H.R. 8352, the Criminal History Access Act

Committee will come to order without objection. The chair is authorized to declare recess at any time pursuant to committee rule two and house rule eleven clause two the chairman may postpone further proceedings today on the question of approving any measure or matter or adopting an amendment for which a recorded vote is ordered. I now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mister Onder, to lead us in the pledge of allegiance.

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, Allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, and to our republic for which it stands, one nation, one nation, under God, our God, indivisible, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. with liberty and the justice of our

That's about as fast as we could ever said it.

Yeah.

That was a record pace. The first order of business today is adopting an updated subcommittee roster. This roster was distributed to members along with the text of the bills we will consider today. This roster returns. Mister Kiley, to the same sub-committees that he previously served on, the crime and the courts IP subcommittee. Is there any discussion before we vote on approving the roster, the gen- uh, the ranking members recognizer?

I'd just like to welcome Mister Keiley back to the committee. Yeah.

And so would I. First time we've ever had an independent, I think on uh, at least on the Republican side, uh, as part of the committee. The question is on approving the updated

I d- I didn't know independents were on the Republican side. Yeah.

We got lots of indep- independent thinkers on our side, mister, mister Mister ranking member. All those in favor say aye. Aye. Those opposed, no. The ayes have it and the subcommittee roster is approved. Pursuant to notice I call up HR eighty-three fifty-two, the criminal history access act for purposes of a mark-up and move that the committee report in favor to the house. The clerk will report the bill.

H R eight three five.

Without objection, the bill will be considered as read, an open for amendment at any point. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mister Schmidt for an opening statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and uh colleagues. It is my honor to introduce H R eighty-three two, the Criminal History Access Act. Uh, this bill is a common sense measure to ensure that state-level agencies that license and certify law enforcement officers have access to the FBI's criminal history database so that they can do their jobs. It was a little over a week ago I was out at the Kansas Law Enforcement Training Center addressing their most recent, uh, basic, uh, class graduates. And I was reminded then, as I always am when I visit, uh, the n- auditorium at the training center where the graduation ceremony is held. is appropriately named " Integrity Auditorium", and each graduate is presented with a challenge coin that bears the phrase " Integrity is the basis for community trust". More than fifty thousand individuals apply each year for law enforcement positions across the United States, and it's our expectation that each of those men and women would be a person of integrity capable of upholding the position of public trust. But we can't just take the applicant's word for it. All fifty states now have some form of a peace Standards and Training Agency, commonly called a POST, which is charged with that task. It is essentially a licensing agency for law enforcement. And while the precise functions of POST agencies vary from state to state, they generally serve as certification entities that set standards for eligibility for employment as a law enforcement officer, and enforce those standards. Under current law, the POST agencies cannot directly access the FBI's criminal history records database, potentially allowing individuals who should be disqualified from serving in law enforcement positions to slip through the cracks. In my own state of Kansas, for example, uh, they're currently dealing with an issue with an officer who has a disqualifying conviction who has nonetheless uh slipped through the cracks, uh, was hired by an agency, uh, and because Kansas Seapost, our post agency, does not have the authority to run criminal histories, it has to rely on a separate agency's verification that the applicant met all of the minimum requirements. Uh, this particular officer has been working for more than eighteen months with a disqualifying conviction. So, this simple bill that we have before us today would add post-agencies to the list of state-level entities that are granted access to the FBI's criminal history database. I want to thank the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training for bringing this issue to our attention, and also thank uh our colleague, Miss Ross of North Carolina, for joining with me in introducing this important

Chair, now I'll recognize the ranking member, uh, Mister Raskin, for an opening statement. Yeah, we'll we'll recognize her. Yeah.

