DOD Missile Defense Activities and FY 2027 Defense Authorization Request

The hearing will come to order. Welcome to our witnesses today and thank you for your service to this country. We look forward to hearing your testimony. As everyone here understands, the United States faces a very different threat environment than ever before. Our adversaries are developing non-ballistic threats, including hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles, designed to hold our homeland at risk. Our adversaries have also spent decades building multi-layered defensive systems often referred to in the past as anti-access, area denial capabilities. While the department did begin programs to modernize our ability to defend against limited ICBM attacks from a rogue actor, the United States has failed to make a similar investment to defend against a broader range of attacks. We now have a real opportunity to build a homeland defense architecture capable of meeting the threats that we currently face. General Gutlein, you have been granted extraordinary authorities as the Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome. While I appreciate our conversations on Golden Dome in I look forward to you sharing more with the American public this afternoon on why we need to improve our missile defense posture and how you plan to do so in a cost-effective manner. Lieutenant General Collins, I look forward to hearing what progress has been made on enduring missile defense agency programs, including the Next Generation Interceptor and Glide Phase Interceptor, as well as how MDA is supporting Golden Dome. Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, your deep expertise in missile defense and deterrence policy is an invaluable resource for this department, and I appreciate your frankness and insight into the risks and the opportunities before us. General Lozano, the Army's contributions towards regional and forward deploy missile defense systems cannot be overstated. I look forward to hearing more about these systems and an update on the defense of Guam. With that, I would recognize Senator King for any opening remarks.

Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm going to submit my opening remarks for the record for some very detailed points that I think will come up in the hearing and we can proceed directly to our witnesses. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator King. Again, welcome to our panel today. Secretary Berkowitz, would you begin with your opening comments, please?

Chairman Fisher, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department of War's missile defense activities. It's an honor to appear with my colleagues, General Gutlein, Lieutenant General Collins, and Lieutenant General Lozano. America faces intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. The pace and scale of the threat is unprecedented. Our rivals are expanding, diversifying, and increasing the sophistication of their arsenals of missiles and aerial weapons. They are integrating offensive strike and missile defense systems into joint operations to deny access and impose costs. By threatening America's safety, territorial integrity, and economic prosperity, rivals aim to undermine our political will, societal cohesion and morale, and ability to project power. President Trump is restoring American strength to meet these challenges and secure peace. He issued an executive order to field and operate the Golden Dome for America, a comprehensive next-generation defense against the most catastrophic fet- threats facing the United States. The Golden Dome will protect our homeland, citizens, critical infrastructure, and second strike capability. The President's Golden Dome for America initiative is the cornerstone of our homeland defense posture. It's a necessary and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as other next-generation aerial weapons. The Golden Dome will complement our nuclear deterrent. Today, our capability to defend the nation is limited and its effectiveness is eroding against increasingly advanced threats. The Golden Dome will rectify this by creating a layered defense in-depth of the United States. It will defend against accidental, unauthorized, rogue, decapitation, and coercive attacks. In contrast to the current limited defense system consisting of a single layer of ground-based mid-course defense interceptors multiple terrestrial and space-based defensive layers will complicate adversary attack planning and provide more engagement opportunities to destroy incoming threats. Combined with the prospect of retaliation, the Golden Dome will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries the ability to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Moreover, it will save lives and limit damage should deterrence break down. The cost of the Golden Dome, while significant, is a necessary investment, protect assets of truly incalculable value, the lives of our citizens and the territory integ- territorial integrity of our nation. The cost of failing to defend our homeland would be infinitely greater. China is our pacing competitor. We will deter China from a position of strength with a denial of defense along the first island chain. Our regional missile defense posture, centered on Aegis destroyers as well as terminal high-altitude area defense and Patriot batteries, provides a forward-deployed, layered, integrated air and missile defense network. As Operation Epicure underscores, regional missile defense is essential to protect and defend our forces, allies and partners. Our global alliances will remain a strategic vantage if our allies and partners invest properly in defense. The Department will continue to pursue opportunities for missile defense and defeat cooperation to increase burden-sharing, capacity, and interoperability. We're also supercharging the U. S. Defense Industrial Base by cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take calculated risks and leveraging private sector innovation. We must accelerate the delivery of critical missile defense and defeat

Thank you, Mister Secretary. General Gutlein, welcome. You are recognized for your opening comments.

