Legislative Hearing on Protecting Communications Networks and Improving Connectivity

Brother Mike. Subcommittee will come to order. The chair recognized himself for an opening statement. Uh, good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing. We are here to consider several bills that address important issues facing our nation's communications ecosystem. These range from securing our networks from foreign threats and robo-calls, to improving how we connect our rural constituents. We all know the frustration of receiving unwanted robo-calls. Americans received an estimated four point three billion robo-calls last month alone. Although some of these calls are legal, calls that the recipient has consented to receiving, such as from a school or pharmacy, illegal robo-calls continue to be a problem. In fact, fraud perpetrated against Americans by illegal robo-calls costs an average of twenty-two billion dollars annually, primarily affecting those who cannot afford such losses. Additionally, fraudulent robo-calls make us distrustful of legitimate callers, causing us to ignore calls from unknown numbers and often miss important calls. Congress has taken steps to address this problem. In twenty nineteen, we enacted the Palone-Thune Traced Act. This law took important steps to reduce illegal robo-calls by requiring providers to implement call authentication, increased fines for intentional violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, authorized tracebook efforts, and established a federal inter-agency working group to combat illegal robo-calls. The FCC has also taken important steps to reduce illegal robo-calls, both in implementing the Trace Act and by working to block these calls from reaching our networks in the first place. Unfortunately, however, more still needs to be done. Bad actors continue to develop new ways to enter our networks. And many of these culprits are based abroad, making them hard to track down. One of the bills we're considering today will improve our efforts to identify and catch these foreign bad actors and make it harder for their calls to enter our networks. These are meaningful steps. I want to make clear that I am well aware of the difficulties that Congress and the federal government face when trying to address this problem. Fraudsters do not allow, do not follow the law. And we must be mindful of imposing new requirements that will only burden legitimate callers while doing nothing to reduce the illegal calls that harm us. We're also considering legislation to improve our efforts to connect our unserved and underserved rural constituents. Closing the digital divide has long been a priority for this Congress, but our efforts to accomplish this goal has created a web of overlapping and duplicative programs. In two thousand twenty-two, the Government Accountability Office found that the federal government runs over a hundred and thirty broadband programs across fifteen different agencies. This fragmented approach has led to overbuilding and waste, not to mention confusion caused by conflicting requirements and obligations. GAO has recommended a government-wide strategy to better coordinate and align these programs and I am pleased we're considering legislation to do that. One helpful development in our efforts to deploy broadband is the FCC's broadband map. Although not perfect, this map has significantly improved our ability to identify who has broadband and who does not. We can improve this map, and today we're considering a bill that will help us identify agriculture areas, so we can ensure farmers have the connectivity they need for things like precision agriculture and other modern technologies. I know full well the immense importance of connecting unserved Americans. I'm a proud member of the bipartisan, bicameral, universal service fund working group, and I'm continuing to work with this group on reforms to ensure the USF is sustainable for future generations. USF is an important tool in our efforts to ensure universal connectivity, and I hope we can reach an agreement very soon. As we continue to deploy and upgrade communications infrastructure nationwide, we need the most advanced technology to ensure they are efficient, resilient, and secure. To accomplish this, we can turn to our favorite buzzword, artificial intelligence, AI. At a time when threats to our network are at an all-time high, AI is a crucial tool to fight fire with fire and ensure one of our most critical systems is protected. Although AI is already deployed throughout our networks in certain capacities, we can always benefit from a greater understanding of how it can be implemented to maximize security. We have a lot of talk uh to talk about today. So thank you to our witnesses for being here. Um, I look forward to this discussion. And I now recognize the ranking member, the gentlelady from California, for her opening statement.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad we're holding this hearing to address two basic needs, affordable broadband for every American and secure networks people can trust. Reliable communications connects students to classrooms, patients to health care, and communities to lifesaving emergency services. In the Sacramento region, we see both the promise of connectivity and the consequences when it falls short. A family can live only twenty minutes from downtown Sacramento and still lack the connection needed for work telehealth and on-line learning. And for families in the California Delta, broadband is also essential for monitoring irrigation, tracking changing weather, and getting crops to market. That's why accurate data matters. We cannot connect the right places when our maps fail to show where service is actually needed. It's great that we're looking at ways to improve our broad-band maps and provide a clearer picture of connectivity across agricultural areas. But infrastructure alone will not close the digital divide. A connection does little good when a family cannot afford service or lacks the device or skills to use it. That's why I co-lead the bipartisan by Canberra University Service Fund working group with Chairman Hudson. We are working to preserve and modernize the programs that connect rural communities, schools, libraries, health care providers, and low income families. It is also why I introduced the Digital Opportunity Foundation Act. This legislation will bring public and private partners together to expand digital skills, device access, and broad band adoption. We must ensure the infrastructure we build actually improves lives and that every person has the skills and tools to make full use of it. We must also secure these networks. Communications networks connect Sacramento's hospitals, utilities, schools and businesses. A cyber-attack can interrupt medical care, classroom instruction, electricity and emergency response. I've long worked to protect our communications networks from untrusted equipment and support more secure technology made here at home. I've also pushed to strengthen cyber security protections for our schools and libraries. That effort helped build momentum for the FCC's two hundred million dollar cyber security pilot program. But our schools and libraries need sustained support to protect their networks and the people who depend on them. That's why I'll keep fighting to secure long-term funding including through the U universal service fund. The bills before us also take important steps, such as studying how AI can help identify malware and cyber threats in real time. But AI can also create new security risks. We need strong guardrails for both open source and proprietary AI models, especially when they are used in our communications networks and other critical systems. That means rigorous testing strong cyber security standards, transparency, and clear accountability when systems fail or are misused. Finally, we need stronger protection from scams. Last year, Americans lost three point five billion dollars to imposter scams. This includes scams that lure consumers through text and phone. An A I now allows criminals to clone a loved one's voice, impersonate a government official, or create a convincing false emergency. The bills we are considering at this hearing takes important steps toward protecting consumers from illegal robocalls, but we have more work to do. That is why I'm working on legislation to prohibit fraudulent AI impersonations and improve coordination among enforcement agencies. Scammers should not escape accountability because they are exploiting new technologies and targeting our most vulnerable communities. I look forward to working with my colleagues to strengthen the bills before us today and keep every community connected and secure. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you. And uh before I recognize the Chairman of the full committee, uh just for the record, during the ranking members' um remarks, I received a robo-call. And it said uh " Hi, my name is Reginald and I'm giving you a call about your installment loan application. I wanted to reach out personally because you've been upreaproof for forty-five thousand dollars, blah, blah, blah." Just pretty timely. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mister Guthrie, for five minutes for your opening statement.

Thank you, thank you. You're pre-proof for forty-five thousand, that's good. So, uh, good afternoon and I thank Chairman Hudson. I appreciate you for holding this legislative hearing on these very important topics. Uh, securing our communication system from bad actors has been a long-standing and bipartisan priority for this committee. Reggie Member Pallone, then Chairman Walden, Representative Matsu, and I led this committee's effort to rip and replace untrusted vendor equipment from our mobile networks by passing the Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act in twenty nineteen. Since then, this committee has worked to ban Chinese manufactured drones, by passing the Countering CCP Drones Act. Just last year we passed Representative Lada's Routers Act to examine the threat of routers made in or by countries of concern, including China. That said, we remain vigilant to threats imposed by adversaries like China and are committed to protecting our critical infrastructure and safeguarding Americans' data. Recent reports of a China-linked plot to cripple New York's communications networks serve as a stark reminder that these threats are real and ongoing and shows the lengths to which our adversaries will go to undermine our interests and then threaten our homeland. Given those risks, Any legislation effort to amend the covered lists administered by the FCC warrants careful consideration by the committee. That's why today we'll be considering the GART Act, legislation that would add humanoid and quadruped robots, linked with certain CCP-linked robotics companies, to the covered list. I appreciate the work of the sponsors of the bill and the opportunity to examine this threat today to better understand why Americans should be concerned about humanoid and quadruped um, robots from adversaries. We will also spend time learning about other attack vectors from adversaries, such as malicious, illegal, robocalls that are fraudulently attacking Americans. I don't know if yours is fraud, you might be able to afford a forty five thousand dollar loan, huh? I'm not sure. Uh, but tacky, but it's it's interesting that happened right as we're sitting here, didn't it? And finally, legislation to ensure that federal broadband dollars are going to areas most in need. Yeah, I get the ones. Kentucky doesn't have a DMV. We call ours the transportation cabinet, so we just call it transportation, so I keep getting the Kentucky DMV needs you to call and give your money for tolls you haven't paid, and well, we don't have hardly any toll roads. And second of all, we don't have a DMV. But anyway, hopefully whoever sending me that didn't figure out we don't have a DMV, cuz I know it's wrong and I don't know any tolls. So but so that we're all affected. And we and we hear I hear about this as much as anything. from constituents back home. I went to visit a friend of mine who, um, I knew from early days in politics, who's now eighty seven. And as we sit and talk for an hour, he has a home line. I bet he answered at least six or seven phone calls in an hour that were spam. So we need to deal with this and, uh, you'll back.

Thank you. And, uh, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, the ranking member of the full committee, for five minutes for his opening statement.

Thank you, Chairman Hudson, and today we are examining legislation across a number of important areas within this subcommittee's jurisdiction. Network security continues to be a top priority for me and this subcommittee, and we must stay on top of new and emerging threats that use increasingly sophisticated capabilities to compromise critical infrastructure. We've watched closely as advancements in the tech space like AI powered coding and other recent innovations have significantly reduced the time and labor cost for network engineering and coding task. Positive applications would be difficult to quantify, but it's clear that widely available AI tools are empowering individuals to build out application systems and even entire business virtually overnight, without the need for huge upfront capital investments. And fewer barriers to entry for start-ups as small businesses could or should open the door to more competition and choice for consumers. But using history as a guide, we know that each innovation or new capability that helps the good guys is also a tool that can be used by bad actors for nefarious purposes. Whether it's cyber criminals working alone, or teams of military or civilian personnel supported by adversarial nations, our enemies can use the same capabilities to more efficiently breach and sabotage American networks, we have to ensure that our network defenses stay ahead of the curve. With that in mind, I look forward to today's discussion of the AI for Secure Networks Act, led by representatives Menendez and Flueger and to hear more about the ways we can proactively employ AI to better defend our communications networks from bad actors. I'm also interested to hear from witnesses about how the Guard Act led by representatives McClellan and Molinau can apply the framework of my secure and trusted communications networks act to the rapidly growing market for humanoid and other robotics. Now is the time to act to prevent untrusted suppliers with ties to our adversaries from flooding the US market with robotics and other advanced technology and services. There's also plenty of work to be done to address the incessant robo-calls and phone scams that still plague consumers on a daily basis despite all of our work on this issue in the past. At best, robo-calls and scams are a nuisance, at worst, if executed successfully, they can upend people's lives and cost thousands of dollars. They're seldom recovered from bad actors who seek out and prey on seniors especially. In spite of bipartisan efforts by Congress, the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commissions have both worked with carriers to weed out scam calls. But my constituents continue to raise this issue as one in need of our continued attention. And I hope today's discussion can shed light on what obstacles are still preventing regulators and law enforcement from stopping or reducing robocalls. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how legislation like and the Foreign Robocall Elimination Act can help in these efforts. We'll also consider two pieces of legislation that aim to build on the subcommittee's work to deploy broadband infrastructure across the country, so that every American can access affordable and reliable high-speed internet service in particular I hope to hear our witnesses' perspectives on how the Plan for Broadband Act led by Representatives Peters and Wahlberg and the Data Bridge Act led by Representatives Kelly, Soho, I mean Soto and Howichan can improve how we manage, track and carry out federal broad brand deployment initiatives as efficiently as possible so lot to discuss Mister Chairman I yield back the balance of my time.