Thank you very much, Mister Chairman. I'm pleased to support this, uh, excellent bipartisan legislation. I want to commend, uh, Representative Schmidt and Ross for their strong leadership on this bill, which would allow peace officer standards and training agencies to access criminal history records for official use such as for vetting people who are applying to become law enforcement officers. Every state has its own standards and requirements for determining who may serve as a state or local officer. Ultimately, hiring decisions are made by individual agencies, but every state also uses a board or agency to help set the standards and training requirements. These agen- agencies known as Peace Officer Standards and Training agencies or post agencies may also certify who may be hired as a law enforcement officer train officers or assist with vetting despite being tasked with making these certifications. Post agencies are currently excluded from the federal law that allows limited access to the records of those seeking to become law enforcement officers. This means that post agencies must rely on the local hiring agency to provide relevant information and records. The International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training, which supports the development of professional standards in public safety, reports that the inability of the post agencies to obtain full and complete access to criminal history record information has resulted in individuals with otherwise disqualifying criminal histories attaining employment and volunteer status as law enforcement officers when such disqualification is not reported or is concealed by the hiring a law enforcement agency. This inability to access information essential to determining whether someone's fit to serve their community, could pose a serious safety risk. H. R. eighty-three fifty-two would fix this dangerous information gap by allowing post agencies to access the criminal history records of people applying to be law enforcement officers. By giving them access to these records when someone applies, this bill would give law enforcement one more tool to protect public safety and promote public trust. Again, I want to thank Congressman Schmidt, Congressman Ross, for working together to bring this issue to the committee's attention. and to propose a very fine common sense solution. And I thank the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training for their expertise in work on this legislation, which is also por- supported by the Major County Sheriff's Association, the International Associations of Chiefs of Police, and Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies. I'm pleased to support this bill and I urge everyone to do the same. I yield back, Mr. German.

The gentleman yields back. Without objection, all of the opening statements will be included in the record. The chair does recognize this gentleman from Kansas to offer an amendment in the nature of

Uh, Mr. Chairman, I believe I have an amendment to the desk.

Clerk report.

Amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Without objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute will be considered as read and shall be considered as base text for the purpose of amendment the chair now recognized a gentleman from Kansas to explain the amendment.

Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman, this is a a mere clerical amendment and does not change the substance of the bill.

Gentleman yields back. The gentlelady from North Carolina is recognized.

Um, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much to um Congressman Schmidt, for this excellent bill, it's an honor to work with you, our offices are right next to each other, and just fun fact, both of us represent um districts that manufacture Cheez-Its.

Huh, oh that was

I when I came by your office yesterday I saw that you two had Cheez-Its, so just

But are they Vermont Cheez-Its?

Um I don't know where the cheese comes from, but the Cheez-Its come from our districts. I think so. Just letting you know if you want Cheez-Its Uh,

Uh-oh.

we have, well, whatever kind you want between our two districts, you can get your Cheez-its.

We need Cheez-its. We need snacks.

So, okay. Um, so, in addition to that, the these two things that we have bonded on, um, I w- I just wanna reiterate that the post agencies are escentr- essentially, you do I this Cheez-it thing has gone crazy over there.

We definitely do.

Yeah.

We love the Cheez-its.

They're essentially the gatekeepers to the law enforcement profession. and their job is to keep bad actors out, and we want them to do their job. Over fifty thousand people apply for law enforcement positions across the country every year and applicants already sign off on disclosure of their criminal history records as part of that process. The problem, as you've heard, is that current federal law actually blocks most post agencies from accessing these records. So they end up relying on whatever the hiring department shares with them. When disqualifying information gets left out, post-a- agencies never see it, and somebody who shouldn't be certified ends up working in local law enforcement. This bill fixes this problem by amending twenty-eight USC five thirty-four to add post-agencies to the list of entities authorized to receive federal criminal history records. the same access that law enforcement agencies already have. It's narrow, low to no cost. It's a technical fix. And I urge my colleagues to support it. And of course, thank Congressman Schmidt for leading on this very important issue. Um, and I yield back.

General Leeds uh yields back. Who seeks recognition? Look at that. Look at that, Mr. Schmidt, you're This is just sailing through. Okay, um. The question is on adoption of the amendment in the nature of a substitute. This will be followed immediately by a vote on favorably reporting the bill. All those in favor say aye.

Aye.

Aye. Those opposed, no. And you're paying the chair, the ayes have it, and the amendment in the nature of a substitute is adopted. The question is now on favorably reporting the bill as amended. All those in favor say aye. Aye. Aye. Those opposed, no. The ayes have it and the bill is ordered to be reported favorably to the house. Members will have two days to submit views. That objection to the bill will be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute, incorporating all adopted amendments, and staff is authorized to make technical and conforming changes.

And the committee will suspend all the other subjects.

Uh, the committee will just end in recess while we, uh, round up the sponsor of our second agenda item.

you're number i'm sorry seven

committee will come committee will come to order

that's good

Pursuant to notice I call up H R eighty three sixty five, the Monitor Accountability Act of twenty twenty six for purpose of mark up and move that the committee reported favorably to the house the clerk will report the bill.

