Hearings to examine an update on the National Defense Strategy

We'll convene in about 30 seconds if that's okay. At the warning order. At the warning order. Warning order. Please, yes.

Where do you want this so it doesn't spill?

The committee will come to order. The committee meets this morning to discuss the 2026 National Defense Strategy. This NDS comes at a time of upheaval as the axis of aggressors seeks to undermine an American-led 21st century. Last month marked the beginning of the fifth year of Vladimir Putin's ruthless war of choice in Europe. Then over the weekend, President Trump rightfully struck Iran to end forever the Ayatollah's quest to use both conventional and nuclear weapons to threaten America and our allies. And of course, China's massive military buildup casts a pall across the Indo-Pacific. Beijing looks to dominate Asia and supplant U.S. leadership around the world. Given such threats, the importance of this NDS cannot be overstated. These uncertain times call for strong U.S. leadership, a crystal clear articulation of the threats we face, and a prioritized set of achievable objectives for how we will defend our interest. This was the approach we saw in President Trump's first defense strategy, a consequential document that focused on homeland defense, acknowledged the return of great power competition, and correctly identified China as the pacing threat. Our witness this morning, Mr. Elbridge Colby, the department's Under Secretary for Policy, helped lead that first process. And for that, he deserves considerable credit. Thank you, sir. The first Trump administration's realistic approach to China policy enabled a long overdue departure from the wishful hope of previous administrations who sought to view China as a strategic partner rather than the enemy it clearly is. There are certainly parallels between the 2018 and 2026 versions of the NDS. For example, the prioritization of homeland defense, the identification of China as the pacing threat, and the importance of equitable burden sharing with our allies. I welcome the consistency in these themes as the underlying concerns have only worsened in the intervening years. Unfortunately, these common themes also highlight some flaws in the new 2026 NDS. Principally, I believe the strategy document fails to acknowledge the global nature of the threat posed by the axis of aggressors working together. The 2026 NDS rightly makes clear that our adversary's best strategy is to act in, quote, "a coordinated or opportunistic fashion across multiple theaters," unquote. However, it nonetheless draws the wrong conclusion about what to do about this. It is no secret that we are currently unprepared to compete against the axis of aggressors. We need to do more, and the administration proposes to do more. But right now, we lack the industrial capacity to alter this condition in the near term. This committee has spent considerable time working with Secretary Weinberg and Secretary Duffy. Together, we are supercharging our defense industrial base to meet the production demands for this type of competition and to build a more resilient American economy in the process. We have much work to do. Particularly, we must continue incorporating new weapons and new companies with advanced manufacturing capabilities that can contribute rapidly. Until we fix our industrial base, we need to get more creative at how we support our allies and partners, particularly when they represent the front line of our adversary's aggression. The President issued a call to arms to our allies and partners, urging them to spend 5 percent on their GDP on defense. That call has been remarkably successful. Congratulations, Mr. President. But any clear-eyed assessment of the military situation in Europe makes it clear we cannot fully delegate the Russia problem to our European allies. In my view, the NDS essentially ignores the implications of the war in Ukraine to U.S. security. The document downplays both America's interest in denying Putin the benefits of his criminal aggression and the threat his success would pose to the U.S. interest in Europe, should he be successful. Currently, Europeans are paying for every weapon that America is supplying. I do not see a concerted strategy to get new types of weapons to Ukraine, particularly those weapons that are not in high demand for U.S. military forces at the present time. I think, for example, of programs like the low-cost ERAM cruise missile. We've got to do better there. The NDS also says little about our vital interest in the Middle East. This seems out of step with repeated military actions to deal with the ongoing threat of Iran. President Trump is demonstrating that we can and will do more than just one thing. He's exercising limited but decisive force in order to ensure that the region and the world will not be threatened by a nuclear Iran or its terrorist proxies. Hear, hear. And of course, the President's National Security Strategy proclaims that the U.S. will reassert its preeminence in the Western Hemisphere. But the 2026 NDS does not describe how the department will achieve this objective. It does not describe what this enhanced focus means in terms of force posture or investment priorities. The reality is that President Trump's actions in the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, and Europe—Western Hemisphere, Middle East, and Europe—are inextricably linked to our overall struggle against the Chinese Communist Party. Tailored use of military force and support in Venezuela, Iran, and Ukraine has thwarted Chinese and Russian objectives and denied their access to resources and technology. The 2026 NDS articulates the President's vision for our allies and partners to step up and get far more serious about their defense, and they are doing just that, and I applaud that. But we cannot ask our allies to do more for us while we do less for them. In that regard, this NDS signals a diminished intent to deter existential threats posed by Russia and North Korea. So we need more clarity on how America's military will continue to support our allies in new and different ways in deterring those threats. Another specific critique of the strategy is that in effect, it obfuscates the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party. And they are our pacing threat. Granted, Beijing remains the focal point. The strategy is clear in its focus on what it describes as the first island chain. This seems to be a way of talking about Taiwan without mentioning Taiwan. The unclassified NDS does not mention Taiwan at all, even though the National Security Strategy directly identifies it. This seems to be an example of what the NDS calls a strong but not necessarily confrontational, quote, "strong but not necessarily confrontational posture toward Beijing." This equivocation has real consequences as it risks misinterpretation of U.S. support for this island's democracy. This perception is furthered by our failure to execute previously authorized and appropriated assistance to Taiwan, authorized and appropriated by the Congress and signed into law. Finally, and perhaps most troubling of all, the NDS is nearly silent on the role of nuclear weapons. The U.S. faces an unprecedented set of strategic threats. They are worsening every day as we move toward a world with Russia and now China as nuclear peers. The lack of any significant statement on these developments raises the question: are we ignoring the existential dangers that China, Russia, and North Korea pose to our way of life? Now, on the other hand, there's much to like in this strategy, particularly its priorities and emphasis. But I still believe we have much work to do. I believe we must be clear-eyed about the long-term threats of the Chinese Communist Party. And I think we need to take the President's successful peace through strength approach used in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere and apply it to Europe and Asia. We should do that as we give our allies and partners better clarity on the appropriate role of U.S. forces in the future. It's my hope that moving forward, we can work together to build and implement a living strategy. It must meet the demands of the moment, particularly as we seek to execute a $1.5 trillion budget that will rebuild our military for a generation. With that, I turn to my colleague, Ranking Member Reed.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Secretary Colby. Thank you for appearing today to testify about the administration's 2026 National Defense Strategy, or the NDS. I'll turn shortly to the specifics of that document, but I must be direct at the outset. The NDS is a flawed proposal, and it is in many respects already obsolete. As we sit here today, the President has engaged the United States in major combat operations against Iran. Over the past several days, American forces operating alongside Israel have conducted thousands of strikes against Iran's missile sites, command and control sites, and senior regime leadership. Ayatollah Khamenei and many other senior leaders have been killed. Iran has retaliated with missile and drone attacks across the region, resulting in American casualties. And to the families of those service members killed and wounded, we owe our deepest condolences and our solemn commitment that their sacrifices will be honored. Let me be clear. The Iranian regime has been a brutal, corrupt, deadly institution for decades. And the day it is replaced by a government that actually serves the Iranian people will be a victory for all. However, in taking these offensive military actions, President Trump has unilaterally started a conflict that is rapidly spreading throughout the Middle East. The end state is unknown. Even administration officials cannot say clearly what objectives they are trying to achieve, nor what happens when those objectives are met. In the meantime, there will be immense costs for the Department of Defense in readiness, in opportunity, and most importantly, in American lives. The President and the Secretary of Defense have promised that this conflict will be brief and decisive, and I am skeptical. With perhaps the exception of Desert Storm, no war in the Middle East has ever been brief or decisive. If past is prologue, I fear President Trump will simply claim he's won, withdraw, and leave behind a crippled state, a regional proxy war, and a humanitarian catastrophe that could reverberate for years. And if this regime ultimately survives, the Iranian people will pay a heavy price. Secretary Colby, on the topic of ongoing operations, I hope you will provide the committee with clarity. What are the administration's objectives in Iran? What is the theory of victory? And what authority does the administration believe it is waging this war under, given that Congress has not been consulted or authorized any conflict? Indeed, one could argue very strenuously that this is not consistent with the Constitution. Now, let me turn to the National Defense Strategy. I'd like to note at the outset something that is easy to overlook but impossible to ignore: the tone of this document. Previous National Defense Strategies authored by both Republican and Democratic administrations have been sober, analytical assessments of the threat environment. This one is instead littered with partisan commentary. It attacks the rules-based international order, the very norms and institutions that we built after the most devastating conflict in human history and that have helped prevent a third world war while enabling America's rise as the world's foremost military and economic power. And I would welcome a debate about how we can improve our alliances, but we should not disparage the foundations of our own success. And Secretary Colby, I would ask you to explain the highly partisan and backward-looking language of the National Defense Strategy. The NDS starts by stating that the department's priority mission is to defend the homeland. Of course, that has always been the primary effort of the military and our nuclear deterrent and cyber forces, among other capabilities. In addition, the Defense Department has long been a key partner to the Department of... ...a regional proxy war and a humanitarian catastrophe that could reverberate for years. And if this regime ultimately survives, the Iranian people will pay a heavy price. Secretary Colby, on the topic of ongoing operations, I hope you will provide the committee with clarity. What are the administration's objectives in Iran? What is the theory of victory? And what authority does the administration believe it is waging this war under, given that Congress has not been consulted or authorized any conflict? Indeed, one could argue very strenuously that this is not consistent with the Constitution. Now let me turn to the National Defense Strategy. I'd like to note at the outset something that is easy to overlook but impossible to ignore: the tone of this document. Previous National Defense Strategies authored by both Republican and Democrat administrations have been sober, analytical assessments of the threat environment. This one is instead littered with partisan commentary. It attacks the rule-based international order, the very norms and institutions that we built after the most devastating conflict in human history and that have helped prevent a third world war while enabling America's rise as the world's foremost military and economic power. And I would welcome a debate about how we can improve our alliances, but we should not disparage the foundations of our own success. And Secretary Colby, I would ask you to explain the highly partisan and backward-looking language of the National Defense Strategy. The NDS starts by stating that the department's priority mission is to defend the homeland. Of course, that has always been the primary effort of the military and our nuclear deterrent and cyber forces, among other capabilities. In addition, the Defense Department has long been a key partner to the Department of Homeland Security for providing intelligence and logistical support for drug interdiction. However, this NDS intends to reach much further, blending national security and law enforcement by fundamentally involving the military in border security and counter-narcotic trafficking operations. On China, the NDS states that our presence in the Indo-Pacific should not be used to "dominate, humiliate, or strangle Beijing" and that "a decent peace on terms favorable to America but that China can also accept and live under is possible." Secretary Colby, I'd like to know specifically what military options the department is prepared to forego within that framing and what precisely constitutes a decent peace when China has spent the last decade systematically manipulating the security environment in its favor. I would also note that this strategy appears focused almost exclusively on the first island chain while China is actively expanding its security partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. And I hope you will address