Syria at a Crossroads: U.S. Policy Challenges Post-Assad

[Gavel sounds.] Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. I'd ask that everybody rise, join me in the Pledge of Allegiance.

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Thank you. Purpose of today's hearing is to address concerns related to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and discuss the wide range of challenges that he needs to contend with for Syria's transition to succeed, including as it relates to security force integration, minority rights, justice and accountability. And I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. I think the United States of America, the world, and the Syrian people themselves are all hungry for Syria to turn the page from years of Syrian conflict and despot leaders to a country that adds to the region, adds to the world instead of detracting from it. A country that invites back in those who fled instead of creating more refugees. I don't believe that any of us thought transitions from the dictator Bashar al-Assad to now Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa would be without incident. But we've already seen too many incidents in my opinion. Too many incidents of sectarian violence against religious and ethnic minorities. There are a wide range of challenges faced in Syria in order to reach a peaceful democratic governance. I can tell you that I had the opportunity to meet with Syrian President. We spoke about a number of things. There are ongoing challenges, including the presence of foreign fighters within the security forces, many of them backed by Turkey. We've seen the recent actions against the Syrian Democratic Forces, our long-standing counterterrorism partner and Kurdish ally. That is unacceptable. There have been actions against the SDF that forced CENTCOM to relocate 7,000 ISIS fighters from detention facilities across Syria and move them into Iraq. Also of serious concern, Russia has maintained a continual presence. We don't know entirely why. Perhaps that's because they are still harboring Bashar al-Assad, the ousted Syrian President, and the Syrian people want him back for justice. We can't be sure, but it's definitely an issue that we need to contend with. And we all know the current Syrian President is a former al-Qaeda fighter. These are all serious points of concern. When I met with President al-Sharaa last November, I asked him very directly why are he and I no longer enemies, me as a U.S. soldier, him as an al-Qaeda fighter? And his response was that he wishes to liberate himself from his past and have a noble pursuit for his people and his country. When he met with President Trump the next day and joined the global coalition to defeat ISIS, that was a glimmer of hope. But the fact is, Syria is nowhere close to where they need to be today. The United States is not satisfied with the progress that he has made yet and views many of his actions as steps backward. We need President al-Sharaa to do better. These are not easy things to deal with, but recent actions against Druze, Kurds, and Alawites are all steps in the wrong direction. They do not create confidence for the United States in President al-Sharaa's desire to create, as he said to me, a noble future for the Syrian people, as he said he wanted to do. President al-Sharaa does not have a blank check from the United States of America. The United States repealed the Caesar sanctions because the reason for them to exist, which was the presence of Bashar al-Assad, that reason no longer existed. But we made it clear that conditions must be met in exchange. Those conditions include advancing military integration, protecting religious and ethnic minorities, as well as their integration into the Syrian government, and working with the United States to combat terrorists. Congress was pleased to see the recent integration deal signed by Syrian President al-Sharaa and SDF General Mazloum, whom I was happy to meet with in this past January, which was a step in the right direction. But this is the third of its kind to be signed, and the United States expects action, not empty words. The goal of today's hearing is to examine the challenges Syria faces and the implications for U.S. national security interests if Syria does choose to go down the wrong path. I want to ask unanimous consent before we continue on. I ask unanimous consent that the member from Oklahoma, Representative Brecheen, and the member from Indiana, Representative Stutzman, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing without objection. So ordered. And I now recognize the ranking member from New York, Representative Meeks, for any opening statement that you may have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to say thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. It was just over a year ago the Syrian people celebrated the end of five decades of a brutal dictatorship under the Assad family. The fall of Bashar al-Assad ushered in a new beginning for the Syrian people and a critical opportunity for the interim government of Ahmed Sharaa. I, along with many members of Congress, repeatedly decried the Assad regime's ceaseless brutality, which was characterized by years of brutal bombings, an extensive torture apparatus we are continuing to learn more about, and a criminal disregard for the most basic responsibilities of governance. He perpetrated one of the 21st century's most shameful campaigns of atrocities against his own people, crimes against humanity for which he must be held accountable. Now the Syrian people face a much different reality and a hopeful future. Gone are the days of Assad and his dictatorial family ruling with an iron fist and destroying the country for his and his family's exclusive benefit. Interim President Sharaa has promised to govern with inclusivity and justice. And when I met with him in New York last fall, he was clear about his intentions to be a president for all Syrians. Congress and the administration have recognized the hope and potential for Syria's future that this moment offers. We have responded by both waiving or eliminating long-standing sanctions on Syria, including the Caesar Sanctions Act last December, to enable critical investment and economic support. This is vital for Syria and President Sharaa's government to rebuild after the decades of neglect and destruction at the hands of Assad. And while I am optimistic and supportive of the Syrian people working toward a new future, I am also deeply concerned by recent violence against ethnic and religious minority communities. Incidents such as last April's brutal violence against the Druze communities in Suwayda, which killed dozens of civilians and damaged several homes, and continued attacks against both Syrian Christians and Druze underscores the insecurity plaguing Syria's transition. Last June's ISIS attack against the Mar Elias Orthodox Church that killed over 30 worshippers and injured dozens more is yet another brutal reminder of the threats Syria's minorities face. Additionally, I'm concerned for Syria's Kurdish communities and the situation they face after years of their courageous partnership with the United States of America. The Syrian Democratic Forces, or the SDF, served as critical counterterrorism partners in operations against ISIS, proving an effective and capable force. But once again, the Kurdish people are facing violence at the hands of Damascus-based security forces, including as recently as just last month. I'm encouraged by the January 30th agreement between Damascus and the SDF, but need to see commitment from President Sharaa to implement it and rein in the abuses of certain units. Finally, as June's attack on the Orthodox Church and another attack last December that killed three U.S. personnel show, ISIS has been degraded but must be fully eliminated so as to no longer pose a threat to the Syrian government, as well as to Syrian civilians or U.S. interests and partners in the region. To be clear, eliminating ISIS is not purely a military matter. Stabilization and development efforts must also provide alternatives and livelihoods for those who are too often ripe targets for ISIS recruitment, especially families and youth in Syria's impoverished rural areas. But the Trump administration's destruction of USAID has crippled those efforts. So I'm keen to explore ways in which we in Congress can act to support those goals. In short, while I stand with the Syrian people in turning the page toward a new future, we must see President Sharaa keep to his word of being a president for all Syrians and ensure Syria's ethnic and religious minorities are safe and fully represented. Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Many people came to hear you all today. The Honorable James F. Jeffrey, the Philip Solanz Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Ambassador Jeffrey previously served as Special Representative for Syrian Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS from 2018 to 2020. Mr. Andrew J. Tabler, the Martin J. Gross Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Tabler was the Syria lead at the National Security Council during the Trump, President Trump's first term and later went on to work with Ambassador Jeffrey at State. Ms. Nadine Maenza, the former chair of U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. And Dr. Mara Karlin, a professor of practice at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a visiting fellow in the Brookings Institution. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today. Your full statements will be made a part of the record. I will ask you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for members to ask their questions of each one of you. I now recognize you, Ambassador Jeffrey, for any opening statement that you may have.

Thank you, sir. My oral remarks will reflect a summary of my written statement. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee. Today Syria is probably the most important front in the international community's effort to stabilize long-term the Middle East following the two-year war begun by Hamas's terrifically horrific attack on Israel. The victory gained by Israel, the U.S., and regional allies over Iran and its proxies opens the door to possible sustained peace and development in Syria and the region as laid out in President Trump's Riyadh speech. The administration is pursuing now generally in Syria an effective policy towards that end, building on the success of the Biden and the first Trump administration Syria policies supported by Congress, which helped bring Assad down. The U.S. should continue leading the international community to unify and stabilize the new Syrian state. That requires, as we've already heard from the Speaker and Ranking Member, ending internal conflicts, integrating disparate security forces, building the economy, keeping Iran and proxies out, keeping the Islamic State defeated, and the Russian presence contained. This effort does not need massive American resources, but rather sustained attention, particularly to ensure that the international community follows common policies among all of us towards Syria. Damascus will only take the difficult but necessary steps to reconcile war-hardened internal animosities and rebuild destroyed infrastructure if those giving support speak with one voice on approaches and requirements. We should bear in mind the alternative, as both the Speaker and Ranking Member mentioned. The Syria of yesterday was not only the epicenter of Iran and its proxies' march through the region and the center of Islamic State activity, it was also the scene between 2011 and 2024, as again mentioned, of the most horrific regional conflict since the Iran-Iraq War 40 years ago. But even before then, Syria has posed a unique danger to the region, at one or another point threatening all five of its neighbors. In short, as a purveyor of violence and instability, it has been in a class of its own in the Arab world, not due to its decent, heroic population, but to its atrocious leaders. U.S. interests in the region over administrations, again with congressional support, include promoting peace, prosperity, and regional cooperation by, with, and through partners. Syria is essential to achieving all of them. Short-term, this means first, reconfiguring the Defeat Islamic State coalition given Damascus's entry into that coalition and the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces, change status to complete the defeat of ISIS, roll back remaining Iranian influence in the Levant, and deter any Russian destabilizing actions. Second, keeping troops on until the situation stabilizes. Here, Mr. Speaker, the Congress could again reiterate its support as you've all done in the past. Third, finalizing a security agreement between Syria and Israel. Fourth, implementing the January 29th agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces on cultural rights, governance, inclusivity, and security integration, including ending the siege of Kobani, allowing all resident Kurds to return to Afrin, and keeping open the crossing into Iraq for humanitarian deliveries. Fifth, advance individual rights and constitutional reform by building on the quasi-election of a People's Assembly back in October to include formalizing the January presidential decree regarding Kurdish identity and cultural and language rights and extending such tolerance to other groups. Sixth, prioritize early recovery, energy deliveries, and infrastructure refurbishment in coordination with international donors. Seventh, and this is a lesson we've taken from other conflicts, particularly Bosnia and Kosovo, recognize that international reconstruction efforts and other economic and diplomatic support to the new government must be directly linked as leverage to the Syrian government's success on the priorities stated above and you all have mentioned. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.

Thank you, Ambassador Jeffrey. I now recognize Mr. Tabler for any opening statement that you may have.

Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the challenges facing Syria 14 months following the dramatic collapse of the brutal Assad regime. Since assuming office in January 2025, the Trump administration has sought to transform Syria's government from a long-time foe into an ally capable of stabilizing a country that has seen considerable instability for over a century, and in doing so, cut off Tehran's power projection to the Mediterranean and across the Middle East. U.S. policy has centered on considerable top-down engagement, including three meetings between President Trump and Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and record-breaking administration efforts to lift U.S. sanctions. Such engagement has successfully diminished Iran's presence in Syria and fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. During times of crisis concerning Damascus's military moves against minority-dominated armed groups in Syria, U.S. policy has been punctuated more recently by calls from Capitol Hill to reimpose sanctions in defense of Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurdish civilians in northeast Syria, as well as military strikes by neighboring U.S. ally Israel in defense of Druze in southern Syria near Suwayda. This overwhelmingly good cop, selectively bad cop approach has helped al-Sharaa government consolidate control over more Syrian territory while averting the often uncontrolled sectarian strife that characterized parts of the Syrian war and that many feared would follow Assad. Damascus's moves against the SDF last month and this month, Druze National Guard last July, and against the Alawite-dominated Assad regime remnants and civilians last March have caused considerable concern in Washington and elsewhere that the emerging al-Sharaa government in Damascus will be unable to include and accommodate the interests of Syria's sizable minority communities. With some going so far as to say that the al-Sharaa government is replacing Assad's minority-dominated authoritarian regime with one dominated by the country's majority Sunni Arab population. Fortunately, we are not in that situation, at least yet, and we must not end up there. By continuing Washington's approach, all the while more closely watching and evaluating developments on the ground, the United States has a hope of achieving President Trump's vision of giving Syria a chance to succeed, stabilize, and in doing so, defeat ISIS and deal a strategic blow to America's adversaries in Tehran and elsewhere. Perhaps the biggest challenge in evaluating progress are a myriad of information and disinformation campaigns by supporters and opponents of President al-Sharaa, which along with recent developments in northeast Syria, is why I suspect you've probably called this hearing. Even people in my hometown of Oil City, Pennsylvania, are beginning to ask questions about what is going on in Syria, why U.S. troops are still there, and who are we handing the country over to. I hope my comments help you and the American people cut through the fog of war and hopefully the emerging peace in Syria. Quickly on your five points. On security force integration, Syria's interim authorities under President al-Sharaa have pursued rapid security sector consolidation following the collapse of the regime. While these steps have produced visible institutional architecture, it is unclear if they have resolved the underlying fragmentation of coercive power, and I can go into that in my testimony. On inclusive governance, while institutional coherence has improved, the process has thus far prioritized executive control over broad-based legitimacy. Minority participation, security integration, and decentralization remain unresolved and a work in progress, leaving the transition vulnerable to renewed fragmentation absent more inclusive and negotiated next steps. Civil society space has expanded relative to the Assad era, that's a pretty low bar, but remains fragile and uneven. The constitution, under minority rights, states that citizens are equal before the law without discrimination based on race, religion, gender, or lineage. The government constantly reaffirms that Syria is for all. On the ground, however, many Alawites, Kurds, and Druze with whom I speak feel a deep distrust of President al-Sharaa's government and its forces. And in particular, tribal and other forces without insignia that have fought alongside government forces focused on conquering Suwayda in southern Syria and during President al-Sharaa's recent campaign in the Kurdish-dominated northeast. On justice and accountability, there have been three main tests. One, on Assad-era crimes, they have established the Transitional Justice and Missing Persons Commission, and I think that's very positive, although both commissions have been kind of slow to act. On the coastal clashes, a fact-finding committee submitted a report to President al-Sharaa concluding that commanders did not give orders for revenge attacks and identified nearly 600 implicated individuals whose names were sent to judicial committees. Public trials have begun, though so far only 14 individuals. The committee's report has yet to be released in full. And last but not least, on the Suwayda clashes, a fact-finding committee is still investigating, and in November, members of the security forces were detained, but no numbers were released. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Tabler. I now recognize Ms. Maenza for an opening statement.

Good morning, Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the challenges facing U.S. policy in post-Assad Syria. I will summarize my written testimony, which is more detailed. I served two terms as a Trump appointee on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, or USCIRF, including as chair. I now serve as co-chair of the International Religious Freedom Roundtable, chair of the Institute for Global Engagement, and a senior advisor to the Shai Fund. Ambassador Sam Brownback recently warned genocide could occur in Syria within four years if the U.S. does not have the right policy. As this committee considers U.S. policy in Syria, it is urgent that we weigh its impact on religious freedom and vulnerable communities, including Christians, Yazidis, Druze, Alawites, Kurds, and others. Congress anticipated this challenge when it passed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. How a government treats its minority communities is a clear indicator of whether it will be a stable and a reliable partner. We all want Syria to succeed. Syrians deserve safety and a path to rebuild. But Syria's future cannot rest on short-term deals that ignore its deep religious and ethnic diversity or deny equal citizenship. Without social cohesion, there will be no durable peace, and the chaos that follows will give ISIS and other extremists room to grow. Northern Syria is proof a different future is possible. I have visited Syria more than a dozen times in the last six years, most often in the northeast, but twice in Damascus this past year. Since 2019, I have seen what USCIRF documented in northeast Syria, remarkable religious freedom conditions. The Syrian Democratic Forces lost over 11,000 lives defeating ISIS alongside the U.S. coalition, but they also built inclusive governance that helped protect minorities and strengthen social cohesion. As areas were liberated from ISIS, local communities were empowered to govern, deliberately including religious and ethnic minorities with half the leaders being women. That cohesive society, a refuge for religious and ethnic minorities, is now under threat. On January 10th, President Trump urged the Syrian government to end its attack on the Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo that are also home to Yazidis and Christians. But the offensive did not stop. Government forces seized those neighborhoods and pushed into the northeast. During the operation, Islamist Syrian security forces themselves recorded and circulated evidence of horrific crimes against Kurds, including beheadings, even of women fighters, execution of families, female fighter's body thrown from a building, rape, torture, including the gouging out of eyes. The northeast did not need to be integrated by force at this cost of human life. On January 30th, the SDF and the Syrian government announced an integration agreement aimed at preserving inclusive governance and limiting the entry of these security forces into minority areas. But agreements are only as strong as enforcements. The U.S. should press for transparency, monitor conditions on the ground, and make clear violations will carry consequences because preserving local governance and security is essential to protecting religious and vulnerable communities, and it could be a model for other vulnerable areas. This past year, as you've heard, Syria has also seen a wave of brutal violence against minority communities, often including Islamist members of the Syrian security forces made up of HTS fighters, foreign fighters, and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, some seen wearing ISIS patches and some sanctioned by the U.S. government. Alawites faced horrific large-scale killings in March 2025 with entire neighborhoods targeted, men, women, and children. Some reported deaths of around 1,500, but most believe the toll is far higher and of course violence continues. Druze communities in Suwayda faced staggering violence in July, reported mass killings likely higher than the 1,600 reported, with abductions and disappearances, sexual violence, mass displacement of at least 120,000. Four civilians were executed over the weekend and there has been an expanded siege in the last few days. Christians were targeted in the June 22nd suicide bombing of Mar Elias Church in Damascus, reportedly by ISIS, killing at least 25 and wounding over 60. And Yazidis remain at acute risk if extremist elements enter their areas, raising fears of atrocities reminiscent of ISIS's 2014 genocide in neighboring Iraq. My written testimony provides details and a full list of recommendations. I will just highlight a few. Designate Syria a country of particular concern unless immediate verifiable changes are made, create a mechanism to monitor and enforce the January 30th northeast integration agreement, and pass the Save the Kurds Act. The United States should also demand that Syria end the sieges in Kobani and Suwayda, deliver an inclusive government, revise the interim constitution to guarantee equal citizenship, correct Yazidis' legal status, and remove foreign fighters and sanctioned actors from the military. If President al-Sharaa is a pragmatist many claim, then sustained pressure is the only way to counter the Islamist base and steer Syria away from authoritarian retrenchment and toward inclusive governance and equal citizenship. Only then can Syrians live with long-term peace and stability. Thank you.

