Hearings to examine an update on Golden Dome.

Good afternoon. The hearing will come to order. I'd like to welcome our witnesses who are joining us to discuss outside perspectives on Golden Dome for America. Our homeland is not a sanctuary. Our adversaries are developing and fielding long-range capabilities, specifically designed to challenge and evade the limited defenses currently deployed. These include cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and large drones, threats that fall below the threshold of a full nuclear attack, yet could still provide devastating damage to our ports, critical infrastructure, and military installations. We do not have an effective counter to these threats, and we cannot afford to remain complacent. Our adversaries must never believe they can coerce us with the threat of a limited conventional missile attack on our country. Which is why this subcommittee has been clear for years on a bipartisan basis that the United States needs a more comprehensive integrated air and missile defense system. This administration has supercharged these efforts. The department is finally prioritizing homeland defense, and has requested the resources needed to rapidly develop and field new systems, and has granted General Gutlein with all of the authorities necessary to realize this vision as Direct uh Direct Reporting Program Manager for Golden Dome for America. I greatly appreciate General Gutlein's close communication with this committee, and I am confident that he's building out an architecture that will provide the United States with much better coverage against a greater variety of threats. He is committed to working with industry to lower costs, explore innovative ideas, and deliver capability as quickly as possible. Golden Dome completed its first successful test in June, and I look forward to hearing about future tests when our committee will be formally briefed in November. Most of the details of the architecture are highly classical. and rightly so. We do not want our adversaries to know the exact contours of Golden Dome. Unfortunately, keeping these details from the public has led to irresponsible speculation, often based on false assumptions about what Golden Dome will look like and what it will cost the taxpayer. Mister Mosher, I understand that CBO's cost estimate released earlier this year, was underpinned by assumptions CBO made based solely on the limited language from President Trump's executive order and it does not reflect any of General Guttlieb's subsequent decisions about the overall program architect architecture. His engagements with industry to lower cost per shot or how he plans to sequence the introduction of capability over time and leverage emerging technologies. I look forward to continue engagements with CBO on more informed analysis in the future. However, there is plenty we can talk about in this setting. And I look forward to hearing from the expert witnesses here today about their views on what the department should prioritize in Golden Dome. Senator King, uh, do you have any remarks you would like to give at this time?

Very briefly, Madam Chair, thank you. Uh, this is an important hearing and it's a difficult hearing. As the Chairman alluded, a lot of the details by definition are uh h h uh are classified and and and must be so. I'm sure our friends in China and Russia are watching us at this very moment. Uh, but on the other hand, this will be one of the most expensive and largest uh projects ever undertaken by the United States government, and therefore the American people have a right to know what how much of their money is gonna go for this purpose, and what will be achieved, what how uh how this uh can and should be effective, particularly given the evolution of of technology of of missiles, cruise missiles, uh space-based weapons, all of the uh alternatives that are being developed today. So, uh I look forward to the hearing and and um uh I hope that the witnesses, we can talk generally about the uh the concept, uh its feasibility and its potential cost. uh of a uh protective uh shield against uh a missile and uh uh airborne attacks on on the United States. So I look forward to to hearing from you, uh bearing in mind that uh we have to be careful uh in terms of what we specifics of what we talk about. And frankly, I haven't yet quite figured out exactly where those where those lines are, but we will we will try to be mindful of of uh not uh alerting our uh potential adversaries of of exactly what it is that we're working on uh on behalf of the American people. So with that, Madam Chair, we'll hear from our witnesses.

Thank you, Senator King. Again, welcome to our witnesses. Uh, Mister Trachtenberg, you are a senior scholar with the National Institute for Public Policy. Appreciate you being here today and you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.