whether the department intends to cede that competition to Beijing by default. On Russia, your strategy is quite clear: Russia is Europe's problem. It would seem Americans' concern should be limited to Moscow's nuclear arsenal and its capabilities in space and cyber. While I understand the logic of pursuing the right balance of U.S. military capabilities with those of our European allies, I do not accept the abdication of our clear national security interest in Europe by suggesting Russia is their problem to manage. Further, the contrast between how this document treats China and how it treats its allies is frankly dumbfounding. The NDS takes a conciliatory posture towards Beijing, yet derides the nations that have stood alongside us for 80 years, describing our allies as more dependencies than partners. I am encouraged by the progress our allies have made in increasing their defense spending, but alliances are not merely burden-sharing arrangements. They are the foundation of our international strength and they also bear the cost of the United States' military conflicts, as we're seeing right now in the Middle East. Demeaning our partners is a self-inflicted wound. Secretary Colby, it's worth recalling that the 2018 NDS from the first Trump administration, which described our alliance network as "the backbone of global security." You were one of the lead authors of that NDS, and I'd like to understand what has so thoroughly changed your perspective on the role of our allies. Finally, I would point out the most fundamental problem with this NDS. It bears no resemblance to what this administration is actually doing. The strategy states the department will "empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies." And yet the United States has just launched the largest military campaign since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is unclear if our allies were even aware of the planning of this operation. Further, the administration has carried out thousands of strikes in Yemen, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria, and other nations over the past year. And of course, we carried out a massive military attack in Venezuela to capture Nicolás Maduro. And we continue to conduct strikes on alleged drug boats with no clear articulation of what goals we are pursuing. Mr. Secretary, your NDS states, "No longer will the department be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation-building." Yet we have repeatedly intervened, started wars, and sought regime change in the past eight weeks alone, much less the past year. Secretary Colby, I look forward to your testimony and explanation of this NDS and how it reflects what the Department of Defense is actually doing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Secretary Colby, the Ranking Member and I took a little longer than necessary, so take as much time as you choose in giving us your opening statement. You're recognized, sir.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you and the other distinguished members of this committee to testify on the Department of War's 2026 National Defense Strategy. The animating purpose of this strategy was to put into reality the logic of President Trump's common-sense America First, peace through strength approach. At its heart, as detailed in the 2025 National Security Strategy, this approach is channeled through the principle of flexible realism. That is, the effort to practically and realistically advance and protect the concrete interests of regular Americans. The core of a strategy, as the NSS eloquently describes, is to evaluate, sort, and prioritize. Needless to say, this is of special importance in the realm of war and peace. The heavy responsibility of effectively doing so motivated our work at the department to produce the 2026 NDS, and we believe that under Secretary Hegseth's leadership that we have done so. Under President Trump's leadership and with your support in Congress, the American military is and will be the world's finest, an unmatched fighting force that has impressively demonstrated its prowess in recent months in Operations Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and now Epic Fury. At the same time, we recognize that, as Secretary Hegseth has aptly put it, we cannot do everything everywhere all the time. This is, of course, a practical reality. The American military, while without peer, is not infinite in its application and resources. Potential opponents have been building their strength and capabilities, and it is not fair, just, or sustainable to ask the American people to bear burdens that are inequitably distributed with those of our allies and partners. As a result, we must prioritize, and this strategy does so. It does not do so in a way that is pinched or hesitant. Instead, it does so in a way that prudently, practically navigates between two unreasonable extremes. On the one hand, an isolationism that pretends that we can retreat from the world and that a favorable stability will emerge. And on the other hand, an unfettered use of military force for overly expansive ends that would drain the American people's will and resources in unnecessary and overly ambitious conflict. This strategy rather prudently adopts a middle course that will actually put us on a far firmer, more successful, and thus more lasting course than either of these extreme alternatives. In particular, the NDS does so by intelligently and strategically allocating our resources and that of our incredible armed forces towards the priorities that most affect regular Americans and where our efforts are most material and necessary to achieve American interests in the world. This is a reflection of common-sense America First thinking. As a deduction, the strategy is built on four pillars. First, it restores, after decades of neglect by some administrations, the military's role in securing our homeland and ensuring that our key interests in our native hemisphere are protected. This is critical for regular Americans because we must ensure that we are directly protected and secure in our home area. While the military is only a part of this effort and often far from the leading element, it does play a critical role that will be enduring. Second, the strategy focuses our military effort on ensuring the preservation of a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the world's largest market area. America's interests there are real and significant because of the scale of that market. At the same time, our interests are not limitless. We do not need to dominate that region. Rather, we only need to prevent that vast and dynamic region from being dominated so that we can trade and interact with it on fair and reasonable terms for regular Americans. As a result, our strategy there is to deter China through strength, not confrontation. We of course understand that China is a very powerful country that is undertaking an extraordinary military buildup. That is a simple fact. At the same time, we are clear that we do not seek conflict with China. To the contrary, we seek to avoid it. We make clear that our interests with respect to China are scoped and reasonable. We do not seek to strangle China nor compel a change in its form of government. Rather, we seek to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of the Indo-Pacific. In particular, this requires, as the NSS clearly states, being able to deny the feasibility of successful aggression along the first island chain. Because of its significance and the central importance of the military role in meeting this requirement, meeting this standard of an effective denial defense along the first island chain is the primary focus of the U.S. armed forces. At the same time, ensuring our forces can pace to this challenging standard will ensure that the department can always offer the president the operational flexibility and agility required for other objectives, especially the ability to launch decisive operations against targets anywhere, including directly from the U.S. homeland. It is critical to emphasize here that our strategy is well-aligned not only with the interests of our allies in the Indo-Pacific but many other countries as well that are not formally our allies. These states seek to preserve their autonomy and thus their ability to chart their own national futures on their own terms. This too is our goal, as Secretary Hegseth eloquently laid out last year at the Shangri-La Forum in Singapore. And our military focus, alongside the efforts of our allies and partners, is designed to uphold that ability. Third, we recognize clearly that there are other very real threats around the world that imperil our allies and indeed our own interests directly. We do not neglect that. To the contrary, we see it clearly. But we also understand that we need to allocate our own resources realistically and prudently and that we must account for our allies' and partners' ability and will to meet those challenges as well. This is why the strategy so strongly emphasizes burden-sharing, which is its third pillar. The logic here is to encourage, enable, and wherever necessary press our allies and partners in other theaters to take primary responsibility for their conventional defense. This makes sense because, as is so often pointed out, we are allied with many of the world's largest and most advanced economies. As a result, we do indeed have an alliance network that has tremendous latent military power. Unfortunately, over the last generation, after the end of the Cold War, partially due to our own permissiveness across a number of administrations and perhaps even hubris on this point, many of our allies have functionally demilitarized. This is untenable and unreasonable and, to be perfectly frank, our allies know it, have admitted it, and are moving rapidly and substantially to step up. And I can say this from personal, extensive personal experience. They are no longer, because of President Trump's leadership as well as leadership in places like Europe, South Korea, and from many of you in Congress, they are no longer fighting the scenario. Rather, they have now accepted that they must step up and are beginning quickly to do so. As a result, our approach has adapted to one of let's get down to business. In Europe, we are urging our allies to move to a model of NATO 3.0, in which wealthy European allies take the lead for the conventional defense of European NATO. On the Korean Peninsula, we are urging our South Korean ally to do the same vis-a-vis North Korea, and in both cases they have agreed. The good news, distinguished members, is that this is working. Our allies are indeed stepping up along these lines. Now, the issue becomes more of a practical, albeit challenging, one of helping them to do so and making this transition as rapidly and as effectively as possible. In other regions, we are also urging and seeing progress with our allies. Along the first island chain, with countries like Japan and Australia, we are urging these wealthy and capable allies to do their part for collective defense as the NSS urges. In the Western Hemisphere, we are working with many like-minded countries in the region to address shared threats to our prosperity and well-being. In the Middle East, we are working with our model ally Israel and other regional partners to address the threat of Iran and terrorism as we see right now. The final pillar of the strategy is to so-called supercharge the defense industrial base. The NSS and NDS indeed both call for nothing short of a national mobilization of our industrial capacity to arm both our own forces and those of our allies and partners. As you on this committee know so well, this is vital because we must be able to arm our own forces and those of our allies and partners with the best weaponry quickly, at scale, and at a reasonable price. We are seeing tremendous progress on this front thanks to President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, Deputy Secretary Feinberg, Under Secretary Duffy, and their efforts as well as your support and leadership on this committee and throughout the Congress, but this will have to be a critical area of focus in the coming years. In closing, this strategy promises, under President Trump's leadership, to put our country and our allies and partners on the path to lasting security. In just a few years, we can reasonably expect the warfighting ethos to have been restored in our armed forces and for them to be armed with the most modern, effective weaponry at scale. We can expect our wealthy allies and partners around the world to have stepped up to do their part for collective defense and their own security. We can expect our potential opponents to see the peerlessly formidable armed forces of the United States and the highly capable forces of our allies and partners together and to conclude that peace and restraint is the better course for them. Thus, we can very much reasonably hope for a decent peace for Americans, for our allies, and for that matter, for our potential opponents. This is a very good future to which we can reasonably aspire. At the same time, however, we at the Department of War know that we cannot take this future for granted. To the contrary, we will hope for the best but prepare for the worst. We will ensure that our armed forces are as ready as they can possibly be in line with the priorities outlined. Should our potential opponents spurn this reasonable offer, members of Congress, your support in ensuring that our forces are ready will be absolutely vital. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. And members are reminded that we will have a classified session after this with the Secretary and then, of course, an all-senators briefing on Iran in the afternoon. Because of our schedule and the fact that we will have another round in a classified setting, I'm going to strictly enforce the five-minute rule on all members, including myself. And so, Mr. Secretary, let's talk about Taiwan. I expressed some misgivings about the inattention to this issue as I perceive it. Congress has authorized and appropriated the use of Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative and authorized use of presidential drawdown authority to accelerate the buildup of Taiwan's defenses, but we do not appear to be using these authorities. Has this money been obligated? If not, why? And I'll go ahead and ask my follow-up question. Why was there no mention of Taiwan, only the mention of the first island chain, which seems to be a way of finessing that issue?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the question of TSCI, I'll defer to my counterparts in the department to give you a precise answer. I will say, sir, that obviously the administration as a whole has undertaken already an announcement, and I think Congress obviously played an important role in this late last year, on a significant arms sale to Taiwan. I don't need to elaborate on that, but I think that is a significant part of the administration's record.

