A New Beginning for Colombia

So, the subcommittee on the Western hemisphere will come to order. The purpose of the hearing is to assess the Recent elections in Colombia and their implications in the United States policy examined the legacy of the outgoing President Pedro's um government, his failed policies, and provide the Trump administration an opportunity to highlight the strategy for resetting the bilateral relationship between two countries. Now I recognize myself for an opening statement, but first of all I wanna thank both witnesses for coming and taking time, and everyone who has joined us in this hearing, such an important moment for the Western hemisphere vis-a-vis the Trump administration. On June twenty first, the Colombian people chose a new president, ushering in what many hope will be a new dawn for that country. They placed their trust in someone who came from outside the traditional political elite who built a new movement which had little connection to all political structures and was largely unknown to most Colombians until recently. Yet they embraced his vision because he spoke to something universal, prosperity, security, democracy, and the opportunity to build a better life at home. President Abelardo de la Espriella has made it clear that he intends to be a steadfast, unconditional, and reliable ally of the United States. Thank God for that. We warmly welcome that commitment because our two nations share the same fundamental values strengthening democracy expanding economic opportunity, promoting security, and preserving liberty throughout the whole Western hemisphere. For that reason, I am pleased to welcome to the Capitol after this hearing the Vice-President-elect the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Commerce, and the Minister of Defense in the de las Prellas incoming administration. We want you to know, we want the Colombians to know, that the United States and the Trump administration is looking forward to work with Colombia as it reaffirms its position among the democratic nations that value a close partnership with the United States. This country stands for freedom. for democratic institutions, for economic opportunity, and for the rule of law. We are proud to stand with allies like Abelardo de la Espraya's new government, who shared those principles. And in particular for myself, Maria Salazar, the representative of district number twenty-seven in Florida, I welcome this hearing or am very happy to be part of this meaningful hearing for me, because I am welcoming Abelardo, who was a good friend, who was once my constituent, living in Coral Gables, district no- part of district number twenty seven, long before he ever imagined entering public service in his country. Watching that journey come full circle makes this occasion particularly very special for me as a person, and I look forward to strengthening the enduring friendship between our two nations. I'm going to say a few words in Spanish for those who are watching us in the Republic of Colombia, congratulations to my Colombian brothers and sisters who chose the path of democracy, of security, of prosperity, economic and well-being. I know very well the new president, Alberto de la Esprella, as I just decided in English, because he was my voter, he was a resident of my district number twenty-seven in the south of Florida for many years long before Now I finish my statement and I recognize the ranking member from Texas, Representative Castro, for any statements he may have. Thank you.

Uh, thank you, Chairwoman Salasada, and thank you to Assistant Secretary Weiland and Deputy Assistant Secretary Mendez for joining us today for your testimony. Colombia is one of our closest and most important partners in this hemisphere. For decades, Republicans and Democrats have worked together to build a security and economic relationship that has saved lives in both the United States and Colombia. I want that relationship to continue. And I want Colombia to succeed as a prosperous, stable democracy and as a partner of the United States. But before we turn to Colombia's new administration, I want to note a loss that touches the same relationship between our two countries. This week, a twenty-six year old Colombian father, Juan Sebastian Duran Guerrero, was shot and killed by an ICE officer in Maine while driving to work. He was authorized to work in the United States, and held a valid social security number, according to his family. His three year old daughter was nearby when he was shot down. And federal officials have confirmed he was not the target of the warrant that ICE was executing. We spend a great deal of time in this committee discussing violence and impunity in Colombia and across the Western hemisphere. I think it's important that we take a moment in this hearing about Colombia to acknowledge a Colombian who lost his life here in the United States under circumstances that I hope the Congress will want answers on in its own right. And now, and to the matter at hand, President-elect de la Espraya won a close race. He did so after President Trump endorsed him in what I believe was an inappropriate action, as he did in Argentina and Honduras. Colombia's leaders leaders are for Colombians to choose, not the President of the United States or the head of any other nation around the world. Mister de la Espraya spent much of his career as a criminal defense lawyer, representing figures tied to drug trafficking and paramilitary virul violence, including the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, a right-wing paramilitary group that was designated as a foreign terrorist organization. and individuals like Alex Saab, a former Maduro ally currently in prison in the United States. Everyone deserves a legal defense, and I don't hold that career against him by itself. And I sincerely hope that he has left those associations in the past. But given what he has said he will do as president, much of his platform gives me serious concern, as it does to other members of this body. The President-elect has proposed walking away from peace negotiations with armed groups in Colombia and has pledged a stepped-up military offensive against armed groups. The American people are not looking to start new wars, especially after the ongoing debacle in Iran and everything that that has brought. If the Trump administration is seriously considering supporting US military involvement, they must make their case to the Congress and to the American people. I also have serious concerns about his commitment to full implementation of the historic twenty sixteen peace accords. President-elect de la Esprea has also said he wants to build ten mega prisons modeled on SICAT and El Salvador a country where more than three percent of the adult male population is now imprisoned under an ongoing state of emergency with well-documented human rights concerns. Colombia's challenges are fundamentally different from El Salvador's, and I'm skeptical that Bukele's efforts can or should simply be replicated in the nation of Colombia. We also need to know what happens to Colombia's obligations of the twenty sixteen peace accord, on land reform, on victims' rights, and protection for social leaders and human rights defenders, who continue to be killed at alarming rates in rural Colombia. And security is not the only question before this subcommittee. The status of the million millions of Venezuelans who live in Colombia and whether Mister de la Esprea will follow the example of his predecessors, Ivan Duque and Gustavo Petro, a conservative and a progressive, who chose to welcome them. I wanna know whether the new government will keep that commitment and whether the United States will help Colombia integrate those families. As we did before, those programs were abruptly cancelled last year. So, what I would like to know with this hearing is straightforward. What does the State Department expect from the new Colombian government? And what actions is the United States expecting to take? And it means understanding how the administration defines success here, beyond a change in rhetoric, out of Bogota. This committee deserves real answers about what this administration has promised, what it is prepared to support. and what safeguards it intends to hold in place. I look forward to your testimony. And I yield back.

And before I introduced our distinguished uh panelists, I want to agree with you, ranking member, that Johan Guerrero should not be dead, and that I have asked the um Trump administration to change some of the misguided enforcement policies of the last years. And I have er personally asked them to review those policies and just concentrate on people who do not have papers and who have serious criminal records. So I agree with you on that policy in particular. Having said that, we are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic, the Honorable Cartwright Whiteland. Right? Whiteland, the Assistant Secretary of Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement of the United States, Mister Weiland has served previously in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs on the State Department's policy planning, and also as a senior counsel on the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. Welcome and thank you for being here to explain to us what's gonna happen now with, uh, the new government in Colombia and how much help we can give them. And I also welcome Mister Luis Mendez, is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South America for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs of the State Department. a career member of the senior foreign service, Mister Mendes has served as acting deputy chief of mission in both Honduras and Costa Rica. So in other words, you know the region very well. And once again, thank you for being here with us. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us, and is grateful to have you here to speak in front of this audience. Your full statement will be made part of the record. I ask each of you to keep your remarks to five minutes in order to allow members further questions. I now recognize Mister Weyland for an opening statement of five minutes. Thank you for being with us.