Uh, thank you, Chairperson Fisher. Uh, s- uh, Ranking Member King, members of the subcommittee. Uh, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I would ask that my full statement, along with an occasional paper I wrote on the topic, be submitted for the record. Uh, let me begin by expressing my condolences on the passing of your former colleague Senator John Keil, who was a tireless champion of defending the American people against missile attack. His loss will be keenly felt. Let me also note that I have no special insight into the current architectural details of Golden Dome. The department's reticence to be more forthcoming is apparently due to concern that additional details may provide adversaries with information we prefer they not have, highlighting the tension between the desire for transparency and the need for operational security. Nevertheless, I appreciate this committee's need to better understand what you are being asked to fund. And the administration must be willing to communicate the important rationale for this presidential initiative at every opportunity. That said, I would like to focus on three issues. First, Does the strategic threat to the homeland justify the Golden Dome effort? Second, what impediments exist that may stifle its progress? And third, what should Congress do to help overcome them? First, I believe the risk of coercive threats from adversaries with a variety of increasingly capable missile systems is growing. This may complicate force planning, discourage US military action where the risk of enemy responses may be considered too great and have a chilling effect on US decision making and freedom of action. undermining long-standing US extended deterrence policy. An effective Golden Dome system can help mitigate these concerns. Second, I believe the most imp- significant impediments to Golden Dome's success reflect more political, bureaucratic, and institutional biases rather than technological or fiscal challenges. These include outdated Cold War nostrums, bureaucratic opposition, a poor understanding of deterrence issues, a belief that adversary nuclear threats against the homeland are improbable, a culture of risk avoidance, and the desire to spend resources on what are perceived to be other more urgent priorities. Ideologically-based political opposition is rooted in the Cold War notions that a more robust missile defense is both unnecessary because deterrence is reliable and destabilizing because it will spark an offensive arms race as others seek to overwhelm the defense. Both notions are seriously flawed. Moreover, the argument that Golden Dome can never be one hundred percent effective is also misleading as perfection is not the objective. Heightening an adversary's uncertainty that any attack would be successful, strengthens deterrence. And providing some protection against the possible failure of deterrence is, in my view, the only morally acceptable course of action for a government whose primary constitutional duty is to protect the safety and security of Americans. In light of growing missile threats, it's time to abandon the outdated thinking that American vulnerability to missile attack is stabilizing. With respect to cost, speculative estimates are fraught with uncertainty and based on assumptions and variables that may not be valid or even known. Therefore, allowing such estimates to drive policy decisions is short-sighted and unwise. There is also an unfortunate tendency to confuse cost with value. I believe the value of Golden Dome, both as a deterrent and a defense against the possible failure of deterrence is worth the cost. It is not that Golden Dome is unaffordable, but rather the critics believe the fiscal resources it requires would be better spent on other priorities. And there is certainly a legitimate debate to be had over spending priorities. But suggesting that extreme cost estimates make Golden Dome unaffordable, I believe is disingenuous. Finally, how might the Congress help overcome these impediments? First, Congress should reaffirm its support for Golden Dome and the NDAA, and codify as a matter of policy that the United States shall be defended against all types of missile threats of any range launched from any location. Second, Congress needs to work with the administration to make the promise of Golden Dome a reality. This includes rejecting a business-as-usual approach to missile defense, and supporting efforts to accelerate the acquisition of critical military capabilities, including kinetic and non-kinetic space-based intercept systems to stay ahead of the threat curve. History demonstrates the technology challenges can be overcome if we are committed to overcoming them and not prematurely dismissing them as impossible. Finally, Congress should commit to a regular long-term appropriations

Thank you, Mr. Trachtenberg. Uh, next we have Doctor Karikou,

Mm-hmm.

who is the Director of Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Welcome, Doctor.