Uh thank you gentlemen, I was distracted because Reginald called again during your report. And apparently I've been approved for another forty five thousand dollar loan, so this is this is amazing,

Wow.

this is incredible. I mean, this is not that unusual, but I've gotten two robo-calls since we've started this hearing.

Interest rate.

Uh,

Yeah.

Mister Allen wants to know what the interest rate is. Um, listen, we've now concluded with member opening statements, the chair reminds members that pursuant to the committee rules all members' opening statements will be made part of the record. Uh, we'd like to thank our witnesses for being here today, uh, and to testify before this subcommittee. Uh, our witnesses will have five minutes to provide an opening statement, which will be followed by a round of questions. from our members. Uh, the witnesses here before us today are Michael Robbins, President and CEO of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International. Thank you. Um, Kevin Ruppe, partner with Wally Rahn. Thank you for being here. Uh, Andrew Vonnaugh, uh, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office. Thank you. And Lindsay Gorman, former Senior Policy Advisor for Technology Strategy in the Biden White House. Thank you for being here with us. Uh, Mister Robbins, you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.

Thank you, Chairman Hudson and Ranking Member Matsui and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to be with you today. I am Michael Robbins, President and CEO of AUVSI. We are the trade association for the autonomy, robotics and drones industry. Our members are at the leading edge of transformation where artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomy are converging to create a new frontier of cyber-physical systems. Before I turn to the Guard Act, a brief personal word uh because this hearing is very special for me. Uh, we are meeting in the John D. Dingell room. I went to work for the late John Dingell in two thousand and two, well, when I was just nineteen years old, and from two thousand and six through two thousand eleven, I had the privilege of serving as his Chief of Staff. He was my boss, my mentor, and my friend, and much of what I know about serving the public, including my commission in the United States Navy, I learned from him. Uh with me today is my son. Uh like this room he is named in the Congressman's honor, uh referencing Chairman Dingell's family nickname of Jack. Chairman Dingell used the jur jurisdiction of this committee to defend American workers and consumers and to keep our industrial strength equal to our security and that is the argument I bring with you today. AVSI stands in strong support of the Gart Act and our backing is informed by history and lessons from previous policy failures in the drone industry. drone technology was invented in america the scaling however took place in china over a decade PRC manufacturers came to dominate american skies the PRC the people's republic of china leveraged massive state subsidies IP theft and deliberate market dumping to drive many american drone manufacturers out of business or keeping their market share small by flooding the global market with artificially cheap systems that was market share engineered in beijing not fairly earned in the market. And this also injected considerable national security risks into the United States. A Chinese drone is a flying sensor built by companies that the PRC can compel to share data that is collected back with the PRC. And that is why CISA and the FBI have warned that Chinese drones put American critical infrastructure at risk. By the time Congress took action to address the risk, and mar- and and the market imbalance, many American operators had built their operations around a single foreign supplier. And therefore every policy option was costly and often faced with fierce opposition from those who had become dependent on Chinese technology. Nevertheless, we appreciate the courage of this committee for moving forward. The cost of restricting an adversary's technology is a function of its installed base and the installed base only grows as the PRC executes on its deliberate strategy to subsidize its companies and dump its products in the United States to create strategic dependence. Accordingly, every year of delay on robotics turns an easier decision into an expensive and more complex one. Because the same PRC playbook used for drones is now armed, now aimed at robotics. The humanoid and quadruped market is still relatively new. Only a few tens of thousands of units shipped worldwide last year. But the capture dynamics are already visible. Chinese firms already account for roughly ninety percent of the global humanoid shipments. And our research universities, where American robots once led, labs have shifted to subsidized, artificially low-cost Chinese systems in just the last twelve to eighteen months. In public safety, police departments are adopting Chinese robot dogs in the same pattern that entrenched Chinese drones over the last decade. And like with drones, this is not merely an economic i- contest, it's also a national security one. A compromised laptop can expose data. A compromised robot can expose data and also move, surveil, and act physically inside a factory or a hospital or a power plant or on a military base. And like with drones, under China's national intelligence law, the companies that build these systems can be compelled to serve state intelligence in secret. Every such system is therefore a Trojan horse on American soil. The GART Act meets the moment because it is action while the installed base for robotics is still small. It protects our NATO and non-major, net, non- major non-NATO allies. It covers Finnish systems and their software, not the components American factur- manu- manufacturers source globally. and it pairs a security review with a deadline that has consequences. AVSI supports the GART Act because it is important to note that it AVSI supports the GART Act but it is important to note that it's just one half of a two-prong strategy. It's the defense. Restrictions by time. They do not win the entire competition. The other half is offense. A national robotics strategy, like Congressman Olbermann'll today has introduced. Secure supply chains for critical inputs, like rare earth magnets. investment into US research and manufacturing, and federal demand for trusted systems. We must protect and we must promote. Chairman Dingell spent his career getting ahead of problems so the families he represented would not pay for Washington's delay. When Chinese drones first arrived, no one warned this committee where it would end because it had not yet happened. This time with robotics we can see it coming, and we can act while it's still inexpensive to do so. For my son's generation, and for the American workers and companies who will build these machines, I hope we will. AUBSI urges you to advance the GART Act. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you. Uh, Mister Ruppe, you're recognized for five minutes for an opening statement.

Chairman Hudson, Vice Chairman Allen, Ranking Member Matsui, Chairman Guthrie, Ranking Member Pallone, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Kevin Ruppe, and I am a partner in the Telecommunications, Media and Technology practice. at Wiley Rhyne LLP, and I'm here today in my own personal capacity. All views expressed in this testimony are my own. I have worked to combat illegal robocalls and fraud since two thousand twelve, including helping establish and oversee the industry traceback group, which has been the FCC's designated traceback consortium since July twenty twenty. I also serve on the board of the Communications Fraud Control Association and represent clients in efforts to combat illegal robo-calls and brand impersonation scams. I share the subcommittee's concerns about illegal robo-calls. Consumer fraud, including illegal robo-call schemes, is no longer dominated by opportunistic scam artists. Increasingly, it is carried out by sophisticated criminal enterprises, including transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and hostile foreign actors, operating at industrial scale. As such, this issue raises serious consumer protection and national security concerns, which is why the subcommittee is right to focus on it. I would like to make three points today. First, enforcement works, especially when it is powered by sophisticated tools, including traceback. Federal, state, and private civil enforcement actions demonstrated real success in disrupting fraudulent schemes. Building on these successes, the government should prioritize targeted and meaningful enforcement actions. As scams become increasingly tied to sophisticated criminal enterprises, federal agencies should fully deploy their criminal enforcement authorities to combat this con- consumer protection and national security threat. According to a recent Gallup survey, Americans lost an estimated sixty-eight billion dollars to scams in twenty twenty-five alone, across multiple channels. a level of consumer harm that demands an equally aggressive criminal enforcement response. Second, because fraud is highly dynamic, industry needs flexible frameworks to adapt to evolving threats and respond in real time. Fraud is most effective Fraud prevention is most effective when government and industry play to their strengths. Government sets the general rules of the road while industry Accordingly, policy frameworks should preserve the flexibility necessary for industry to innovate and respond as threats evolve. To this end, I urge Congress not to look to complicated compliance frameworks like the TCPA as a solution to the illegal robocall problem. The TCPA is an incredibly complex statute already, and its core purpose is to establish compliance guidelines for legitimate callers. Additional compliance mandates will primarily burden legitimate callers, not the scammers who routinely disregard the rules. I encourage Congress to focus on legislation aimed directly at fraudsters and criminal enterprises rather than retrofitting a compliance statute that bad actors will simply ignore. Third, to keep pressure on illegal robo-callers, industry and government must strengthen collaboration and information sharing. Fraudsters regularly collaborate across sectors, defenders should too. This collaboration is already occurring on multiple fronts, and is having meaningful results. Information sharing and coordinated action across telecom, financial, technology, and government sectors can accelerate threat detection, disrupt fraud, and better protect consumers from increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. No single sector can combat fraud alone. Staying ahead of evolving threats requires sustained information sharing and coordinated action. I look forward to discussing these issues with you today.

Thank you. Uh, Mr. Von Ah, you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.

Chairman Hudson, Vice Chairman Allen, Ranking Member Matsui and members of the subcommittee. I'm pleased to be here today to discuss our work on federal broadband efforts as the committee considers potential legislation. Expanding and improving a- access to broadband across the country has been a vexing and time-consuming task. Questions about where to build, which technologies to support, and at what cost to the taxpayer and price point for the consumer have proven difficult to answer. Even then, other challenges have presented themselves, including difficulties in inter-agency collecting accurate data for mapping, and ensuring the viability of the networks we are investing in, among other things. In response to these many challenges, the Plan for Broadband Act being discussed today directs the development of a national broadband strategy that focuses on improving inter-agency coordination, reducing administrative barriers, and ensuring funding is used efficiently and responsibly. In May of two thousand twenty-two, we recommended the Executive Office of the President develop and implement a national broadband strategy. to help agencies manage existing fragmentation and overlap of the hundreds of broad band programs we identified, focus federal efforts on a common goal, and mitigate the risk of potentially wasteful duplicative air efforts. At that time, Congress had created several new broad band programs and increased funding for others in response to the pandemic, which had underscored the importance of access to broad band. Ultimately, four agencies, FCC, NTIA, and the departments of Agriculture and Treasury administer the bulk of broadband funding and have been executing programs to deploy and support broadband. Fast forward to today, and we are at a moment where NTIA's BEAD program, the largest broadband de- deployment program, is starting to roll out funding to states and tor- territories with the aim of connecting every remaining location in the country. At the same time, the dozen or so other broadband deployment programs administered by these agencies are all in the middle of building out their projects as well. The question for our national strategy today may be more about what comes next, as we approach universal access over the next several years. With or without a strategy, having many overlapping programs creates the necessity for federal agencies to effectively collaborate to ensure they avoid unnecessary duplication and meet the needs of unserved and underserved communities. In April twenty twenty-five, report reported that while the agencies have some processes in place, opportunities exist to improve their efforts, for example, clearly defining, agreeing upon, and documenting each agency's related to sharing the deployment data and avoiding duplication would improve existing maps and better position the agencies to sustain their collaborative efforts especially in the event of leadership or staff changes. Furthermore, we found that the agencies' collaborative efforts did not fully identify common outcomes, or clearly establish agency roles and responsibilities, including leadership roles. To that end, the strategy called for in the Plan for Broadband Act calls for agencies to establish those clear roles and responsibilities. as well as goals and measures for their efforts. Other work we have conducted has highlighted risks to maintaining the broadband services deployed using federal funds, another factor that could be considered in the creation of a national broadband strategy. For example, in reporting on NTIA's tribal broadband program, we found that recipients were often relying on funding that was no longer available in order to support subscribers. Without ensuring whether recipients can afford to operate their networks, NTIA risks the long-term viability of its investment. We have ongoing work that we expect to issue later this year, which will discuss how agencies have addressed challenges recipients face in maintaining broadband service. Ensuring funding is targeted to areas of greatest need also requires accurate data on where broadband is available and where it is lacking. The Data Bridge Act being discussed today also directs FCC to further to refine its maps to identify rural and geographically essential areas, where broadband deployment may be prioritized. Our work has highlighted the importance of accurate maps and agency coordination efforts, and in the targeting of federal funding. Challenges to FCC's data have frequently been successful, creating questions about the overall accuracy of these maps. While FCC takes steps to ensure the quality of its maps data, it has not s- assessed how well those efforts are working. And in response to our audit work and recommendations, FCC has taken some steps to address uh issues related to data accuracy, although our reme- recommendations remain open. Uh, to sum up, as broad band deployment programs are in full swing, Our work suggests federal agencies must continue to effectively coordinate their efforts and improve the broadband availability data they rely on to mitigate the risks of overlap and duplication and risks that area of the country remain underserved. This concludes my statement. I look forward to any questions.

