Orbits of Influence: Emerging Threats to U.S. Space Security and Foreign Policy Implications

so we're waiting on the ranking member uh He'll be right here. He's got to gavel in on the secretary before he comes. So, give us a few minutes to get him here. The subcommittee on Europe will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the foreign policy implications of emerging threats uh to security and stability of outer space. I now recognize myself for an opening statement, but before I do, I ask unanimous consent that the member from Florida, Representative Herodopoulos, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. Just a few weeks ago, the world watched as our astronauts completed a historical circling the moon, the first astronauts to return in over half a century. It was once again a powerful reminder that American leadership in space is unmatched and must remain that way. However, the realities in outer space are very much different today than when than they were fifty years ago. Space is now a congested and contested domain, one the US Space Force characterizes as a war-fighting domain. Our hearing today on space security is important as our subcommittee grapples with the question of how to compete effectively and maintain US leadership in a competitive global environment, where technology and the nature of conflict are ever-changing. Space is an environment where actions can be difficult to attribute, formal norms are limited, and intentions are frequently unclear. China for example has engaged in aggressive maneuvers in space from pushing satellites out of orbit to close proximity operations that the US Space Force is characterized as dogfighting in orbit. It is difficult to distinguish between benign and aligned uh actions uh in space because so many space systems are dual use, frankly. Put simply, a satellite's grappling arm that may be used to repair another satellite in peacetime, could in wartime be employed to disable a US reconnaissance or military communication satellite. The competition is not only playing out in orbit, but also here on Earth. China is rapidly expanding space partnerships in developing countries, investing in ground infrastructure to improve tracking monitoring and launch capabilities. And while China has now surpassed Russia as America's greatest challenger in space, Russia still maintains a formidable space program. For years, the Russians have been deploying a nuclear-capable anti-satellite weapon that if employed would have devastating impacts on satellite operations in low Earth orbit. At the same time, concerns in outer space extend well beyond counter space capabilities. The competition for space superiority is also front and center in the civil, commercial, and diplomatic realms. Programs like NASA's Artemis Accords, in coordination with the US State Department, show how American leadership in space strengthens our alliances and advances US interests. Sixty-three countries have said establishing a shared framework to guide the civil exploration and use of outer space. But China is working aggressively to challenge that leadership from lunar base ambitions to expanding satellite constellations to the International Telecommunications Union, the ITU. That is why it is encouraging to see the State Department prioritizing these emerging challenges. Secretary Rubio created a new Bureau of Emerging Threats, which among other priorities will focus on the very space security issues we are discussing today. It is important that we authorize this bureau and advance additional legislative actions which we will discuss in more detail today to ensure this committee supports efforts to strengthen the security and stability of the space domain. As Chairman of the subcommittee with oversight responsibility uh of the Bureau of Emerging Threats as well as a member of the space subcommittee on science, space and technology,

