HEARING

Select committee will come to order. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for being here. United States leads the world in scientific discovery because we've built a research enterprise that's rooted in openness, innovation, and excellence. American taxpayers invest billions of dollars each year in fundamental research to advance national security, our economy, and human knowledge. The discoveries made in our laboratories today have become the technologies that drive commercialization, sustain our industrial base, and protect our nation tomorrow. Our free and open society is the envy of the world, and we value the scientific contributions Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese diaspora have made to our nation. The Chinese Communist Party has a different agenda. It seeks to exploit American taxpayer-funded research, its policies have long emphasized leveraging foreign universities, laboratories and researchers, to accelerate China's scientific, technological, economic, and military development. Some of those policies explicitly encourage overseas Chinese communities and individuals with cultural or familiar ties to China to acquire knowledge and expertise in service of the Chinese government's national objectives. China's military-civil fusion strategy erases the distinction between civilian and military innovation. And the CCP's twenty seventeen national security law makes clear there is no such thing as a truly private company in China. Scientific discoveries, commercial technologies and academic partnerships are expected to serve the priorities of the CCP. including the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. China has openly declared its ambition to become the world's leading technological power and to build a military capable of challenging the United States and its allies. China's theft and diversion of American technology and research is not theoretical. It is documented through criminal prosecutions, intelligence assessments, congressional investigations, and the Chinese government's own public strategies. The issue before us is not whether this occurs, but rather what we need to safeguard taxpayer-funded research against China's exploitation. At Duke University, Pentagon-funded research on military stealth technologies was ultimately diverted to China. and reportedly contributed to stealth capabilities associated with the J-twenty fighter aircraft. We have a responsibility to ask one question. Should American taxpayer dollars be used for research with entities within China's defense research and military industrial base? The common sense answer is no. Subsidizing an adversary that exploits our openness for malign purposes commits human rights abuses and seeks to displace the United States is unacceptable. Over the past two years, the select committee has extensively documented research security vulnerabilities. Our report, Fox in the Hen House, identified approximately twenty-four hundred recently published publications involving Department of War funding and Chinese institutions, including more than half involving entities within China's defense, research, and industrial base. I want to thank Secretary Hegseth and his department for acting on that report's recommendations. The Pentagon has now strengthened post-award monitoring, enhanced compliance mechanisms, and prohibited research involving entities which had been publicly identified by the U. S. government as posing national security and other risks. Our investigation into the Department of Energy identified roughly four thousand three hundred and fifty publications involving Chinese entities. This included more than half connected to Chinese defense institutions, more than two hundred involving the seven sons of national defense universities, and dozens involving Chinese supercomputers linked to China's nuclear weapons enterprise. DOE is taking some positive steps to correct these problems, but challenges remain and we look forward to discussing today how DOE can move faster to close those remaining gaps. I also want to thank the National Science Foundation for its proactive approach to update their research security policy, to prohibit NSF funds from being used to conduct research with entities identified on US government restricted entities. Finally, the committee's investigative work on NASA demonstrated that meaningful reform is possible. NASA strengthened its policies, established a dedicated research security office, improved oversight, and suspended active awards that appear inconsistent with agency requirements and federal law. What the Pentagon, NSF, and NASA have done should be the standard across the federal government, which is why I, along with Senator Jim Banks, introduced the Securing Innovation in Research from Adversaries Act. This legislation simply codifies what Department of War has done, and establishes clear government-wide prohibition on the use of federal research funds for collaborations with entities and individuals on U. S. government blacklists. The American people deserve and expect the discoveries that they fund will strengthen our nation and secure our future. They do not expect those investments to accelerate the ambitions of China, a strategic competitor that openly seeks technological and military dominance at the expense of the United States. That is the challenge before us today, and I now recognize Ranking Member Khanna for his remarks.