General and Fisher, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to report on the progress of Golden Dome for America. We are here today because the global strategic landscape has changed. For the first time in a generation, our nation's margin of safety has vanished. While we have been focused on the away game, our adversaries have been working around the clock to challenge us at home, and today the homeland is exposed and relatively undefended. A new generation of advanced air and missile threats, unprecedented in their speed, numbers and lethality, now holds the American homeland at risk. Our adversaries are not just expressing the intent, they are demonstrating the capability to threaten our families and our way of life. This threat is not theoretical. We see it unfolding in front of our own eyes every day on our televisions. It is real, it is growing, and was, we must meet it with American resolve. Golden Dome for America is the administration's bold and decisive answer to this danger. It is the cornerstone of our strategy to rapidly improve the equation of the homeland and to ensure peace through strength. This is not another weapon system. It is a layered, integrated shield designed to defend the homeland against the full spectrum of advanced threats. This vision is ambitious, but it is achievable. The foundational technology exists today, and we are moving with the utmost urgency to bring it to bear. Our strategy is built on speed, affordability, and partnerships. My priority is establishing unified command and control networks. to link our existing battle-proven systems and field credible defenses now. With the resources authorized by this community, this committee, we are also investing in next generation technology to dramatically increase our defensive capacity, and fundamentally drive down the cost per intercept for generations to come. Make no mistake, the greatest challenge here is not technical, it is organizational. Success requires forging unity of effort. across the federal government, and as the Golden Dome Director, I have been granted unprecedented authorities to do just that. The leaders on this panel before you today, along with NorthKom, represent this new way of doing business. We are working as one team. NorthKom is my number one customer. The Missile Defense Agency is integrating the architecture and delivering cutting-edge capabilities. The Army is building the operational framework, and policy is deterring our adversaries. In addition, we are transforming our relationship with the industrial base, using innovative partnerships and prize-based competitions to unleash the full power of American innovation. Golden Dome is a generational investment in the security of our nation. It is a promise to the American people and a clear message to our adversaries that their reckless and aggressive actions will not go unanswered. With your continued support and resourcing, we will deliver a defense that protects every American. We owe nothing less to our children and our children's children. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, General Gutlein. General Collins, welcome. You are recognized for your comments.

Thank you, ma'am. Good afternoon, Chair Fisher, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your continued unwavering support of the missile defense mission. Since its initial founding as the Strategic Defense Initiative office in nineteen eighty-three, And through its current establishment as the Missile Defense Agency in two thousand two, the men and women of this missile defense enterprise have made the impossible possible, hitting a bullet with a bullet. And we have integrated disparate capabilities from services, agencies, and nations into an effective weapon system, proven in combat in recent years, months, and days. We have developed, globally delivered, and evolved the missile defense system since it went operational in two thousand four. to address evolving threats, leverage new technology, and align with the nation's national policy. MDA has leveraged its extensive experience in integrating, testing, and delivering technologically advanced missile defense systems to deliver on its promises and commitments to our nation,

Yeah.

and provide the warfighter the battle-proven, lethal, and effective systems that have saved thousands of lives. This team has adapted to the changing character of war, but the mission is not done. Recent operations have only highlighted the increasing increasing pace of change, and MDA is increasing our acquisition tempo to maintain relevancy. Today, MDA is pressing ahead to continue developing and delivering the disruptive, lethal, resilient, agile, and affordable capabilities required today and tomorrow for the defense of the U. S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our international partners. We continue our transformation into the fast and agile enterprise the nation needs, and we are renewing our focus on delivering cutting-edge capabilities across the air, land, sea, and space domains. With the ongoing transition and transfer of proven missile defense systems, MDA will invest more purposely in the development, experimentation, integration, testing, and delivery of breakthrough technologies and foundational missile defense capabilities. MDA will continue to develop and test system elements, components, and technologies for this new generation of capabilities, what we're calling Missile Defense System Next, and it will continue to operate as the system of systems integrator for the homeland defense architecture, developed and delivered by the Office of the Golden Dome for America. MDA al- is aligned with Golden Dome, I with General Gutlein, to deliver the critical capabilities required to defend our homeland and our nation's interests. In closing, I'd like to honor those who have paid the ultimate price in the service to our country, and thank those warfighters, civilians, contractor professionals, and their families, uh, of those operating the missile defense system around the world, around the clock, in harm's way today. They honor us with their selflessness and sacrifice. I greatly appreciate your steadfast support for MDA and your commitment to providing the resources necessary to execute the missile defense mission. Recent conflicts have proven and cemented the vital role missile defense plays in the strategic environment and on the battlefield. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, General Collins. General Lozano, you are recognized for your comments, sir.

