FY27 Strategic Forces Posture Hearing

K, t- today's hearing will come in order. It's good to see you there, Mr. Bolton. Good afternoon and welcome to the Strategic Forces subcommittee's first hearing of the twenty twenty-seven fiscal year posture of the season. I am filling in for the chair, uh who's still uh in tra- transit, trying to get here. But I am proud to be a part of this uh committee. First I wanna welcome all the members back to the best subcommittee here on the House Armed Service Committee, with maybe the exception of cyber.

No, it's better.

They have a little bit better chairman on the cyber subcommittee. I look forward to working with you all again as we build the National Defense Authorization Act. As we say here today, the joint force is conducting operations in the Middle East against the Iranian threat. We don't take for granted the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, and that is why it is more important than ever that we make sure they have the best, or have what they need and when they need it. I'd like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. With us we have Mister Mark Berkowitz, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. And Doctor Robert Kalik, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense, someone who I've worked with uh extensively over the last few years. General Stephen Whiting, Commander of the US Space Command. General Gre- Gregory Guillaume, who at one time commanded the Bust Wing in the Air Force, uh Commander of US, now the Commander of the US Northern Command. And Admiral Richard Correll, Commander of US Tr- Strategic Command at one of the bus ba- or the bus base in America right there head off it. General Whiting and General Guillaume It's good to see you again, a special welcome to Admiral Corral, Mister Berkowitz, Doctor Kalek, and their first appearance for the subcommittee. As we await the President's budget request for the upcoming fiscal year, we look forward to hearing from each of you about the complex threats you are seeing in your areas of responsibility and the capabilities you need to address them. Space plays a vital role in everything the joint force does and it's more apparent now than ever. GPS jamming has become a common occurrence in every recent conflict from Ukraine to now as we've seen in Iran. How we fight and posture our space assets is central to the success of the success of the mission both here and abroad in defense of the homeland. During the wedding I look forward to hearing from you from you how this increasingly threatened space domain is factored to your plans to both support the joint force but also break red kill chains. I was happy to see the administration's national defense strategy recognize that nuclear threats are growing, particularly with China's rapid nuclear build-up and emphasize the need for a robust and modern nuclear deterrent. However, while our strategy may recognize that threats have changed, we continue to feel the deterrent designed for a bio, a bipolar nuclear world and to pursue a modernization plan that was developed nearly a decade before China's nuclear breakout began. Doctor Kalach and Admiral Corral, I look forward to hearing from you about what changes are needed to adapt to the current threat environment and what additional capabilities are necessary to prevent deterrence gaps. Joe Guillo is the warfighter responsible for homeland defense you stand at the intersection of all the subcommittee's missionaries, nuclear deterrence, space operations, and missile defense. While many of us continue to have questions about how the Golden Dome architecture will address your needs for domain awareness, defense capabilities, I know Joe Gutlin is working hard to finalize the plan and there's only so so such such there's only so mu- so much can we discuss at this time. With that, I'll turn it over to the ranking member, Molten, for any remarks you'd like to make.

Thank you very much, uh, Mister Chairman. I I had all these nice things I was going to s- say about the rear, real chairman. Have to take a look and see if uh, well actually they apply even more so to you. So, thank you very much for your partnership, long-time partnership on this, on this committee. We're gonna miss you.

Thank you.

I also wanna welcome our witnesses and thank you for your continued service to our country. It's a difficult time, we seem to have a new war every few weeks. Uh, but before we begin, I wanna take a moment to specially welcome Admiral Kurell, Doctor uh Kadlik, and Mister Berkowitz on the subcommittee as this is our final hearing with you. Get that right?

The first.

First hearing with you. Did not get it right. The policy and programmatic issues in front of us are some of the most consequential that we face as a nation. And we must continue to work together to ensure the department is a good steward of the taxpayers' money, but also because the world we will leave our children depends on it. I also would like to thank General Guillo, as this will be his final posture hearing in front of this committee. I have always appreciated your thoughtful and measured approach, uh, as the head of NORTHCOM and NORAD, and your leadership there will be missed. The responsibilities of this committee encompassing our space, missile defenses, and nuclear forces formed the foundation of security in America. So the issues before us should be debated rigorously. And honestly. On that count, I'm gonna be blunt, speaking not just as a senior member of this committee, but as a four-tour veteran of a misguided war in the Middle East. We simply cannot ignore the fact that as we sit here today, America is more at risk than we were before the Iran war began, both in the Middle East and here at home. We should all hope for a miracle, but miracles are not strategies, and it's very difficult to see our way forward right now. Since taking office fourteen months ago, the so-called President of Peace has attacked seven countries, and through these conflicts of choice, has expended scarce munitions and emboldened both Rina, Russia, Russia and China. He has sought regime change in both Venezuela and Iran and failed twice. Maduro's regime is now headed by his Vice President. In Iran, we've succeeded in replacing an eighty-six year old in failing health with his son in his fifties. And in case you wondered whether he was more or less hard line, we killed his wife and his son. It's hard to imagine a better way to turn the pro-American Iranian people against us than raining down bombs from the sky and killing at least a hundred and eighty-seven innocent civilians, most of them little school girls. But Trump did find a better way, doing it with the Israelis. And now, implausibly, with the Strait of Hormuz closed and oil prices skyrocketing, Trump is actually losing the war. He has kicked a hornet's nest and gotten his floor-shime-shoed foot stuck in it. Russia is happily helping Iran target American troops. Some Democrats criticized Trump for enforcing oil sanctions on the high seas. I did not. I said it was long overdue, especially against Russia's so-called dark fleet. But now, as if to thank the Russians for targeting Americans, Trump is rewarding Putin by lifting the oil sanctions and giving him more money to fight Ukraine. and build out its nuclear arsenal. I can't imagine what our troops who risked their lives to board those ships a few weeks ago are thinking now, except that I can't imagine what they're thinking because I lived through similar harebrained decisions in Iraq. The president is now appealing to both China and Russia for help. That's how bad it is. You can't make this up, and yet it's no fairy tale. The cost is paid in the lives of brave young Americans, willing to serve as the president was not, as well as by children and innocent civilians. Against this back of self-inflicted geopolitical idiocy, the mission we are discussing in this hearing is increasingly important. It represents the backstop against our worst day, even as the threat is growing in scope, importance, and urgency. The Chinese Communist Party's ICBM fleet continues to exceed US intelligence estimates, and they have deployed several hypersonic weapons that can carry nuclear weapons, warheads. Russia has developed a treaty violating space-based nuclear weapon that would destroy nearly all the satellites we rely on for GPS and communications every day. And again, as a reminder, we're lifting sanctions on Russia, the only country with the capability to completely destroy the United States. Last year I spoke at a defense conference about how dangerous the President's Golden Dome idea is for strategic deterrence, instigating an arms race where our adversaries develop weapons to get around it. When I came off the stage, my team told me that the senior Republican speaking after me had just asked his staff to ask ChatGPT why Golden Dome is good. Again, you can't make this up. I don't know if ChatGPT has come up with a better answer yet or not, but I do know that the Russians are developing multiple weapon systems to attack the US that will be not that will not be defended effectively by Golden Dome, years before we will ever see anything fielded. Never before has Congress spent so much money on something so ineffective with no strategy whatsoever, though I guess the Iran war could give Golden Dome a run for that record. Now, for the first time since the Cold War, we are living in a world with no agreement to constrain nuclear weapons, and that is to our disadvantage because to be clear, our adversaries have and are building more than we are. I don't know if that's the art of the deal or not. With everything going wrong in the Middle East, it's easy to lose focus on America's strategic but it remains the bedrock of our national security and must remain a top priority. Even the right weapons with the wrong policy can be destabilizing weakening our national security. We need strength, not chaos. We need weapons to deter our enemies, not recruit more. We need defenses that work to defend the country, not bankrupt us. And we need leaders focused on reducing the need for nuclear weapons, not spoking sp- stoking an arms race for even more. I look forward to working closely with the members of the subcommittee and our witnesses to make America stronger and more secure. We often say that our nuclear arsenal must be safe, secure, and reliable. Our country should be the same. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