Well, Chairman Fischer, uh, Ranking Member King, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation, uh, to be here today. Missiles have become weapons of choice. And missile defenses have in turn become foundational to deterrence and defense. And we find ourselves at a moment of unprecedented global demand for capabilities that have for instance helped keep Ukraine sovereign. It's little surprise the Ukrainians have put a Patriot launcher on their currency. Over the next few minutes I'd like to highlight a handful of topics. Communication, strategic stability, cost, space-based interceptors, and the missile defense enterprise. First, communication. Despite being a flagship priority for the White House, as both of you noted, Golden Dome suffers from a serious lack of strategic messaging, an explanation of what it is and what it's trying to do. References to Golden Dome conjure up fanciful ideas and memes. Critics and cheerleaders project onto it their fears or fantasies, and political polarization doesn't help. So let me tell you what I think Golden Dome is quite simply. It is about creating a limited but meaningful measure of air and missile defense that enhances stability and deterrence. Now, what do I mean by that? Well, the Cold War idea of strategic attack was synonymous with big nuclear attack on the homeland. Today it comprehends much more. With cyber attacks, drones, and missiles, there is now the specter of non-nuclear strategic attack. If Guam went away, if Offit went away, without the release of radiation, it would still be a strategic event. Weakness here is provocative. The absence of air and missile defense invites crisis instability. Tempting an adversary to try a disarming, non-nuclear first strike is not deterrence. It is an invitation to an adversary to see what they can get away with, short of a nuclear reprisal. Now, with apologies to Ronald Reagan, Golden Dome will not make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. But deterrence by denial does raise the threshold for attack. That was the logic when the Biden administration began work on the defense of Guam, and cruise missile defense of the homeland. Golden Dome extends that same logic. Russia and China know this. They have sophisticated homeland error and missile defenses for their homelands. But we refer to them with boring names like anti-access and area denial. Third, cost. And here again, insufficient communication uh fuels misperception. Some estimates are in order of magnitude greater than General Gutlein's publicly stated budget of a hundred and eighty-five billion dollars over ten years. One of the layers of Golden Dome, referenced in public industry day slides, refers to pockets of limited area defense, and nor add term of art. The word limited is literally right there in the title. Another reason cost estimates are off is, I think, inattention to the art of the possible. and even what public information tells us. This is a home game, and home field advantage translates to eased manning and ruggedization requirements. A containerized FAD launcher, plugged into the power grid of your local military base, has a lighter footprint than a mobile battery bouncing around the desert. A home game would also permit things like a mesh network of sensors, analogous to what Ukraine did with acoustics. We could, for instance, integrate data feeds from things like the FAA's air traffic control radars. Next, space-based interceptors, or SBI's. The implications of space as a war-fighting domain are still beginning to sink in. But as with all other war-fighting domains, it will be home to the various war-fighting functions, including fires. Space to space, space to ground, and yes, space to boosting missile. The question isn't whether SBIs can work, but whether the constellation can be scalable and affordable. Here it's important to be clear-eyed, open-minded, and imaginative. Cheerleaders should stop ignoring physics and the absentee ratio. This is a hard problem. Likewise, critics should acknowledge improved feasibility and leave intellectual baggage from the Cold War behind. It's not the nineteen eighties anymore. This can't just be a repeat of brilliant pebbles. Congress can push the Pentagon and industry to innovate, solve, and get after those hard problems that will meet those criteria of scalability and affordability. And consistent with the fundamentals of war fighting functions, to build capability that allows us to mass fires from space and to partake of maneuver warfare. New technologies and capabilities are available, more innovative operational concepts can be devised. This is America. I would urge objectivity and patience. Let these experiments advance. Let's see what industry can deliver and render judgment in a few years. Finally, we should think about how to institutionalize these efforts within the broader missile defense enterprise. The DERPAM construct is a temporary one. We probably don't need more than one joint national missile defense acquisition-centric organization. for the foreseeable future. It may make sense to merge GDA with MDA into something else more fit for purpose. Ingredients for success would include unity of effort, authorities, high level access, and control of resources. And it's no secret that the Golden Dome name has contributed to polarization. But there's probably ways to get after that too. Congress could even rename it in the future NDAA. In closing, let me emphasize that it is the threat that drives the need for Golden Dome and for deterrence by denial. My written statement includes recommendations for how to shape and improve these efforts. The most immediate need, of course, however, is to appropriate funds for both the munition acceleration ramp and this Homeland Defense effort. All these efforts will stand or fall on twenty twenty seven funding. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Doctor. I I would remind everyone that while President Trump has named Golden Dome, the focus for this layered missile defense system came from the senate armed services committee and it was put into a study, put into uh effect in the fy twenty-four uh NDAIA. So, it came from us.

Thank you.

Thank you, doctor. Mister Mosher, uh, director of the national security Director of National Security Analysis with the CBO, Congressional Budget Office. Welcome, sir.

