National Security Space Programs and Activities

Mike. Today's hearing will come into order. Thank you for your patience. Uh, one of those days. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the policies and programs related to national security space activities, Whitney's favorite subject. Good afternoon to our witnesses, and thank you for joining us today. Before us we have Mister Mark Berkowitz. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. Mister Thomas Ainsworth, performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration. Mister Brett Markham, Dep- Deputy Director of the National Geospatial Intelligent Agency. Mister William Adkins, Principal Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. And last but not least, Lieutenant General Douglas Schess, the Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations US Space Force. Thank you all for being here. I believe this is the first time testifying for most of you, with the exception of Mister Berkowitz, so uh welcome back and uh we appreciate all your time and your service. Unfortunately, once again we meet to review the department's budget for space activities, but we do not have the president's budget request for this fiscal year. This lack of information makes our job much harder. Despite that, there are several topics we can discuss today that are central to how our national security space systems are currently performing and how you all are working to make sure that both our space operators and the joint force have what they need to fight and win in space. As we have seen recently in Iran, space has become instrumental to every conflict with both space effects and support to the joint force. As CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper described it, the space force's abilities are degrading Iranian capability and helping to protect American forces. Ukraine has also shown us the same lesson repeatedly with jamming becoming routine and battle line shifting with the availability of space-based communications. All our space capabilities play a vital role when it comes to winning the fight. Without PNT, secure communications, or ISR, our modern joint force would not be nearly as effective. Furthermore, and space weapons are needed to break the red kill chains and defend our own space superiority. When it comes to protecting the homeland, Golden Dome missile defense architecture has space at its center and is being developed by the Space Force's own general guideline, guideline. All these systems are going to require acquisition at speed by committed and skilled professionals who can then work with highly trained operators to deploy these new capabilities on a relevant timeline. Mister Ainsworth, I'd like to hear from you how the department is balancing the natural tension between the desire to deploy capabilities as quickly as possible, with the need to develop a robust space industrial base that is competitive and innovative. Mister Adkins, the NRO's rapid deployment of proliferated constellations has clearly proven that the government can move quickly when it chooses to. I'd like to hear what lessons we have learned and what you would do differently. Lieutenant General Schatz. as the Space Force expands into these new mission areas that just five years ago would have seemed unheard of, and how you are working to make sure we aren't thinking about space operations the same way we always have. How are we incorporating technology that allows each guardian to execute high level strategy and not just following a checklist? Mister Markham, how is NGA working with commercial companies to make sure that the combatant commands have not just exquisite intelligence, but also timely, actionable information. And finally, Mr. Berkowitz, uh, everything I've talked about is underpinned by our policies in space, how the administration plans to normalize our approach to testing, training, and operations will be vital to an effective war-fighting doctrine in and from space and ultimately our success in this domain. With that now, I recognize my friend and ranking member, Mister Moulton, for his opening remarks.

I wanna thank my friend and the chairman uh for for his remarks and uh welcome our panel of witnesses. I'd like to take this opportunity especially to welcome our new witness witnesses to today's hearing, as this is their first appearance in front of the subcommittee. Mister Ainsworth, Mister Adkins, Mister Markham, and Lieutenant General Schist. We look forward to working with you this year as operations in the domain continue to become more congested and contested and we build this year's National Defense Authorization Act. for fiscal year twenty twenty seven. Our national security space architecture is continuing a significant transformation, and it must transform because life as we know it relies on space. While most Americans still do not realize the relevance we have on the satellites that orbit above us, the reality is that nearly everything we do here on earth relies on capabilities we get from up there. From the GPS app that likely got many of you to this hearing today, to commercial satellite communications that are bringing internet to the most rural parts of our country. We have been embarking on a revitalization of our operations in space over the last decade that our country began in the nineteen sixties. As our military has become critically reliant on space cap- capabilities over the past forty years, our adversaries have been watching and developing capabilities to counter our systems. The People's Republic of China has over one thousand three hundred satellites on orbit, over seventy percent of those in the last five years. That's striking. And they include systems that could be used as weapons in space. And as we all know, Russia is developing a space-based nuclear weapon. If launched, it would be in direct violation of the Outer Space Treaty, and if detonated, it would degrade or destroy nearly every satellite in its path. As I've noted before, that includes any space-based interceptor constellation that might be part of the President's Golden Dome vision. One push of a button could destroy trillions of dollars of investment. and make low earth orbit unusable for years. Obviously, any nation willing to launch a massive nuclear attack on us, would not hesitate to quickly take out our defenses. The innovation of our private sector is why the United States has been able to maintain space superiority for the past forty years. As this committee has urged, and with the significant acquisition reform that has been legislated over the past several years, the department is attempting to more rapidly adopt commercial technology for our war fighters. But there is more work to be done. And as we look to the future, we would be wise to take lessons learned from other domains to ensure we are creating a competitive environment that maintains a healthy industrial base and does not lock us into one company for decades to come, like we have we have done with countless other platforms like the F-thirty-five. It's no secret that almost every weapon system in our inventory currently depends on space whether for communication navigation or intelligence. The Secretary of Defense has stood on a briefing stage at least once a month this year, and said space was crucial to yet another unauthorized conflict. What apparently is a secret though, is this department's strategy when it comes to space. Mister Berkowitz, you challenged me last week saying that the classified NDS is where the space strategy was addressed. In doing so, you highlighted an issue this committee has had for years, which is that space is over-classified. We went back and checked the document and ironically the only mentions of space were unclassified. However, they did not appear in the public document. If rumors are true that we are going to see a substantial increase in funding to the Space Force in the FY twenty-seven budget request we need to start talking about what we are doing the American public has the right to know where we are investing billions of dollars and the world should have some accounting of our capabilities as deterrence is only effective if your adversaries have some idea of what you can do to them space is a fascinating and infinite domain until recently we only really experienced it through the light of science fiction, but in reality space has been a part of our daily lives as Americans since the dawn of the space race, and our adversaries are keenly aware of that. Our war fighters everywhere, on the ground, at sea, and in the air depend on space. I look forward to today's discussion with our witnesses on how best to maintain US sup- superiority in space and how we can address the many concerns that challenge it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