Thank you, Chairwoman. Uh, it's good to be here today. Um, I was a staffer on the Foreign Affairs Committee for four years, and I always had uh exceptionally good relationships with your staff. Uh, I just wanted to commend you for your commitment not only to your constituents, but also to the entire hemisphere. Uh, I'd also like to thank uh Representative Castro, Ch- or uh Chairman Castro uh for Raking member Castro rather for having me today, as well as all the other uh members of the committee. Eleven months ago, Colombian narco-terrorists attacked a US titled INL helicopter during a coca eradication operation in Antioquia. Thirteen police officers lost their lives from a mortar that was planted in the ground and detonated when the helicopter landed. This was a tragedy for the families that lost loved ones and for Colombia. But it hit home for me because earlier that summer, I had flown into the same area on another INL helicopter to observe eradication. This proximity of events is one of many examples showing how deeply entwined US interests are in Columbia's web of violence. And my experience, along with that of the tens of thousands of Americans whose lives are destroyed or cut short by cocaine, is proof that narco-terrorist attacks aren't happening in some world far far away. They have direct implications for and pose a danger to Americans. Colombia is the source of up to ninety-four percent of cocaine seized in the United States, and an operating base for at least four US designated foreign terrorist organizations. That near and present danger is why, despite huge setbacks under the Petro administration, President Trump sought to maintain amicable relations with Colombia. That is why, even during the most difficult days, our partnership with security forces has never ebbed. And that is why we are optimistic that under President-elect Abelardo de la Espriea, our efforts to stem coca cultivation and cocaine production will reach new heights. Doing that will require us to use all tools at our disposal, to rein in armed groups that profit from mayhem and whose raison d'etre often involves perverse ideological crusades. Earlier this year, for example, the FARC-EP said its guerrilla members, quote, " will give their last drop of blood fighting against the American empire", end quote. That imperialism charge is ironic because its declarants seem more intent to fight innocent civilians in their country. One was a farmer recently driving his truck down a highway in Calca. A gas cylinder bomb exploded just up ahead of him. Striking a bus during a traffic jam. His truck went flying from the blast. Unfortunately and unforgivably, events like this became more commonplace in recent years. President Gustavo Petro's failed total peace negotiations allowed narco-terrorists to regroup drove eradication to historic lows, and paused extraditions of five heinous criminal leaders. One result of his policies is that cocaine production potential now vastly exceeds interdiction efforts. Another is the carnage. One hundred and seventy-three Colombian police officers and soldiers gave their lives last year trying to protect their country and ours. The new President-elect de la Espriella has rightfully called what Colombia is facing a pandemic of insecurity. He has said that, quote, " Colombia and the United States, united by friendship and the principles we share, constitute an indestructible force in defense of freedom, the defeat of narco-terrorism, and the prosperity of the Americas. That friendship and indestructible force can be seen in the many ways my office at the State Department has mitigated the downward spiral. Supporting Blackhawks and elite units that have taken down FTO lea leaders, providing US-built vessels and drones, counter-drone capabilities, and forensic software form the backbone of Colombia's narco-terrorist or narco- counter-narcotics operations, exchanging intelligence and squeezing the money launderers who finance these criminal organizations. Now we enter a new era. If the new government delivers, we're prepared to deepen our partnership across every dimension. The Colombian people deserve a government that fights for them. We believe we're about to get one. We ask for this committee's continued support for INL's Columbia programs, Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you for your statement, Mister Whalen, and now recognize Mister Mendes for an opening statement of five minutes.

Good afternoon. Chairwoman Salazar, Ranking Member Castro, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. President Trump has returned the Western hemisphere to the center of American foreign policy. That means close collaboration with regional partners to combat drug trafficking and illegal migration, dismantle criminal networks, and uphold democratic governance. Colombia is central to this work. It's no surprise that over the past four years, our partnership with Colombia was tested. The Petro-administration's failed policies allowed continued violence, armed group fragmentation, and record coca cultivation and cocaine production. The deterioration of Colombia's counter-narcotics performance was a direct result of President Petro's policy choices. These choices undermined security cooperation, emboldened narco-terrorist organizations, and weakened Colombia's institutions. The United States responded accordingly. In September twenty twenty five, President Trump determined Colombia had failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its international counter-narcotics obligations. And Secretary Rubio followed with non-certification and targeted sanctions. Despite this, we did not turn our back on the Colombian people. Our relationship with Colombia's security forces, justice sector, and local officials remains strong throughout. Colombia's cooperation on migration enforcement has also been inconsistent. While transit across the Darien region have dropped sharp sharply under President Trump, the Petro-administration has refused to accept deportation flights for most Colombians unlawfully present in the United States. The inauguration of President-elect de Lesbilla on August seven presents a reset moment, and we are committed to ensuring the United States is an engaged partner from the very beginning. President-elect de la Esprita has expressed a clear desire to realign Colombia with the United States join the shield of America's and renew forced eradication of coca we welcome these commitments and look to deepen cooperation in ways that deliver concrete results for the American people. That means holding the new government to measurable benchmarks on eradication, extradition, and security cooperation. The incoming government inherits challenges. Membership in foreign terrorist organization has doubled over five years. These groups are destabilizing not only Colombia, but Ecuador and Venezuela. They are also diversifying into legal gold mining and other illicit economies to fund their operations. Colombia's finances are strained. Its military is undersized, and urgent domestic pressures will compete for the new government's attention and resources. President-elect de L'Esprit will need a strong U. S. partner, and we intend to be one. Our partnership must extend well beyond security. China has expanded its footprint in Colombia, posing strategic risk to critical infrastructure and digital systems. We must compete effectively, and we can. Colombia offers significant potential for U. S. investment, energy cooperation, and critical minerals development. These are areas where American companies and the US government can offer something China cannot. Transparent, rules-based partnerships that strengthen Colombian sovereignty rather than erode it. In closing, Chairwoman Salazar, Ranking Member Castro, members of the committee, the election of the Lesbria is a historic opportunity we cannot squander. Working with this subcommittee, we can deepen the US-Columbia partnership in ways that deliver for the American people, the Colombian people and the region. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

And we welcome that cooperation as well. Now I want to recognize and welcome to the committee, uh my good friend, uh Mister Meeks of New York for an opening statement next, ranking member Meeks. Five minutes.