Thank you very much, uh, Chairperson Fisher, Ranking Member King, uh, and Senator Reid and the committee. Thank you for having us, uh, the opportunity to talk about our analysis, uh, of national missile defense. Uh, I'd like to submit my formal statement for the record and then just emphasize a few points. Um, CBO is, just to be clear about our tasking, CBO is. estimate the costs of implementing President Trump's January twenty twenty-five executive order the Iron Dome for America CBO has estimated the cost of a notional NMD architecture based on the goals and capabilities outlined in that executive order the Department of Defense in um since the executive order implementing it uh has created an initiative now called the Golden Dome for America was that sort of term that we all use now uh it's still being developed uh and the details about what they will develop and when they will deploy it, as people have talked about here, the objective architecture has not been publicly released. Um, so we did not estimate, uh, the cost of that system at all. CBO estimates that a system that is consistent with the executive order would cost about one point two trillion dollars to build and operate over twenty years, and these numbers are all in twenty, twenty-six dollars. That estimate includes seven hundred and forty billion dollars for a boost phase space-based interceptor layer, two hundred and seventy billion for uh multiple layers of ground-based defenses as called for in the executive order and a hundred and eighty billion for other activities including deploying a sensor system and conducting research and development the Golden Dome's price as has been mentioned that they've announced a cost target of a hundred and eighty-five billion um which as people have raised is very different than our number. Let me talk briefly about the executive order it marks a real change in US Missile policy as some of my uh co-panelists have mentioned. It's more in common really with Reagan's uh strategic defense initiative than recent policy recent policy is largely focused on uh sort of defending against small numbers of missiles coming from small countries like North Korea with limited countermeasures and the system we have in Alaska sort of reflects that that focus um but Golden Dome in the executive order calls to protect the entire United States its critical infrastructure and its population from all air missile attacks from any country, including Russia and China. Um, that could amount to hundreds of ICBMs if it's a large attack, thousands or more nuclear warheads that they may carry, uh, hundreds of hypersonic weapons, uh, it could be cruise missiles or other aerial threats, and conventional as well as nuclear attacks. So it's a whole range of threats that we've been talking about here. To arrive at our estimate, CBO analyzed this notional system, it's a multi-layered system, with the executive order. To counter missile threats, it includes several layers of ground-based systems and a layer of boost phase interceptors, uh, based in space, all of which were specified in executive order. To counter hypersonic threats, it includes space-based sensors and it includes specialized interceptors based on the ground. To provide protection against cruise missiles and long-range drones, it includes air defense interceptors and radars, and to protect itself against the sorts of drone threats we've seen recently, in other countries. It includes counter drone defenses. To the largest extent possible, CBO's notional architecture relies on existing systems, the idea being that you can deploy things quickly if they're existing. Uh, new technologies just take longer to develop. Um, some technologies like space-based interceptors we don't have at hand. Um, I just wanna sort of emphasize here that CBO's estimate is subject to considerable uncertainty and it's based on this notional system. Costs could be higher or costs could be lower, depending on a number of things. The biggest determinant of whether the costs are higher or lower is the size of the threat and the type of the threat that the defense is designed to handle. Um, and the e- executive order, in - in our view, takes a very - sets a very high bar on that, and so that's reflected in our estimate. To help address that uncertainty and allow readers to kind of make up their own mind, we used a building block approach. um and reported the cost of each of the elements that we have at each of the layers so that uh we could see what we have done and you also could if you were so inclined uh come up with your own architecture and use those pieces. Uh in general though cost could be lower as I mentioned if DOD builds a a a system that's smaller, and some of the things that uh my co-panelists have mentioned as sort of building smaller and building up that could certainly cost less than our estimate. Um if you had space-based interceptors to deal with a smaller attack ten uh missiles we talk about would reduce costs. If you focused as as uh Doctor Carrico has mentioned on just parts of the country, with your ground-based systems, that would reduce costs. On the other hand, costs could be higher uh if they build a larger system that's really intended to deal with a full Soviet or R- excuse me Russian or uh or a Chinese attack. Um could also be higher if new systems encounter cost growth, and also in sort of an important way could be higher if our potential adversaries take steps to try to undermine those defenses, they increase the size of their forces, they uh engage in uh countermeasures and involve in different systems that would reduce the effectiveness of our defenses. And so all those things could lead to higher costs. Thank you again for the opportunity uh to talk about CBO's work and I look forward to all your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Mosher. Um, Doctor Karikou, in the near term, what are the best opportunities to improve coverage of the homeland against missile attacks. What is your opinion?