I thank the gentlemen. We'll now move into opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record. We'll each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. Mister Burke, let's begin with you, after that I'll recognize Mister Ainsworth, um Mister Markham, Mister Adkin, and Lieutenant General Shess. Mister Berkowitz, you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you. Uh, Chairman Desjarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee, good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to testify on the department's national security space programs. It's an honor to appear alongside my colleagues, Mister Ainsworth, Lieutenant General Ritz, Mister Adkins and Mister Markham. America faces intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. Outer space is an increasingly complex and contested war fighting domain. Competitors have fielded and operated sophisticated arsenals of space, counter space, missile, and integrated air and missile defense systems. Indeed, as Secretary Hegseth has stated, space is the most important domain of warfare. The fight for space is a fight for the future of the world as we know it. President Trump is restoring American strength to remeet these challenges and secure peace. He issued an executive order which prioritizes the defense of US vital interests to in and from space by ensuring America's space superiority. The president also issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden Dome for America, a comprehensive next generation defense against the most catastrophic threat facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical infrastructure, and second strike capability. Space is central to US strategy. Space assets ensure America has the world's most powerful, lethal, and advanced military to protect our interests, deter wars, and if necessary, win them quickly and decisively. Access to and use of space is a US vital interest because of its overriding importance to our security and economic prosperity. Space systems contribute to all elements of America's national power. We will secure and defend our interests to, in, and from space. Space assets enable deterrence. They provide domain awareness, including access to denied and hostile territory, indications and warning, launch detection, command control and communications, positioning, navigation, and timing, environmental monitor and attack assessment. The President's Golden Dome for America initiative, cornerstone of our homeland defense posture. It is a necessary and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as other ne- next generation aerial weapons. The Golden Dome will complement our strategic deterrent. Today our capability to defend the nation is limited, and its effectiveness is eroding against increasingly advanced threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense in depth of the United States. It will include a space layer for global sensing, data transport, and missile defeat. Combined with the prospect of US retaliation, it will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries the ability to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, the Golden Dome will save lives and limit damage should deterrence break down. China is our pacing competitor. we will deter China from a position of strength, not confrontation, with a denial of defense along the first island chain. Space capabilities are essential to this effort because they enable the intelligence, command and control, and other war-fighting functions needed to project power effectively across the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, space forces have been integral to the planning and execution of operations Absolute Resolve, Midnight Hammer, and Epic Fury. As Admiral Cooper, the Commander of US Space Command said, space superiority has been a critical enabler to the fight to degrade Iranian capabilities and protect American forces. Our global alliances will remain a strategic advantage if our allies and partners invest properly in their defense. The department will continue to pursue opportunities for space cooperation to increase burden sharing capacity and interoperability. We're also supercharging the defense industrial base By cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks, and leveraging private sector innovation, we must accelerate the delivery of critical space capabilities at scale. In closing, with the continued support of Congress, the department will invest in the national security space programs necessary to achieve peace through strength. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you for your remarks. Uh, now we'll recognize Mister Rainsworth.

Chairman DeJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the state of space acquisition. I am honored to lead a dedicated team of space acquisition warfighters who deliver capabilities with speed, discipline, and agility. After years of laying the groundwork for acquisition reform, we have pivoted from planning to doing. We are keenly focused on delivering integrated, resilient warfighting capabilities. with deliberate speed and unwavering accountability. There are three core themes that drive our daily activities. First, we're accelerating our acquisition transformation, focused on delivering integrated warfighter capabilities at speed. We're breaking down bureaucratic stovepipes by entow- by empowering our portfolio acquisition executive warfighters with the requisite authorities to make smart, integrated trade-offs and deliver complete, cohesive capabilities into operations. We sincerely appreciate the support and efforts of the subcommittee in the stand-up and enabling of the portfolio acquisition executives. Second, we have embraced the rapidly growing commercial space industry to harness proven commercial technology as our primary option. By opening the door to new partners and streamlining streamlining requirements, we leverage the speed and innovation that the private industry offers. This way, we not only become a better business partner, But we also ensure our guardians can quickly access cutting edge technologies at the speed of relevance. And finally, the accountability is the bedrock principle for our acquisition war fighters. Speed without discipline is not a strategy. We must hold ourselves and our industrial partners responsible for delivering capabilities at speed, on cost, and on schedule. By executing the authorities that you have granted us, like the other transaction authorities or OTAs and software acquisition pathways, we have accelerated necessary programs. We are also reviewing and monitoring the entire acquisition portfolio to ensure that we are executing properly. This review has allowed us to place underperforming companies on notice and when warranted, restructure or cancel programs that fail to meet expectations. The trust of the American taxpayer and the needs of the warfighter demand nothing less from us. We continue to seek out and build new technologies that solidify our preeminent glo- global space superiority. With your continued partnership, we will deliver tangible results and ensure the United States remains the undisputed leader in space. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

Mr. Markham, you're recognized.

Good afternoon, uh Chairman DiGiarle, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you this afternoon, along with my colleagues. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency's mission is to provide world-class geospatial intelligence, or GON. That involves the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict features in geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth and in space. As a combat support agency and member of the intelligence community, the GEO-AMT we produce provides war fighters, policy makers, first responders, allies, and partners with information that we're they require to make informed decisions across their mission space and to support national security objectives. Space-based systems play a critical role in supporting the U S national security strategy and serve as a key source for the data NGA utilizes to develop and produce produce geo-net. That said, the space domain is becoming increasingly contested. Our adversaries are rapidly accelerating capability of electronic warfare systems, anti-satellite missiles, and directed energy weapons. Systems intended to disrupt, degrade, and deny access in the space domain. GEOAMP is increasingly essential in understanding these threats. By characterizing adversary ground-based operations, such as space lift capabilities and command and control nodes, GEOAMP provides insights into emerging threats and on-orbit activities. NGA is also focused on ensuring combatant commands and combatant commanders and the services receive the imagery, data, and analysis they need when they need it. We maintain embedded personnel at every combatant command, and intelligence agency, and we work in lockstep with our mission partners, such as the United States Space Force, United States Space Command, and the National Reconnaissance Office to carry out our mission. We also have made significant strides with our combined joint mission management center, a collaborative center at NGA headquarters where NGA experts and our mission partners sit side-by-side to satisfy collection requirements orchestrate a complex constellation of space-based geo-nets assets, including national and commercial systems. Finally, space-based data is increasingly vital to NGA's responsibility for maintaining the world magnetic model, which underpins the accuracy of navigational devices. Through our MAGQuest challenge, NGA is pursuing new approaches to collecting magnetic data of the Earth, including through CubeSats, scheduled for launch later this year, that will provide high-quality geomagnetic data to inform our twenty thirty world magnetic model. The complexities of the world magnetic model serve as a reminder of the importance of NGA's critical mission and its support to our national security programs. In closing, the women and men of NGA remain committed to delivering timely and actionable geo-net that empowers war fighters and policy makers, and strengthens our national security. Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you. I now recognize Mister Adkins for five minutes.