Chairman Fisher, ranking member King, and members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the criticality of defending the island of Guam. On behalf of Army senior leadership, we thank you for your continued support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, civilians, and their families. Guam is an undisputable part of the homeland, and I cannot overstate its strategic criticality as the home of American citizens. Defending Guam is unquestionable. It is a geo-strategic location that makes it central to the deterrence efforts against our adversaries in the Indo-Pacific. Serving as a critical hub for power projection, logistics, and regional operations. Our ongoing efforts center on defending against increasingly sophisticated and evolving threats. As the joint program acquisition executive, our organization is charged with synchronizing the development, testing, integration, fielding, and sustainment of the Guam defense system components. These components span across twenty-five prototype efforts and programs of record in the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the Missile Defense Agency. The Joint Program Acquisition Executive also serves as the Material Developer for the Guam Defense System Battle Manager. This suite of products allows current service and agency developed weapon systems and command and control to behave as a unified system. Guam currently hosts multiple systems that not only deliver critical defensive capabilities but also provide soldiers with valuable training and hands-on experience. In the past year, the Army fielded a lower-tier air and missile defense sensor, known as LTAMs, and that battery is on the island. Additionally, a terminal high-altitude area defense battery, known as Task Force Talon, is fully integrated and actively operated by soldiers stationed there. An AN-TIPE-Y-six radar panel provided by the Missile Defense Agency also serves as a key element of the Guam defense system architecture, contributing to a comprehensive, three hundred and sixty degree coverage of the island. With initial operating capability taking place in fiscal year twenty-seven, the GDS architecture will continue to evolve to outpace the threat and could incorporate new technologies in the future, such as directed energy. Thank you once again for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to your questions about the Guam defense system. Thank you.

Thank you, General. Assistant Secretary Berkowitz, I'd like to begin with you in general, guideline. In this setting, what threats is GDA being designed to defend against? And perhaps more importantly, how well has the homeland defended against those threats today?

Uh, thank you for the opportunity to uh to underscore a critical rationale for the program. Um, as I indicated in my opening statements, um, we are in a very complex and dangerous security environment where our rivals have, uh, dramatically expanded their, uh, missile and aerial arsenals. Um, those include ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial weapon systems. Um, the threat they pose, whether nuclear-armed or even conventional, our our truly uh grave threats to our homeland, to uh the American population, to our critical infrastructures, and to our second strike capability. And that is the reason uh why the President took the initiative to uh to order the department to pursue the Golden Dome initiative. Um, if you could remind me about your second part of your question, please.

Can we defend against those threats today?

Um, today we have a very limited um, ground-based, uh, single-layer homeland defense system that was specifically designed against a small-scale rogue attack from North Korea. And, um, we have very limited capability against, um, any other attack with ballistic missiles, and we have no defense against hypersonic weapons or cruise missiles today.

Thank you.

I should say advanced cruise missiles.

General Gutland, would you like to add anything to that?

Uh, yes, Chairwoman. So, Golden Dome is designed to good after the next generation aerial threats, uh, which includes, uh, unmanned aerial systems against our, uh, homeland, uh, cruise missiles, hypersonic, uh, and maneuvering hypersonic missiles, as well as ballistics from the air and ballistics from the sea. Uh, today, as, uh, Secretary Berkowitz discussed, we were really focused on the rogue nation intercontinental ballistic missile threat to protect the homeland, and then we relied on our oceans to take the fight to the enemy. Uh, that distance has been quickly eroded by their technology. Uh, so Golden Dome is bo- is protecting for both conventional threats that we see unfolding on television every day as well as nuclear-capable threats, that could be brought against the homeland.