Well there's a there's a lot there. Uh there's a lot of different types of missiles. I will say, and I wanna harken back to the title of the executive order from last January, it was called a it was originally called an Iron Dome for America. I think they decided that might come into copyright issues. Uh so it's now called Golden Dome. But you know, Iron Dome is the lowest tier of Israel's multi-tiered missile defense. And so where I start from is at the bottom, from the lower tier threats. We have a limited GMD ICBM defense from rogue states, as was said, but w- the the the degree of vulnerability is extraordinary at the, let's just say, counter drone, counter cruise missile type of things. This is one of the

Do you think, do you think at that level that we currently have, um, a number of, uh, defensive systems that we could leverage?

Uh, actually yes. Uh, those are systems that largely are used over there for quote unquote regional defense or base defense. Uh, we put out a report a couple years ago called North America is a Region Two, because to emphasize that those air and missile threats are coming to a theater near you. And that's kind of what this Golden Dome, I would also say the uh, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Task Force four O one is getting after, the drone threats and the cruise missile threats. And so to get to the additional part of your question, uh, Senator, the first and most needful thing are the the sensing capabilities to have better uh, air surveillance and better tracking and better target identification of the low and slow drones of the cruise missiles and things like that so first and foremost, you can't kill it if you can't see it and so uh first and foremost I would go after the sensors and and start there with the aerial threats and build up.

What do you, what do you see as challenges in trying to um develop um a management system out there that that would integrate systems across different domains, um across multiple services, across uh a number of agencies, and I guess the main point I'd like you to hit here is our industrial base up to the task right now.

Mm. So I mentioned along the way the the the Biden administration's initiative for the defense of Guam. At the time it was described as the perfect air and missile defense problem. Why? First and foremost because of the neighborhood that it's in and the number of of threats that it faces. Uh but also because of the systems integration challenge of fitting together the Aegis and the Thad and the the Patriot or IBCS fire control systems. These are systems that were designed to operate alone and unafraid within their silo. And so the defense of Guam effort and now the Golden Dome effort must first get these systems that we have today to be able to work together and in concert with another and what that means especially is to not all shoot at the same thing. You could have uh, and we've seen this in the real world over the past couple years, if you need fire de-confliction and fire control so that you can use these things efficiently and not shoot more interceptors than you need at a given target. That's just an example of the battle management problem.

OK. OK, thank you. Uh, Mister Trachtenberry, uh, what capabilities, uh, do Russia and China have that they're developing that you believe, um, threaten our homeland the most and why are these threats fundamentally different from what we've faced in the past?

Uh, thank you, Senator. I I think both Russia and China have been engaged now for many years in a very aggressive uh nuclear uh strategic and non-strategic modernization program to develop newer, more sophisticated systems. Uh, for the Russian Federation, everything from the Sarmat, uh, for example, to the Oreshnik, which was used uh against Ukraine, an intermediate range nuclear capable system, uh to nuclear torpedoes and and things like that, uh the Russians have been very aggressively modernizing their capabilities. In fact, I think it was Vladimir Putin himself who not long ago said that uh the s- the strategic modernization program of the Russian Federation was well over ninety-five percent complete. Well, the same cannot be said obviously for the United States. Uh, the Chinese have also been modernizing their nuclear weapon system and building up their their conventional capabilities as well. Uh, the discovery of some three hundred and fifty uh, previously unknown Chinese ICBM silos suggest that the Chinese have abandoned the policy of minimum deterrence if they, if they ever actually believed that. Uh, uh, they have been, uh, developing, uh, fractional orbital bombardment systems, uh, hi- uh, hypersonic, uh, capabilities. So the threats themselves have been growing, I believe, substantially. And my concern, Senator, is that the growth in the missile threat, uh, i- is outpacing our ability to deal with it. We still have a very limited national missile defense capability, primarily directed against rogue states like North Korea, with a limited number of terrestrial-based interceptors. I think we have the c- capability to do more.