Thank you, Ms. Maenza. I now recognize Dr. Karlin for any opening statement that you may have.

Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Just over a year has passed since transformative events occurred in Syria. President Assad was deposed, and notably, none of Assad's backers were able or willing to recognize him. Here's my bottom line up front. After many decades, Syria is moving in the right direction, but its trajectory is not guaranteed and the struggles it faces may get harder. Building the new Syria requires juggling major political, economic, and security opportunities and challenges simultaneously. Political fragility characterizes Syria. The government has taken many pragmatic steps, and their writ is weaker the further one travels from Damascus. There have been some troubling instances of restrictions that merit scrutiny for evidence of the government's influence and ideology. Many minority groups hold justified fears about what their future will be in the new Syria. The civil war shattered Syria's economy. 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty and rebuilding will take more than $200 billion. The human element is inextricably tied to the future of Syria's economy. Millions have returned home and millions more fear doing so. I saw the major economic challenges first-hand on a recent visit to Syria. While Damascus itself is bustling, just 15 minutes out of town, there is devastation as far as the eye can see. The security situation in Syria is growing trickier, characterized not by widespread violence but by worsening violence in certain areas. The two toughest domestic security issues in Syria are intertwined: the Kurds, the Kurds' autonomous region and the institutions they've established, and current and former jihadists. On the first piece, the visions of Damascus and the SDF fundamentally differ. Outside actors can shape both parties' incentives so they are bought into re-envisioning their evolving roles and relationships. For the Kurds, meaningful integration into the Syrian state requires giving them the confidence that they have a future in a unified Syria, one where they have security and rights. On the jihadist front, the Syrian military must responsibly secure ISIS prisoners and ISIS-affiliated family members, particularly amidst the SDF's integration into the Syrian military. The Syrian military must be vigilant in its effort to integrate former HTS members and foreign fighters pose a particular challenge. And of course, regional dynamics matter as well, including the Lebanese military's historic effort to assist... ...establish operational control south of the Litani River and the rivalry between Israel and Turkey that plays out in Syria as well. So over the past year, the United States has made the right strategic choice: engaging the new Syria while remaining vigilant. Congress and the administration deserve credit for lifting sanctions, removing barriers to cooperation, and welcoming the first official visit by a Syrian head of state to Washington. Going forward, I recommend five priorities. First, reopen the U.S. embassy in Damascus. This should be the top priority and would provide a crucial platform for implementing the following recommendations. It must, of course, be executed in ways that meet security requirements. Second, monitor the ISIS threat. Encourage the Syrian government to meaningfully participate in the global coalition to defeat ISIS. Also, task the Pentagon to offer a quarterly report detailing its approach to countering ISIS, including the U.S. military's mission and rules of engagement and the plan to secure ISIS prisoners that are transferred from Syria to Iraq. Three, launch a security sector reform program. This would involve tasking the Pentagon to work with the Syrian military on a robust program as it integrates armed groups and is rebuilt to facilitate professionalization. Fourth, encourage the protection and livelihood of all Syrians. Urge the Syrian government to protect minorities, including holding those who violate this tenet accountable. The dismantlement of USAID means there are fewer tools available to the United States to help a fragile country. This is not merely a humanitarian concern but a security imperative. I recommend you task the State Department to explore what stabilization and development resources still exist to build capacity in critical sectors. And fifth, continue U.S.-led regional security convenings because only the United States has the credibility to facilitate dialogue on security arrangements between Syria and Israel and Lebanon and Israel. And relatedly, the regular U.S. engagements with Turkey appear to have been beneficial as well. Today, Syria is undergoing a moment of transformation, a rare one for a country that has seen so much destruction for so long. The United States can help the new Syria seize this opening. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you, Dr. Karlin. I'm going to be here till the end no matter what, so I'm going to start by recognizing my colleagues for questions. We're going to begin with Mr. Wilson.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you for being here today, witnesses. We so appreciate as I'm very hopeful that we can give Syria a chance. And I want to thank Chairman Brian Mast for his support of lifting the Caesar sanctions. This is fulfilling President Donald Trump's call to give Syria a chance. I am personally appreciative in that November a year ago, the Assad dictatorship correctly condemned me as an enemy of the state. And then three weeks later, Assad fled to Moscow. And then eight months later, I was grateful to be in Assad's office in Damascus with the new president of Syria. And so times have truly changed. And how incredible it was, it was bipartisan, bicameral with Senator Jeanne Shaheen from New Hampshire. Additionally, it's exciting to me to give Syria a chance with President Trump welcoming President Al-Shara to the White House. It was reported it was the first time in 250 years that a leader of Syria has visited the White House. That's from the Syrian perspective, from the American perspective. The Syrian perspective with the world's oldest city, Damascus, it's the first time in 8,000 years that a Syrian leader has shown up in the White House. And so indeed, with the challenges that have been identified, and hey, Chairman Mast was quite pointed with President Al-Shara about addressing change. And so this is not new as we were together a couple of months ago. Ambassador Tom Barrack is doing a tremendous work in securing a ceasefire and integration agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Defense Forces. I'm really grateful for the efforts of Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq for assisting in these historic diplomatic efforts and the agreement between President Ahmad Al-Shara and General Mazloum Abdi. I'm grateful to have founded the Kurdistan Regional Caucus 20 years ago, and now the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is a symbol of prosperity. With that in mind, we have unfortunately hardline elements of the PKK in Qandil that are intent on spoiling this with continued conflict. And what can be done to avoid the conflict which would destabilize the Kurdish communities of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran? And Ambassador Jeffrey, how can Congress support President Trump's objectives of integration and stabilization, and how can we address the Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, role of some disrupting?

Thank you, Congressman. I've been involved with the PKK since the outbreak of the attack in Turkey in 1984. We're at a turning point. First of all, with the ceasefire in Turkey, this is real between Ocalan, held in prison, the leader of it, and the Turkish government. It's been going on now for a year. It is gaining real momentum. As you mentioned, after decades of dispute between the PKK offshoot in Syria that we now know as the Syrian Democratic Forces and the KRG, the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq under the Barzanis and Talabanis, there's been much friction over the years, but that is now moving beyond. Everybody sees the Kurdish issue in Syria of individual rights and self-governance, and there's a considerable amount of support. I think that Qandil will eventually come around. I think that they have lost the ability to dictate to the leaders of the SDF, the YPG, the PYD, they go by many names. And I think they are working all in all relatively well with the central government. For example, the interior Syrian Interior Ministry sent in essentially company-sized elements to several of the Kurdish cities almost a week ago now, and we've heard no friction, and what I've heard from the scene is that people are working together. It depends on who you're dealing with. Some of the Sunni Arab tribes from the Euphrates are still a problem, but all in all, we have good cooperation. This is being managed intensively by the U.S. government but also by many other countries, and so far they're all cooperating. Thank you, sir.

And Ambassador, my time is short, but I want to point out how hopeful I am that indeed the new government of Syria can have a relationship with the government of Israel, how mutually beneficial it would be. Additionally, I believe we should all be working to remove the Russian bases at Hmeimim and Tartus. They're the only Russian bases outside of war criminal Putin's bases, and they provide logistics for the dictatorships of Africa and enslavement of the people of Africa. All the more important we work together. I yield back.

Ranking Member Meeks.

Dr. Karlin, I am... if the new Syrian government is to succeed, seems to me that, and I think you mentioned in your testimony, that there's need to be development, deradicalization, you know, rule of law and civilian security sector capacity building. And I think you talked about technical assistance for electric and water grid managements. I think all of these are extremely important because you have to reach the people that's on the ground. You know, that makes a difference and that, you know, gives a feeling of a huge difference from the Assad administration in that regards. Now, for me, we had utilized USAID for a lot of those things, instructions there. And you recently were on the ground, I believe, and met with a number of officials and organizations there. So A, can you give us an assessment of the humanitarian conditions there? And B, could you tell us, you know, what we could have done or what we might have been doing if the USAID with the tools that we have? And then how do we, without the tools now of USAID, how do we become successful? You know, we know a lot of this got to be done by the Syrian people, but when I spoke to President Al-Shara at the UN, he was asking for those kinds of things also, saying and using that as an indication of how he wanted to try to change things in Syria.

Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks. The humanitarian situation is pretty devastating. As I noted, inside Damascus you don't see it as much. You drive not terribly far away and it's just skeletons of buildings, unexploded ordnance, and folks trying to figure out what is their livelihood in this new Syria. Millions have returned, millions just aren't sure what does return look like. Will they be secure? Will they have jobs? What could that be? So there is a whole lot to be done on that humanitarian front. Now, we used to have a whole lot of tools to help with this, as you note, Ranking Member Meeks. I think the Office of Transition Initiatives in USAID was a perfect case study. They did a lot to help fragile states who are undergoing transitions. And to be clear, this is not just altruistic, of course, right? It is in our interest for a country like Syria to be secure and to be stable so it doesn't export its problems the way that we have seen with Syria in particular over the years. And that doesn't exist anymore because of decisions made by this administration. So going forward, there's a couple of things we can do. One, we can work with the State Department to see what stabilization resources they have maintained and the extent to which they are prioritizing Syria. Given how crucial the Middle East is to U.S. national security interests, I would think this would probably want to be high on their priority list. Another thing we can do is work closely and convene, have U.S. leadership to convene allies and partners both around the region but in particular from across Europe who also have a real interest in a stable and secure and therefore prosperous Syria as well. Thank you.

Well, thank you. Let me just ask, is there anything else that you think that we in Congress should be paying attention to, to what's missing, and anything else you think that we should be advocating for in regards to trying to help stabilize the humanitarian assistance?

Thank you. The security situation, as you and Chairman Mast highlighted in your opening statements, is really, I think, the other top priority. So what's happening in terms of stabilization economically and then what is happening in terms of security? So there has been violence, as you all noted, particularly against minorities. What is the government doing to hold those accountable who are violating those norms? What are they doing to ensure that folks feel like they have a future in Syria? Otherwise, they are either going to destabilize the country or they're going to leave and potentially ultimately destabilize other places as well.

And that's exactly, you know, my... because are there any additional actions that you think the Trump administration can do to ensure the protections of these communities, to hold, for example, the perpetrators for of abuses accountable? Is there anything else that you think that we can and should be doing to ensure that the key pillars of the January 30th agreement are implemented?

This agreement seems right. The question is less the words on the paper and more what are the actions that are taken? What is the reality? The United States has been a crucial... has played a crucial role in shaping this agreement coming together in the progress that has been made to date. So I would really urge this to be a very high priority as it has been for for this Congress and as we have seen this Congress's leadership and the administration's as well. This agreement has to work, frankly. If it does not, we will see profound fragmentation and can perhaps push aside dreams of a newer and prosperous Syria.

Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks. I'm going to go to Representative Perry next, but let me... do I understand you have a video that you want to play? That's what I was going to ask for the tech team. Is it ready yet? So Representative Perry, are you comfortable if we come back to you in another round? Very good. Representative Issa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, put on your wayback machine hat. We are dealing with Syria, once part of Transjordan, once owned by for 600 years by the Turks. Turkey's influence today is renewed and significant. Is that fair to say?

It is, but it is an Arab country in an Arab Middle East and there are inherent tensions between Turks and Arabs, yes sir.

But some of the things that we're seeing in Syria seem to be affected by Turkey. In other words, the treatment of Kurds seems to be a common denominator, for example. Turkey's inability to deal with or unwillingness to deal with minorities being treated fairly within Turkey seems to be also a similar problem in Syria today.

There have been problems in the past. I would say that over the last 15 years, particularly in the last two years, there has been an extraordinary reconciliation between the Kurdish population and the Turkish government. We see this with the actions of the Kurdish party in the Turkish parliament and the cooperation on a ceasefire. Now, what the Turks have asked for, and it's reasonable with the Syrian Kurds, is because the Turkish government has long had an extremely close relationship with both the Barzani and Talabani Kurds in Northern Iraq, and I've been witness to that over decades. What they want is for the Syrian Democratic Forces leadership to sever their ties with the PKK and accept the larger ceasefire that is being worked with Ocalan. In fact, Ocalan, the leader of the PKK who's in prison now, has called for the Syrian Democratic Forces to do that.

So it's fair to say that one of the impediments that Syria faces in its reunification is in fact coming up with a way to deal specifically with a minority that identifies itself throughout what was once Transjordan plus Iraq. Fair enough?

Absolutely, but it's actually two minorities: the Druze in the south and the Kurds in the north, and of course smaller ones that we've mentioned today. But I would say the biggest and the biggest project that we're looking at, and it covers Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and to some degree even Iran, is the Kurdish one.

Well, as someone who has visited with the Druze in Lebanon many, many times, I was quite surprised, quite frankly, to see the... what occurred with the Druze, but you're right, I should have included that in Syria their plight is different by far than it has been as one of the many confessionals in Lebanon. Well, I ask those questions and ask you to put on the wayback machine because you're the institutional memory here. You and I have known each other for years. Decades ago, Western powers made a decision to split up these countries, to put them in certain order, and they've been in turmoil ever since. Is it fair to say, and the most important question I think for all of us on this committee today, that as we look at Syria, while looking at a million refugees in Egypt, percentage-wise the largest percentage of a country as far as refugees is still Lebanon with the massive amounts even after the Syrian withdrawal, Jordanians still have a large amount of integrated and semi-integrated refugees, that the State Department and this committee need to look at a holistic approach that goes from Iraq to Turkey, from Turkey all the way down to Egypt, and that if we look at Syria in a vacuum and we don't deal with these broader problems, we will be back here again as the doctor said and we'll be looking at, well, where's our agency to stabilize or fund this, rather than did we have a plan to help this region recover fully, not just one country?

I agree, Congressman, but I would make one point. We've been able to do that successfully in Europe with the help of our European partners and in East Asia where I began my military career. We haven't in the Middle East because of the tremendous forces of disorder and violence. That's why in my statement I pointed to the fact that for the first time the Iranian proxy network throughout the region has been largely defeated and Sunni Islamic extremism with the defeat of ISIS is also, at least for the moment, largely off the table. That is a prerequisite for us doing in the Middle East what we've been able to do with our partners elsewhere. So I'm optimistic.

As am I. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Issa. Representative Costa.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I concur that a lot of the obstacles to peace in that region have changed dramatically in the last several years. And Dr. Karlin and Ambassador Jeffrey, tell me, where should our focus be in 2026 to try to facilitate these opportunities? I see them as opportunities. Certainly the Syrian president was here, but what would be the primary steps that we should begin now? And Ambassador Jeffrey, and then Karlin, could you please respond?

Short term, I believe the single biggest contribution you could make because it's where I think the administration may be wavering is to keep a few U.S. troops on along with the heroic diplomats and assistance people that we move in and out of Syria until the situation stabilizes, particularly in the northeast. We know what's going to happen with the ISIS prisoners and families, and we know how the campaign against ISIS continues. That's the single immediate thing. Longer term, it is to ensure that we focus on verifiable agreements supported by the international community for the integration of these minorities that we've talked so much about. As we've heard from my colleagues on this table, if there isn't integration and a buy-in from these people, we will see Syria descend into crisis again. And any administration needs help from you people, be it funding, be it hearings like this.

Is there a coordinated role that Europe can play with us on that effort?

Coordinated role with what?

With Europe.

Yes, but more importantly is with the Arab states, that is Qatar, Saudis, and the Turks.

The moderate Arab... exactly, what we refer to as moderate Arab states. And do you see that there's a determination after the challenges they've had with Israel in with Gaza? Are they prepared to do that?

I believe so. We're moving into phase two on Gaza slowly, but I'm encouraged by that. The Israelis and Syrians came to a preliminary agreement on the 9th of January last month, and there is considerable back and forth between Israel and the moderate Arab states today despite Gaza.

Yes. Dr. Karlin.

Yeah, thank you very much, Congressman. I would add a couple points. I do think we have to better understand what the U.S. military is doing in Syria. Particularly we've seen it looks like about 2,000 or so of the ISIS prisoners have been moved to Iraq. There is a plan to move a couple thousand more of them. That probably makes a degree of sense given the level of stability in Iraq compared to Syria. If that is the case, what is actually the mission, the rules of engagement, and the purpose of the U.S. military staying in Syria? The other piece I would highlight in addition to what Ambassador Jeffrey did is the really important role the U.S. is playing in terms of bringing Syria and Israel together and Lebanon and Israel together. So that latter one, for example, is crucial to making sure that the Lebanese government continues the historic steps it has started and has a whole lot more to go in terms of establishing operational control and disarming Hezbollah. On the former, on the Syria-Israel peace, making sure that that is a quiet border, making sure that the Israelis are able to have trust in Damascus and its willingness to behave as a responsible security partner is all really crucial for some sort of stability in the Levant.