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing here today. For decades, the United States has engaged in strategic competition in space. This began with the space race and the Cold War and continues today as we race back on our way to the moon. Yet the race to achieve new heights in space continues. The US, China and Russia are increasingly competing in space in the military and security sectors. As our world becomes more interconnected, the need for greater number of satellites has driven the development of new space-based capabilities as well as the systems to counter them. Today, the threats posed by space-based security issues have been long-standing. and in recent years the United States and international organizations have taken important steps to mitigate risks and ensure the freedom of movement in space, while also recognizing that space is a militarized domain. Uh, as well. In twenty nineteen, NATO allies declared space an operational domain, and at the end of the twenty twenty-one Brussels summit, NATO recognized that attacks on, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the alliance. Meanwhile, in twenty twenty two, the Biden administration implemented a moratorium on direct ascent anti-satellite missile testing, or ASAT missile testing. The moratorium on ASAT testing, as well as efforts like the Artemis accords, demonstrate not just how the United States will position itself to compete in space, but also how the United States will lead in space. We've established norms, promoted responsible and worked with allies and partners to create a shared understanding of how we should engage our adversaries in space. Space by definition requires a coordinated strategy to ensure the United States can not only participate in the system but also shape it. I'm disappointed in the Trump administration's space policy and certain steps that are taken to by the administration that have hurt US interest. First, the administration has failed to publicly reaffirm the prior administration's moratorium on direct ascent asset testing. These weapons should not be tested, and a failure to reaffirm this policy gives way to countries like Russia and China to test offensive capabilities as well. Second, the Trump administration needs to provide more information to the public about his plans for Golden Dome. While Golden Dome has increased security in concept, the administration has not provided enough details to Congress or the public about how its plan, how it plans to utilize the requested one hundred and eighty billion dollars for this program. At the same time, many critics believe such a multi-layered missile defense system will be prohibitively expensive and impractical. Others believe the administration will use uh the contracting process for Golden Dome to reward its friends at the expense of the American taxpayer. We need answers and I hope the administration can provide them to us and importantly to the public. Finally, the Trump administration must do away with its quote-unquote American alone policies in space and double down on international engagement. This includes uh the International Telecommunications Union election later this year where the administration must work to re-elect Doreen Bogdan uh Martin as secretary general. It also means working to protect the US delegation and the US industry as well as uh as they travel to China, to China. for the World Radio Communications Conference in twenty twenty seven. After the Trump administration's chaotic start rewarding China with the hosting of this conference, we must now ensure that China's home field advantage in Shanghai doesn't stack the deck against US interests. Space is and will remain a national security interest for the United States. As ranking member, I believe the State Department must play a more robust role in carrying out our space diplomacy efforts in combating China and Russia's Moving forward, US leadership in the space arena relies on upholding the vital frameworks and initiatives it's already put uh in place long before the administration, but with an administration that has the opportunity to carry forward still. I'm hopeful our panel here today can shed some light on these issues and particularly how we in Congress uh can further our space diplomacy efforts in the Department of State and throughout all the US government. I look forward to it. forward, questioning the witnesses, and I yield back.

Uh, other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We're pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. The Honorable Kerry Bingen, the Director of the Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Doctor Scott Pace, the Director of the Space Policy Institute at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and the Honorable Mallory Stewart, the Chief Executive Officer at the Council on Strategic Risks. Uh, this committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have uh our panel here to speak with us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Miss Bingen for an open.

Thank you. Uh, Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today with these esteemed colleagues and friends. I was privileged to work with this committee while staff were on the House Armed Services Committee and saw firsthand the importance of your work. I would like to highlight three key challenges shaping the space security landscape and offer five recommendations on how we better employ the diplomatic tool of national power to ad- to address them. First, space capabilities underpin how our military fights and projects power, providing connectivity across dispersed forces, intelligence in denied areas, and are critical to missile warning, precision targeting, battle damage assessment, and weather. In Ukraine, we have seen how a militarily overmatched nation can use space-based assets to level the playing field. Starlink became a lifeline for connectivity and satellite imagery, is aiding in battle space awareness and helping to document evidence of war crimes. It should come as no surprise that our adversaries want to deny this battlefield advantage. China and Russia possess a range of counter space weapons. In the last year alone, we have seen prolific jamming of GPS and communication signals. Chinese and Russian satellites are conducting unusual and concerning maneuvers in orbit, including a first-ever orbiting orbital refueling mission in GEO. These dynamics are a key reason the Space Force and Space Command were created. They are focusing on building more resilient space architectures, developing operational tactics and procedures, and integrating with allies and industrial partners. A second trend is the rise of commercial space. More than eighty percent of satellites on orbit are commercial, and over a hundred countries now operate in space. With more actors in space, broader access to technology and greater economic stakes, global competition is intensifying. China, for example, is building its version of Starlink and Falcon nine rockets, and challenging the long-standing US lead in commercial satellite imagery. One consequence of this new dynamic is a far more transparent battlefield. Persistent surveillance from worldwide remote sensing means that military movements and signatures are increasingly visible. This is playing out in real time in the Middle East, where US firms have withheld satellite imagery to protect US forces in the region, and avoid aiding adversaries, while foreign providers, including Chinese companies, continue to supply similar data. We need a more nuanced policy approach that protects national security without disadvantaging US companies relative to foreign competitors. At the same time, US forces must adapt to a more transparent battlefield by strengthening training under persistent surveillance, and investing in protection, deception, and disruption capabilities. Third, China is the most consequential threat and competitor in space. Marking one of the swiftest climbs in the history of any modern space program, China has amassed hundreds of satellites in orbit, set record launch rates, built satellite gigafactories, and advanced flagship projects related to space station and um and the moon. China is using space as a tool of diplomacy and expanding its partnerships across the global south. On the diplomatic front, Chinese delegates are becoming increasingly skilled at navigating international forms, like the ITU and the UN. The long-term implications are profound. As nations align with either the US or Chinese in standards, the winner will not just supply technology. It will set the terms by which information flows, networks interoperate, and how the world is seen. So, recommendations. First, space is soft. power. US space companies remain global leaders in SATCOM and Earth observation, navigation and launch services. For many partners in the global south countries, US firms provide practical solutions. Satellite imagery for agriculture monitoring, maritime surveillance to combat illegal fishing, communications that connect underserved regions, and geospatial data that supports a disaster response and infrastructure development. The State Department should expand this advantage. Our embassy should actively support the US commercial space industry. and space data and services should be integrated into their security cooperation toolkit. This is a threefer, strengthening US industry and and increasing investment in US companies, extending American influence, and countering China. However, outdate outdated export restrictions still treat many space technologies and data services as though they were weapons. So second, we must continue to modernize our export control policies and processes, finding a better balance between protecting sensitive technologies while enabling firms to compete in partnership. Third, our allies and partners from Europe to Japan are committing to record defense budgets including major increases in space. The State Department working with their defense and commerce colleagues can shape these investments so they produce capabilities that complement ours create opportunities for US industry, and strengthen collective security. Fourth, the United States should sustain leadership in key governance and standard forms like the ITU to support US companies in managing scarce spectrum, shaping technology standards and best practices, for satellite operations. Finally, we are in a strategic technology competition with China, which has prioritized aerospace alongside AI, quantum and biotech. These technologies will reshape warfare and confer significant economic and geopolitical advantage. We need a holistic approach that advances US technology leadership while checking China's progress. This will require deepening state's technical expertise and better integrating it with diplomatic tools. So I'm hopeful that the new Bureau of Emerging Threats