We'll now move to opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared comments or statements will be made part of the record, but you'll have each five minutes to make some opening remarks. Mister Berkowitz, let's begin with you.

Oh, thank you. Uh, Chairman Desjarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, uh, and distinguished members of the committee. Congressman Bolton. Um, thank you for the opportunity to testify, uh, about the department's, uh, space and missile defense posture. It's an honor to appear alongside my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Katlik, Admiral Currell, General Whiting, and General Guillaume. America faces intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. Outer space is an increasingly complex and contested war fighting domain. Competitors have fielded and operate sophisticated arsenals of space, counter space, missile and integrated air and missile defense systems. Indeed, as Secretary of War Hegsath has stated, space is the most important domain of warfare. The fight for space is a fight for the future of the world as we know it. President Trump is restoring American strength to meet these challenges to secure peace. He issued an executive order which prioritizes the defense of U. S. vital interests to, in, and from space by ensuring America's space superiority. The president also issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden Dome for America, a comprehensive next-generation defense against the most catastrophic threats facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical infrastructure, and second strike capability. Space and missile defense forces are central to U. S. strategy. They help to ensure America has the world's most powerful, lethal, and advanced military to protect our interests, deter wars, and if necessary, win them quickly and decisively. Access to and use of space is a U. S. vital interest because of its overriding importance to our security and economic Space systems contribute to all elements of America's national power, and we will secure and defend our interests to, in, and from space. Space assets enable strategic deterrence. They provide domain awareness, including access to denied and hostile territory, indications and warning, launch detection, command control and communications, detonation detection, and attack assessment. The President's Golden Dome initiative is the cornerstone of our homeland defense posture. It's a necessary and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as other next generation weapons. The Golden Dome will complement our nuclear deterrent. Today, our capability to defend the nation is limited, and its effectiveness is eroding against increasingly advanced threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense in depth of the United States. Combined with the prospect of US retaliation, it will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries to ob- pre- to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, the Golden Dome will save lives and limit ja- damage should deterrence break down. China is our pacing competitor. We will deter China from a position of strength, not confrontation, with a denial defense along the first island chain. Space and missile defense capabilities are essential to this effort because they enable the intelligence, command and control, and other war-fighting functions needed to project power effectively across the Indo-Pacific region. Our global alliances will remain a strategic advantage if our allies and partners invest properly in the - in their defense. The department will continue to pursue opportunities for space and missile defense cooperation to increase burden sharing, capacity, and interoperability. We are also supercharging the U. S. defense industrial base by cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks, and leveraging private sector innovation. We must accelerate the delivery of critical space and missile defense capabilities at scale. In closing, with the continued support of Congress, the War Department will invest in the space and missile defense posture necessary to achieve peace through strength. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, and now it's my turn to uh, Dr. Doctor Kodlik.

Thank you, Chairman uh, Dejarle and ranking member, molten members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our nation's strategic posture. US strategy is at a critical inflection point. China's strategic nuclear breakout means we now face the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear peers. This is not a distant problem. it's a central organizing challenge for our defense strategy today. Compounding this external pressure are two additional factors, immense budgetary, industrial and programmatic strains of mar- modernizing at once the three legs of our nuclear tri-li- triad and its command and control, and the expiration of the New START treaty this past February. We must be clear-eyed about these threats we face. China is engaged in the most rapid and opaque nuclear expansion in its history. This nuclear build-up is coupled with a massive investment in theater range delivery systems, designed to hold US forces, allies and partners at risk in the Indo-Pacific. A force of this size and sophistication provides China with a spectrum of nuclear options to try to deter US invention intervention and coerce a resolution of a conflict on China's terms. Russia fields the world's largest arsenal, and retains a doctrine that explicitly integrates nuclear weapons for regional coercion. Its ongoing modernization and development of novel systems, like the SIDEN and Skyfall cruise missile, underscore its continued reliance on nuclear forces to offset conventional weaknesses. The twenty twenty six national defense strategy correctly identifies this new and more dangerous environment. To support that strategy, the reality is that our nuclear posture must be a credible backstop to our denial strategy, not a substitute for it. In Asia this means building a conventional force alongside our allies and partners, capable of defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The role of our nuclear arsenal in this context is not to fight and win a nuclear war, but to deter China escalating to nuclear use in the first place, or from believing it can use its nuclear arsenal to coerce us into accepting a fait accompli. Our nuclear forces must provide the President with credible options to manage the escalation demonstrating that any nuclear use will be met with a response that leaves the adversary worse off. This requires a flexible and modern nuclear posture. A solvent defense strategy also requires our allies and partners to carry their fair share of the conventional burden. US nuclear extended deterrence is a powerful enabler of this. providing our allies in both Europe Europe and in the in the Pacific Region, the critical security backstop they need to invest in their own conventional denial capabilities. We must now plan for the real possibility of coordinated and or opportunistic aggression across multiple theatres. Our force structure posture and nuclear strategy must be robust. Enough to deter both peers simultaneously, we were to be engaged in a major conventional conflict with one. This does not mean we must match their combined arsenals warhead for warhead, it means we require a no- nuclear force sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs on both adversaries under any contingency, either ensuring that neither believes that they can exploit a crisis elsewhere for their own gain. To execute this strategy our modernization programs are an urgent necessity. The transition from our legacy systems to a modernized triad occurs during a period of maximum geopolitical risk. There is no room for error. We must fully fund and where possible accelerate the Sentinel ICBM, the Columbia class submarine, the B-twenty-one bomber, and the LRSO cruise missile. Critically, we must feel also field theater range nuclear options. Slicum N is one example. It is essential and a vital tool for managing escalation in a conflict with a peer competitor. We're entering in a m- into a new, more dangerous era. The luxury assuming a single major adversary is gone. The cost of modernizing our nuclear deterrent is significant, but the cost of failing to do so is immeasurably greater. Congress's continued support is essential to ensure we have the deterrent we need, to preserve peace, protect our nation and our freedom. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Doctor. General Whiting, you're recognized.