How much disruption do we think Hezbollah is still capable of doing in that in those neighborhoods?

So they have been devastated at the leadership level and operationally, and it doesn't appear as though they have been able to substantially rearm. They have largely permitted the Lebanese military to take the steps it has over the last few months to disarm them south of the Litani River. What is not entirely clear is the extent to which they've gotten more money. It appears as though that has happened to to some extent, and so I think we need to watch this space.

Been part of their money source from Iran?

Money source from Iran indeed, and frankly just going through other systems that aren't terribly well monitored because the Lebanese economy is devastated, frankly. It's a really cash-heavy economy.

Well, we have a number of failed states there.

Indeed, indeed. So it's pretty easy to get money money through. So I worry a lot about that, slightly less about the weapons right now. Look, Hezbollah is still in some disarray. They also know things are about to get harder for them if the military decides, and I hope that it does, to keep on going further north and to the Bekaa Valley to actually disarm them.

Well, my time's expired, Mr. Chairman, but I'd like to hear more about the carrots and sticks that we have available to us with our European allies and the Middle Eastern states that we're working with to to try to facilitate some important goals in 2026. Thank you very much. I yield back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Costa. And if time allows, I'm more than happy to move into a second round of questioning later if you have more questions. Chair, now are we ready for Mr. Perry's? Just hold hold if you're ready, but hold it. I'm not ready to play it yet. But you're ready? At my direction, all right, Mr. Chairman? Absolutely. Thank you. Your five minutes, my friend.

I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate you. Mr. Perry, you are recognized. Thank you, sir. I'm going to address my questions to Ms. Maenza, but I want to create some context here first. You know, Syria was a predominantly Christian country until about the 5th century when the Islamic conquest of Syria started and culminated in about the 13th century. And ever since then, it's been a living hell for all humanity that has that has lived under the religion of so-called religion of peace. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to enter for the record a series of videos that I have received, and I would like the committee to have on record. Without objection. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been said that Mr. Assad has been unable to protect minorities, and I want to make the case that he's not unable, he's correction, not Mr. Assad, Mr. Al-Shara, that he's not unable, that he's unwilling. Because as former HTS is wandering around and Mr. Jolani rebranded Al-Qaeda is not a whole lot different than ISIS. It's not a whole lot different. Let's face it, if you had a choice between ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which one would you really choose? Is there a whole lot of difference? And I know that HTS has said, you know, that they renounced global jihad, but they haven't renounced jihad in Syria. They haven't renounced that at all. And so to set the context of because people talk about violence here, but they don't know what it looks like. So we're going to play a video and I'm going to just tell you upfront, if you don't want to see things that are shocking and barbaric, turn your eyes away. It's about 40 seconds and then I'm going to ask you some questions, ma'am. Go ahead and play the video, please.

[Video plays.]

This is life in Syria for minorities. Not some fancy picture where we all hope it's going to get better. You can trim the beard of an Islamist and you can dress him up in a suit and send him around the world. I think we're foolhardy to believe that he's anything other than an Islamist. Madam Maenza, tell me I'm wrong.

Those videos, I just had some sent to me this morning from Hasakah showing women being raped. You know, this military campaign into the northeast was unnecessary and that was proof. That didn't have to happen. They could have integrated in peacefully. And the fact that these Islamists put, you know, an ISIS flag over Raqqa, I mean, it didn't stay up long probably, but it just shows that that's some of the ideology. And it's so easy to look at the PKK narrative and be like, oh, the northeast is dangerous because they used to be part of PKK and not everyone in the northeast is PKK and the PKK has never been a threat to the United States. In fact, they're trying to make peace with Turkey. And so to make that be the issue when Al-Qaeda was responsible for 9/11, for the attacks on U.S. embassies and the U.S. Cole, and here we have these fighters with a history of Al-Qaeda who sometimes wear ISIS patches on their vests, you know, and committing atrocities as we've seen against minorities. And so I do think the Syrian security forces are a real problem, and I, you know, they include for instance Turkish-backed Syrian National Army leaders as heads of brigades or actually in military positions, like for instance the head of the 86th Division over Northern Syria was sanctioned by the U.S. for trafficking Yazidi women and girls, for horrific human rights violations, yet he's a leader in this military. So I think we can't just manifest what we want this military to look like or what we want this government to look like. We have to actually look at it with real clear vision. And I think there needs to be an enormous amount of pressure on Al-Shara to remove these elements from their from the military. And also this is why this integration deal must work. And I'll tell you what, I'd love to have time to explain. I got an update on the ground this morning and there are some problems here because right now the deal keeps these Islamist forces out of minority villages. But they haven't pulled back. They were supposed to pull back by the end of today. They haven't. And what we can't allow is for them to be in Assyrian, Yazidi, Kurdish villages in the northeast because we're afraid we're going to see more videos like this.

If I can just comment on Mr. Jeffrey, you said we had these successes in the past with other countries under another model. You're dealing with another culture. Other cultures that actually respect life and don't live as a death cult. Unfortunately... ...certainly that model's not going to work with Islamists who want to cleanse the world of anybody that is an apostate or an infidel. And so I think, look, I'm hopeful that something great can happen with Syria and the United States ought to be part of that, but giving all our leverage in advance to me doesn't seem a good idea and a good way to make sure that happens. Mr. Chairman, I yield.

Representative yields. Representative Latimer is recognized.

Mr. Chairman, I don't have any questions at this time. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me start by genuinely thanking the chairman for not just for holding this hearing, but for what you tried to do on the repeal of the Caesar Act. When the White House and Senate leadership pushed to hand Damascus a clean, unconditional sanctions lift, you pushed back. You insisted that repeal come with at least some benchmarks and reporting requirements and at least a skeleton of accountability, which I think is critical. I want the record to reflect that this committee on a bipartisan basis rejected the administration's reckless instinct to give away our leverage for nothing in return. Syria is one of the most complex ethnic and religious mosaics on earth. It has a 5,000-year history, not a short history of the last few hundred years. Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, Alawites, Druze, Syriacs, Armenian Christians, Yazidis, Ismailis, Turkmen, and that's just the little bit of the list to go through. For 50 years, Assad forced the mosaic together with terror. The question before us obviously is can the new government hold it together with consent? The evidence is mixed at best and we have seen massacres and violence targeting minorities as was just shown. U.S. sanctioned individuals have not been effectively sidelined. Extremism is too often becoming normalized and concerningly, Turkey is becoming increasingly entrenched in Syria. Meanwhile, the administration has dismantled USAID, the most effective stabilization tool this country has, at exactly the moment Syria could use it the most. It has terminated demining programs in a country littered with unexploded ordinances, just one example. Mr. Chairman, I know we share the conviction that Syria's transition deserves American support and that it must be conditional, clear-eyed, enforceable support. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about whether the conditions Congress set are being set, whether the tools we have are adequate, and what this committee needs to do next. And Ambassador Jeffrey, if I can start with you and what you were talking about. You talked about Syria as an Arab country, it's 90 percent Arab. But within that, there is great diversity. And maybe in the context of other countries, can you do a very briefly comparison of the diversity, the complexity of this Syrian ethnic mosaic relative to countries like Iraq or Lebanon?

Thank you, sir. I think Iraq is a good example, partially because I spent a lot of time there and also because while you do not have Druze, you have a large Kurdish minority and you have a very dramatic split between Shia and Sunni Arabs who seem to get along less with each other than the Kurds get along with either of them. What I would say is that these terrible pictures that we have seen, unfortunately I have experienced in many of my tours in the region and far away from the Islamic world, frankly, in Southeast Asia as well. And therefore, there's a tendency when order breaks down, when you have chaos and groups fighting other groups, that people turn into these basically beasts. First of all, we have to monitor it. Secondly, we have to measure how bad is it and in which direction is it going. For all of the horrors, particularly of the first attack against the Alawites in the spring of this year and then in Suwayda, the fighting against the Kurds, which was brief in Aleppo and then a bit in the northeast, had far less casualties. There were 27 killed in Aleppo according to most accounts compared to thousands in Suwayda. So is the trend going in the right way? Basically yes. Does that mean we won't see others? No. But what we have seen, and this is almost surprising to me from my bad experiences elsewhere, we had one terrible situation in Latakia with the Alawites who of course were largely Assad supporters. And since then, it's been almost a year now, there has not been major fighting. There's been killings back and forth, but nothing like what we saw. Likewise with the Druze. And I am confident from what I've heard from both sides that we've got a good chance of having this 29 January agreement between the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and the central government survive. Now, the problem is, and we saw this in a film, there are these unregulated, undisciplined elements, particularly the tribes. They're a problem for the Kurds in that area and that's something that we and the Syrian government have to give priority to, sir.

Well, thank you. I have many more questions which I'll hopefully have a second round to touch on. But let me just say it's important as we look here, we have to understand the ethnicity, we have to understand the topography of Syria, it is distinct and it defines how we approach it. We have to understand the politics. And as was said here, United States, it's imperative that we stay involved, we engage, we hold our partners to account, and that we work to make sure that Syria doesn't go down a disastrous path that we've seen in the past, but hopefully has a positive future that we all pray and wish for. I yield back.

Thank you, Representative Schneider. And I would tell people, because I keep hearing this brought up, there is a reason that USAID no longer exists. And as one example in Syria, they diverted about $10 million of meals to Al-Qaeda fighters. It was intended for Catholic Relief Services. The person that diverted that is still at large today, there's a warrant for their arrest, Mr. Al-Hafaya. And so there are reasons that USAID doesn't exist because they were burning through cash. And if anybody wants to have that argument, I got about 100 examples of really embarrassing things they were doing, like transgender seminars and other things like that, which we should all be very embarrassed about. In that, I recognize Representative Burchett.

Are you embarrassed that you had to recognize me, Mr. Chairman?

Not at all. Number one is in our hearts as you always remind us.

4:35 on the chart. Yes, sir. Ambassador Jeffrey, do you have concerns about Ahmed al-Shara and his previous ties to Al-Qaeda?

Sir, I have concerns about every leader I've dealt with in the Middle East. That's an easy escape, but I will say yes, but I've also monitored it closely. While I cannot confirm because it would involve intelligence methods and sources, the New York Times in November published an article talking about how beginning in 2016, U.S. agencies were working with him against the Islamic State and to some degree Assad. And again, that is generally consistent with what I was involved in from 2018 on. We worked closely with him. President Trump issued a demand to the Russians in September of 2018 not to help Assad attack Idlib where Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, then al-Jolani's people were, because they were so effective, A, in fighting Assad, which was an important and the Iranians, important issue for us, B, fighting the Islamic State in that area, and three, keeping three million displaced people right along the Turkish border. I saw them living in tents there with sufficient, with the help of U.S. assistance and other international assistance, to stay there rather than flood into Turkey and on into Europe. So he was in essence, although on the terrorist list, working for some of the same goals we had. We didn't have direct contact with him, but we had indirect through NGOs and assistance agencies.

Do you also have, you touched on around the edges of this, do you have concerns about the continued centralization of government power in Syria?

Yes, very much.

Also is Ahmed al-Shara following the conditions of the recent ceasefire with the Syrian Democratic Forces?

It's too soon to tell. As I said, it depends on the element. The Ministry of Interior people I've heard from all sides, including the Kurdish, have been working well and they're the ones who are inside Kurdish cities, Hasakah and others. The Ministry of Defense and their army troops, they're a mixed bag. We've heard from my colleagues here who what the origins of some of them are and we know them from 2019. And the worst problem is, as we saw in the films, these tribal fighters and they need to be brought under control. They've been quiet over the last few days, but that needs to be watched closely. I would say so far the agreement is holding and all sides, including the international community, are all pressing both sides to adhere to it. And that's good if everybody talks with the same message.

Okay. Thank you. Ms. Maenza, how do I say that right, Ms. Maenza, is that correct? Nobody ever gets Burchett right either, so I'm... How can the United States trust or partner with Syrian government forces to counter ISIS, Iranian operations and influence?

You know, after having the insider attack against U.S. forces in December in Palmyra, I mean I think it showed the inconsistencies of these forces. I mean there was a member of the security forces that stopped a suicide bomber from going into Aleppo that was supposedly targeting a church. So I do want to say the inconsistency. And I think it's premature to be partnering with these forces to fight ISIS. I think the U.S. should continue with the SDF, our partners who have never seen an insider attack as we continue to counter ISIS because as we're seeing with all this chaos, ISIS is rising again and we need to be very proactive in how we approach that.

Where are they getting their funding, ISIS?

That's a very good question. And I don't, my colleagues might have a better sense about that. But you know, when I was in the northeast last April, I asked, or a year ago October it would have been in 2024, I asked people in Raqqa, Assyrians in the Khabur Valley, everyone I, everywhere I was by myself one-on-one said, what do you do when you see somebody that's becoming an extremist in your community? Who do you go to? Like is there an office? And do you know what every single person told me, even in Raqqa? We just don't see that anymore. They had built a society in Northeast Syria because they had built, not that they were perfect, believe me not that they're perfect, but because they had built this social cohesion. They had had these political dialogues with Arabs, with Christians, with Yazidis, with all the different religions, ethnicities, where they had built this cohesion among all the groups that just inside their society they just weren't seeing their kids join ISIS. And so to me this military attack, not only was it horrific the violence we've seen, but it also has deepened sectarian tensions. Of course we know Assad started those 60 years ago, like the family has ruled minority against majority. They helped heal those in the northeast and now this attack is only making things worse and making it much more dangerous for all the people in Syria.

I'm out of time, but ma'am, do you have any concerns about Russia's continued involvement in Syrian affairs? Yes or no?

Yes.

All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Representative Burchett. Representative Sherman, floor is yours.

First want to comment on the chairman's comments on USAID. I have no doubt that one-quarter percent perhaps of the money that USAID spent in the Biden administration was wasted. You know, when I go to the grocery store, at least one-quarter percent of the money I spend is also wasted. For the Trump administration to convince that to declare that they are incapable of running USAID and eliminating that waste and fraud and abuse and instead terminate it, may be responsible for three million deaths in the last year because we stopped fighting malaria, we stopped fighting HIV/AIDS, we stopped fighting tuberculosis. And even if you're only focused on America, every time one of those viruses infects someone abroad, it is a chance for the disease to replicate, mutate, and migrate back here. And that's why about 11 months ago today, I sat in this seat and showed a picture of Evan Onzu to Secretary Rubio when he said that no one had died as a result of the gutting of USAID and I introduced him to the first child that he and Musk killed. Focusing on the issues today, I'm certainly concerned about the ethnic and religious minorities in Syria. Dr. Maenza, the National Defense Authorization Act provided for a conditional repeal of the Caesar Act. Within 30 days, the president under that repeal is due to submit a report to Congress certifying whether the Syrian government has committed itself to aligning with several U.S. priorities. Among the determinations is whether the Syrian government has made progress in providing security for religious and ethnic minorities, removing foreign fighters, particularly from senior government military positions, and investigating Syria's human rights massacres of religious minorities. If you were to submit that report today, how would you assess the Syrian government's fulfillment of these conditions?

Thank you so much for the question, Congressman. Of course, I can name three quickly that the government has not met and that they've not taken steps to remove foreign fighters. In fact, when the Kurdish woman's body was thrown from the building in Aleppo, it was apparently a foreign fighter who did that. Upholding religious and ethnic minority rights in Syria, clearly these targeting of minority communities with violence and we still continue to see that in smaller numbers in the coastal areas, even in Suwayda there were four people killed over the weekend. We saw some continued violence that would not make that threshold. And of course the March 10th agreement. You know, I don't think people, most people understand, but the last two months of the year, the Kurdish leaders couldn't even get a meeting with Damascus to talk about integration. And when they did have conversations, they were always about how to integrate the SDF in or how the next thing after that was going to be energy. And yet they were never really talking about how to integrate the government in. And I, it almost felt like a setup. And I would talk to the U.S. government and then I'd talk to them in the northeast and say like, why isn't this happening?

I'm going to try to squeeze in one question. One thing that every government has to deal with is the degree to which you have regional autonomy. In our country we call it states' rights. And clearly when you have a Kurdish area that is relatively well-run, the regional autonomy ought to be provided. Turkey has historically been Shara's number one source of aid. Has Turkey's influence on the new president of Syria been helpful or harmful and in particular has Turkey pressed the government of Syria to be particularly hostile to its Kurds? Dr. Karlin.

Thank you very much. The Turks obviously have an outsized role in where Syria is today and where it is going and they of course have a certain interest in that they want a unified Syria. I think there have been examples where they have played a more helpful and a more unhelpful role vis-a-vis President Shara. They have tried to get him more support both regionally and globally and I think they probably played a role in some of the U.S. decision making as well. What would be useful now is frankly if they could be supportive of these integration efforts and also look at their own issues with their own Kurdish population and try to make progress on that front as well.

Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Thank you for your acknowledgment that USAID does have issues, we agree on that much. I would just simply say it's different if you go to the grocery store, you're spending your money. When the government's working through USAID, they're spending the money of the people and I know you recognize that as well. And they were wasting a lot of money of the people. I just gave one example in Syria, $10 million in meals, one program alone. But they were doing other things like transgender job fairs in Bangladesh for $850,000 and other just fraudulent and wasteful things. And that's why they no longer exist.