Thank you. Ms. Gorman, you're recognized for five minutes for your opening statement. Make sure your mike's on there.

Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Matsui, Chairman Guthrie, Ranking Member Pallone, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Lindsay Gorman and I come from a background as an AI and cybersecurity engineer with start-up companies as a builder with technology-focused venture firms, as a researcher of US-China technology and AI competition, and as a former White House advisor on technology. Two years ago, I had the honor to testify before this subcommittee on the future internet and the risks of cyber warfare from the People's Republic of China. I argued then that democratic allies needed trusted supply chains for a projected five hundred billion dollar internet of things market, and that applications such as in healthcare and connected vehicles introduced new risks around dependencies, building, espionage, and intellectual property theft. Today, those risks have grown immeasurably, and they have also transformed in character with the rapid adoption and diffusion of generative artificial intelligence. Yet the US policy response has not kept pace. I focused my testimony on three dimensions of this challenge, the new cyber attack surface posed by AI models, agents and applications, the competition with the PRC, and consideration of open versus closed AI, and advances in sixty telecommunications networks as AI native. First, AI is massively expanding the cyber attack surface and risks, tipping the offense-defense balance in favor of the attacker. AI systems are becoming increasingly capable hackers. In April, the UK's AI security institute assessed that Claude's mythos preview was capable of autonomous intrusions. Just yesterday, OpenAI announced that during a benchmark cyber test, its models escaped their test environment, exploited a vulnerability to access the internet, and breached fellow AI company Hugging Face to steal the test results. Models and agents also create new cyber access points for intruders such as through prompt injection and data poisoning attacks. AI shows promise in defending against cyber intrusions, but the barriers to closing vulnerabilities are often less technical and more organizational. Moreover, as AI development moves from chatbots into the real world, this attack surface will only grow. One movement in the AI community is the development of world models. in order to realize the true superhuman intelligence its adherents argue ai needs to understand the physical three dimensional world the potential is extraordinary from humanoid robots that can diffuse explosive devices on the battlefield to those that fold laundry at home just as with large language models enormous quantities of real world data will be required to train these world models such as videos of janitors cleaning office buildings soldiers conducting reconnaissance missions factory workers assessing complex assembling complex machinery or basketball players shooting free throws once developed and deployed these systems will collect data continuously on their environments to refine their models a cyber security framework addressing covered adversarial providers must contemplate this future second the united states and its allies can benefit from leading open source ai infrastructure but today it is the prc driving this approach Historically, the United States has enjoyed the benefits of open source leadership. When software engineers the world over today write code, for example, they do so in English. The US holds a small lead in frontier AI, but its infrastructural foundations are unfolding behind closed doors. By contrast, PRC players are releasing open weight models that are free to use, but harder to spot bugs. While analysts assess that this approach carries uh is a short-term strategy while china lags behind the us it carries long-term risks that third countries adopt prcai systems now due to cost some us companies already are the us needs lower cost alternatives for export and a vibrant open-source ai ecosystem at home finally six g telecom networks will merge computing and communications in an ai native architecture The US must lead a coalition of democratic allies to deploy secure six G as foundational to secure global AI. In my written testimony, I provide recommendations to Congress to monetize US cyber security oversight for the AI era, secure AI models, and applications against foreign adversarial suppliers, accelerate six G adoption and security, secure and co- compete on open source AI, and rebuild tech trust with allies and partners. The AI landscape is changing day by day and week by week. Protecting our networks and our leadership is vital for America's future. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you. Um, we'll now begin questioning, and I'll recognize myself for five minutes. Um, Mister Ruppe, um, I'm tired of receiving illegal robocalls. I got two while we were sitting here. Uh, my constituents are sick of getting these calls. Um, many of these calls come from abroad, so what can we do to find these perpetrators and how can we stop these calls from entering our network in the first place.

Chairman Hudson, um, I I share your frustration. I under it it it is a huge issue. And, you know, I think, based on, you know, what I discussed in my testimony, I do believe we need more enforcement, uh, and in particular criminal enforcement. We need to find the bad actors behind this and put them in jail. And the fact of the matter is, we can do that. we have powerful tools uh that thanks to the TRACED Act develop things like um the industry trace back group, the trace back consortium, uh stir shake and call authentication. So what I think um we should be focusing on is directing our efforts at identifying these bad actors and putting them in jail, especially given the changing nature of

I agree. Um, so you mentioned in your testimony, um, about some of the consequences of if we get the regulation wrong on this, and uh, and imposing too many burdens on legitimate companies. Um, what Uh, can you expand on that a little bit more, um, and and why wouldn't w- you know, what i- what is the harm that we wanna avoid, uh, by doing that?

Absolutely, Chairman Hudson. Um, I like the way I think about this is where can we get the most bang for the buck? Um, and when I look at the the TCPA in particular has a role to play, right? It it sets compliance frameworks for uh legitimate callers who are trying to communicate with consumers but at the end of the day organizations like the Jalisco drug cartel and the Sinin Sinola drug cartel they're not gonna play by those rules and the fact of the matter is the Jalisco drug cartel was engaging in telemarketing um so i think

incredible

you know what we would be doing instead of using a compliance statute to address this problem. This is a criminal national security problem, and we need to use existing criminal statutes to address it.

Thank you for that. Um, Mister Vanna uh Vanna, um, it's been a few years since GAO released its report on the need for broad band strategy to improve the coordination of federal broad band programs. Uh, have things improved over the last four years?

Yes, I think things have. improves we've seen uh programs get on track and begin uh putting money out into um to to provide to carriers and others to build infrastructure so we have seen that we've seen uh improvements in agency coordination as well um the better ability to sort of uh de-duplicate or or avoid duplication of of effort where they have overlap overlapping service areas and things of that nature so yes absolutely

that's that's good news um with with the beat program finally connecting homes. Uh, do we still need a hundred and thirty different government programs, uh, doing broadband? Uh, did we ever need that many?

Uh, well that's the question that we're asking today with a with a strategy. Uh, I would say that we probably don't need a hundred and thirty programs. Uh, and Bede's goal is ultimately to connect every location that's in the map. Um, so what go what happens going forward I think is sort of the next question for what we think of as a national broadband What are the what are the existing needs in a post-beat world?

Yeah. Well, I agree with you on that. Um, Mister Ruppi, um, we've talked about how AI can be used to secure our communications networks from bad actors. Um, how are providers using AI to combat illegal robocalls?

Thank you, Chairman Hudson. Um, basically, think of it as an ecosystem. So we have voice providers, we have partnering analytics providers. Um, and then obviously we have the bad actors. Um, what what I'm seeing in the industry right now is that these analytics providers are using AI, uh, they're using AI to make those algorithms that they use to identify these calls more accurate. They're using AI to identify AI generated calls. Um, and you know, at the end of the day, this is a bit of an arms race. I mean, the the good guys are using AI and the bad guys are using AI. Um, but at the end, you know, basically industry is leveraging these tools because they're essential particularly in this space.

Well, uh, I appreciate that. Uh, that's just one more reason we've gotta win the race to develop AI. You know, we we we've gotta we've gotta be the ones with the best systems. Um, thank you for that testimony. My time has expired. Uh, now I recognize the ranking member, General A. California for five minutes to ask her questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, oof. Cyber attacks are increasing in frequency and severity, and AI models have increased the capacity for bad actors to attack critical infrastructure. We need a clear strategy to protect the communicative systems that Americans rely on every single day. Ms. Gorman, many critical infrastructure providers rely on complex networks with software from multiple vendors. How could a trusted software catalog, automated punching uh patching and continuous monitoring help them close security gaps.

Thanks for the question. As as I mentioned in my testimony, AI is also creating this incredible uh threat service, but also can provide some defensive tools, some of which you've mentioned in automated threat detection, vulnerability patching, uh what I would urge Congress to do. is we really need to have some minimum security standards when we're rolling out networks, when we're using ai within our networks uh we need to be sure that they are not subject to adversarial incursion uh and that can be they can be leveraged for these these benefits.

ok um can you suggest other tools that congress should support to help critical infrastructure providers find and fix vulnerabilities faster

i think ultimately some things some of these things just have to be required um we can let the private sector and collaborate with the with the private sector um do some of this uh on its own but when it comes for to critical infrastructure if ai systems are going to be discovering vulnerabilities for the attacker i think we need to require that they're also going to be discovering vulnerabilities uh for the defenders

ok Open source AI supports innovation, competition, and lower cost. However, they could carry, as we know, significant risk if adopted without a clear understanding of their origins or security limitations. Uh, Ms. Garman, how can Congress protect against unsafe AI models while still allowi allowing open source researchers and uh companies to innovate?

There are two dimensions of the risk here. one is models coming from adversarial actors such as the people's republic of china which tend to be open weight and two is this question of can you audit the source code can you understand what a model is doing right now those two questions are kind of aligned because the pr c is putting forward these open weight models which unlike open source software traditionally where you can inspect the source code you can see understand if there are bugs in there with open weight models that's not really the case. So what the United States needs to do is one, come up with competitors to these low cost models that the PRC is putting forward, and two, support a vibrant open source, not just open weight, but open source ecosystem for AI infrastructure. Things like the National AI Research Resource could be codified in statute, uh tools to develop the infrastructure um behind AI so that researchers across the country can build on open source architectures uh for their own models.

OK, now, Mr. Garman, we know China is making advanced AI models cheaper and easier to adopt. Um, what investments does United States need to ensure that secure American and allied alternatives remain affordable and competitive?