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, thank you for your leadership in convening this important hearing. Uh, I represent Silicon Valley, uh, one of the most innovative regions on Earth, and I see up close what American science can do. So let me start where I think we all agree. Dem- Democrats, Republicans, scientists and researchers, and every American agrees that we need to protect research security. Our cutting edge research cannot be weaponized by the People's Liberation Army, or dual-use dual-use entities, not quantum, not sensitive AI, not the breakthroughs that keep America safe. I have zero tolerance for the CCP stealing what American scientists build, and so do the career officials in front of us. The CCP is running a deliberate campaign to acquire our most sensitive research. That is real, it's a persistent challenge, and we need to stop it. And on that issue, we look forward, Mister Chairman, to working uh in a joint effort. But we cannot protect American research while the administration is dismantling the very people and programs that protect it. The President's own budget request proposed devastating cuts to three agencies before us today including twenty-six percent cuts to the NSF Research Security Office, NSF's Inspector General, both of which help keep our research secure. President also proposed capping the indirect costs on grants at just fifteen percent. This is money universities use to fund their research security efforts. Meanwhile, Doge fired every civil servant at NSF, NIH and DOE that our scientists relied on to assess security risks. The administration even fired every member of the board overseeing the NSF. You cannot claim the high ground on research security while firing the people who do it and cut the programs that fund it. If we are serious about research security, we need to put our money where our mouth is. But it goes deeper than budgets. The bigger question is why does the CCP want our research so badly? Because it's the best in the world. America leads. We lead because of a formula that took generations to build. Open research, the best universities, and attracting the world's best talent. That leadership is what the administration is putting at risk. With the administration's relentless cuts to funding science, attacks on foreign talent, many top scientists are moving their research elsewhere, or not coming here in the first place. And due to federal funding cuts, the number of students admitted to PHD programs this fall fell by fifteen percent. Even while overall PHD enrollment is declining, China remains our top source of science doctoral students. Nearly eighty percent of America's billion dollar startups were founded by an immigrant or have an immigrant as a key leader. If we turn these people away without exception, with visa crackdowns and a climate of suspicion, they won't stop innovating, they'll just do it somewhere else. And in the past year, that is exactly what we have seen. American scientists moving their labs to China, Europe and beyond because the administration cut off their funding. Universities are already being defunded because of their perceived politics. And now OMB is proposing to hand the final say over to federal research grants to political appointees. For too many American scientists have faced unfounded discrimination and xenophobia through the failed China initiative, which left left us weaker in our competitiveness and innovation. It's a false choice between being tough on China and protecting civil rights. We can have zero tolerance for CCP theft and zero tolerance for civil rights violations at the same time. So the path forward, first fund and staff research security, second, protect what makes us great, our research funding, research environment, and attracting the world's best talent. Third, protect the civil rights of every researcher. Fourth, keep funding the world's best research. That is how we keep our research out of the hands of the People's Liberation Army, And that is how we make sure the next great discovery happens right here at home. Thank you, Mister Chairman. I yield back.