General Gutlein, in the President's fiscal year twenty-seven budget requests for Golden Dome, it included, uh, over seventeen billion dollars in the mandatory portion of the request. In this setting, can you tell us why it is critical for these funds to be provided to Golden Dome this cycle, and what happens if we wait to fund these programs until fiscal fiscal year twenty-eight or even later?

Thank you, Chairman, for that that question. Uh, today, as we stated, the homeland is relatively undefended, and what we our number one objective is to change the homeland defense equation as fast as we as we possibly can. uh with the objective of delivering an operational capability to protect against those next generation aerial threats by the summer of twenty twenty eight uh if we

and are you are you ready um in your plan to be able to put that seventeen billion dollars to to good use and then to be ready in fy twenty eight uh for more funding to continue the build-out

absolutely chairman chairman chairman we've completely uh uh gotten the entire architecture approved uh we know what the testing strategy is gonna be to get us to the summer of twenty eight and we are postured to rapidly put those funds on contract uh efficiently and affordably to deliver an operational capability in the summer of twenty eight

great and what's the total projected cost of the golden dome and and how will you insure that the taxpayers' money is gonna be spent responsibly what what's gonna happen if portions of the planned architecture turn out to be not feasible, uh, from a cost perspective.

Chairman, that's a great question. Currently the estimated cost of Golden Dome with the objective architecture out into the twenty thirties is a hundred and eighty five billion. That's the hundred and seventy five billion that the President announced when he stood up Golden Dome plus an additional ten billion to accelerate space capabilities that were not p- originally part of our architecture. We have built the foundation of Golden Dome upon a uh scalable uh modular architecture, uh using affordable elements and taking advantage of competition innovation from industry to deliver those elements. And we have scaled it so that uh it is multilayered and uh integrated. If any component of the architecture cannot deliver on time, we have pathways to pivot away from that and and embrace a different technology.

Thank you, General Gutleitner. Senator King.

I have a more much more general couple of more general questions. Number one, I'm very concerned about the way this is being funded. In this year's budget, almost twenty-five percent of the budget is in this uh reconciliation slush fund that doesn't go through the normal appropriations process. It be- it makes defense a partisan process, which I think is unfortunate. And I - I don't I mean, the the Senator and I were here in the days of OCO. This is son of OCO. And it's a fund that doesn't have the oversight of the United States Congress. Yes, it's authorized by Congress, but in a purely partisan way. And since I've been sitting on this committee, all of our work has been bipartisan until now. And I don't understand how this all happened. And you talk about mandatory spending? Mandatory spending is Social Security and Medicare. This isn't mandatory spending, and this is the American taxpayers' dollars, and it's our responsibility to shepherd those dollars and to approve and work through and have oversight over programs created. I thought, Mister Harwich, this is interesting, you said it was the President's initiative and continued support of Congress. So the President gets to say we're gonna do a hundred and fifty, two hundred, three hundred billion dollar project and Congress can sit meekly by and say, OK, we'll write the check for you. I don't understand, I'm I'm very disturbed by the precedent that this is created, which is basically for this year I understand is about twenty-five percent of the defense budget is out of the con consideration of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee and the Chairman of our committee is reduced to saying will you hopefully follow the precedence of Congress, we've heard it saying at mutual at multiple committee meetings, rather than the uh the process that is supposed to take place which is the President proposes, that Congress considers the risks and the costs, and in- and enables and authorizes the program. Uh, I don't know if any of you wanna respond to this, but I really am very concerned about the process that we're talking about here. None of you personally have any responsibility, but but we're talking about taking twenty-five percent of the defense budget away from the Appropriations Committee and effectively away from the from the authorizing the Armed Services Committee and handing it to OMB. in the White House. That's not the way our system is supposed to work. Mister Horowitz, can you give me some reason why it should be done this way, and not through the ordinary appropriation process that stood this country in good stead for a couple of hundred years?

Uh, yes, Senator, I'd like to answer the question. Um, my understanding is that, um, the diss- the rationale for, uh, making the request as part of the reconciliation part of the budget is to accelerate the President's initiative and to provide flexibility

That's another way of saying we don't want to mess with that messy congressional thing where they consider and have hearings, right? You just want to do it because the President wants it. Is that what you're saying? Accelerate.

Uh, no, sir. No, sir, what I'm saying is that this is a uh a one-time request for a plus-up to accelerate the President's initiative.