Thank you. Chairman Dejule, Ranking Member Moulton, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, well, alongside my colleagues. I'm proud to be here today to represent the nearly three thousand men and women of the National Reconnaissance Office. As an agency belonging to both the Department of War, as well as an element of the intelligence community, the NRO is uniquely positioned to meet the needs of the national security Data collected from space by NRO's overhead capabilities, primarily signals intelligence, imagery, and radar, underpins much of the intelligent community, intelligence communities reporting to national policymakers intelligence analysts and war fighters. From the high ground of space, NRO systems provide timely, accurate, and actionable data for global situational awareness and support to military operations. Space-based collection is often the only means of gathering intelligence against adversaries who are trying to hide their capabilities or obfuscate their plans especially in denied territory. However, the Interroad does not do this alone. We work closely with our mission partners across the intelligence and defense communities, including NGA and the Space Force represented alongside me here today, as well as others such as NS. Today, The NRO is in its third year of a transformational pivot to accelerate the fielding of proliferated architectures for some of our key missions. Specifically, we have significantly increased our launch tempo over the past three years, with more than two hundred satellites now on orbit, to create the largest and most capable government constellation in our nation's history. Equally important, we're making significant investments in our ground architecture to squeeze the most out of the data we collect. We are also working closely with our mission partners to optimize the tasking of our considerable but still finite collection systems. The result of this transformation is that NRO systems will be more resilient and provide greater coverage to our partners and users. However, as this committee well understands, our adversaries are investing heavily in counter space capabilities to deny our nation's strategic advantage in space. In response, we have made substantial progress fielding our proliferated architectures across diverse orbits, integrating commercial systems, and fielding exquisite collection systems when needed to meet the nation's needs. The NRO's continued success depends on our ability to innovate, invest in our workforce, and further strengthen our partnerships. We will continue to build partnerships across government, academia, industry, and with allied nations, enabling us to leverage innovative technologies and maximize our impact. The NRO continues to greatly benefit from commercial space products, processes, and services. We are expanding our commercial partnerships. We're using commercial spacecraft buses and platforms, commercial launch capabilities, and a range of commercial data sources, including electro-optical, radar, RF, and other phenomenologies. We combine these commercial feeds with national data streams and deliver the results in a more accessible way to our customers. To maintain our technological advantage and ensure America remains the world's leader in space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, we must continue to invest in leading edge research in areas such as photonics, quantum sensing, advanced materials and artificial intelligence. Advances in these and other technologies will allow us to provide better information faster to users, especially war fighters down range, allowing them to make critical decisions with the best information. The key to accomplishing our mission is our workforce, which is a blend of government, civilians, and members of the m- every military service, and especially the Space Force. The NRO is a relatively small organization, but has an extraordinarily talented and dedicated team of professionals with deep technical ex- competence in systems engineering, acquisition, operations and program management, devoted to delivering on the mission every day, on orbit, on the ground, and everywhere in between. We take acquisition discipline and financial stewardship very seriously to ensure taxpayers' dollars are wisely spent. One of our program offices was recently awarded the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award by the Department of War, and I'm also pleased to report that the NRO earned its seventeenth consecutive clean financial statement audit fiscal year twenty twenty five. In closing, with Congress's continued support, the NRO is well positioned to provide the systems and capabilities to the nation needs for intelligence. On behalf of everyone at the NRO, thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Atkins. Uh, now I would like to recognize Lieutenant General Shish for five minutes.

Chairman Dejarle, Ranking Member Moulton, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Space Force today. Space superiority is a joint force priority and is critical to joint force success. The Space Force achieves space superiority through space control. Space control encompasses offensive and defensive counter space operations across multiple domains to protect the joint force from space-enabled attack and ensure freedom of action in space while denying the same to any potential adversary. Space force operations are foundational to our national security and to the ability of the joint force to deter and if necessary defeat our adversaries. Guardians have provided critical intelligence, missile warning, satellite communications, position navigation and timing, and electromagnetic warfare to the joint force in support of operations Midnight Hammer and Absolute Resolve. Additionally, Guardians are an integral part of our Operation Epic Fury. As you heard Honorable Berkowitz say earlier, the CENTCOM Commander, Admiral Cooper, recently stated, quote, "Our space superiority has been a critical enabler to this fight. Unseen by the world, the Space Force is doing two things. First, they are degrading Iranian capability, and second, they are helping to protect American forces." In the service we are aligning resources, mission areas, infrastructure, and guardians to achieve space superiority. The Space Force is investing significant resources in modernizing and upgrading our missile warning and missile tracking c- architecture to respond to evolving adversary threats and capabilities. We understand the critical utility GPS provides military and civil users worldwide. and that GPS is an attractive target for our adversaries. Jamming and spoofing are current and growing threat to GPS. We are modernizing GPS to mitigate these threats. The vital importance of our facilities and infrastructure as weapon platforms cannot be overstated. Our infrastructure is foundational to the launch and operational missions we conduct. And while we have guardians currently in harm's way, most of our combat readiness guardians are employed in place at their home stations executing their mission from their installations. As a service, we must support both of those situations. Space force launch ranges are indispensable national assets critical to our nation's ability to maintain space superiority and expand the space economy. Launch rates have drastically increased at our ranges in the recent years, and are expected to continue to rise, emphasizing the need to plan, fund, and execute requirements to sustain and improve the ranges and their supporting infrastructure. Finally, space superiority mission requirements will necessitate growing our force size and infrastructure over the next

I uh appreciate all your open remarks and testimony. We'll now turn to the questioning portion of the hearing.

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

And I'll start by recognizing myself uh for five minutes. Uh, Lieutenant General Schatz, in February a Vulcan rocket once again experienced an anomaly shortly after launch. One of the four solid rocket booster experienced a rapid decrease in pressure and burned through another nozzle. Ultimately, the main engines compensated and the payload was successfully deployed. However, as a result, the Space Force has announced a pause for all future Vulcan launches until the root cause is determined. What is the operational impact of what will probably be at least a six month delay to any Vulcan launch?

Chairman, thank you for the question. Uh, as you know, first off, we're we were very concerned about uh this, but we are very happy that the satellites were placed in the proper orbit, uh and will be able to perform their missions. Um, we are actively looking through what the impacts will be. As I think you've seen, uh we will be moving a GPS launch from the Vulcan to uh to another provider. And then we are actively looking at several launches coming up to see what we can do for, can we extend the current s- uh satellites that are on orbit, and what we can do to maybe move other satellites to different providers. Uh, but the effect is several, including uh next generation Geo, uh, Silent Barker, WGS, some NRO satellites, and some space domain awareness. But with my teammate, Mister Tom Ainsworth, we are working through that, and we will come back to you when we have some more information on that. Uh, but we we understand this and we're actively working it.