Thank you, Rec Ranking Member Khanna, and uh if any other w- member wishes to submit a statement for the record, uh without objection those statements will be added to the record. I now submit for the record without objection a statement from Chairman Babin of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology. Now I'd like to introduce our witnesses today. Doctor Rebecca Kaiser is the Acting Chief of Staff and Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy, at the National Science Foundation. She oversees NSF's research security strategy and has been instrumental in developing policies to protect federally funded research while ensuring the United States ruma- remains the global leader in science and innovation. Mister Jeremy Eisen is Senior Policy Advisor to the Under-Secretary for Science at the U. S. Department of Energy. In this role, he advises DOE leadership on science policy and research security and has been involved in the department's efforts to strengthen protections for federally funded research and the national laboratory system. Doctor Patricia Valdez is the Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer at the National Institutes of Health. In that role, she provides strategic leadership on NIH's research security and integrity policies, including efforts to address foreign interference, research misconduct, and the protection of taxpayer-funded biomedical research. With that, I wanna welcome all of our witnesses today, and thank you for being here. And Doctor Kaiser, you are now recognized for your opening remarks.

Chairman Molinar, Ranking Member Khanna, and members of the select committee. My name is Doctor Rebecca Kaiser, Chief of Research, Security, Strategy and Policy, and Acting Chief of Staff at the US National Science Foundation. It is an honor to be with you to discuss how NSF is working to protect US critical US taxpayer investments in R and D, and in our domestic stem talent from aligned foreign actors. Research security is a vital part of the NSF mission, and is essential to US economic and national security. NSF works closely with partners in federal law enforcement, including the NSF OIG, and the intelligence community, as well as other federal R and D funders. The security of the US research ecosystem is the responsibility of the federal government as well as the recipients of federal research dollars, and NSF counts Congress as an important partner in this work. For example, earlier this year, NSF worked closely with the committee to review and strengthen safeguards governing access to NSF-funded computing resources through the NSF access program. We're grateful for that collaboration. and remain committed to working with Congress to bolster US research security efforts in response to current and evolving threats. Under the first Trump administration in t- twenty nineteen, NSF commissioned a report by the JSON to inform NSF's approach to research security. It found that a group of governments, notably the People's Republic of China, were improperly attempting to benefit from the global research ecosystem. As co-chair of the NSTC's subcommittee on NSF collaborated with OSTP and agency partners on the development of NSPM thirty-three, which was released in January twenty twen twenty twenty-one to provide clear research security direction to the community. It's my office at NSF, OCRISP, that stewards the agency's research security efforts, including those responsive to NSPM thirty-three and enacted legislation. This work is a matter of protecting American competitiveness. and national security and requires continued vigilance, culture change, and accountability. In fact, NSF recently published a dear colleague letter notifying the research community of the agency's intent to implement a policy in FY twenty-seven, which the chairman just mentioned, to prohibit the use of NSF funds to support research collaboration with entities named on restricted entities lists. Under the policy, Institutions will be responsible for ensuring funds are not used to support prohibited collaborations and for maintaining appropriate oversight, to identify and address potential non-compliance, before NSF funds are expended. The policy also prohibits NSF funds from being used by senior or key personnel with active positions with or funding from these restricted entities. This policy bolsters the NSF trust framework. which guides NSF's assessment of grant proposals for potential national security risks. NSF has also implemented the prohibition on funding for researchers that participate in a malign foreign talent recruitment program, including certification requirements of both research institutions and senior personnel on NSF awards. Researchers must also certify they have taken research security training to qualify to apply for NSF funding. To advance our understanding of the full scope, potential challenges, and nature of the research security field through scholarly evidence, NSF established the research on research security program and funded the first cohort of awards just last year. Accountability is also vital to NSF's research security efforts, and NSF works very closely with its OIG in this regard. NSF has taken and will continue to take swift action in response to OIG referrals. NSF has taken actions such as terminations, suspensions and debarments. Collectively, NSF has recovered, put to better use, or protected from misuse over twenty million dollars. Safeguarding taxpayer investments in research inno innovation is central to US national security and international competitiveness. NSF welcomes international collaboration and understands that such collaborations can advance the frontiers of science, for the benefit of the American people. The research community, industry, individual researchers, and the US government must work together to identify, understand, and address the risks posed to the research ecosystem by foreign actors that do not share those values, and improve awareness of these risks through increased in- communication and information sharing. NSF remains committed to this, and we look forward to continuing to work with you on this vitally important issue. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions.

Thank you very much. Uh, Mister Eisen, you may now proceed.