But let's say that to the three million people who have died in the last year.

And I would let you know that USAID programs, many of the programs that were worthwhile, not waste like some of the things that I mentioned, they continue. It was brought up demining. Demining was brought up by some people. State Department has very specific weapons removal and abatement programs and those continue. There's demining going on across the globe. So it's under a new command and control where there is zero diversion to things like drag shows and real mission focus. So we can continue to speak about it anytime. In that, we're going to recognize Representative Mills.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I get started, I want to just point out the fact as we sit in this room that there are continual ongoing atrocities that are occurring for the Iranian people. 40,000 plus who have been killed by this brutal Islamic dictatorship. Those who have continued to fight in the streets against those who are armed with bravery that many of us can imagine. You know, I want to just make sure that the Iranian people, for those who can hear us who aren't being subjugated and suppressed and brutally dictated over, that their voices are still being heard here in Washington. And I know that they're not looking for a better deal, they're looking for a better life. And we can only do that when we eliminate this Islamic dictatorship and return it back to what it was as the lion and the sun. So my heart goes out to the Iranian people and just know that we see that you want a brighter and better future. You know, there's a lot of things that's been mentioned today and I just want to bring up a few of them. You know, Ms. Karlin talks about USAID OTI. You know, I watched the Office of Transition Initiatives waste more money than almost any other program, that being let's say Ramp Up North, Ramp Up South, the Regional Afghan Municipalities Programs, the ASI South Afghan Stabilization Initiatives. I've watched time and time again where tens of millions of dollars, including that of SIGAR's November 2011 John Sopko report where they made false claims by Chemonics International, DAI, Creative Associates, and all these for-profit implementing partners who have done waste, fraud, and abuse to the tens of millions, hundreds of millions of dollars. So I would actually caution Ms. Karlin about the fact that OTI has actually seen the greatest risk when it comes to corruption, when it came to fraud, and with it came to the inefficiencies. Now, I can tell you having gone and as one of the first members of Congress to go after the Assad regime had fallen into Syria with my good friend Marlin Stutzman who bravely went with me on this, that we went with an open mind. Is al-Shara the best that we could get? Is any of the former leaders that, you know, as Ambassador Jeffrey's talked about, the best that we could get? No, probably not. But it's the cards we were dealt, it's what the people has chosen in many areas. And I would caution that we have to at least allow the agreements and things that are being put in place to actually take hold. You know, we talk about making a ability to try and eliminate these generals or these leaders that were former HTS fighters. I think everyone can get behind that and support that. I think that we know that many of these are brutal fighters who have fought for Al-Qaeda and others who are continuing to probably not follow the direction of the government to the letter of the law and still utilize a lot of the Islamic radicalization to make the decisions on their behalf. You know, we talk about the idea of eliminating, but we also have to be mindful of what happened in the de-Ba'athification process of Iraq and how that led to additional insurgency and sectarian violence. We have to caution about the ideas of oh, we can just set a constitution in place. As Mr. Jeffrey knows all too well, the 2005 Iraq constitution sets forth Article 38, which is saying that the government is mandated to protect the people, but whether or not that's enforceable is a whole other story. We also have to talk about inclusivity. Inclusivity is great. That's what we want. But let me mind you of Article 76 of the Iraq constitution that its idea of inclusivity created a sectarian democracy that hadn't existed since pre-apartheid South Africa and Northern Ireland. This is what actually gave rise to the Iranian militias. This is what gave rise to people like Hadi al-Amiri, Qais Khazali, Nouri al-Maliki, and many others. And so we have to be very cautious to take our examples of what we did as America and failed the Iraqi people, what we did as America that failed with regards to Afghanistan, and make sure we don't repeat that because Syria is important. It is one of the lynchpins for stabilization in the region. We have to understand though that there has been steps that's been made. You look at the Captagon trade. You talk about how does ISIS and Al-Qaeda and all the others make money? Captagon trade is one of the big ones. And guess what, under al-Shara, 350 million pills and 28 facilities have been eliminated. We talk about trying to work towards protecting Israel, building the relationship between Lebanon and Israel and Syria and Israel. Well, let's talk about the fact that it was under this current leadership that they stopped ISIS from actually trying and Iranian-backed militias from Iraq from transferring through Syria into Lebanon weapons that was going to be used against the Israelis. You know, we talk about this idea of inclusivity, but yet why don't we note the fact that there are Christians, Druze, Alawites, women who are actually part of this cabinet. Now, are there going to be bad decisions made? I think we know in America that there's bad decisions made in all cabinets. But what I'll just caution in saying all of this is simply as of February 10th today, Syria joined the anti-ISIS coalition, marking a new chapter in global security, looking at ways to progress forward and has worked with the United States against ISIS and also to help support regional security with Israel. So while we can understand the past of many of these individuals, we have to not look just at the past, we have to look at the future, the lessons learned, and making sure that we have a free Syria that's going to help with stabilization across the region. With that I yield back.

Thank you Representative Mills. Representative Keating, you're recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I read with interest just a couple of weeks ago an op-ed by former Secretary of State and CIA Director Mike Pompeo. And I found it interesting that he was obviously taking umbrage with the U.S. administration, the Trump administration's position, you know, regarding the relationship with the SDF and the Kurds. He mentioned in the article that, you know, evidently the U.S. allowing al-Shara to politically and militarily the political and military drubbing of the Kurdish-led SDF could be dangerous. He mentioned that, you know, if the reports are coming out that President Trump was overly optimistic in his trust with al-Shara and he questioned the administration's lifting of sanctions because it'll remove leverage over al-Shara in that regard. He also mentioned that this action would undermine the security directly for the time being and indirectly, which I thought was interesting term too, in eroding the U.S.'s credibility that reneging on our commitment to the SDF we would lose the trust of a valuable, loyal and proven ally. These are the words of former Secretary of State for this administration, former CIA director, so it gave me great pause to read it from him. And he certainly was very involved in this area in those capacities that he did have and served in the area. It also reminds me that in terms of waning of U.S. credibility of our proven allies, just the pulling back of SIV visas and everything from those people in Afghanistan who risked their lives to help support our troops in other actions in the world when the U.S. are deployed or in actions in Syria. Are these the kind of signals that the U.S. is no longer a trusted, trusted supporter of their allies? So in reading that, I'd like to ask Dr. Karlin, these are concerns, broad concerns, and when they're voiced from, you know, a former high-level Trump official, you know, they make all of us, including myself who had been critical of him, sit up and take notice of this. And the message was clear. You know, you couch something saying, well if reports are true and but the message was quite clear. So could you react to that?

Congressman, these are real concerns and I agree with that. But it's important to remember the Assads broke Syria, right? For 50 plus years, they did everything they could to foment distrust and insecurity and frankly that has also hit America as well. I'm sure we all remember very well the jihadi pipeline that would go from Damascus into Iraq to murder American service members. So what was handed to the new government about 13, 14 months or so ago was a country that was devastated in a wide variety of areas. So this is hard. I think the problems that former Secretary Pompeo highlights absolutely merit vigilance and I think frankly that's a lot of what we have seen from Congress and the administration to date, a willingness to really get involved in the politics of what's happening with Syria.

But it seems to me that there's just such a rush to somehow having another peace agreement there that he's overlooking what the former secretary said quite strongly was it's overly optimistic and to take all the sanctions, not using the sanctions as leverage going forward is a mistake.

Congressman, I can't speak to the peace agreement. I can say though, having the United States bringing the Israelis and the Syrians together is a good thing and there's no other country with the credibility to actually make that happen.

No, I'm not denying the overall effort. I'm denying the way he's treating in the words of the secretary, a proven loyal ally. And when you look at what's happening with our proven loyal allies from Afghanistan, there's no question this'll put our service men and women in danger going forward with future deployments. And I yield back.

Thank you Representative Keating. It is important to speak about the Caesar sanctions. And I would just just remind everybody that the Caesar sanctions were specific. As lawmakers, it's important that we be specific. They were for systemic human rights abuses by the Assad regime. Now it might make sense for a lot of us to say there should be other sanctions against Syria and entities that work with Syria, but it won't be right now because of what's going on with the Assad regime that no longer exists. And that's why those sanctions no longer exist. Now recognize Representative McCaul.

Thanks Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding this important hearing. hearing. Look, we're focused on a lot of other areas of the world right now, but we can't let our eyes off the ball on Syria. I remember when I chaired the Homeland Security Committee, watching the rise of ISIS and the caliphate was one of the most terrifying things I've seen in my career and my lifetime. And the threat it posed to the United States and our national security interests was real, as we saw foreign fighters entering Europe and the United States. So here we are back in Syria again. All roads lead to Damascus, as said in the Bible. March 10th agreement was done in part to satisfy conditions made by the Congress to lift the Caesar Act sanctions. Unfortunately, that document was not fully enforced. We saw an upscale in violence. I was in Israel and I talked to the Druze sheikhs. They showed me videos of decapitations similar to what I saw when I chaired Homeland a decade ago when ISIS controlled Syria. The SDF, who is an ally of ours, we worked with the SDF to defeat ISIS, has been under advancement and attack by Syrian forces as well. Most disturbingly, we saw prisoners from the prison in Eastern Syria being released to go God knows where. Thank God CENTCOM stepped in and removed 7,000 remaining ISIS detainees to Iraq, but we do not have a full accounting of what happened to those who actually got out. That is a nightmare scenario from a national security perspective. I am pleased that there's a new agreement, January 30th, in response to this uptick in violence against ethnic minorities, including Christians, in response to the attacks on the Kurds and SDF, when the March 10th called for integration and normalization, that was not happening. So now we have this new agreement, January 30th, an attempt to get back to normalization and integration between the ethnic minorities, SDF forces, and the new Syrian government. Ms. Nadine Maenza, can I ask you, what is the status now of the implementation of the January 30th agreement?

Thanks so much, Congressman. And I did get an update this morning from Northeast Syria. And of course, there's great hope that this agreement will be successful. But currently, the Syrian government has not withdrawn troops, and they need to by the end of the day. While the governor of Hasakah was appointed and chosen, he's assumed his responsibility, but the government hasn't officially appointed him yet. You know, they also apparently are appointing people to different positions without consultation with the SDF. We also, of course, continue to see the siege of Kobani, which is dangerous at this point. And there's supposed to be an exchange of detainees, and that isn't also being facilitated. And there continues to be hate speech and rumors that are just adding a lot of tension to it. There is much hope that this could preserve what they built in these Kurdish areas because it is supposed to integrate in both the inclusive government they've built, which includes all the religious and ethnic minorities with half the leaders being women. So they would maintain that, and they would keep their local security, which as we talked about, and of course, Congressman Mills, your point was well taken, which is, what do we do with this army? Well, one of the ways we do it is by allowing local security. So these folks that are hardened sometimes Islamists are not in these minority communities. And right now, when I was traveling throughout parts of Syria, I ran into the fact that almost every mayor I met was from Idlib or HTS, and all the security was as well. And so I'm just saying that's not a safe way forward in this way forward. I think one of my recommendations I made is to create a mechanism to monitor the January 30th Northeast Syria integration, ideally with partners UK, France, and Germany, because they've said they would do that, and make sure that they keep local officials. Because of course, what can happen is everyone starts looking away and immediately they're all fired and new people are brought in and no one even notices. To keep that ethnic and religious diversity that's in the government right now, the Syrian security forces cannot enter these Kurdish, Yazidi, and Assyrian areas. And I think that we have not seen the Syrian government keep any of their deals with the SDF so far. But there is hope. I'll tell you what they want this to work in the Northeast, but I don't think, I fear that unless the international community and the U.S. in particular is really strong on it, that that might not happen.

Well, my biggest concern in my five seconds is a return to the Islamic State. And I am supportive of this new president, I want him to succeed, but I do not want a return to an Islamic State again in Syria. I yield back.

And if I could just add, for legitimacy for him himself, this helps Al-Shara for this to be successful. He needs legitimacy with these minorities. And if it fails, it actually hurts him and will hurt the whole government, the stability of the whole government.

Agreed. Thanks.

Thank you, Chairman Emeritus McCaul. Now going to recognize Representative Titus.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll say that I agreed with just about everything you said in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. That's why I wasn't in such a big hurry to take away some of the sanctions and the status of the president when he transitioned from so-called terrorist to so-called leader of all the Syrians. I'd like to go back to the issue of Turkey if we could, just a little bit. You know, Turkey still is and remains the most significant outside backer and continues to provide a lot of assistance and diplomatic support to Syria. But Syria is multi-ethnic and multi-religious. And you've got Christians and Druze and Alawites and Armenians and Assyrians and of course the Kurds. So I just have concerns about the ability of the president to be the leader of all Syrians with Erdogan having such a profound hatred for the Kurds, so much that he stalled Sweden's accession to NATO because of it. And I just don't know how he's supporting the government and how they can be kind of independent when it comes to decisions like that of the Turks. Dr. Karlin, you mentioned when you responded to Mr. Sherman's question about Syria's role, like how could they be helpful, how have they been harmful? You talked about how they could be helpful, how they have been helpful, and what they could do. But you didn't really talk about how they've been harmful. Could you kind of lay out some of that so we get the full picture?

Thank you very much for raising this, Congresswoman. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I think you've said it really well. It is very clear and has been for a number of years that the Turks do not want the Kurds to have meaningful political power, representation in Syria. They absolutely did a whole lot, including occasionally using violence, to undermine say the SDF as well. And so I think we need to monitor that really closely. And frankly, as we are monitoring the steps that the Turks are taking, what we should really focus on is what is President Shara trying to do? Is he trying to work with the Kurdish community, make them feel safe and secure and like they have a future in Syria, or is he perhaps being lured by others in trying to degrade that? I think that'll be a really important indicator for what we see as the new Syrian approach to all minorities, frankly.

Turkey's never a very reliable ally of ours or anybody else's, but you feel confident that some of these agreements can persist into the future or provide stability for not just Syria but for the region with Turkey's involvement being so great?

Having worked with the Turks a lot, I will say they are a complex ally in a whole lot of ways, as you highlight, and no doubt Ambassador Jeffrey knows this better than just about anyone. That said, to the extent we have robust U.S. efforts to shape the new Syria, we will be able to degrade the efforts of those who are actually trying to either undermine it or push it in a direction that doesn't lead to representation and pluralism.

Are you confident that the January 30th agreement is going to last? You know, it ended fighting and that we got this phased integration of SDF and the administrative bodies of the Syrian state. Do you think that this is going to be a long-term arrangement or do you see the dynamics that we've just been talking about undermining its success?

So it's too early to tell, of course, but the words in this agreement are right, right? And frankly, this is among the very hardest things that I think Syria's got to figure out. What does it look like to have a unified country where you don't just have centralization in Damascus, but where folks feel comfortable and free and see themselves as having a real future, even if that is going to look different than the past has looked for the SDF? So the words are right. I think now we've got to be vigilant in monitoring the extent to which it actually gets implemented. And this is a really good opportunity for Congress, frankly, given your involvement in this issue, really when you're seeing violations, being able to call them out, and when we're seeing positive steps, being able to call those out as well.

And how much do we have on the ground there in Syria from the U.S. that can do all this monitoring and be involved?

I'm so happy you raised that. We do not have a 24/7 U.S. embassy yet. And that is actually the most important thing that we can do. You've heard from all of us about the dynamism and plasticity in Syria. We're all trying to understand it through visits, through talking to people. But there is nothing as valuable as having a bunch of smart American diplomats that are going to be there 24/7. We do have a U.S. military presence. It has gone down over the last year. And with the removal of at least a couple thousand, if not more, so far ISIS prisoners, you could imagine that presence going down as well. So our ability to understand what's really going on is only going to get tougher if we don't have a lot of smart folks on the ground.

Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you, Representative Titus. Representative Barr.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tabler, during President Trump's first term and continuing in his second, the maximum pressure campaign against Iran's regime significantly weakened Tehran's regional influence and demonstrated U.S. resolve against malign actors, including Iran's proxies operating in Syria. Given President Trump's recent decision to lift broad sanctions on Syria with the hope that they may now distance themselves from Tehran and rebuild under new leadership, how do you assess that strategy? What are the benefits of that strategy, and how might lifting sanctions contribute to regional stability?

Thank you for that question. Well, the, if it works, this will push Iran and its, the Islamic Republic of Iran and its influence through proxies out of the Levant and back to Iran so they can decide whether they are a country or a cause, to steal I believe Henry Kissinger's quote. And I think that's very important from a strategic standpoint. But I was thinking when Representative Mills was making his statement about our bets and so on, I found, and I've been dealing with Syria for over 25 years, I lived there for a long time, so I know a little bit about the, not necessarily diplomacy, but about the working it from the ground. Syria is a very, very difficult information environment. We're making big bets on something that is still uncertain and is, it is currently under formation. And it hearkens back to that Mark Twain quote that it's not the things you don't know that gets you in trouble, it's the things you know for sure that just ain't so. How many of us have seen maps put in front of us during the course of the Syrian war and then subsequently after it that assure us that certain parts in the territory inside of Syria is either under one government's control or another group's control and so on? We, and unfortunately and tragically, we had two U.S. service members and then a translator killed in an environment that we thought was safe. And the people in my hometown don't want to deploy U.S. forces to those areas. They want to deploy with reliable allies. And President Shara is an ally in the making. They are, the administration is trying to achieve this strategic goal in a very difficult environment with, with more limited tools than we did in the past, very little boots on the ground, not so much. So it is a difficult task.