Thank you Madam Chair, and I thank the witnesses for joining us today. Let me first start by congratulating the Colombian people. for once again exercising their fundamental democratic rights. More than twenty-six million Colombians participated in the June twenty-first presidential runoff, sixty-three point six percent of eligible voters and the highest turnout in the country's history. This is a powerful demonstration of the Colombian's people commitment to democracy, even during a period of profound political polen- polarization. I also joined the Organization of American States, and recognizing the professional work of the National Civil Registry, the National Electoral Council, Columbia's security forces, election officials, observers, and other state institutions. In an extraordinary tense environment, these institutions helped create the conditions for Colombians to exercise their right to vote freely and securely. By the narrowest margin in Colombia's history, Mister de la Esprit won the June twenty-first election. It was close. It was contentious. But let me be clear. It was free and fair elections with credible results. So I say to outgoing President Pedro that your response to the results alleging fraud without sufficient evidence risked undermining confidence in Columbia's democratic institutions. Ivan Zepeda, the losing candidate, conceded the results. President Petro should follow suit. Let me be equally clear. For more than two centuries, the relationship between the United States and Colombia has endured because it has always been larger than any single president, political party, or movement of disagreement. That partnership should not and cannot be based on whether the politics of the White House matches that of Columbia's administration. That is why I'm deeply concerned by the framing of this hearing, which follows a dangerous line of thought that celebrates the ideological identity of Columbia's president-elect more than the Colombian's people democratic rights. The suggestion that Columbia's democracy is legitimate only when Colombian voters select Donald Trump's preferred candidate deepens polarization, undermines confidence in electoral institutions, and disrespects the sovereignty and judgment of the Colombian people. The United States should champion the democratic institutions that allowed Colombians to make their choice, not attempt to make or influence them for that choice that they chose. That is why I joined my colleagues in denouncing President Trump's attempt to interfere in Colombia's election by openly promoting his preferred candidate and suggesting that a superior victory would threaten or even endanger the survival of Colombian democracy. It is statements like that which endanger Colombia's democracy. And I've worked with five presidents of Colombia from across the political spectrum. Pastrana, Uribe, Santos, Duque, Pedro. And I've had numerous differences with all of them, including President Pedro. And I will surely have stark differences with the incoming president. But I have never doubted the necessity or promise of a strong U. S. Colombian partnership. So I look forward to working with the incoming administration to advance the relationships based on our nation's shared democratic values, because that's what a commitment to democracy looks like. And without a governing majority in the Colombian Congress, the president-elect will have to work with the opposition and centrist legislators if he hopes to govern successfully, just as we here in Washington have to work across the aisle to get things done. And though we may have Trump's endorsement, He will also need Democrats here in the United States Congress to help sustain assistance for Colombia. That support must be tied to the defense of Colombia's democratic institutions, human rights, the rule of law, the twenty sixteen peace accord, and the safety and political participation of all Colombians, including Afro-descended and indigenous indigenous communities who have been affected most by the armed conflict, the brutal violence committed by transnational crime organizations, that operate within Colombian borders. In that regard, the Trump administration's cancellation and dismantling of assistance program serving Afro-Columbian and indigenous communities is especially troubling and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses why the Trump administration has defied uh bipartisan congressional intent and appropriations law and abruptly canceled funding for such activities. In closing, presidents come, And go. Political parties rise and fall. Member of the Congress will be elected and retire. But the friendship and partnership between the American and Colombian people must endure. And with that, I yield back.

Thank you, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mister Meeks, for your statement, and now I recognize myself for five minutes of question. Once again, thank you for being here. Looking forward to hear your responses to my questions. Let's start with military support. We know that uh, Mister Weyland, that seventy per five percent, seventy five percent of aircraft and helicopters in the Colombian Air Force cannot take off. Seventy five percent. So what is it that the United States can do immediately in order to help this new incoming government to make those Vehicles fly again.

Thank you, Chairwoman, for that question. Um, we in INL have a variety of tools at our disposal. Um, we have a fleet of Black Hawks, um, that we, uh, maintain with the Columbia National Police. Um, and as part of that program, we have a group of very talented, uh, contractors who are expert in various types of aviation, uh, service and and maintenance. Um, so I'd love to explore with you and

So black hawks, how many are we talking about, can they be given to the new government immediately, what do those black hawks do? Can you expand a little bit more on that, cuz black hawk sounds powerful

They are powerful, ma'am.

and dangerous.

We, twenty nine I believe we have currently, but we're um, interested in speaking to the Colombians and the new administration about uh potentially growing that fleet. Um, these helicopters uh conduct a variety of missions. Um, just last year alone, they seized over four hundred metric tons of cocaine. They eliminated about two hundred high value targets. And they um, you know, they're they're they're expert at what they do. Um, and so, uh, as I said, we're exploring new opportunities to perhaps grow that fleet.

To grow the fleet. Uh, cuz we know that under the federal government the last four years, the coca crops grew by three hundred percent. Is that true? We're talking about around three hundred thousand uh acres of coca crops. Is that correct?

Uh yes ma'am, about about that. Um the number I have is about two hundred and sixty-two thousand, um which is a historic high, uh and at the same time, as you know, the Petro-administration uh refused to uh be very serious about eradication, so only about eight thousand hectares were destroyed um last year and that's a historic low.

Okay, and when you tell me uh destroying them, we know that those um farmers or those people who are growing that coca need to have a substitute cuz they are poor Colombian farmers. Do we have any idea or any any plan to substitute one for the other and make those people eat?

Uh, ma'am, uh, as far as economic development goes, that's not what we're in the business at INL of doing. Um, I know that at least previously there were um, high level ranking officials and may perhaps in uh even in a whole agency that addressed the that question. I also know that the Europeans are very involved in crop substitution programs. So that partnership we may be able to um, you know

What about military bases? How many United States military bases Columbia has on its territory?

I would defer to DOW on that, ma'am. I'm sorry, I don't have that number off the top of my head.

Okay, but if uh, is there any possibility that that the Colombian, new Colombian government invites the United States to set up military bases in order to help that eradication process easier. Could could we consider that?

Well, in INL we certainly could do something similar. We could uh set up forward operating bases in the hard to reach territories that right now um are essentially ungoverned spaces that is something that we and INL have experience doing and right now as you know, the rural areas is where a lot of these armed groups are operating with impunity.

What would that look like? If this is not a military base, what does that look like? The other option that you gave.

It's for the national police, which, you know, uh engage in similar um tactics and operations as the military. Uh those lines are a bit blurred in in Colombia, but I mean the forward operating bases would be logistics centers where, you know, um the CNP would keep equipment and and technology and so forth that would uh facilitate their operations.

CNP means Colombian?

Colombian National Police.