Chairman Molinar, Regimenter Kahnem, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's commitment to research security. I serve as chief of staff to the Under-Secretary for Science at the Department of Energy. The Office of the Intersector for Science stewards ten national labs, and provides scientific support to all seventeen DOE national laboratories, as well as overseas major basic research programs in advanced computing, fusion, nuclear and high energy physics, basic learning sciences, biological and environmental research. I have spent much of my eighteen years at DOE working the intersection of counter-intelligence, national laboratory security, and research security policy. Earlier in my career, my counter-intelligence worked focused on China-related threat issues, investigations, and oversight across DOE's national laboratory complex. I later helped develop and implement department-wide research security policies across multiple administrations. I share that background because this issue is not theoretical to me. I have seen how foreign governments try to exploit research environments and I recognize the importance of disciplined, targeted, and executable responses. The People's Republic of China has publicly documented policies and programs designed to acquire foreign science and technology and to align overseas expertise with national strategic objectives. That reality requires the department to protect taxpayer-funded research, intellectual property, and data. That is why DOE has spent years building a research security framework, that is stronger than it was a decade ago. DOE has long maintained four national access controls, counter-intelligence capabilities, export control requirements, cyber security, physical security protections, and laboratory security programs. I stress this. Access is not automatic, and mitigations are in place if access is granted. DOE continues to build on that foundation more specific tools for the threats we face today. In a national laboratory environment, one of the most important steps has been the development and use of the science and technology risk matrix. That tool helps DOE and the laboratories identify unclassified areas of science and technology, where breakthroughs could have significant national security or economic security implications. It gives decision makers a common way to think about the sensitivity of the work before access decisions are made. DOA has also strengthened policy for foreign government sponsored affiliated activities through DOA order forty-six point one A. That policy prohibits participation of malign foreign talent recruitment programs involving countries at risk and places restrictions and disclosure requirements on other foreign government per sponsored affiliated activities. It provides the department a clear basis to address undisclosed obligations, conflicted commitments, and foreign programs designed to divert US-funded research or expertise. Those tools matter because the national laboratories are complex research environments that include open science proprietary work user facilities, sensitive unclassified capabilities, and classified national security work. A risk-based system allows DOE to support legitimate mission work while applying strong controls, where the technology, affiliation, access, or conduct creates greater risk. DOE has also made significant process progress on financial assistance. Through the Office of Research Technology and Economic Security, DOE now has a dedicated capability to evaluate research technology and economic security risks before and after funds are awarded and as risk change. As part of award decisions where the risk can be managed, DOE can impose mitigation terms and monitoring requirements. Where risk cannot be mitigated, DOE can decide the funding that proceed. Finally, research security must include American STEM talent development. Long-term security is not achieved only by restricting risk. It also requires building the American scientific and technical workforce that will lead in the technologies that matter most. DOE's national laboratories are not only research institutions, They are training grounds for the next generation of US scientists, engineers, and national security professionals. The United States must remain the world leader in scientific innovation. DOE is congressionally directed to achieve major scientific technological advances. And that mission requires exceptional talent across the United States and where appropriate, secure and where appropriate and secure around the world. The goal is not to close off American scientists, It is to make sure that collaboration is transparent, accountable, mission-aligned, and protected. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much. Uh, now let's turn to Doctor Valdez.

Chairman Molinar, Ranking Member Khanna, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National Institutes of Health. My name is Patricia Valdez and I serve as NIH's Chief Extramural Research Integrity Officer. For nearly a decade, I have led NIH's efforts to strengthen research security, promote research integrity, and address foreign interference in federally funded biomedical research. NIH is the world's largest public funder of biomedical research, supporting discoveries that improve health, drive innovation, and strengthen American's le- America's leadership in science and technology. With that investment comes a responsibility to ensure that taxpayer-funded research is conducted with integrity, transparency, and accountability. Research security is fundamental to that responsibility. Safeguarding federally funded biomedical research from foreign interference helps protect America's scientific leadership, economic competitiveness, and national security. NIH is committed to protecting the US biomedical research enterprise enterprise while recognizing that appropriately managed international scientific collaborations remain essential to scientific progress and US competitiveness. Our approach is designed to protect both security and openness through clear disclosure requirements risk-based oversight, strong institutional partnerships, and close coordination with our federal partners. Since twenty eighteen, NIH has significantly strengthened its research security program. We have updated disclosure requirements regarding foreign support, conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment, implemented mandatory research security training, and a prohibition on participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs, and enhanced our ability to identify potential disclosure disclosure non-compliance and indicators of foreign interference. Most recently, NIH introduced a new approach to managing foreign collaborations by replacing traditional foreign sub-awards with linked foreign sub-projects. Under this model, foreign collaborat collaborators receive separate, directly linked awards, providing NIH with greater transparency into foreign research activities, stronger financial accountability ability, improved tracking of federal funds, and enhanced oversight of international collaborations while continuing to support legitimate global scientific partnerships. Throughout the grant life cycle, NIH employs a risk-based approach to research security. We reviewed disclosures submitted with grant applications and throughout the award period to identify potential concerns including undisclosed foreign research support, conflicts of interest and commitment, funding overlap, participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs, and threats to the integrity of the peer review system. To ensure these reviews are conducted consistently and objectively, NIH uses a decision matrix to assess potential foreign interference involving covered individuals and senior key personnel. Active participation in an aligned foreign talent recruitment program is automatically disqualifying while other foreign activities are evaluated individually based on the specific facts and circumstances, allowing NIH to distinguish between legitimate international scientific collaboration and activities that present unacceptable risks. Most compliance matters are resolved through collaborations with in re recipient institutions. When evidence indicates potential fraud or other violations of federal law, NIH coordinates closely with the HHS Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice. When matters of national security arise, we work with the HHS Office of National Security. Our efforts are producing measurable results. Since twenty eighteen, NIH has received more than seven hundred allegations involving potential foreign interference and related disclosure concerns, and identified possible non-compliance in two hundred and seventy-three matters. Most were resolved through administrative action by NIH and recipient institutions, including recovery of twenty-one point nine million dollars for forty-nine cases, and coordination with the HHS Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice led to the recovery of an additional seventeen point seven million for six cases. We have also seen a significant increase in institutional self-disclosures, reflecting stronger oversight and a growing culture of compliance across the research community. NIH closely coordinates with federal partners to strengthen policies, improve information sharing, harmonize disclosure requirements where appropriate, and provide research security guidance to the research community. Research security is essential to protecting the integrity of the of the nation's biomedical research enterprise, and ensuring that taxpayer-funded research advances US interests. NIH remains committed to strengthening its research security program,