OK. And thank you. And you may have, uh, answered Mr. Ainsworth's, uh, question, but I was going to ask what options are being considered by your office and the PAE, to mitigate those operational impacts.

Certainly, sir. Um, just to, uh, expand a little bit from Lieutenant General Shess, uh, we are d- looking at different options, um, as far as how we're handling this. Um, I've given the action to all of the p- all of the PAs and PEOs. to examine what launches we may be able to distribute, uh, our ride share options, what other options we have, uh, to continue to deliver the capabilities we need to deliver. Additionally, we've taken, uh, a very, um, uh, strong step forward with our industrial partners, Northrop Grumman, ULA, as well as the parent companies Northrop, or, uh, Boeing and Lockheed, the NRO team, and the Space Force teams working together to go and to r- try to resolve this issue as fast as possible. The investigation is still ongoing, but we are very focused on getting the fleet up and running.

OK, I was sticking with you, with the addition of uh new mission areas for the service like space-based sensing and targeting and the increased effort for Golden Dome is the Space Force's acquisition workforce sized appropriately to execute successfully for these programs?

So, sir, we we certainly need to grow as we go into the future. Uh, we are developing the acquisition workforce to support the efforts that we need to do going forward. Uh, but we do look f- to continued support to expand, uh, our acquisition capabilities.

With the new training approach for guardians, how does that impact the acquisition workforce in terms of manning the program's support?

So we're working very closely with the service to ensure that we get all of the, uh, appropriate training and we can grow the acquisition workforce the way we need to. Uh, we do benefit from the operational, uh, connection and ensuring that our acquisition professionals and warfighters understand what the operational uh, capabilities and needs are, uh, but we continue to work that with the service.

OK, I'll t- we'll turn to the Honorable Berkowitz for the next question. Uh, the this subcommittee has long advocated for the reclassification of spro space programs as part of the effort to normalize the use of space and its place in the joint fight. Your predecessor, Doctor Plum, made good progress on this effort. Talk a bit about your approach, uh, to this issue and what are your priorities when it comes to classification for space systems.

Uh, thank you for the question, uh, Chairman. Um, first off I'd like to say that, uh, the department is continuing to implement, uh, the decisions of the prior administration with respect to classification reform. Uh, beyond that, um, I'd, I'd like to say first off that, or second off, that, um, what we're really focused on is ensuring proper classification of our programs. Um, in some cases that means, uh, classifying them to protect intelligent sources and methods, to protect scientific and technological advances, uh to classify them properly, to protect our forces, our their capabilities and their operations, and at the same time we also need to take into account and are doing, so doing, uh the needs of the war fighter to make sure that uh they can train and exercise like they're going to fight, uh and make sure that they can plan and deploy and and execute operational capabilities. Um as part of that endeavor we are um going to be reviewing our overall uh space policy with respect to classification and uh and and hope to continue and grow upon the efforts of the prior administration.

Yeah I'm gonna cheat just a little bit, my time's expired, but Mister Adkins uh people always have a lot of praise for the NRO when it comes to how you acquire systems. From your perspective what are the key things that you all do that enable that success, and how important Is it for you to have Space Force personnel in these jobs?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, thank you for the question. Uh, first of all, uh, with regard to Space Force, it's absolutely critical. They're part of the team. They're nearly a third of our workforce and and having Space Force guardians as part of the NRO team, uh, provides a a mutual bene benefit both to the NRO and the Space Force. We get the guardians, uh, to support us across acquisition operations intelligence and cyber. At the same time the guardians learn how the NRO does its mission, both from acquisition operations and supporting the intelligence community. So I think uh it's that's mutually beneficial to both and and we uh want to continue that partnership with respect to acquisition uh there's there's sort of three main things that I would say and I know we're we're over time but uh to to summarize real quickly I think first of all it's not a matter of authorities. It's a matter of culture, of people, uh and and and incentives and the the three main things are the tone at the top that's set in terms of prioritization of technical competency and expertise and management discipline the second is a flat organization the NRO is a very small organization it's very flat and the director has control over people programs budgets uh contracting security and is able to move quickly when necessary. that clarifies accountability. The third piece is that space is a profession and that trying to complete uh complex jobs can't be done with a high turnover rate. A lot of the people at the NRO uh have been at their jobs more than five years, some more than ten, and even a lot that have been there m- twenty years or not. The the learning curve on space is extremely steep and it's time on target to study those and develop that kind of trade craft and experience to deliver those systems. Thank you.

I'm usually a pretty punctual person, but I think it was important to hear that and I'll show a little attitude to my colleagues. I will now recognize Mister Garamendi from uh California for questions.

Think I was the last one here.

Oh, you were the last one, I'm sorry, I wasn't uh

Norcross, okay.

Mister Norcross, I'm so sorry. Well, you are now recognized.

Uh, a call to Lyman scrimmage, huh? Okay. Uh thank you for being here certainly uh a number of issues that uh I wanna talk about unfortunately some of those will be held for a classified meeting but the one that I think I just wanna expand on um primarily is we're looking at the budget for space in general and the priorities uh increasing at a rapid pace. And next year, depending on what numbers you're listening to, that increases even more rapidly. We have a defined industrial base that is growing, but does not have the maturity of much of the other programs and other uh services. Given what is on the platter for the next few years, I just wanna expand, where do we think that industrial base, that mature industrial base is going to come from? The existing workforce and companies? Or are we looking well beyond that? Because I just, I don't see, with the numbers that I've seen, and the programs that we have coming, I'm not sure, it's coming from somewhere else. And I'd like to hear each of your views on the capacity of the industrial base to handle what is coming up. Mister Berglitz if you wanna start.

Um I'd I'd propose to defer to my colleagues uh who are responsible for acquisition management and uh and have a much deeper understanding of the industrial base or

Well, when policy comes you have to have a view of the world. and i just wanted to give you the opportunity if you don't want to answer that's fine i just

what i'll say is i believe the industrial base uh is there to do what uh what the demand signal is going to be and in fact it's grown dramatically because of the uh the rapid expansion and fatality of our commercial space sector um and the department as i mentioned is really seeking to leverage the the innovation the know how and the technology developed by the private sector so Uh, I'm I'm very optimistic that the industrial base can meet the department's needs.

Mr. Hingsworth.

Thank you very much for the question. Uh, I I would acknowledge that it is a challenge uh as we expand out, both on the acquisition side as well as within industry. Uh, that being said, I have to concur, we have seen rapid growth uh in the commercial space market. Um, there are companies today that weren't around yesterday or even a few months ago. And so that continued growth and the continued investment, um, both within some of the traditional companies as well as new entrants to the market and private equity and others um, have given us the ability to start to address uh the issues and the challenges that we have going forward. Um, so I'm I'm likewise optimistic that we will be able to address it, but it is a challenge that we'll have to work through as we go through.