Uh, thank you. I now recognize Doctor Pace for an opening statement.

Thank you. Uh, Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, uh, thank you for for holding this important hearing and and thank you also for the uh the panel uh you've assembled here uh with some honored colleagues that I worked with for many years. Um in light of ongoing military operations, disruptive technologies and shifting balances of power, this is a very timely opportunity to consider American space enterprise and in particular the role of diplomacy at the US State Department. We have moved from a bipolar contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, into a crowded field defined by globalization, democratization, rise of new space. The United States Space Force's envisions its future operating environment as being a, what they call a " hetro-polar" world order, a global system defined by uneven concentrations of capability where the United States and China hold dominant but asymmetric influence. Our most visible space effort, the Artemis program, is not a military effort, but it is a geopolitical instrument of national security and diplomacy. It signals that the United States intends to lead an international and commercial coalition built on transparency shared expectations, and sustainable presence. For the State Department to meet the demands of this new strategic landscape and space, I offer a few recommendations. First, of course, strengthen the T and E family uh coordination. Uh, the recent reorganization that merged arms control and non-proliferation into a bureau of arms control and non-proliferation I believe is the logical one. Disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin, so aligning these functions within the department to act more efficiently, to address threats from weapons of mass destruction, including those that may use the space domain. This should not neglect the civil side of space, as represented by the Office of Space Affairs in the E family, and the role played by multilateral institutions such as the UN Committee, on the peaceful uses of outer space. Civil, security, economic interests are all important to US foreign policy. As was mentioned, a focus on the ITU in the upcoming World Radio Conference twenty twenty seven is crucial. The department must take an assertive lead on ITU matters, not leave it to others, speaking with a unified voice for the administration to balance the equities of both government and the private sector. The work team needs to be fully resourced and engage early with regional blocs, uh, such as in the Americas, Asia-Pacific, and of course Europe, to enter into work twenty-seven with a coalition that can defend a rules-based spectrum governance. Next, complete space export control reforms. As was mentioned, the space depo- state department should finalize the space export control reform regulations that were released for public comment in late twenty We need to ensure industry feedback is incorporated, and it's crucial that foreign commercial availability is evaluated on the front end of the process so US firms are not restricted from selling technology that is, in fact, already accessible on the global market. Third, strengthen allied space security dialogues. The US should move beyond episodic consultations to include space security and annualized dialogues with priority allies especially in the Indo-Pacific region such as Japan, Australia, India and South Africa. These dialogues should explicitly integrate space into broader defense and deterrence conversations, aligning threat perceptions, and pre-negotiating crisis response procedures. Next, expand a space literate diplomatic cadre. Um, I'm in International Affairs School, so teaching more space to uh International Affairs majors is a pet project. Um, the department should develop and maintain a cadre of space literate diplom- diplomats who can serve as resident experts, in key embassies and multilateral This expertise can draw upon other agencies like NASA and the Department of War, who have representatives at US embassies, but we need a whole of government representation at our embassies, one team, one fight, to ensure our commercial and space security interests are embedded in our diplomatic engagements in a more integrated way. In conclusion, space activities touch all aspects of our national life. The rules of this new frontier will be made by those who show up, not those who stay behind.