This is the second year of reconciliation. This isn't a one-time request. This is year number two.

Um, the other part of the rationale is that a provides flexibility given the uh the changing the rapidly changing dynamic of advanced technology, sir.

Well, I I I really don't like this uh process. I think it's I think it's a a huge mistake and I think we're Congress is one more abdication of Congress's responsibility and authority uh to take care of the taxpayers' money. Um, General Lozano, what's the cost of defending Guam, the the uh the uh what you outlined, what's the what's the total cost of the of the defense that you outlined in your testimony.

Uh, thank you, sir, for your question. Um, right now we're tracking a t- a total cost of about uh three and a half billion, sir.

OK. Three and a half billion. So the total cost of Golden Dome projected I think is one hundred and seventy-five billion. Divide that. I'm not very good at doing math in my head, but uh that comes out, what what is it? I I I'll I'll do it right in in front of you, divided by three point five. Uh, it would be about uh fifty thousand times that. I mean we're we're talking about a very significant cost. General Gutlein, can you do Golden Dome and protect like Guam is being protected with that hundred and seventy-five billion dollar budget?

We can absolutely protect the homeland for a hundred and seventy-five billion dollars. Senator, the difference is Guam is a point defense, uh and it is uh uh uh needs to be self-contained and self-defended, whereas the protection of the homeland is an area defense. It's similar to trying to

When you say area defense, what does that mean? That means the whole country. Montana isn't necessarily gonna be protected, or Iowa.

I mean you're p- you're protecting everything simultaneously, so if you were p- trying to protect a single jewel in a museum, you would have to put down an enormous amount of protection measures and defensive measures to protect that one jewel. If you step back and you're trying to protect the entire museum, you can now go back to a regional defense, protect the perimeter without having to do- dedicate all those point defenses. That's really the big difference between the way we're protecting Guam and the way we're gonna protect the homeland.

So the b- the budget that you have, you can protect the entire homeland, the the villages of Louisiana or New Mexico or Montana or Maine uh with the system that you're proposing. It's not it's not designed to protect particular areas like the national capital or the major metropolitan areas?

Golden Dome is designed to protect the entire homeland from that array of threats, whether that be counter-UAS, cruise missiles, hypersonics, or even uh ballistics from the air, ballistics from sea, the entire homeland to include Alaska and Hawaii. And after Guam uh the defense of Guam is delivered, Guam will be part of the defense of the homeland as well.

My time is up. We'll have a second round, I presume, Madam Chair.

Yes. Since we have no other members here, I think we'll continue, if you're good with that, Senator King. Uh, General Gutline and General Collins, I have a question for you. Can you walk us through the role that Missile Defense Agency has in supporting Golden Dome? I don't know how you wanna work this. Who wants to start?

Uh, if you're okay, Madam Chair- uh, Chairwoman, I'll start. Uh, what we wanted to do is take advantage of the vast resources and the expertise of the Missile Defense Agency which has been around uh for for several uh decades. So under the authorities memo that the secretary of war gave me, they aligned the Missile Defense Agency under the operational control of Golden Dome to do the systems of systems integration to do the testing and to do the transition from uh uh development into operations to take advantage of the vast expertise and resources of the Missile Defense Agency. So under Golden Dome, General Collins is actually dual-hatted as my deputy for systems and systems engineering, as well as the director for the Missile Defense Agency, reporting to the director for research and engineering within the uh department of work.

Thank you, General Collins. And in your answer if you could, if you could talk a little bit about that integration that we did yesterday at our meeting in classified and if you could bring that up a little bit.