Has the money been obligated?

I don't, I couldn't say to you, sir, so I'll, I'm not trying to be evasive, I just can't give you an informed answer. So I'll get, can I get back to you on that?

Sure. And perhaps between now and the classified, you could get an answer.

Okay, we'll do that. Thank you very much, sir. Go ahead, proceed. And then on, I mean, sir, I would say, obviously this document is read very carefully and we recognize that there are, you know, multiple audiences including international partners. I think obviously that we are very, very tightly aligned, and this is something I'd really stress, the degree of alignment and coordination with our interagency and White House partners as well as the extensive internal coordination of the document. I don't think anybody can mistake that this, the focus of this strategy on preparing for a denial defense along the first island chain. That is elaborated on the National Security Strategy, which includes a reference to Taiwan. That has been very clear to all of our audiences. At the same time, as Secretary Hegseth laid out at the Reagan Forum, sir, I think you were there as well as a number of your committee counterparts, our approach is strong and clear but quiet. What I would say to you, sir, is we're really focused on delivering military hard power readiness to the, not only to our own forces but to our allies and partners, and less focused on making, you know, significant rhetorical statements. That, you know, obviously is a topic of debate as to whether that's the right mix, but our approach is really this strong and clear but quiet. I don't think anybody can doubt our focus on making sure that we support the NSS presidential direction to have the ability to deny aggression along the first island chain.

Okay. Thank you. Let's let you respond to some doubts I expressed in my opening statement. Do you think the NDS signals a diminished intent to deter existential threats posed by Russia and North Korea?

I don't at all, sir. In fact, I think the NDS details and does so from a realistic perspective that matches our perspective. Obviously, the primary existential threat posed by Russian nuclear or North Korean nuclear weapons, in the case of Russia they have other capabilities, that is explicitly detailed. But we look realistically and carefully not only at our own interests, we recognize our interests in Europe and center on that as well, but also say obviously the Europeans have an even more, as the President repeatedly points out rightly, they're even more indexed and focused on that. And so the basic logic here, Senator, is not to ignore or downplay, but rather to array our overall strategy in a way that works with the warp and woof of our allies. So that's why I think actually, to be honest, sir, even in the last couple months, my first trips, my first trip was to, I stopped in Alaska, but then I was, I went to South Korea where they have agreed to take primary conventional responsibility of South Korea vis-a-vis North Korea. And in Europe, I was at the, had the honor of representing the department for Secretary Hegseth at the Brussels Ministerial and at the Munich Security Conference. The Europeans are leaning into this and stepping up. It's not that we're not saying that we're pulling out of these, to the contrary, we're saying realistically we're going to look to them to take the lead. And something I would stress, and I know I'm going to have the chance to talk to Senator Reed here, is I think this is a return to the Cold War mentality when these were expected to be real military alliances with burden sharing. And members of this committee in the 1970s and '80s on both sides of the dais would make a real point of making sure that our allies did their part. And we're going back to that noble heritage.

My time has expired. Ranking member is recognized.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Secretary. As I stated in my opening statement, the NDS specifically states that in the Middle East, the department, quote, "will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies," close quote. Furthermore, the NDS repeatedly states that while our allies will receive critical support from the U.S., it'll be much more limited. This National Security Strategy was published, by my count, about 39 days ago. So, Secretary Colby, the military operations unfolding in the Middle East are completely contrary to the strategy the department has put forth. Why has the department abandoned the strategy after 39 days?

Well, Senator, I'd completely reject that characterization, sir. If you look in the strategy, it details specifically not only the threat posed by Iran and ensuring that the President has the options to act against Iran, first. Secondly, it also explicitly and repeatedly details that the strategy will provide the ability for the President to use particularly effective air and maritime forces, standoff kind of or overhead kind of forces, to do exactly this kind of operation. Obviously things like Midnight Hammer. And then thirdly, I would say that we actually are, Senator, seeing a real example. Obviously our Israeli allies are really leaning in, but we see that from our Gulf partners right now, we see it from other partners in Europe. So I actually don't think this is an invalidation at all, Senator.

Well, so our Gulf powers, our partners are taking primary responsibility as it's described in NDS?

Well, Senator, primary responsibility specifically refers in particular to the European context, the South Korean context. We're looking at Israel in particular. It's a general theme. It's a little bit more differentiated how we're talking about. We obviously want allies and partners throughout to be able to take responsibility, but you know, we're looking as a general, it's not a kind of straightjacket, if you will.

Did we notify our allies and partners, except Israel of course, of our—

I'd defer to the operational or other, you know, the Department of State on that.

Mr. Secretary, I would assume that you would be vitally involved in that notification process. Did we notify our partners?

I have myself been on the phone with a number of ministers and sub-ministerial level over the since the outbreak of the operation on Saturday. So I know we've notified them. The exact timing I'd defer to others more senior in the administration.

Thank you. The military strategic objectives of the Iran operation have varied from eliminating the nuclear program, taking out the ballistic missile arsenal, protecting Iranian civilians, cutting off support to Iranian proxies, and defending the American people in general and our allies. The President has moved the goals post constantly and now is conveniently thrown out all the rationales as justification for this war of choice. Secretary Colby, can you as the lead policy advisor at the Pentagon explain the objectives of this operation and can they be accomplished by airstrikes and air power alone?

...President were elucidated by Secretary Hegseth and General Keane yesterday in their briefing, which were focused on addressing the ability of the Islamic Republic to project military power against of course us, our bases, our forces, etc., as well as our allies and partners in the region and beyond. And that's primarily the missile forces of the Islamic Republic, which had obviously been growing substantially and posed a very serious threat to all of those equities that I just mentioned, as well as the ability to produce that, and then the Iranian Navy. Those are the primary focus of the military campaign. I do think those are scoped and reasonable objectives that can be attained. I think at the same time the President, for instance, has made comments, and I wouldn't speak for him, but my interpretation of how the military campaign nests under that is he has urged the Iranian people to take this unprecedented opportunity to, you know, supplant or overthrow this oppressive Islamic Republic. But the military campaign as detailed that he has directed is focused on the power projection capabilities. And at the end of this campaign, yes, primarily relying on aerospace and maritime forces, that will have substantially set back a threat that sir, you just yourself detailed as such an opprobrious and noxious threat.

Now, if regime change was nothing with respect to the military objectives and the President was just sort of wandering off, why was the first objective in the campaign the attack and death of Khamenei and key leaders of the regime?

Well, just try to answer quickly. I wouldn't characterize the President. He sets our agenda and he directed these military goals. I'm talking about, sir, about the goals of the American military campaign.

How do you separate the military goals from the President of the United States?

I'm not, sir. I was talking about those are Israeli operations.

The Chairman is enforcing his rule as he must.

Senator Fischer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Secretary Colby. I believe that all strategies must evolve as geopolitical threat shift. When a regime that's responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans remains committed to building nuclear weapons and growing a ballistic missile force that poses an unacceptable risk to the United States, the President will respond. That said, there is one pillar of this strategy that will remain relevant no matter the conflict. We need to supercharge U.S. industry. For too long, the Department has used the munitions funding as a bill payer for other programs. No more. We need to build more weapons systems, do so at scale, and negotiate better terms and prices. You mentioned that, sir. Thank you. So how is the Department reviewing the total munitions requirement to address the long-term strategy for production?

Well, thank you, Senator, and I think that's, I mean, you've really keyed in on, and I think the President's truth last night really also shone the light on this. And I would say obviously Deputy Secretary Feinberg is, I would say, heroically leading the effort on this front. Under Secretary Duffy, I know there's a lot of people involved, the services, I know you are all involved. I mean, I think I've seen an unprecedented degree of focus on this. The way I think I was talking to the Secretary yesterday and Mr. Chairman, sir, Senator Reed, we were talking about this the other day. I think we see, you know, a fundamental mindset shift in the degree of urgency and with a couple of lines of effort. One is 1.5 trillion. I mean, that's the President saying we got to get after this problem. First of all, you need the money, and the strategy says we're going to try to, we are going to advocate for higher top-line, but money alone is not sufficient because it needs to be executed.

So how are you going to address this then?

Well, I think I would defer to Deputy Secretary Feinberg because he's the one leading this, but we are all very confident in his supply. Sorry, I don't mean to be dodgy of your question. I just, that's something I know my lane and that's, you know, he's the real lead on that.

But we have a lot of critical weapons programs that overlap the supply chain. So how is the Department going to be able to identify the key bottlenecks that are out there and address those?

Again, I defer...

Address that or should we talk to the Deputy Secretary?

I would talk to the Deputy. I would just say I think there's not specific kind of boutique solutions to this. This is why both the NSS and the NDS call for a national mobilization, which is a pretty big deal. I mean, this is a huge deal.

Right. Well, it's a huge concern.

It's a huge concern and we need a like, it's not a Band-Aid. This is like surgery.

Okay. Defending the homeland should always be the first priority of any NDS. And this includes a commitment to modernizing and diversifying our nuclear forces, which are foundational to our national security. Since the United States now faces for the first time in history two near-peer nuclear powers in Russia and China, I encourage any changes in force structure to result in greater nuclear deterrent capability, not less. As Beijing continues its military build-up, including their breathtaking nuclear breakout, how will the Department seek to achieve strategic stability?

Well, thank you, ma'am. I will say actually this is something I was emailing Admiral Correll about this morning and the nuclear strategy is something that obviously has my personal attention, but at the top leadership of the Department, we fully agree that the two-peer environment or, you know, soon to be potential peer of the People's Republic on the nuclear side requires a fundamental rethink. One of the things that we did is we nested the nuclear elements at the kind of high level into the National Defense Strategy. That doesn't mean we're just ignoring the nuclear piece. As you and I think had the opportunity to discuss, Senator, we are going to do a deeper review in the nuclear, but with more of a focus on actually getting in at the classified level into what are the problems we need to solve. I will say that I think most of the problems with the challenges with the nuclear force are a matter of execution and programmatics and money and less the sort of strategy elements. There are key strategy elements that I'd be happy to talk about in the classified...

Do you plan to do a nuclear posture review?

I don't think we plan to do a kind of formal nuclear posture review. I think the declaratory policy and so forth from the first Trump term was very good and we didn't feel the need to do a huge amount of, I mean, one thing about this strategy is that it's designed to move the bureaucracy and the organization in a certain direction. It's not designed to kind of do things just because we've done them. But rest assured, nuclear forces are at the top of our priority list.

As we look to deterring China as the second line of effort, do you anticipate that we're going to increase our efforts in partnership with South Korea, Japan cooperation with AUKUS partnership as well?

Well, absolutely. We're going to deepen partnerships, especially with Japan and South Korea. I know I'm running out of time, but happy to elaborate.

Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Shaheen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Under Secretary Colby, you've previously written that the Middle East is, and I quote, "relatively unimportant for the United States." You also wrote in an article entitled, quote, "Why Not to Attack Iran," that strikes against Iran's nuclear program without a clear strategy would leave, quote, "Tehran every incentive to reboot the program with greater vigor." You wrote in the same article that military strikes were unlikely to, quote, "embolden resistance to the government." And you concluded by noting that it's probably best not to start down a road that has no end in sight. And then in 2012, you wrote that putting boots on the ground would, quote, "likely prove protracted and costly." President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have left the door open to putting boots on the ground. Do you agree with them now, and why?