Well, one one way we could do this is right now we have an american ai exports program where consortia of ai providers and industry are coming together and the idea is they'll receive uh preferential financing, maybe some tax credits, uh investments, and also promotion from from the state department uh around the world. we need to make sure that there is a cost competitive track of that, potentially open source, potentially even open weight, so that our systems can also be in the global marketplaces competing um directly with the pr c not not only do we need to make the the the best frontier models which the united states is still doing um but we also need to be providing uh some lower cost alternatives to meet the world i think where it is

ok alright well thank you very much mr. Gobern are you back

thank you the chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee mr. Guthrie five minutes for your questions

thank you Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm kind of focused on the uh humanoid robotics industry. So, Mister Robbins, who currently has the competitive edge in the human or humanoid quadruped uh robotics industry, the US or China?

I would say the US is leading in innovation and China is leading in actual deployment.

Okay. Can you speak more uh about why you think Congress needs to act swiftly?

Yeah, the the Congress needs to act swiftly because uh we've seen the exact playbook that China is using. uh right now with humanoid and quadruped robotics and robotics broadly uh work very effectively in other industries like uh like drones for example, which is an industry we also represent. And the longer we wait, the more the installed base grows in the United States, and the more uh difficult it is then to make a policy change later, the more costly that policy decision is uh to people who have installed uh the the Chinese robots and and built that base. We we saw that with with drones. uh when this committee uh passed the uh the uh protecting c c p drone act um there was a lot of opposition um from people who had made significant investments in chinese drones thinking that was ok they didn't understand the national security risk

so what do you think are the concerns with having these robots from china

yeah there's there's a couple of uh big concerns first um data exfiltration uh the the the connected systems are are you know known to be uh directing data directly back to the pr c so when research is being done um that research uh in american institution is also being shared with chinese institutions uh so all that that leakage is is occurring uh further there's the uh these are mapping uh and surveilling uh an audio uh sensors on all of these robots so whatever operation they're in whether it's a factory or a hospital or military base uh they're creating uh three d models of the world around them um they're listening to the world around them and again all that data can be leaked back to china And then the scariest version is, uh, through a data update, a remote sensing, a remote access, uh, they could actually be used to physically disrupt the environment that they're in as well.

Yeah, this committee uh worked on the ban for Chinese cars, and that's the same same issues with cars as well. So uh, so also, Mister Robbins, so prior to the Guard Act's introduction, we worked with sponsors to add in a rule of construction to carve out partner and ally countries from being included in any addition to the cover list. Can you talk more about the importance of collaborating with like-minded partners? Specifically in the robotics industry?

Absolutely, yeah.

And if we didn't have outside help, I mean outside connections, not help, but connections.

Yeah, the robotics industry is a very global industry, and we have a very strong partnership uh in the United States with many uh democratic allied countries uh uh Korea, Japan, uh Taiwan, uh throughout Europe, uh Israel, Australia. Uh, and we are much stronger when working together, taking on China's authoritarian scale, uh than when any single democratic nation trying to take on China's authoritarian scale alone.

Okay, so uh also, Mr. Robbins, the the secure and trusted communications networks act, uh re- referenced earlier, will be called rip and replace, was signed into law in twenty twenty. Since then, foreign made, this is the routers act, foreign made routers and drones have been added to the coverless. Okay, so I guessed that wrong.

Yep.

So since then, the foreign made routers and drones have been added to the cover. Are there any lessons learned that we should be considering as the Guard Act goes through the legislative process? And for example, How should we think about balancing naming specific entities of concern versus entire categories of products and services?

Yeah, great question, sir. Um, so when uh the FCC took action on drones, uh they did both. They named uh entire category of products of drones, but they also named two particular companies, uh DGI and Altel Robotics as particular entities uh uh companies of concern uh due to national security findings. So uh both work, uh in this case in the robotics space, the leading Chinese robotics company, uh Unitary Robotics, has already had a national security finding from the department of war they've been placed on the twelve sixty h list which is the uh uh people's republic of china PLA military uh linked companies um so i think doing both would would make sense in this case as well i think another lesson learned from from jones uh that would is a cautionary tale is uh with drones the the focus was on all drones not just on uh adversarial platforms uh the guard act is written in a way that targets verified national security risk with adversarial and and does not sweep in our trusted, uh, NATO and and major non-NATO allies. Um, additionally, the Guard Act also, uh, does not cover, uh, components. Um, it instead has a study on components for potential future FCC action, uh, allowing there to be, uh, more of a transition time for US industry.

Okay. I have, uh, my time's about to expire. Not all my questions. I yield back. Appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman. Uh, the chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mister Palone.

thank you mr. chairman uh i believe my secure and trusted communications networks act provided a helpful framework for how the fcc should work with our national security agencies to determine a certain communications equipment or services pose a threat to society and under that framework the fcc must place the equipment or services that have been deemed a national security threat on its covered list which effectively removes them from our country's But given these takes, it's important for this committee to have oversight over the way the FCC is implementing the framework and ensure the FCC's decisions are the result of a rigorous and detailed national security analyst. So I have three questions of um Miss Gorman. Uh, and then I'm gonna go to one of Mister Ruppig. So, Miss Gorman, is it important for the FCC to work with our national security agencies to evaluate the security threat spectrum posed by communications equipment and services

vary the FCC doesn't have a full picture on its own of national security threats

ok and should we build upon this framework to insure that the FCC provides more transparency to this to this committee before placing equipment or services on the cover lists and it if so why

I believe we should we need a well articulated strategy which the FCC should work with this committee with congress to develop so that the full spectrum of US national security risks as well as economic objectives are considered in these decisions and that the biggest risk can be mitigated with broad bipartisan support so that ultimately they stick.

OK, and then my third question is also how else can we improve the secure and trusted framework, especially given increasing capabilities of drones, of robots, and AI?

I think we need to really clearly spell out what risks we actually want to guard against, when it comes to securing our networks. We're about to be confronted with a a huge panoply of PRC made devices, robots, um, AI models, the systems using AI models, and we need to make decisions about what risks, is it espionage? Is it dependence building? Is it intellectual property theft? is it the the pure cyber security risk um that we wanna guard against with these these kinds of devices and spell that out in a clear framework uh that looks to the future that builds in uh both the network security and also the applications that are sitting on top of these networks we're gonna be using ai within the networks themselves we're gonna be training ai models on the network um so it's not enough to think about applications and the networks uh as two separate pieces um but if we're gonna be using ai to monitor network traffic for vulnerabilities for malicious behavior uh what are the guardrails we wanna put on those systems uh i think that's what uh this the an updated framework uh should get at

alright thank you i wanted to go to mister uh rupi we all know dangerous and unwanted calls and texts continue to bombard americans the trace attack which I authored required among other things the creation of the industry trace back group ITG, public-private partnership to trace and stop illegal coals. While the ITG has helped to reduce the amount of unwanted rubble coals, there's a lot more work in for Congress and the industry to do here. So let me ask you first, thank you for your past efforts to stand up the ITG and with your experience, uh how else should the federal government and industry collaborate to further protect consumers from dangerous robo-calls and robo-texts, if you will.

Thank you for that question, uh, Ranking Member Pallone, and I applaud your leadership on the passage of the TRACE Act. When when I think about the TRACE Act, and I remember the run-up and the passage of it, that's exactly the type of legislation that we need to be thinking about, um, and how to approach this. You know, one of the big things that has changed since you know, just prior to the TRACED Act and now, is this involvement with criminal elements, national security threats, like it really has morphed, um, in recent years from my perspective. But I think, you know, t- to your point, the TRACED Act established the TRACEPACT consortium, the ITG, and the FCC, federal, other federal and state agencies have used that data, ITG data fuels enforcement. And as an example, there was a case uh the FCC's Sumco, Panama, where once the FCC acted based on trace-back data, those calls fell off a cliff. And I think what's what's missing is the individuals behind those calls, we need to bring criminal enforcement to this problem. I mean, the numbers are just staggering, particular particularly in terms of financial loss. So I think that's a key element. And collaboration is happening, and it works.

Alright, thanks so ma- thanks again. Thank you, Mister Chairman.

The ranking member yields and uh now I'll uh ask my questions here for the next five minutes. Uh, I wanna thank Chairman Hudson for holding this important hearing, and I wanna thank the witnesses for being here to testify. Um, and we keep talking about robo-calls. Um, I've had my experience with those.

Mm-hmm.

And, uh, and in fact, this, uh, one call I got, I, uh, I mean, uh, I I told the guy, I says, you know, I'm a member of Congress and I'm gonna have the FBI investigate you. And, uh, he kept trying to get me to go buy this car to And I finally said, " Did you hear what I said?" And, you know, so I don't know, but uh, but like I said, it's it's it sounds like a game of whack-a-mole as far as these harassing calls uh, uh, rem- and they remain a a nationwide problem, and they're getting really more serious and more serious. And uh, I don't know whether they come up with all these ideas, but uh, uh, but obviously, uh, we talked about some of the things that they're that that are working. But um, you know, and we talked about the the the trace legislation where we can, so we can we can trace these calls? We have the ability to trace these calls back to the originator?

That's correct.

OK.

Um, and one thing I wanna emphasize about that is prior to trace back, it it would take months, like six, seven, eight months.

OK.

for law enforcement to do that. We c- it it can be done now in twenty-four hours,

OK.

sometimes less.

So, as far as convicting these people, where's the holdup? Is it in the court system or is it uh i- i- i- is law enforcement able to do what they need to do? Uh or or is DOJ involved? How how does that the court system work in the fines and things like that?

So, I I think it's a resource issue. I think it's a resource and prioritization issue.

Okay. Okay.

And, you know, in my opinion, I think what often happens, whether it's a US attorney's office, the DOJ, whomever, they see robo-calls and they think, you know, this this isn't a big deal.

Right.

Um, it's just robo-calls.

Yeah.

But given the changing nature of this fraud and who is involved, um, I I think there needs to be a prioritization on on criminal enforcement. Civil enforcement works, it disrupts,

Mm-hmm.

it it knocks them off their game, but I believe we need to put people behind bars.

Um, how about the uh the the carriers and the equipment suppliers? What are they doing to try to eliminate this problem?

So, there are various things that are happening, both you know on the handset side on the carrier side um carriers work very closely with various vendors that are providing more and more powerful tools to consumers to identify these calls um you know traditionally these calls were being labeled with scam likely spam likely uh but as the fraud evolves the tools evolve

right

and so now we're moving to solutions like branded calling solutions that, you know, will literally show verified number and logo

Right.

on the device. And carriers also work closely with the ITG in identifying these folks.

And so I'm in listening to you, the federal government needs to do more to deal with this, obviously, in uh in identifying these these, uh particularly these uh uh uh enforcing the laws outside your j- jurisdiction. Because I'm pretty sure this robocall I got was from some other country. I could barely understand the the the person.

Sure.