Thank you. Thank you. Senator King.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Um. First, I have an issue with how this program is being funded. And that's not really your, your gentleman's problem, but, uh, it's being funded principally through reconciliation, which is a c- totally partisan, uh, process with very little input from the Appropriations Committee or uh the members of this committee and um it has very little restrictions in the way of how it can be spent. So I just want on the record that uh this is a, as I mentioned at the beginning, one of the most expensive and important uh initiatives of of this government and it should be one that is um has broad popular support uh indicated by broad support here in the Congress. The fact that the vast bulk of it was funded first in the reconciliation last year and is proposed for this year uh, I think is - is, uh, very bothersome from a point of view of process. Um, I have a hard time figuring out how this would actually work in practice. And here's a - here's a, uh, uh, uh, a simple example. Uh, Guam, as we know, is a US, uh, uh, uh, uh, pla- uh, place in the, uh, in the Pacific, a territory in the Pacific, uh, that is highly important to us strategically. So we have a very substantial missile defense uh capacity there and I've sitting right where you are, Mister Moser was the general in charge of that, I asked him how much it cost to develop a comprehensive missile defense strategy for Guam the answer was eight billion dollars I just I wasn't doing my email on my phone, I was asking Claude how many cities in the United States have fi uh fifty thousand people or more the answer was seven hundred and eighty so if we're gonna protect those seven hundred and eighty cities the way we protect Guam uh, the calculation is six point two trillion dollars. So, I I just this hundred and eighty-five billion dollars to me is is is a is is a not a realistic number. Uh, and a and the the other piece of this that bothers me I was looking at the President's executive order. It says, will deter and defend its citizens and critical infrastructure, uh, provide for the common defense of its citizens. The implication of the term Golden Dome is a national coverage. And I think all of you will agree that that's just not in the cards. So one of the questions that has to be discussed is who's being protected? And what is the Golden Dome actually gonna do? G- uh, the - the - the nomenclature implies an arch over the entire country that's - that's protected from any kind of missile attack. And w- w- would you agree that - that that is not what we're talking about here?

Uh, uh, Senator, I would s- I would suggest that the nature of Golden Dome is to try to produce a system that is capable of a much broader level of defense for the American people, uh,

So this means every - every - uh,

for - for the country.

every American citizen can sleep better tonight

Uh,

because they're gonna be protected from a missile attack?

I - I - I - Well, with all due respect, Senator, I don't think that's the appropriate metric to use. The - I - I believe the appropriate metric, as - as I stated, is can we provide uh can we build a system that provides a level of protection that dissuades and discourages

To whom? To whom?

I'm sorry.

Who is who is being protected and who makes that decision? I are you are you telling me that every citizen

Oh

in America can be protected by this system?

I I no, I'm not saying every citizen can be protected. I'm saying

OK, so if that's the case, who decides who's protected and who isn't?

Oh, I think that the uh actual architecture would be Again, I I don't have insight into the current architectural plans, but I think it would be deployed probably in phases or in stages, uh, at at certain times when the architecture is is ready,

Oh.

but I think it should be expansive. I'm a firm believer, Senator, in the old Air Force recruiting motto, aim high. I think we should aim high on this. We may not get there. Uh, I I agree, but I'd rather aim high than aim low.

Well, S in in terms of what we are attempting to do. As you can tell, and and these are these are good faith questions. I mean, I'm just trying to understand this thing. And i- if it's not gonna protect the entire country, who is it going to protect, how is that going to be decided, and what what is the realistic cost estimate? Is my Guam example just completely crazy? I mean, that there's a case where there's a b- you know, a golden dome over Guam and it cost eight billion dollars to to cover, I think it's two hundred square miles. Los Angeles is four hundred square miles. So protecting Los Angeles would cost twice as much as protecting, uh, as protecting Guam. What am I missing?

If I could take a stab at that, uh, I would suggest that the the Guam an- uh, analogy is perhaps not the most apt one. Uh, Guam has, as you as you noted, Senator, uh, an outsized significance for our overall operational plans for the Pacific.

Right.

Uh, and in that sense, it's the defense of Guam is about buying time, for the forces that are stationed there or based out of there to be able to end the threat by other means,

Protecting,

to last long enough.

protecting Guam.

Not not not the just the territory,

OK.

but especially the power projection capability.

Of course, I understand.