Just to expand a little bit, do you think uh our education system is graduating or moving on enough of the engineers and technicians that you believe we all need. Because again, you're not the only service that is growing, it's across the board.

No, absolutely, I think that's another thing that w- uh, with this growth we're able to express that demand signal to students and to the academic community to help support us as we try to build our relationships with the academic community I believe that's an opportunity uh to grow that as well. Um, again, it, it, there are limitations to this, but this is a challenge, uh, that we intend to take on and, and hope to deliver.

Thank you. Sir, as the, uh, functional manager for Geo-int, uh, NGA facilitates a requirements driven process, uh, on behalf of the community and develops, uh, statements of capability that we work hand in glove with, uh, NRO, uh, from a national standpoint to articulate a requirement. Uh, they obviously work directly uh with the uh defense industrial base to develop capability that addresses those requirement sets so we don't have a direct role in that but we do certainly influence that I would say from an analytic perspective we do have concern about the population of experts in the uh geomatics fields uh that our universities are cranking out and we have put some concerted effort into trying to get uh talent uh in our pipeline through internships and things of that nature, to be able to the exquisite capabilities that we're putting on space.

Sorry, sorry, give the question. Uh, I believe there's more money going into space generally now than ever before.

No question.

Uh, so that that bodes well for the industrial base. Uh, and and I think the government on the government side, the national security side were competing more contracts than ever. And I think that also bodes well, but there are definitely areas where there's supply chain issues, particularly in uh down in uh second third fourth tier suppliers that we have to monitor and uh and and uh track in the supply chain so um I think the key thing that the government can do is to provide a stable demand signal I think starts and stops on programs that that causes the kind of churn that is actually highly corrosive to the industrial base So I think stability in programs is is critical. Um

Well

and I think the government has done a pretty good job of of leveraging the commercial world, but could do better. But uh it's managing the industrial basis is critically important. Thank you.

And it all falls to you. Can you get it done? Because and just to refresh sort of the the focus is is the increase the volume that we're looking at across the board. You don't have the history of starting and stopping programs with some of our other services. So, history has been kind to you in general. So, I think they've had the demand signal, that's why the private sector has grown and certainly has helped us in the Vulcan. But, overall capacity is just stunning, what we're talking about, that has to be produced. and delivered.

Ye- yes, sir. Uh, kind of outside my uh my area, but I do work with uh uh with Mister Ainsworth on this, and I would say I'm I'm also optimistic uh of that. I would say too the Space Force has several university uh programs that we work for, that not necessarily a person comes into the Space Force, but actually gets some of that experience that might then go into the defense industrial world.

Thank you. I exceeded my time. Sorry, Chairman.

Chairman yields back. Uh, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, General Bacon.

He says that loosely. Welcome, and thank you for being here. We appreciate your leadership. America wants to own the high ground. I think we do. We we leverage space more than any other nation. It's integral to how we war fight. But the bad guys know it. And they're gonna do everything they can to deny us space on day one of the war. So the decisions we make today, yesterday, tomorrow are so important to future victory. So I appreciate your dedication of the space fight that we're gonna have, or that we're trying to deter so we don't have it. My first question deals with commercial geo-intelligence. Uh, there's a lot more of it that keeps growing. It's gonna give us the ability to rapidly surge global collection, extend imagery access to over a million government users, support domestic disaster response, strengthen information sharing with allies and partners, and get through some of the classified barriers that we've had. So, I hope, I'd like to know that we're leveraging it to the max extent that we can to augment our actual more classified systems. So, Mister Atkins, how do you synchronize commercial and national collections for surge operations? How do you create the synergy that we need?

So, um, in partnership with NGA, who's our functional manager for GeoINT, uh, we look at the architecture as a whole and try to find the best athlete for our collection. So we try to integrate commercial into the tasking and management and data, uh, to combine commercial and the national technical means in a way that puts the best athlete against whatever the the target is. As you clearly point out, commercial has the benefit of being, you know, the shareable data with, uh, it's unclassified data that's shareable with allies and partners, and it helps, uh, increase and complement the coverage of our national systems. And that greater coverage allows more revisit time and and better intelligence. So

It's definitely a forceful. I always could go to Mister Markham uh next and just say, how are you validating disseminating commercial imagery fast enough for edge users and allies and partners? Mister Markham.

Thank you for the question, sir. Uh, as Mister Atkins mentioned, we have uh fully integrated commercial capability into our GUEnd architecture. uh not only commercial imagery, think pixels, but also commercial data products and services. Uh we have a team uh that is laser focused on uh sussing out specific capabilities against stated requirements that we leverage uh directly through contract vehicles uh we call them Luno A and B uh that are focused on uh things like maritime domain awareness, space domain awareness uh and other high interest areas uh that are uh combatant commands and some of our other partners across government are interested in. So, uh, as pointed out, uh, we, uh, do not look at it as a - as a sensor-driven process. We look at it as a requirements-driven process and what sensors are best utilized to satisfy those requirements. We've also fully integrated commercial into our analytic workflows from a geospatial intelligence perspective so that our analysts are leveraging national systems alongside commercial as well as the proliferated architecture the Department of War has uh sponsoring, and the foreign uh information that we are uh in receipt of.

Thank you.

So I think it's it's it's it's maturing at a rapid pace.

It surely augments our capabilities. Charles, uh where where where does commercial Geolint plug into your operational C two uh today?

Representative Bacon, thanks for the question. We uh obviously work with our partnership uh partners at NGA. on that I think you've you've heard of some of the programs that we're working through, and what we do is we have a a great uh cooperation with them when a commander in the field needs uh products that uh maybe need to be on a different time-line maybe need to be able to share those with uh allies and partners. Uh we work with them to see if that product is already there at the right classification level if not then we're able to go out to the commercial companies and purchase that uh through the contracts that the NGA does and then provide that to the commander. for planning purposes. And so we have a great, uh, relationship and, uh, we continue to work through that.

Great. Thank you. Got one question for Mister Ainsworth. You know the updated GPS ground segment, the Generation Generation Operational Control System, or OCX, has been a troubled acquisition program for years. It began around twenty ten, was supposed to be operational in twenty eleven. Uh, it, I think it was delayed for about a decade roughly. It went from a three billion dollar estimate to a seven billion dollar cost. of seventy percent and I think we're still struggling with it. Can you tell us what went wrong or what are we learning from this? Please give us insight what happened.

