FY27 Missile Defense & Missile Defeat Programs and Activities

Today's hearing will come to order. The subcommittee meets today to review the department's fiscal year 2027 budget request for missile defense and defeat activities. Testifying before the subcommittee today, we have Mr. Mark Berkowitz, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, General Gregory Guillot, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, General Michael Guetlein, the Director of the Golden Dome for America Initiative, Lieutenant General Heath Collins, Director of Missile Defense Agency, and Lieutenant General Sean Gainey, Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint Task Force Gold. Good afternoon and welcome to all of you, we appreciate you being here with us today. I want to begin by recognizing the service of our air and missile defense operators in recent weeks, they have served with great distinction, most of all, their courage and proficiency has saved lives, we salute them. This is the first subcommittee hearing to be held since the president's budget request for upcoming fiscal year 2027 was released. While we continue to wait programmatic details, I was pleased to see the top line level reflects a strong investment in missile defense capabilities. Three areas are worth highlighting, first, the Missile Defense Agency's budget for research and development would grow substantially to over 12.3 billion, an increase of more than 50 percent since President Trump took office. This reflects a renewed focus on MDA's core mission of pursuing advanced technology development, which is long overdue. Second, this budget invests about 23 billion in the production of missile defense interceptors, which makes up almost half of the department's broader munitions acceleration initiative. While conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have proven the importance of magazine depth, finding for interceptor production has been inadequate, our funding for interceptor production has been inadequate for years. As production lines operated at or near minimum sustainable rates, our industrial base withered. Just two years ago, the previous administration proposed ending production of the Navy's SM-3 Block 1B interceptor. Congress rejected this decision and provided additional funding to continue its production, but were unable to address the root of the problem, an ever-growing gap between the munitions demands of the modern battlefield and the production capacity we are budgeting for. President Trump's 2027 budget represents the first serious effort to course correct and rebuild our nation's munitions production capacity. This is critical for our missile defense enterprise. Third, building upon the historic investment this committee made through last year's reconciliation bill, the 2027 budget seeks over 17.5 billion for the Golden Dome initiative to protect the homeland from air and missile defense threats. However funding for both of these critical initiatives, interceptor procurement and Golden Dome, are part of the department's 350 billion mandatory spending request, which depends on the outcome of a broader political process that is less predictable. As the budget landscape evolves in the weeks and months ahead, I hope our witnesses will continue to work with this committee to convey the importance of this funding and to clearly communicate the consequences that would come with failing to provide it. I also want to express my appreciation for the department's effort to improve communication with this committee about its Golden Dome plans. Challenges remain, and over-classification will need to be addressed. However the increased engagement from particularly General Guetlein and Mr. Berkowitz on this topic is welcome and deserves to be acknowledged. General Gainey, I understand that you will be retiring this summer after 36 years in uniform. We thank you and your family for all that you have done on behalf of our nation. [Applause.] And General Guillot, just in case this is the last time we see you, I want to also express our thanks to you for your 37 years of service to this country. We have enjoyed working with you both and have benefited greatly from your unwavering professionalism and candor. [Applause.] And with that, I now recognize the ranking member Mr. Moulton for his opening remarks.

Well thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to be here with all of you, and I want to start where you ended, which is to acknowledge that this is Lieutenant General Gainey's last hearing before the committee, and 36 years in uniform in service not just in your present role but also as the director of the Joint Counter-UAS Office, you've helped save a lot of lives, and we're grateful for that. Missile defense has been front and center for the last six weeks as we have seen American missile defenses save the lives of an untold number of service members and civilians. But we also are plainly seeing its limitations. The hundreds of wounded service members and the families of the seven Americans killed by enemy fire know these limits all too well. Missile defense is not impenetrable and never will be. It's an incredibly finite resource. In many cases we are spending millions of dollars a shot to take out $50,000 drones. And most importantly, missile defense is not a strategy. Our president has chosen to spend down billions of dollars in years worth of interceptor production, and with Iran now having locked down the strait, doubled oil prices, alienated our allies, strengthened China's hand, forced the president to remove oil sanctions against Russia and unbelievably against Iran itself, and with Iran today directly projecting more power against us and our allies than it ever has, all for the cost of ballistic missiles they will rebuild even while they still have plenty to shoot at us, the president is now losing the war that he started. Missile defense will not absolve us of poor strategic choices, and it cannot prevent our adversaries from finding other ways to inflict harm. Every conversation about missile defense, both policy and programs, must acknowledge these limitations honestly. As you all know, I'm supportive of many investments in missile defense, there are many areas where there is strong consensus on this committee. We have made robust investments in sensing and tracking. We have helped mature the regional missile defense capabilities that are truly miracles of engineering and are saving lives in the Gulf today, Patriot, Aegis, and THAAD. And we are defending against the strategic threat posed by rogue nations such as North Korea who may not be deterred by mutually assured destruction. I would add that we were doing that against Iran as well. But when it comes to the strategy, we continue to have serious disagreement. Many of us here with the administration and the vast majority of those who now sing Golden Dome's praises with themselves just hours before Trump announced his scheme. I've sat on this committee for years and have never heard a colleague Republican or Democrat advocate spending half a trillion dollars on a system to protect us from ballistic missiles but that will in fact probably be quite easy for our adversaries to engineer around before Mr. Trump announced this idea. Now I understand that someone willing to take on the Pope and the image of Jesus Christ probably thinks himself a greater theorist of strategic deterrence than everyone else as well. But our job is not to blindly answer to the president, it is to ask tough questions on behalf of the American people. It is clear to me now that the reality does not match what President Trump has promised to the American people, an impenetrable shield as he says against all threats. So let me be clear, just like other promises the president has made like how terrorists will not impact the cost of living or that we do not need commerce that transits the Strait of Hormuz, Mr. Trump's version of Golden Dome is just not the truth. Experts from both sides of the aisle have admitted this. Both from a technical and fiscal perspective, it's impossible to defend all of the United States from any kind of threat that could be launched at us. As the Middle East shows, even the best missile defense is imperfect. Now perhaps if we could have a debate about exactly what is envisioned for Golden Dome, we might be able to agree on the right answer, perhaps a more limited version of homeland missile defense. I will certainly be an advocate for more missile defense on the homeland than we have today. I would love to see many of the Patriot batteries defending foreign countries defending our own. We might even be able to agree that we shouldn't touch the underpinning of our strategic stability that has kept the world safe from nuclear war. That nuclear deterrence based on the concept of mutually assured destruction is a far better way to deal with Russian and Chinese nukes than trying to shoot them all down. But unfortunately the administration has chosen to classify nearly everything when it comes to the architecture and cost of the system. And I have to assume that this is being done on purpose for Hegseth so that he does not have to own up to the fact that Golden Dome is yet again another lie by the president to the American people. It's convenient for him because he has no problem sharing classified information himself whenever he'd like to impress a friend. But as we continue to evaluate DOD's missile defense programs, I will continue to ask the hard questions. How will expanding U.S. missile defense today impact strategic stability tomorrow? Does it raise the incentive for our adversaries to strike first? We are already in an arms race, will this accelerate it? Do these choices make our nation and our world more or less safe? These are the questions and debates we must have on this subcommittee. It's the oversight we are constitutionally required to provide not just with an eye to this year's budget and the NDAA but with a view towards how our decisions will impact the world we leave for our children. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