Okay. Now, Mister Mendes, I would like to ask you about, you know, m- uh President Petro, the outgoing president, called President Trump recently and asked him to lift the United States sanctions that this government has imposed on him. Petro is on the list of the OFAC um OFAC for different type of um of uh um mis uh misconducts. So we will not go into that. Um and not only to be he is on the OFAC list, but also his visa

Thank you, Chairwoman, for that question. Uh, the OFAC designation is run out of the Department of Treasury, but what do I can tell you? The genesis for that designation was due, as you said, to his uh failed counter-narcotics policies that fueled coca cultivation and production, uh, and and led to cocaine that reached the United States, that killed American citizens. So there was action that was needed to be taken and the president was decisive in taking that action. Now, as it pertains to, uh, what our policy will be, um, with respect to Petro's olfax sanctions, uh, we'll expect him to, uh, you know, just remediate uh, previous actions taken.

What is the State Department asking or advising the President to do?

I think that that that's a conversation that the Department of Treasury is is pureheading.

But have you received any type of information from the White House that that we should consider the State Department should consider lifting those sanctions, and allowing Petro to have a United States visa?

Uh, not at this time, ma'am.

You have not. All right. So, uh, Mr. Mendez, let's just move from Colombia to Venezuela. And I will I will, um, not, um spend too much more on my time. President Trump said has said repeatedly that Maria Corina Machado from Venezuela can return at any time. He said it the other day on Air Force one, coming back from Turkey, he says, how could I have a problem with that? She gave me the Nobel Peace Prize. I have no problem with her. So, specifically, what does the State Department, what type of plan do we have? for her safe return to Venezuela. Give me the most detail you can give me, because if the President of the United States is saying publicly that she can return, then we know the Dils- uh, Delsey's interim government should be responding to what we, um, ask her to do.

Thank you for that question, Chairwoman. The the policy, uh, in the State Department is clear, we're not going to obstruct Maria Karina's return to venezuela she is a venezuelan citizen and entitled to return now i do think that there is some work we need to do in the context of venezuela so that way when she returns she doesn't get arrested there was an amnesty law that the govern interim authorities put forward that unfortunately as written still precludes maria carina from entering venezuela and not be arrested right and so i think uh those conversations need to take place not only for Maria Corina, but for all Venezuelan political exiles that are around the hemisphere.

Some have returned. Some of the members of the opposition forces have been able to go back to Venezuela, but not her. And you're telling me that she's on the blacklist. Is there any way that the State Department can call the Delsey government, including Delsey Rodriguez herself, and inform that this is not what, this is what the president would like to see?

Yeah, we we made very clear to the interim authorities, and as Secretary Rubio has clearly articulated, we need to have elections in Venezuela, right? And so part of that

Good, can you repeat that again?

Yeah, we we need to have elections in Venezuela. President uh uh Secretary Rubio has made very clear that that is part of the democratic transition that we expect in the context of Venezuela.

Cuz we're not in the business of occupying, we're in the business of liberating and allowing for the people to d- like Chairman Meeks said that let them decide whomever they want to be ruled by or governed by. That's why the United States is in that business.

Yeah.

Thank you. Let me just yield back and now I'm going to um recognize once again, Mister Meeks of New York for five minutes of question.

Thank you, Madam Chair, and let me just agree with you one hundred percent.

Good.

We need elections in Venezuela.

Of course.

And let the people's will govern. That's what democracy is all about. That's democracy. My question is for Mister Mendez. You know, Mister Mendez, Congress has annually appropriated twenty-five million for Afro-Columbian and Indigenous communities in Columbia. That is not charity. It's a bipartisan recognition that supporting front-line communities that have borne the greatest burden of decades of war, displacement, and violence is in America's interests. And there can be no serious strategy to confront transnational criminal organizations without investing in the communities they prey upon. Criminal groups thrive where the state is absent, where poverty is entrenched, and where young people see few alternatives. There are historically marginalized regions as corridors for cocaine, illegal mining, and other illicit activity. The fiscal year twenty-six appropriation bill includes twenty-five million dollars under the National Security Investment programs to support Afro-Columbian and indigenous communities in Colombia, including support for organizations led by these communities. So my question, sir, is how does the State Department intend to comply with this directive, and what programs are currently in place to support Afro-Columbian and Indigenous communities in Columbia?

Thank you for that question, sir. Uh, what I can tell you now is that there are conversations ongoing, uh, about the the twenty-five million, uh, but big picture. Uh, I wanna just reiterate the point that you made. Uh, the Afro-descendants, uh, and indigenous communities in Colombia, uh, share a huge burden in terms of the violence that the country has experienced. The insecure areas along the border, along the coast in Colombia, are areas where these communities live. And I think a lot of the work that we're doing in the security space, through partnerships of INL, helping to make these communities safer, helping to make it a place where people feel comfortable walking the streets, sending their kids to school, having a job, is is really important and part of our holistic uh security strategy, uh as it pertains to Columbia.

Yes, sir, but you didn't know, I wanna make sure that that twenty five million dollars is still utilized, uh specifically for those individuals. And I would hope that um uh INL would be focused on just that and would have a plan, or let us know here in Congress report back to this committee. as to what they are doing. And I will surely also be speaking to the interim the the the the government elect uh to make sure that they uh are also advocating uh on behalf of uh the indigenous and African Colombians. Um because I'm just looking at the record of those programs that USAID used to sponsor all being cut is absolutely essential. Mister Wheeler, the Trump administration has ordered the extra judicial killing of two hundred and twenty-one drug alleged drug traffickers in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific with the stated purpose of stopping the flow of drugs into the United States. Meanwhile, overdose deaths are declining at a much slower pace under the Trump administration than even under the Biden administration. In twenty twenty four, overdose deaths fell by nearly twenty seven percent. Preliminally, CDC data show they fell by roughly fourteen percent in twenty twenty five. Now, my first question is how much fentanyl do you assess is being produced in South America?

Uh, thank you, uh, Reiki member Meeks, for that question. Um, we have seen instances of precursor seizures throughout South America, obviously when it comes to Colombia specifically, cocaine is uh the name of the game, um but you know we've we've started to see fentanyl pop up in places

You say it's a lot, uh just a little bit of time, a lot or none.

You mean in South America specifically?

In a little. Yes.

Precursor chemicals? I mean, relative to Mexico, it is is uh significantly a smaller amount.

And what percent of cocaine is believed to be produced annually in South America and Colombia, that has been interdicted or destroyed as a direct result of the boat strike campaign?

Uh, I don't have a specific number for you.

Well, the New York Times reported in May twenty twenty six that cocaine prices have largely remained unchanged and that the cocaine purity has not meaningfully declined since the strikes began. So quickly, does the INL dispute those findings? And if so, what supports your bureau's conclusion? Does it dispute them?

Well, ranking member, I would just say that as Secretary Rubio has emphasized, um the the boat attacks which are um conducted by DOW, not by INL at the State Department, have been successful. Um, you know, in terms of what we're seeing uh relative to cocaine trafficking in Colombia, um last year the uh Colombian security forces um interdicted a all-time high of over a thousand metric tons.

Yep, I I I I I I hear you.