Thank you, Doctor Valdez. Uh, I'll now recognize myself for five minutes of questions. I'd like to begin for all the witnesses with a yes or no question. Do you believe that federal research funds should be used to support research involving individuals or entities that appear on US government restricted entity lists. Doctor Kaiser.

No, I don't. Hence, uh, we released our draft policy in that regard.

Thank you. Mister Eisen. Uh, no, we do not. Doctor Baudeis.

So, so NIH does follow all statutory and regulatory requirements governing collaborations including any restrictions established by congress and the executive branch. Um, that said, you know, we we are discussing this.

OK. Um, does your agency have a policy that prohibits the use of federal research funds to support research involving individuals or entities that appear on US government restricted entity lists? Doctor Kaiser?

Through our dear colleague, Leder, uh we uh communicated to the community our intent to develop such a policy, along with the draft policy. Uh it's draft right now because it does need to go through a public comment period, because we're going to require certification by all of the key personnel, as well as by institutions once the policy comes into effect, that they are not collaborating on the NSF project. with a restricted entity, and they're also not receiving funds or have an appointment with such restricted entities.

Thank you, Mister Eisen. So, let me clarify things here. So, we view this as a risk factor, a high risk factor for the department in terms of making uh decisions. And so, a if this uh is something that is disclosed or something that's discovered, we certainly would uh not be comfortable with that. Um, but we do not have an ATHA policy, you know, that we're currently reviewing a a policy, uh, to implement.

Dr. Varez?

So we do regularly screen, um, our, um, awards to determine whether or not individuals are collaborating with um entities on the restricted list. And as - as uh Doctor Eisen mentioned or Mister Eisen mentioned, we - we also consider that a risk factor. Um, so it's something that is definitely um considered.

Uh, for those uh, first of all, I appreciate, Doctor Kaiser, your uh efforts to uh do the, dear colleague, and to get feedback um towards a policy. Um, let me ask you this, uh, Mister Eisen and and Doctor Valdez. Why has your agency not implemented a policy to stop taxpayer-funded research collaboration with groups, these groups have already been identified by the federal government as presenting national security, military, export control sanctions, or human rights concerns. Can you I recognize you're using the term " high risk factor", but given the fact that these are already on entity lists that the federal government has designated to be uh dangerous for the United States, why wouldn't you have a policy on that?

I'll I'll go first. So we are currently reviewing the NSF policy, right? It was just announced last week. This is something that we're studying with inside our department. Um we have a series of mitigations that are in place that I am happy to discuss today. Uh it's includes the science technology risk matrix for protecting critical emerging technologies that are unclassified. We have as I noted in my testimony the foreign government sponsored affiliate activities order. These are our attempts, as well as many other things, updates to DOE order one forty-two point three C, unclassified for national access program. The department has a long-standing layered approach to ensure that we have a managed research environment to mitigate risks posed by these types of collaborations types of interactions.

Yeah, as I as I mentioned, this is something that we're we're definitely um discussing, um uh particularly after seeing NSF's policy come out, um you know w- we agree that it it is it is a concerning um risk factor and it's something that when we do identify this um we we do take appropriate mitigation step steps to um alleviate the risk or mitigate the risk um so again you know something that we're discussing and absolutely see the concerns

well thank you for that and i would just say um that i appreciate the discussions are ongoing but i do believe now is the time for action and the best way to mitigate the risk would be to develop a policy, publish the policy, so that our entire uh federal government has a consistent standard uh that can be known throughout the research community. So thank you, and with that uh recognize the ranking member for his questions.