Chairman Desjardins, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces subcommittee, it's an honor for Sergeant Major Stackpole and me to appear before you today, alongside Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, Assistant Secretary Kadlik, General Guillaume and Chief Master Sergeant Storms, and Admiral Corral and Command Sergeant Major Nauman. And I'm privileged to testify before this subcommittee for a third time as the commander of US Space Command representing the men and women who worked tirelessly to ensure the United States maintains our dominance in space. US Space Command's area of responsibility is the ultimate high ground, from which we provide critical capabilities and overwatch that enhance joint force lethality. In space we also protect American interests from the threats now arrayed against our space systems to include our opponents' capabilities that allow them to conduct Thanks to the steadfast support of Congress, US space capabilities, ranging from precision navigation and global communications, to missile warning and real-time intelligence, provide the joint force with unmatched precision, accuracy, reach, and lethality. We saw the joint forces' unmatched integration of multi-domain capabilities in Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Resolve, and more recently, Operation Epic Fury. during which space effects were critical to mission success. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently highlighted, space and cyber forces were the first movers, employing layered, non-kinetic effects to enable freedom of maneuver for the joint force. General Kane's remarks underscore the importance of achieving and maintaining space superiority. Not only to safeguard the systems essential for precision strike, missile warning and tracking, and secure communications, but also to provide overwatch for terrestrial forces operating in harm's way. Should an adversary degrade or destroy our space capabilities, the joint forces' ability to fight as it is sized and designed would be immediately and materially impacted. At US Space Command, we command and control offensive and defensive space capabilities provided by the military services to conduct operations that set favorable conditions for our joint warfighters. This operational imperative aligns with Secretary Hegs' observation during his Arsenal of Freedom tour that, quote, " Space is the ultimate high ground and we must deliver supporting fires from our position of advantage to cover our maneuver forces." Unquote. Make no mistake, our opponents are moving at an alarming pace, developing and deploying capabilities to deny us the use of space. China has integrated space-enabled effects across its forces to make them more lethal precise and far-ranging, while fielding weapons purpose-built to outmaneuver and destroy our satellites. At the same time, Russia continues to demonstrate capabilities designed to disrupt our assets, including the potential placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit, the single greatest threat to our space architecture. These developments threaten our joint force in every domain, since the control of space shapes outcomes on land, at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace. To ensure US Space Command can deter conflict, and maintain dominance in space, we request continued congressional support of our key fiscal year, twenty twenty-seven priorities. This includes fielding integrated space fires, active protection of our high-value satellites, enhancing our battle space awareness, building an integrated command and control system, sustaining our forces' freedom to maneuver, and providing sufficient cyber defenses for our space enterprise. We thank Congress for its support this past year, which has enabled us to begin the disciplined transition to our permanent headquarters at Redstone Arsenal as directed by the President. To guarantee mission continuity, we are executing a phased relocation, operating from interim facilities while a new purpose-built command and control facility is constructed. Our people are central to this effort and we are using retention and relocation incentives to keep our mission critical talent throughout the move. Your continued support and authorizations for FY twenty twenty-six and twenty-seven are essential. to accelerate the completion of this modern headquarters and ensure our uninterrupted readiness. With the continued support of Congress, US Space Command will remain prepared to address the evolving threat landscape, deter aggression, counter adversary actions, and safeguard America's interest in space today and for generations to come. Armed conflict in space is not inevitable, but should deterrence fail, the integrated space power of our team will provide a decisive advantage. Thank you for your steadfast leadership and unwavering support to our mission. And, Mister Chairman, my posture statement has been submitted for the record and I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you, General Whiting. Uh, General Guillaume, you are recognized.

Good afternoon, Chairman Desjardins, the uh ranking member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today along with my teammates to the left and right, and represent the dedicated and disciplined men and women of the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. As the strategic environment has grown more complex, NORAD and US NORTHCOM have responded by fundamentally transforming both commands, taking on new missions, and rapidly implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America. From intercepting long-range bombers off the coasts of Alaska and Canada, tracking advanced maritime platforms in the approaches to North America, or standing ready to defend against long-range missile attacks, NORAD and US North Comm remain vigilant, capable, and committed. The commands have undertaken several initiatives over the last year to build on our preparedness to respond to any threat, including two that are particularly relevant to this subcommittee. In January, twenty twenty six, US North Comm activated joint task force Gold to serve as the operational arm for future layered defense system provided by Golden Dome for America. And US North Comm developed a rapidly deployable counter small UA fly-away kit to defend military installations and critical infrastructure. Through exercises like Falcon Peak, we are also accelerating the development of new counter-UAS technologies in partnership with GIATA four one and industry. NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to pursue critical investments in modernized domain awareness systems and defensive capabilities to meet the challenges of tomorrow. The ability to detect, track and discriminate threats from the sea floor to space is critical, and I remain grateful for the subcommittee's ongoing support for space-based, airborne moving target indicator, over the horizon radar, airborne early warning, and integrated undersea surveillance systems. The men and women of US North Comm and NORAD have embraced these new challenges and are unwavering in our no-fail mission. Discipline defense of our homelands in all domains, from all avenues of approach, against all those who intend us harm. We appreciate the stead Excuse me, steadfast support of this committee, and I look forward to your questions. We have the watch.

Thank you, General Guillaume uh Admiral Correll, you're recognized.

Good afternoon, Chairman Desjardins, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee. Command Sergeant Major Nauman and I are honored to appear before you today, alongside General Whiting, General Guillaume, Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, and Assistant Secretary Kadlick. Before I begin my begin my remarks, I'd like to take a moment to honor our fallen US service members. The joint force is eternally grateful to those that paid the ultimate service price in service to our country. This is my first time addressing this committee as commander of US strategic command and I want to express my gratitude for the committee's steadfast support. Your commitment to providing the resources necessary for us to execute our mission during this critical bi-generational period of modernization and recapitalization is deeply appreciated. I also extend my sincere thanks to the American people. Their unwavering support enables us to remain the most advanced lethal and credible fighting force in the world. Our nuclear forces, the foundation of our national security, are safe, secure, effective, and credible. My confidence does not come solely from our combat capabilities, but from the professionals at U. S. strategic command, the very essence of our credibility. As I testified before you today, STRATCOM and its components stand ready, not seeking out confrontation, but deterring strategic attack and underpinning all Department of War operational plans. The strategic capabilities provided by each leg of the triad, coupled with assured nuclear command control and communications, or NC three systems, underpin everything the department does in defense of our nation and American interests abroad. Our fundamental challenge, one that we successfully face each and every day, is to deter great power conflict and to deter multiple nuclear competitors while simultaneously adapting to dramatic technological change. This change is most evident in five evolving threat vectors, cyber, counter-US space capabilities, a contested electromagnetic spectrum, novel missile systems, and supply chain challenges. Adapting to this changing environment requires constant vigilance, sustainment, and modernization of our strategic forces. As we bring the B-twenty-one bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system online, we will continue to ensure the credibility of our deterrence for decades to come. Thank you again for your support and trust in the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and civilian professionals that comprise U. S. Strategic Command. And for your time and effort to our mission and portfolio. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Admiral. Uh, I will now uh yield to myself for uh questions. Doctor Kadlec, I'd like to start with you. Our nuclear strategy from the Cold War to the present has been remarkably consistent. Bad policy ideas such as counter-value targeting or no first use policy have been rejected by presidents on both sides of the aisle and remain completely inconsistent with the threats we see today. As I mentioned, as Doc- Doctor or General uh Bacon mentioned in my opening statement, um I think the main question is whether we have sufficient capabilities to achieve our strategy in the new threat environment we face. I understand that the department will not be conducting a formal NPR, but can you talk about uh the follow-on work you will be doing to look at this question?