Uh, sir, I think for uh uh it'll probably take a longer conversation to walk through a lot of the history. Um, I think it's been uh problems in program management, problems with contractor performance, problems in system engineering uh both on government and on the contractor side over a number of years. Um, it's a very stressing uh program. Um, we are still considering how to ensure, uh, we move forward. The GPS capabilities that we get out of three F, um, and three and the rest of the constellation are critical to the nation going forward and we will ensure that we have a ground system that works.

Okay. I yield.

The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Representative Bell.

Thank you, Mister Chairman and Ranking Member, to the witnesses, thank you for being here. I'm proud to represent St. Louis, home to one of the fastest growing geospatial technology ecosystems in the country. With deep expertise across academia, startups and industry, our region plays a critical role in advancing our national security. St. Louis ho- is home to roughly a quarter of the national geospatial intelligence agency's workforce. And just this year NGA opened its state of the art new campus in North St. Louis. This facility will serve as a hub for talent, workforce development, and innovation across the geospace enterprise that is thriving in the Gateway City. Uh, Mr. Markham, the Geospatial Workforce Development Pilot Program at the University of Missouri-St. Louis is a strong example of how partnerships between academia, industry, and NGA can build. The talent pipeline our national security depends on. How important are programs like this to meeting future geospatial workforce needs? And how can the department help expand this model?

Thank you, sir, for the question. Uh, to answer it pointedly, it's critically important. Uh, we have a strategic workforce plan at NGA, uh, that outlines our critical skill sets and work roles that we need to fill over a five year period. Uh, the Geospatial Workforce Development pilot program that you referenced recently kicked off in the St. Louis region. While it is nested in one university, it affects the broader ecosystem across the St. Louis region. So we have a very aggressive uh recruitment uh process uh in the St. Louis region to acquire the talent that we need, the technical skills. We work with the universities and other institutions to ensure that they are providing the requisite training and developing the talent that would be useful, uh in the NGA workforce. Uh, and we see it as a role model, uh, where we transition, uh, from elementary school, if you will, all the way through high school into internship programs that then convert into full-time employment with the federal government. So to be able to recruit, uh, develop and retain a modern skill set workforce in the St. Louis region is absolutely critical as a number of our, uh, activities occur only in the St. Louis footprint, as you're well aware, sir.

And in your state -

Uh, we're very supportive of that.

And and in your s- and thank you for that. And in your statement you emphasize NGA's commitment to ensuring combatant commanders receive the im- imagery and intelligence analysis they need no matter the time or place where they are you also mentioned bringing together combatant commands for a collection summit last fall and support US Indopaycom during last month's keen edge exercise. Could you expand on how these efforts have strengthened NGA's support to US Indopaycom and how they might apply more broadly to other combatant commands.

Yes, sir, uh, at a high level we have a NGA support team in every combatant command globally. Uh, that team is their purpose built and purpose uh focused on satisfying requirements, uh leveraging reach back into our uh headquarters elements as well. With respect to the collection summit you referenced in last October, uh that was a proactive uh initiative to bring combatant command J twos and J threes, so the intelligence and the operators together uh across all combat commands to have a very focused conversation on the collection requirements process to determine whether or not the collection requirements they had articulated are current and ready uh and how we were gonna get after resolving and satisfying those requirements. We then took a deeper dive into US Endo Paycom specifically and participated in Keen Edge, which was an exercise whereby we embedded NGA professionals with subject matter expertise to run through the exercise process, if you will, to discover, uh, if you will, what's working, what's not working from a collection requirement standpoint, and being able to make adjustments that affect real-world operations. Similarly, we have already engaged with USU comm, US Afri comm, US CENT comm, US SO comm, and we're on a path to touch all of the combatant commands to ensure that we have a process in place that is responsive to their needs.

And uh one more question for you, Mister Markham, and for Mister Berkowitz too. Um, how can we better leverage NGA's capabilities to advance our national security? Are there specific areas where NGA's capabilities could be further utilized? And how can Congress help support these efforts?

Sir, uh, I would say I would boil that down into three distinct areas, the the workforce uh acquisition, talent acquisition that we've already discussed,

Mm-hmm.

but in the mission space, Uh, it is critically important that we're, we acquire, we integrate, and we adopt automation, artificial intelligence, and machine learning in very deliberate ways that cut across all of our mission areas to include our foundation mission, think maps and charts, as well as our analytic mission, which is both regional and functional on a wide range of global activity. Uh, the third bit I would say is focused on acquisition reform. At NGA we're being proactive in the adoption of the PAE construct. so that we are more agile in terms of acquiring a new technology and then rapidly inserting that technology into our workforce in ways that we have not done in years past.

Mr. Burke was

Uh, mindful of the time, I'll just say that I concur with my colleague. I thought he did a very good job of articulating it. Good answer.

I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes a gentleman from Colorado, Representative Crank.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, uh General from uh from enabling missions uh such as Absolute Resolve and Operation Midnight Hammer to supporting ongoing operations. Today the Space Force has become really the central uh delivering global uh central has become central to delivering global awareness and decision advantage. Admiral Cooper said that our space superiority has been a critical enabler uh to Operation Epic Fury. How did space-based capabilities contribute to those operations and what role Combat Forces Command playing?

Representative Crank, thanks. Great to talk to you the other day.

You bet.

Appreciate the conversation. Um, Combat Forces Command, which is uh in uh the city of Colorado Springs there, Peterson Space Force Base, uh so they uh generate forces uh for our uh service components. And so they're the ones that make sure that the forces are either uh they're gone through a what we call a space force generation process, so that means that they are ready, that they've been trained, and then they're committed to whatever combatant command that they're doing that operation. The majority of those forces are committed to US space command, but some of those forces are uh presented in this case to to US central command. And then we have service components that execute those operations, so s- uh combat force command is critical to how we tell how we do operations uh to our combatant commands. Specifically in asking, you know, what we have done, we have done um incredible what we call missile warning uh capability. Uh the folks that are uh there in uh the Colorado uh do an incredible job of uh making sure that they know that a missile's been launched where it is going, and then be able to warn uh the uh soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians uh and to make sure that they're safe. They've also provided satellite communications uh from uh folks there at Schriever uh doing communications and then serve some electromagnetic and we could probably talk a little bit more about this in the in the closed session.

Great, thank you. When we spoke last week, we talked about the infrastructure needs of the Space Force to continue the fight against Iran and the successful logistics change that the Space Force has established to meet those needs. Um, how is Space Force leveraging forward supply change to sustain flight?