So Uh, well thank you uh for your work on on behalf of that problem. Uh, Mister Von Ah, in my district uh many communities don't care which federal program builds broadband, they simply want reliable service. How can we make the federal process easier for local providers from electric cooperatives to local telephone companies? and uh and our communities they're just simply trying to get connected uh GAO found that more than a hundred and thirty broad band programs spread across and I think the chairman mentioned this fifteen something agencies from your per sec per per perspective what is the single biggest coordination problem that congress should be focused on fixing and getting this done

so I think from our work uh vice chairman Allen I would say that it's it's making sure that the roles amongst the agencies are clear. Um, we have uh seen a lot of positive things from coordination. We've seen them focus on avoiding duplication and being largely successful in doing so. Less so are they sort of considering br- uh more strategic kinds of issues,

Mm-hmm.

whether that that uh service is going to be sustainable over the long term, whether that's going to be um, you know, have the kind of subscribership and that's going to sustain that going forward. And so we would like to see sort of, you know, what happens next with federal agency coordination in those in those areas.

Yeah. Thank you. Well, I am out of time. I'm over time actually. Okay. Uh, I'll uh now call on Representative Soto for his five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Chairman. Technology is moving at an incredibly rapid pace, and this committee needs to keep up to help boost jobs, to lower costs, and protect our constituents. And so we have a wonderful hearing today on a whole range of issues from uh technology and telecommunications. Uh first continuing the battle against annoying and sometimes fraudulent robo-calls I feel like this is like the enteenth chapter of that uh but this time foreign calls and uh AI generated voice calls are uh now on the on the menu finally as well uh secondly uh AI can be used to help uh as well uh in uh improving uh security and resiliency in our telecom network. I've seen that even in our local roads uh back home, so uh I'm interested to see those efficiencies. Uh and then stopping the flood of Chinese robotics, we know uh from our rip and replace uh issues with Telecom from Huawei that uh Chinese companies have spied on us uh they've used Communist principles to help corner markets uh we need to boost domestic production and uh make sure uh that we are uh these are trustworthy uh machines. Everybody wants a better cell phone service and internet connections and so I I know that uh when we're dealing with the AI telecom network bill uh that's gonna be important. I'm particularly excited about the Data Bridge Act, uh adding agriculture areas uh to national broad band maps. Uh proud to represent cattle and citrus country, they are using precision agriculture. they're tracking livestock receiving and analyzing large uh amounts of data to improve yields and so i that connectivity is so important uh first uh mister von ah in relation to the data bridge act i i gotta ask why were ag areas not included in the original national broad band map do you happen to know

uh they were included in the sense that there if there's a broad band serviceable location um it would be included in the map so for example if there was a a farmhouse that would be a broad band serviceable location, but it wouldn't necessarily show the entire area that might need broad band coverage.

Sure, and with a lot of these farms and ranchers, they're so vast that they're gonna need different stations for both uh internet connections and for wifi. Uh, on the bead program, we we finally got testimony that two states, after a year and a half into this administration, finally are getting broad band. Do you see a Is the speed picking up finally again on on some of the be because I know uh, Floridians especially in these rural areas are really really waiting on this.

Uh, ye- from all indications it looks like funding is starting to go out. Um, nearly all of the state plans have been approved and as you mentioned, there's funding going out the door to to various states and they're beginning to execute their plans.

Thank you so much. Mister Robins, uh, I know under the GARD Act that we would help boost domestic production and also with our allies so guess my question is would we be ready to meet the need or at least get close to meeting the need uh on day one what would that look like as far as uh having the means of production to be able to meet the demand for all these robotics that are uh are needed for our daily lives.

yeah thank you for that question congressman um american robotics companies are actively working to uh to scale uh manufacturing in the us now and working with uh with partners uh from allied nations as well uh the the challenge at the moment is uh it's hard to scale when you don't have consistent demand and it's hard to raise money when uh investors look at the marketplace and look at other markets where china has come in and uh and dumped subsidized products into the market and drove american companies out of business so right now investors are are standing on the sidelines more than we'd like them to uh you know private capital is is sort of learn lessons from the drone industry and solar panels and others and and said you know, and until the US actually does something about this Chinese dumping, this might not be a safe bet. So, uh, addressing this now with the GART Act would certainly help spur US manufacturing, as, as we're seeing now in the drone industry, where there are literally hundreds of millions of square feet of, of drone manufacturing, uh, production under construction in America today.

So, we saw with telecommunications, we had to do rip and replace because it was already in there, right? It was already, uh, too late and we had to pull all this Huawei equipment back. Uh, is there any other sort of economic development aspects we could help you with to boost production beyond sort of stopping uh the the dumping of of Chinese robotics and drones?

Yeah, that's a great question, Congressman, and and you're absolutely right. The Guard Act is a defensive mechanism and we need a we need some offense as well. Uh, what China does really well is they uh they both support the the companies that are are manufacturing the the robots but they also support the companies that are acquiring the robots domestically in in China. um they they create uh demand so the federal government can be a better customer uh first and foremost uh in national labs uh on the military bases and other places um but also uh can can create incentives for us manufacturing uh to purchase uh american made robots and install them in the factories we have about uh over five hundred thousand manufacturing jobs shortfall in america right now and american robotics can uh help enhance american manufacturing efficiency and uh us g d p uh by helping uh to to enhanced manufacturing efficiency.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Thank you, sir.

Thank you. Uh, Chairman, I'll recognize this gentleman from Ohio, Mister Latta, for five minutes.

Well, thanks, Mister Chairman, and thanks for our witnesses for being with us today. Uh, this uh this hearing is very, very important. And if I could start uh with you, Mister Vannau. It was just I've been on this subcommittee for a good mi- number of years and chaired it. But you know, when we talk about having a hundred and thirty broadband programs across fifteen different departments and agencies, and we've e- question always comes up how much how you know how many we really need we don't need that many i know we don't and the question i guess is geo done a report as to the cost of having that many different programs across that many departments and agencies

we haven't delved into the costs in terms of whether they're sort of like um you know uh uh duplicative effort across the uh the agencies we haven't honed in on the exact cost of that but certainly there's overhead in each agency to execute those programs Um, so if you've got sort of repetitive and reduplicative overhead in those.

I well, let me ask, is that something then this committee, this subcommittee could ask of you and at GAO to uh do any uh cost estimate on that?

Well, we could certainly discuss that certainly with your staff,

OK.

yeah.

Right, well thank you. If uh Ms. Gorman, if I could uh ask a quick question for you, because I'm so short on time and we only have five minutes on so many questions. in the in the last uh bullet point in your testimony you have your rebuild tech trust with us allies and partners and you talk about you know about the us leadership that's been out there and that we need to be back out in front that's always been talked about huawei and zte you know we did a four point eight uh billion dollar rip and replace in this country cause they're not a trusted network and we know that these a lot of country countries out there get it cause quote unquote cheap but you know you sometimes you just end up uh selling your soul to get the get what uh huawei and zt is giving how do we regain that trust when because when everybody knows this is not trusted equipment that the chinese are putting out there

i very much agree uh and in fact i think we for our allies and partners we should be continuously pointing out the risks not just to us not just to someone else but actually to them of using these the uh these vendors the intellectual property theft um the displacement of their own industries um that are that are at risk um i think some countries uh you know also and some parts particularly in europe look at the us and say well we wanna there well we wanna move towards our own sovereign approaches uh and i think that would be that would be much more difficult than if we come up with an allied uh an allied strategic approach where we can use trusted vendors across our allies and partners. Uh and so that's the kind of trust um in the United States, in our our ecosystem of allies and partners, that I think is critical to ensuring that we don't make choices in this country, and in our closest allies and partners, uh t- uh about using uh some of these untrusted vendors like Huawei uh and CTE.

thank you uh mr. robbins uh you know you've talked about the uh the especially in your your uh testimony that uh ninety six percent of the uncrewed aircraft in the united states is uh coming from one source from the prc this and uh that's that's truly an exceptional i know we've been trying to get something done about that but we all know the the absolute risk of having these drones flying around the united states collecting information on us law enforcement has said oh we we really like the technology and we how do how do we say that you know folks it might be time to turn those things off put them in the closet and leave them there eh has there been a lot of discussion out there to tell people they they better not be used because i know when i'm out and i'm asked i said don't use them

yeah i i appreciate that congressman and i think the conversation has evolved a lot um the the education work done by congress uh by agencies like cissa and the fbi uh have really put out a lot of good information on the the risk of using chinese drones and the national security implications of that we also have to recognize that that uh you know local law enforcement uh public safety agencies um they typically have very very tight budgets and and they've made uh in some cases very significant investments in their uh chinese drone fleets and it's not an easy switch for them to just turn those off uh and go back to not having drones because they're they are a lifesaving tool it's also not easy for them to to go out and into the market and and find new dollars to to to buy replacement drones. Uh, Congress did have a rip and replace program, as we talked about, uh, for the the Cal communication network when, uh, uh, there was a a clear national security risk with ZTE and Huawei. Uh, we would very much like to see a similar rip and replace program for drones. Um, there are a few grant programs out there now that are helping communities, uh, DOJ grants, DHS grants, FEMA grants, um, acquire, uh, non-Chinese drone technology. as the Chinese drone technology is is being faded out um because of the FCC rule ruling. Um, but it's not a lot of money right now and and there that's uh certainly an opportunity for Congress to to uh to step in and help uh local uh public safety agencies uh make this transition faster.

Well, thank you very much. My time's expired and I'll sit submit questions uh that uh I didn't have time to ask uh to the witnesses. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thank you, and I'll recognize the gentleman from California, Mister Peters, for five minutes for your questions.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, thanks for calling this important hearing, um, we've discussed many times on this subcommittee just how critical broadband connectivity is in our increasingly on-line world. And in an age of technology, it's more important than ever for my constituents in San Diego and Americans across the country to get connected as quickly as possible, so they can access employment opportunities, education, telehealth care, and more. In twenty twenty two, the Government Accounting Office, or GA GAO, released a broadband study on uh the quote national strategy needed to guide federal efforts to reduce the digital divide. In this study, GAO identified the over one hundred thirty federal programs to expand broadband access administered by fifteen different federal agencies. Um the amount of investment shows that the um federal government surely understands the importance of connectivity however the study found that this vast number of programs spread across so many agencies has led to a fragmented, confusing, overlapping patchwork of funding. I'm concerned that the communities with the most limited resources may be the most affected by this fragmentation. Following the publication of the GAO report, I introduced the Plan for Broadband Act with my colleague, Representative Wahlberg. The Plan for Broadband Act directly mirrors uh mirrors GAO's recommendation in this study to synchronize federal efforts with the national broadband strategy. Mister Von Ahn uh what is at stake with regards to this federal program fragmentation and what which communities do you think are being harmed uh most

um thank you for the question uh representative peters uh so going forward right now there's you know all these programs are underway in terms of trying to build out their their broad broadband broadband uh projects um and so what's key now is sort of what areas might be missed uh a- after those uh projects are completed. Um you know will we get all of the areas covered that we want to have covered, will there be sufficient coverage, are there going to be those some carriers who drop out of these programs or default on their requirements or their um they're what they're uh have promised to do over, you know, in these programs and then it's sort of what do we do with at that point um and that's kind of where we are at at this point so in terms of the programs it's really boiled down to about a dozen programs programs or so that are focused on broad band deployment currently

yeah

and they're all underway

right um so you're not particularly concerned about the fragmentation or is there something you recommend we do about that

i'm still concerned about the fragmentation of course and i and what we've recommended to agencies is the importance of interagency collaboration on knowing what each uh agency is doing where they're deploying broad band

yeah

whether they're trying to leverage those resources to basically bring uh communities up to speed.