Well, thank you for the question, sir, and I just wanna make sure that you understand that What uh we decided in the department, and this is uh Under Secretary Colby working with uh Admiral Carell is to do a nuclear strategy review which is really looking at some very specific issues as it relates to the two-peer problem. And that is the pace of modernization and and sufficiency of what we have already in the programs of record. We ha- we're gonna be taking a look at the theater nuclear forces issue as well, uh and and also other factors that have been identified in the uh national defense strategy. All of this is to come uh come back uh to to the president and uh I think to the congress to identify those things where there there may need to be some changes or additions made. Uh in previous conversations uh people have asked about numbers, and I think this is the first opportunity to really ev- evaluate the threat in a way that it's real and tangible uh with the commander of STRATCOM. uh uh to to actually see what we will need to have going forward. And again that will identify areas for uh maybe expansion uh but I will just pause and and remember remind you of the Strategic Posture Commission's findings, is that what we have as far as program of records is necessary but not sufficient to deal with the two-peer threat.

OK, thank you. Uh, Mister Berkowitz, the space domain faces similar challenges. Our adversaries are moving rapidly to counter our space capabilities and deploy their own and I don't think the previous administration responded sufficiently. I was disappointed that the National Defense Strategy had no discussion of space, which doesn't seem to reflect the President's long-standing uh prioritization of this domain with the creation of Space Force. How is the policy team working to set a strategy for space and align budgets to meet our objectives?

Thank you for the question, Chairman. Um, space is absolutely essential to the, uh, security and defense of the United States. Uh, the President's executive order on ensuring American space superiority states very clearly that the Defense Department, uh, will take all the steps necessary to be able to detect, characterize, and counter threats, uh, to our interests, both from, uh, very low Earth orbit all the way to c- c- lunar space. including the placement of a nuclear weapon in orbit. Um, consistent with, uh, the President's direction, the national defense strategy's top two priorities, the defense of the homeland and our ability to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region, uh, are, are fundamentally enabled by our space capabilities and I look forward to the, uh, to the classified sessions so we can get into, uh, the details of, of, of what we're planning on doing there.

OK, sounds good. Uh, Admiral Carell, your predecessor strongly supported the slick amend program. Do you also agree this capability is extremely important?

I do, ranking member uh Desjarlais. It's uh it's very important to address the deterrence challenge in front of us from my perspective, where the adversary is developing and fielding a range of theater nuclear capabilities. And uh so our ability to have a capability that raises the uh the threshold or decision ca- calculus for the adversary for theater nuclear weapons is important.

Okay, and I know we can talk about this a little more in the classified session as well. Um, uh, Doctor Kodlik, when we talk about nuclear modernization, we typically think about the major acquisition programs to recapitalize our triad, like Sentinel or Columbia or our efforts to rebuild our production complex. While these programs are foundational to the future of our deterrent, they take decades to execute and cannot pace the dynamic security environment. Uh can you talk about the importance of investing in tailored supplemental capabilities that can rapidly uh or be rapidly developed to complement the major modernization programs?

Well thank you, Mister Chairman, again for that question, the the whole intent here and there is uh efforts underway in the classified setting we can talk a little bit more about them, particularly in the areas of uh theater nuclear forces that would represent some of our efforts to kind of get to capabilities that would be using the existing stockpile and existing platforms that are available to expand our capabilities rapidly.

OK, my time's just about expired, but Admiral Corral from a threat perspective, do you believe this is necessary? And can you also discuss how STRATCOM is working with Doctor Kadlik and the Nuclear Weapons Council to put this approach into practice?

Yes, Chairman Desirele, uh, we're working very closely with uh with um Mr. Kadlik and his team on the capabilities and prioritization of those capabilities, and uh we can discuss that more in a classified setting.

And don't worry, General, so I got questions for you in the classified setting, I'll yield to my good friend and ranking member, uh Seth Moulton, for his questions.

Thank you. Thank you very much, Mister Chairman, um I thought the Chairman asked a great question uh to you, uh Mister Berkowitz, about the prioritization of of space strategy, which we've heard from the President is important, and yet that's not reflected in the budget, I mean you can They say you can judge values by the budget. And the National Defense Strategy strategy of course is well, both the unclassified and the classified versions are completely silent on space. Um Can you elaborate on why that is and what you're doing to rectify given that, given the fact that we're spending billions of dollars on something the department can't even prioritize in the only strategy document that they have, delivered to Congress thus far?

Well, I appreciate the opportunity to uh to uh correct the mischaracterization. Uh, in fact, the National Defense Strategies classified uh report uh addresses space. Uh, what I can say uh in addition is that um the Inter-Age Society is in the process of conducting a broad range of activities to implement the President's executive order on ensuring American space superiority. Uh part of that effort includes developing a new national security strategy uh for space security. Um as part of that we will be uh that will be used to drive an architecture as well as a technology road map uh that will be reflected in the president's forthcoming project request.

We look for- we look forward to seeing it. I mean you have a k subcommittee here that recognizes this is important and would very much like to invest in capabilities and we'd love to see the prioritization, you know, commensurate with what we saw from previous administrations, including the first Trump administration. I'm not sure how you rank Venezuela in space, but to me space is much more important. In the national defense strategy, the department supposes, uh, to deal with si- simultaneity via burden sharing amongst allies. It's been the country's position for many years, across decades in fact, that global proliferation of nuclear weapons

Thank you, member Moulton. Thank you, member Moulton. Thank you for the question. Thank you for your question. uh offer you the insights from Under Secretary Colby who recognized that proliferation even within our allies is not something that we would accept or or find beneficial. And so I think from the standpoint of France, they have an independent nuclear force that operates uh independently of NATO, and and I think that's their choice to make. But as far as NATO members, I think uh Under Secretary Colby is on the record, uh whether it's in this chamber or in the Senate, saying very specifically about that that it's not beneficial.