But that's not really answering my question, you know, because I'm trying to figure out, you know, we, you know, this exercise was done. I know that and how much it has cost the American taxpayer to do it. I don't think that the, you know, it's four point seven billion dollars, I believe, that it has cost, these boat strikes have cost the American people four point seven billion dollars. Uh, so my next question is how many additional INL programs to prosecute drug traffickers

Uh, well

Uh, well

Well, Well, Ranking Member Meeks, um, uh, uh, uh, uh, we are in uh very detailed discussions and have a lot of experience in all of the three of the realms you just mentioned. I know you um earlier were talking about the Colombian communities. Um, those are mostly on the Pacific coast where INL has a, uh, very substantial presence. Uh, and right now there is, um, uh, a re- rejiggered program. Um, they're re-

I I I don't wanna, I understand, and I don't mean to cut you off, I just don't, I'm out of time actually. But what's the total dollar amount of INL program currently in South America?

Uh, somewhere around six hundred million. I'd have to get back to you.

Six hundred million. There's four point seven billion dollars that was spent for these boat strikes. Don't you think INL could have used that four point seven billion dollars?

Well, Reinky,

So

remember, as you know, that's a DOW uh budget question,

No

not a State Department one.

All right, but wouldn't you say it seems fair to say that the Trump administration, you know, two hundred and twenty-one individuals died with no due process, failed to stop drug flows into the United States, spent nearly five billion dollars that could go down to other proven interventions, including preventing overdose deaths here in the United States. So to me, it's clear that this administration is winning the race to the bottom.

Well, sir, if if you'd like to talk to your appropriations committee friends and appropriate the some some more money to INL we'd gladly take it.

I wanna take some of that four point seven billion

Yes, sir.

that the American people have to pay for and utilize it in a better manner, a year back.

Thank you, ranking member, now a recognized ranking member for this subcommittee, Mister Castro of Texas, for five minutes of questioning.

Uh, thank you, Chairwoman. Um, the President-elect campaign on what he calls quote, "Plan Colombia two point O", unquote. Military operations against armed groups where he's seeking US support. So my question for Mister Mendez, has the administration made any commitment, formal or informal, to support military operations in Colombia, consistent with that?

Thank you for that question. Uh, the Vice President-elect and his uh accompanying delegation were at the State Department earlier today and met with Secretary Rubio. And in that conversation they had a wide-ranging uh, you know, talk about areas of priority. Uh, I would say security and carbon narcotics was certainly one of them, understanding that what happens in that space impacts American citizens on the ground. In addition to that, there was discussions about how we can work on accelerating economic and investment opportunities in Colombia, uh, as well as

Well, I guess, uh, let me, let me ask you just cuz I don't wanna run out of time. I know you said the meeting just happened today, uh, but are you aware either from today or before today that the administration has committed any kind of resources to support the incoming president's plan Columbia two point O.

I think those conversations have started uh this week.

So the so the administration may decide to support it.

I I think it's clear that we wanna prioritize security and counter-narcotics as an area that we wanna work in.

Uh when when you have a more firm answer, I hope that you will communicate that to the subcommittee and the larger committee. Um, for Mister Weiland, is the State Department viewing the fight against these armed groups and organized crime as principally as a principally military mission? Uh, will the INL Bureau support Columbia with judicial, prosecutorial, or investigative capacity building, especially to address organized crime, tied corruption?

Um, as far as your first question,

Mm-hmm.

I mean, I think we would certainly view this as a um, a situation that calls for aggressive law enforcement tactics. Um, as you know, we're not, um, a military assistance bureau, um, but these are

Well, and that's why I ask you, cuz there's really a mix of both going on.

Well,

So, how how do you see it?

we, we work closely with the military in Columbia, we'll continue to do so along with the national police. As far as your second question, the answer is yes.

So, which of those resources do you anticipate providing? Judicial, prosecutorial, investigative, or do you expect to provide all of them?

Well, we're already doing prosecutorial and investigative. We'd certainly be interested in ramping those up. Um, as far as the third, that's definitely something we'd be happy to explore with the new administration if they're looking for that type of assistance.

Uh, once those decisions are made, if they're made, I hope you'll report back to the committee.

Of course.

Um, also, the President-elect campaigned on a platform of rejecting peace negotiations with armed groups. And so, Mister Mendez, my question is, is it your view that the Colombian government should continue to implement the twenty sixteen peace accords Uh, what steps, if any, is this administration taking to push Columbia to maintain and fully implement that agreement?

Thank you for that question. Uh, I think the United States cares about peace and justice in Columbia, and we think that the twenty the two two thousand and six peace accord is part of that process that's why we worked uh as the United States government to support the UN verification mach- uh mission in Columbia to make sure that Uh, the the efforts uh undertaken by the two thousand six peace accord are in fact being implemented on the ground. There was mission creep associated with that, so we've asked that our Colombian partners on the ground really focus on demobilization of those FARC dissident elements that you mentioned.

So I just I I wanna get a clear position from the United States Department of State. Um, is it the Trump administration's posture to reject uh President-elect de Esprea's rejection of peace negotiations and following through on the peace accord.

Yeah, I I think what de la Esprea has articulated is his concerns with the total peace uh process, which we we don't support.

Right, I'm but I'm but I'm asking you, is our position as a government in contrast to his position? And yes or no?

I I I think in the space of of demobilization, in the space of you know taking the fight on, uh against these far dissident actors we are clearly aligned

well but he's talking about just rejecting the whole thing right i mean uh you're talking about a categorical position not the kind of nuance that you're articulating

it it's still very early on and we look forward to

actions

conversations with the ls pre administration

ok i mean i'm i wish that we could get a clearer more definitive answer now but we'll have plenty of time for further conversations Uh, Colombia's cur currently hosts nearly two point eight million Venezuelan migrants, and it has been one of the region's most successful examples of large-scale regularization and integration. However, the President-elect has suggested a greater emphasis on immigration enforcement, while offering few details about future regularization pathways. It is the administration assessing the potential potential impacts of these policy shifts on US migration dynamics. And just to put it more clearly, As I'm sure both of you all know, there's a well-told story by the Colombian government even, that a big reason you don't have more Venezuelans trying to migrate to the United States and ending up in the United States and presenting at the southern border, is because Colombia has taken a lot of them in. Uh, and so, if the new president intends to move away from accepting Venezuelans and others, uh, how does that affect the dynamics of US migration and what counsel do we offer as a state department? to the new president on that issue.

Uh, thank you, Congressman. You know, I I think in in that space I would point out a few things. One, um, I certainly recognize the role that Colombia has played in welcoming the millions of Venezuelans that were displaced because of the Maduro regime. Uh, I think you're well aware of the efforts that we've undertaken in the Venezuela context to create a new chapter, where Venezuelans are welcomed back and integrated into their society.

So you're betting they'll stay there. more of them will stay there.

Hmm?

You're betting that more of them will stay there rather than going to Colombia?

I I I think I think Venezuelans currently in Colombia, uh, you know, once we start seeing uh transitions occur in the context of Venezuela, we'll be inclined to go back.