Ye- yes ma'am, thank you. Um, certainly uh to build on uh General Gutland's uh comments, uh Missile Defense Agency, uh and I mentioned in my opening comments, uh we have a long history of integrating uh disparate capabilities into uh effective combat proven um missile defense systems uh and uh the big s that uh that comes with Golden Dome is is part of that as well uh one additional thing I I we are also an acquirer of of a number of that of those capabilities as well so we are acquiring capabilities to deliver uh and then we're the integration lead for Golden Dome across all the services and agencies as we go forward uh that integration role really covers down on a number of different uh parts of what integration means. There's uh there's program integration, making sure all of the acquisitions and deliveries and schedules are integrated integrated together. Uh earlier today ma'am we talked about uh an integrated master schedule and how we're uh in an integrating office that we stood up uh are really the the source of bringing in the capabilities uh and the schedules from all of the different partners integrating those together, so General Goulime has insight uh into execution as well as all the interdependencies across the uh uh across the enterprise. Uh another integration is systems integration, more the technical integration piece. Uh my chief engineer at the Missile Defense Agency is work shoulder-to-shoulder with General Goulin's chief engineer uh and they really make sure that technically uh the technical integration, the requirements, the interfaces and the management of those interfaces are tied together seamlessly so that when the kit arrives It all works together as a single weapon system. Uh, and then we're we're building below that as well. How do we integrate with operations? How do we integrate with integrate with the warfighter inter-agency and the like? Uh, and so all of those are part of the integrating office, and it's really part of the DNA of Missile Defense Agency in support of General Gutlein and Golden Dome for America.

I'd ask any witness this. We're looking at a h- generational investment here in homeland defense, and we wanna make sure it's um it's going to be what we need in order to meet the threats that we have. Are you um working with industry so we have the best concepts and technology available for this and when you when you work with industry partners the the second and third tier of suppliers um are you making sure that those supply lines uh can't be exploited in the future or even now?

At this moment I'll take that. Uh, we are absolutely working, uh, in partnership with industry. I have personally met with well over four hundred individual companies uh over the past six to eight months, uh, to add to share with them my problems but also to uh understand how they can solve uh our problems. Um, we have uh stood up the C two consortium, the command and control consortium, which includes both the traditional contractors as well as new entrants. Uh, they are, there are eleven of them now working in partnership to deliver our next generation command and control capability. And then as of last week, we stood up what we call the Ecosystem Hub. Uh, the Ecosystem Hub is a one stop shop for industry to come do business with Golden Dome. It's a single point of entry. It includes two-way communications to, uh, uh, have transparent dialogue back and forth. Uh, it has strategic matchmaking. I can connect them to anybody in the federal government, uh, that may be in need of their services or their capabilities. Uh, it has a, a security and resilience element to it. We have brought on companies like Exiger and Goveni to do supply chain resilience down to the multiple levels deep into the supply chain, uh, to look for alternatives to expand the supply chain, uh, and diversify it. And then we have also partnered them with a red team that goes in and helps them figure out how the threat's gonna manifest itself, how to protect and defend themselves against that threat, uh, in a very transparent and partnering type manner. So we are embracing industry like we've never embraced industry in the past.

Thank you, General. Senator King.

Um, what's the estimate of the number of missiles, UAVs and other a- a- attack uh elements that China has? What do we know?

Senator, those numbers are classified, uh, but they they they range depending on the type of threat from several hundred to several uh tens of thousands.

Like, I guess one of my questions about Golden Dome is that the cornerstone of our defense strategy for eighty years has been deterrence, mutually assured destruction. And we lived through a period of the second half of the twentieth century where we faced a a an aggressive adversary with a lot of capability, strategic missiles, bombers, the whole range, without any golden dome. And what protected us wasn't uh sensors and and missiles but the the d- idea of deterrence, that if we are struck we will strike back in such a way as to impose uh unacceptable costs on the adversary. What has changed that makes this uh uh new initiative necessary uh from the experience that we had with the Soviet Union in the in the second half of the of the uh twentieth century? They had bombers, they had missiles, uh, they had strategic capability, they had ICBMs, uh, and that's what we're talking about that, that China has. Why is it that we suddenly need a, a, a defense shield when we went without one for seventy years and it worked? Mister Horowitz?

Uh, thank you for the question, Senator. Um

And I'm, I'm not tr- I, I am being a little argumentative, but I'm, I'm genuinely skeptical and wanna understand why we're, why this is necessary now. when it wasn't necessary when we faced a similar threat, uh perhaps more aggressive from the Soviet Union.