So is there anything that that the Secretary or the Department of Defense intends to do to alleviate France's concerns about our reliability in defending NATO so that they do not expand their arsenal?

Well, I think we've already done it and, uh, Under Secretary, uh, Colby again is on the record publicly in the Munich conference and during his visit to NATO to say unequivocally America extends its, uh, extended deterrence uh capabilities uh to NATO and to the Indo-Pacific region.

Well, that's great that he said it.

So.

But the reality that's transpiring is quite different.

Well, sir, I think the reality is that we have uh aircraft F-thirty-fives that are stationed in Europe, and we have dual capable aircraft, and we have nuclear weapons stored in Europe, and I think that's a pretty pretty loud statement in terms of what our what our policy is and what our capabilities are.

uh President Macron's statement was pretty loud as well. And I think we ignore it at our peril. Um Doctor Doctor Chadwick, I was I pleased to hear you talk about the challenges of dealing with two near-peer adversaries. Some might call this the three-body problem as opposed to the two-body problem and the the mathematical challenges that that presents. Uh I know General Cotton was pursuing this uh both within Pentagon but also within uh academia uh I I asked uh I got the chance to talk to Admiral Correll about this uh would either of you like to comment on how you continue intend to continue General Cotton's work and uh get us a better answer here in Congress uh then uh as the um the distinguished uh gentleman from from Omaha said in the uh gentleman's from Tennessee's opening statement, we don't have good numbers here they're really outdated and we wanna be good stewards of the taxpayer dollars to get what we need for our fundamental strategic stability

Uh yes uh uh Ranking Member Moulton um the uh the work that John Cotton has done forms the basis of the starting point for the strategy discussion and the ongoing work, in terms of um, force efficiency for our nuclear forces to address that challenge.

Gentlemen, you're back, uh, we now recognize the gentleman from Omaha, General Bacon.

Thank you, uh, Mister Chairman. My first question, well, I have three questions, but I just wanna make a comment. Mister Berkowitz, I appreciate what you were saying about missile defense. I couldn't imagine having this fight right now in the Middle East without it. Cities are being targeted. We see it also in Ukraine. This isn't gonna go away. And leaving America undefended's not not an option. So, appreciate your comments. My first question is to Admiral Correll. We're hearing now that maybe a hundred and fifty B-twenty-one bombers is the target area. I'd like you to maybe comment on that. What is the STRATCOM numbers? Are we building the infrastructure to support that?

Yes, Representative Bacon. uh STRATCOM has uh Jill Cotton has uh gone on the record and said based on our analysis for our portfolio of capabilities and the bomber leg of the triad that uh one hundred and forty-five is the number um you know from a STRATCOM perspective. There's ongoing work within the within the joint force to determine what that endpoint might be and there are of course investments that have been made to uh uh increase uh the production rate and to potentially open a second production line. That decision has yet to be made, but clearly the B-twenty-one represents a really significant capability, both from a conventional and a nuclear perspective for the joint force. It's a six generation stealth capability with stand-in or stand-off precision distance strike or stand-in precision strike and the ability to maneuver within a contested electromagnetic spectrum. So what it enables for the joint force goes beyond, you know, the strike capability associated with it. It's an important capability for the joint force.

I sure hope we accomplish this, cuz I know what we said about the B-two. We ended up with about, it's currently nineteen. I think a hundred and forty-five is uh the number we should be aiming for. Um, Doctor Kadlack, I'd like to talk about electronic warfare. I am a electronic warfare officer, uh, by trade. The PACOM and Air Combat Command say they need twenty-two EA thirty-sevens. If it wasn't for Congress, we'd be at six. Uh, coming out of this committee or or the ha- the Armed Services Committee we've been able to fund four more. I think we have enough money for two more, but I'm not too sure if the if the department's gonna fund eleven and twelve yet. So I'd like to ask you, are what's the plans from the department on an aircraft eleven and twelve, and is the target twenty-two?

Uh, so I can't talk about what's in the budget, but I would love to provide you with that uh briefing on where we are and where we need to be. And I do believe that in terms of what the Indo-Pakom commander needs is a very important factor in what we purchase and what we supply to the war fighter.

I think the all all the services in the war fighters like the A thirty seven has significant capabilities way beyond uh the old uh EC one thirty platform. And, but I would tell you if it wasn't for Congress, we'd be at six right now, and that concerns me. We, we, it's been Congress pushing the department to fund uh this platform. And so my confidence has always been a little shaky on are we gonna get to the numbers that our war fighters say they need. And my last question deals with nuclear command control, uh survivability, uh really for Doctor Cadillac, but maybe Admiral Corral would like to comment as well. You know, we, STRATCOM, Pentagon. White House, Peterson Air Force Base, we can all get hit in fifteen minutes with hypersonic weapons. I'd like to know what is the plan for the Looking Glass mission, one. But two, isn't it beyond time that we have a twenty-four hour airborne alert again, like we did for twenty-nine years? Cuz I don't think we can dependably have survivable command and control without s- an airborne twenty-four hour a day alert, or something comparative on the ground. And right now I think we're leaving ourselves vulnerable, and it makes me concerned. Doctor Kalak.

Well, sir, I I do agree with you that uh NC three nuclear command and control is probably the the king jewel in our crown of our nuclear deterrence. And and certainly the ability to ensure the ability to provide uh, you know, detection uh, decision space for the president and direction of our forces is critical. And whether that takes air or land or both, uh, I do know During my recent trip to Oma- Omaha, I saw one leg of that, uh and again, uh very impressed with the uh development of technologies. And I do know that uh looking glass next is part of the plan. So I'll defer to Admiral Carell to offer some more specifics as to timing.

I know you got a short time, but please.

Uh, thanks, Doctor Kadlik, and uh uh Congressman Bacon, and I appreciate the robust discussion that we had on you and uh in uh in your office in our office call um i would just reiterate what i've said uh previously and that we've gotta with assured command and control both both for conventional and especially for nuclear capabilities we've gotta account for those five threat vectors and where we don't have the strategic warning that we feel we need then we need to complicate the adversaries targeting problem associated with that and so uh you know mobile distributed capability is uh is what our uh uh trade space study with associated with future command and control architecture indicates. And uh,

Mm-hmm.

you know, it is likely to be a mixture of air and terrestrial mobile capability.

Mm-hmm. I yield back to the chairman, but I just think to the chairman and the ranking member, this is something that we can really work on in this NDAA. Thank you.

Th- thank you, General. Uh, chair now yields to the distinguished member from California

Uh, thank you, Mister Chairman. Uh, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. Uh, is uh extremely important. Unfortunately, we're not going to be able to get into the depth that's necessary. Um, Mister Berkowitz, you spent your entire opening uh, in a discussion of the Golden Dome. What is the goal of the Golden Dome? And what would it cost?

