an example of a failure, very clear example of a failure to share information. So what can we do? what what what can we do to make classify I understand the challenges, but what can we do to make it you don't even know what you don't know, right? Cuz I I and I'm being oblique about this,

Right.

but how what how what's the solution to that?

Congressman, uh, an example that I gave in my longer testimony, in terms of targeting state lawmakers, if you just have iterative information sharing, maybe through a web portal about whatever the unclassified findings are on this topic or otherwise, um, Congressman Krishnamoorthy one time said one

Great, great suggestion. Thank you. That's exactly what I'm looking for. One last question, um, cuz I don't have a lot of time left, but um, the flip side of if you see something, say something, and of really mobilizing here is that we're gonna see an analogy to what we saw in the CT world, right? where Sikhs are getting approached because they may be Al-Qaeda or whatever. Civil liberties are really important and I'm so so tell me maybe starting with you, Mister Sena, what are we doing to make sure that overly enthusiastic law enforcement or citizens aren't approaching every individual with Asian features with a camera?

Absolutely, and that and that is a huge part of what we do as far as that suspicious activity reporting. A core element of that is privacy, civil rights and civil liberties, so there have to have that training That not only says what do you look for, but what do you have to balance as far as th- those key indicators. And uh photography, a prime example. Taking photo- photographs is not illegal. It's, but it's the context. It's how it's done and you have to approach it in a certain way when you're doing your follow-up in your investigation.

Is this training you're referring to,

We don't want

is that broadly mandated to local law enforcement?

I will tell you it is not. And we have started to get it in some areas, in actual police academies and other locations where people are being trained. But it is not, you know, broadly disseminated to everyone out there. We, we, you know, a number of centers are reliant on Homeland Security grant funds, but we have seen even this last cycle, uh, funds not getting to where they need to be and some centers actually uh not getting their funding at all. So this becomes problematic when you don't have the funding to do the training, but that's part of the training that we have to get out there is that how do we protect the rights that a that Americans have in this country.