But I think the goal of isolating Iran as much as possible is obviously a very important objective. Ambassador Jeffrey, thank you so much for your extensive expertise and your service to our country in this very complex part of the world. I will never forget visiting with an IDF senior officer in the Golan Heights. This is back in 2015, and he was showing to me a village right across the border in Southern Syria that was at the time controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda in Syria. And he referenced just to the west, Southern Lebanon, controlled by Hezbollah and the threat of rockets coming into Israel. And then he pointed to the northeast, he said, 100 kilometers, that's ISIS. And then he pointed due east, he said, that's the Shiite militia in Iraq controlled by Iran. And then further east, Iran. Not to mention Hamas and the Houthis in the south. Very complex part of the world for Israel, very difficult geography. In the aftermath of the Assad regime's collapse, Ambassador Jeffrey, there was some optimism that Israel and Syria could explore a narrow security understanding aimed at stabilizing their shared border, right where I was standing back in 2015, and reducing the risk of escalation. In recent months, however, momentum toward that outcome appears to be stalled. What is the present state of engagement, formal or informal, between Israel and Syria, and what key political or security conditions would be required for meaningful progress toward an agreement?

Thank you, sir. It's been a roller coaster ride of Israeli actions back and forth, brokered by the U.S. The latest was on January 9th in Paris. The two governments, Israeli and Syrian, with a lot of U.S. urging, have agreed to set up a coordination committee to talk about security and other issues. This is preliminary to moving towards an agreement that would, we believe, acknowledge the 1974 formal ceasefire between the Assad regime and Israel. That's something both sides I think do want. Other issues such as the Golan Heights are going to be pushed off. But the thing that is so important is that Al-Shara has been fighting Assad and the Iranians for a decade. And he is now doing his best with some success in blocking Iran to re-establish a foothold there and in particular, as we heard earlier, provide weapons flows to Hezbollah. So it's a very important Israeli security dimension to have somebody finally to their north that is not on the side of Tehran. And for all of his problems, that is for the moment Al-Shara. That's one reason why there has been a calming of Israeli strikes and other activities and military movements in the south. It's not resolved yet. The Druze issue is very important to Israelis because of the Druze population within inside Israel. But nonetheless, I'm more optimistic now, frankly, than I was a few months ago.

That's great to hear. Thank you, and I yield back.

Thank you, Representative Barr. Representative Olszewski.

Thank you, Chairman Mast, for holding this important hearing. Thank you to all of our witnesses. I want to open by saying how proud that I am to represent an engaged Syrian diaspora in the Baltimore area. The stories and the experiences of that community remind me and should remind all of us that the struggle for dignity and for freedom in Syria also lives right here with all of us. We know that under the Assad regime, education became a tool of ideological control used to assimilate non-Arab communities and to erase their history. So-called nationalism classes glorified violence against anyone labeled an enemy of the regime. Teachers faced threats from the Assad government, from armed opposition groups, while extremists like ISIS imposed their own curriculum. In short, education was militarized into yet another form of oppression. After Assad's fall, Syria's transitional government moved quickly to rewrite textbooks and to remove Assad propaganda. Many Syrians welcome this change, but some of the revisions also removed references to women, to love, to pre-Islamic culture, and to even human evolution, sending a chilling message to religious and ethnic minorities, including Christians, who were already fearful of exclusion. Rebuilding a truly inclusive education system, in my estimation, is one of Syria's most important tests. With more than 2.4 million children remaining out of school and another million are at risk of dropping out today, Syrian schools should teach a shared civic identity that embraces diverse thought without glorifying any faction, leader, or sect. History classes should acknowledge the suffering of all communities and emphasize the need for reconciliation. We can't replace one form of intolerance with another. Post-conflict experiences elsewhere offer lessons. After the 1994 genocide, Rwanda's education reform emphasized shared citizenship over ethnic identity, helping to prevent classrooms from becoming a continuation of that war. Syria now stands at a similar crossroads. And education, I believe, can be one of the single most important levers that we use for lasting unity. Dr. Karlin, I'll start with you. Can you talk to us a little bit about what steps you think the U.S. and our international partners should be taking in support of Syria's transitional government to implement effective educational reforms that promote inclusivity and address some of the exclusion and the division that we've seen in the past and that we've shared in these comments today?

Thank you for raising this really important topic, Congressman. I wholeheartedly agree with you in terms of the role that education can play and when we've seen it in places around the region in particular where it has done the exact opposite. The, you know, it seems to me that the things that you all can particularly focus on is who is playing a leadership role in the education ministry and in key aspects of the government touching these issues and how are they best doing so? So looking at issues like textbook revision, looking at how topics like sectarianism are covered, looking at how topics like the history of Syria are covered as well. So really thinking about who is in leadership there and how they are operating. Thank you.

Appreciate that. And then to open it up to the panel, if anyone wants to chime in with any lessons or models that you have seen from other post-conflict countries that you think we should be thinking about in Syria? Ambassador.

Specifically on Syria, I believe that the current education minister has at least some Kurdish background. And what we saw in this 29 January agreement between the Damascus government and the SDF was, among other things, a good deal on the educational situation, that the degrees and the educational experiences that the Kurds have made over the past essentially 15 years when they've been separate from Damascus would be acknowledged. So we have to watch that closely. More generally, having been sent off by the White House and you folks to do exactly what you said in a half a dozen countries, it's a real problem, sir. Look at what we are debating now in the United States about these very issues that you raised. Think how we would feel, how this House would feel, if somebody came in from the outside and said, look, this is how you are to think about women, this is how you are to think about this issue, this is how you are to think about very sensitive questions of minorities, of refugees, of dare I say it, immigrants. Regardless of where you come down on that issue inside America, you wouldn't be happy at people from the outside. There are general principles we should underline, particularly with other Arab states so that we are all speaking with one voice. And that is, do not oppress minorities. Do not exclude them. Do not do things like not allow them to use their language and so forth. In these things, we are able to do. But whenever we get into more details and more directive missions, and I've been sent on a number of them, boy, I'll never forget I had a billion-dollar program to teach the Iraqi police to do community policing and de-escalation. And what they told me was, we want to go out to the range when the military is running this, we were shooting all the time. Why are you guys talking about? And this is the kind of cultural problems you get.

And I appreciate that. I know my time's expired, but I hope that we learn that lesson both in our work in Syria, but also that we remember it here as we think about our own histories in the United States and we keep that as part of our curriculum. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.

Thank you. Representative Kim.

Thank you, Chairman Mast. And I want to thank all of our witnesses for joining us today. On January 29, Syrian President Al-Shara met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a reportedly friendly meeting with both sides signaling intentions to deepen bilateral ties. Russia was a key enabler of the Assad regime's atrocities during the Syrian Civil War, and its resource strains from its campaign against Ukraine contributed to weakened Syrian air defenses and the Assad regime's collapse. Since then, Russia has continued providing Syria with oil via sanctioned vessels and grain supplies stolen from occupied Ukraine. In exchange, Syria has permitted Russia to retain access to its key military bases, as Representative Wilson previously mentioned. Mr. Jeffrey, in light of its diminished military presence and leverage in Syria, how is Russia attempting to reposition itself militarily, economically, or diplomatically with the new Syrian government?

You're absolutely right, Congresswoman. Russia is trying actively to maintain, first of all, its bases, which are a logistical center for its operations further to the south in Africa. Secondly, there is a long tradition of ties between Syria as a whole and Russia. Russia has $20 billion in investments in Syria. There are 35,000 Syrians who have been educated in Russia, one of them being Maha Al-Shara, the brother of the president, who for many years was a medical doctor in Russia. So there are very deep ties, and the Russians don't want to lose them because they're trying to maintain a hold on their position in the region. As long, the most important thing is we do not want to see Russia dealing with Iran in Syria or anyplace else. That's a red line for us, and it should be for Al-Shara. Secondly, we want to watch carefully what Russia is trying to do with that government, including sanctioned oil and other things. There's plenty of other oil that Al-Shara could get. But finally, part of the problem is that both the Turks and the Israelis, and we haven't talked too much about this, but they have a kind of tension between them, and both sides kind of want the Russians there as a sort of buffer. So it's hard to convince Al-Shara to throw them out. I don't know exactly where the administration is. What I know, if they want to do that, that would be low on the list of priorities after taking care of minorities, after fighting ISIS, after fighting Iran, after doing six other things. I think that we're stuck with the Russians for a while, I fear.

Right. Thank you. You know, I want to follow up on Rep Barr's questioning earlier on Israel. Mr. Jeffrey, can you talk about the principal obstacles to achieving a lasting agreement between Israel and Syria, and how can the U.S. bridge the gap?

It's a very good question. I was in Israel some time ago, and I spent much of my time talking with members of the government and others, more on the right than on the left in Israeli politics, on their great concerns. We have to understand that after October 7th, Israel went through a huge, horrific transition, far worse in many respects than us after 9/11. They do not want to make any mistakes in their near abroad because they made a huge one with Hamas in Gaza. So they look at Lebanon, they look at Syria through that same lens, and I understand that and sympathize with it. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the goal is to keep ISIS and Iran out of Israel's north. They have no real choice other than Al-Shara. The rest of the region is supporting him. The U.S. is supporting him. The Europeans are supporting him. And I think gradually, it's why I know I'm sounding too optimistic here, which I haven't been in other appearances before this committee, but I think gradually we're moving in the right direction with the Israelis and Al-Shara, and even with the Israelis and the Turks, although that's a tougher issue. Thank you.

Thank you. I want to get to Saudi Arabia quickly. On February 7, Saudi Arabia and Syria signed a multi-billion dollar investment deal, including a launch of the low-cost joint airline and major telecommunications project. That marks one of the largest foreign direct investments in Syria since the repeal of the Caesar Act sanctions last December. Saudi officials noted that the agreements would be ready to implement contracts rather than non-binding MOUs. So can you talk about any provisions, if there are, in these contracts that raise concerns for U.S. national security or regional stability and that Congress should be aware of?

It is the stated, repeatedly stated policy of the Trump administration and in various degrees other ones to work by, with, and through partners and have them put up a lot of the money for some of these reconstruction issues, be it in Syria, be it also in Gaza. So I think the administration is happy with the Saudis, it's happy with the Qataris, it's happy with the Egyptians and other countries that are reaching out to Damascus along with Turkey, of course. We're doing very little in that regard, although we're ready to have business deals. But I think that the administration is quite open to regional states playing a big role in securing the peace after, as I said, the defeat of ISIS and Iran.

Thank you. My time's up. I yield back. Thank you.

Representative Amo.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for being here. Last year, the Syrian people marked the fall of the brutal Assad regime. This was a historic moment after years of repression and war and a moment of hope for minority communities in Syria and the diaspora, including the Kurdish Americans that I represent in Rhode Island. But while Syria's future holds promise, the road ahead is fragile and unfinished. ISIS remains a threat. Millions of Syrians still rely on humanitarian aid to survive. And the country must rebuild trust with its neighbors and the international community. For Syria to realize its democratic aspirations, it must become a nation where religious and ethnic minorities safely coexist and enjoy full representation in their new government. The new Syrian government has promised to lead on behalf of all Syrians. Yet, violence against minority communities exists. Attacks against the Druze and the Alawite communities continue. A Greek Orthodox church was bombed in June. In January, fighting between Syrian government forces and Kurdish fighters killed and displaced civilians. After two weeks of violence, the Syrian government and the Kurdish Democratic Forces announced a ceasefire to integrate Kurdish fighters into the national army. President Shara granted citizenship to Syrian Kurds and established Kurdish as a national language of Syria. These are meaningful steps toward inclusion, but the... ...violence that preceded these actions underscores the fragility in this newfound peace. Dr. Karlin, how can the United States support its compliance with this ceasefire and push the Syrian government to continue moving forward with truly inclusive governance?

Thank you very much for that question, Congressman, and I would wholly agree with your diagnosis of the picture of the major challenges ahead. And I also appreciate how you highlighted that Damascus has taken some really important steps lately in terms of citizenship, in terms of language, in terms of most notably, I think for your question, saying it will penalize those who try to incite and divide. And so I think what we all really need to do is to monitor when those things happen, monitor when there is violence, monitor when there are efforts to expose rifts with minorities, religious groups, etc., and then see what steps is the government going to take. We have seen some really positive case studies. So following some violence, we've seen efforts to investigate a couple hundred folks. We have seen some trials. It's not enough at all, but it represents meaningful steps and we need to make sure that that keeps happening. And if not, then we need to really put some serious pressure on the Ashara government. Syria under an authoritarian strongman that doesn't allow for pluralism isn't going to be a great partner to the United States.

Well, speaking of pressure, you know, when Congress repealed the Caesar sanctions last December, we made it clear that the inclusion protection of ethnic and religious minorities was going to be a major priority and, frankly, non-negotiable. But we're in the situation we are now where we see meaningful progress but not enough to guarantee those rights and freedoms. Dr. Karlin, do you think the threats of reinstating the Caesar sanctions serve as an effective deterrent to ensure those commitments are upheld for ethnic and religious minority protection? And what are some things that we in Congress can do and that we should consider to keep Syria moving forward?

Thank you for highlighting that important point. I do think the effort to remove the sanctions was the right step. Syria is in this dynamic moment and allowing for investment is important so that folks can see a future for themselves in a new Syria and thus don't look elsewhere. You know, I think I would look really closely at what happens with this SDF integration. This is a very, very new effort, of course, recently brokered. We did see some initial violence, of course, earlier this year. That has largely dissipated but not entirely. And I think what we want to see in particular is the extent to which the SDF is welcomed and integrated into the military and then who's going to be responsible for the Kurds in those areas. So I don't know that threats to reimpose are necessary at this moment. However, I think reminding folks of what a high priority this issue is for this Congress and for this administration is exactly right.

Well, thank you for that. And the importance of protecting those ethnic and religious minorities is, you know, paramount focus and, you know, with the help of leaders like you and others, we will continue to press on. With that, I yield back.

Representative Davidson.

Thank you, Chairman. Thanks, witnesses. I really appreciate you being here and the attention you've given to this vital region. And I think it's a great, timely hearing. I often think of the wisdom of Ronald Reagan's famous saying, trust but verify, but increasingly, particularly in Syria, I think of a saying of my own: don't hope, know. We hope things are great, but we haven't done enough verification. I appreciate you guys coming today and giving us some of the know what's going on on the ground. So, Ms. Maenza, could you highlight what is going on on the ground, particularly with respect to religious freedom, but, you know, the state of security on the ground in Syria today? What do you know?

I know that a lot of the religious and ethnic minorities are afraid of the violence that they've seen. And the polling that was done at the end of the year showed higher satisfaction among Sunnis than minorities. But it's interesting because on social cohesion, it was actually even the Sunnis had a low score on that because I think everyone wants to live in a cohesive, peaceful place. And right now we've seen a lot of violence, of course, in March, massive violence against the Alawites, in July, massive violence against the Druze. And but we've seen those areas continue to have violence. Christians continue to also report threats and, of course, this terrible violence just recently against the Kurds. But I just want to throw out that, you know, the areas that Turkey invades and still occupies because Turkey's not leaving, they just announced yesterday, any of the areas, so they have Afrin, Tel Rifaat, Ras al-Ayn. In those areas, USCIRF's reports are so damning. Like, for instance, you know, they continue to target religious minorities, especially Yazidis, for rape, assassination, kidnapping for ransom, confiscation of property, desecration of cemeteries and places of worship. The other report just from last year, their latest report on Syria, that these forces, these Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in the north, terrorize Kurds and religious minorities with extortion, detention, torture. So this is the kind of stuff that's been going on day to day without really any international outrage. And I think as we look at all of Syria, we need to call these areas out.

Yeah, thank you. I mean, when you think about northeast Syria, it wasn't exactly secure and stable under Assad, but I will say, you know, I heard from a lot of religious minorities while they couldn't defend Assad overall, they could say, at least we felt like Assad protected kind of everybody religiously. Except maybe in the northeast. And the northeast hasn't been under control, hasn't been under control under the new government. It doesn't really seem to be the case. So my heart goes out to persecuted Christians in particular. And clearly the United States needs to display the strength to keep ISIS down and out. But the same fighting just goes on in a sort of endless way in that region. And when I think about the legal authorization for U.S. presence in Al-Tanf and more broadly, what's the strategic justification to continue operating there, Mr. Jeffrey?

That's a very interesting question, Congressman. Al-Tanf was part of the U.S. D-ISIS mission, but there were very few ISIS in the region. There were no Kurds there. It's down on the tri-border area between, as you're looking at it, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. It was the Obama administration that moved forces in there with local Syrian opposition forces that stayed with us up until just some months ago. Now they've been integrated into the Syrian army. Its purpose was anti-Iranian, but we never said that. It blocked a major route for Iran, as you're looking at the map, to move from Tehran to Baghdad to Damascus to Beirut. And it was very important. The Russians, speaking for the Syrians and the Iranians, constantly pressed us to leave there and we didn't. Now at this point, I don't think it's serving much of a purpose, but I think the administration should speak for that.