Thank you for the question, representative. Um, I'm gonna defer any conversations about cost to the Direct Reporting Program Manager uh since that's outside of my purview.

Well, just excuse me. Just what are you doing if you don't know what the cost is?

Well, I do know what the cost is, sir, but as, as you may be aware, uh, there is a, a number from the president. Um, I would repeat that number, but um But I'm not responsible for the program or its cost. I'm responsible for its, for policy matters associated with the program.

But then let me go to the opening part of my question.

Sure.

What is the purpose of Golden Dome? What is it to achieve?

Uh, the purpose of Golden Dome is uh, is to provide a comprehensive next generation defense of the United States against the most consequential threats, the potentially the most catastrophic threat that we face. Our adversaries are diversifying, expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals and their long-range delivery systems. Those include ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, and other forms of advanced aerial attack.

So the purpose of Golden Dome is to defend, to stop all of those threats. Is that correct?

The, the purpose of Golden Dome is to provide a defense of the homeland, and in the process, to deter coercion and aggression. And in so doing, we will do so in combination as a complement to our nuclear deterrent.

I'm gonna go back to just being very simple, who is to stop those threats. Is that correct?

Uh, that is correct, sir, the - the uh deterrence,

Good, thank you.

but, well, if I could.

Uh, mister uh general or Admiral Corral. Your task is to penetrate the defensive systems of our adversaries. Is that correct? Or to be able to penetrate those defensive systems.

Uh, that's correct.

Okay, and therefore achieve deterrence.

That's correct. The bi- the ability to hold at risk and achieve the damage expectancy for whatever particular target we're holding at risk.

War games at the Pentagon are rather common. Have you thought about how you are going to penetrate the Golden Dome defensive system? And do you have the necessary uh offensive systems to do that?

The uh the Golden Dome is a is a US capability, so we have not done analysis. on our ability and and that's a system that's still being developed.

OK.

Uh in terms of adversary capabilities we pay very close attention uh to those and

I'm gonna go to my point here. My point is a golden dome is to stop a whole array of nuclear threats as just listed by Mister Berkowitz. Your task is to provide an American system to penetrate the defensive mechanisms uh that Russia and China might deploy. And I'm just curious how you would address the task and purpose of Golden Dome. In other words, a very interesting little war game, wouldn't it be? In other words, testing the purposes and the effectiveness of the uh multi-billion, hundreds of billions of dollars that would be spent.

Absolutely.

In other words, as um my ranking uh member next to me so eloquently put up in his opening statement, becomes a fool's errand here. You defend we offense. You defend we defend back and forth. And we're caught up in a nuclear arms race. Uh, I gotta go with that.

Congressman.

I'll I'll yield back at this point, but it would be, seem to me, beneficial for us to think about this in the context of the purposes of Golden Dome and how it would or would fail, would achieve or would fail its purposes, and the kind of weapons that we presently have that might be deployed uh with China or Russia, or even similar weapons much many of which were already discussed here, that are now being deployed, developed, by Russia and China, taking us back to Golden Dome. Is it indeed a fool's errand? I'll let that hang out there. I yield back.

Uh, gentlemen yields back and and just for thought purposes uh the way the pendulum swings in Washington in twenty twenty nine this may not be called Golden Dome but would you all agree that everything that you're doing right now is something we should be doing anyway whether it had a fancy name or not. I see mostly nods. Uh,

Yes, sir.

uh, thank you all. Um, uh, no disrespect to my colleagues. Um, but I, I, I just think we get hung up on, on, on the name more than what the purpose of what we're trying to do, cuz our adversaries are not slowing down. I would now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mister Crank.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, I I apologize for my voice in advance, so I'll ask short questions and give you more time to respond. General Guillaume, is NorthKom prepared for the tight decision timeline uh needed for boost phase intercepts um and what more needs to be done in that area?

Congressman, yes we are prepared and we uh train and exercise that multiple times each day.

General Whiting, um to the extent you can share in an open hearing, how do you at uh Space Command view the cyber threat, and we talked this earlier today in my office to our space capabilities and what more can Congress be doing to ensure that we stay ahead of our adversaries in uh in this cyber domain.

Yeah, Congressman, thank you for the question. We we think the the cyber threat is a um is a is a true threat to our space capabilities. While Russia and China have demonstrated they can attack us in space with weapons like direct SNASAT or high-energy lasers uh I think they would rather attack us using cyber cuz it's cheaper for them to attack us in space. for them and harder for us to attribute. So we have to harden um in the cyber domain our space enterprise. And uh we've made a lot of progress in that area, but uh Congressman I think uh I would ask the the Congress uh to continue to support US Cyber Command as it grows out its forces and capabilities, and the forces of the individual services that they deliver to Cyber Command that provide uh defensive uh cyber capabilities. We routinely have defensive cyber teams from the different services that that help us uh harden our systems. Uh but but there's more that could be done there.

Are the main are the main cyber threats China and Russia uh with regard to space do you believe or are there other actors?

Uh Congressman I agree, those are the fundamental uh principal uh threats.

OK, and then General Guillaume, a key element of Golden Dome will be the ability to defeat uh missiles in the in the initial launch phase. However, the compressed timelines inherent uh to boost phase intercept challenge legacy command and control architectures designed around longer mid-course engagement windows. How are you thinking about your requirements for sensor integration, uh, b- sensor integration, battle management software, and operational procedures to compress the timeline for boost phase intercept?

Congressman, the the the way we need to do this is through a layered approach that takes uh a variety types of sensors. There's not a single sensor that we can uh establish and put uh either on orbit or uh on the ground that will will give us all of the cues that we need to go from boost phase all the way through uh mid course or even into terminal phase so the layered approach uh is essential and perhaps the biggest challenge that uh General Gutlein and I uh discuss is how do we tie all this into a single command and control system uh that takes probably a dozen or more uh disparate uh command and control systems and ties it into one screen where the operators can look from the boost all the way through the terminal phase and seamlessly inject all of the different sensors and effectors that it would take to uh defeat that uh he does think that we're on track for that uh you know within the n- next year or two for the demonstrated capability and i'm confident that he'll get there how about uh ai ai and how that would relate

Now how do you keep uh a hum- the reliability of a human in the loop if we're if we're using AI in that process?