Uh, thank you, and I now recognize uh Miss Stewart for an opening statement.

Good morning, Chairman Self, ranking member Keating, and distinguished members Good morning, Chairman Self, ranking member Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My fellow panelists have already underscored the importance of outer space to the United States as well as the growing threats to our space systems. I will re-emphasize one specific theme. If the United States does not lead in shaping the rules of behavior in outer space, others will. To elaborate, I will briefly address three points, first, why the US must work with its allies and partners, both for greater outer space security and in the formulation of rules. Second, why the US needs clear space security policy leadership from the State Department. And third, how the State Department's bilateral and multilateral engagements advance US national security interests. As this subcommittee knows well, one of America's greatest advantages is our alliances and partnerships. These relationships are not just political, they are operational. They are built on shared laws and norms that allow us to cooperate with predictability interoperability and trust. The same logic applies outer space. For decades, the United States has understood that it is in our national interest, as well as the global interest, to establish rules for greater outer space stability. We have done this through treaties, norms and shared practices. As space becomes more congested and contested, however, the risks of miscalculation and conflict will grow. The limited existing rules will not be able to support the scale and scope of operational growth. Moreover, as discussed, space is extremely relevant to global military. That makes it even more important to strengthen deterrence and resilience against attack in outer space. Alliances and partnerships are central to this effort. Interoperability among allied systems increases resilience and allows us to respond collectively if systems are disrupted. Collaboration enables us enables us to establish shared expectations for responsible behavior in space.

Mm.

Establishing such expectations in the form of rules helps us deter and identify anomalies and or intentionally irresponsible behaviors, giving us more time to protect and defend our collective assets. For the strongest possible partnerships, trust is critical. Without it, cooperation declines and normative deterrence is not possible. To sustain our partners' trust, the United States must demonstrate that its approach serves collective and not just national interests. This is where US diplomacy plays a central role. Russia and China have promoted a narrative that the United States seeks dominate space, and they have proposed to legally ban all space-based weapons. Putting aside that their proposed treaty fails to address their own ground-based, cyber, and dual-use capabilities, the text itself lacks a clear definition of a space weapon. Because any satellite in space could be used as a weapon, such a legal prohibition would be meaningless, unenforceable, and would not improve space security. The United States has taken a different approach to space rules, focusing on observable verifiable behaviors. A clear example is the t- twenty twenty-two initiative to ban direct ascent debris-generating anti-satellite tests. Despite Russian opposition, this effort gained the global support of a hundred and fifty-five nations in the United Nations. That success was not automatic. It required sustained, coordinated diplomacy to demonstrate that the initiative benefited all nations. This is what space policy leadership should look like. Support for practical, verifiable rules, that enhance our collective security and outer space stability. But effective US diplomacy abroad depends on close coordination at home. Today, responsibility for space security is spread across multiple US agencies and within multiple State Department bureaus. That structure can work, but only with strong leadership. With the cancellation of the US Space Council, the State Department must play a stronger coordinating role, aligning the inter-agency and commercial sectors, engaging allies and ensuring that the United States government speaks with one clear voice on all space security issues. Finally, the State Department should restart and expand U. S. space security dialogues. These dialogues allow us to share threat perceptions, explain our policies, and better understand those of other space actors. They also help coordinate the U. S. inter-agency, bringing together the numerous voices in space security diplomacy to ensure a unified message. These engage engagements, especially with our strategic competitors, are stabilizing. They reduce understanding, build transparency, explain US positions, and help prevent escalation. In sum, the future of space will not be shaped by emerging technology alone. It will be shaped by rules, norms, and leadership. To protect US interests in outer space, we must lead in collectively defining clear and forcible rules of responsible behavior, strengthen alliances and partnerships, improve policy coordination across the government, and reinvigorate the State Department's space security.