H R eight three six five.

Without objection, the bill be considered as read and open for amendment at any point. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mister Biggs, for an opening statement.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, I appreciate you also hearing this bill today. Uh, we're considering H R eighty three sixty five, the Monitor Accountability Act of twenty twenty six. This legislation is a result of a field hearing that the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance held in February in Maricopa County, Arizona. While that hearing focused on the special monitor in Maricopa County, it also has implications for residents across this nation, who also find their law enforcement agencies held hostage by a special monitor or consent decree. Since December twenty thirteen, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office has been under federal judicial oversight following a d- a Department of Justice investigation into a case that started in two thousand eight Ortega Melendrez versus Arpaio. In two thousand seven Latino motorists and passengers aided by the ACLU filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County and the County Sheriff. The lawsuit alleged that MCSO violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments by engaging in a systematic practice of unconstitutional racial profiling, including stopping, detaining, and arresting Latino individuals during traffic stops and patrol operations based on race or perceived immigration status. Unlike other agencies that have been placed under court monitors, there were no allegations nor findings that anyone was ever physically assaulted, shot or killed. Following a bench trial in December of twenty eleven, US District Judge G. Murray Snow ruled in twenty thirteen that MCSO had violated constitutional protections and imposed permanent injunctions that required MCSO to implement sweeping reforms to policies training, uh operations, and internal investigations. Unlike a consent decree, which is a negotiated settlement agreed to by their par- by the parties, the court imposed these injunctions. DOJ cons- consent decrees are typically entered into voluntarily by state or local governments to resolve a civil rights investigation without a trial even though they can result in similarly similarly extensive federal oversight and court-appointed monitoring. In January twenty fourteen Judge Snow appointed federal court Robert Warshaw to oversee MCSO's compliance with the court's permanent injunctions, including reforms intended to address racial discrimination during traffic stops and deficiencies in policy development and oversight. Following that, in July twenty fifteen, the court mandated additional remedial measures, including further policy revisions to further strengthen oversight mechanisms. The federal court monitoring was intended to last only until MCSO received full and effective compliance with the court's injunctions. Yet oversight has continued for more than a decade without a fixed end date. This extended judicial supervision has placed significant financial burdens on Maricopa County taxpayers with costs rep- reportedly reaching nearly three hundred and fifty million dollars since twenty thirteen. Most of these expenses include the administrative efforts needed to demonstrate compliance with court orders. For example, despite remote work and meetings, in twenty twenty one, the county was responsible for funding a two hundred square foot office suite for the monitor, costing taxpayers more than ninety-seven thousand dollars for one year. This persistent federal judicial intervention has created operational challenges for MCSO including difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified deputies. The increased administrative workload and ongoing scrutiny have led to a decline in staff retention and discouraged potential recruits from pursuing careers within the department ultimately impacting on the office's ability to serve and protect the community. The federal court monitor typically issues quarterly reports which track the MCSO's compliance with the court-ordered reforms and provided the court with independent assessments of policy implementation, operational practices, and overall progress. Over the course of more than forty reports, the MCSO's compliance rate increased from below thirty percent in twenty fourteen to more than ninety-four percent by twenty twenty five, meeting the standard that requires the agency to demonstrate adherence in more than ninety-four percent of instances. According to Warshaw, the monitor, MCSO's compliance framework has become quote " self-sustaining and institutionalized" close quote. Warshaw also labeled MCSO's compliance with policies, training