OK. Well, I'm happy to see the plan for Broadband Act included in today's hearing, after it was reported out of said the Senate Commerce Committee last spring, and hope this bipartisan proposal, we can see it through the committee to the floor soon. Uh, today we're also discussing legislation on crackdown on robocalls. There's been a lot of discussion about that. I consistently hear from my constituents about the harm robocalls cause, and just recently Heard from a senior citizen who resorted to changing his phone number to stop the approximately twenty scams twenty scam calls he receives every single day. Uh, for many people, phone calls are the only way to stay in touch with loved ones or to receive important medical information. But thanks to the constant flood of scam robo calls, answering the phone can feel like taking a gamble, as if the scammers have taken over the whole system. So, mister Rupi, can you talk about how AI is changing the landscape?

Thank you, Congressman. And yes, um, you know, it is an evolving landscape, and AI is certainly a tool that the scammers are using to, uh, make their fraud schemes seem more authentic, uh, make them more convincing. Um, And at the same time, like those same tools are being used by industry to counteract those. Um, there are challenges uh at times with, you know in the example you gave, you know certain networks, IP networks versus TDM networks um may be more capable of handling some of these tools. Um, but at the end of the day um you know industry is doing everything they can to you know deploy these tools deploy ai to counteract these um but it's an ongoing process and i i do believe that you know a criminal enforcement element is is needed

ok mentioned that that's something obviously we could add here thank you all for uh your testimony um glad to see the committee responding to these threats and mr. chairman i'll yield back

thank you the chair and our recognized gentleman from virginia mister griffith for five minutes

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, I appreciate and Mr. Rubio, I appreciate your testimony and I I have gotten one. I'm not as popular as the chairman. I've only gotten one uh spam call while we've been sitting here and and I am curious though uh because my constituents get these all the time too but they uh a lot of them in my district and the complaints I get are people calling up on Medicare, Medicare Advantage type programs. Uh, but like the chairman, I don't I don't get those. Now, he's too young to get them. But I don't get those. I get the ones that want to lend me money. Uh, so how do they, uh, how do they, what algorithm are they using to decide to call, uh, based on, uh, uh, lending money or Medicare advantage?

Oftentimes, and thank you for that question, Congressman. Oftentimes these scams, um, they obviously vary, they come in different flavors. Um, but oftentimes the scammers will gain access to what are called " lead lists", uh, where, you know, because of something, whether it's a a cyber hack where that information was obtained, where they can find identifiable information about that particular consumer, you know, " They're on Medicare, they're on Medicaid, they

They need to borrow money.

they need to borrow money." Um, you know, that gets sold on the internet as a a full package lead list and they'll start making those calls and it it can fluctuate I used to get a lot of robo calls um and even though I answer them uh fewer now it seems to me but to your point it it's a very dynamic space and there is access to information that enables them to target individuals.

And and and then I'll I love the ones and I don't know whether anybody else has gotten these but I love the ones that where it says I'm calling myself. I get a call from me.

Where your, your phone number is in the caller ID.

Um, it's, it's my phone number that's calling me to tell me about whatever it is they wanna sell me. Yeah.

Right, and that's, they're, they're spoofing your caller ID,

Right.

exactly.

Right. And I, and that, and I'm, I know that it's happened to constituents cuz they've told me that. So, we're hearing all these complaints, and I'm glad we're holding the, the hearing today to talk about HR s- uh, sixty-one fifty-two, which I am a cosponsor of. But it it seems to me that you got these organized uh scam rings that are operating overseas to do this, and isn't that what the FCC's robocall mitigation database is supposed to block? Um and how come it didn't work and and how is it supposed to work?

So, I will say this, I think the FCC's robocall mitigation database plays a very important role. Um, And, you know, at a very high level, the way it functions, if you're not in the database, no provider can accept your traffic. Right? So, if - if a provider tries to go to, say, Verizon or AT&T, and Verizon and AT&T sees they're not in the database, they can't send or originate calls. Um, I think the biggest challenge with the FCC's RMD is the quality of many of the entries. There are just um fraudulent organizations, void providers that are registered in the database, um and the FCC to its credit has thrown, done a lot to throw these providers out. They removed about fourteen hundred providers last year from the RMD. But I think, you know, the big issue is we need to catch them on the front-end before they get in the database, because once they're in the database, they can make phone calls.

And does the foreign robocall elimination act incentivize tracking down the bad actors? Um

I believe it does, Congressman, and, you know, there I think there's a lot of good things um in the bill, uh among other things the the task force that is formed, I'm a big believer that, you know, good data informs good policy. And and the task force strives to do that. Uh, on the trace-back front, I think it is a great idea that we are moving that re- renewal process from one year to three, because all that is is a paperwork exercise for FCC enforcement bureau staff and the trace-back consortium. So let's reduce the paperwork so they can focus on enforcement and trace-back. Um, and I I do acknowledge that, you know, the RMD has a lot of issues and, you know, that's something that just today the FCC adopted a rulemaking on. They've initiated a rulemaking proceeding to see how best to tighten up the RMD.

All right, I appreciate it. I yield back, Mr. Chairman, probably have questions for the record. Thank you.

Thank you. Uh, the chair and I recognize the representative from Illinois, Representative Kelly, for five minutes for your question.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and ranking member for holding today's hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for being here. Reliable broadband is essential infrastructure. It connects families to health care, students to educational opportunities, and small businesses to customers around the world. It is critical to the success of American farmers and rural communities who increasingly rely on precision agriculture and other connected technologies to remain competitive. As a proud democratic co-lead of the bipartisan Data Bridge Act, I believe one of the most important steps we can take to ensure that we are making decisions based on accurate complete data. If our maps fail to identify agricultural areas, we risk overlooking farmers who depend on reliable connectivity to support food production and drive innovation. This legislation simply gives policymakers better information by incorporating USDA cultivated land maps into broad band maps so that broad band investments can be targeted where they are needed most. Improvements to the national broadband map will lead to better decisions, better stewardship of taxpayer dollars, and ultimately better outcomes for rural America. Mister Von Ahr, can you explain why incorporating agricultural land into FCC's broadband maps would improve federal broadband plan planning and deployment decisions?

Absolutely. Thank you for the question, Representative Kelly. Our work over the last several years has continuously shown that The better accurate, more accurate data we have in maps, the better we can target our investments. Um, that's been true going back to when FCC used census blocks, uh, to sort of identify where where, uh, broadband was or wasn't. The more refined and more accurate data that we can get, the better we can target those investments.

Thank you. And as farms increasingly rely on precision, agriculture, connected equipment, and real-time data, what are the potential consequences to federal broadband funding if these agricultural areas continue to be underrepresented in our mapping efforts.

I think the answer is fairly simple, that they may not get the investment necessary to support those kinds of activities.

And that affects our farmers and economic development. My district is urban, suburban, and rural, and I have four thousand five hundred farms in my district, so they are definitely very interested in this. Well, thank you and we must ensure greater access to broadband for all Americans, and that includes

Thank you. The chair now recognizes representative of Texas, represent Flueger for five minutes for your questions.

Yeah, thank you, Chairman, and thanks for for holding this hearing and to our witnesses, we appreciate your your testimony as we look through these issues. Um, every phone call, every text and transaction that Americans make travel across networks that are under a growing attack and I think we can, you know, Mentioned that today, but recent reporting showed millions of attacks launched against US telecom providers in a single year. And those, that obviously has a cost that's associated with it, millions of dollars, uh in fact. And AI has given our adversaries a powerful new tool to launch these attacks at a scale that we have not seen, um maybe ever. And it should also be one of our best tools to stop them. AI should be that tool that we can help leverage and stop. And I think that's important and that's why Congressman Menendez and I introduced a bipartisan AI for secure networks act, which directs the Department of Commerce to examine how AI can be responsibly used to strengthen uh the security and resilience of telecommunications networks. So, uh, Ms. Gorman, I'll start with you. You've said that AI risk uh tipping the offense-defense balance in the attacker's favor even as it shows real promise for automated threat detection. Can you maybe expand a little bit on where is ai-based network defense mature enough to deploy right now um and then on the other side of that coin where does it still need to grow

yeah thank you congressman uh for the question and i think this is a the offense defense battle balance um is is evolving these technologies are evolving so rapidly um that every week there is a new a new development um but i agree and i agree with the the premise of the ai for secure networks act that we need to be leveraging these technologies um for deceptive for defense um where i think these technologies are increasingly mature is in finding vulnerabilities that we might not be able to find with other means uh that's incredibly powerful for both attackers and of course also for defenders where i think there is still work to be done is exactly in this question of what kinds of models and what cyber security standards of the models of themselves, are we going to allow into our networks to monitor the traffic on networks, to find vulnerabilities, to monitor for suspicious behavior. Right now we don't have any requirements on cyber security standards of the models themselves. They're they're subject to data poisoning, they're subject to prompt injection attacks, um they could be using uh adversarial models. So I think that's really the biggest barrier to fully integrating, uh these these AI models into network defense.

Thank you. Um, Mister Robbins, you've made the case that the connected sensor rich devices pose a uh a a risk, whether they're robots or network or equipment or otherwise, and I agree with that. Does the same logic apply to how we think about deploying AI uh enabled monitoring tools across um telecom networks?

Yes, thank you for that question, Congressman. Uh, we see robots as the ph- physical manifestation of AI, it is uh embodied AI. So yes, that logic absolutely is uh is sound.

Um, look, I wanna talk robocalls and and I know that this has been discussed, but they're it's obviously one of the top complaints that we hear. Um, and assuming that most of my colleagues are also uh getting the same, but according to the FCC, illegal and spoofed robocalls remain its top top consumer protection priority. Uh, and a large share of that traffic uh is originating in foreign locations with foreign-based robocallers. And it's a a huge problem and a challenge. Um, the TRACE Act, signed into law in twenty nineteen, directed the FCC to designate a single consortium to run private-led traceback efforts. Um, and they've redesignated the industry traceback group every year since twenty twenty. Mister Ruppe, uh, you you helped build the ITG from scratch. And uh, how would extending that consortium's designation from one year to three years, say, um, affect its ability to actually go after robo-callers and and have a higher effective rate?

Thank you, Congressman. I I think that extension makes great sense. And, you know, the main reasons are um, I think it's prudent that the TRACED Act established a review period for the designated cr- trace-back consortium. But it's sort of a Goldilocks scenario, right? Like one year is a little too short, three years is an ideal period, because each and every year, the FCC has to go through an administrative process. If a competing application is filed, the the Traceback Consortium has to respond. So, in my mind, it's a more efficient process that enables both the enforcement bureau and the Traceback Consortium to do what they do best, which is find bad guys and target them.

Thank you. Five minutes is hard to get uh everything solved, but I appreciate that. Yield back, Chairman.

Thank you. The chair now recognizes a representative from California, Representative Baragon for five minutes for her question.