I thank the gentleman for his opening remarks and we will now move to opening statements from our witnesses. I would note that your prepared statements will be made part of the record, but you will each have five minutes to make some opening remarks. I will start with Mr. Berkowitz and work our way down, so Mr. Berkowitz you're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of War's missile defense and defeat programs and activities. It's an honor to appear with my colleagues, General Guillot, General Guetlein, Lieutenant General Collins, and Lieutenant General Gainey. America faces intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. The pace and scale of the threat is unprecedented. Our rivals are expanding, diversifying, and increasing the sophistication of their arsenals with respect to missile and aerial weapons. They are integrating offensive strike and missile defense systems into joint operations to deny access and impose costs. By threatening America's safety, territorial integrity, and economic prosperity, rivals aim to undermine our political will, social cohesion and morale, and ability to project power. President Trump is restoring American strength to meet these challenges and secure peace. He issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden Dome for America, a comprehensive next-generation defense against the most catastrophic threats facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical infrastructure, and second strike capability. The department's highest priority, as directed by the president and the National Defense Strategy, is the defense of the U.S. homeland. The Golden Dome is the cornerstone of our homeland defense posture. It is a necessary and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles as well as next-generation aerial weapons. Nuclear deterrence complemented by the Golden Dome remains the cornerstone of U.S. deterrence strategy. Today our capability to defend the nation is limited and its effectiveness is eroding against an increasingly advanced set of threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense in depth of the United States. It will defend against accidental, unauthorized, rogue, decapitation, and coercive attacks. In contrast to the current limited defense system consisting of a single layer of ground-based midcourse defense interceptors, multiple terrestrial and space-based defensive layers will complicate adversary attack planning and provide more engagement opportunities to destroy incoming threats. Combined with the prospect of U.S. retaliation, Golden Dome will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries the ability to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, it will save lives and limit damage should deterrence break down. The cost of the Golden Dome while significant is a necessary investment to protect assets of truly incalculable value, the lives of our citizens and the territorial integrity of our nation. The cost of failing to defend our homeland would be infinitely greater. China is our pacing competitor, we will deter China from a position of strength not confrontation with a denial defense along the first island chain. Our regional missile defense posture centered on Aegis destroyers as well as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot batteries provides a forward deployed layered integrated air and missile defense network. As Operation Epic Fury underscores, regional missile defense is essential to protect and defend our forces, allies, and interests abroad. Our global alliances remain a strategic advantage if our allies invest properly in defense. The department will continue to pursue opportunities for missile defense and defeat cooperation to increase burden sharing, capacity, and interoperability. We are also supercharging the U.S. defense industrial base by cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks, and leveraging private sector innovation. We must accelerate the delivery of critical missile defense and defeat capabilities at scale. In closing, with the continued support of Congress, the War Department will invest in the missile defense and defeat programs necessary to achieve peace through strength. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

I thank the Honorable Berkowitz for his opening remarks and we will now recognize General Guillot for five minutes.

Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today alongside this panel of outstanding partners and to represent the dedicated and disciplined men and women of the United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. As the strategic environment and missile threats have grown more complex, NORAD and NORTHCOM have responded by fundamentally transforming both commands, taking on new missions and rapidly implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America. NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM remain vigilant, capable, and committed to defend against cruise missile threats as the commands routinely intercept long-range bombers and track advanced maritime platforms in the approaches to North America while standing ready to defend against long-range missile attacks around the clock every day. The commands have undertaken several initiatives over the last year to build on our preparedness to respond to missile threats, including U.S. NORTHCOM's activation of Joint Task Force Gold, which will serve as the operational arm for the future layered defense systems provided by the Golden Dome for America. The ability to detect, track, and discriminate threats from seafloor to space is critical, and NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM also continue to pursue modernized domain awareness systems and defensive capabilities to meet the challenges of tomorrow. I remain grateful for the subcommittee's ongoing support for space-based airborne moving target indicator, over-the-horizon radar, airborne early warning, and integrated undersea surveillance systems, all of which allow us to detect and track launch platforms well before they can threaten the homeland. The men and women of U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD have embraced these new challenges and are unwavering in our no-fail mission. Disciplined defense of our homelands in all domains from all avenues of approach against all those who intend us harm. We appreciate the steadfast support of this committee, and I look forward to your questions. We have the watch.

Thank you, General Guillot. I now would turn to General Guetlein for his remarks. Recognized for five minutes. Thank you, General Guillot. I now would turn to General Guetlein for his remarks. You're recognized for five minutes.

Thank you Chairman. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to report. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the progress of Golden Dome for America. We are here today because the global strategic landscape has changed. For the first time in a generation, our nation's margin of safety has vanished. While we have been focused on the away game, our adversaries have been working around the clock to challenge us at home. And today, the homeland is exposed and relatively undefended. A new generation of advanced air and missile threats, unprecedented in their speed, numbers, and lethality, now holds the American homeland at risk. Our adversaries are not just expressing the intent, they are demonstrating the capability to threaten our families and our way of life. This threat is not theoretical. We see it unfolding in front of our own eyes every day on our televisions. It is real, it is growing, and we must meet it with American resolve. Today, Golden Dome for America is the administration's bold, decisive answer to this danger. It is the cornerstone of our strategy to rapidly improve the defensive equation of the homeland and to ensure peace through strength. This is not another weapon system. It is a layered, integrated shield designed to defend the homeland against the full spectrum of advanced threats. The vision is ambitious, but it is achievable. The foundational technology exists today, and we are moving with the utmost urgency to bring it to bear. Our strategy is built on speed, affordability, and partnerships. My priority is establishing a unified command and control network to link our existing battle-proven systems and field a credible defense now. Simultaneously, we are investing in next-generation technology to dramatically increase our defensive capacity and fundamentally drive down the cost per intercept for generations to come. Make no mistake, the greatest challenge here is not technical, it is organizational. Success requires forging unity of effort across the federal government. And as the Golden Dome Director, I have been granted unprecedented authorities to do just that. The leaders on this panel before you today represent this new way of doing business. We are all working as one team. NORTHCOM is my number one customer. The Missile Defense Agency is integrating the architecture and delivering cutting-edge capabilities. The Army is building the operational framework, and policy is deterring our adversaries. In addition, we are transforming our relationship with the industrial base by innovative partnerships and prize-based competitions to unleash the full power of American innovation. Golden Dome is a generational investment in the security of our nation. It is a promise to the American people and a clear message to our adversaries that their reckless and aggressive actions will not go unanswered. With your continued support, we will deliver a defense that protects every American. We owe nothing less to our children and our children's children. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, General Guetlein. I will now recognize General Collins for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. Good afternoon, Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity and for your continued support of this critical missile defense mission. Since its establishment in 2002, the Missile Defense Agency has developed, delivered, and sustained the missile defense system that has recently been used successfully in days and months of real-world combat. MDA has leveraged its extensive experience in integrating, testing, and delivering technologically advanced missile defense systems to deliver on its promises and commitments to our nation and provide the warfighter the battle-proven, lethal, and effective systems that have arguably saved thousands of lives in recent days. Today, MDA is pressing ahead to continue delivering the disruptive, lethal, resilient, agile, and affordable capabilities required for today and tomorrow for the defense of the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our international partners. MDA is renewing its focus on delivering cutting-edge capabilities across the air, land, sea, and space domains. With the ongoing transition and transfer of proven missile defense systems to the services, MDA will invest less in sustainment and upgrades and operational support of missile defense sensors, interceptors, and platforms and invest more purposefully in the development, integration, and testing of breakthrough technologies and foundational missile defense capabilities. MDA will continue to develop and test system elements, components, and technologies for what we are calling Missile Defense System Next. And it will continue to operate as a system-of-systems integrator for the homeland defense architecture developed and delivered by the Office of the Golden Dome for America. MDA and GDA are operating in lockstep to deliver the critical capabilities required to defend our homeland and our nation's interests. This afternoon, I would also like to honor those who paid the ultimate price in the service of our country and thank those warfighters, civilians, and contractor professionals who operate the missile defense system around the clock today. They all make us very proud. I greatly appreciate the committee's steadfast support for Missile Defense Agency and your commitment to providing the resources necessary to execute the missile defense mission. Thank you, I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you, General Collins. And last but not least, I recognize General Gainey for his opening remarks.