and supervisory review as solid, noting that the compliance measures were fully built into the agency's daily work, showing full independent accountability. Earlier this year, DOJ filed a brief supporting Maricopa County's request to end federal oversight, noting that the litigation has been successful in reforming the agency. The department argued that the extensive reforms imposed through the court-appointed monitoring regime have been successful in correcting the unconstitutional practices identified in the original case, and that MCSO has demonstrated sustained systemic compliance. The department cited multiple recent monitor reports documenting consistently high compliance rates, institutionalized policy adherence, effective training programs, and durable accountability mechanisms. The department indicated that continued federal c- supervision is no longer necessary, to ensure constitutional policing, supporting termination of the court-appointed monitoring regime. Maricopa County is not the only jurisdiction being monitored by Robert Warshaw and his associates. Warshaw has been accused of taking exorbitant payment without producing results in monitoring law enforcement agencies in New York, California, Michigan, and Louisiana. For example, Warshaw faced criticism for the duration, high cost, and evolving compliance benchmarks of federal oversight in California. In other words, Warshaw made a bunch of money while continuing to move the goal posts. Despite reportedly spending little time in Oakland, Warshaw is paid currently more than a million dollars annually by the city, a structure that incentivizes prolonged monitorship. What incentive does Warshaw have to ever make a finding of compliance and completion of the terms when to do so would mean he would lose a big million dollar payment? It turns out the court monitor is incentivized to grift. on his appointment. Compared to monitors who operate under narrowly defined mandates and fixed timelines, Warshaw's role continuously blurs the line between oversight and management. Questions about judgment and incentives have also followed Warshaw's consulting contracts elsewhere. In Niagara Falls, New York, for example, Warshaw was retained at a rate of two hundred dollars an hour, ultimately costing taxpayers more than two hundred thousand dollars over two years. despite the mayor's initial public estimate that the contract would total just fifty seven thousand dollars. Together, these episodes have been cited by critics critics as emblematic of a pattern in which Warsaw's work unfolds with limited transparency minimal cost controls and little external check on the expansion or duration of his authority. And while I agreed very little with former Attorney General Merrick Garland uh when he was in office, I actually uh believe he had pretty good ideas with how to deal with these issues involving monitors, not just Warshaw, but all court monitors. In April twenty twenty one, Garland asked then Associate Attorney General Vinita Gupta to conduct a four month review of how the Justice Department appoints and oversees federal monitors and settlement agreements and consent decrees with state and local governments. On August thirteen twenty twenty one, Associate Attorney General Gupta's memorandum to Attorney General Garland proposed nineteen recommendations stemming from five core principles. These principles include minimizing cost, and conflicts of interest, ensuring monitors' accountability, compliance assessment, community engagement, and efficient reform. One notable reform included in the memoranda was imposing term limits for federal monitors. The significance of these recommendations set clear expectations for time-limited oversight, ensuring that federal monitorships are not indefinite. The Monitors' Accountability Act before us today codifies those necessary reforms formulated by former Attorney General Garland. This bill requires the administrative office of the United States courts to establish conditions on the appointment by a district court of a monitor of a state or unit of local government. These conditions include a cap on fees, a term limit on the monitors, and judges overseeing monitor cases, allowing for public comment on the selection of the monitor, and providing a public accounting of the activities of the monitor. It does not eliminate m- eliminate monitors or limit the scope of their work. Uh, let me repeat that. It does not eliminate monitors, nor does it limit the scope of their work. What this bill does, however, is dis-identifies monitors from taking it uh from turning into grifters while trying to fix problems that need uh correction in their community. I urge my colleagues to support this common sense bill and I yield back, Mister Chairman. Thank you.