All right. Once again, we'll have a chance to follow up in the coming months. Thank you so much.

Thank you, ranking member. Now I recognize Representative Jackson of Illinois for five minutes. Welcome.

Thank you. Thank you, Representative Salazar. Thank you to our panelists. Uh, thank you, ranking member Castro. Um, our heart goes out to the Colombian people. I'd like to also mention, remember the name of Johan Sebastian Guerrero. He had a right to be in our country and as an American citizen and a representative, I do apologize for your distinguished citizen being killed on the US grounds, um, under this administration's Policy, also would like to remember the um fisherman Alejandro Guerrera Carranza, who was killed in a extrajudicial killing off of the um shores of Columbia. There have been two hundred and twenty-one extrajudicial killings, and I hope that our uh Department of Defense stops this killing, the fishermen have a right to uh make a living. As Columbia enters this new chapter, our Congress must carefully examine how this Administration tends to preserve our strategic partnership while encouraging continued progress on implementing the twenty sixteen peace accord, protecting the Afro-Columbian and indigenous communities, addressing violence against social leaders, managing migration, and expanding legitimate economic opportunities. Our shared security and prosperity depend upon a stable, democratic, and inclusive Columbia. Uh, Mister Whelan, I would first ask you, under the USAID had launched the Indigenous People in Afro-Columbian Empowerment Activity, and twenty twenty one is a five year, sixty million dollar initiative. The underlying USAID funding opportunity was also listed by the US government at up to sixty million. Do you know the current status of the IPACE program?

Uh, no, Representative Jackson, we are uh not in the business that USAID once was, uh we uh focused on security assistance, however I can tell you that under the previous administration, um there was a uh scholarship program for Afro-Colombians that would allow them to join the um security forces in Columbia. And unfortunately under the previous administration that program lapsed. We are currently um in the business or in the process rather of bringing something like it, uh back to INL, um under President Trump's executive order. uh we are prohibited from focusing solely on one um social group. Uh however um this this new program that we're very excited about would extend um eligibility for this type of scholarship not only to Afro-Colombians uh but also other groups as well um and this is meant to sort of uh launch more more people into the security forces right now in rural areas especially there's a huge shortage. I think the Colombian National Police estimate that Uh, they need seven thousand more police officers in those hard to reach areas. And this program is is supposed to uh ameliorate that situation.

OK, well thank you so much. The administration did not just cut a line item we can agree under this USAID cut and dismantled a five year program, something that had proven successful. Um, it was an investment that stood between the criminal organizations, some of Columbia's most vulnerable territories. I totally disagree with the administration's approach on not specifically targeting where pain is. Any epidemiologist would tell you you have to first address the pain. Um, have those territories most populated by Afro-Columbians and indigenous peoples become more safe since these cuts?

Well, I would not attribute any security deterioration to the cuts necessarily, but certainly in these communities there is violence that

Well, in the interest of time, let me just finish this, because I think you're pulling me into another direction. I'm also concerned about the possibility the United States may have facilitated transnational repression by detaining Colombian asylum seeker and activist Beto Corral. The United States President, Mister Trump, weighs in on the election, endorses who he wants in the Colombian election, yet a person here that's an asylum seeker, when they have a voice of opinion, they seem to be shut down. Secretary Rubio has expressed a strong um disagreement with the cuban government saying that they have a dissent of public opinion yet we see that same faction regime now rearing its head in the united states where we are suppressing different opinions if you will freedom of the speech have you had any contact with mister uh carell's um family or the individual

uh no congressman uh we are not in the asylum business uh we

well thank you so much Uh, Mister Chairman, I ask that for unanimous consent to enter in two articles into the records, a memo by Mister Rubio, who approved the detention of an immigrant who criticized a Trump ally, uh, to show that this behavior of the, uh, current president, uh, squashing legitimate political discussion and conversation within the United States. Uh, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.

All right.

Thank you for your consideration.

To you. Thank you for your comments. Now I recognize my representative, Weissman-Schultz, from the wonderful state of Florida for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chair. And it's uh good to join you and my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee here.

To you.

I wanna start by saying that something that I feel very strongly about the US and Columbia, have a deep, strong and critically important partnership. And it's one that has lasted for more than two hundred se- two hundred years, and overcome all kinds of political disagreements. And I know this firsthand from the large Colombian population that I represent, as well as Afro-Columbian. Um, and this is a relationship that should not be contingent on who is in charge. I also wanna commend ranking member Meeks on his personal commitment to the Columbia relationship, plan Columbia, and the peace plan. Um I I just I wanna stray from what I was gonna my my my question line and just uh wonder aloud why the administration, Mister Cartwright, can uh, excuse me, Mister Weiland, two last names, um why the administration can extend refugee benefits solely to white white South Africans but not continue long-standing investments in the Afro-Columbian community that Congress explicitly the Appropriations Committee, uh uh committee on which I am a senior member, have made explicit you certainly have done right by Afrikaners who have been brought to this country as refugees and directed benefits exclusively to them. How is it possible that you could do that, treat them as a special class, but the D the executive order prohibits targeting assistants to Afro-Colombians?

Uh ma'am, unfortunately I'm not in the, my office does not work on immigration policy or refugee policy, um but

OK, reclaiming my time, because I think the answer is obvious, you pick and choose amongst who, which groups you actually prefer to take care of. Uh, Mister Mendez, I, can you explain why the Trump administration has recognized Delsey Rodriguez as the legitimate leader of Venezuela?

The there was a a recognition that, you know, she uh is currently in in a position uh of of leadership in in Venezuela, and we have to work with uh an entity in order to uh advance the interest that uh, you know, the American people have in Venezuela. And I think Secretary Rubio has been very clear that part of that is, you know, making sure that Venezuela is stabilized.

Okay, reclaiming my time. What renders Delci Rodriguez, who is Maduro's hand-picked consigliere, the legitimate leader of Venezuela, Donald Trump? Has she won an election? Has the Venezuelan constitution been suspended? Did she receive the mandate of heaven, or just the mandate of Trump? Uh, uh, the Venezuelan people certainly have not elected Delci Rodriguez. There appears to be no democratic transition in sight. As a matter of fact, I just came from a human rights uh the the Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing in which we heard devastating results daily from the human rights abuses that are still occur occur, the laws that have not been repealed in Venezuela. There has been not only no human rights progress in Venezuela, now they've been devastated by two earthquakes. And your administration, and I realize you are also not a immigration official, But your administration refuses to extend TPS to Venezuelans. Uh, it is absolutely unacceptable to send them back to a country in, that has been devastated by two seven plus earthquakes on the Richter Richter scale. Uh, the Port of Cartagena in Colombia, shifting to Columbia, is one of the largest trading partners with Port Everglades in my home county. And President Trump's tariffs on Colombian imports have undermined jobs and raised prices in my district. Um, I I don't see any plans uh that move in the direction of tariff relief in in terms of Colombian goods coming to Florida in light of the new government. That in and of itself is disturbing. Um, I I'm sure, Mister Weiland, that you were also disturbed as I was by President Petro's refusal to acknowledge the results of the recent presidential election in Colombia. Can you share your feelings on President Petro's denial of the election outcome?