Uh, thank you, Mister Chairman. Last year seniors lost seven point seven billion dollars to scammers, up to fifty-nine percent from the year before, and part of that came from what the FBI calls the disc- distress scams where the AI voice cloning tools mimic a grandchild's voice. to fake an emergency. Mister Ruppi, these scams are already happening today. In addition to the quiet act, what else can Congress do to stop that call before it ever reaches someone?

Thank you, Congresswoman, and um, you know, I I I don't wanna sound like a a broken record, but I I do believe that, you know, in my mind we can find the individuals originating these calls. We can find them, we can locate them, and we can find the organizations that are, you know, managing that process. And that is a heartbreaking scam. It's terrible. My own ninety year old mother received a call like that. Um, but that is why I - I really think we need to start focusing on criminal enforcement. I think too often people think about robo-calls as a nuisance, a bother. Uh, it - it's no longer that. Th- this is, you know, as I noted in my opening testimony, it it's not only a major consumer harm issue, it's it's national security.

Is there anything in the current law now that would stop the call before it connects?

I think the closest thing that would stop a call before it connects is removal from the FCC's robocall mitigation database. In other words, you know, whoever that provider is that is originating those calls once they are taken out of the database, they can't do that anymore. And the FCC has done that. They've they've, you know, removed fourteen hundred last year from the RMD.

Thank you. One more on this um is a lot of my constituents speak Spanish or another language at home first and scam operations already run calls in multiple languages. Does a disclosure rule like the quiet act protect someone if the scam isn't happening in English? Or are non-English speakers more exposed and less protected than anyone than everyone else?

Thank you, Congresswoman. In my opinion, I I don't I don't think that um imposing compliance mandates will lower the prevalence of those calls or reduce those calls, because at the end of the day, the bad actors behind those calls, they don't they don't care about compliance. They don't observe do not call mandates. They do not disclose their actual identities and you know it it it it's not gonna have the downward pressure on illegal robo calls that we all want, in my opinion.

Is there any kind of tracking of whether these scams are uh disproportionately target non-English speakers or is that data we don't have?

There are there are certainly vendors out there and um you know potentially some carriers that have that information, they they can see where these

Great, thanks. Uh, Mister Von, I um, a twenty twenty-three report that you authored found that nearly a third of families without broadband, so the reason was cost, and a quarter of families who already had it struggled to afford it. Now, those same families are paying up to thirty dollars or more, uh thirty dollars a month, more um which is almost three hundred and fifty dollars a year since the affordable connectivity program ended does GAO still consider the single biggest barrier between families um does it does GAO still consider cost the single um biggest barrier between families and affordable broadband

uh if it's uh it's certainly one of the the key issues if not the most critical one yes

It's not the most critical, cost is not the most critical?

No, it certainly, it certainly is one of the most critical, yes.

Oh, it is one of the most critical. Um, cuz I saw a report uh the geo had and it mentioned um a number of programs that were important and that the affordable connectivity program was one of them.

Right.

Um, do you think that help people uh afford? access to broadband

uh while that program was going on it uh there were some twenty four twenty three million subscribers to that program that benefited from that um particular program um after it was after it ran out of money um i think that there were sort of estimates that some five million or so subscribers um discontinued their service and some eight million more perhaps um you know would uh either downgraded their service or went to try to find some lower cost options so

Some millions of people lost access to broadband when that program went away.

they some some did lose access to broadband and then i what we understand more recently is that they're trying to find ways to get broadband back so they're trying to find you know cheaper lower cost options

Yeah. Well they need democrats back in power to do that a yield back.

Uh the chair recognizes the uh gentleman from Louisiana Mister Carter for five minutes for your question.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and thank the witnesses for being here, we appreciate your time and expertise. Um, broadband is the critical infrastructure that connects our communities and enables people to fully participate in the modern economy it powers nearly every sector of our society. And as artificial intelligence continues to evolve, reliable high-speed connectivity will not only become uh more essential but will be more needed in areas than ever before. Uh, if the United States wants to remain a global leader in innovation and compete with other nations, we cannot afford to leave people behind because the lack of reliable connectivity. That's why the Broadband Equity Access and Deployment or B program is so important. This historic investment was intended to fully to finally connect rural and undisturbed communities to high-speed internet. Unnecessary deployment uh delays only widen the digital divide and postpone economic opportunity. Uh we know that broadband is the backbone of telehealth, allows patients especially in rural areas to access quality healthcare without traveling long distances. But without reliable infrastructure, broadband infrastructure, telehealth simply is not an option for those who need it most. And our technology continues to evolve, we must continue investing in communication technology and networks to connect everyone regardless of their zip code. Mister Gorman, why is resilient broadband infrastructure an essential component for consumers to fully leverage artificial intelligence?

Thanks for the question. I think a a few reasons. Uh, first, that throughout we're we're in a global competition to develop AI, to deploy AI, and we need the best and brightest from this country to be part of of that race and that contest. And right now, if if students around the country are unable to access artificial intelligence are um unable to build their own tools because of a lack of access to broadband um we may not get uh the best and the brightest is part of this geopolitical competition. Um, additionally you mentioned the rural and unders- underserved communities, telehealth, i actually think some of the most innovative applications of artificial intelligence are exactly in these fields. Um, taking a global example, uh in India, AI helped farmers massively increase yield, productivity, uh decrease the amount of pests in uh in crops. Uh, I think we can do the same thing in many, many farming communities across the United States. Uh, and similarly, telehealth uh is an area where throughout the country uh i think we've all had the experience of being plagued by wait times um high costs and where's there's real room for ai disruption and innovation uh and i agree that is that's only possible with connectivity and broadband uh throughout

uh thank you mister how can communities be harmed when high speed reliable internet isn't available especially when it comes to healthcare outcomes

uh thank you for the question representative carter i mean in general they would forego the benefits of being able to participate in the internet economy right which could mean things like uh job opportunities or um business opportunities it could be

When health when healthcare clinics are closing down because of drastic cuts to to Medicaid and we're seeing clinics and critical care units going away and in some cases rural hospitals the only access they have will be through telehealth.

Right and so they would also forgo the benefits of you know uh opportunities or information available on their on from in a in a healthcare setting.

I mean Mister Ruppe you you indicated that we know where the bad actors are. Those who are perpetuating these um erroneous phone calls that are scamming. Telling the chairman that he's got forty five thousand dollars waiting to just pick up. Or calling to say we'd like to buy a property that you own. Or calling to say that I'm stuck in on some foreign island and I lost my credentials. and I need uh a thousand dollars just to get home. These happen all the time. Um our aged communities are finding themselves more and more vulnerable to these bad actors who call with what appears to be legitimate phone calls with people with distress. You indicated that we can find them. How successful are we in actually finding them and bringing them to justice?

Well, I I think we're very successful at identifying these parties. I mean, it the the way trace back works, the the trace back goes from the point of determination to who made the call. Um, I think the the challenge we have here is, you know, uh, the will to to go to that next step to pursue meaningful enforcement actions. Um, you, you know, the FCC and and the FTC and state AGs have undertaken a number of civil enforcement actions But again, I think, you know, in that instance you're talking about I, you know, I believe that we need criminal enforcement action.

Got a ton of more questions but time is uh exhausted, so, Mister Chairman, at you.

Thank you, gentlemen. The chair now recognizes the representative from Indiana. Representative Halchen.

Sorry, Mister Menendez. Thank you, Mister Chairman and Ranking Member Matsui for holding this hearing, and thank you to the witnesses. Uh, two things on today's agenda matter a great deal to the people back home in Indiana, getting reliable internet service to the places that still don't have it, and stopping a flood of scam calls from hitting their phones. On scam calls, this is one of the biggest issues I hear about from constituents. They're getting them every day, sometimes all day every day, and the people running these uh are increasingly organized criminal operations overseas. I appreciate the work that my colleagues have done on the foreign Robocall Elimination Act, as well as the Quiet Act, and I look forward to seeing more activity on this topic. Lord knows we could all use quieter phones, less scam texts and less scam calls. But on broadband I'm pleased to see that H R four nine five zero, uh the Data Bridge Act, in is included in today's hearing. I wanna thank my colleague, Miss Kelly, and Mister Soto and Mister Landsman for their support as cosponsors. The FCC keeps a national broadband map that shows where internet service is available, and the federal government uses it to decide where to send broadband funding. But the map is built around homes and businesses. It does not show farmland. That's a problem because farming today runs on connectivity out in the field. on guidance systems, sensors, monitors, and equipment that has to talk to a network. A farm can be counted as covered on the traditional broad-band map at the farmhouse, while the acres where the actual work happens have no service. The Data Bridge Act aims to solve that problem by directing the FCC to place data that the USDA already collects uh on the broad-band map, onto the broad-band map. Right now the FCC has a map showing where service is available. There's a separate federal map showing where agencies are funding deployment. Mister Von Ack, is it fair to say that improving the broadband maps is one of the highest return, lowest cost things Congress can do to address broadband deployment?

Uh, thank you for that question. It certainly, um, uh, improving, uh, the accuracy of the maps, uh, goes a long way to better targeting federal investment.

And it helps prevent us from overbuilding. It might also help us, um, in these, uh, dead zones, uh, according to, uh, the map, it looks like the they are covered but they're actually dead zones. Might help us spur some federal investment to finally get those, what we consider the final miles covered with access. Is that correct?

That's correct.

Are y- are the USDA, the NTIA, and Treasury sitting on their own data? or are they submitting that data to the FCC for maps?

So, um, the agencies have some agreements in place on the data they share about their deployments. Um, we have made some recommendations about them agreeing to the time frames and the kinds of data that they send to those maps, because we see certainly a lag in, um, th- those maps when, uh, an, a deployment has been made and whether it shows up on the map or when it shows up up on a map.

So should the FCC's broadband map uh be the unified source of truth for federal broadband decisions on these dollars?

Uh at this point it's our best option, although there are, and I think the agencies do refer to other sources when they're coordinating to avoid a duplicative effort.

Thank you. A principle that runs through the GAO's work is that agencies should use the data that the government has already collected before uh devising anything new, is putting an existing federal data set onto an existing

Yeah, our work would suggest that we wanna make sure that the data that we add would be accurate, right? So, uh, we did notice in the legislation this notion that it would be developed in concert with agriculture um data and existing data and so that uh certainly is an important piece of it.

We don't have to reinvent the wheel. Do you see other opportunities where the data the federal government already holds could be useful in making the map more accurate?

Um, we have recommendations again for the agencies to sort of continue to uh feed data t- to the map and uh and to do it in a more um uniform and uh timely manner, and so that's what we would like to see, yeah.

Well, whether it's stopping scam calls or closing this digital divide, the through-line today with this hearing is clear, the federal government works best when it's coordinated and working from good information. Uh, the Data Bridge Act delivers on that. uh by providing a more complete broad band map built from the data the government already collects at no new cost. I urge my colleagues to support H R four nine five zero as it moves through the committee process. I thank the witnesses, thank you Mister Vana, uh and I yield back.