Yes sir, thank you for the question. Uh, we have a great uh partnership with the Defense Logistic Logistics Agency. Uh, and we are working through how we get parts to those folks that are uh down range doing the mission. Uh, and uh any time that we're in a situation like this, there's a prioritization by the combatant commander uh doing that, so in this case Admiral Cooper. Uh, and then we work through from a Space Force perspective of how we get the prioritization up for the capabilities. And as I think three of us now have mentioned Admiral Cooper's uh quote, uh you can see that that's a high priority to get that uh, but we are uh putting force uh uh putting parts forward in other locations and then using them to get to the to the folks that need them. Um we're continuing to learn on that as we grow out our logistics uh capability in the United States Space Force. Uh but uh the team has done a really good job making sure that the forces forward have exactly what they need to be able to get the mission done.

Uh you know and we've uh despite the continued investments in data platforms across the department we're still seeing challenges in sharing operational data across uh services and combatant commands. Uh the Department of the Air Force's unified data libraries demonstrated success in aggregating and operaly operationalizing, uh, space domain awareness data at scale. How has the Space Force utilized the UDL and what benefits have you seen as it's come online?

Uh, yes sir, thank you for the question. Uh, the UDL is a great uh technology uh that we can put uh information uh specifically space domain awareness information at different classification levels. And then it allows, if you are cleared to that classification level, to go in there and get that information. It's allowed us to put it to the - to the lowest level to be able to get the information, all the way up to the - to the highest levels as well. It also, uh, be- because of the different classification allows us to work with our mission partners and also our, uh, allies and partners to be able to provide that information. So it's - it's doing great. We need to continue to work on that as we continue to bring on more sensors for uh space domain awareness but it is - it is working really well.

Um, and, Mister Adkins, uh, I was encouraged to read in your testimony that you said, quote, the NRO continues to greatly benefit from commercial space sector advances in products processes and services, uh, unquote, including electro-optical data. This is especially helpful considering the NRO's efforts to cut commercial imagery funding last cycle with little regard for the downstream effects. uh, imagine how much more difficult planning for epic fury, midnight hammer, or absolute resolve would have been without ready access to imagery of what's happening in those contested environments. And it's also vital to maintain in space sensing capabilities as on-orbit warfare continues to advance and is becoming a foundational element of modern warfare. I hope that your testimony can be construed as support for robust funding of the commercial image budget and look forward to working with you uh to get that funding across the line.

Great. Thank you, sir. Uh Commercial data is critical to the NRO mission, uh electro-optical and radar, uh for the geo-emission. We also collect RF, commercial RF data or purchase commercial RF data support to NSA, and it's absolutely critical to extend the coverage of of our missions. I think the challenge is trying to right size the demand and the requirement for data across the the entire enterprise and the demand signal coming from uh the functional managers and the combatant commands to make sure they get the products that they need so we're working with NGA on GEOINT and NSA on the RF to make sure that we have the right amount to right size that.

'Kay, thank you, Mister Chairman.

Gentleman yields back, the chair now recognizes the gentleman

Thank you, Mister Chairman, I'll try to keep it short cuz I'm sure we all wanna get to the um uh closed session. First of all, let me just say uh thank you to all of you, Mister Atkins, it's great to see you. Uh, we worked together years and years, a terrifyingly long time ago, uh but your professionalism as a group is a credit to the nation and and we're so grateful uh general for your leadership as well at this time uh I'm gonna focus on things that are public relevant. First of all, I just wanna make a statement which I say in each of these, which is I think that it is very important that the United States continue to act as a responsible actor in space you all are sort of the keys to that and there are a series of policy and technical choices that you will be confronted with uh and are confronted with uh daily. And I think as you go through those choices, making choices that uh bias towards the long-term sustainability of space, particularly at the moment when we have you know potentially um an exponential growth in objects in space is crucial. I don't think I need to explain that and I think you all are acting in the right way, but that is an important um top-level policy goal that I think we should support. I wanna talk about uh wildfires and the intersection between space and wildfires, first launch and then sensing. Um I I'm concerned about wildfires around our two national launch sites. Vandenberg suffered the Canyon fire in twenty sixteen, which burned over twelve thousand acres. Other notable small fires include the twenty twenty-four Santa Lucia fire and the twenty twenty-five Orion fire. At Kennedy, or I should say Patrick, as recently as March twenty twenty five, we saw two lightning sparked fires that burned nearly seven hundred acres, and the Merritt Island uh refuge, including a four hundred and fifty acre fire inside the secured KSC perimeter. We only have two orbital uh launch sites suited to launching our most sensitive military and intelligence payloads. Our national security depends on assured access to space. A mega-fire along the lines of what we saw in Los Angeles in January twenty twenty five could cause enormous damage to our launch sites and thus our national security. developing solutions to this challenge are a small cost compared to the challenge of not being able to access space during a conflict uh with a peer competitor, and would also offer tremendous benefit to the security of Americans across the West and the Southeast. I have been on a, something of a mission to get the DOD to see this as crucial to its mission. Um, and this is really a question for anyone, but perhaps generally you might wanna make a comment on this. I'd I'd love to get your comments and frankly your support in acknowledging that wildfire is is a serious risk to space launch operations and perhaps your advice and support as we seek to mobilize uh the resources and attention required to address this challenge.

Representative, good to, good to see you again. Thank you for the question. Uh and uh having uh uh been at both locations uh several times in my career, uh we do understand uh the threat from wildfires at both of our uh launch, and we take that very seriously. Both locations have uh uh firefighters made up of civilians, contractors, and uh military members that do that for us. We also have great relationships with the local communities uh to do that. And we also have environmental folks on the teams that look at um, you know, uh uh prescribed burns and different things to make sure that we are as safe as possible uh to do that. But uh both of those uh delta commanders that are responsible for both of those launch bases uh think about that on a regular basis and uh they are they, you know, as as winds get up, as temperature gets up, they make sure that they are doing everything they can to uh keep those two launch bases safe.

Thank you for that. I think um one thing that I think would be interesting is if we can take technologies from other parts of DOD to apply to the wildfire prob problem the DOD may be a a leader in addressing that challenge in a way that the civilians um have trouble with. Turning attention to a different technology area, I wanna talk about the fire guard program. You're probably all familiar with it. It uses uh imagery f- from uh government assets to help front-line firefighters in the US, it's a crucial program. Um, would love to, uh, get your sense of its importance. It's very important to my constituents and, uh, if any of you'd like to comment on that, would love to hear your thoughts.

Sir, thank you for the question. Uh, at NGA we have a, a long history of support to humanitarian assistance disaster response. Uh, that includes servicing, uh, the wildfire problems, that I'll call it, uh, typically on the West Coast, uh, as you point out. Uh, we have been great partners uh with FEMA uh when it comes to emission assignment, the formal designation. We've also worked very closely with the National Inter-Agency Fire Center, NFSI, uh that uh is a recipient of activity that then they work with the states and local elements to be able to scope fires uh and target I'll say response efforts uh, in a responsible and meaningful way. Uh, right now, uh they are still receiving that information. Uh, and it is still, to my knowledge, being applied effectively in, uh, addressing fires as they're breaking out, uh, on the West Coast in particular, but more broadly as needed.