And so Los Angeles has some ports, but it doesn't have that power projection capability. And so, when to answer your question of what should be protected, I would suggest walking down the hall of the Pentagon to the NorthKom office, and asking them for their uh uh defended asset list, the one to enlist and start there. And it's

Well, one of the, one of the things in the executive order which I think makes sense is the United States will guarantee its secure second strike capability. That would imply a special protection for the Sentinel project or the stealthiness of our submarines or the basis of our, of our uh uh air force. I understand that, I uh but but the the I'm I'm just I'm just trying to get at what this thing will really do, at what cost, and The most serious national security threat facing this country today is the forty trillion dollar debt. The ch- the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff testified to that several years ago, and I c- I can't disagree. So, we can't just say, well, this is important and we're gonna spend whatever it takes. And I think we need to have some realistic cost estimates and a hundred and eighty-five billion to protect what part of the country, ten percent, twenty percent, uh, I think we have to have answers to those questions. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Senator Fish Senator Fishers Thank you, Senator King. End of the day. Sender rounds, you are recognized.

Uh, thank you, Madam Chair. Look, I let me look at this a little bit different. I'd I'd I'd I I respect uh what Senator uh King is suggesting here, but let's start where where we're at where we're at today and what the difference would be. If, as the senator had suggested, that this may protect ten percent and we're spending that kind of money the the answer is is today do we have any protection at all and and i will simply begin with doctor uh just let's just begin with this what what percent of the united states is protected today from these incoming missiles

you're talking about north korea icbm the md system is designed to provide

uh put your put your and start over again

pardon me uh if you're talking about a rogue icbm the gmd system is is designed to provide continental coverage uh, or national coverage against a very small number of threats. Uh, but it, but again these, the kind of threats that we see on a weekly basis in Ukraine or the Middle East, the garden variety, cruise missiles and drones, the short answer is, sir, sir, we are astonishingly not protected. The heads of North Com have come up here and said the same thing. You see drones around Barksdale, and people think

No, if you were, if, if you were to ask the American public, they would say, we have NORAD and the protection is there. The, the reality is, is for a, for a, lone shot from North Korea, we can handle that. But right now what we're really talking about is taking the next step, which is to avoid a nuclear conflict and part of that means being able to assure our our competitors, the the adversaries, that even if they were to get off a successful first strike, that we would be able to defend against it and that we would respond with a devastating response, a a response strike that they would never wanna see. And this is one more step in saying let's not go to nuclear war. And then the question is is how do we do that without destroying our economy? And the the idea behind this to begin with was is the the layered effect that we have right now as a first step. But let's just think about how this is all gotta be put together a little bit so that we have a better understanding of what we're really talking about. And I I I also agree with with Senator King when he says, should this taken, should it have been necessary to go to our reconciliation to get this started? And I would say, no, this should have been on a bipartisan basis. And I won't lay fault for why that isn't happening, I'm just simply saying we need to get back to a bipartisan approach to this as soon as possible. And w- but we couldn't wait another year to have that happen or we'd be farther behind than what we are right now. So Let's get back to a bipartisan and let's include it in the underlying appropriations, but which is ongoing. Now, i- if we talk about the, the uh, the plan itself, today there are a couple of things we need. Number one, we've gotta be able to sense it. In other words, identify if there is an adversary who is actually coming out. We can do some of that by cyber. We check on them, we know what they're up to, we can see their planning. We also know that before the left of a launch we can have some sort of sense of what they're what's going on but upon a launch we need worldwide coverage in other words the ability to actually see these launches can you talk for just a second about what that would entail in terms of our ability to see worldwide on these types of launches that would create the the confirmation that something is going on um i'll start with doctor caraco once again

yes well in terms of the launch detection if you're talking about icbm we've got all kinds of uh overhead uh infrared to detect the launch uh but there's some very important initiatives go back to the the the biden administration and and before in terms of especially hypersonic and ballistic tracking for those less uh for the more maneuverable things

so we need more than just infrared we also gotta be able to track a moving object and separate it out from other moving objects correct

the discrimination channel

which means radar for the most part

for the most part yeah

ok the the three point one to three point four five portion of the of the magnetic spectrum is critical for all of our radars our best radars Right now it constantly is under attack by commercial operations that wanna take that over. Can you talk about how serious that is, just in terms of a very simple issue that we have to protect right now?