Thank you. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mister Menendez, for your questions.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, our district s- our district sits at the heart of America's critical infrastructure. The corridor between Newark Airport and the Port of Elizabeth has been called the most dangerous two miles in America, because of the particular risk to our transportation, energy, communications and commercial infrastructure. A disruption here wouldn't just affect New Jersey, it would have cascading consequences for communities and businesses across the country. For our community, secure and reliable communications networks are essential. They link families to emergency services, banks, hospitals and schools, and ensure a quick, effective response, in the event of an attack against our infrastructure. As cyber th cyber threats grow more sophisticated, we need the strongest tools available to defend these networks. AI can help providers protect our communities from disrupted communications networks. Used responsibly, AI can help identify vulnerabilities and respond to threats more quickly. But used maliciously, it can make cyber attacks more damaging and harder to stop. Congress has a responsibility to address both realities. That is why Congressman Flueger and I introduced the bipartisan AI for Secured Networks Act. Our bill would promote the responsible use of AI to strengthen the cyber security of America's communications networks, while confronting the risk risk posed by its misuse. We cannot afford to stand by as threats to the networks American families rely on every day, continue to grow in scale, sophistication and severity. As cyber attacks become more frequent and sophisticated, Congress must act to protect these systems and the communities they serve. Miss Gorman, just briefly, given the concentration of critical infrastructure in and around New Jersey, would you agree that a cyber attack on our networks could have far reaching consequences for both our communities and the nation?

They could be among the most disruptive attacks.

I agree. Um, Mr. Ruppi, just briefly, how does AI powered threat detection and response help prevent these attacks, and protect the families, hospitals,

Um, I I think is uh thank you, Congressman, I think um, you know, communications companies are leveraging AI to protect the networks, um, because as you noted adversaries are likewise deploying it. So it's a bit of an arms race.

Yeah, it's on both the offensive and defensive capabilities, and so being prepared for both. While AI offers opportunities for innovation in security, we also know that bad actors are also using this technology to exploit our vulnerabilities and improve cyber attack capabilities. Miss Gorman, as bad actors increasingly use AI to launch more advanced attacks, how could the AI for Secure Networks Act help network providers and federal agencies better understand and keep pace with these evolving risk?

Thank you, Congressman, for the question. generally when such a breach happens one of three things has occurred either a known vulnerability that was unpatched gets exploited an unknown vulnerability gets exploited or there was some kind of a human error someone clicked on a phishing link someone had an insecure password ai can be helpful with all three of these tools and that and all three of these types of exploits finding vulnerabilities that we don't know about automatically patching vulnerabilities that we should know about and also flagging potential phishing attacks for the humans, so we don't make those errors. That's why I think this, the secure networks, AI for secure networks bill can be so vital to figure out which are the threats that are actually coming from AI into our networks which are causing us the most harm, and what can we actually be deploying uh to to combat that. And this technology is moving so quickly that this needs to be

Mm-hmm.

more than just a one time uh one more than just a one time thing we need continuously updating our understanding uh and i think this this act um is is a great start to provide this information across the federal government

i appreciate that uh because american families should not have to worry that a cyber attack could cut them off from emergency services or the people they love our networks are too important and the stakes are simply too high for congress not to act i am proud of this committee's advancing bipartisan solutions to strengthen these systems protect families and keep communities across the country connected. Thank you, Chairman, and I yield back.

The gentleman yields. Now I'll call on Representative McClellan for your five minutes of conversation.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, US households have on average twenty-one devices connected to the internet. I expect this is only going to grow as AI, robotics, and other smart internet of things devices become more integrated into our daily lives. This makes reliable and secure communication networks more important than ever. And at the same time, we have seen what happens when we do not act fast enough to address the growing cyber and national security threats early. We must learn from the past to inform the future. The stakes are too high to do otherwise. And that's why I am proud to work with Chairman Molinar on the bipartisan GARD Act, which takes a proactive approach to evaluating the national security risk, posed by connected robotics before those technologies become deeply embedded in our economy and critical infrastructure. And with that I want to start with you, Mister Robbins, I think we can all agree that we should not repeat the mistakes that left the United States scrambling to remove way NZTE equipment only after it had already been become embedded in our communications networks, and posed a significant national security risk. in your view what makes the covered list an effective national security tool and are there other tools or authorities that congress should consider to ensure that the us maintains pace with china's rapid deployment of robotics

yeah thank you for that question congresswoman and thank you for your leadership on the guard act uh it is very much sincerely appreciated so first of all the covered list is a a good source of uh of action uh it would the guard direct act directs the fcc to take action because um the fcc has uh the authority to um take care of this proactively um they can well as they've done with drones and uh internet routers uh restricted the import of future models which doesn't necessarily impact the models that are already here um that ensures that there is a cut off point uh it gives investors certainty that the market's not gonna continue to be flooded with subsidized uh uh chinese robots or drones um and further injecting national security risk into the united states um the fcc also has a lot of agility in their ability to act um so when a company uh takes an action like sets up a fake subsidiary uh a a white label company to then continue to try and do operations in united states uh the fcc has the agility to quickly take action and ban that subsidiary and in fact they just did so this week with uh nine or ten uh fake companies that were operating uh as uh uh white label subsidiaries of of a chinese drone company dgi

And and what is the worst-case scenario if we wait too long to confront the potential threats uh posed by Chinese-made communications equipment technology and services in advanced robotics?

Yeah, the the the risk is that uh they become embedded in in society like Chinese drones did, and then the cost of rolling that back is uh is significantly uh greater to uh to the American people, um while we're also exporting uh uh the data that the robots are collecting right back to China. uh powering their uh innovation powering their research um you know research labs universities they're doing research today primarily in artificial intelligence with chinese robots all the debt is going right back to china we're we're we're we're handing this uh uh a gift to them uh so you know their their flooding the us market with subsidized robots is strategic

and what's the stake for american startups in our robotics research and development ecosystem Chinese made robotic and communication technologies continue to undercut US innovation.

Yeah, it's gonna be very challenging for companies to to uh to be able to compete. I think US innovation uh will continue to lead the world, but it's very challenging for companies to scale manufacturing. It's very hard for them to raise the money to hire the workforce and build out the floor plan. Uh, when investors see what's happened in other industries, where China has come in flooded the market and drove companies either out of business or kept their market share small because they have artificially low prices.

And so you'd agree it's important that Congress act now to ensure that American companies compete on a level playing field, uh, and that the United States remains a global leader in these critical technologies.

Absolutely. Congress should act now.

OK.

If I

And, um, I may not have time to get an answer to this, so I'll ask, uh, you all to respond in, uh, on the record. But, you know, Ms. Gorman, you've seen, and I'm sure we've talked about already, the news that during the testing phase of open AIs, GPT, five dot six and a more powerful unreleased models their ability to to you know break out and go rogue um this is an unprecedented event in which ai acts outside of its directives and could become more commonplace so what safeguards should we be looking at so that the very technology that we're using to protect our critical infrastructure works for us and not against us

happy to happy to answer more fully but essentially this is the question of model alignment and making sure that we assess models for alignment before deploying them in critical infrastructure uh is vital.

Thank you, I yield back.

Good morning ladies and now I'll call on Doctor Joyce for your five minutes of questioning.

Thank you Mister Chairman for allowing me to join in this important hearing. Bridging the digital divide and improving connectivity is a top priority for my constituents. Representing rural South Central and Southwestern Pennsylvania, I am keenly aware of the unique challenges that rural agricultural communities face when it comes to b- getting connected. Rural communities consistently fall behind the rest of the country, seeing technology continue to advance. While many state and federal programs exist to help bridge this gap, that divide is still very wide. These communities are strong, they're hard-working, They contribute to our nation. And without them, we wouldn't have food on our tables tonight for dinner. They deserve our unwavering support. The subcommittee has done extensive work in examining the unique roles and needs of our rural communities, and diligently working to solve these problems. But there's still work to be done. And there's still broadband to deploy. Having reliable data to drive that deployment is necessary as we seek to ensure universal broadband availability for each and every American. Accurate broadband mapping is critical to the efficient use of taxpayer dollars for the administration of federal broadband programs that aim to deliver necessary telecommunications infrastructure to rural communities. Mister Von Ah, current data can sometimes be unreliable. I think we can agree on that. Can you speak about your recommendations for improving the FCC's mapping strategy and how this can be achieved in a way that improves specifically broad band broad band deployment in the underserved rural areas.

Thank you for that question, Representative Joyce. Our recommendations have been around getting federal agencies to be more uniform in their reporting of their deployment data to the to the maps so that we understand where there are federal obligations for a build-out and where, where there still is lack service lacking. Um, so we have those open recommendations, we're working with the agencies to close them and to get sort of agreement amongst them all. But that's uh this where where our recommendations are.

Led by Congresswoman Halchen, who just spoke to you, HR forty nine fifty, the Data Bridge Act seeks to improve the FCC's existing national broadband map to include a layer specifically for agricultural areas. Representing rural Pennsylvania, I am grateful to Congresswoman Halchun for leading this legislative effort, and I'm proud to join in and cosponsor that legislation. Mister Von Au, in your opinion, how would this mapping addition create the opportunity for more federal grant dollars to reach these areas that the coverage is needed in so desperately?

I think our work has shown again more specific and more accurate data in the maps will help spur investment into those area to those areas that are of greatest need.

Do you have, Mister Vandahl, do you have any other suggestions for this subcommittee as we continue to work towards closing that digital divide completely?

I think what's important going forward is once these programs that are all actively deploying broadband infrastructure, uh, sort of get to a an endpoint, how are those gonna c- uh, networks going to be sustained over time and maintained over time? And I think that's sort of the question going forward for what a national broadband strategy would look like uh in the future.

And those next steps need to be addressed right now, so thank you for bringing that into the discussion. We recognize that critical resources for rural communities, such as precision agriculture, telemedicine, and even the ability to call nine one one require dependable and reliable connectivity. Hardworking families in rural America built this nation. Their way of life must be preserved and supported by the modern technology that is available to so many Americans. And as we continue to seek ways to provide this infrastructure to every corner of our great country, I'm proud to support Congresswoman Halchen's Data Bridge Act. It makes a strong step forward on the path to finally bridging the digital divide and ensuring the universal broadband availability reaches each and every corner of America. Thank you, Mister Chairman, for allowing me to participate in this, and I yield back the remainder of my time.

The gentleman yells, um, I believe we have one more member on the way. We just got a notification. Uh, he's he's on his way in. Bear with us a moment. ok alright well i'm sorry mister albonofsky is not gonna be able to each he helps me a lot with all these kinds of things. He's really good with this. But seeing there are no former members wishing to be recognized, I I'd like to thank our witnesses for being here today. You point a lot, pointed out a lot of things we gotta we gotta get done, we gotta get to work on. And I and I thank you for sharing that with us and uh and in helping us to uh to deal with these many issues that we have with technology and communications and everything else. I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record the documents included on the staff hearing documents list, uh, without objection, so ordered. I remind members they have ten business days to submit questions for the record, and I ask the witnesses to respond to those questions promptly. Members should submit their questions by the close of business on August fifth, twenty twenty six. And without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.

Good job.