Thank you, Chairman. Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished guests of this subcommittee. I am honored to testify on behalf of nearly 12,500 men and women of the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command, of which 2,500 are currently deployed. These professionals provide credible combat capability so important to our national defense. I am so proud of our space and missile defense formations who continue to fight a complex threat while innovating in real time. We are living transformation in contact. I am honored to represent them, and I thank you for your unwavering support for them and their families. You have already heard much about the dramatic evolving threat. It is clear we have entered a new air and missile age. Our adversaries are investing in advanced long-range air and missile strikes and space-based interdiction capabilities in hopes of holding our homeland at risk and preventing Americans from pursuing our interests abroad. In response to this change in threat, the Army has invested into Space and Missile Defense Command, adding two division-size organizations under the command, the 32nd and 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command. As a warfighting headquarters, we provide global ready forces to deter aggression, execute part of the joint force, and defend our homeland against aerial threats. The effectiveness of our forces have been pivotal to success in recent operations. Here we clearly see space and air and missile defense as a decisive enabler of the modern combat. Even in contact, we are continuously transforming into a more mobile and lethal force. My technical center is pushing the boundaries of distributed aperture and small form factor counterspace technology. Right in step with them, my Space and Missile Defense Center of Excellence transform technical innovation into unit-based transformation, designing formations, formulating training, and supporting units to consolidate innovative gains in applications against real threats. Meanwhile, Joint Task Force Gold, activated in January, has transformed to serve as the operational arm to NORTHCOM's integrated air and missile defense enterprise, working closely with the Golden Dome program management team to align all domain defensive capabilities within command requirements. Together, our one team is strengthening the profession across many disciplines, whether that is my Army astronaut detachment's central role in America's return to the moon or my Space and Missile Defense Command schoolhouse training 10,000 students annually to dominate the fight in space from the ground. SMDC and JTF Gold deliver value where it matters most. And finally, as the Army air defense enterprise integrator, I would be remiss if I did not highlight the continuous strain on our Army air and missile defense force that is the most deployed force in the Army. We ask so much of our air and missile defense forces, and I am truly amazed on how they and their families respond every time they are called. The Army leadership has responded with MOS recruiting flexibility through the 14 uniform MOS program and added critical skill bonuses, increasing training opportunities and built-in station of choice initiatives, significantly improving accessions. Further addressing the optempo challenges, the Army integrated air and missile defenses is undergoing the most significant modernization in our history, fielding the Integrated Battle Command System, also known as IBCS. This will fundamentally change the way sensors and shooters are integrated across the battlefield, increasing capacity in depth and achieving an outsized effect. Army AMD force structure will also increase by 47 percent by FY 2033 while simultaneously modernizing the existing force. Over the past two and a half years, I have seen firsthand how our one team at SMDC and JTF Gold contributes to the lethality of the Army, joint force, and the defense of our homeland. Every day brings both challenges and opportunities. The interdependent functions of space and missile defense will play a significant role in all future conflicts. I look forward to addressing your questions today. Thank you.

Thank you, General. We will now turn to member questions, and I will start by recognizing myself. And I have great respect for Ranking Member Moulton and his service to our country both in uniform and in Congress, but I have to say I agree vehemently against most of what his opening statement was. General Guillot, I know we are limited in this setting, but can you talk about how adversaries approach integrated air and missile defense because the core idea of Golden Dome, protecting your territory and critical infrastructure from air and missile attack, is this something Russia and China are already doing?

Yes, Chairman. It is a critical question. Our near-peer adversaries do integrate their air and missile defenses and are providing a pretty significant air defense capability over their cities and over their key infrastructure.

General Collins, do you have anything to add on adversary missile defense capabilities?

Sir, really just to duplicate what General Guetlein has said. Our adversaries are seeing the utility of missile defense into staying in the fight as well, and they continue to pursue and proliferate layered missile defense as well to counter our activities.

And Honorable Berkowitz, prior to the President's executive order creating Golden Dome, U.S. missile defense policy when it came to defending the homeland was limited to threat posed by rogue nations and accidental launches. Did Russia or China show similar restraint from policy perspective in their approach to missile defense?

No, Chairman, they did not. Their policy has long been to not use societal vulnerability, certainly not their societal vulnerability, as the basis for strategic stability. They have always pursued a comprehensive homeland missile defense.

Yes, sir. Either other generals have anything to add to that? General Gainey or... No? Okay. General Guetlein, how do you see the relationship between the investments we're making in space-based interceptors and ground-based capabilities like NGI program? I know when it comes to missile defense, there's always a temptation to gravitate towards the most ambitious capability and mistake complementary systems as being duplicative. So developing SBIs doesn't mean we can abandon the NGI program, does it?

No, Chairman, it does not. We as a nation have traditionally piled a lot of requirements on individual weapon systems, expecting the individual weapon system to do all the heavy lifting. For integrated air and missile defense, we actually need a layered, multi-domain, distributed architecture to make sure we do not have any exploitable holes. So all of those systems that you talked about, next-generation interceptor gets after the ground layer, space gets after the boost phase intercept and midcourse, and then we need additional layers with the maritime and with the sea to guarantee that we have no exploitable holes.

Yes, sir. General Guillot, you're the warfighter, and right now you're relying on some effective but aging ground-based interceptors. How important is it that we replace these systems with NGI?

Chairman, it's extremely important that we keep NGI on track and, if possible, even pull it to the left. And I work with Lieutenant General Collins every week on seeing if there's ways that we can do that. And that's because the adversaries we're facing are relentless in their pursuit of achieving more capability, trying to find any exploitable seam in our defense. And I think they're cooperating amongst each other, sharing information and technical data and sometimes even weapons in order to do so. The NGI is essential to ensure that we can outpace those efforts.

And General Collins, MDA is acquiring NGI and sustaining the current fleet of interceptors. What is your view on the need for the NGI program?

Sir, as General Guetlein and General Guillot have identified, one, we did do the miracle 24 years ago of developing and fielding the GBI program in two years and putting it in the hole. Since that time for 22 years, that's been the sole defense mechanism for the United States. Those systems are aging, the reliability is being impacted, as well they were designed for threats from the past. And as the threat increases its complexity and capability, we need to also increase that. We've increased the capability of the inherent GBI design, but the game-changing step increase in capability that NGI brings to bear will help us to defend both the rogue nation threat as well as the peer adversary ICBM threat in the future. It is critical to be able to do that.

Okay. Well, my time has about expired, but I look forward to the closed setting where we can do a deeper dive on a lot of these issues and we'll certainly have more questions there. The Ranking Member Moulton has... he'll be back, but we will recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman, and I thank all the witnesses for being here today to talk about what is by any measure an incredible vision to try to keep our country safe from all... from everywhere all the time. And it's a remarkable idea. Certainly it's going to be tough, and there's many discussions on the actual nuts and bolts of it. But I just want to talk about the cyber threats, which can interrupt any of our systems potentially. Recently, the Department of Defense and Anthropic are having a bit of a spat, to suggest anything less does not even come close. The idea of removing their systems from what is currently being used by many of our branches is going to be difficult and by any measurement it's going to be expensive. The idea that Anthropic talked about the Claude Mythos, this new system that they were so concerned they are not releasing it but to Project Glasswing. Now, why am I talking about this? Because they have reported that this system has been able to detect flaws in our defenses that nobody thought existed. So there is currently a designation of Anthropic as supply chain risk, and the DOD has designated Anthropic for all our military to remove whatever piece they have within 180 days. General Guetlein, can you talk in the degree that where we are, what impact that will have in your world?