Congressman, I I do think AI is nece necessary. Uh, what we usually face today, for example, would be a uh single North Korean uh interceptor. And if you looked, you've been to our headquarters, you see we have six or eight different screens and hundreds of people yelling and talking about one interceptor inbound. If we looked at a raid from a a a pier, uh nation the number that that might be we would have to have ai uh but as you mentioned we cannot replace the human on the loop to make the decisions at the right points from detect all the way through engagement uh but it would allow us to to um you know address multiple threats simultaneously which we'd be challenged to do now

thank you general and i apologize to everyone in the room for my voice and mister chairman i yield back thank you

i thought it sounded wonderful uh Uh, gentlemen, yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mister Norcross, for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman, and for witnesses for being here today. Um, the bulk of my questions I'm gonna hold off for the classified, but one that I think we can have the discussion here today is talking about our ability to deliver that one leg through our bomber fleets. Um, seventy-four B-fifty-twos, nineteen twenty B twos, I'm talking for the nuclear dual capable and what we're looking at, the one forty five ish twenty ones. Uh unfortunately over the course of last few weeks we saw uh us losing six of the or that lost or damaged six one KC one thirty fives. Uh certainly will make an impact but I far from the only ones that we have available. It is an aging platform, it's one that will uh run its time in the next um part of the century, how long it makes it, uh certainly up there. KC forty-six is coming in quickly and at some point will be dual capable. But with the increased bombers, in addition to taking care of the entire flying force that we have, are the refuelers, the KC forty-six, being delivered at a rate that is acceptable to keep our other platforms flying when we need it. General or excuse me Admiral Corral.

Um you highlight the absolute essentiality of the uh bomber fleet to enable air operations any operation the department conducts that involves the air leg is enabled by our uh our tanker fleet. I'm sorry, I said bomber, I meant tanker fleet. Um and uh the uh RC one thirty-five is an aging platform as you know and the KC forty-six is uh is uh ramping up in terms of delivery and production and um the department has analyzed and uh and indicated that we need to sustain the tanker fleet that we have and expand that tanker fleet uh to uh more platforms uh the minimum number uh is about uh five hundred and two tankers total.

And how how many of those are dual capable or are you assuming they all will be?

Ideally they're all dual capable but as you know the RC one thirty five is currently nuclear certified the KC forty six is not yet nuclear certified but we can um we we are uh on a path to be able to use uh the the new tankers to to refuel nuclear capable bombers for conventional uh missions and and that's where we need to get to and then you know fully certify for the nuclear mission and that's the survivability and endurability piece in a trans-attack environment but in the interim we accept the risk and we use the capability we have to refuel uh all aircraft

because as we look down the road those numbers are increasing those flying platforms obviously the nuclear capable um i say would take precedent but we don't know depending on the mission and how its being delivered at the rate and boeing has had issues and i think we're past the back end of that are we getting the delivery rate or do we have to look at increasing that through boeing

i would advocate for uh continuing to look at options to accelerate delivery of the tanker uh fleet.

I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mister Carbajal, for five minutes.

Thank you Mister Chairman and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. General Whiting, space debris continues to be a concern in orbit. There are thousands of objects in orbit that we cannot maneuver. And at the same time we have more satellites in orbit than ever. requiring increased maneuvers to avoid collision. This is a compounding issue, and the longer we wait to address it, the harder it will be to do so. Do you view space debris as a threat to US systems in orbit, and what are you doing to address this concern?

Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Just to put a number on the scale that the debris and and number of satellites has increased, uh, since US Space Command was stood back up six and a half years ago, that number has gone up. uh about ninety percent. So we've almost doubled the number of objects on orbit in the last uh six and a half years. So we we do see it as a concern, but it's something we have to work every day so that we can continue to derive the benefits of space. So right now the Department of Defense through US Space Command and our Space Force uh tactical squadrons provides warning to every we track all the objects on orbit and we provide warnings to um any satellite owner operator uh anywhere around the world so they can know their satellite uh potentially is going to run into a piece of debris and uh and take action. Um so it's something we are concerned about and and we are applaud commercial efforts that we've seen there's been some recent announcements in the last few months about how commercial industry is rallying to to help each other understand where this debris is as well so we think uh government has a role in this but also commercial industry.

Thank you. General Whiting, let's for one second put aside the technical and fiscal concerns that have been raised with regard to the development and deployment of a space-based interceptor system. As the com- combatant commander responsible for operations in and in defense of the domain, in your best military judgment, does deployment of a space-based interceptor constellation introduce risk to the domain as a new target for both Russia and the PRC?

Congressman, I think we've already seen that uh Russia and China have demonstrated that they're building capabilities to hold all of our satellites at risk. So it's hard for me to say that the introduction of another satellite or a different class of satellites is going to change the amount of uh capability that they're developing. Uh if we look at China, they have developed uh everything from cyber capabilities to um reversible jammers to direct ascent ASAT weapons that can hold all orbital regimes at risk, to high energy lasers, to co-orbital ASAT um satellites. So the the breadth of threats are now there, Mister Congressman.

Thank you. General Whiting, you recently underscored the need for space-based logistics and sustainment at the Space Mobility Conference in January. However, investments and acquisitions that focus focus on space mobility and logistics beyond rapid launch don't seem to have materialized yet. Despite increasing commercial capabilities in relevant government demonstrators, going back many years. Can you explain why logistical capabilities are important to sustain effective operations in space? And is the capability that SpaceKom needs in order to improve our readiness in space.

Thank you Congressman for the question. I do think logistics and sustainment capabilities on orbit are critical, and not because I just want to see that result, it's because it enables maneuver warfare on orbit, and maneuver warfare has been a uh an advantage for the United States in all domains, at sea, in the air, and on the ground. And it's even a principle of warfare and it's a joint function. And we need to bring this idea that we can maneuver for advantage to space. And to do that there's several ways that are going to have to or or several means that'll have to be required. But but on-orbit, logistics, refueling, and sustainment is one of those. So that we're not just sitting ducks and we can maneuver for advantage away from threats or uh to maneuver uh you know where best to execute our operations from.

Thank you. Admiral Corral, we all know the issues Sentinel continues to face. This program was supposed to be fielded by the end of this decade, but we know it won't be. At the same time, Minutemen-three continues to age. The test bodies are not infinite. How are we balancing the need to continue tests with the limited supply until the ground leg is modernized?

Thanks for the question, Congressman. Um, I'm uh balancing the risk of sustainment versus bringing on the new capability and working very closely with uh Direct Report Portfolio Manager General White in terms of uh Sentinel coming online we have a weekly conversation on um where the you know where the opportunities are to accelerate delivery of that capability in those conversations, we also talk about sustainment of Minutemen three. As the combatant commander, uh, you know, responsible for, uh, the ability to employ those capabilities, my, I see my job as to communicate precisely within the department where risks manifest themselves and what we're doing to mitigate those risks. I remain confident in our ability to sustain the Minuteman-three as we transition to Sentinel. And I'm encouraged by the progress that Joel White has made as a direct report portfolio manager. with uh with Sentinel.

Thank you, I'm out of time, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Uh the gentleman yields back, uh the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mister Bell, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking member, hello to the witnesses, thank you for being here. Um Admiral Correll, the St. Louis region is home to one of the fastest growing geospatial technology ecosystems in the country. anchored with the new NGA West campus. Given how central geospatial intelligence is to nuclear command and control, targeting and missile warning, how is STRATCOM integrating next generation geospatial analytics and AI enabled data from places like NGA West into strategic deterrence operations?