Thank you, Senator. A couple of things. First, we discussed this at some length actually almost exactly a year ago in my confirmation hearing and I committed to provide credible military options that were rationally correlated to America's interests and I have done so in furtherance of that commitment and I believe here...

So I'm sorry to interrupt, but then do you agree with Secretary Rubio that the reason that we took this action now was because of Israel's intent to strike and was there any effort to dissuade Israel from making these strikes now?

Well, I would defer to Secretary Rubio on his specific comments. I know he and others, the President, the Vice President, Secretary, Chairman have all talked about the threat that Iran has posed and I was clear about that in my testimony a year ago. We've been clear about that here. I would say Operation Midnight Hammer did have a clear objective and that was something that distinguished it often from the kinds of perspectives that I was writing about 15 years ago in a private capacity.

So you do agree with them now that putting boots on the ground is a possible viable option?

Well, I mean, the President has reserved the right to... the President has obviously as he's discussed...

I don't want to know what the President... I've heard what the President said. I want to know what you think.

Well, I'm a, you know, lieutenant of the President's, so I'm keyed on his intent. I think...

So you're not going to take a position on that. Whatever the President's decide, you're going to be supportive of.

Yeah, I'm a... yeah, I will abide by the President's instructions.

Let me switch to another issue because in your opening statement, you didn't mention Russia or Ukraine. And this is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. Do you think that it's central to U.S. deterrence or not?

I think the war in Ukraine is very important. Obviously, as the President has rightly said, obviously it's especially vivid and important for people on the European continent, which is where it's taking place, which is one of the reasons why he's, I think, really to his great credit trying to end the war and the negotiating team that's working on it. I think they're making good progress. But yeah, I absolutely think the war in Ukraine is important.

They would be making a lot better progress if we put some pressure on Russia, don't you agree? And is Russia... has Russia had any role in supporting Iran in this operation?

I couldn't speak about that in this hearing or it would be sort of I'd be happy to discuss that in a closed hearing, my assessment of that, although I'd defer to my intelligence community colleagues on the specifics. But sorry, your first question was oh, pressure. I mean, the administration has put pressure on Russia, for instance through economic measures, and the administration, I personally been involved, contrary to a lot of press reporting, in facilitating the transfer of weaponry to help Ukraine. So I think the administration is, but the goal is peace, Senator.

I certainly agree with that and I think the fastest way to get peace in Ukraine is to put more pressure on Russia and Vladimir Putin and what he's doing in this war and that the way to do that is to further sanction the shadow fleet, further sanction oil production, it is to provide the weapons and the support that Ukraine needs to continue to execute this war and sadly, we are not doing that in the way that I think would really lead us to peace. Let me ask you because I just came back from Ukraine and one of the things I heard, well, and from Eastern Europe, one of the things I heard from all of the military leaders that I talked to, both American and among our allies, is that what the Ukrainians are doing in executing this war is the most highly innovative technological advances that are happening in conflict anywhere in the world right now. And we are not at the table to take advantage of getting the best information about what's going on because in the Pentagon, Ukraine has become a dirty word. Can you respond to that and tell me why we are not taking advantage of the opportunities that Ukraine is showing us?

I just don't think that's true, Senator. I think people like Secretary Driscoll, for instance, are incorporating a lot of lessons learned and there's a lot to learn from the Ukraine conflict, a great deal to learn from the Ukraine conflict.

Good. I hope we are learning. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Rounds.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Colby, first of all, thank you for joining us today. I sincerely appreciate the attention you and your team have paid to the simultaneity problem in the National Defense Strategy. The simultaneity problem is the fact that in the event the United States is engaged in hostilities with one of our adversaries, other adversaries in other theaters will likely initiate hostilities with us and seek to press their advantage in their region or theater after U.S. forces are committed elsewhere. You and your team seem acutely aware of that problem. I also appreciate that the Department is trying to maintain deterrence in multiple theaters with finite resources and that protecting our interests in the Western Pacific must be the priority in the face of the existential threat posed by the CCP. That's the background for my questions. The National Defense Strategy places a heavy emphasis on burden sharing with our partners and allies. Is it the position of the administration and the intent of the NDS to build up partner and ally capacity prior to shifting resources out of a theater such as Europe or the Middle East? And if we could ask it in perhaps a different way, how do you think the Department should sequence the marshalling of resources and the capacity between INDOPACOM and the rest of the world? ...multiple theaters with finite resources and that protecting our interests in the Western Pacific must be the priority in the face of the existential threat posed by the CCP. That's the background for my questions. The National Defense Strategy places a heavy emphasis on burden sharing with our partners and allies. Is it the position of the administration and the intent of the NDS to build up partner and ally capacity prior to shifting resources out of a theater such as Europe or the Middle East? And if we could ask it in perhaps a different way, how do you think the department should sequence the marshaling of resources and the capacity between INDOPACOM and the rest of the world?

Well, thank you, Senator, and I appreciate the spirit of your question because I think you're exact exactly understand what we're trying to do. And I think, you know, one thing about the strategy is it's, you know, it's obviously a high-level capstone document and I think Senator Fischer, I think you said it's a living document or maybe it was the chairman, but basically it's more of a heuristic or framework. It's, you know, obviously the publication is a point in time, but the idea is it should be adaptive to events like it came out before Operation Epic Fury, but I think it accounts and anticipates for it. So I think what I would say, sir, to your point is we are trying to get to the best point where everybody is in the right position to deter, I obviously ideally, and if necessary to fight effectively for denial as soon as possible and certainly within the window of of any potential danger. And so part of what's happening, Senator, and I think this is part of what's changed early this year from our tone and I think our partners have noticed it. I I regard 2025 as a lot of it is about reframing and and giving our allies and partners credibly under the president's leadership a an understanding that things are going to be different, that the demand signal is different. And a lot of that was a hypothesis whether they would whether they would change and whether they would register. And I think what we've seen over the course of 20 2025 is that they have, they are not fighting the scenario. So in Europe, I mean, I was just there at the DefMin, I mean, you have countries like Germany, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, etc., Netherlands, Netherlands is now raising the retirement age according to what I'm told to 70 in order to fund their defense buildup. So they are actually doing what we've been asking. And so the change in tone is because actually things have now adapted. Now it's more this get down to business and that's when it becomes, Senator, to answer your question directly, more a matter of how do we deal with a transition in a situation in which as the president said yesterday, there are areas where, you know, we we would like to be in a different place than we are. And that's where we want to take the conversation. I I am confident that together across the Department of War and our very capable allies and partners, we can do that, but it's very important to send a clear signal that it's this is not a joke, this is not a recipe for more lassitude by our allies. And I think that's happened.

Okay. There is strong support in Congress to provide additional resources to our national defense. Engagement between the administration and Congress is critical to identifying and addressing the resource shortfalls. Have you shared with Congress any specific resource shortfalls or capability gaps that will cause us to assume additional risk as the NDS is implemented?

Well, actually that's some of the sort of implementation work that we're doing right now, especially in light of, you know, ongoing, you know, dynamics is to try actually I was talking to the chairman and the staff about this yesterday just to say we are doing some targeted looks at this and we definitely would like to come back to you because some of this needs, you know, and I think it's something that would appeal across the aisle where we all benefit from having the right stuff in the right place at the right time. So, you know, my my personal advocacy will be open kimono on on what we find on that because it's obviously your participation is absolutely critical.

Well, that open kimono should probably be done in a classified session.

For your sake, yes.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Scott. Senator King.

A rare opportunity to go before Senator Kaine. Mr. Colby, you're in charge of policy, so I'm going to ask you some policy questions with regard to Iran. When I woke up Saturday morning to the news, my first question that popped into my mind was why now? Why now? What what was the precipitating factor? And there was discussion of an imminent threat of missiles, there was discussion of rebuilding the nuclear capacity, but none of those were imminent in any way. Yesterday, Secretary Rubio told us why now in a stunning statement. We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that there would be that that would precipitate an attack against American forces and we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched these attacks, we would suffer higher casualties. Have we now delegated the most solemn decision that can be made in our society, the decision to go to war to another country? That's the implication, the breathtaking implication of Secretary Rubio's statement, which to me is the only explanation I've seen as to why this action was taken when it was. There were no objective facts on the ground that said this is something we have to do now. There were no missiles being loaded on launchers, there were no there was not a nuclear bomb being rolled out. I'd like some response on policy. Is it now the policy of the United States that we're going to be taken into a war by the prime minister of another country?

Well, actually, that's some of the sort of implementation work that we're doing right now, especially in light of, you know, ongoing, you know, dynamics, is to try actually I was talking to the chairman and the staff about this yesterday, just to say we are doing some targeted looks at this and we definitely would like to come back to you because some of this needs, you know, and I think it's something that would appeal across the aisle where we all benefit from having the right stuff in the right place at the right time. So, you know, my personal advocacy will be open kimono on on what we find on that because it's obviously your participation is absolutely critical.

Well, that that open kimono should probably be done in a classified session. For your sake, yes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Scott. Senator King.

A rare opportunity to go before Senator Kaine. Mr. Colby, you're in charge of policy, so I'm going to ask you some policy questions with regard to Iran. When I woke up Saturday morning to the news, my first question that popped into my mind was why now? Why now? What what was the precipitating factor? And there was discussion of an imminent threat of missiles, there was discussion of rebuilding the nuclear capacity, but none of those were imminent in any way. Yesterday, Secretary Rubio told us why now in a stunning statement. We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action. We knew that there would be that that would precipitate an attack against American forces and we knew that if we didn't preemptively go after them before they launched these attacks, we would suffer higher casualties. Have we now delegated the most solemn decision that can be made in our society, the decision to go to war to another country? That's the implication, the breathtaking implication of Secretary Rubio's statement, which to me is the only explanation I've seen as to why this action was taken when it was. There were no objective facts on the ground that said this is something we have to do now. There were no missiles being loaded on launchers, there were no there was not a nuclear bomb being rolled out. I'd like some response on policy. Is it now the policy of the United States that we're going to be taken into a war by the prime minister of another country?

Well, sir, what I would say is and I think Secretary Hegseth and General Keane went into this yesterday that it was and the president has talked about this as well, is the very rapid buildup and reconstitution of Iran's missile ballistic missile, cruise missile and one-way attack drone...

But that's been going on for some time. The question is why was it Saturday, Sunday?

Well, I think there was a perception that this threat has been manifest. They've as the president said, they've they've been killing Americans for 47 years and this is something where we can see this is going and they're going to be able to have with this kind of missile shield...

So you do you do you dispute Secretary Rubio's statement? I think Secretary Rubio inadvertently told the truth the other day that this was driven by Benjamin Netanyahu and here we are in a in a major conflict. Do you do you not agree that that seems to be the precipitating factor?