Well, I think when you highlight that, you know, obviously Iran doesn't just act on their own, they act through proxies. And that's one of the deficiencies of the 01 AUMF, isn't it? I mean, not everyone in the region, even ISIS, isn't truly an affiliate of Al-Qaeda. They have their own rivalries. But clearly the Iranian-backed militia groups that are on the ground aren't affiliates of Al-Qaeda. Would it at some point merit giving the administration the legal authority and flexibility to designate true enemies of our country as enemies of our country with a more modern authorization for force?

That's a legal issue. I think the administration and the past administrations, Democrat and Republican, felt that they had enough authority to go after both the Iranian proxy groups, be they Hezbollah, Hamas, the Hashd al-Shaabi, the Houthis, and Iranian IRGC itself, and ISIS and its offshoots. As we know, Al-Nusra, which then became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and is now become much of the government of Syria, was on various terrorist lists by us and the UN up until very recently.

A good point. It shifts quickly. Unfortunately, my time's expired and I will follow up with you guys with some written questions. I yield back.

Representative Stanton.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this important and timely hearing. The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime represented the end of one of the most oppressive governments in modern history for more than 50 years. It was a regime responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, the use of chemical weapons against civilians, the displacement of millions of refugees during its decades-long rule. Its cruelty extended beyond its borders, including allowing Iran to traffic weapons through Syria and to its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah. And its fall represented one of the most significant political shifts in the Middle East in decades. We must recognize the courage of the Syrian people who made this possible, who flowed back over the borders to their homeland for the first time in years in the immediate aftermath. They created a chance to help Syria rebuild on a foundation of stability, pluralism, and representative governance. That's why I supported the removal of the Caesar Act sanctions. These sanctions served their purpose in pressuring the Assad regime but risked strangling Syria's economy when it could be rebuilding and stabilizing. As Syria rebuilds, the U.S. must provide strategic support conditioned on the actions of Syria's transitional government under Ahmad al-Sharaa. First and foremost, we must ensure the protection of Syria's minority communities. Syria is not a monolith. It's a diverse nation of Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians, and others who have coexisted for generations. These communities are now vulnerable. Olive branches that aim to integrate minorities, such as establishing Kurdish as a national language and promising to settle the civil educational rights of the Kurdish community, must be upheld. Dr. Karlin, the fighting between the Syrian army and Syrian Defense Forces was deeply troubling. I'm glad the two reached a ceasefire agreement and a deal on integrating the SDF into the Syrian army, but the two weeks of violence highlights the hard work ahead. Can you explain to us the agreements made under the new deal and what specific metrics for success or failure Congress should look to in the future?

Congressman, thank you for highlighting this important issue. Exactly as you highlight, the SDF was a critical counterterrorism partner as we fought ISIS and has been responsible for many thousands of ISIS prisoners and ISIS family members as well. Completely agree with you that the violence we've seen with the SDF and the Syrian military has been pretty awful. It is good that it is over and it now needs to continue being over. There is an agreement that has been put together, as you highlight. It is a very, very fresh agreement. And I think, look, the words in the agreement are right. The issue will be the implementation. I think what is especially important, frankly, for the U.S. to think about is how do you help the Syrian military and the Syrian government and how do you help the SDF understand their different roles and their different relationship going forward? Right? So the SDF has governed a chunk of territory for a very, very long time. That is not going to be the case for a number of reasons in Syria going forward if you are going to have more centralization and Damascus able to extend its sovereignty throughout its country. But what does it look like to make sure that the SDF and that the Kurds feel like they have a future in that country? So it's the words on the paper that are important, but I would say the spirit is in particular where the United States has such a vital role to play.

Thank you very much. We must maintain strict oversight of detained ISIS fighters. Thousands of ISIS combatants remain in detention facilities in northeast Syria. Syrian government recently took over the responsibility of Al-Roj and Al-Hol. Dr. Karlin, is the Syrian government capable of taking on this critical responsibility? Is the Iraqi government capable of securely overseeing ISIS detainees that are being moved from Syria to Iraq?

Congressman, I think this is one of the most important things for us to focus on and to look at. Iraq does offer a degree of stability that Syria does not. I assume that is probably why the Pentagon is moving thousands of ISIS prisoners to there. We need to see what the Syrian military is capable of doing. The transfer from the SDF to the Syrian military was a little bit bumpy, to put it lightly, but to date, they appear to be trying diligently to take this responsibility. I think this is an area where the U.S. military presence in Syria is going to be important as the government consolidates its power and its capabilities for doing so.

Thank you very much. Chairman, I'm going to run out of time, so I'll have questions for the record. I just want to note on a personal note that Congressman Joe Wilson has been such a leader on this issue and his leadership particularly on the Caesar Act has affected many of us, including me, across the aisle. So I just want, he's not here, but I want to recognize Congressman Wilson for his critical leadership as it relates to this important relationship with the United States with Syria. Thank you.

Thank you, Representative Stanton. Representative Self.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a fascinating hearing. I'm just a soldier and I won't go into details, but dealing with the issues in the Middle East and Islam, U.S. embassy in Egypt, IDF with Israel, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Bosniaks, Central Command J5. There's an old saying in the Middle East: no war without Syria, no peace without Egypt. Syria's been a central part of this area and the warlike nature of this area for centuries. For centuries. We've heard basically two separate views here in this briefing. I'm glad I've been so late in the order here. I chair the Europe Subcommittee on this full committee and we've already had a hearing on Turkey. And basically the title was, Whither Goeth Turkey? And I think that we've had some discussion about Turkey, but I want to go back in several areas. The one viewpoint that we've heard is, and I'll ask this question first, what is success? Because we've been debating unknowingly what is success for Syria in this very hearing in the last hour and a half. I've heard I think the two gentlemen take the point of view that if we make Al-Jolani, renamed, successful, Syria will be successful. Well, we Americans tend to say once we depose a tyrant, things will be better. Then the other point of view that we've heard, the other world view, I'll put it that way, that we've heard is that the disparate minorities, the Christians, the Kurds, the Druze, the Alawites, and the Yazidis have a play in this. And so what is success in Syria is going to be my point. Yes, there is a vacuum of Iranian proxies. We have destroyed that road to the sea. We and the Israelis have destroyed that road to the sea. However, right now in Turkey, they are increasingly an Islamic dictatorship. The chief opponent to Erdogan is in jail. He will not get out prior to the elections, I don't believe. Erdogan is overturning the secular state that Ataturk set up and I think that that is going to set up between Turkey and Israel a future conflict. I don't know how that works. So, Ms. Maenza... What do you believe the out... oh, before I go to the question. This SDF integration that I've heard so much about. I understand there's a question about whether or not it's going to be unit integration or individual integration. Look, we had that same question in World War I and Pershing refused to let Americans be individually put into French and British... so that to me is a key question, Dr. Karlin. But we'll set that aside for just a second. And I want to ask you, Ms. Maenza, what is going to be the outcome depending on the SDF integration for the minorities in their area?

So this agreement being successful is huge for all of Syria, not just the northeast, because I think it's going to set a precedent even for Suwayda. And I think I mentioned earlier that Suwayda, they've clamped down even the last few days and let no one, they say you can leave but you can't come back, and there have been additional deaths there. So I think if we could see a peace in northeast where they integrate them as brigades, where we're able to see local security, local governance and keep these mixed Syrian security guards out, we could have that kind of peace that we were talking about. I think the thing about Turkey that's important to understand, and I just explained how horrific the conditions are for religious minorities in the places where Turkey controls completely that are run by the Syrian National Army. I know Al-Sharaa had promised to take Afrin as soon as he was, in fact, while HTS was taking Aleppo, I was promised when he took Damascus the first thing he'd do would be free Afrin. And he tried to like three times and I think Turkey will not give it up. So I think first of all, Erdogan is not constrained by the constitution in Syria. So in Turkey, he's constrained by some elements of the law that keep him from not doing everything he could, but in Syria, that's not the case. So we've already seen, of course, this deep relationship with weapons systems, equipment, logistical support, training of officers. I mean, I just think that Turkey is clearly very integrated into Syria at this point in time.

Yeah, I think they want to, with Iran being down and out, I think they want to play an outsized role, I think was your word, in the Middle East. I'll leave with this. UNIFIL is withdrawing most of their forces, I believe by 2027. We've lifted sanctions, we're pulling UNIFIL, as worthless as UNIFIL was, they were a UN force. I have more, but my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Thank you, Representative Self. Representative Jayapal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome the witnesses. Mr. Tabler, it's nice to see you. We both had a fellowship from the same institute back when we were young, but it's great to see you here today. After decades of repression and brutal conflict, the Syrian people are finally free of the Assad regime, a government that ruled through fear, violence, and systematic abuse and marked by mass detention, torture, and the deliberate targeting of civilians, forcing millions from their home. Today, the emergence of a new government in Syria represents a powerful symbol of hope. It offers the possibility of rebuilding a country rooted not in terror but in accountability, inclusion, and respect for Syria's diversity. For families who have known nothing but war, and I have several of them in my district, this moment carries the promise of return, of reconciliation, and of recovery. But we also need to meet the moment with accountability and responsibility, and the new Syrian government must demonstrate through concrete actions that it will protect religious and ethnic minorities and uphold fundamental human rights. Syria's diversity is one of its greatest strengths and the safety of Christian, Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, and other minority communities will be a measure of whether this new government will truly break from its past. As we consider the future of U.S. policy towards Syria, we also have to learn from the past and recognize that sustainable peace has to be built through dialogue and diplomacy, not punishment and isolation. And that's why I was so proud to co-lead with my Republican colleague Joe Wilson a bill to repeal the broad Caesar Act sanctions on Syria, an action which has been taken to help ensure that the new government has the chance to succeed in delivering for the Syrian people. Ms. Karlin, you were recently in Syria with UNHCR and I know you met with numerous officials and organizations on the ground. Can you give us your assessment of the humanitarian situation within Syria and the challenges that that poses for the interim government?

Thank you very much for that question, Congresswoman. The humanitarian situation there is almost mind-boggling. When you drive a few minutes outside of Damascus, you see skeletons of buildings, I mean, just truly shattered for as far as the eye can see. But you also see kids with backpacks and families returning. I met some families that were returning that hadn't been there for a decade. And they were coming home and they weren't really sure what home would look like, but they wanted to try to rebuild. They wanted to find hopefully security and livelihood. There's so much to go. It's why, frankly, the leadership you and others have shown in lifting the sanctions is so important because that's kind of what's going to unlock this sort of this reconstruction. As Syrians return to their homes either from other countries or from having been internally displaced, as they start contributing to their economy and see a future, we can see a different Syria, which is important regionally, of course, but also for U.S. national security interests.

And, you know, while we repeal the Caesar Act sanctions in the 26 NDAA, sanctions could be reimposed if the Syrian government doesn't make adequate reforms. And so I guess I'm wondering if you can talk about the lingering, I think we need to get ready for that by talking in part about the lingering impacts of sanctions, of U.S. sanctions on the humanitarian landscape and what impact it would have if we suddenly reimposed those sanctions on the Syrian people.

It's a country that needs at least $200 billion in reconstruction and 90 percent of the people are living in poverty. So if sanctions are on, I think we can assume that Syria will not be able to prosper and, frankly, folks are going to find alternatives and they're often not going to be the kind of alternatives that will meet U.S. national security interests. That said, I of course completely agree with you that we have got to have accountability, we've got to monitor the extent to which the government is making pledges and actually following through on those. We've seen some important announcements in recent weeks, particularly vis-a-vis the Kurds, in terms of inclusivity, in terms of punishing those who are inciting to violence, etc. Those are the right words. Now we've got to see, are they actually going to follow through with them?

And I appreciate your raising how important the humanitarian assistance continues to be. Mr. Tabler, I wanted to ask you about Jordan and Lebanon and refugees. Both of them have keen interests in seeing Syria's new government succeed to enable thousands of refugees still in each country to return home and ensure that the respect of borders are better secured and open to trade again. How is it, how can the U.S. best support and facilitate the safe and voluntary return of Syrian refugees to their homes from neighboring countries?

Thank you, Representative Jayapal. Actually, it's a very good question what the U.S. can really do. First of all, there are many Syrians who want to return and have returned. And those, the people that return to Syria are the ones that feel safe. And so therefore, it's going to be a little bit different. If you have an overwhelmingly, for example, Sunni base of refugees in Jordan, they might feel more safe going back to a Sunni-led government in Damascus with as we've been talking about here today. If they are minorities, however, and they're hiding in Lebanon, they probably are not going to feel as comfortable going back. That is also for a security reason. That's the initial on the surface. Deeper than that, it's the question of what are they returning to? And that gets us to the rebuilding of Syria. And sanctions under the Caesar sanctions had a tremendous impact on Syria because it had secondary and other effects that prevented the reconstruction of Syria under the Assad regime for these crimes. Now with its repeal, it allows for the potential for Syria to receive these investments. However, it is not unconditional, as you pointed out. And the fact is is that in my opinion that while this is a barrier, the real barrier here is if the Ashara government doesn't institute the kind of reforms, both on a security level as well as on an economic and legal level, to allow for these funds to flow back into the country, they will just evaporate as they did under the Assad regime when Gulf countries dumped money into Syria and people actually will not be able to rebuild substantially and we will not have a reliable ally going forward. And that's something that the United States, you asked a question about what we can do, I think we need to go back to the Ashara government with their neighbors and say, okay, what are the kind of changes you need to make today to make a better future? Thank you.

Thank you, very comprehensive answer and we have a lot of work to do, but we appreciate all of you being here today. Thank you for your testimony. I yield back.

Representative Lawler.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, I worked alongside Chairman Mast and our Financial Services Committee Chairman Hill as we negotiated a package to update the Caesar sanctions on Syria to fit with the present period and the present leadership. Ultimately, the Caesar Act was repealed as part of last year's NDAA, but we did fight to include a mechanism for sanctions to be imposed if certain conditions are not met by Al-Sharaa and his government. Mr. Tabler, do you think this is an effective compromise to allow for the interim government to expand on their economy while keeping the pressure on them as you were just alluding to with Ms. Jayapal?

It's an excellent question. I think that I think it has two levels. One, the way that the sanctions were repealed, I think were quite rational in that the original reason for them being there, and I worked with Ambassador Jeffrey on implementing these sanctions in great detail during during COVID. So I think that lifting them was was the rational thing to do. But the problem that there are many other things in the Caesar sanctions that are of concern to the United States. And so therefore, if those things, if those benchmarks are not met, it is worth revisiting them because very frankly, because the Ashara government cares about that, right? And they this is a major point of leverage over their behavior and right now nobody here is talking about a regime change or anything messy like that. We're simply talking about modifying the behavior of the Ashara government, its security forces and so on as it goes forward as a result concerning minorities and others.

So to that end, what pressure can we put on Al-Sharaa's government absent Caesar? And to what extent do you see Syria's state sponsor of terrorism designation as effective leverage?

Yeah, so that's a big one that's coming up. I think it is tremendous leverage. I think the one immediate in the, you know, we're talking about very early implementation, is concerning President Trump's engagement with with Ahmad al-Sharaa himself personally. So if we were if we were to look at this, any communication between President Trump and Ahmad al-Sharaa, and I think this has been communicated, that this agreement on the 30th of January needs to be implemented because it concerns a very sensitive issue as concerns minority rights, also strategic places where U.S. forces are. This, this line needs to be enforced. And I think the administration as well as Capitol Hill is prepared to do that.

So Al-Sharaa continues to position himself as a moderate and pragmatic leader for Syria. Given the alternatives, that may be true. But, you know, even though he is often sending diplomats to D.C. and has visited the White House, he's still growing closer with Russia. There are concerns about that, not to mention obviously his past terrorist ties. Mr. Jeffrey, do you view... ...to al-Shara as an honest broker. Based on what he has done in the past few months, do you trust him or are you wary of his assurances?

I'm wary, but I also have seen when we were working in the first Trump administration, key to much of what we were trying to do in Syria, which was not only to defeat ISIS, it was to get all of the Iranians out and to have a reconciled and peaceful Syria. For those three core goals, objectively what al-Shara was doing in Idlib with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham supported what we were doing. Now, we couldn't give him orders or talk to him because he was on the terrorist list, but we generally knew what he was up to, fighting Assad, cleaning the area from ISIS, and as I mentioned earlier, keeping 3 million internally displaced people who would have destabilized Turkey if they fled across the border. I was right there with them. I saw they were living in makeshift shelters and tents. And so he was giving, under the conditions of horror that I've seen in much of the Middle East, I thought Idlib was basically a bright spot. Now, he did some bad things in Idlib. Frankly, our Kurdish friends did some bad things in their areas as well. But all in all, he's somebody that we've been able to work with. Let's just see what happens next. And the most important thing is executing this January 29 agreement.

Now, obviously there's been some positive steps with Saudi Arabia and others with economic investments, which is critical to actually get this on the right track. One of the most important things has been the discussions between the U.S., Israel, and Syria with respect to de-escalation and intelligence sharing. And there are reports of upcoming talks to finalize this. Mr. Jeffrey, in your opinion, what would this type of security agreement mean for both Israel, Syria, and the region?