Uh, gentlemen yields back, the chair now recognizes his ranking member for an opening statement.

Thank you very much, uh, Chairman Jordan. Uh, alas, th- this one is not a, uh, finely tuned Derrick Schmidt compromise bill. Um, this one appears to be a - a roundabout way of undermining existing federal monitorships, including the one in Maricopa County that, uh, our distinguished colleague from Arizona speaks of in great detail. Uh, and, uh, I must alas oppose it. In May of two thousand thirteen, a federal court found that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office under the infamous leadership of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, racially profiled and illegally detained Latino motorists, violating the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments, Title Six of the Civil Rights Act of sixty-four in the Arizona State Constitution too. One expert called it, quote, " the worst pattern of racial profiling by a law and law enforcement agency in US history." Following this ruling, the federal district judge placed the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office under supervision by a court-appointed monitor to ensure it was taking the necessary steps to correct violations of the law. For years after the initial court order, Sheriff Arpaio gleefully violated a succession of court orders, refusing to end his office's practice of rampant unlawful racial profiling which eventually led to courts finding him in civil contempt finding him guilty of criminal contempt and then finally in need of a presidential pardon. As a result, the court is had to issue subsequent orders each time trying to m- more clearly articulate the steps the sheriff's office must take to come into compliance with the order and the law. Recently, uh, our colleagues had a field hearing in Phoenix where they apparently took issue with the fact that the sheriff's office is still under federal monitor's ship decree more than ten years later. It's not a grift, as they allege, that a monitor is still in place. The monitor is still in place because the sheriff's office has failed to remedy its egregious violations of the law pursuant to multiple court orders. In fact, more than a decade later, and even under a new sheriff, data reveals that racial disparities in the sheriff's office arrest rates persist. The real grift is contained in the bill before us today. While I'm certainly open to having a serious policy discussion about ways to strengthen and improve the federal monitorship process, the bill before us today is flawed in a number of ways. We've heard that the Monitor Accountability Act is simply a codification of made by Attorney General Merrick Garland and Associate Attorney General Vinita Gupta in a twenty twenty-one DOJ memo on the use of such monitors in settlement agreements and consent decrees. But that is not the full story. There's a lot more to the picture than meets the eye. The Monitor Accountability Act is a cherry-picked, chopped-up creation that would make inevitable the demise of the Maricopa County monitor, and would make all other federal monitorships less effective and less efficient. It would exacerbate existing problems in accomplishing the goals of consent, degrees and settlement agreements, which are to provide legal and equitable relief to remedy serious violations of federal law, particularly for entities that engage in a pattern or a practice of misconduct. The bill would also have sweeping consequences for the enforcement of federal law around the country including consent, degrees and settlements that have been entered into with other government agencies, including those outside our jurisdiction here on judiciary, undermining one of the most important tools that we've got to address persistent violations of federal law in matters ranging from civil rights to policing to detention to disability rights, to the environment, education, and antitrust. While this bill certainly encompasses some of the Garland memo's recommendations, many other key recommendations contained in the memo are not included, such as requiring a hearing after five years to assess the progress made under the agreement and evaluate whether a monitor t- monitorship should be terminated. Additionally, many of the provisions of this bill are far more prescriptive than the recommendations made in the Garland memo. And in other cases, the legislative language in the bill expressly contradicts the Garland memo recommendations. For example, the bill would impose mandatory five-year term limits on federal monitorships. While the Garland memo supports term limits for monitors, it does not prescribe a specific time limit in councils against automatic termination as would be the case under this bill. Instead, the Garland memo recommends judicial evaluation of monitorships at the end of their term and allows for the possibility of reappointment. The Garland memo also recommends that consent decrees and settlement agreements explicitly include a mutually agreed-upon process for assessing the monitor before reappointment. This bill also imposes a new mandate that requires appointment of a new judge after six years which means this bill fails even to align the term limits for monitors and judges. Where is the efficiency there? Far from making this a more efficient process, these requirements will delay, prolong and confuse. Monitorships, as a new monitor and a new judge, will have to get up to speed on the complicated history of the case and the progress completed by the party prior to their appointment. They will have to review years' worth of briefs, orders, reports, motions, replies, pleadings and other case documents. Together, these provisions could certainly incentivize a reluctant party to simply run out the clock until a more favorable monitor and judge is appointed to their case. The retroactive application of this bill is also curious. The Garland memo explicitly warns against retroactivity, noting that " because existing consent decrees and monitorships are the product of extensive negotiations, with approval by the federal court, the specific recommendations should apply only to consent decrees and monitorships used in future cases." Inexplicably, the Monitor Accountability Act does the exact opposite of this advice. The bill would apply retroactively, meaning that both the monitor and judge in the Maricopa County Sheriff's case would be terminated shortly after the bill becomes law. And that, I suspect, may be why this bill is being offered and rushed through here today. I'll also note that this bill suffers from other technical deficiencies, um,

Thanks.

Excuse, sorry.

It's okay.

Okay. Um, from other technical deficiencies, we brought some of them to the attention of the including the timeline for implementation that has been changed and I appreciate that but I think the fact that there are these last minute changes taking place to make the bill at all remotely sensible demonstrates we've not done any kind of thorough vetting and analysis of the recommendations uh that are contained in here um if the majority is serious about improving the appointment and use of federal monitors and I'm sure it is in making the AG twenty twenty one recommendations law uh then please work with us and the AO to

Without objection, all other opening statements will be included in the record. Chair recognized a gentleman from Arizona to offer an amendment in nature of a substitute.

At the desk.

Clerk will report the amendment.

HRA three six five.

Without objection, the amendment will be considered as read and shall be considered as the base text, for purposes of

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This amendment to the ANS uh, excuse me. That's the that's the other that's the amendment to the ANS. Uh, it simply removes the year from the short title

This is like like two hours.

and I yield back.