Representative, it is right to call attention to our cyber vulnerabilities. And from a Golden Dome perspective, we architected in cyber resiliency from the beginning and have set up what we call an ecosystem hub where we have brought in external companies to come in and help us make sure we're securing the supply chain. One of which is utilizing artificial intelligence. Today, we do not have Anthropic anywhere in the GDA architecture. That's the way we started out of the gate, it just ended up that way right now. But I will tell you there are other suppliers out there of artificial intelligence, and we are leveraging those as we go forward to get after the cyber vulnerability threat.

So that is in the Golden Dome structure.

That is within the Golden Dome structure.

If we can start right down the line to say in your portfolios, do you have any Anthropic products?

Congressman, for the NORAD-NORTHCOM systems, we have one, but it's not in our classified systems and we're in the process of transitioning to another system that we already have on contract. So that there is little, if any, effect on our operational capability.

Thank you. General?

Representative Norcross, same with the Missile Defense Agency. We have a host of different AI companies and capabilities that we apply to our mission set and how we do business. Anthropic is currently not in that set, and so there's no impact from that.

Terrific.

Honorable Norcross, same for the Army. None that I'm tracking personally. We're working to move to AI-enabled type systems, so no effect that I see right now.

So that's good news. The one major issue is that they felt this was such a significant vulnerability that they're withholding it for distribution and they put together Project Glasswing of the top tier of companies that deal in this area. So they are able to find these vulnerabilities. Hopefully there's somebody else with their capabilities to do it. It certainly is something that we as a nation have to make sure that we are absolutely sure all the time. Let me just shift gears a little bit. There's been a number of comments over the course of particularly the last year or so that talks about some of the vulnerabilities and problems that we have in what will be protecting our homeland. Particularly, I'll call them vertical structures in the offshore area. General Guetlein, you and I had a previous conversation to talk about this, how the offshore wind industry is being impacted with the suggestion is they are going to inhibit our ability to deal with incoming missiles. Whether it's offshore wind, drilling platforms, quite frankly, depending on where you are, they could be mountains. It sounds to me as if we've always had the ability to address these things. In your opinion, do you see these offshore winds, platforms, and others as being something that we can't deal with in the new structure you're putting together?

Representative, the challenge I have for protecting the homeland with General Guillot is to make sure we have no exploitable holes. The wind turbines have caused havoc with our legacy sensors. But from a Golden Dome perspective, we are approaching this as a multi-domain distributed architecture with redundant sensors that include sensors in space. In addition to that, we are taking advantage of the next generation of signal processing to try to integrate all this data together and make rapid sense out of it using artificial intelligence. So we are rapidly trying to within our architecture to work around those challenges as well as other geographical challenges around the homeland.

Thank you. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. We'll now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guetlein, you and I had a prior conversation that I want to continue in this hearing, and that is concerning the current integration of the air component into our current missile defense structure. If you look to what we've been able to accomplish in Middle East and in the current conflicts that have occurred, as you and I were discussing with the direct attack that occurred from Iran into Israel where the United States provided a backup component of missile defense to Iron Dome and David's Sling and their missile defense components. And of course, the broader conflict that has occurred now where the United States assisted not only with Israel but also providing missile defense to our own assets and our own military and personnel, but also then to our broader allies in the missile defense. It wasn't just our missile defense architecture, it was also our air component architecture. And it's great that I'm sitting in front of three Air Force personnel and no disparaging to the rest of all of the witnesses that are here and I appreciate your participation, but I want to engage you in an air component integration discussion as we talk about Iron Dome because I want to get to I believe that there is a miss that we're having in the Iron Dome. So if we could first have your acknowledgment of that currently our architecture as it's deployed includes a significant air component integration with the F-35 as you were discussing with me, both in its sensor suites, in its integration and how it follows targeting, but also I'm aware even the ability to use missiles has a component. Could you speak to that for a minute as to what we currently do with the F-35 and our air components integration?

Thank you, Representative. That's a key component of the defense equation that General Guillot has to execute is the full-on integration of the multi-domain environment to include the maritime and the air component. The air component allows us to push the defended area out away from the homeland. It also gives us a 911 response in case of a threat as you're seeing over in Iran. What we are doing from a Golden Dome perspective, even though the air layer is not part of my architecture, that is part of a different set of architectures, is I am integrating that in, both the sensor data and the communications layer, and then making sure that my data is transportable back out to the air layer and the maritime layer.

Well, and this is why I'd like to engage all of you into the conversation, including the General. I believe that as we do that, that we need to make certain both in the as we look to the F-35 and also the opportunity of the B-21, that we need to ensure that we take into consideration the opportunity for that integration, both the supersonic nature of the B-21, the hypersonic opportunity of its missiles for homeland defense, because the Golden Dome is going to have, you know, its space-based architecture and its terrestrial architecture. The terrestrial is going to be static and relatively fixed, space-based of course going to be more fluid, but the agile, flexible, multi-dimensional capability of the air component provides an opportunity that we should not miss and we I think we should be forward-looking and as you're passing that baton, that developmental aspect needs to be made certain that those platforms are developing up with you, General.

Congressman I couldn't agree more with General Guetlein. In fact the day after he was confirmed he flew out to Colorado Springs to talk to me about from an operational perspective what the needs of NORAD and NORTHCOM were and then in addition to the space-based and the and the upper layer and under layer we talked for a great deal of time about what we call the air layer or the limited air defense layer for the reasons that you mentioned. The agility that that fighter aircraft and others bring the 911 response as General Guetlein described it is integral to any air defense challenge that we have.

In the terminal phase and also in the mid-course there's a huge opportunity for both the B-21 and the F-35 to play an absolute essential homeland defense role in Golden Dome and I hope that as we're passing that developmental baton that the nation's ingenuity is utilized to ensure that they're fully tasked.

Congressman I agree and I'd also throw in any advanced airborne early warning systems would have capability there as well.

And unmanned.

Yes sir.

Thank you all. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from California Mr. Carbajal for five minutes.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you to all the witnesses for being here today. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that Golden Dome will cost $542 billion over 20 years. The American Enterprise Institute estimates it could cost upward of $3 trillion over 20 years. This is a stark contrast from the original $175 billion over the three years that President Trump initially stated. Surprise surprise. General Guetlein I want to first thank you for the great work you've done to make the defense industrial base more resilient and diversifying our supply chains. Now the question. What do you think the cost of Golden Dome will be and how long will it take for Golden Dome this Golden Dome concept to be operational?

Thank you Representative. We are going to deliver an operational capability by the summer of 28 that will be able to protect the homeland against a variety of threats. The ultimate objective architecture is going to be $185 billion that's $175 billion as identified by the President of the United States and an additional $10 billion to accelerate some space capabilities that were not originally part of our architecture. When we start talking about the different cost estimates the first thing I always say is first of all they're not they're not estimating what I am building. They are estimating the modernization or and the continuation of the legacy systems that we already have and they just take the cost of a legacy system and they multiply it out and they get these really large numbers and they say well that must be it. That is not what Golden Dome is doing. Golden Dome is doing business differently. We have different set of authorities different set of acquisition strategies that we're following. We're disaggregating architecture automating and bringing to bear artificial intelligence and we are laser-focused on affordability. So the difference in the architectures is they are just not estimating what I am building.

Well it sure would be good to get that estimation that list you have if not in open in classified settings so that we could see it because to my understanding we have not seen that whatsoever. So it'd be great to see that at some point. And I hope you're right. I hope we don't play this video and interaction in the summer of 28 and hear something different. So I'm going to hold you to that. General Collins and General Guillot as Golden Dome is being built do you think it is safe to assume our adversaries are taking note and designing capabilities to defeat Golden Dome?