Uh, thank you, and I'll recognize myself for five minutes for questions. I will start by saying, uh, I believe that we are currently in a hybrid war with China today, and and other nations, but certainly with China. So, uh, a lot of our discussions, so. rules and we need rules, but we also ha- ha- I think we need to understand that we are already in hybrid war. So Miss Bingen, uh in your written testimony you talked about ensuring we have adequate defenses and necessary offensive capabilities. I don't hear people talk a lot about offensive capabilities in cyber, in space, uh can you uh can you talk about what offensive and defensive capabilities we're currently investing in?

Ch- Chairman, I would be happy to. Um, and if I can first frame it by, there are, I I mentioned there are a range of threats that we see China and Russia pursuing, from cyber methods to electronic warfare like jamming, all the way up to kinetic activity, uh, uh, direct-to-snet missiles, on orbital systems, and then even nuclear. So that all speaks to us looking from a, looking at investing in defensive capabilities, more resilient architectures. At the same point in time, when you see what China is doing in space, building and launching over five hundred ISR satellites today, building their versions of Starlink, they're essentially closing their kill chains. And frankly, they're practicing targeting our ports, our ships at sea, our bases. It ra- it, when you think of an Indo-Pacific scenario, so much of our military connectivity, our command and control, our ISR, our eyes, our ears, our ability to communicate rests in The Chinese know that. Um, they're also taking advantage of space to target our forces on the ground. It raises the question of we also need capability to hold at risk their ability to see us to target our forces on the ground. It doesn't have to, there there are options. You can do it kinetically, you can do it non-kinetically. But we are now at a time where space is being used against our joint force, and we need to have tools in the tool kit to hold that at risk, the same way that they hold

Uh, thank you, Doctor Pace. Uh, well, no, misbeing it again. Uh, you also said delivering capabilities that would support our allies' security needs. What do you think that looks like? Is that like our FMS program for weapon systems? Uh, are we talking about money? We talking about equipment? What are we talking about there when you, when you, delivering capabilities to our allies? But but how do we do that? I've I've got that. How do we do that?

Oh.

Is this an FMS system, a DCS system?

I think it can be all of the above. I think it'd be, it can be direct commercial sales. It can be through FMS and security cooperation. It can be providing hardware. It can be providing software, providing services.

Do we have that today? Do we have that today?

To s- to some degree we do, and I mentioned a b- a b-

Which brings me to one of the points you made, we need more nuanced policies in your written, in your spoken uh testimony. What are those nuanced policies? You're talking about ITAR?

Uh, that that's one of the t- that that's that's one of them,

Export control.

and I would uh not recognize, I mean, this committee's done a

OK, very good. OK, very good. And Doctor Pace, And Doctor Pace, Uh, obviously China is hosting uh the next uh radio communication conference in Shanghai. What policies do we need to see come out of that and how do we keep China from using their home field advantage, I think one of you said. How how do we do that? Cuz they do have a home field advantage.

Uh, thank you, Chair. Um, a couple of things. First of all, um, sta- strategically that one of the most important things we can do is to strongly support uh Doreen Bogdan-Martin's re-election um, which Nominated of course, you know, during uh the first Trump administration, uh re-nominated for her current position during the Biden administration, re-nominated her again. Uh she's been a a tremendous uh asset and in terms of ensuring that the ITU is run in a fair way, uh I think uh her re-election's number one. The second thing we need to think about uh at a fairly granular level, uh security uh for our delegation while they're over there. Uh, world radio conferences always have a certain share of intelligence activities going on from various countries. Uh, the fact

Thank you, thank you, Doctor Pace. My time is up unfortunately. I appreciate it. I wish I had more time, but I'm going to uh recognize the ranking member for five minutes. Thank you.

Thank you, Mister Chairman. Uh, Miss Stewart, uh, in in your remarks you emphasized the need for partnerships and cooperation, uh, take a few minutes and detail the progress that's been taking place uh going forward and and the importance of getting these partnerships to share norms uh to to make sure that the principles in the international community are aligned uh and particularly uh in the area of space and how that's different than so many other uh approaches that we have to take.