Yeah, that, that program is crucial. My understanding is that it detected the Palisades fire in Southern California, which as you probably know, burned down, uh, thousands of homes about fifteen minutes before any other source. And so, I just emphasize that that's a crucial program for my constituents. I'll save the rest of my, uh, questions for the classified session. Thank you, and I yield back.

Gentleman yields back, uh Chair now recognizer ranking member Moulton for his questions.

Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Um Over the past several years, uh whether it's in Ukraine or the Middle East, um we've seen incredible proliferation of commercially available satellite imagery. And it's pretty remarkable, what's what's available, of course we wanna make this more available at the tactical level to our troops. Uh there are certainly advantages to just uh the general transparency that it offers. But we've also seen, particularly with Iran, how it can be a real problem, in that all this imagery that used to be classified is now publicly available and can be used against us, uh, allowing our adversaries to tell where our troops are, for example. So, what are the kind of safeguards that we should be put in place? And, uh, what are you doing between the DOD and the intelligence community to work with these providers, many of whom have contracts with the US government, uh to make sure we have better control over this.

I'll start off. Um so as we were discussing earlier commercial data is absolutely critical to the NRO, to the GON mission, to NSA and we have a strong partnership with our commercial providers. Our s- their CEOs meet with our leadership quarterly, we have an ongoing dialogue, uh it's a very strong partnership and I think our commercial providers understand the power of their data, as you point out. They understand the grave consequences and potential implications. So, when kind of

But - but if - but if they did, we wouldn't have had these incidents where they've disclosed things that I think there's general agreement in the national security community we didn't want disclosed.

Well, I th- I think we're the - the industry is relatively new. We've been learning as a ind- as the industry and the government as to the power of commercially available high-resolution imagery. And the - the providers understand the power of that data and - and when, uh, the conflict in the Middle East began shortly after that, the commercial providers recognized that it was a potential national security issue of exposing sensitive military operations, and voluntarily offered to limit dissemination of the de- of data in sensitive areas uh where our forces

Well, uh, uh, Mister Atkins, I'm glad that they realized that after the fact. But if we had actually had plans for whatever the hell we're doing in Iran, and we'd actually moved troops into position beforehand, which we're now obviously doing to try to catch up with the situation, then a lot of those troops would have been endangered while you guys were figuring this out. So don't you think it would be good to have some safeguards in place for the future?

Well, I I think the relationship that we have with the industry at this point, um, in the, i- is working and that they're working with us to seeking guidance from the government.

So your position is that there should not be any guidelines. We should just account, we should just count on their goodwill.

I think we

Cuz I think you gotta be able to, I think you gotta be able to go to a marine platoon commander on the ground and say, don't worry, we've got your back, we're just counting on these for-profit companies and their goodwill. Even though they're learning on the job, as you just said. I don't think that's good enough as a former Marine Lieutenant.

Well, sir, we're we're working with the industry to provide them the guidelines on what areas are sensitive to to allow them to uh limit the damage.

Well, let me just say we would like to see those guidelines.

That data.

We'd like to make sure that everybody has them available, because right now you're just counting on goodwill to protect our troops.

Mm-hmm.

And I don't think that's a very good force protection plan. Uh, Mr. Markham, the work of the NGA has been in the spotlight recently because of the attack on the girls' school in Iran. Do you have any idea what went wrong?

Sir, thank you for the question. Uh, we are aware that there is an ongoing and open investigation being conducted by United States Central Command. And as a combat support agency, we are fully supporting, consistent with the Department of War's guidance in that regard.

That's great. I asked you, do you have any idea what's going on?

Sir, I cannot comment on an act of an ongoing investigation.

When do you think you will be able to comment?

Sir, we will wait for the results of the investigation.

Do you have any idea what the timeline for that investigation is?

I do not, sir, I would have to refer you to the Department of War.

Well, I would just say that We ought to find out what went wrong. And I think it's easy for people to wa- will write this off, cuz there are our adversary's kids. But they're little girls. Do you have sons or daughters?

Both.

If my daughters were killed in an airstrike, no matter by whom, I'd certainly want a better answer than that and I'd want it soon. I think that our allies need to be able to trust that we know what we're doing. And frankly, our adversaries ought to be able to trust that we know we're actually going to hit their targets. And not miss. Like we clearly did here with tragic results. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back and uh Lieutenant General Shish, you get a bonus question. Uh, this committee established the moving target indication working group to, in part, uh to develop the processes and procedures for tasking, collection, processing, and exploitation and dissemination of the data collected by moving target indication systems. You are the co-chair of the working group along with the J eight. How is this process going from the DOD perspective?

Chairman, thank you for the bonus question. I appreciate that, uh but uh uh it is going really well. I got into my new position in November and the new J eight Lieutenant General Steve Whitney got into his position around the same time. Uh, we have met, uh, several times with the full, uh, uh, group. And we meet, uh, monthly, uh, about just the two of us with our teams and it continues to go well. We're working with all of our partners at NGA, NRO, and across, uh, the Department of, uh, War. And, uh, we continue, we know that we owe a, uh, response or a, uh, update to, uh, to the committees and we're working through to bring that, uh, either in a briefing or on a paper Uh, but, uh, the team's working really well together.

Very good. And, Mister Markman, I didn't mean to skip over you during my questions, and so I'll just, from your perspective at NJ, how has this process gone?

I think, uh, sir, uh, uh, and I apologize, the specific process?

It was the, the same question for General Scheich. I could read it again, but she gave me a print about this big and I can barely read it.

This

Um, but I can read it again.

If you would please, sir. Sorry.

Uh, it's uh, the the target working group uh with J Oh.

I am

Okay.

Sir, I can answer that the NGA has representatives in our uh MTI working group, uh but also uh I have a great relationship with uh Lieutenant General Bredenkamp and we've discussed this uh several times uh um. Director of uh sources in in in that as well, and so uh good relationship with the NGA.

OK. In fairness to you, Mister Markham, that was a tough question for me to even read as far as you to follow,

Sorry.

so we'll uh

Thank you, sir.

we'll give you a break on that. OK, uh so that pretty much uh concludes the open portion of the hearing. Uh it we can reconvene for the closed session at uh five o'clock in twenty three thirty seven that gives a little comfort break and I think there was a few members that wanted to attend the closed session so give them a little extra time to arrive the open portion of the hearing is now concluded

Yeah we should be joining you I would like to