First of all, it would stabilize the rather rocky relationship between Damascus and Israel and probably end, although they've pretty well settled down now, Israeli military operations inside Syria, which were quite extensive right after the al-Shara government came to power. I think it's important because again, Israel's core interest is not having an Iranian proxy on its northern border. And it doesn't have one now because al-Shara rolled in and the Iranians had to retreat. As long as he can maintain, Israel can maintain al-Shara as a partner in that particular endeavor, then I think that there's a basis for a relationship. But as we've talked about for the last two hours, Iran will come back in if the country starts falling apart. So it's not just not being nice to the Iranians, it's also being nice to the minorities to the degree that they don't start looking for allies because I've had several indications Iran is trying to get back in and find partners.

Appreciate it. Thank you.

Representative Fine.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I approach this from a different perspective. I'm going to give you all the chance to educate me a little bit today. I generally believe that once a Muslim terrorist, always a Muslim terrorist. That you don't engage in that sort of behavior just because you're trying to advance a political agenda and then all of a sudden you turn the other cheek. Maybe I'm wrong and maybe people can engage in the most horrific acts but then they were only doing it for sort of inexplicable reasons. So, Ms. Maenza, I really want to ask you, there have been terrible things that have happened in Syria since he came to power. And my question to you is, do you believe the current president of Syria was in control of those events? Were these intentional events or is he just not a sort of competent leader of the country and so these fell, I have no idea what's happening, I didn't know, they're just killing people around me? Do you think he agrees or is incompetent? Which of the two?

Thank you so much for the question, the difficult question, Congressman. I think the important thing is to note is the facts that al-Shara sent these troops into Suwayda after they had already committed atrocities in the coastal areas. They sent them into the northeast even though they had a history and there was this growing hate speech against the Kurds, so they had to know that there was going to be violence. So I just think the threshold for allowing violence should be unacceptable to the U.S. and there needs to be a pushing back of this isn't allowed. The fact that that horrific video you watched and even more happened days ago and then right after that we see an economic deal being signed with the Syrian government and Ambassador Barek. That's not the way to reward this kind of behavior. So I think that if in fact, let's presume that President al-Shara is a pragmatist and his troops aren't quite there yet. A pragmatist will bend when they have pressure. So we're not doing him any favors by giving him a high five, by giving him unconditional support, by trying to raise him in the international community when you look at these atrocities that his troops are committing.

All right. So I haven't gotten a real sense. Again, it's either I'm incompetent and so these people do this and I'm not really in control, or wink-wink, nod-nod, I was a terrorist, I still am a terrorist, and I'm killing people. But let me let's try to put it in terms of something that people may be able to wrap their head around because look, I was in Israel last summer. I didn't think anyone could care less about the Jews, which I am one, until I saw what was happening to the Druze, which I believe it's because they sound like Jews so people must assume that we're sort of all the same. I'm interested in all four of your perspective. How many innocent people do you believe have been killed in Syria since the new president took over over a year ago? Is it 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000? How many do you all think have been killed since he took over? Whether it's intentional or incompetent. And I'll start with you, Ms. Maenza, and then I'd go down the line. Got a guess?

I would say 10,000 in the minorities. I think that we're way undercounting both in Suwayda and in the coastal areas.

So your estimate's 10,000. Ms. Karlin, what's your estimate? How many innocent people have been killed?

My estimate's probably slightly lower, but I really can't pinpoint it.

But like between five and 10,000? In the thousands. I think we... Mr. Tabler, how many?

I think the number killed have been in the thousands. The degree to which they're innocent or not or whether they were combatants or not, I have no way to judge. But of course people have lost their lives, that's not a secret.

Mr. Jeffrey, Ambassador Jeffrey?

Probably between two to 4,000 in a country that in 14 years of war saw 600,000 people killed. And that has to be taken into consideration too. It's a hell of a lot less than what we saw when we were dealing with it.

Well, thank you. I mean, look, I think it's probably close based on what I saw in Suwayda. I wouldn't be surprised if it was 10,000 people right there. I would just say this. I don't think you can turn over a new leaf all that easily. I personally am very skeptical of what is going on there and I don't think that you reward someone who's engaged in very, very bad behavior in the past until you see the kind of good behavior that I don't think that we're seeing thus far. So thank you all for being here today and Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Representative Shreve.

Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate the testimony of our witnesses. I had to step out for something else, but I've learned a lot today. Mr. Jeffrey, it's good to see you again. I had an opportunity not so long ago to stand at the Israel-Syria border and it was at one of those quiet moments as Dr. Karlin described it. But I'm just reminded of the importance on both sides of that border toward keeping it such. A few weeks ago, there was a prison break, a detainee break, 100 or so folks at the low end of the estimates that broke out of custody. And then subsequently our U.S. forces began a mission of transferring I think about 7,000 detainees, ISIS detainees, from northeast Syria to Iraq. The question might best be directed to Mr. Jeffrey, but Mr. Tabler obviously has a lot of experience on the ground, all of you do. Can you tell us what the current status is on the movement of these many thousands of detainees and are we going to be in a better place once we've effected that in your view?

We were in a good place when the SDF was guarding them. There's no doubt about it. But these were in areas that essentially were Arab areas and the Arab tribes rose up and basically changed sides, so the SDF started withdrawing. And as you said, there was some confusion in what amounted to a handover. I'm surprised it was only 100 or 120, supposedly 80 were captured. Now, what the U.S. decided in order to basically spread the wealth to allow us to better manage this, us being the entire defeat ISIS coalition, was to move third country, European, Russian and such, terrorists and family members and the remaining Iraqi people in northeast Syria, and there weren't too many left, to Iraq where the Iraqis will, and they have a lot of experience that also has been mixed, but it'll probably be okay. The Syrians, however, are staying in northeast Syria and they've been placed under the control of the al-Shara government. So it isn't that we don't trust them so we moved them all away. The Syrians are remaining.

Yes. Mr. Tabler.

So it's a very good question. I think the big bet here, the risk, is that of course the SDF, which had intelligence developed with us about different fighters, now that these prisons that were previously SDF now are under the control of the Syrian government, many are being released from these prisons and they, as Ambassador Jeffrey said, they are Syrian in and by and large. The problem is that what will those people do now that they're released? And that is very risky because Syria's borders are not as secure as we would like them to be. So there's a threat in terms of getting outside of Syria. But I think more to the point, it threatens the hold of Ahmad al-Shara on the government in Syria because he has a problem with ISIS within his own ranks. And tragically we learned that from the loss of the lives of two American servicemen and a translator more recently. So again, beware of maps and certainty in Syria. I would urge you as somebody who's been doing this for 25 years and lived in Syria and worked on it from the top down, work the intelligence community, ask for their assessments, try and square things as much as one can. Videos are very important and there are no secrets in Syria, but try and verify the information that you're getting.

I appreciate that very much. We've got approximately 1,000 troops in Syria. Do we generally agree on that number? And we're conducting ongoing missions. Mr. Jeffrey, would the U.S. be capable of conducting these strikes or gathering relevant information in Syria without that presence? Do our troops serve to provide intelligence information?

They do. And it's very, very important. As you know, they do both unique unilateral missions, typically with the JSOC, black SOF people, bombings and raids. Then they work with the SDF. And over the last year, increasingly they've also been working with al-Shara and his central government forces. Now, there was some intelligence sharing, as I said, I cited earlier a New York Times article on how as early as 2016 there was some intelligence sharing back and forth between al-Shara in Idlib and the U.S. So they can do some of that, but it's always best to have intelligence people on the ground, which means troops to protect them, to work with our local allies. I'm a big fan of that and I think they should stay on.

Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you. Representative Brecheen, you've been here from the beginning and you were fighting for this hearing to happen. Welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee, my friend.

I'm truly grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing. I'm going to jump to questions. Ms. Maenza, tell me relative to what you know about Erdogan, the president of Turkey. Has he made public statements that he wants to re-establish the Ottoman Empire?

Yes.

In his desire to re-establish the Ottoman Empire, that means driving all the way to Jerusalem. And so would you please describe the Turkey influence relative to this new regime in Syria in one minute?

Sure. So no doubt that President Erdogan had a big role in bringing al-Shara up into this position he has. He's training his military, he's putting their officers through school, but also establishing troops on the ground. I think he has over 20,000 on the ground and says he's not going to pull them. So I do think that as I mentioned earlier, there are no constraints for Erdogan in Syria like there are in Turkey. So he's able to push al-Shara, no doubt pushed him to want to take the northeast, which is why the U.S. really should have countered him better.

Is there any decision that al-Shara has made in the last six months that Turkey is going public in major opposition to?

I have not seen that.

Neither have I. Is there any position, and I can only say privately because of great respect for what's trying to be accomplished, are you hearing from those of Israel concerned about their own national security about the amassing of troops in the Suwayda region in southern Syria where Israel is saying danger?

Exactly. And I think that we heard earlier about how Turkey even wanted Russia to be in southern Syria.

Glad you brought that up. Can you expound upon the foreign minister discussion as of November between the Russian government and the al-Shara Syrian government and their desire to have Russian military bases in southern Syria once the Caesar's Act was repealed and what that would mean to what we had all hoped would be a demilitarized zone and how if Israel wanted to protect the Druze, which nobody else is concerned about in that region to protect the Druze and the Christians who are being slaughtered, how does that then create not an international incident and al-Shara and Turkey know this, that the Druze would be without protection?

Yeah. So al-Shara in a meeting with Russia said, admitted Russia's fully involved in Syria. And the Syrian government took the Russian defense attaches to the border and wanted to set up I think over 12 outposts. So clearly Russia is wants to I think over 10 bases in Syria right now and I'm hearing from all sorts of sources that there's all sorts of discussions going on about that.

So I watched videos a few months back where paragliding exercises as an exercise in Damascus were taking place. And so the question is asked, is al-Shara weak or is he complicit? Because it's one of the two. Because the ISIS insignia, the flags being raised when they're pushing the Kurds out, ISIS insignia. The people being slaughtered in the hospitals with the Druze, ISIS insignia. He's either weak or he's complicit. And I think it's these wink-wink, nod-nod. And my personal belief is is that he is reading the part of the Quran that says in a weakened position, remain quiet, remain still, let not your true motives be known until you get to a place of strength. My real belief is that Erdogan's desire to have a re-establishment of the Ottoman Empire, that al-Shara is not being fully truthful to what his real goal is. I don't think he's weak, I think he's a pragmatist and I think he's using. I am greatly concerned that 20 years ago China was $2 trillion GDP. And once prosperity came to China once they got in the WTO, now they're at $20 trillion. They're the closest GDP clipping at the heels of America. And what we did by bringing prosperity to China didn't change their ideology. All it did was make them truly a weapon of warfare that we now fear. My great concern is that we are enabling the prosperity of Turkey, we are enabling the prosperity of Russia, and al-Shara is not being truthful to us and that we years down the road if prosperity comes, it's not going to change the jihadist mentality. It didn't change in China, there as the witness said before, 5,000 years and we think that prosperity, they're paying attention to the afterlife. So I've got 19 seconds left. I'm enamored by this concept because Tom Barek has got a role as the Turkey ambassador and special envoy to Syria. He has to maintain a good relationship with Turkey. Would we not be well served for someone that could be specific to Syria, whether it be an envoy specific to Syria or ambassador? How would that not help us to make sure that Tom Barek can maintain a good relationship with Turkey but we can have someone that can play hardball in Syria?

It has been very difficult to have him play both have both hats on and I think we've seen that even with the State Department not having a role to play in Syria policy and waiting for Barek to make decisions that I don't think have served the president well if his goal was peace and stability in the Middle East.

Thank you. I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again.

Representative McBride.

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and to the ranking member as well for organizing this hearing. Thank you so much to the witnesses for your patience as we move all the way down the dais. While today's hearing centers on Syria, the implications reach far beyond its borders. This conversation really is about how the United States shows up in the world and whether we're willing to stay engaged when our influence is being tested. When we step back, when we dismantle tools like USAID and lose our presence on the ground, we leave a gap. And Russia and Iran are quick to fill it. They use instability to grow their power rather than helping the Syrian people build a future. Continued engagement alongside our NATO allies is how we build stability, uphold our values, and convey to the region and the world that we won't cede ground to actors who thrive in and on chaos. Zooming back in specifically, for decades Syria under Bashar al-Assad served as a base from which terrorism and instability radiated across the Middle East. And woven deeply into that reality is Russian influence. Russia didn't appear in Syria overnight. Their military ties date back to 1971 when the Soviet Union first established the naval facility in Tartus, a strategic base for projecting power in the Mediterranean. Over time their influence has become embedded in nearly every layer of the Syrian state. Russia began printing Syrian currency, Russia began supplying arms and subsequently servicing their weaponry. And in turn the Syrian Civil War became a proving ground for Moscow's military tactics and weapons. Experience later carried onto the battlefield in Ukraine with devastating consequences for civilians in both countries. Russia has been playing both sides of the coin for over a decade, harboring Bashar al-Assad in Moscow while simultaneously drawing the new Syrian leadership into further dependence. And we know too well Russia's approach is about leverage, not loyalty. Russia builds its leverage through division and fragility. The West seeks to build it through stability. And so my question to Dr. Karlin, as we seek to stabilize Syria and combat Russian influence in Syria, both militarily, economically, and diplomatically, what concrete tools does the United States have to reduce Russian influence in Syria?

Thank you very much for highlighting that important question, Congresswoman. It seems to me that the Syrian government's approach towards Russia is similar to its approach writ large. It's got to minimize enemies and maximize friends because it's juggling a whole lot as we've talked about throughout this hearing. I have gotten the impression that it is not a top five, top 10 priority from the U.S. perspective to pressure Damascus to downgrade its relationship with Russia. I understand that, there's a whole lot of issues to be worried about, but fundamentally Russia being there is not in U.S. national security interest, particularly Russia's military being there. And as you highlighted, the Syrian government having this dependence in some ways on Russia in a wide variety of ways. So one thing in particular we can do is just start raising this with Damascus, start showing them that while we appreciate they want a lot of friends, this is actually a friend that we see highly, highly problematic. Other things we can do is to help fill the space and get others to fill the space. So if we are working on security sector reform and professionalizing the Syrian military, they're less likely to turn to others as well. And then really the last piece is efforts at stabilization and reconstruction. So trying to bring in additional regional investment, we've seen the Saudis most recently doing so, European investment as well, always to try to decrease the Russian presence.

Certainly that to me I think is a sound strategy moving forward. I'm curious your perspective on the administration's destruction of USAID, the undermining of foreign aid including humanitarian and democratic assistance aid, how that impacts our capacity to effectively execute that strategy.

It absolutely affects it. I mean, we had folks inside USAID focused on helping transition fragile states and they're not there and they don't have the resources. And so you need someone to do this. And frankly, it's not a wholly altruistic effort, it's not wholly a humanitarian effort, it's actually a selfish security effort. If we see a Syria that is not able to be reconstructed, that is not able to be stabilized, that is not able to be secure, it will fundamentally go against our national security interest.

An example playing out in real time about how our destruction of foreign aid undermines not only our values but our own interest. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Thank you, Representative McBride. This has been a great debate. I've really enjoyed hearing it myself. I've held my questions up until this point and I want to ask my question and then I'm going to give the chair to Representative Mills to take over for a little bit. And I believe that we're going to move into another round of questioning for members that have another round of questioning as long as you witnesses can stay for more questions. We're happy to have you and have your input. I want to ask this difficult question and it's not to have you put yourself out there and have somebody, you know, come back and talk to you in a year, three years and say, ah, you know, you were right or wrong on that one. But I'd just ask you to go down the line. Where do you actually think we are next Christmas or a year from now or three years from now or five years? I don't care what the window is that you pick, I'll let you pick it for yourself. But given the course that we're on, given the histories that you know, the possibilities for the future. We'll start with you, Ambassador, and we'll go down the line. Where do you think we are in you pick the window of time?

I think we have a chance in Syria and in the larger Middle East to stabilize and build on our successes over the last few years. But I'm old enough to remember we felt the same way after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 and in the end the region returned to chaos and violence. So we shouldn't think that we are on a path that is going to just get us to a peaceful Middle East. We are on a path that could, if we make the right decisions, I've enumerated some of them, my colleagues have enumerated others, by and large I totally agree with them, but the jury frankly is still out and that's the best answer I could give you.

Mr. Tabler.

A year from now we are going to have very fragile stability. If the agreement that's currently on the table from January 30 is not implemented, I'm afraid it'll become a blueprint for the rest of the country. I don't think you can stabilize Syria without bringing in more minorities beyond tokenistic appointments in the government. I think most Syrians understand that. If the government is unable to do that, we are going to have increased instability in the country. Also at the same time, investment will not flow into the country because now that sanctions are lifted and that's all fine, the bean counters and the other ones who are responsible for these investments coming in from the outside, with perhaps the exception of the Gulf, but I'm not, do not want these funds to go to illicit activities and most importantly they want a return on their investments. Even Gulf countries are very skeptical of kleptocracy. Greater, I think right now, without greater reforms inside of Syria and fast, we're going to be in for a rough year and the years ahead.

Ms. Maenza.

I think the title of the hearing is right on, we're at a crossroads. It can go one of two ways. You know, al-Shara could accept pressure from the U.S. to push towards an inclusive government. That January 30 agreement is key, keeping local governance, local security. So there's a chance, let me put it that way, there's a chance. But if not, we're going to see war, the legitimacy of this government is going to fail, we're going to see the rise of even further of Islamist extremists in this country and it is going to fall apart and that is the worst anti-Iran strategy there could be because chaos will give every all the bad actors, there is no vacuum in nature and that is and in the northeast they filled a vacuum and that is what we've got to be watching for now. So I think it's the pressure the U.S. puts on right now is going to be critical for what happens next.