Well, I I agree with you that Secretary Rubio told the truth. I wouldn't characterize his remarks, they stand for themselves. I know he's spoken a lot. The remarks I've seen of his, the president's, the vice president's, the Secretary of War, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff focus on the buildup of Iran's conventional missile capability.

Well, I find it very disturbing that we are committing this nation to war based upon a decision by a even though a staunch ally and I'm a supporter of Israel, but I don't think anybody should drive our decision to go to war but but the interests of the United States, not the interests of another country.

I think the president made our decision, Senator. That's my understanding. Sir, our understanding at the Department of War. The president made our decision. I mean, he makes the decision obviously.

Well, he made the decision, but it appeared to be based upon the fact that Israel was going was going to strike. And my question, one of my questions is going to be at the hearing this afternoon, was any effort made to dissuade the prime minister? Prime Minister Netanyahu has been egging for a invasion of Iran for 20 years. U.S. presidents have consistently said no. And my question is why now? Let me move on to something else. I'm very concerned about the president's words to the to the Iranian people. In his speech the other night, in his speeches back in January. The other night he said, I call upon the Iranian patriots who yearn for freedom to seize this moment, to be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country. America's with you, I made a promise to you and I fulfilled that promise. We cannot protect the valiant people of Iran from the IRGC from the air. There is no way that they can be protected without troops. Do you understand have any different understanding of that? And my concern is that we may be raising the expectations of these people that we will truly have their back when we won't and they'll be slaughtered again as they were in January.

My understanding and again I wouldn't presume to interpret the president's words, but is that this is objectively a historic opportunity. Obviously you've had the significant erosion of the most, you know, oppressive members of the Islamic Republican government, but ultimately I think one of the reasons this isn't an example of nation building and this kind of interventionism that Senator Reed mentioned is precisely because it is looking to the Iranian people to take the initiative. I have no question that it would be risky... Well, thanks, Senator. Just to answer your question on training, I think this should be is actually a priority for Secretary Hegseth on things like 127 Echo. So I think that should be something where there should be a lot of receptivity and if obviously if allies are not are not getting that message, obviously they're they're welcome to look me up. And then on weapons, sir, this is something that really has our top attention and we were just talking about it with the national mobilization of the defense industrial base. There's also been a process overhaul. One of the things we've done and I actually a big advocate of this, looking at the clock, is pushing the FMS process and consolidating it under Under Secretary Duffy because then it's the acquisition people, the industrial relations people who have the whole stack, as they say. And obviously we have a role in policy from a strategic point of view, but ultimately this stuff is a I call it an Excel problem rather than a Word problem. I believe FMS sales demand have quadrupled since 2021. So there's just a massive scale issue and of course our own services are also in line. So this is something I think we all just really want to attack this problem and we've fortunately we've got Deputy Secretary Feinberg is really amazing on this.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Peters.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before getting to my questions, I just want to talk briefly about President Trump's decision to basically drag America into another war in the Middle East without congressional approval. The Constitution is is very clear for the reason for congressional approval. If you look at the debate during the Constitutional Convention, our founders were very clear that having unconditional power for a president to go into war was a power too great. It reminded them of the king that they had just defeated in the Revolutionary War and believed that the people's house, the Congress, in Article 1 of the Constitution should have that that power to declare war and to bring those powers in into play. As a Navy reservist, former Navy reservist, I served in Bahrain and the UAE, places right now that are under risk, our service members are under risk in those places for attack. My thoughts are certainly with them and others serving through the Middle East. I know the thoughts of all American people are with the men and women who are serving in the Middle East as well. But what I am hearing from my constituents is that they do not want to send their sons and daughters to war. That is not something the American people want. In fact, what I hear from them is they want to see costs come down in America. They're paying too much, costs continue to go up. Trump policies have raised prices, now we may see spikes in energy prices. They don't want a war. Now I want to be clear, Iran is a bad actor and we must ensure that they never ever produce nuclear weapons. But I also want to be clear, we should remember that we had a diplomatic agreement with Iran on nuclear proliferation and President Trump withdrew from that from that agreement during his first term without a plan and he was basically playing politics. I get it. But now he's sending U.S. forces back to the Middle East to fight in a war without the support of Congress and without the support of the American people. And that's why the administration must immediately seek congressional approval to make clear to not just to Congress, but more importantly to the American people that there's an actual end goal and there's an actual strategy to ensure that what he is doing there actually protects our homeland security as opposed to endangering it. So Mr. Colby, my question for you is, President Trump has provided a number of conflicting reasons for his decision to declare war himself unilaterally on Iran. And at no time did he ever offer any evidence of an imminent attack, as we heard from my colleague, which would be an exception to getting immediate approval if there's an imminent attack. No evidence of that. Sometimes he has stated a goal is regime change, sometimes it's about eliminating the proxy forces, ballistic missiles, a list of things that he is considering to as goals for the program. The President has also stated he is willing to negotiate with the current regime to bring an end to hostilities. But I want to remind you of a discussion we had in January of last year. We met prior to your confirmation hearing and you shared and you were very clear that you did not want to enter another war in the Middle East without a clear purpose and a clear end state. We're not hearing that. I want to hear from you what you think that is. You have been consistent on this point throughout your career, in fact in some of the articles I have, a recent one just in 21, just a few short years ago, three, four years ago, where you said that U.S. military focus on Iran should be dramatically reduced and requests for additional U.S. forces to quote, deter Iran, should be rejected. You also said Iran can be checked from any plausibility of dominating the Gulf states by supporting theirs and Israel's efforts to check Iran's ambitions. They can do it. You also said Iran draws critical resources including leadership attention and popular support from far more important defensive objectives, namely ensuring a favorable and stable balance of power in Asia. So my question for you, sir, is given your strongly held beliefs that you told me face to face in my office and you were very sincere in those efforts, I never would question what you said. Do you feel the President has actually articulated a clear purpose and an end state to the American people? Has he articulated to the American people that we need to go to war in Iran?

Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate the detailed and thoughtful question. I would just say I think the, first of all, in terms of your questions on the imminence issue and the legality, I know there's going to be a briefing later today and I defer to my general counsel and intelligence counterparts to get you the answer you need on that. I do think that the President and the military campaign, the President has directed the military campaign. Obviously, those are not exclusive of other goals like his encouragement to the Iranian people to take this opportunity. This is to degrade, and I mentioned some of those things, and in fact, Senator, the Israelis are taking the lead. I mean, it's the Israelis who are conducting a great deal of these operations, and it's the Gulf states that are actually conducting a lot of operations as well, and some of our European partners. And I think you've seen the reaction not just from regional partners, but countries like Canada, Australia, a number of the German Chancellor yesterday. So I think we do, we have, we, and I mean, I'm not on the uniform side, but the Department of War has been provided with we are going to degrade and destroy the Iranian missile threat, the one-way attack drone threat, and the Navy in particular, and of course, be in a position to deny Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Mullin.

Thank you, Chairman. I just feel like I need to respond to some things the Senator was bringing up by accusing the President of pulling out of a nuclear deal in his first term. It was a horrible deal. It was a disastrous deal. It was a deal that we all know that would originally allow Iran to be able to have enrichment to the grade that they could make a nuclear weapon. And then for the Senator that was saying that the President needs to come back for reauthorization, I don't remember him saying anything in 2016 when Barack Obama at the time dropped 26,000 bombs in Syria, Pakistan, Libya, just to name a few. And I definitely don't remember my colleagues in 2013 at all complaining about the President going, President then Barack Obama, going into Syria. And I would like to ask the question then, what threat did Syria have to the United States? What threat did Libya have to the United States during the Arab Spring to which these leaders were removed? And then I would ask the question, what threat did Iran have to us? Do we really need to talk about it? Do we need to talk about how many times they've killed thousands of Americans since 1979? From the first time they took hostages in November of 1979 to the last time they attacked us in June of 2025? And anybody wants to doubt that they were a threat to us and an essential threat to us? Does anybody doubt on that side of the aisle, does anybody doubt that Iran, if or when they got a nuclear weapon, would deliver it to the United States if they have capabilities of doing it? Does anybody deny that the fact that the President was being proactive on an adversary that has been chanting death to America since 1979? Does anybody deny that Iran was a threat to us and our service members? Or do we have to remind you how many they've injured and killed through their proxies and through direct action? This is the first president in seven presidencies that actually did something about the thorn that constantly came after us. And now you criticize him and you say it's illegal? It's not. This same authorization is the same authorization that Democrats and Republican presidents in the past have used. And thank God we had a president with the backbone to finally get rid of this murderous regime. And now we're complaining about it? Remember, legally he has to respond to Congress or inform Congress within 48 hours. That has happened. And then within 60 to 90 days, he needs to inform Congress if we're going to war and ask for specific war authorities. But the President through Article 2 clearly has an obligation and the powers under the Constitution to defend our interests home and abroad. And there is no question he's defending our interest. No question. So what is this grandstanding about? Do you think we should have let the Ayatollah in place? Do you think he was a good guy? Are you defending the Ayatollah now? Or aren't you glad that America finally stood up and took care of this murderous regime that's been sponsoring terror around the world for 47 years? How about we say thank you, Mr. President, for finally getting rid of this nuisance, this murderer, this sponsor of terror. He did the world a favor and the world is a safer place because of it. You may disagree with a lot of his actions, you may disagree with some of his policies, but you can't deny that this was a threat and an essential growing threat to the United States. And you want to say he's playing politics and you get the politics behind it, Mr. Peters? You guys are playing politics. You guys are the ones that are grandstanding. The President's doing his job as Commander in Chief. And I think at one time or next, we should say thank you. Thank you for being a strong leader. But there's no way in God's green earth you guys can ever give the President, at least President Trump, any credit. Sorry. Thank you, sir. I'm out of, I still got 49 seconds. I got one question. Strategically speaking, Secretary Colby, how is your department working with director or with the Department of Defense, with, sorry, how are you guys directly working with the Department of War on strategies specifically towards Russia with Canada, or is there a strategy there?

Well, thanks, Senator. I actually we're working a lot with our Canadian partners. They're one of the countries that really does need to step up. They've, you know, Canada has an incredibly storied and proud military history. I always point out they were in all the years of World War I and World War II. I think they had the fourth largest navy at the end of World War II. They had their own beach at D-Day. But frankly, the Canadian Armed Forces, if you talk to them, they've really kind of dismantled, particularly since the end of the Cold War, even a bit before. So we're trying to get more Canada. We've actually engaged with them extensively. The Secretary and I met with Minister McGinty a few months ago and we've been in constant contact or continuing contact with them with a sense of where we think they need to go not only to meet NATO targets, but also for homeland defense as part of NORAD, the potential for Golden Dome, these other kinds of things. But we're really looking very carefully at Canada to make sure that they're stepping up in in line with collective defense and what everybody in NATO's doing. ...really looking very carefully at Canada to make sure that they're stepping up in line with collective defense and what everybody in NATO's doing.