Congressman I think they are taking note. Their history of doing that is well noted but they already they already were anyway. Before we started building Golden Dome they're already trying to design systems that would exploit the capabilities that we have and so I'm not at all surprised by that.

Thank you. General Collins?

I agree with General Guillot. We've seen throughout history as we built a missile defense system the adversaries immediately trying to counter it and we've seen that time and again in those evolutions of capability and the systems that we're seeing fielded and demonstrated in Ukraine in Iran today even day-to-day changes in Iran they show that they're a learning organization always trying to defeat our systems as best as they can. So whatever we continue to pursue and make they will continually look to defeat it.

Thank you. General Guetlein is there a possibility that when Golden Dome is finally operational it will already be outdated or unable to defend against defend against new capabilities deployed by our adversaries?

The architecture that we are building is a very flexible open architecture systems design system of systems type architecture so that we can continuously modernize it as the threat continues to mature. It is not a static architecture so we will continue to upgrade along the way to get after the threat.

Thank you. Mr. Berkowitz space capabilities are an integral are integral to our joint forces. Space-based interceptors are the keystone of the Golden Dome architecture. Understanding the fact that both Russia and the PRC are developing anti-satellite weapons does the deployment of space-based interceptors have the potential to increase the likelihood that our adversaries will preemptively target space assets degrading communications and missile defense simultaneously to make that constellation inoperable?

Thank you for the question Representative. I think this is a very important point to make so I appreciate the opportunity. I believe our adversaries understand the importance of space to the United States and our national defense and that is the reason why they have been building and accelerating a broad array of counterspace and anti-satellite weapons capabilities. They've been doing so long before the President ever announced the Golden Dome for America or the fact that we would have a space layer as part of the overall multi-layered defense system. It's incumbent upon the United States and our armed forces to make sure that we can protect and defend our interests in space and as the President has directed in his executive order in assuring American space superiority we the Department of War are directed to ensure that we can detect counter and detect characterize and counter all threats to our interests in space including the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit. So we are very assiduously looking at those threats evaluating them and determining a broad range of options to provide to the Secretary and to the President to ensure that we can protect all of our interests in space including the space layer of the Golden Dome for America.

Thank you. I yield back Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman yields back. Now pleased to recognize the gentleman from Nebraska General Bacon.

Thank you Chairman. Thank you to all five of you for being here. I appreciate your leadership and your service and your hard work. I want to give a special shout out to General Guillot he was the 55th Wing Commander two times removed from me. So anyway thank you for being here. Iran has fired well over 1,000 ballistic missiles and several thousand rudimentary cruise missiles in recent weeks. Based on a standard shot doctrine defending against the ballistic portion of that threat alone would require more than 3,000 interceptors. Yet today U.S. annual production is roughly 650 Patriot PAC-3 interceptors and fewer than 100 THAAD interceptors. Even though both lines have announced plans to surge to higher rates closer later closer to 2030. Couple that with foreign military sales that have not been fulfilled we have a serious problem. I know the Deputy Secretary has led an effort to accelerate munitions production and the budget request tens of thousands tens of billions to expand interceptor production. Can each of you talk about the importance of this effort for your mission areas and the need for Congress to provide this funding to improve what we're doing? I'll start with General Guillot.

Congressman thanks for having the 55th in great shape before I got there. I should I should give all the credit to you. Having the the right stockpiles gives us flexibility and also gives us a hedge against the adversary that we spoke of a moment ago that is always trying to increase their capability finding new countermeasures new ways to try to trick defeat or find a seam in our systems. Therefore it's not always a one-to-one shot ratio and having the required number of interceptors or defeat mechanisms plus some gives us that flexibility that I think we'll need in any future fight.

General Guetlein?

Thank you Representative Bacon. As you know we have optimized our entire industrial base for efficiency at the expense of capacity and scale. We have relatively shallow supplier base and so what we have been doing is working with Secretary Feinberg to rapidly expand the industrial base to give out multi-year contracts and start finding alternative suppliers to increase our munitions production going forward. So that's one of the lessons learned that we have brought forward. From a Golden Dome perspective we are working really hard to make sure that we use the right effector against the right threat bringing to bear multiple layers of sensor data from multi-domain to make rapid sense out of that to make sure we send the right effector to get after the right threat with a modernized C2 system that we did not have available in the current conflict in Iran.

Thank you. General Collins?

Congressman thanks for this question. It's a really important question as we see a key lesson of OEF that we can't talk about is the need for the right number of weapons, the right magazine depth to protect our assets. And from day one, I've always said the reason, the way we get there is through sustained focus, sustained will, and sustained resources to make sure we have that appropriate inventory. And the last two years, I've come up here and we've reported that priorities were low and we were driving our industry base to minimum economic quantities or below minimum economic quantities. That's where this enterprise has been for the last few years. That is being undone this year. And the activities that the deputy is driving to change industry to get them to also show the focus, will, and urgency is there. And so now's the time. We will continue to need sustained focus and sustained resources to make this happen. Thanks, Chair.

General Gainey, I have a separate question for you. So if I just may, so it's unacceptable, and it's not your all's fault, but we as a nation cannot allow this low production rate to continue. We have to as a committee and the Pentagon solve this because what's going on in Ukraine and the Middle East is not an anomaly, it's the future. So we got to raise our game on production. General Gainey, I got a question for you, sir. JTF-Gold has transitioned from a coordination-focused standing task force to a fully war-ready, high-ops tempo command operating continuously to defend U.S. airspace. To add, the conflict in Iran has prompted a sustained high-alert posture. General Gainey, can you talk, can you talk about how you're managing the stress on your force given the high operational demand they're facing? We hear it's stressful.

Yes, Representative Bacon, thanks for that question. As the Army AMD force, highest deploy rate in the Army, it's been a tough challenge for us. We've done several studies, health of the force studies, to try to get after what's the best way to assess stress on the force and implement areas to improve health on the force. Really, it's going to come down to our modernization. So funding our modernization to allow us to transition to our integrated battle command system will allow us to do more with less. Being able to integrate to several different sensors and shooters together will provide us that additional capacity and capability as we move forward. How it's being handled currently, I have an amazing command team that's fighting the fight with my 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command in contact right now. And the way they're caring for our soldiers, energizing our soldiers with the strain that we're putting on our soldiers is truly amazing. That's how leadership is how we're getting through it right now.

Thank you, General Gainey. And I'm out of time, so I need to yield back. Thank you.

I thank the gentleman from Nebraska. And I'm now pleased to recognize the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Vasquez, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. In New Mexico, Kirtland Air Force Base and White Sands Missile Range have been at the forefront of developing and testing cutting-edge missile defense technology, which includes most recently the testing of the next generation of short-range interceptors. It's evident that these bases play a critical role in air and missile defense and that the department relies on to keep our homeland safe. These two installations offer a unique focus on growing the department's understanding and use of directed energy and electronic warfare capabilities on the battlefield. Electronic warfare and directed energy systems offer relatively inexpensive but very effective alternatives for taking down low-cost drones, short-range rockets, artillery, and mortars. Systems like the Army's directed energy maneuver short-range air defense systems or the Navy's SLIC-32 have demonstrated the potential that this type of technology could have to defend against varying missile threats with estimations to be as little as $3 per shot. My first question is for Lieutenant Collins. I understand some of this development and testing is being done at Kirtland and White Sands. How is the Missile Defense Agency working with these two bases to field this technology and potentially use to counter varying missile threats?