This is like two hours. Gentleman yields back. Who seeks recognition? Yes, ma'am. The gentlelady from Georgia is recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh, thank you so much. This bill addresses the work of federal monitors who are appointed by a court to oversee the progress. a state or unit of local government is making after violating federal law. Monitors can be put in place to address a large number of issues, and often their role is to make sure charges changes are made to right wrongs inflicted on the public. Often monitors are put in place after there is a finding of serious misconduct, including violations of constitutional rights or actions that jeopardize people's health safety and well-being. For example, last January, to avoid prolonged litigation, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Fulton County of Georgia, where I reside, and the Fulton County Sheriff's Office entered into an agreement that included the appointment of a monitor to oversee changes to address dangerous and unhealthy conditions at Fulton County Jail, conditions that DOJ found violate the constitutional and civil rights of those held in that jail. Court-appointed monitors have also been used to address violations of the constitutional rights of children in foster care in Georgia. And these are just two examples from within Georgia of the ways that monitors can provide independent oversight to improve public institutions, and protect Americans' rights. My colleagues on the other side of the aisle will say that this bill follows guidance from former A. memo regarding monitors, but in many ways it does not. The bill would require monitors to serve for no more than five years, even if the monitor has been effectively overseeing the changes needed to better serve the public. Even if the parties agree that is the case. The bill would require the parties to find a new monitor with the right knowledge and expertise needed to understand and address the problem. then inform the new monitor of all the work that has occurred prior to their appointment and all the work that lies ahead. Instead of actually addressing the problem that the parties and the monitor are all working to resolve, time and taxpayer dollars will be wasted on turnover and procedure. The bill doubles down on this obstacle by also requiring the appointment of a new judge after six years. This applies even if the judge is diligent, efficient and fair, and even if the parties all agree this is the case. That's just what could happen when the parties are operating in good faith. But what about a local official who isn't trying to make a change? This bill creates an incentive for reluctant public officials to stall and hope that they get a lenient monitor or indifferent judge next time. The public will again hear the burden of waste They'll bear the burden of waste and delay while someone tries to run out the clock, rather than working with the monitor, the judge, or the parties to truly solve the problem. As these examples illustrate, the stakes can be incredibly high. A delay could leave more people incarcerated in unconstitutionally dangerous conditions or more foster children facing inadequate care. A delay could also force employees like police officers, prison guards, and foster care case workers to continue working under conditions that make it impossible for them to do their jobs safely and effectively. I would be happy to work with Chairman Biggs to make the reforms of the Department of Justice carefully outlined in the Garland memo permanent, so that we can improve efficiency and accountability in federal monitorships. But I must oppose this bill at this moment, um, this bill that could result in more waste, I believe, and delays while worsening the public services that are meant to be improved, under the watchful eye of federal monitors. And I yield.

Gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from, uh, Arizona is recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have the mid mid at the desk.

Clerk report.

Amendment to the amendment in the nature.

Not objection, the meal be considered as read, the gentleman is recognized gentleman from Arizona is recognized to experience

Miss Chairman, can I reserve the point of order?

Point of order reserved by the gentleman from uh uh Maryland.

Yes, this is the this is the AN ANS.

Uh-huh.

There's two things. It extends the implement implementation to a hundred and eighty days from ninety, and it replaces the term administrator with director, which is the correct title of the head of the administrative office of the US courts. We made these changes after conversations with the administrative office. I urge my colleagues to support this ANS and I'll yield back.

Gentleman yields back. Is it fair to say l- l- l- this is basically technical with other, I guess, a a longer date, but

Yeah, yeah, otherwise it's technical.

Okay.

I mean, including that.

Okay. Uh, questions on the amendment? Do this this does anyone see recognition here? Without objection, then the amendment will No, the s- the gentleman's just on his mobile, yeah. Oh, that's right. Gentleman insists on his point of order.

No.

Withdraw that.

Mm.

Point of order withdrawn.

Please, sir.

The question then occurs on the amendment offered to the amendment in the nature of a substitute. All those in favor say aye.

Aye.

Aye. Those opposed, no.

No.

Penny the chair, the ayes have it. And the amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute is adopted. Gentleman from who seeks recognition? Oh, maybe it's time. Question is on adoption of the amendment the amended amendment in the nature of a substitute. This will be followed I vote aye. Aye.

Good morning.

Aye. Aye.

Good morning.