Thank you for the question. Really appreciate um the the emphasis

Oh, I'm sorry, could could you move the microphone closer to you? Yep. Yeah. Really appreciate is that

Thank you for the question and appreciate the focus on partnerships,

Okay.

alliances and norms, especially in the outer space arena. The the previous administration and in fact uh administrations prior to the Biden administration had focused on developing processes and standards that could enable greater cooperation that were in the interest of stability and security of the outer space arena, because we recognize that that was also in the US's interest when operating in the space environment. In order to achieve these norms and these treaties, we had to work collectively with the global community to explain why it was in all of our interest, to have some standard rules, to have some norms that allowed us to know which way we were going, uh, in in in, um, you know, in in in situations in which we were going to uh have conjunctions and situations in which we may interact to allow us to understand what is normal and responsible behavior so that anything that fell short of that um could be identified as irresponsible that that system that really we developed in in numerous domain domains like aviation and maritime allowed for safe operations and allowed us to understand how we should perform even when intentions are unclear. In the space. domain when intentions are even less clear, because we cannot communicate directly, we cannot see very clearly where these satellites are operating or or or what their intent is. We need those norms and cooperation capabilities more than ever. And so the US has pursued um the direct descent destructive ASAT testing, normative uh principle in the UN. The US has pursued um another uh strengthening of the outer space treaty in twenty twenty four in the UN first committee resolution, recognizing that treaty and emphasizing Article four's prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth particularly to highlight for the international community that any activity to violate that outer space treaty would be harmful to all space operators and in fact the US believes that the Russians are developing such a program to place a nuclear weapon in orbit around the earth and so highlighting this treaty highlighting this norm of responsible behavior is important to our success. The reason we need partnerships is the so that they can agree and support and collaborate and in fact enforce the normative deterrence against those irresponsible behaviors and this has been the approach of uh many US governments up until this point and hopefully it will continue in this administration.

Yeah, you you mentioned the uh direct ascent eh ASAT testing, uh with the conference coming up and everything else, what's the opportunity for this administration and other administrations going forward to to have that kind of clarity? Eh uh and the importance of that going forward. How should we approach the Chinese and the Russians about this? Uh, I'll open that to anyone in the panel that might wanna comment on that, the importance of that.

I'm happy to answer that question. I agree that the US government should reaffirm its commitment not to conduct direct descent destructive ASAT tests. The US has made this operational decision years ago. Um, this is not any problem for us to recommit to, but it's important for us to affirm this normative approach

Yeah. The m- oh, there's about twenty-five seconds left, so.

I would say that one of the important uh one of the important things about this is to recognize that a lot of developing countries are recognizing that they're incredibly reliant on space. So we want our space systems to work, they want the space systems to work because they're reliant on it. And by providing an attractive narrative where people can join with us, uh responding to US proposals, those votes come our way. And those votes are important in the ITU, they're important in COPUS, uh they're important in shaping that sort of global environment.

Thank you, and I I think you hit the central point. Uh, I think we'll hear more of them in this hearing, so I yield back, Mister Chairman.

Uh, thank you. And I recognize the representative from Ohio, Mister Davidson.

Uh.

Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for this hearing. Uh, for our witnesses, thanks for your preparation and your comments already today. Um, as we talk about, um, the emerging threats, uh, space is one of those areas where there's emerging opportunity, but there's inherently emerging threats. Uh, it's also often observed that the chief export for the European Union is regulation. So, one of the primary threats to anything is too much regulation or bad regulation. Maybe start with you, Mr. Pace. What concerns should the United States have about the EU's proposed space act?

Oh, thank you for that question. Um, I think the, it's interesting that both the uh the Commerce Department and State Department work fairly closely to provide US comments uh back to the EU. Uh, and we, and it's also fair to say we have a number of problems with that. Um, the EU uh desire to regulate and in many cases uh s put up barriers to US firms being able to operate inside the EU. uh, is the serious one. Uh, many cases if you look at the language, it looks like it could be okay, but on the other hand it could be interpreted so many different directions. And so because of that vagueness, because of that uncertainty, uh, I think there are a number of problems with it. Uh, one of the ones that are particularly, uh, keen interest to me are some of the requirements on cyber security. Uh, some of the EU requirements there uh, are fairly onerous, uh, fairly expensive, and I suspect would probably hurt U- European firms as much if not more than ourselves. So, uh, Europe is playing, uh, its hand. Yeah, I think in regulation. Um, but it's not really a good one. I wish they were doing more in other areas to be good partners with us, including in defense and burden sharing, as well as working with us in multilateral forums, as was described.