Uh, thank you, Congresswoman. I think we were all equally concerned when we saw the statements that President Petro made and continues to make as earlier as as today, uh, trying to to shed, um, just misrepresentation about what's taking place on the election. So that

Right. And and I that that concerns me too. Um, so can you identify, Mister Weiland, who won the twenty twenty US presidential election?

You're asking Mr. Weiland or Mr. Mendez?

I'm sorry, Mr. Mendez. Who won the twenty twenty presidential election?

I'm here to talk about Columbia, sir.

I I realize that, but I'm asking you a direct question. Who okay, how about you, Mr. Weiland? Who won the twenty twenty presidential election in the United States?

I'm here to talk about Columbia, ma'am. But I know, um, former President Biden served for four years and and President Trump

Right, and did he win that election?

I'm sorry?

Did President Biden win that election in twenty twenty?

Again, I think you're trying to embarrass us. Um, I'm

I'm I'm doing nothing of the kind.

just

Uh, you you you have been very obviously both of you are very concerned about

gave you my answer, ma'am. So

uh, President Petro's refusal to acknowledge the results of a legitimate election. You just acknowledged that President Biden served for four years. Do you think that President Biden won the election in twenty twenty?

I gave you my answer, ma'am.

OK, uh, th- that's the problem. It's it's very difficult to work together on important issues like Colombian security without having a common set of facts. It's it's incomprehensible to me why you would only be concerned with Petro's denial of election results, but not Jair Bolsonaro's, or for that matter, President Trump's. And so the inconsistency of your point of view and your positions and the administration's positions undermine this administration's credibility, and it's absolutely unacceptable. Thank you for the indulgence, Madam Chair, and I yield back.

Of course. And now I recognize Representative Stanton of Arizona for five minutes.

Thank you, Madam Chair. The United States and Columbia have long shared a partnership built on mutual respect, democratic values and cooperation to advance security and prosperity throughout the hemisphere. Unfortunately, by making reckless threats to use military force on Colombian soil, the Trump administration did little to keep the US-Columbia partnership on track during President Petro's term. Rather than build on historic cooperation, Trump administration allowed political hostility toward President Petro to dictate its Columbia policy. It treated disagreements with one president as reason to undermine a decade decades-long partnership between two nations. The question should never have been whether President Trump personally liked President Petro. The question should have been whether cooperation with Columbia made the American people safer. And the Trump administration let this dangerous line of thinking bleed over into the Columbia election. Public endorsements and actions fever perceived as favoring one candidate over another undermined our long-standing commitment to non-interference, damaged trust with a critical regional ally, and injected unnecessary strain into a relationship that has been essential to counter narcotics cooperation and regional stability. America's interests are best served by respecting Columbia's sovereignty and working constructively with the government, the Columbia people, freely chose. Following the election of President-elect de la Espraya, President Trump said he would have " total support and strength of the United States" behind him. It's unclear what that means. Assistant Secretary Whelan, you stated in your testimony that " if a new government delivers, we are prepared to deepen our partnership across every dimension." In a March twenty-six to Congress, the Trump administration estimated the total assistance to Columbia declined from four hundred point seven million dollars in FY twenty-four to a hundred and eighty-six point nine million in FY twenty-five, largely representing cuts to funding for global health and other development activities. Uh, Dec- Deputy Assistant Secretary Mendez, do these statements indicate a commitment from the administration to reviving our humanitarian assistance to Columbia following President-elect de Esprey is swearing in next month.

Thank you for that question, Congressman. Uh, I think it's clear that we had our differences of opinion with uh President Petro, a and did not share uh, you know, mutual interests as it pertains to a a plethora of different issues, including counter-narcotics and security. And we look forward with the de Esprey administration to to sitting down together and identifying what those areas of cooperation will be.

So in terms of restoring the humanitarian aid that was cut, is there a commitment or just conversations ongoing?

It's very early on with the legislature administration and we'll need to sit down with them and figure out what the mutual areas are.

Our partnership with Colombia is strengthened not only through security cooperation but through sustained humanitarian and development assistance that helps communities displaced by conflict supports million of Venezuelan migrants and refugees and promotes long-term stability. That advance in investment advances our values, addresses the root causes of instability, and makes both of our nations safer and more prosperous. I'm extremely concerned by de la Espray's promise to build mega-prisons similar to those in El Salvador, and the possibility of conducting military strikes against boats and planes carrying drugs in the Colombian waters modeled after the lethal extrajudicial boat strikes carried out by the United States. My second question uh is this. While I recognize that Columbia's armed and criminal groups have grown and posed a threat to many of the country's citizen and regional stability, no security challenges justify mega prisons, the government suggests. Has the administration encouraged any other approaches to tackling armed groups in Columbia? And that's for either witness. Mr. Whalen.

Thank you, Congressman, for that question. Um As my colleague here referenced, it's very early on, but in terms of INL support, uh, we certainly, uh, welcome the opportunity to discuss corrections. We do that in, uh, you know, in the far reaches of the world, we have a lot of experience, um, in providing certain infrastructure, um, as well as, you know, uh, deep expertise. Um, and so if the new administration would like to discuss what resources we could potentially uh bring to bear we'd be happy to do that. Under the condition of course that they um also provide a certain resour sources themselves so that we can burden share in that space.

Under the US Columbia partnership, underlying is the fact that President Petro and his predecessor, President Duque, pursued closer economic ties with Beijing, including the misguided decision by President Petro to join the Belt and Road uh initiative. Uh, this is for you to witness. What risk does this expanded role of China, in Columbia present for the United States?

I- i- it's certainly an issue that's um, you know, has caught our attention. And we were heartened to hear that uh President-elect de la Esprit has been very clear early on that uh he will uh you know, no longer participate in Belt and Road Initiative. Um, and one of the priority areas that we have is making sure that US industry um from the united states can compete uh effectively in the context of columbia that has a very robust critical infrastructure digital agriculture uh sector there currently six hundred companies that operate in columbia we think that there can be a lot more so we see that partnership with columbia as a very strategic and an important one and a way to counter sort of the opaque processes that china has put in place that has resulted in a closer partnership with China and Columbia.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I yield back.

Thank you. And um before I wrap this up, I just wanna thank you for your participation and ask you just if you would like to add something else to the questions that we have posed to you and specifically, what else can the Trump administration through the State Department do in order to help the Dela Espraya government to flourish, not only to eradicate the coca crops but to uh fight the guerrillas or incorporate them into public life or into civil society. How can we make sure that China is not um is not creeping up and gaining more territory in the Western hemisphere, those problems that every single country in Latin America has. We know that La Espraya wants to be very close to the United States. What else can we do for him in order to to achieve that goal, which is beneficial to everybody?