Thanks, Congressman. It's a great question. We are very much all in and focused on bringing directed energy to the fight as we move forward. My directed energy leads and office are actually at on Kirtland Air Force Base, so we're very closely tied in with Kirtland Air Force Base and the Air Force portions of working directed energy. And in this budget and in our way forward, we are certainly putting more attention into bringing potentially game-changing directed energy capabilities to bear in an unmanned platform, air platform is what we're focused on so we can bring that capability to the edge of the fight and thin the herd on UAVs, potentially air threats, and the like. So we're very into that and we're driving through on that experimentation as we move forward. And then WSMR is just a national capability of air missile defense testing, and so it always will be.

Thank you, Lieutenant General. I encourage you to keep utilizing these important bases in my district, which have played a leading role, as you know, since World War II in developing this technology. Now let me turn to why this applies to the current threats that we are facing today. Within the last year, it's become increasingly apparent that missiles and interceptors are an essential requirement of the modern-day battlefield. And depending on the U.S. interceptor, cost can range anywhere from $4 million to $90 million. From $4 million to $90 million. And as our adversaries increasingly employ low-cost methods to force the U.S. to deplete valuable and expensive interceptors, we must adapt to limit this cost disparity and preserve our firepower for when it's needed the most. Lieutenant General Collins, what else is the department doing to pivot to ensure that our U.S. missile defense interceptors are adapting to the strategies of our enemies and that we can rapidly deploy this new technology rather than traditional missiles?

Thank you, Congressman. First, in the first lane, we have some very proven systems with incredible capability that are being proven in the desert today. We are always driving to figure out how to drive the cost of those down, one through the acceleration in quantities that we're going to talk about, we're going to have savings in those, but those are pretty exquisite and unique weapons as we move forward. We are continuing to push down directed energy and non-kinetics to change the cost equation and increase magazine depth. As well as part of our push into more disruptive technologies for the fight, affordability is actually one of our key technology thrust areas and bringing that to bear, we have started a low-cost interceptor study at this point with a few vendors where we're taking a look at actually pushing a cost target on a capability and using modern-day design and manufacturing capabilities to see what threat base we can cover down with a reduced cost weapon to really help if we can reduce the cost of the weapon, we can increase the magazine depth through that affordability. And we're very much starting that process, we're really moving forward in low-cost interceptors and wide-area kill mechanisms and the like to make sure that we can continue to drive affordability into the equation.

Thank you so much, Lieutenant General. And I can't stress how important it is as you talk about those low-cost solutions for my district because we have some really innovative small businesses, startup companies, spinoffs from our national labs that not only lower the cost of the munition itself but reduce costs of if we're doing space, getting that weapon or getting that system into orbit, the deployment, the operation, and the maintenance of these systems as well, which we are hoping to be added as approved vendors into our defense industrial base. And so I look forward to seeing how the department maintains its U.S. missile defense moving forward and employing these low-cost measures. Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.

The gentleman yields back. We are now pleased to recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Messmer, for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. As co-chair of the Hypersonics Caucus, I believe in the importance of the hypersonic missile technology is a crucial component in America's national security platforms and I look forward to hearing your answers. To that point, General Collins, could you give an update on the development of the glide phase interceptor?

Yes, sir. Thank you. As a reminder, glide phase interceptor really is the future of hypersonic missile defense for the nation. Today we have terminal defense capabilities only, i.e., at the very end-game defense capabilities against hypersonic missile targets. GPI will bring a capability to reach out and give you an additional layer of capability to help thin the herd, increase your performance against that hypersonic, that really tough threat. The GPI program last year reported due to funding priorities, we were delaying the program. This year, we are actually accelerating that program with partial reconciliation money, which was just reported this past week that we've put that reconciliation money on contract. We are accelerating today from 2035 to 2031 and bringing a land-based capability to the fight. Still not fast enough, but that is the beginning by taking resources off the table. Now we are very much continuing to look in support of General Guetlein how to accelerate more and bring hypersonic defense capabilities faster.

Well, you answered my second question and that was going to be how we're going to accelerate, so thank you for that. Can you comment on the value add of working with the Japanese on this program? Is there any potential?

Yes, sir. The Japanese have been a long-standing great partner of ours. Our best exoatmospheric interceptor today, the SM-3 Block 2A, that was also co-developed with the Japanese. They bring a great mindset of development as well as manufacturing, and so they're a key partner for us on the 2A and the expansion of the 2A line. They're also bringing that same capability and partnership to bear on the GPI program as well, and they've been a great partner so far.

Okay. Is there room for more U.S.-Japanese hypersonic joint development and production?

I believe there could be. Yes, sir.

Okay. General Collins, what do you see as the bottlenecks in development and production of more hypersonic systems?

I believe some of the bottlenecks is the continued investment in the industry base to do that. Even before I was at MDA, I was in the Air Force buying hypersonic weapons, and there was a very small, some of them even mom-and-pop garage manufacturers of some of those components. I think sustained focus, sustained resources to really streamline out the production and manufacturing of hypersonics to take it from S&T mom-and-pop to no-kidding front-line industry manufacturing is really required. We're beginning to do that with our planning for GPI and some of the other offensive hypersonic weapons. We need to continue to do that so that we're not relying on one or two very small entities to scale.

Is the increased demand signal that we've had the last year in funding leading to better response from the defense industrial base?

I believe so, sir. So, sir, I'm not actually in the middle of an active production line for hypersonic weapons. GPI will be there in a few years. But I know how we've been engaging industry across the enterprise for the munitions acceleration activities has really changed how we engage with industry and how industry engages with us, and so it's been a very positive effort.

Anything Congress and MDA can collaborate on to make sure these get deployed at the speed of relevancy?

Yes, sir. I think I've said it maybe three times, I'll say it a fourth. I think the continued support, the continued focus, the continued resources to help us continue to push those programs forward is absolutely critical.

Perfect. Thank you. General Guetlein, thank you for your update on Golden Dome program last week. As the House side lead on the Golden Dome Act, I'm a big supporter of getting this program in the field on schedule and on budget and would like you to maybe highlight a potential hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor as it could serve in the Golden Dome architecture and specifically as it pertains to hypersonic and ballistic missile defense.

Yes, Representative. As I've been talking about, we have a multi-domain set of sensors. Some of those are space-based sensors and one of those is the Missile Defense Agency's hypersonic ballistic missile tracking system. We have been working with the Space Development Agency and United States Space Force to accelerate that program and currently have a request for proposal out on the street.

Okay. Thank you. General Collins, one more quickly. How has the SM-3 distinguished itself in our recent conflicts in the Red Sea and Iran?

Sir, it's the premier capacity weapon defending from the Eastern Med, both defending Europe as well as defending the CENTCOM AOR. It's done well and executed better than designed.

Okay. Thank you. Yield back.

The gentleman yields back. The chair is now pleased to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Whitesides, for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to start off by saying thanks to each of you for your dedicated service to our nation, particularly those who are retiring, recognizing your families for the sacrifice that they have carried as you lead our armed services. We've now been at war with Iran for over six weeks. What was announced as a limited engagement has evolved into a sustained kinetic conflict with no clear end in sight, marking a significant and dangerous escalation in a region that is already fraught with instability. President Trump's decision to blockade the Strait of Hormuz will cause gas prices to spike even more than they already had. Gas prices are projected to rise to over $7 per gallon in California if this blockade lasts. The president seems to have no coherent strategy to end the war or bring down gas prices. Increased gas prices are now driving inflation throughout our economy as the higher price of transportation and manufacturing drives up costs everywhere. I am deeply concerned that this operation is currently foundering. By almost every metric, it has failed to meet its stated strategic goals. We have not eliminated the nuclear threat, nor we have nor have we achieved regional deterrence. Our adversary retains long-term ballistic, drone, and industrial capabilities. Furthermore, we must address the grave legal precedent being set in this operation. The administration continues to prosecute a high-intensity conflict, a war, without a formal declaration of war from Congress. This is a direct violation of our constitutional framework and an end run around the War Powers Resolution, denying the American people a voice through their elected representatives. Finally, we must confront the alarming rate at which we are burning through our munitions stockpiles. Our current expenditure is unsustainable, particularly regarding our inventory of interceptors. By exhausting these sophisticated, long-lead-time assets in this theater, we are rapidly hollowing out our own domestic defenses and leaving our forces vulnerable to other global contingencies. We cannot afford to compromise our long-term national security for an operation that lacks both a legal mandate and a clear path to victory. General Guetlein, can you share with us what is the impact on price and timeline to the Golden Dome deployment from the war in Iran?