Thank you to uh all of you for your public service. Doctor Kaiser, the Chips and Science Act requires the NSF to maintain an office of research security with at least four full-time staff and a chief of research security. Uh, how many people were employed in that office at the end of twenty twenty four, compared to today?

At the end of twenty twenty four, uh, we had ten people in the research security office. Uh, we currently have five, which does meet the requirement in Of course we would love to build and have more, and we are in the process actually, of hiring additional folks for the office. We have announcements out on the street. I want to say though that we consider uh research security a responsibility across the foundation. And so we communicate with our research directorates that they need to have representatives focused on research security as well. Programme officers do need to as well, and they are required to take research s

I appreciate that. And why was it reduced from ten to five?

We had uh folks who did take the deferred resignation program, uh and uh and uh early retirement uh is part of the that opportunity, that was their choice. Uh so they were not let go, they did choose to leave the foundation, and so now we need to rehire.

Do you think uh it was better when there were ten people as opposed to five?

Research security always benefits from having more people in the office, and that's why of course we have announcements out to build up the office even more. I do have to say though that we are in addition to focusing on numbers of uh people in the office, we're focusing on scaling up our research security analytics and harmonizing and streamlining our processes. And intent going forward is to have research security reviews as part of overall merit review process so that we can integrate things in and have a good work flow so that it's less workload on the office and we're also able to assess our proposals for research security issues at scale.

Thank you. Uh, Mister Eisen, uh, do you uh agree that these indirect costs which have been kept, that many times those cover research security efforts at universities?

I do not have a uh a position on that. I'm happy to take that back and get you an answer.

Does anyone on the panel have an opinion on it? Okay. The do you think in general the country could benefit from more funding on research security?

Uh y yes, I think that funding always is, of course, important uh in research security. We do focus quite a bit on the fact that uh this is a joint responsibility, uh and the fact is that the community as well needs to take on these efforts. Now a lot of the information in research security is publicly available information, uh and a lot of what is good research security are good practices overall in research, uh and uh looking at your partnerships, looking at your collaborations carefully. Um and a lot of that doesn't require additional resources, uh it just requires a good practice of research overall. Um as an example

I don't wanna cut you, I just have one minute so I just have one more question, Doctor Kans- uh Kansar um how concerned are you about this fifteen percent reduction of PHDs in the United States?

I think we I'm very concerned we need to build up the US PHD workforce. And as you know, we uh funded the largest class of graduate research fellows uh this past year ever, uh because we want to make sure that we build up the US PHD workforce.

Why do you think there is this decline?

I don't w I you I'm not an expert, of course, in the

Well I appreciate it, appreciate all the witnesses.

Thank you very much. Uh, Representative Lohut.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, I wanna thank our witnesses for your valuable testimonies here today. And I wanna start off, uh I think over the course the of this committee, since it's existence as a special committee has shown and highlighted that the CCP plays by a different set of rules and standards than every other industrialized country in the world. And China has demonstrated through IP theft, forced technology transfers, coercive trade tactics, funding of SOEs, um that they'll exploit any tool at its disposal to undermine our national security and and steal our intellectual capital. And I I also serve on our house intelligence committee, and I believe it's existential that we win the strategic competition against the CCP when it comes to AI, quantum, and obviously advanced uh chip manufacturing. But brain power and intellectual know-how uh is at the center of this competition, and obviously that starts with our world class academic and researched institutions in the United States. Um, as you may know, last year this the this Congress, uh, with the work of this committee passed legislation, the Coins Act, that created targeted restrictions for outbound US investments that would fund military or advanced technology capabilities of our foreign adversaries including the CCP. And, th- this committee recognized the national security threat posed by those outbound investments um and in order to fortify our national security, uh, I believe the US needs uh full transparency and visibility into the vulnerabilities of these investments and that includes investments in federally funded research and we need to have a unified federal agency approach to insure us capital and know how insensitive technologies and dual use applications are not further seated to our foreign adversaries um in my home state uh we have the argon national lab that is located in le mans illinois and from quantum computing to advanced energy technologies the work at argon is fundamental to america's research now and for the future and the development of that ecosystem and we count on many world-class academic institutions including northwestern university and the university of illinois as partners with that my my question um to you mister is um can can you talk about current DOE guidance in place that provides Argonne and the other national labs and these universities with effective mitigation plans to protect uh from theft in federally funded research.