Um, well thank you for the question, I think it is a very important question that uh the Congress and the American public uh must understand to uh be able to support the program's rationale. What I'd say is that the strategic environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and that we're no longer facing just a single monolithic threat. uh we we're now facing multiple nuclear armed rivals uh who have uh increasingly sophisticated um missile and aerial capabilities, first off. Uh the second thing I'd say

But deterrence, I mean we're while this is all going on we're upgrading our own triad very substantially in terms of of our ICBMs in terms of uh new bombers and new nuclear submarines, so why won't deterrence work

Um, I believe that strategic stability cannot be based on US societal vulnerability to assured retaliation. Our competitors clearly do not accept that their societal vulnerability contributes to stability. Both uh Russia and China, um and for that matter uh other actors, have long pursued their own integrated air and missile defense systems. Their objections to US missile defenses are not really about preserving strategic stability they're aimed at weakening or constraining our own defense capabilities that would complicate their ability to use coercive threats, or to attack the United States. In short, what they've been doing is insisting that US vulnerability is stabilizing while simultaneously rejecting such vulnerability for themselves. As I said earlier, um, The Golden Dome is intended to be a complement to our nuclear deterrent because in because in conjunction with our nuclear triad, um, a homeland missile defense capability will provide us both a sword and a shield that'll have a synergen- synergistic benefit to strengthen deterrence, and should deterrence fail, it'll provide a means, uh, to protect the the territorial integrity of the nation and the lives of our citizens.

Thank you. General, uh, knowing that we're in a an open setting. Can you explain how Golden Dome would work? You you in answer to my question about Guam you said, well this isn't like Guam, we're not protecting particular places. By the way, I I did my math, if we if we protected particular places in the US we could do fifty, if we had the same cost that we have it in Guam. But you're saying the system doesn't work that way. Can you can you give us the the concept of of how it would work, rather than having THAAD batteries around Kansas City, for example?

Absolutely, Rink, you remember. If you look at the way,

The away game.

uh, we fight the away game, sorry, the away game. Absolutely, Rink, you remember. If you look at the way we fight the away game, uh, every one of our weapon systems have to be self-contained so that it can operate in a bare-bones environment that it can operate independently uh, disconnected from the larger enterprise. But that is not the way we need to defend the United States. Rather than having all those point defenses being able to operate independently, we can actually bring that ca- capability back to the United States integrate it, network it in new and innovative ways, layer it, bring to bear multi-domain capabilities, automate it, uh, and then take advantage of the next generation level of processing artificial intelligence to make sense out of a greater array of data, to get a better fire control solution. So it allows us to fight cheaper.

But But but doesn't it, I mean, a missile's coming from China. What's the defense? Is it a, is it a, I mean, what you used a lot of words there, but I still don't are we still talking about THAADS and Patriots, or we talking about uh something entirely different?

Rick, you remember we're talking about something different.

Well, tell us what it is.

Uh, we are integrating and networking an array of effectors and an array of sensors using next-gen technology to get a greater magazine depth at a lower cost per intercept.

OK, so when you talk mag- magazine depth, we still are talking some kind of kinetic response, a bullet on a bullet.

We're, we are talking about kinetics. We're talking about uh uh uh non-kinetics. We're talking about left of launch. Uh, we are talking about a whole host of capabilities and a layered effect to include directed energy and bring it to bear in new and innovative ways. We cannot go into the specifics of the effectors nor the magazine depth. But it is a different set of capabilities than what we currently have for the away game.

You said directed energy just because you knew that that was something I was gonna respond to.

He knows your deal.

Thank you. Yeah, he does, he does. Thank you very much. And again, I'm not trying to be argumentative, but my job is to represent the American people who I think deserve to understand how this thing would work, why we're doing it, whether it will in fact increase our security, and as I said at the beginning, uh, how it's being funded. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Thank you, Senator King. If Senator Rosen's ready, she just joined us. I won't be coming back, but I'll normally be, Take your time, get a breath. I'll normally just find me and I never get here before five thirty, but today I was uh here, so. You made good time then. No, no, I didn't come in today. I was here for this meeting. Okay, good to see you. I just opened my envelope.

Good afternoon everyone. Thank you for being here, thank you for holding the hearing and uh Thank you for your service to our country. I really appreciate that. And uh, well, I'm gonna talk a little bit about Golden Dome and the vulnerabilities that are there. Wait, I'm gonna move this a little bit closer. There we go. So the proposed Golden Dome architecture represents a significant expansion of the US Missile Defense Network. Integrating a wide variety of systems, numerous touchpoints that of course have to be protected. An example would be the command control, battle management, and communication system that serves as a global network, linking disparate sent- disparate sensors and shooters. So, General Gutlein, can you talk to me about how the department is addressing the wide variety of systems and numerous touchpoints that need to be protected in such a complex, interconnected system?