In the opinion of the chairs, the ayes have it. Aye. The amendment the amended amendment in the nature of its substance is adopted. Aye. Aye. The question is on favorably reporting the bill as amended. All those in favor say aye. Aye. Aye. Those opposed, no. No.

No.

The ayes have it. The bill is ordered to be reported favorably to the House. I don't know. But it will go recorded vote.

Like to seek a recorded vote, it's true.

Recorded vote being requested. The clerk will call the roll.

Mister Jordan.

Yes.

Mister Jordan votes yes.

I can't see if they would

Mister Issa.

and I mean I don't

Mr. Biggs.

Aye.

Mr. Biggs, votes aye. Mr. McClintock. Mr. McClintock, votes aye. Mr. Tiffany. Mr. Massey. Mr. Roy. Mr. Fitzgerald. Mr. Klein. Mr. Gooden. Mr. Gooden, votes aye. Mr. Van Drew. Mr. Nels. Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore, votes aye. Miss Hageman.

Oh, good.

Miss Lee.

Oh, yeah.

Miss Lee, votes aye. Mister Hunt. Mr. Fry. Excuse me. Mr. Kiley. Excuse me. I'm sorry. Mr. Kiley votes aye. Mr. Grothman. Mr. Nott. Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris votes aye. Mr. Onder. Mr. Schmidt. Mr. Schmidt votes aye. Mr. Gill. Mr. Baumgartner. Mr. Raskin.

No.

Mr. Raskin votes no. Mr. Nadler.

No.

Mr. Nadler votes no. Miss Lofgren. Miss Lofgren votes no. Mr. Cohen. Mister Johnson. Mister Liu.

Super.

Mister Jayapal. Mister Correa. No, I'm not. Mister Correa votes no.

No.

Mister Scanlan. Mister Scanlan votes no. Mister Nagoose. Mister McBath. Mister McBath votes no. Mister Ross. Mister Balint. Mister Balint votes no. Mister Garcia. Mister Garcia votes no. Mister Kim Agridov. Mister Kim Agridov votes no. mister moskowitz mister goldman miss crockett

which one is dear dear lady from washington

miss shirepoel votes no

gentleman from wisconsin gentleman from wisconsin

mister fitzgerald you're not recorded mister fitzgerald votes aye

recorded so it's two two two two two i guess yeah

gentlemen from georgia

mr. johnson you're not recorded hello hello

Uh, no.

Mr. Johnson votes now.

So, we're gonna have to do our part of our poll, so we can get the results. Uh, could we wait? We can wait until after the poll is done.

Mm-hmm. Thanks for waiting for me, Johno.

gentleman from virginia gentleman from virginia

mister aye

gentleman from missouri gentleman from missouri

uh it's

mister yes

uh who is it i just i just heard the door open where we at gentlemen from wisconsin

yes yes yes mr. grokman bets yes

Voted yes three times, but only one of them counts, right? Click report.

Mr. Chairman, there are thirteen ayes and eleven noes.

The eyes have it and the bill is ordered to be reported favor to the house. Members will have two days to submit views. Without objection, the bill will be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute incorporating all adopted amendments.

You want me to read these again?

And and st- and staff is authorized to make technical and conformant changes. And staff is authorized to make technical and conformant changes. This gentleman from Arizona is recognized. Gentleman from Arizona is recognized.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you. For the record, I have uh some submissions.

Your name is.

Yes.

Gentleman is recognized.

What were we doing on the

Letter from National Association of Public Police Organizations, uh POLRAC.

Without objection, without objection.

Uh, individual uh citizens uh from We could have a survey. uh an article from Arizona family dot com, another one from AZ family dot com, another one from AZ family dot com.

Without objection?

Latino Supervisor Thomas Galvin.

Without objection?

Um, and uh basically some uh uh bills and receipts regarding to Mister Warshaw's bills.

Talking to taxpayers?

Yes, that's the one.

Yes.

Without objection.

That is the one.

Gentleman uh gentleman from uh uh ranking members recognizer.

Thank you.

Mister Chairman, thank you. Uh unanimous consent request, this is the um Attorney General Memorandum of September thirteenth, twenty twenty one.

Without objection.

Um. a uh i've got um an article from um uh sheriff joe arpaio's office commits worst racial profiling in us history concludes doj investigation

objection

uh and finally new report reveals maricopa county sheriff's office misled public by massively inflating the costs of court ordered reforms

without objection that concludes the committee's business for this meeting the meeting is adjourned