There has not been a direct cost impact on Golden Dome because of the Iran conflict.

Has there been a schedule impact to your plans?

No, Congressman, there is not.

Okay. This is a question for any of you. What can you say publicly about quantifying the impact of the Iran war on the cost and timing to restock our depleted inventory of expended missile defense assets? General Collins?

Representative, thank you for the, thank you for the question. From a cost impact, I can't really, other than we're having to buy additional rounds to replenish those, then the cost of those are there. Really, the impact is being superseded by what we have, what the deputy had already started last year, the munitions acceleration work and the effort. He had already identified the need to maximize all of our production across both the defensive as well as offensive weapon portfolios and began that work to drive that forward and bring that capability to bear. The work being done now, it will take some time to see the benefit of that. It will, these weapons do take years to come to fruition. But starting it last year as he did, the sooner you start, the sooner you finish and you start seeing those rounds come to bear. The weapons expended in the last six weeks will certainly drive us, you know, it'll take that amount of time to get those rounds back to replenish, as it's going to get those production lines. All of those weapons do have active production lines, so we are every day producing weapons to replenish those, but it will take a number of years to replenish.

Do you have an estimate of the number of years?

No, sir, not at this time.

Is there a way that you could provide the committee with an estimate?

Yes, we can.

Okay. Do you know what time frame you might be able to provide that estimate?

It should be in the matter of weeks.

In weeks. Okay. Thanks. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

I thank the gentleman for yielding and I now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Van Orden.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to double tap real quick with General Guillot, or excuse me, with General Guetlein about the production capacity of what's going on here. Do we really actually have a plan that's laid out in phases so that we can have enough interceptors to perform the functions of Golden Dome?

Yes, Representative, we do. There are risks in that plan, but we have identified a schedule of deliveries of when we would need those various sensors, various munitions effectors, etcetera.

Okay. Excellent. So I've noticed, I'm very observant, that you look a little different from the other two folks sitting next to you in blue. Can you tell me why that is, sir?

United States Space Force.

You're in Space Force, aren't you?

But 31 years in the Air Force.

Okay. Well, okay, I just, I feel the necessity to clear up some things. There are people on the subcommittee that mocked, mocked openly the formation of Space Force. Mocked it in hearings and on television and everything. So General Guillot, from your professional position, do you think that Space Force has been integral in making sure that our homeland is going to be secured now, or is secured now, and will be secured further in the future?

Without question, Congressman.

Okay. And then so General Guetlein, would you say that you have the confidence of General Whiting?

Absolutely. And when General Guillot said I flew out there to meet with him on day one, I also flew out there to meet with General Whiting on day one to make sure that we are fully integrated, making sure I'm getting after his threats and he understands how I'm going to operate in his AOR.

Okay. And General Guillot, do you have confidence in General Whiting?

Absolutely, sir.

So ergo we could determine that you have confidence in General Guetlein.

Without question.

And General Guetlein is a competent professional to the saying that Golden Dome is not only a requirement to protect the homeland, but it's also within the realm of possibility of creating within our lifetimes. Is that correct?

He has told me that and I believe him.

Okay. So then maybe we should go with people that have made decisions in the past that have actually panned out to be correct. And maybe we should really put at a lower threshold of confidence the opinions of people that have proven to be galactically wrong. Let's just do that in the future. General Guetlein, how much do you interact with our Israeli partners?

Currently very limited. The majority of the interaction is through the Missile Defense Agency, which is my deputy director for integration. They are the primary point of contact right now, but we will have increased involvement with our allies in the future.

Okay. And how much of the technologies' dual use that we have received or the benefit from Israel with their Iron Dome and David's Sling?

I would say significant lessons over time. We co-developed those systems with the Israelis and some of those capabilities are actually produced here in the United States.

So in your professional opinion, would you say that the strategic, the strategic relationship we have with our Israeli allies are going to accelerate the ability for us to protect our own homeland?

The integration of our allies into our homeland defense equation is absolutely critical.

General Guillot, would you agree with that assessment? Yes, sir, I would.

So we can say that it is beneficial to everyday American citizens that we maintain a very strong and robust relationship with our Israeli allies.

The Israeli allies and others. Yes, sir.

Well, obviously, but there's been some contentious things with people saying that we have no business partnering with Israel and I fundamentally disagree with them. And I think that our ability to protect ourselves is accelerated by the fact that they're sitting there getting hammered every day by missiles and rockets and we're not, thank God. So I want to thank you gentlemen for your dedication. I know that you did not ride a horse here, you flew in a plane, right? Okay. So sometimes when we can't really visualize future technologies, we tend to mock them and I think that that makes us lesser people. So thank you very much. You have my unwavering support. God bless you and the Space Force, sir. I yield.

Gentleman yields back. Now please recognize the ranking member, Mr. Moulton.

Thank you very very, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There's bipartisan agreement on this committee that our incoming threat detection is not perfect, but I detected a circuitous and vague insult on my intelligence in the previous remarks. And I would just point out to the gentleman from Wisconsin, whether he's a gentleman or not, that the only person who voted against the formation of the Space Force on this committee was a Republican. Lieutenant General Gainey, your air defenders saved thousands and thousands of lives in the Middle East. I disagree with the war, but I honor and praise the service of our air defenders and want our allies and the American people to appreciate that. Just give us an idea, I mean, approximately how many installations and cities are you currently protecting with Patriot and THAAD batteries?

Ranking Member Moulton, thank you for that question. I'm extremely proud of our air defenders currently deployed in the CENTCOM AOR. Our 32nd team are covering dozens of location facilities and some of that covers some of the city out there. And the way that they are fighting this fight, you know, we have teenagers out of high school and officers out of college sitting in that van day in and day night fighting a complex threat out there and are doing magnificently doing. Not only that, we are rapidly reducing data and innovating in real time to be able to get after some of these complex threats that we thought we wouldn't have been able to do.

And that's fantastic. I mean, this is the most complex air defense fight that the U.S. has has faced and and you can see the pride that you have in your in your soldiers, which I appreciate. Protecting dozens of installations across the United, across the Middle East. General Guetlein, how many American cities are currently protected by Patriot or THAAD batteries?

Today there are none.

Today there are none. So we're protecting dozens of installations and cities in the Middle East, but we're not protecting any American cities with these assets. Does that concern you?

Congressman, I'm very concerned about the homeland defense equation. We are vulnerable to a numerous array of threats that Golden Dome is being designed to get after. We have traditionally focused on intercontinental ballistic missile threat and have not really thought enough about the cruise missile, the hypersonic missile, the ballistic missiles from air or from sea, nor now what we are seeing the expanding counter-UAS threat. So we do need to expand our defense equation.

I totally agree. But if Golden Dome is such a priority, then why are we expending so many Patriot and THAAD missiles at millions of dollars a copy in the Middle East when we have not a single American city, not even the capital city of Washington, D.C., protected here at home?

Congressman, we are changing the defense equation of the homeland to get after those threats. Traditionally we relied on nuclear...