Thank you, Senator, the the threats that you are talking about are are are uh very detrimental to our capabilities. When we first stood up Golden Dome, the first thing we did was architect in cyber resiliency from the start, whereas traditionally our legacy systems had to be uh architected l- after the fact,

Mm-hmm.

we actually brought to bear cyber resiliency from the beginning. Then we stood up a, what we call the uh GDA ecosystem hub, it's actually a collaborative effort with industry uh to help them protect their IP and to protect their systems. So we have red teams that can go into industry and show them how the threat's

Mm-hmm.

gonna manifest itself and how to protect and defend themselves against that threat in a very collaborative and partnering way going forward.

Mm-hmm.

From a command and control perspective, we brought to bear some of the leaders of industry that know how to do this.

Mm-hmm.

They are architecting in a cyber resiliency from the very foundation of our command and control capability that brings to bear all the legacy C two systems uh, GDA becomes basically the glue layer, if you will,

Mm-hmm.

uh, federating all of these in a machine-to-machine interface with cyber resiliency

Mm-hmm.

as a foundation.

Yeah, I think that's really critical because if we don't work with the public sector, that interconnectivity, that's puts points, every touch point's a point of vulnerability to your point. And, um, I wanna talk about building on that. I appreciate what you're doing there, bringing in industry partners, uh, building that cyber resiliency in from the bottom, or from the bottom, from the top, from from every side, I guess we'll say it like that, but I want to ask you that to consider that adversaries like China are employing already jamming capabilities, other technical means to confuse our missile defense systems, what measures are you taking then, too, to ensure the integrity of the data layer and prevent that cyber interference from degrading our defensive response during a conflict?

We have built in a layered uh set of capabilities, multi-domain set of capabilities so that we do not have a single point of failure.

Mm-hmm.

And where we can, we have pulled our capabilities off of the grid to be able to operate independently at the tactical edge if necessary and if they are disconnected from the broader uh enterprise if you will.

Thank you. Um, I want to move on to talk a little bit about um some lessons learned in missile defense because our current real-world air and missile defense in the Middle East in Ukraine. Uh, well, we know they provided insights into how advanced air and missile syst- defense systems perform under extreme stress. So these engagements have highlighted not only the effectiveness of layered defense architectures, but also the challenges. And I so appreciate your focus on resiliency, redundancy, and all of that. It's just critical. But the challenges are posed by high volume, mixed threat types. It includes cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems in addition to adversary tactics designed to exploit our system's limitations. So General Collins, can you describe how the department is incorporating the lessons learned from the recent air and missile defense operations into its testing and evaluation pro evaluation process and what steps are you um are you taking going forward to uh um validate um or update our systems before they're deployed again?

Thank you, Senator Rosen. Uh, very important question. We've certainly had a number of lessons learned over the last couple years in, in Ukraine, as you mentioned, uh, defense of Israel as well as in just the last couple months with the

I was gonna say the Middle East too, but uh we'll stick to this.

And very much in, in OEF as well. Uh, and I think you've really, uh, tagged into the increase in complexity and a scale and a layering that we have not seen or uh or planned for in the past it's it's really uh it's increasing at a at a at a

Mm-hmm.

It's an ever-increasing rate, and the ability to do integrated battle management and integrated command and control is, is paramount to the success of these weapon systems going forward. We have uh, during the w- uh, operation, we meet with the warfighter every single day. We pull data from the systems every single day and analyze every data source from every weapon system. And we have been feeding that data back to the operators. Uh, they have been making uh, tactics changes, Mm-hmm. technique procedure changes within a day of seeing the adversary make a change, Yeah. as we go forward. In addition, we're distilling those down into upgrades and advancements of the weapon systems that we are responsible for, uh, as well as, uh, you know, working with the Army on their systems. Uh, and we've put, uh, hundreds of updates out to the field in the last two years, to Aegis, to Thad, to C two BMC, Mm-hmm. uh, in response to the capabilities that we've seen. Uh. there are still capabilities that we need to continue to drive forward in. Uh, I think salvo size and the complexity of integrated salvo size, uh, is a is a very, uh, tough problem to scale the system into.