Thank you. Thank you, Senator Mullin. Senator Warren.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, over the weekend, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu launched illegal strikes against Iran. This war for regime change is both unconstitutional and dangerous. Now, we've already lost six service members in this war, and President Trump has said, quote, "We may have casualties, that often happens in war." Yesterday, in his briefing to the American people on why our sons and daughters are being sent to war, Trump highlighted the quality of the White House drapes that he had purchased and the gold ballroom that he is building, giving us a sense of what's top of mind for him. Under Secretary Colby, both you and I have sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States. Under the Constitution, who declares war, the president or Congress?

Congress declares war, if I understand correctly.

Right. Thank you. You know, all three of my brothers served in the military, and this is personal for me. I am praying for the families who have already lost loved ones and for all of our troops that the president has put in harm's way without legal justification or moral justification. Donald Trump ran on lowering prices on day one and on a, quote, "pro-peace" ticket. He called himself the peace president, and of course, he claims to put America first. So, Under Secretary Colby, do you think that America first means starting another war in the Middle East?

Well, Senator, I would just say that I the administration does have a legal and moral justification, and I would certainly support the idea that President Trump is a president of peace. First of all, he has brokered multiple...

Well, all I can say is, boy, the justification sure seems to be changing every 20 minutes. But could you answer the question I just asked you, and that is, do you think America first means starting another war in the Middle East?

I would say America first and peace through strength are served by rolling back, as the military campaign is designed to do, the threats posed by Iran's large and very large and growing missile and one-way attack drone program, its navy, and of course, ensuring that it doesn't have a nuclear weapon. And in fact, I think the evidence is the proof of that is demonstrated by the global support for this mission.

So you think America first means starting a war anywhere, anytime? You know, I'm confused because you're here to discuss the Trump administration's National Defense Strategy, and I'll quote it back to you. "No longer will the department be distracted by interventionism, endless wars, regime change, and nation building," close quote. Interventionism, that means going to another country and bombing them. Endless wars, wars that may last we don't know how long because there's no clear endpoint. Regime change, which the president has said this is all about. And nation building. Evidently, the president seems to think he's going to come in and build a different Iran. Now, is that...

Senator, I don't—well—

...putting America first and following your own foreign policy strategy?

I think I would characterize it fundamentally differently. The defense strategy does talk about the threat posed by Iran and the need to have credible military options, and I don't think this is, certainly as we understand from him and in the goals of the military campaign, this is certainly not nation building. This is not going to be endless, as the president and the vice president...

So this is not in your mind interventionism?

I don't think this is, no, I don't think that's what that, you know, nation building, endless wars, that's definitely not.

Interventionism, that's actually the very first word in the Department of Defense...

And interventionism is a more, I would say, you know, kind of responsibility to protect or something. I mean, it's obviously not precisely defined.

Really? And we didn't do this in order to try to protect Israel?

I think the well, that's one of the goals is obviously we're serving our own interests.

Oh, so it is interventionism. And how about the endless war part? Is there is there a clear goal that we will know when this is over?

Well, the president's going to decide exactly how we do it. The military campaigns have clearly defined scope.

Okay. And the regime change part, remind me about that. The president, of course, has called it regime change. Do you disagree with him?

No, I think the president has said that he's this is an opportunity for the people of Iran to rise up and overthrow their oppressors, but as he indicated, the Venezuela model could be one the other day.

Now he has called on them to do that. Does that sound like regime change to you?

I think the goals of the military obviously overthrow allowing the Iranian people to take this matter into their own hands is one of the options here, but the American military campaign has got more short goals. It's not an endless war.

No. So that's great. So the Trump administration first says it's going to be America first, then puts out a National Defense Strategy, and then goes to war alongside Israel illegally, unconstitutionally. And that is now the policy of the Trump administration. Say one thing in a campaign, write it down on paper, and then go do whatever the hell you want. That is wrong.

The time of the senator has expired. Senator Schmitt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for being here, Under Secretary Colby, and for your service. I want to thank you for your leadership and your fortitude to take on, in my view, this foreign policy blob and these entrenched experts that seemingly never go away in this town, who've been continually wrong about so many things over the years. And I think the 2026 National Defense Strategy acknowledges a bunch of things, but certainly that after the Cold War ended, there was never really an adjustment, whether it was trade policy or foreign policy. You know, the idea was that Europe, we would help Europe get back on their feet, Japan get back up on their feet with these unfair trade deals, a defense umbrella that, quite frankly, Europe didn't really ever pay for. And that's changing. And I think that's a good that's a good that's a good thing. And I think it reflects an urgent need on the ground for our foreign policy for disciplined realism rather than bouncing around from Wilsonian pet project to Wilsonian pet project that there isn't really a strategy. And I think the the NDS does outline a strategy because the American people are certainly concerned about the things that are happening in their communities, the influx of drugs. And so when people try to point out some inconsistency with taking out, you know, these cartel boat runners, I actually had a fake news reporter characterize them as fishing boats. But but I think it also, you know, requires us to take a look at our foreign aid too and making sure it's aligned with these America first principles. I want to ask you, as it relates with limited time, I think your presence at the the NATO ministerial meeting and the Munich Security Conference thereafter, hopefully, was a signal to our European allies that you're willing to engage with them and have thoughtful but constructive dialogue. How how are you communicating to our allies this new reality that in order for America to continue to be strong, that they have to step up in a much more meaningful way? I mean, we've heard a lot about the five percent, but the five percent can't be for pensions, right? It has to be for munitions and the defense of their own continent. How are you communicating that and what's your feedback?

Well, thank you very much, Senator. Really appreciate it, and I think you put it well. And I'd actually like to go back to something, if I could, connected to Senator Reed's comments about the tone. I would say the tone of this document is not partisan, but rather a refutation of a post-Cold War. I mean, I think I'd really like to stress that point, that I think during the Cold War, the substance of this strategy is much more akin to what you would have seen in something like a flexible response document or Schlesinger or Harold Brown or Cap Weinberger, and of course, the secretary gesturing to Weinberger.

Wouldn't we be better off as a country if in 1993 we would have had something like this?

I think so. I think we got a bit hubristic, well, very hubristic in some cases, and frankly, that you know, this is not saying it's only Democrats. We're pointing at ourselves as well. And I think part of the communication here, and this relates back to Senator Reed's question as well, is to be clear. And there is a I mean, as people point out, Bob Gates went to NATO in 2011 and, you know, Panetta said it and whoever and Barack President Barack Obama said it, etc., and we were politely ignored because it wasn't seen as credible. And so in order this strategy is designed to have an impact on real behavior. And in order to do that, you have to break through to people. And sometimes that's being pretty sharp and direct, not with the point of being sharp and direct to be insulting, but to actually get through to people, actually because the best friend is a one who tells you when you need to change something. And that gets to your question, Senator, about talking to allies. I talk to the allies all the time, and I talk to Europeans any European comes through, I talk to them often privately. But I think the point of what we were trying to do with the visit in Brussels and, you know, with the secretary's full support and State Department and others, White House, was to say, all right, I think the message has been conveyed. We're obviously going to continue it. But now let's people have are no longer fighting the scenario. People are willing to step up. I had great meetings with the German Minister of Defense, for instance, who is a Social Democrat, but he's been a leading probably the number one figure along with the chancellor in raising Germany's defense spending. You have Polish government of both types, obviously, you know, the Scandinavian governments. So our view is we want to work towards a results-oriented goal, which I think, Senator, you put it really, really so well, which is common sense, which I mean, there's, you know, and I've had these conversations of how does it make sense for Americans to be spending 3.5, four, five percent, six percent of the GDP and wealthy Europeans to be spending one percent? That just makes no sense. The Minister of Defense of New Zealand, who's a real leader on this, she said it over the summer. You know, since the Cold War, we all dismantled our militaries, we put it into healthcare. The free ride is over. It's not that the alliances are over. The way you're going to save those alliances by making them relevant and equitable for Americans is by rebalancing. Not only is that what we're doing, that's what's happening.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Schmitt, thank you for your questions regarding the subject matter of this hearing. Senator Kelly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mine too are, at least the first one, the subject matter. Secretary Colby, is it correct that the administration is justifying the ongoing military operation against Iran in part because of the urgent threat posed by Iran to U.S. forces in the region and the perceived future threat of Iranian ballistic missiles to the U.S. homeland, yes or no?

From a general perspective, I wouldn't comment on the legal rationale, but certainly from a general strategic point of view, absolutely.

Absolutely. So your 2026 National Defense Strategy downgraded the Middle East and didn't label it as a core strategic theater on the same level as the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Is that correct?

I think what we said that we were very clear-eyed and specific about the threat posed by Iran and by its missile program and the potential for resumption of its nuclear program after Operation Midnight Hammer and the need to give the president options working with our own...

But on the core strategic theater question, it was the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere that should be the focus.

The overarching focus of the American military obviously is the homeland hemisphere and the first island chain and the Middle East is part of that.

Thank you. That's how I read it. So when that was drafted, did the administration believe, as it claims now, that Iran was close to having a ballistic missile capability that could threaten the homeland?

I defer to my intelligence community colleagues on the specifics of that kind of question, but obviously the administration, I think I can speak for the administration as a whole, thinks that the Iranian missile program is a very serious... ...threat posed by Iran is not limited to any whatever the status of that is, which I think would be at the classified level.

Yes, so it sounds like you didn't know of anything that could range the United States or close to it. So here's the thing, I'm trying to understand whether you believe Iran can be primarily contained by our regional partners, which is what you wrote a few weeks ago, or is it an imminent threat to the United States as President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and Secretary Rubio have told the American people over the last few days? Can't be both.

Well, the strategy had in mind the Operation Midnight Hammer, obviously, in the past. It was written before Operation Epic Fury, but we fully anticipated providing the president with credible military options to deal with the Iranian threat in concert with our allies and partners in the region.

Because but here's the thing, Mr. Secretary. None of us here heard about Iran having missile technology that was that advanced, being able to range the United States or being close to obtaining a nuclear weapon. I mean, the last thing we heard from the president on the nuclear weapon before this war, as he calls it, was the Iranian nuclear program was obliterated. That means completely eliminated, gone for good. That's what obliterated means. And then on Saturday, this administration started a war on that basis, inconsistent with the document that I think you're responsible for. And now at least six U.S. service members have paid the ultimate price based on this notion that Iran posed an imminent threat to the United States, to the homeland, and to our military. And many more risking their lives right now to eliminate a threat that six weeks ago, when you published that document, you didn't really believe existed.

Senator, I think it's demonstrably untrue that the strategy didn't countenance the potential for the president to use military force against Iran. In fact, it appears several times in the...

Could you speak into the microphone?

Oh, I'm sorry. Senator, I think it's demonstrably untrue that the document didn't countenance the provision of credible military options for the president to use force against. In fact, it specifically refers to that in a number of occasions. So obviously, I think the military campaign that's underway, Operation Epic Fury...

Yeah, but wouldn't you think that that would be a primary theater that we would be focused on in the document if that threat, that imminent threat to the homeland existed?