Thank you for that question. So the department has a managed research and environment. What that entails is we have built on a multi-decade approach to physical security, cyber controls, export controls, and added things with this new adversarial approach to S and T acquisition, as I mentioned in my testimony, to protect things that traditionally did not have traditional protections. The S and T risk matrix is something that we built back in two thousand nine, two two thousand nineteen, during the president's first term. We sat down with the chief research officers of the national laboratories, explained to them that certain countries were making investments in certain critical emerging technologies, certain countries were using illicit as well as licit techniques to acquire that technology, and three, they were having success in making uh progr progression in those topics. And so we challenged them to develop a list of research areas that have a red yellow green categorization, red areas being the topics that have the national security or economic security implications of breakthroughs and then in turn to restrict the access to country of rest foreign nationals so this is a tool that we use across the complex uh we also have as I mentioned earlier uh our foreign foreign government sponsored affiliate activities so we have a layered approach for conflict of interests conflict of commitment restrictions and a prohibition for talent program participation in particular applying to China and the country's risk. I need an, I should note that the department was the first agency to come out with a public definition and prohibition in two thousand nineteen for talent program participation. Uh so it has been a a very positive risk mitigation. So all these policies and tools uh that have been uh incorporated into the contracts for the MNO contractors as management national labs, this is the type of guidance we provide to them. We of course have counter-intelligence offices that provide support to all the national laboratories. I think that's something to stress here. DOE is unique in that we are a member of the IC, and we have intel as well as counter-intell that support the department's mission for production. Thank you.

Thank you. Uh, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. Representative Krishnamoorthy.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, research security is obviously a national priority, but unfortunately research is insecure not just because of external threats but because of internal ones due to unprecedented cuts posing I think an existential threat to our research. Doctor Kaiser, according to NSF's own web site, NSF grants have helped make breakthroughs in science, from smartphones to LASIK eye surgery. But as we found on your web site, when President Trump returned to office he proposed to cut According to your website, almost sixty percent of NSF's funding for FY twenty six. That's what it says on your website, right?

Yes, that's correct.

And Doctor Valdez, NIH has made breakthroughs breakthroughs in science related to Alzheimer's, uh cancer and other diseases, and yet according to NIH's website, President Trump proposed a forty percent cut. That's from your website. That's what it says right here, right?

Correct.

And, Mister Eisen, same story at DOE. In fact, according to DOE's own web site, this year Trump wants a twenty percent cut at the very lab that Darren LaHood just mentioned Argonne lab in my home state of Illinois down to seven hundred fifty-four million dollars that's what it says here right?

I agree that it is that is what it says, yes.

And while President Trump wants to cut funding, China is investing. This spring OECD showed that China has topped the US in R and D spend. We're killing the very research that we're attempting to protect, and that's wrong. I wanna transition to my next topic. Unfortunately, these cuts are part of a larger effort against science, which has real life impacts. Doctor Veldez, I see that your post-doc training was in immunology, right?

Yes.

So let's consider vaccines and their importance. Secretary Kennedy has repeatedly cast doubt on vaccine safety and efficacy. And last year, the periodical Science reported that NIH ended over thirty grants on vaccine usage. And now? According to the UCLA Health periodical reported here, lower vaccination rates cause measles to reach a thirty year high and measles is soaring again in twenty twenty six. That's what UCLA is reporting, right?

Yes.

Next, let's take screw worm. Forbes reported that last year Doge ended a USAID project dedicated to eradicating New World Screw Worm, a flesh eating parasite that threatens livestock. And now, over one hundred eighty thousand animals and two thousand humans across the Americas have contracted this deadly disease, screwworm. It's reached the US and as we can see here, the CDC actually activated an emergency response center. Isn't that what it says, Doctor Valdez?

Yes, that's what it says.

Next, let's take Ebola. Last year, the periodical Science reported that Trump closed a network of NIH centers for research in emerging infectious diseases, like Ebola. The stop work order called the research, quote, unsafe for Americans and not a good use of taxpayer funding." And now, the New York Times reports that a US citizen tested positive for Ebola in Congo, as the outbreak continues to spread. That's what we see reported here, Doctor Valdez, right?

That's right.