Ms. Karlin.

Thank you very much for that question. I think we're going to continue to see fragility. So a year from now we will see the integration of nearly all armed actors. We will see violence continue, including violence against minorities. I think simultaneously we will also see efforts to try to counter that violence and to investigate it as well. We'll see a lot more investment come through and I think we will see continued progress on the Israel-Syria front. I think the dilemma will be us trying to understand a year from now has enough progress been made because we will not be satisfied with where things are a year from now.

...administration. For the 10 years preceding the fall of the al-Assad government, al-Sharaa exercised sovereignty over the Idlib district. This decade-long tenure serves as a primary case study for his administrative philosophy. So my question is to Dr. Maenza. Since past performance is the best indicator of future performance, what were the conditions like for Christians, for Druze, and other religious minorities under his control in Idlib?

Thanks so much, Congresswoman, for that question. I'm going to refer to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom's last two reports on Syria. And I think while it's easy to look at Idlib as having been a success and hearing some of my colleagues talk about the stability, the religious freedom conditions there were horrific in the last several years. And the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and the State Department both designated HTS as an entity of particular concern because of the egregious, ongoing, systematic violations of religious freedom. So for instance, in the last year's report, it said HTS continues to impose its interpretation of Sunni Islam on both Muslim and non-Muslim residents alike, and goes on to talk about how they had taken land from Christians. And the other report they had, very similar to that, said that despite HTS's robust campaign to distance itself from its past massacres and other crimes against religious minorities, the group's governance in the northwest advanced a Salafi-jihadist ideology, disenfranchising Christians and Druze. HTS continued to expropriate property, restrict religious rituals, arrest and detain religious minorities and non-conforming Sunni Muslims, and imposing religiously justified dress codes on women. So these are things that we're just not hearing, but that is how al-Sharaa governed when he had Idlib. And so we're seeing his same forces, that is what was normal to them. And so he's projecting this moderate image, and his own forces are like, wait, I don't think so. So many of them were expecting a similar type, really harsh environment for the rest of Syria, and it hasn't been the case, and so there's been friction among even his own forces.

Thank you for that. So during this time, what was the official policy regarding the seizure of homes and lands belonging to the displaced Christian families, and were those properties ever returned?

There was some movement to bring Christians back. In fact, in 2024, the New York Times did an article about the last Christian in Idlib, to give you any sense about how friendly it was to be a Christian in Idlib. But then there was a movement to give some lands back, to bring Christians back, and I think as they were trying to revitalize their image, to try to show that they were pro-Christian, but we have not seen the lands really being returned in any sort of positive improvements in the conditions for all the minorities in Idlib.

Okay, I have one final question. So were the non-Islamic houses of worship, were they allowed to remain open and undergo repairs or hold public services under the Idlib administration?

I understand they mostly were. There weren't very many Christians left to attend, but as you know, religious freedom is more than just being able to go into a church. It's being able to identify and not be targeted because of your identification, be able to have your beliefs openly. So there is some show of that here and there, but overall, it was a pretty harsh place for Christians, Druze, and other minorities to live.

Well, thank you so much, and I yield back.

Thank you so much. I was getting an update on who's next. At this time, I want to recognize a gentleman who was brave enough to actually go into Syria and truly see it for himself, a man that I respect highly. At this time, I'll recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Stutzman.

Thank you, Mr. Mills. I went because you were along, because I know you rescue people for a hobby.

It's not a very high-paying hobby.

Well, thank you. And thank you to the panelists for being here. You all have been great today and really appreciate all of you. As Congressman Mills mentioned, we did go to Syria about a year ago over the Easter weekend. And I tell you what, I love the people of Syria. There's just remarkable people. And the pain and suffering that they have gone through over the past 50 years is... we went up to Sednaya to the prison and just saw the horrific conditions of what thousands and thousands of people lived through. And we as Americans, I know I want to help Syria. I want to help the people of Syria. Christianity was basically born in Syria. You know, I got to walk on the road where Saul walked on his way to Damascus. And I met with President al-Sharaa, and I told him if we could get Syria safe and secure, the amount of tourism that would occur from Christians, just Christians, others as well, but Christians would love to go to Jerusalem and then to Damascus. The economic impact would be incredible. There's so many good reasons why we need to help Syria get this together. And so I thank all of you for what you've done. And religious freedom, I think, is the key to all of this. We are a very diverse country here in America. Religious freedom is one of our core fundamental foundations. We've got to respect one another, no matter our disagreements. Let's agree to disagree, but let's also agree to have a civil dialogue as well. And so I think that's just a critical component to making sure that Syria is on the right track is religious freedom. And I know that there are people there that are living in fear today because they don't believe they have the safety and security because of who they are or who they worship. One thing I'll quickly comment is, you know, I am rooting for al-Sharaa. I want to see him successful. But over the last year, the attacks have been on the Alawite, the Druze, Christians surrounded around Syria, now the Kurds. And so I don't see an attack on Damascus. So I think to me, and this is what I shared with President al-Sharaa, is that actions speak louder than words. At the end of the day, that's how we have to all judge what's happening in Syria is the actions that are occurring. I want to ask, actually because time's running out, I want to ask all of you because Dr. Karlin, thank you for your comments. You gave some great suggestions at the very beginning. And I think that that's so helpful to us as what can we, should be doing. But I want to bring up the embassy because nothing has really been talked about the embassy. And I want to ask each one of you on the panel, how important would it be for us to lean in? I think that's what we have to do, honestly. I don't think we should be backing up. I think we need to lean in. But how important is it or would it be to open the embassy and have a Syrian ambassador? Dr. Karlin, I'll start with you since you brought it up, and then we'll just go right down the line.

Yeah, thank you for raising that, Congressman. I think it's incredibly important. We've debated a lot in this hearing what's really going on, and when you've got smart diplomats there 24/7, they can really help us understand that. And they can try to coordinate all of the different efforts that we have swimming about. So I think it's hands down the most important thing that can happen here.

Yes, I do agree that we need to have a presence in Damascus. And I think that we need to have people that are going to be able to be independent in interacting with the government. I fear that right now the way that Ambassador Barrak has been running policy for Syria, there isn't a robust discussion internally about policy at the State Department. And I think that's why Congress matters so much right now and why your voices matter so much. And the embassy needs to have a very diverse group of people there. I also want to state that I think that Damascus needs to have a mission here. They have not sent official groups here either to interact with the government. The State Department actually mentioned to me, boy, it would be really helpful if they had a presence here so we had this interaction and we could socialize these ideas together, work together, and help them see the only way forward for a diverse country like Syria for peace and stability is to be able to have an inclusive government. Otherwise, Syria is going to fail. And this is the way to do it.

I want to get Mr. Tabler's and Mr. Jeffrey's comments real quick.

I spent a lot of time in the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, not as a diplomat, in and out. It's not safe. It's on Malki Square. There's another property out in Yaafour, we can talk about this offline, that I think we still own. It would have to be constructed, it would have to be a set-back embassy, very, very difficult. But setting up something there is very important. From a public diplomacy standpoint, yes. But most importantly, getting to the point of this whole thing, you know, you've called this hearing because you're caught in the fog of war and peace in Syria. You're trying to figure out what's going on. We need a collection station and we need diplomats there who can go and meet with people and say, hey, what the hell is going on? I saw this video, what is this? What are these tribal forces that are fighting alongside of your forces? What's going on here? We're doing that from the top. We need to do it in a more comprehensive way. We have diplomats and engineers and others who are very, very good at this, but they have not yet been engaged.

Absolutely. But to be effective, any ambassador has to have access to and the trust of the president and his top advisors, Secretary Rubio and Tom Barrack in that case. That's critically important, or you wind up with cacophony in diplomacy. Believe me, I've been there. Thank you, I now yield back.

Thank you so much. And again, that's a great question, but also not just focusing on the U.S. Embassy being based out of Damascus. We know what happens there, but truly looking at the consulate outpost, that would allow us to get ground truth realities, which I think is what Mr. Tabler's talking about. Mr. Tabler, I couldn't agree with you more about the fact of one, have the necessary security protocol standoff and relocation of where the current existing embassy is, but also ensuring we have strategic areas combined with working with things like the Syrian Sovereignty Fund who control all the federal land assets and being able to ask them for those land assets at no cost to the American people. That's the other thing is looking at total cost, because fiscally responsible and safety of Americans is our number one priority. Stabilization and ensuring a free Damascus and Syria is a secondary to that. So I'll always put the American people first. At this time, I'd like to recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Mackenzie, for five minutes.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of our panelists here today. It's a very important topic, safety and stability in Syria. And for myself, it's an important topic because we have a strong and vibrant local community of Christian Syrians. It's the second largest Syrian population in the country. And I have heard and engaged with them on a number of times. They have serious concerns about Christian Syrians who are still in a very tenuous situation in Syria. So Ms. Maenza, my question to you is what is your assessment of the security for Christians and other religious minorities in Syria, but particularly Christians? And do you see conditions for those groups improving, remaining unchanged, or deteriorating under the current government?

Thank you so much, Congressman, for your question. You know, Christians have dropped from 10 percent of the population before the war to 2 percent today, roughly about 300,000 to 400,000 that are left. And you know, and while it seems that President al-Sharaa has directed his forces to not touch Christians, so we haven't seen the same sort of targeting of Christians and it seems to be purposeful that way, yet they have been caught in Suwayda, they've been caught in obviously the Kurdish areas, they've been caught in the Alawite areas, so we have seen them killed. And there has been targeted killings. In fact, there are even some Christians that are being detained right now. So it is not... they still are running into problems and have great insecurity and fear of the future. I think that beyond the historical churches, and I think those are the ones that there has been some sort of sense that you can't touch those and so they haven't been targeted the same way we've seen some other minorities. I think it's important to understand that in the northeast, especially among Kurdish Christians, they've been very public that there are places, in fact where else in the Middle East do you see churches of Christian converts? And so they are especially at risk, and it's so important that Congress also is paying attention to them as we look at the integration agreement, as we look at what these forces do to make sure that Christians who are converts, who've been more public, and of course there are also evangelical churches that tend to be more Christians from the historical Christian churches, but also again, sometimes they're more at risk from these Islamist factions. So yeah, it is very tenuous right now for Christians. I talk to them, some of them that are more up in the high in the mountains further away feel a little safer, but the ones in Damascus and other places are very fearful.

And so you mentioned some of the statements from the current government in Syria. They have made other public statements about how they want to protect Syria's religious and ethnic minorities, including Christian Syrians. But given the violence in the past year, to what extent do you think those assurances are translating into real on-the-ground protections for Christians?

Well, Christians don't feel protected. In fact, so many people personally have told me that someone has come up to them or at the church they've received some post on the front saying you're next. So it's almost like a kind of way of just threatening them even if they haven't followed through with all of it. So I do think that many Christians are afraid. And of course, Christians aren't a monolith, right? There are some that feel safer and there's some that feel less safe. So I hate just making a broad statement because there are... and the Christians are a little different, they live throughout the country, so there's not like one place where the Christians are and they tend to be the glue among all the different communities, so they live among all the communities, especially the Alawites, the Druze, and the Kurds.

The final question I have is the current government under al-Sharaa has agreed that this was one of the points of their framework with the United States government that they would work on, and there are milestones or benchmarks that we want to hold them accountable to. What can we do as members of Congress and the U.S. government to ensure the safety of those minorities in Syria?

I think one of the most interesting things when I met with them, a lot of the Christian leaders in February when I first went to Damascus, and they said don't be the rally cry, don't have the rally cry be protect the minorities or protect the Christians. We want the rally cry to be equal citizenship. They don't want to be favored, they don't want to be marginalized, they want to be equal citizens with their Sunni brothers and sisters who for thousands of years they lived together peacefully. And so I think it's important to fight for equal citizenship for Christians, Druze, Kurds, for everybody. And that means changing the constitution right now. It's an Arab Republic, it could be the Syrian Republic. It has Islamic jurisprudence as the source of law. Even Turkey had that once, it doesn't now, no one holds that against Turkey, they can take that away. It says that the president must be a Muslim, but he doesn't have to be a Syrian. Again, these just send a message to all of society that you're a second-class citizen, and that actually makes them feel more vulnerable.

Well, I want to thank you for sharing that because when I met with a member of the clergy in our local community, that is exactly what he said. He said we are all Syrians, we don't want to be differentiated. They want to stand for everybody. And so I appreciate that sentiment, and that's something we want to carry forward as well. Thank you.

Thank you so much. And that's absolutely one of the things that I noted. Ambassador Jeffrey, I know as many on this panel can tell you, during the fall of Iraq, one of the things that you saw is that everyone started identifying themselves as I am Christian, I am Shia, I am Sunni, I am Chaldean, I am... the benefit that I look at when I went to Syria is that everyone was proud to represent the nationalistic I'm Syrian. I think that's a very bold and big step when we think about what the future of Syria can be, looking at the lessons that we've had from the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. Tabler, you've kind of hit so many good points for me, and I just want to follow up with something because I really do want your thoughts and mindset on this. Seeing the HTS-linked bureaucrats that are filling key ministries in Damascus, is this do you think a genuine political transition or are we actually just watching a terrorist organization put on a suit in an effort to try and get around U.S. sanctions?

Yeah, that's a difficult question to answer. First of all, I note your concern about this, the role of HTS in the new government, even though it's formally been disbanded. Those figures are very clear, they're front and center and everybody sort of knows about that, right? So the problem is I think both the administration itself as well as the centralization of everything, the General Secretariat for Political Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has created, even Ambassador Barrak has talked about this publicly, bottlenecks concerning decision-making, key decision-making on everything in Syria. And I'm sure my international counterparts have found this as well. You have a meeting, you go to Damascus, you have a great time, it's a great place to party too and you have some great food, and you leave and nothing comes from your meeting. That Syrians are also facing that. So the question is a very good question. Is this just part of the political management? I think it is. It could be that it's just the HTS base, but I will point something out to you. Everybody here today has talked about how political instability in Syria was fostered by the Assad regime. It was exacerbated by the Assad regime. Political instability in Syria has come since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It was under Sunni leadership in the 40s, 50s, and into the 60s oftentimes, where the country actually disappeared for three years under union with Egypt because there were coups and counter-coups and their elites were thrown out of the country, and that's how a minority government came to power. So Ahmed al-Sharaa knows, I'm sure, I haven't asked him myself but I look forward to it, how to deal with instability inside of Syria even from within the Sunni community. I'm sure that's part of it. To your point, we need to raise with him the concerns about not including minorities in real, beyond tokenistic, positions. I think that's a legitimate concern of minorities and we need to put this front and center with him if he is to be able to stabilize the country.

I would completely agree with you. One of my favorite books was The History of the Arab by Eugene Rogan. And to your point, when you look at the history of the Middle East, you have to go all the way back from Sultan Suleiman, the Ottoman Empire expansionism, as well as to the elimination of the Mamluks by the Janissary armies and so on and so forth in order to try to truly understand the breadth of history and understanding on this is how it's always been and how we can improve upon it. And so I absolutely agree with that. One of the key things I worry about, and Ambassador Jeffrey, this is something that I know that you focus a lot on, is dealing with Daesh. And one of my concerns is that with the SDF integrating into the national army, which I agree that that's what we need, we need to be looking at how do we expel foreign fighters, how do we guarantee inclusivity and pluralism, how do we actually ensure that SDF and others are integrated into an army that can stand against the various forces, whether it be ISIS or not. But what concerns me, knowing how many we've imprisoned that we've gotten off the battlefield, who exactly is holding the keys to the prison that holds thousands of ISIS fighters today and can we trust them to keep the doors locked?

Right now, it's in transition because as we talked earlier, you've got the number is 7,000 but only a few thousand have moved already of third-country and Iraqi families and terrorists are being moved to Iraq. The Syrians are going to stay. Some of them will be released. We talked about that way back with the SDF when I was in government in the first Trump administration because some of them are just the detainees that we round up just like we did in Iraq because they were on somebody's cell phone number. And some of those people are going to be released into their communities. Remember the projects we had with Guantanamo, we would talk to people and say, well you take these people and you put them embedded in a family or in another environment to get them... and I think you'll see some of that. I don't know how successful it will be, but you will see some of that. I don't think it will be a major problem. The Syrian government is committed to fighting ISIS. They fought ISIS back when they were al-Nusra. It was one group of jihadists fighting another, but they were the jihadists who were fighting ISIS who were the people we wanted to see fought. And they were pretty effective on it in their areas. I think that this requires, however, continued American attention and again, the best way to have that is through...

I agree. My biggest fear obviously is to make sure we don't have what happened with Afghanistan where they dumped the prisons and 40,000 new Taliban fighters joins the battlefield. And that's obviously a very big concern for me. Mr. Tabler, I rather I want to make sure that you and I are constantly in concern of is how Christians are being persecuted throughout the Middle East and even in Nigeria and other places. And I know that you know, this is something that's near and dear to our hearts to ensure that everyone has a right to their own belief, but at the same time that they're not having the persecution and the murderous kind of ideologies that Islam has brought along. Do you have any questions that you want to add into that? All right, thanks. I just wanted to make sure to give you that opportunity. I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask you to respond to that in writing, please. Pursuant to the committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.