I think the document countenances the employment by the president of military force globally as part of the strategy, Senator.

Well, I'm about out of time, but I think it's important to say that we've seen this playbook before. It's what dragged us into a war decades ago, a bloody war in Iraq. And Secretary Colby, I think if you intend to avoid this mistake again, I think we've got to rethink about how we need to be really straight with the American people about what's going on. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Banks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Securing the Western Hemisphere is not a distraction from deterring China. Securing our own backyard enables us to project power to the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Just look at Panama. Secretary Colby, does the removal of Chinese companies from the canal zone support our ability to surge forces to the Pacific?

Thank you, Senator. I think the ability to operate freely and without any hindrance through the canal is absolutely essential.

Or look at Venezuela, where the Maduro regime supplied heavily discounted oil to China. The same goes for Iran, by the way. How will reducing discounted oil shipments from Venezuela and possibly now Iran impact China?

Well, Senator, thanks. I'd defer to my colleagues, but I think one of the things we're seeing is that this perception that everything was connected and that these were a sort of aligned adversaries, as the last administration would put it, is actually not happening. The president, through his creative diplomacy, his flexible diplomacy, as well as the targeted use of force, has been able to break off in key respects, even working with a government that is obviously the Maduro has been brought to justice or is being charged. But we can put a lot more in there, much more compliant with a reasonable conception of our interests. And I think it actually is demonstrating and enlisting a lot of support in the region and beyond that's showing that people, I think as Senator Scott said, people want to associate with our country.

The NDS talks about our adversaries coordinating aggression across multiple theaters. If Iran were no longer a threat to the U.S. and our allies, how would that impact our ability to respond to coordinated aggression?

Well, Senator, I think the degradation of Iranian military power as the goal of the campaign being carried out will certainly lessen the threat of simultaneity in the Middle East and will put us in a better position from that point of view.

And how would that free up military assets that could be assigned to INDOPACOM?

Well, I think if we, and I think I have a lot of confidence in our military forces, that that hopefully should put us in a position where Iran at a minimum is not significantly back. And as I've discussed with the minority members a lot, there may be a range of more optimistic outcomes in terms of a fundamental change in the government in the Islamic Republic. But in any case, it will be significantly degraded and be put in a position where our very kind of our model ally Israel, which is willing and able to take a lot more responsibility, our Gulf partners who are doing a lot both defensively but also increasingly more assertively, some of our European allies are now moving more assertively. I think that's going to put us in a position where obviously the United States will still play a very important role in the Middle East, needless to say, including militarily, but allow us to enable this focus on the first island chain.

I want to give President Trump a lot of credit for his historic arms sale to Taiwan in December. How do FMS cases like these contribute to Taiwan's ability to assist U.S. forces in the denial mission?

So I think the issue of Taiwan is a particularly sensitive one, and we are clear in the National Defense Strategy that we are not changing or seeking to change American policy or declaratory policy in any way. But of course, it has been the position of the United States for almost half a century to provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character and to oppose the use of violence or coercion to change the status quo. And I think our policies are consistent with that, also consistent as I spoke with the chairman about earlier, with this strong and clear but quiet, I think this defense strategy and approach of this administration is more focused on delivering on results. And I think you could favorably compare President Trump in that respect to President Biden, who was very vocal in a number of ways but actually did less in terms of the ability to actually deter.

And how important is it that Taiwan pass a special defense budget to fund these types of capabilities?

Well, I think if we, and I think I have a lot of confidence in our military forces, that that hopefully should put us in a position where Iran at a minimum is not significantly back. And as I've discussed with the minority members a lot, there may be a range of more optimistic outcomes in terms of a fundamental change in the government in the Islamic Republic. But in any case, it will be significantly degraded and be put in a position where our very kind of our model ally Israel, which is willing and able to take a lot more responsibility, our Gulf partners who are doing a lot both defensively but also increasingly more assertively, some of our European allies are now moving more assertively. I think that's going to put us in a position where obviously the United States will still play a very important role in the Middle East, needless to say, including militarily, but allow us to enable this focus on the first island chain.

I want to give President Trump a lot of credit for his historic arms sale to Taiwan in December. How do FMS cases like these contribute to Taiwan's ability to assist U.S. forces in the denial mission?

So I think the issue of Taiwan is a particularly sensitive one, and we are clear in the National Defense Strategy that we are not changing or seeking to change American policy or declaratory policy in any way. But of course, it has been the position of the United States for almost half a century to provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character and to oppose the use of violence or coercion to change the status quo. And I think our policies are consistent with that, also consistent as I spoke with the chairman about earlier, with this strong and clear but quiet, I think this defense strategy and approach of this administration is more focused on delivering on results. And I think you could favorably compare President Trump in that respect to President Biden, who was very vocal in a number of ways but actually did less in terms of the ability to actually deter.

And how important is it that Taiwan pass a special defense budget to fund these types of capabilities?

Well, I wouldn't comment specifically on the issue of Taiwan given its sensitivity or seek to intrude, but I will say it is absolutely vital that our allies and partners who expect our defense to do their part for defense. And I think members of this committee, I think have been making this point very clearly in a way that I think really...

Mr. Banks, what was the question? I'm sorry, I didn't...

About Taiwan passing a special defense budget to fund their defense capabilities.

Thank you for that. And go ahead and take the time.

I was just saying, members of this committee, I think, are making a very similar point, and I would say without specifically addressing the issue of Taiwan or et cetera. But in general, it's really critical that our allies and partners step up to defend themselves if they expect us to potentially defend them. So I think that message is really important. And I've...

...change in the government's behavior.

Okay, well, let me just say then, okay, you you are uncomfortable having your own words read to you, and you're uncomfortable saying that the assassination of a leader and the arrest of a leader, you won't acknowledge that that's regime change. I think that's very instructive to those listening. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Senator Sullivan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Under Secretary, good to see you. I want to thank you, right? We've you've had a I think we've had a good discussion back and forth on coming to my office, meeting with other senators, emailing, texting. I appreciate that input from you guys. You guys get input from us. I think it I think it helps both sides, so I want to thank you for that. I think it's important, and I just encourage you to keep it up. So I appreciate that very much. Look, just to answer Senator Kaine a little bit, you know, my view Iran has been at war with us for like almost 50 years. They've killed and wounded thousands of service members, starting with the Beirut bombing, the Khobar Towers, the IEDs that were very sophisticated that General Soleimani, the Quds Force commander, they built those, they provided them to Iraqi Shia militias, killed over 600 American service members, wounded over 2,000. And I was in a top secret hearing with General Dunford, and I asked him a question, have we lost deterrence against Iran? They're killing our guys everywhere. They're not afraid. And he said, we've lost deterrence. They feel they can kill Americans at will with no consequence. So to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, wake up. This country's been at war with us for almost a half century, and they've killed thousands and wounded thousands of our best and brightest. By the way, I was in another classified hearing last October of 2024, all the top intel officials, the FBI director, 100 U.S. senators about election interference one month before the 2024 election. And I directly asked the FBI director, are the Iranians still trying to kill President Trump? Okay, a month before the election. The FBI director, I asked him. You want to talk about election interference? That's what this was about. Trying to kill the lead candidate. He looked at me, Senator, yes, Iran is still Iran's leadership is still trying to kill the President of the United States. Okay, so again, they've been at war with us, and I think what is happening now is reestablishing deterrence in the allies that we have in the Middle East. And by the way, it's been a bipartisan goal of every president to make sure the Iranians don't get nukes and don't get ballistic missiles. And that's what the President and our brave troops are undertaking right now. Do you have a comment on that?

Well, thanks, Senator. I agree with everything you said. I mean, in terms of the threat that they've posed. In fact, I mean, not I know you're a Marine, my my uncle who was here with me a year ago for my nomination was a Marine actually in in Beirut for the barracks and was almost killed. He was missing for a few days. So I think I mean, that's that's less than a lot of people have said.

Well, over 230 Marines, I think 16 soldiers. Killed them all.

So fully agreed, and I think we've obviously brought in the lessons and as the President said, you know, he's not going to have the yips, as I think he put it yesterday. There's still we're still going to learn the lessons of the last 25 years and not make the same mistakes. But I think that's, you know, in Operation Absolute Resolve, we've seen the results that have been favorable. And we're in the early I mean, this is something I just really stress without consuming your time, sir, but is just we are at the earliest stages of this campaign.

Yeah. No, it's dangerous. There's no doubt about it. Let me ask, there's been some articles about munitions and how we're running short of munitions. I don't know if that's true. I'm just reading the press. How are we doing on our defense industrial base? And do you want to send a message to any other countries around the world who might be reading, hey, America's low on munitions, maybe it's our time to move on Taiwan or something like like that? Do you want to send a message here in a public hearing like don't think about it, we're not low on munitions? Where are we on that? Where are we on the industrial base? And do you want to send a clear message to anyone else who might be trying to undertake some mischief?

Absolutely. I think our President has got the will and resolve to use the American military, is not afraid of it. I would say, you know, he spoke on the issue of yesterday of munitions, and I'll get back to that in a second. But I would say I know for a fact that our potential opponents are looking at the prowess of the joint force under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's leadership, and they are intimidated, and they're right to be intimidated. We have a president with the resolve, and the Department of War is giving him the ability to do so as with this strategy, but especially a $1.5 trillion budget. I know you've been a leader on that, sir, and overhaul national mobilization of our defense industrial base and allies who are actually stepping up.

And are we are we making progress on the industrial base, munitions, and should our potential adversaries around the world not read these articles about we're running low on munitions and think it's time to maybe move on Taiwan?

Absolutely. I think we need to work hard on the defense industrial base, but nobody should get the wrong impression. We're ahead of the problem.

Good. I'm going to submit records or questions for the record because I don't want to go over my time, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate your visit to Alaska. We have ICEX going on up there with senior Navy officials this coming week. We had the top, you know, the Chief of Staff of the Army up there I visited with his him and his leadership. So a lot of military up in the most strategic place in the world, and I look forward to submitting records on the Arctic.

Thank you, Senator Sullivan. The Secretary pointed out early in this hearing that his first visit as after confirmation was in Alaska. Senator Gillibrand.

Thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you for appearing. The reason why so many people on this side of the aisle are so concerned, it's not that as Senator Sullivan said that we don't know that Iran is an enemy, that Iran has conducted so many terror attacks against the United States through its proxies, against our allies, multiple times, multiple years over many, many decades. There is no confusion there. There is no love lost for the Ayatollah, and we are grateful for the strategic capability of the bravest men in the world, bravest men and women in the world in our armed services. They can do and execute any mission we give them with precision, with extraordinary bravery and courage, and they will serve regardless of what President Trump what mission he sends them on. Now, the reason why there is so much consternation is because President Trump has not given us a clear reason why he is in Iran. If he wants to declare war on Iran, that is the job and responsibility of Congress under the Constitution. So he is subverting our authority in every respect. Second, he's had a mixed message. He's talked about regime change, the Secretary of Defense has talked about regime change. He's talked about take out the missiles, he's talked about take out the explosives, take out the centrifuges, and take out the capacity to create nuclear weapons. And he's used these messaging over many, many instances. And so we are rightly concerned that President Trump neither has the clarity or disposition to execute a mission that he feels is for the defense of America, because we've not heard that. We've not heard how this is an exigent circumstance where he must defend America. So from a policy perspective, since you are the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, do you not agree that President Trump should be coming to Congress asking for an authorization for use of military force?