Yeah, I think they're pretty already well-staffed on regulation. Uh, so they haven't staffed up on space and defense. Do they have an autonomous, um, space capability, or to what extent do they depend on the United States?

They they they they do. They they do have a lot of cap- capable technology and therefore it's disappointing they don't do uh some more uh with it. They're deeply concerned about the state of commercial industry because they see that as a source of innovation and power um part of the United States, and they're concerned with how do they keep up with it. But they're not really doing the kind of reforms I personally would argue for in terms of um slimming their own regulation, putting more uh private equity and financing into their markets and putting on a more entrepreneurial end. There are things they could do, they recognize they can do. been hard for them to bring themselves to just pull the trigger and and do what they need to do to compete.

Yeah, so as we look at um our our relationship with uh historic allies in Europe, um are we at least united in the threat and challenge posed by China and Russia?

I believe there's a common sense, I'll defer uh maybe to my colleagues here, but uh there is a recognition of the threat, uh there is a lot of good discussion at the working and operational levels, I think within NATO and within the military. Uh the problems

Yeah, thanks. Miss Bingen, you have thoughts on um, are we united in countering China and Russia?

S so sorry, I I think in there in general I would agree with what Doctor Pace said. A lot of it though comes down country to country. So so NATO increasingly has recognized space as a war fighting domain, and we have threats, particularly the Russian threat. Germany and France are increasing their space budgets, including for defense and security. ESA the European Space Agency, civilian agency, but for the first time has been given a mandate to also support security. Um, if I can also touch on your first question briefly and generally talk regulation, we have such an innovative commercial space sector right now. Private capital is going into these areas. There are missions now being commercialized that I would have never imagined being commercialized. It was something only the government do or or or we imagined only the government would do. So the challenge here is we do not wanna stifle this innovative sector.

Yeah, thanks. And so for, you know, taxpayers back home, they they often think of space as, you know, why would we weaponize space? Uh, people don't always think about all the commercial applications, uh, that are there for communications, not just for defense, not just for targeting or surveillance, uh, but even GPS and our way to, you know, operate in modern society. So space is an increasingly important domain. And so you know, I get the frustration with Europe, I guess, I'd say why should we keep working with these folks? I mean there's a there's a sense of frustration at some point where you go, well look you guys just do you, we're gonna do us. Um, you know, it's a shame to get to that point on some levels of this, but you know, what what are the pros and cons of that just saying, look we're we're done trying to persuade you, we're just gonna do it, kinda go it alone, as it's alleged. Doctor Pace.

I wou I would say that um that that would be very unfortunate if it came out that way, because Uh, first of all, practical reality among the, as you're familiar with the five I countries of, you know, Canada, UK, Australia. Um, the, they're integrated in our operations. I mean, they're, we're, we sit console by console, you know, with, with these folks. Uh, we're looking at Germany is starting to make movements toward a more serious defense posture to putting more funding, uh, into space related areas. We'll see if they can execute on that. Uh, so as, as, as, as, as, uh, Kerry Bingham was saying, you have to look country by country and, and, regard the EU itself is somewhat disappointing, but individual countries are making movements. You're seeing movement in the commercial sector by Italy. You're seeing France taking some of the commercial stuff more seriously. We'll see what they can do with it. Uh, as I mentioned, the five eyes are aligned with us. So I think if we look as the phrase is, a more nuanced approach, there are some signs of hope that we should encourage and work with, um, while still pushing back against the attempts to have a giant top-down European regulator in charge.

Thank you all. I appreciate your testimony.

Uh, thank you, uh, we are already sixteen minutes into a vote, so this uh committee will recess for votes and we will return.