Research security is important, but health security is paramount. And these cuts are literally killing us right now. Let me turn to my final topic. Um, here's a picture of Artem Patapushin. Artem moved to the US as a teenager, worked dominoes at night, attended the University of California, and in twenty twenty one, after a long career of uh distinguished research, won the Nobel Prize for discovering how humans sense touch. But Trump froze Artem's NIH grant to research new pain treatments. Within hours of Artem posting about these cuts, China offered to move his lab to quote " any city, any university" he wanted with guaranteed funding for twenty years. Luckily, Artem said no. "Doctor Kaiser, China wants our talent." And you've previously testified in the Science and Technology Committee that China is actively reaching out to researchers to recruit them, right?

Yes, that's correct.

A poll from the periodical Nature pointed out that seventy-five

Thank you. Representative Hinson.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, good morning to our witnesses. Thank you for coming to testify about a a very important topic to Iowans. Um, it's no secret that our academic institutions have become uh susceptible to influence from malign actors and uh that the CCP is leading the charge to take advantage of our schools and our tax dollars to going to those institutions. So I think it should be concerning to all of us that they have found ways to manipulate that and uh undermine our values our way of life and our safety. Um, and I would like to focus today on Department of Energy, uh which is truly the heart of our country's basic and physical research and will be of course leading um the the next frontier for energy available and security. Um back home in Iowa we are very blessed to have the Ames National Laboratory uh conducting research into rare earth minerals critical minerals, magnetics and so much more. Um they regularly partner with our institutions including Iowa State University allowing our students to have those hands-on um experiences in an advanced lab setting and it was just last summer we welcomed secretary reit uh for a tour of the ames laboratory to see up close that work that will uh help to change the future of our energy needs for years to come so um mister eissen my question is for you today um i'm sure you can agree that uh securing our nation's energy needs from both a supply perspective and a safety perspective is a top priority and that includes of course recognizing where some shortfalls exist on the security side, um it should be a given how the c c p has been able to access some of our premier institutions. But um I wanna address how federally funded research like what is happening at the Ames National Lab could be at risk of abuse from serious actors from within the c c p especially with those um possibly linked to the Chinese military um and their web of state sponsored organizations so can you talk a little bit to how Department of Energy really triages uh the risks of foreign institutions a foreign um influence at the institutions and then what review systems do you have in place to make sure those federal grants are uh vetted properly during that review process.

Great, thank you for that question. So, the way that the department approaches research security is essentially in two buckets, funding buckets. We of course fund the national laboratories, we also fund financial assistance. And consequently we have different risk communications attached to each of those. So for, as I've mentioned earlier, the department's approach for the national labs is using physical security, our counter-intelligence presence, export controls, there is a vetting process that has been uh enhanced over the years. Uh, I should note that the vetting uh requirement was congressionally passed in two thousand, attached to an NDAA, uh, specifically identifying certain sensitive country foreign nationals as being required prior to access.

You think we need to do more there now, knowing what we know now about their their influence and their uh efforts to inter in in in in intervene here?

S that's a great question. So, we recognize, and starting some of my oral testimony coming from a counterintelligence background,

Mm-hmm.

our collaboration with the office of intelligence and counterintelligence within a department as policy recommenders as well as policy decision makers is is exceptionally important. We recognize the evolving threat, and correspondingly we adjust our policies to mitigate that threat. For instance, and there's a lot to cover here, for the foreign talent recruitment program prohibition back in two thousand nineteen, we evolved our policy based upon discussions with inside the department that that did not cover enough, right? So we expanded the scope to include all these other types of activities, uh, in-kind support, Chinese scholarship council uh offers a future employment as restricted activities that have to go all the way to the secretary for approval for laboratory employees so the bar is very very high in terms of our vetting system that we have in place, we have piloted a new risk management framework that the department uh initiated in March of this year and now we have fully implemented it across the complex. That applies a tiered vetting pro uh approach. We have included additional requirements under the four national um classified four national access order. So there is additional information four nationals have to provide, which in turn allow our counter-intelligence professionals in the field to be able to make better assessments and better advice and recommendation. And lastly on four national access, but again there's much to cover, we have an escalation clause that is now included as a requirement for the laboratories. And what that means is that our local counter-intelligence officers will make a recommendation to laboratory leadership if it is high risk as the criterias I can we can discuss, uh would indicate, then IN through counter-intelligence has the opportunity, the authority to escalate and ultimately it's an under secretary for science or in an essay or the client offices that has to make those determinations.