Congressman, we have a uh a phased approach. um and uh we've built an analytic engine to account for the threat environment for those five threat vectors that i talked about before accurately representing those threat vectors and testing the new capabilities to come online the capabilities you're referring to are part of the uh universe of capabilities that we're considering for next generation uh nuclear command and control And I acknowledge the importance of uh of those capabilities.

And and workforce development is something I've prioritized during my time in Congress. From STRATCOM's perspective, how important is a skilled workforce and resilient industrial base to sustaining long-term strategic deterrence?

Congressman, is i- it is exceptionally important. Um, it uh, it's essential.

Thank you. General Guillaume, you've been Busy today. Um, our missile and homeland defenses ultimately depend on a resilient defense industrial base. Whether it is interceptors, sensors, or aircraft, we cannot afford gaps in production or capability or capacity, excuse me, when we have numerous adversaries watching our every move. Communities like mine in St. Louis play a critical role in that ecosystem through advanced aerospace manufacturing. and a strong supplier base. From your perspective, how important is maintaining a strong domestic aerospace industrial base to sustaining our strategic deterrence and homeland defense posture?

Congressman, it's uh it's extremely important and uh we also benefit from many of the uh NGA capabilities that Admiral Correll spoke about. And then into the uh aircraft uh manufacture and development uh keeping a fleet of aircraft uh that can operate in the high arctic all the way uh down to the southeast part of the united states uh is imperative uh we have some old but very capable aircraft uh but they they're uh going through the process with the air force of of being uh replaced and i know that uh some of the uh manufacturers that you're talking about are are critical to that giving us uh longer range more ability to carry uh ability to carry more uh at the same time and having uh fused avionics that bring in uh inputs from all different types of sensors into the cockpit, all which benefit NORAD and NORTHCOM.

Thank you. Uh General Whiting, um China's reportedly develop developing satellites capable of inspecting, moving or potentially disabling other spacecraft, potentially ours. How concerned is Space Command about these capabilities being used to physically interfere with US military satellites during a crisis.

Thank you Congressman for the question. It's a capability we have to pay great attention to, cuz we've uh we've seen China demonstrate that capability on orbit by maneuvering a satellite to one of their uh defunct uh satellites, moving that satellite uh up to a higher orbit and then and then the uh first satellite returning and uh while that might have a commercial or a a civil use, it also demonstrates a military capability, so we have to consider all of those from a dual use perspective as as potential threats and uh make sure that uh that we uh have uh mitigation strategies appropriately.

And then quickly, do we have the ability to detect and attribute these types of operations in real time?

Congressman, we have the an an outstanding uh or let me say this way, we have the world's best space domain awareness capability, but I would like it to be even better so that I can main constant c- maintain constant custody of these kind of potential threats. So you asked, do that in near real time. Um, uh, we work every day to try to mitigate the amount of time it would take us to detect that, but I cannot say today we can do that in real time.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Gentleman yields back, and last but not least, uh, my Democratic colleagues had a very deep bench today, uh, and, uh, appreciate your interest in this very important hearing. I recognize the gentleman from California, Mister Whitesides, for five minutes.

Today and every day, Mister Chairman. Um, thank you. Uh, good to see you all. I tell my kids that this is the subcommittee where we have the adults in the room, and I think that that's very important, you know, when we're dealing with a subject that has the capacity to cause extreme damage to human civilization, it's very important to know that we have serious people in charge of the relevant organizations and I know that you are serious people. I have one comment and three questions. My comment is directed primarily at generally white general Whiting, which is simply that I believe that the United States is acting as the most responsible actor in space. And I think it's crucial that we continue to be so. I know that you share that commitment. That extends from public to classified worlds. Um, as we head into frankly a singularity moment in space activity, it is crucial I think that we continue to set a good example for the rest of the world on how space can be maintained sustainably, whether militarily or in commercial areas. And so I would just urge you to carry on that ethos that is, I think, embodied in the new and young, uh, you know, organizations that you, that you lead. B twenty one. Um, Admiral Correll, it was great to meet with you and discuss your approach and priorities, uh, including the importance of the air-based leg of deterrent deterrence. As you know, I'm extremely proud to represent the folks at Palmdale and um the people who build the B-twenty-one. Can you briefly describe the ways in which the ability to more quickly produce the necessary aircraft in the fleet could act as an effective deterrent to our adversaries?

Congressman, um because the B-twenty-one represents that six generation stealth capability and what I talked about earlier, it's enabling a function for the joint force. the sooner we field that uh capability and the sooner we ramp up in delivery of that capability the stronger position that puts the joint force in to uh to address uh the strategic environment from deterrence to any spectrum of uh conflict that uh that we would contemplate.

Thank you, and I support Congressman Bacon's um support of the hundred and forty-five number. Um Mr. Berkowitz, you've written extensively on our asymmetric vulnerability regarding GPS and PNT. China and Russia have developed robust terrestrial backups for their satellite navigation. Uh, does our current policy prioritize a domestic terrestrial backup, and how are we incentivizing the commercial sector to harden their PNT dependent infrastructure against the navigational warfare you've warned about?

Uh, thank you very much for that question. Um, I I absolutely share your concern about uh the need to make sure that we have a very robust set of capabilities to provide uh both space-based and terrestrial PNT services to all of our our critical infrastructures uh and especially for for national defense. Um as I mentioned uh previously the uh we're in the process of implementing the President's executive order on on insuring US space superiority one of the issues we're gonna be taking up is looking at our uh our p n t policy um as part of the overall process of reviewing um as as a new administration reviewing all of our policies we're going to be focusing in particular on the question of of the future of our space-based p n t capability and assuring that that is uh not only robust but resilient sir

thank you and i actually i should have mentioned space-based backup capability as well doctor kadlik Briefly, um, you've identified deterring adversary biological weapons use as a top-tier priority alongside nuclear deterrence. In the context of this hearing, are we properly integrating bio-resilience into our integrated deterrence framework? Or is this still being treated as a separate health crisis issue? How does uh our budget and our policies reflect the reality that a biological strike could be a strategic prelude to a kinetic or nuclear conflict?

Sir, thank you for the question. I think the key thing here is that we're in in the process here right now in response to a uh joint urgent operational need by end of pay comm commander to actually deploy a bio-deterrence approach into the end of pay comm theater. Uh and it's not focused on public health as it is in indications, early warning, characterization and attribution. And this is really the link of integrating bio-deterrence with our uh nuclear capabilities or capabilities to respond in a way where they would be decisive in response to some use of this in that theatre, and then uh again propagated globally uh around the world as well as domestically. So we're we're in the midst of that, I would be welcome to come and brief your staff and yourself on that, uh because it's uh gets a little geeky but I think the point here is the intent is we're trying to operationalize this in real time to meet a commander's need.

Thank you. I yield back.

Yeah. And I'd like to thank all our witnesses today for their uh testimony, very insightful, and I'll look forward to continuing our discussion in the closed setting. We'll meet upstairs in approximately five minutes after a short comfort break if needed the opening portion of the hearing is now adjourned.