Well, I'm just saying like we we didn't have to start this war. So if we wanted to change this equation, it was so urgent, then why are we not putting these batteries here at home rather than starting a war of choice in the Middle East that's eating up so much of our inventory?

Congressman, my focus is on homeland defense. I cannot answer to the overseas conflict.

Okay. Mr. Berkowitz, in General Guetlein's opening statement, he makes a policy assertion that Golden Dome forces our adversaries to question whether an attack could ever succeed, making them less likely to threaten or attack the United States in the first place. How have we seen that theory either sort of supported by current events in Iran? I mean, we just heard from Lieutenant General Gainey that we're literally protecting dozens of installations and cities with our missile defense assets, which notably are not protecting American cities here at home. But Iran has just shot more drones and ballistic missiles at us and our Gulf allies than they ever have before. So it just seems like this basic theory of deterrence is not working with the current conflict.

Um, deterrence occurs in the cognitive domain. It's a psychological phenomena in the minds of our adversaries. Um, I think we're talking about a regime that may be beyond deterrence. Um, they have for decades pursued nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Successive administrations have engaged them to try and...

Yeah, exactly. And yet they weren't projecting power the way they are now until we started this war. And my point is more focused just on, I don't disagree with what you said, that's a fine comment, but my point is more focused on the basic theory of deterrence with Golden Dome, which says that if we have a robust missile defense, our adversaries won't attack us. And by the way, part of the rationale given for this war was that at some time in the future, the president said in a matter of days, although our own intelligence community has said it's more like a decade, Iran will have the capability of shooting ballistic missiles at the United States. But that basic theory seems blown out of the water by our current experience, which is that we have incredibly robust missile defense across the Middle East. We've been singing its praises in a very bipartisan way, and yet it has not stopped Iran in the least from shooting a lot of missiles and drones at us and our allies, which also, to the point that missile defense is not perfect, has ended the lives of several Americans. So I think we should just be asking more questions. I'm unfortunately out of time, but Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. Chairman, is it possible for me to respond?

Feel free to respond, sir.

Mr. Moulton, I just wanted to complete my thought, which was deterrence is in the adversary's mind and in this case, they have not been deterred at all. They have been killing American citizens for the better part of 40 years through a variety of means, not just through ballistic missiles, but through a variety of modalities.

Have they ever killed Americans by ballistic missiles before?

They have not, but they've used many other tools to do so.

And I agree. And I've seen Americans personally killed by Iranians. So I think I understand this threat in a pretty real way. I've been there on the ground in Iraq, seeing Marines killed by Iranians. So I get that. I want to defeat them. I want to win. I would like to be buying more interceptors. I would also like to prevent a war in the Pacific. What I don't want to be doing is getting bogged down in a war in the Middle East that we're losing while also spending hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars here at home on a theory of deterrence that seems pretty shaky. And if the hope is that what didn't work against the Iranians will work against Putin, that kind of hope is not a good strategy, at least in my mind. But I appreciate the conversation and look forward to continuing it. Thank you.

Are you both finished?

Oh, no, no, no. We'll carry this on. For the purposes of this discussion, we'll save it. And let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I very much appreciate the intellectual discussion that we are starting to have on this committee because I think for too long it's just been, hey, you want to do this, go ahead. And Mr. Berkowitz and others have really been willing to engage in this debate, which fundamentally is important for the American people, for the taxpayers whose dollars we're supposed to supervise. So we may disagree, it may take us some time to come to agreement on these issues, but the debate matters. And I appreciate your willingness to have it.

And I've been uncharacteristically light on the gavel today because we have such a distinguished panel in front of us and this is a very important topic and a very important hearing. And so we're going to go to our final member for questioning, the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Crank, before going to the closed session. You're recognized for five minutes, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. And before I begin my questions, I'd like to take a moment to honor Sergeant Benjamin Pennington, who was killed by Iran during the opening days of Operation Epic Fury. Sergeant Pennington served with the Army's 1st Space Brigade at Fort Carson and supported the Army Space and Missile Defense Command while in Saudi Arabia. And General Gainey, thank you so much for supporting his family. I've spoken with Ben's dad several times and your outreach has meant a lot to him. I also believe that had we not deployed those systems, had we not procured those weapon systems and deployed them and used them at the beginning of this, there would have been a lot more of our American servicemen who would not be alive today. General Guetlein, I appreciate our conversation last week. I'm confident you are the right person to lead this critical mission to defend our homeland. And we had a good conversation during our call about lessons learned from Operation Epic Fury regarding modern missile attacks and how you're applying them to Golden Dome. For everyday Americans who don't spend every waking hour thinking about missile defense like you do, I think there's an understandable gap in understanding how the missile threat has changed in the last 20 years. Iran showed the world how difficult it is to deal with mass swarms of traditional ballistic missiles. And in your testimony, you discuss new technologies like FOBS and MIRVs that threaten our homeland. In layman's terms, can you communicate what's different about the modern missile threat, how our legacy defenses currently fall short, and why Golden Dome is the right option to meet that threat?

Yes, Representative, I can. It's a very fundamental question of why we need Golden Dome. We have traditionally relied on our oceans to take the away game to the enemy. While we have been focusing on the away game, they've been focusing on holding the homeland at risk. And what's worse yet, they've also become very capable at it. They've increased their arsenal both in range and lethality and now even in maneuverability, which makes these exceptionally challenging threats to get after. What we are seeing in Iran is proof that these threats have been modernizing. They are becoming more lethal. We are seeing an exceptionally high operational tempo. We are seeing threats coming from the multi-domain environment, meaning they're coming from air, they're coming from the sea, they're coming from space, they're coming from land. And they have figured out how to get some low-cost threats in there as well to challenge our depth, our defenses. This is driving a demand for increased magazine depth and a demand for lower-cost solutions to get after these effectors. And that's what Golden Dome is focused on, is how to change that defense equation. And we're doing that through partnerships with industry, partnerships with academia, and partnerships with the national labs.

Boost phase intercept is particularly challenging aspect, of course, of Golden Dome as it requires much shorter decision timelines for the warfighters. How are you addressing that challenge?

It is an incredible challenge that is going to be incredibly difficult. However, I do believe that the technology exists to get after that threat today and we believe we can solve it. What we do not know today is can I do it at scale and can I do it affordably? That's going to be the huge challenge for boost phase intercept. I will tell you, because we are so focused on affordability, if we cannot do it affordably, we will not go into production. And that's something that others have not understood. Because we are looking at the threats from a multi-domain perspective to make sure I have redundant capabilities and I don't have single points of failure. So if boost phase intercept from space is not affordable and scalable, we will not produce it because we have other options to get after it.

And then finally, you're working under a pretty tight timeline to address the threat, meet the President's objectives. How are you leveraging your existing authorities and what regulatory barriers may need to be removed to help you meet your deadline?

Yes, sir. The authorities have really allowed us to gain unity of effort across the joint services, the military services departments, and as well as the agencies, but also across the rest of the federal government to make sure that we're all getting after the same thing simultaneously. I have acquisition authority, I have contracting authority, I have budget authority, I have classification authority. I have all the authorities I need to be successful and that has allowed us to build those partnerships to get after the threats in new and innovative ways.

Well, just wrapping up, thank you all for your service to our country. I don't think the American people generally understand this threat that's out there. They just don't think about it every day. Thank God we have folks like you who have dedicated your careers and think about it every day. And I told you this, General Guetlein, before, someday you and all of you will look back, your grandkids will look back and thank you for the great work that you did on this. Thank you very much. I yield back.

Gentleman yields back and I'd like to thank all of our witnesses today for their excellent testimony and answers and also our committee members for their very thoughtful and timely questions. This will end the open session of the hearing and we'll take a brief comfort break and meet up in 2337 in five to 10 minutes. This hearing is adjourned.