Thank you for your patience. The committee comes to order, and I now recognize Representative Amo for your five minutes of questioning.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Uh, thank you to our witnesses for being here. Uh, earlier this month, uh, the Artemis two mission reminded the world what's possible when we lead and when we lead together. This wasn't just an American achievement, as you know. It included partners in Canada, one brave astronaut, Jeremy Hansen, and it was built on decades of cooperation from partners around the world. This isn't the first time we've coordinated with our allies to make space exploration possible. The world watched Neil Armstrong take a giant leap for mankind, thanks to scientists in Australia relaying the broadcasts from space around the world. In nineteen seventy-five, the US and Soviet Union met in space for the first as part of the Apollo-Soyuz test project. And since two thousand, the International Space Station has served as a microgravity laboratory, bringing together astronauts from twenty-six different nations to conduct groundbreaking research. We don't lead in space alone. We lead by bringing others with us. We lead by setting the rules, shaping the standards, and ensuring that space remains pa- uh peaceful, stable, and accessible. Uh, that's why I'm working with Congressman French Hill to pass the Taiwan and American Space Assistant Act Act, the also known as the TASA Act.

It's the TASA.

Our bill would help NASA, NOAA, and the State Department coordinate more effectively with Taiwan on space exploration, satellite programs, atmospheric research, and importantly, science education. It's also why efforts like the Artemis Accords are so important. They bring countries together around shared principles and avoiding uh a de-stabilizing race uh in orbit.

Uh, thank you so much for that question. Absolutely agree that the Artemis Accords benefits the United States because it

Mm. Mm. Mm.

brings everyone together on the shared principles of supporting the outer space treaty, of sustainability and safety. Uh it it coordinates our efforts toward a common goal of of cooperation, of understanding where we're coming from and where we want to achieve greater scientific progress um civilian um benefits across the board for all participants. Um the outline of uh the expanded Artemis Accords um provides some principles to ensure future space exploration is peaceful, sustainable, and beneficial to all. And that's certainly in the US national interest. We need to keep our reliance on outer space safe and secure. We need to be able to grow and expand into the space commercial industry.

Yes.

And we need to work with partners and allies for resilience, for interoperability, for greater capacity in the scientific arena. So this is all consistent with the principles of the Artemis Accords, and it's consistent with the US's own national practices, even if the Artemis Accords didn't exist, is that our ability

And I appreciate that sentiment. It highlights the fact that our security, our self-interest, uh, is deeply connected to partnership, right? Uh, we have to move together. Uh,

Mm.

now, Under President Biden, uh the State Department dedicated a special uh sp- uh envoy for space, uh who worked to advance American leadership in space exploration and to foster uh commercial opportunities. But, uh unfortunately President Trump eliminated both the Office of Science and Technology Co- Cooperation and the Science Envoy program weakening our ability to lead and coordinate globally. So again, Miss Stewart, what were the benefits of having a special envoy?

Any opportunity to coordinate the complex issues in the outer space environment, the complex sort of reliance we have from commercial to science to military and other um reliance purposes is important and to have one special representative who could help as an envoy bring all of that together understand it more clearly and even be a

Mm.

figure for the international community to reach out to if they had questions, if they wanted to understand better or cooperate with us. That was valuable and that was seen as beneficial to the US national interest. In the absence of a special envoy, we need to understand who are the touchpoints, who can provide the communication, coordinate everyone, and be available to other governments and other partners in the commercial arena to help guide those conversations toward cooperation. I think, you know, in the absence of the US science envoy program, um, at the, at the State Department, um, specifically having that science envoy for space, we should figure out how we enable that coordination, the cooperation, and the voice that can represent the US government.

Thank you. My time has expired, but uh I appreciate you highlighting the space personnel yields good space policy and we have to continue working together with that, I yield back.

OK. I now recognize myself. Um, mister, at the State Department, civil and commercial space diplomacy are handled under the while space security, arms control, and defense related space issues are handled by the T family bureaus. This organizational split reflects the dual use nature of space, but can create disconnects in policy execution. So from your experience at the department, uh can you briefly discuss how or the characterize the day-to-day coordination and information sharing between the bureaus and if you can talk about what improvements you can suggest. uh, for robust inter-bureau coordination to avoid sending mixed signals to allies and partners but let me throw one more question out there in practice how do the relevant bureaus ensure alignment and coherence when the US engages in international forums such as conference on disarmament which is led by ACN and the UN committee on the peaceful uses of outer space that is led by OES?