Yeah. Uh, thank you for your leadership on this. The lower three that you identified are the S-band. That's where so many of our our radars operate, our Aegis SPI radars, Gator, uh, the Army's uh TPQ fifty-three, LRDR. A lot of the radars we have today and that we're gonna be deploying are in that band, and if we, if you have commercial noise, It will jam them.

OK, and and so that's just the sensing of it, but then we've gotta be able to identify and this is where the space-based systems come in. We've gotta be able to identify early on because we don't wanna have that come into the United States. We play away games. We want the ability to have systems available to take out these targets and some of those are gonna be space-based, aren't they?

Uh, uh, yes, sir, it could be, it could be X band related things that are involved there, it could be kinetic things as well.

OK. I'm I'm running out of time, but I I I think this is very important that we have this discussion. And the fact that right now, compared to what we have right now, what the Golden Dome will provide is magnitudes more of an opportunity. The question is, is how do we efficiently deliver this thing in a period of time, and how do we do it on a bipartisan basis? Thank you, mister. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Senator Rounds. Ranking Member Reid, you are recognized.

Well, I would prefer Senator Kelly to win this one.

Okay. Thank you. Senator Kelly.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Senator Reid. Uh, Mister Trachtenberg, um, I've got, you know, some major issues on the physics of this system, especially the space-based interceptor part of this. The physics favors the offense in a big way. Um, interceptors can be defeated by countermeasures. Uh, and often when we test these things, we don't account for those. Um, but the other issue here is deterrence is about perception. And this administration might see Golden Dome as a defensive system. But what also matters here for strategic stability is how does, how does China and Russia see this? I mean, for decades, US nuclear strategy has recognized the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. They're connected. The basic concern is pretty straightforward. If one side builds defenses that could substantially reduce the effectiveness of the other side's nuclear deterrent, the other side has an incentive to build more or better offensive weapons with more countermeasures. And that dynamic was part of the rationale behind negotiating limits on offensive and defensive systems during the Cold War. We considered this very seriously. So we need to understand what the response, uh, an expansion of US strategic missile defense could generate. If Russia and China believe that the Gold- that Golden Dome could reduce the effectiveness of their retaliatory forces, they could respond by expanding their arsenals, developing new ways to penetrate our defenses, or seeing the U- United States as willing to take a lot more risk if we're in a crisis. So, Mr. Chachtenberg, what do you assess Russia and China are thinking about Golden Dome today?

Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your comments. Uh, I think Russia and China have been moving out, uh, irrespective of what the United States plans to do or or or may do in the future. Uh, uh, as I said, both Russia and China have been modernizing, their own nuclear systems, and I believe that they're doing that because their goals and objectives don't align with ours. I do think Russia and China will oppose Golden Dome just as they have opposed uh all US missile defense efforts.

But you sound like it sounds like you think they're on a path regardless of any steps we take. As I think uh Senator King pointed out,

What I'm saying, sa-

Chinese are watching this today.

Yeah, sure. Uh, but what I'm saying, Senator, is that there is no mechanistic action-reaction formula. Uh, and historically, the belief that the United States generates reactions on the part of adversaries has not been proven to be so. And I go back, you mentioned the cold net.

Yeah, but isn't it logical that if we were to build let's just say, let's you know, when you When you study math, right, you look at things at the limit. If we were to build a system that they perceive is able to take out, let's say, a large salvo of ICBMs, what would it be, what would the logical thing for them to do? What would be a logical response?

I think the logical thing for them to do would be not to consider attack in the first place.

You don't think the logical thing would be a larger salvo in nuclear weapons? Cuz this is gonna be sized for something.

Sure, sure. But se- but, Senator, again, if you look at history

So you think that is logical?

If you

That if let's say, just theoretically.

No, no. If you,

If

if you, if you look at the historical record, I think you see the Russians and the Chinese moving out based on their own considerations irrespective of what the United States has or has not done. You may recall the

On all kinds of things, and we do exactly the same thing.

No, you may recall the ABM treaty of nineteen seventy-two was intended to the Soviet Union at the time from building up its offensive capability, because because we eschewed defense of the of the national territory, so they had no defense to counter. In reality, what happened was the greatest increase in Soviet ICBM weapons and warheads occurred after the signing of the ABM treaty. So their reaction suggests these are the