Thank you, Chairwoman. For me it's quite simple. I think the bipartisan uh interest and commitment from both the Democrats and the Republican side of the house towards Colombia is really important. And just continuing that will be critical as D'Lisprilla takes on this new challenge ahead.

What in particular should we work together in, in order to help him become successful? Anything, two or three now you have both uh members uh top members of this subcommittee for Latin America. We worked closely together. We want Colombia to succeed. We knew under Uribe that the Plan Colombia, one point six billion dollars were used correctly by the Colombians, by the Colombian police, and it uh gave a lot of fruit. So just explain to us what is it, it in which way we could work together to make this a very success story.

I'll turn it over to Carter in one minute,

Both of you,

One one concrete one.

yes, and then I have to I wanna give uh my last

Yeah, one one concrete area, as I said in my statement, foreign terrorist organizations have proliferated in Columbia under the Petro administration and they've used illicit economies in order to accomplish that.

What you're saying.

So one area that we're thinking about is being able to cut those illicit financing streams that these foreign terrorist organizations are using as a way to decapitate them. So we're working with Department of Treasury, we're working with different entities in this Department of State. to take that issue on, but car- everybody

And I commit to work with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle in order to make that happen if it's good for for both countries. And thank you. Yes.

Thank you, Congresswoman. Uh, I just point to a few things. Uh, first and foremost, traditionally there has been bipartisan support for INL programs.

Mm-hmm.

And so we'd really appreciate that to to continue under the new uh administration. But more specifically in the security space, we need to uh work together on going into these ungoverned spaces and re-establishing state control. Two areas in which we can do that immediately under the new new administration are to invest in drones and counter-UAS equipment. That is the cutting edge of warfare these days. You see it not only in Colombia, but of course in Ukraine. We need to invest in that, and as I mentioned the helicopter program, we need to explore opportunities to uh ensure that Colombia takes over more of the financial responsibility for that program, but also um perhaps grow the fleet as I mentioned earlier. In the China space, you're absolutely right that China is a threat. Inside Columbia we see that in the um illicit, the PRC linked illicit networks, finance networks. INL is in the process of um deploying some forensic tools that would allow for money laundering to be better detected. We're also involved in developing tools that would allow for crypto seizures. Um most recently I'd point to um I know working together with Columbia law enforcement to arrest one of the most notorious Chinese money launderers, his name is Chakan. I think that success is representative of the type of of work that we can do more of in the future. Thank you.

And I don't wanna close off without giving the opportunity to my very good friends, uh, from Nevada, Madam Titus, for five minutes.

Well, thank you very much. I've been running around but I wanted to get back to this committee. I just wanna ask you about the military strikes in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. You know, the administration notified Congress in October twenty twenty five that the president had determined the US is a non-international conflict with cartels, that he's designated as terrorist organizations. Now, these designated terrorist organizations are not on the public list, the public foreign terrorist organization, or specialty designated global terrorist list. Those are separate. uh, distinct classified lists. Uh, so, but that apparently there's another list, a kind of a secret list of twenty-four organizations, that suddenly a handful of them have become public. That's been through the press, the two groups, the ELN and the Cartel de los Soles. Um, we can find the name of every foreign terrorist organization that's listed in the federal register, but we don't really know who these other kind of secret terrorist groups are that are justifying this action. So can you, Mister Menendez uh, Mister Mendez uh, repl- supply us with a list of these designated terrorist organizations?

Thank you for that uh, Congresswoman, uh, in in the remit of the WHA office, we we don't manage that list. I haven't seen that list. I don't have visibility on that list.

I figured you'd say that. You'd say it was the jurisdiction of somebody else. Y'all are always doing this, Department of Justice or Department of Defense, but surely you are working on these kind of issues don't you think it's important that if you don't have it you should have it and we should have it we should know who these groups are

again i i would point you to our counter chairs and bureau for for a response on that

oh if we can get that list would you like to have it do you think it would be important

uh i'll i'll work with your staff to see what type of information we could provide

that's not very helpful but ok uh we'll see what we can Fine. Uh, another question I have is about the twenty sixteen peace accord. Uh, we helped broker that and we funded it for I think nine years. It's done a lot. It's supported demining, uh, reincorporation. There's an ethnic chapter that protects Afro-Columbian and indigenous communities. Well, now that A USAID has been dismantled, uh, as of this administration, can you tell us, uh, kind of what's being implemented or do you still think that the accord is a a worthwhile thing to foster to continue is it in the US interest what's happening with that

Thank you for that question, since the accord was implemented what we've noticed was that there's been a mission creep associated uh with it, uh being able to do activities that weren't necessarily at the core interests, so what we've orchestrated over the past year is essentially an effort to make sure that this uh UN verification mission that uh works in conjunction with the twenty six two thousand and six peace accord is doing its core duties, which is focused on demining, which is focused on demobilization in order to create a peaceful peaceful environment and space for Colombians to to carry out their day-to-day lives.

So which implementation programs have survived? Are you still supporting the JEP special jurisdiction piece or is that one you think doesn't fit your goals?

In the recent negotiations with the UN, the JEP component was uh eliminated uh and instead what we've decided to do is prioritize the core work of the two thousand six peace accord which was on the, the mobilization of far distant actors.

So it's kinda kinda being promoted a little bit, but not in the same form as it was, and so that only court is just out the window. And you think you can continue with uh fighting civil war or mass death or lawlessness in Columbia with without this accord in place?

I think the two thousand six peace accord is simply just one component of many that we need to make sure we get right in order to bring peace and security, and justice to Columbia.

OK, thank you. I yield back.

And I would just add, ma'am, I mean, putting aside the legal status of the accord, It's very clear that the armed groups that we're all concerned about, that were wrecking havoc across uh Colombia, were not respecting it. Um and you know, so that I think is evidence of certain problems perhaps. Um the accord was very important in one uh moment in time, uh but if nobody in the crimin criminal world is is respecting it, then obviously the Colombian government in conjunction with the US needs to recognize that fact.

Do you know the list of that those twenty-four terrorist groups? Do you have that information?

I'm not aware of such a list, ma'am, but I know that Secretary Rubio uh briefed um both the House and the Senate mult- multiple times. He also had multiple hearings in which the boat strikes came up, w- in which FTOs came up. Um you know, so I I can't tell you what in a classified setting may or may not have been uh discussed, or transmitted to you all, um but I know that he has um brought this up uh on a regular basis.

I was in those hearings. I can tell you we don't want to have the list. Thank you.

Thanks to you, Madam, and I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have additional questions, and we will ask those to be presented in writing, pursuant to the committee rules, or members may have five days to submit statements questions for the record subject to the length of limitations. Without objection, this committee stands adjourned. So thank you again. Alright.