Well, thank you, Senator. I defer to my colleagues Office of General Counsel and others in terms of the the legal requirements. I do think that the military campaign that the President has directed does have clear goals. It's the destruction or degradation of the Iranian ballistic missile force and production capacity as well as one-way attack drones and the Iranian Navy and of course always preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. My understanding and not speaking for the President in any way, but just listening extremely closely to him is that he has indicated or stated that this is a unique historic opportunity for the Iranian people to take matters into their own hands. The fact is that there has been substantial degradation in the leadership of the Islamic Republic and as you say rightly so, Senator, that's, you know, no no tears anywhere around here imputed. But I think the goals of the military campaign that he himself has directed are indeed clear.

But those goals are ones that should be directed by Congress because they are declarations of war. And if he is indeed interested in America is backing you with overwhelming strength and devastating force and Secretary Hegseth, all I want is freedom for the people, then you should have come to Congress first. That is not an exigent circumstance where we must defend the United States. His only authority under the Constitution is to protect America if they are being attacked or imminently going to be attacked. And so we believe that the American people have a right to know if we are going to get involved in a war. They have a right to be part of it through their representatives, Congress, their senators, their house members, to decide whether it's in America's best interest to go to war. And the last time I was in New York, what New Yorkers want to talk about is the cost of groceries, the cost of housing, the cost of transportation, the cost of medicine. And they voted specifically for non-intervention throughout this country. They voted for lowering costs, not for forever wars. Those were promises of the Trump administration getting elected. And so we expect that when this country decides to go to war where our citizens will arguably be vulnerable to attack, whether they live abroad or they're serving in the military, that we can use our voices to represent our people and decide whether we will authorize the use of military force by the President. He owes it to the American people to go through us to ask to go to war.

Well, Senator, obviously on the specific legal issues I defer, but I know that the leadership of the administration is going to come this afternoon and brief you and engage with Congress. I know how how importantly I know Secretary Rubio is here, I believe Secretary Hegseth as well, the Chairman. So exactly what those conversations are going to be, I'm sure you'll get detailed answers to your questions.

Thank you, Senator Gillibrand. We have Senator Rosen and then Senator Duckworth.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for holding this hearing. I also first want to take a moment to share my sorrow for our service members killed and wounded in action over the past few days. Especially want to express my sorrow and gratitude to their families. And we must always be sure that their sacrifice will not be forgotten. And I've always said that we can never allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon, and that they're the number one state sponsor of terror around the globe with the blood of American service members, Israelis, and countless others on their hands. They've oppressed their own people for decades. Those same people are rightly celebrating what could be the end of the reign of terror. And so like so many others, I'm glad the Supreme Leader is dead. I believe the world is better off without him. But the President's past approach to armed conflict and his administration's history of repeatedly withholding information and misleading Congress raise concerns that he may be leading us into another protracted Middle East conflict without clear objectives, without presented evidence that an Iranian attack was imminent and without Senator Gillibrand said authorization from Congress. Operation Epic Fury also appears to stand in contrast to the regional priorities of the National Defense Strategy that we're here to discuss today and to Secretary Colby's own stated belief that the United States must shift focus from the Middle East. And so I hope today this hearing will provide some clarity. So Secretary Colby, I'm going to move on and talk about cyber strategy. Cyber capabilities integral to the success of all of our military operations. We're seeing it right now with Operation Epic Fury. Military power is no longer just about bombs, bullets. Cyber has evolved into a fully integrated domain of warfare. So now more than ever, we need a cyber workforce equipped with the expertise to defend our networks, to execute offensive operations in a rapidly changing battle space to achieve America's national security objectives. The domain has shifted. We can't fight today's digital wars with outdated and inflexible personnel structure. However, the NDS sparingly mentions cyber. I'm surprised at how little emphasis has been placed on cyber as compared to other capabilities discussed. It does not engender much confidence that cyber is being treated with the necessary respect and understanding of its significance in every area that we engage in. Not sure it's an urgency or a priority for this administration. So why does the strategy fail to prioritize offensive and defensive cyber capabilities required for addressing today's conflict in the cyber environment, and does the Department of Defense believe our digital infrastructure can survive a multi-theater war without focused investment in these critical domains?

Well, thanks, Senator. I'd just reject the characterization that we're not super focused on cyber. We are, and I'd be happy to go into it in the closed hearing. We have a fantastic, in my organization, we have a fantastic Assistant Secretary for Cyber, who I believe used to work on this committee, Katie Sutton, and she's leading a real effort on applying the strategic principles to cyber. One of the points is that we didn't want to kind of just repeat things that have already been said a lot of time, but rather the purpose of the strategy, and I think Senator Fischer was saying this, is more of a living kind of heuristic to apply to drive change in the organization. So we don't need to, and similarly with the nuclear issue, we don't need to solve every particular problem within a domain or area, but rather we want to provide a framework that then creative people like Ms. Sutton can then go and drive along with General Hartman, who's now the Cybercom Commander, as well as General Rudd, if confirmed. So we see very much that cyber is absolutely critical. You saw it in Operation Absolute Resolve, you're seeing it in Operation Epic Fury. I think the chairman talked about that. The way we see cyber is elemental and inextricably linked with the success of the joint force across the board.

Well, we need to continue to prioritize that. I think it is foundational. I want to talk about quickly the withdrawal from Syria and the ISIS threat. The U.S. began withdrawing troops out of the largest base in northeastern Syria last month. Appears to be part of the complete withdrawal from the country. I was pleased to see Syrian government join the defeat ISIS campaign. We've seen repeated ISIS attacks over the last several months, including one in December resulted in the death of two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter, as well as a breakout of up to 20,000 ISIS-affiliated individuals from Al-Hol. So does the department intend to withdraw all U.S. forces from Syria, and does the department view ISIS in Syria as a threat to U.S. interests?

Well, I won't speak specifically about some of those issues just in the open hearing, but I'll say we take very seriously from the President and the Secretary on down the need to sustain a long-term counterterrorism fight, and that's encompassed in the strategy. And of course, you've seen military operations against ISIS recently, and we have a political strategy in Syria being led obviously by the State Department and others.

Well, thank you. I'll be interested to hear if I take us off the record if you consider the breakout from the camps with tens of thousands of ISIS-affiliated individuals a threat to U.S. national security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Rosen, do you intend to ask the next to the last question you asked in the classified session?

I think we might get an answer there.

Senator Duckworth.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This week's operations against Iran and Trump's obsession with military adventurism shows a huge gap between his promises to get America out of foreign wars and his actions. This illegal military campaign against Iran has resulted in the deaths of service members so far along with the serious injury of others. It puts a target on the back of every American in the Middle East, and it has no clear end state other than vague promises about the freedom of the Iranian people. Trump claims this was necessary to prevent imminent threats against Americans, but he has failed to present a shred of legitimate evidence, and this is a pattern. Between Iran, Venezuela, strikes in the Caribbean Sea, deployments to American cities, threats to Greenland, and the way he's treated our NATO allies, Trump is creating more chaos than he's eliminating and distracting and exhausting our military in the process. He insists on fabricating excuses to push our military into wars of choice, his choice, instead of preparing for potential future crises that could have real impacts on Americans at home and abroad. We're here to talk about the NDS. So, Mr. Colby, I want to talk about our role as a Pacific nation. Every day, flashpoints threaten to spill over into war in a region of core importance to the United States, the Indo-Pacific. You and I have had many conversations about this region. I want to make something clear. We are a Pacific nation. Securing Americans requires securing the Pacific, where hundreds of thousands of Americans live and work and millions more depend on peace for their livelihoods. Five U.S. states and three U.S. territories are either in or along the Pacific Ocean. In fact, the only Veterans Affairs hospital outside of the United States is in the Philippines because so many American veterans call it home. And as the NDS rightfully points out, the American economy is powered by key trade and energy routes in the Pacific. But there are very real signs that the People's Republic of China is exploiting Trump's adventurism to threaten all of this. Just in the last three months, there have been at least four flashpoints in the PRC across the region. In February alone, U.S. and Chinese fighter jets engaged in a standoff near South Korea, and in the South China Sea, the Philippine Coast Guard claimed that the PRC jammed their internet access, the first time their communications have been disrupted. To show what Americans might lose if this administration gets a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, I want to discuss with you just one example out of dozens of possible regional flashpoints: the disputed islands on the western side of the Philippines. Mr. Colby, do you agree that one of DOD's major decisions in the initial hours of any crisis will be coordinating with the State Department and local nations on how to deploy the military to ensure the safety of American families, including arranging a non-combatant evacuation if necessary, anywhere in the world?

I do, and I actually was doing that in the middle of the night last night. So yes.

Okay. In the case of a flare-up involving the Philippines, more than 750,000 Americans, three-quarters of a million people, are living in the country, and they would be caught in the crossfire, and getting them out would involve coordination across as many as six countries' airspaces across Southeast Asia. Mr. Colby, do you agree that DOD would need to make quick decisions about how our military should be used to protect access routes, sites, or assets key to our global and domestic economy?

I do, Senator, and if I could just briefly say, I think the U.S.-Philippines relationship and alliance is especially critical, and I think we've made tremendous progress over the last year.

Yes, we have. A conflict on the western side of the Philippines in the South China Sea could disrupt as much as one-third of global maritime trade, especially supplies of oil, gas, electronics, and agricultural goods that Americans depend on, generating economic catastrophe for Americans at home. There's a clear danger to this administration's failure to prepare for crises in this region that is essential to American prosperity. If the U.S. isn't prepared, flinches, or delays a response, the PRC could exploit it. We have to be ready right away. But that requires focus and preparation, and it can't be done when the Indo-Pacific is not a top priority, and it can't be done when President Trump insists on illegally and recklessly using our military to generate chaos around the world. If we continue to strain our military with wars of choice all over the world and make our enemies doubt whether we will defend our interests in the Pacific, we will all lose. And I cannot emphasize to you how important it is that we continue to focus on the Indo-Pacific.

Well, thank you, Senator. I, needless to say, I disagree with your characterization of the President, but in the limited time, I'll stress that that is exactly why we are focused on your points on the Indo-Pacific. I completely agree, and that is exactly why it is the priority. And I am personally focused, the Secretary I know is personally focused, and obviously people like Admiral Paparo are personally focused on watching things very carefully and operating from a position of strong and clear but quiet and very close alignment with our allies and partners in the region. My first trip was to Korea and Japan. My first call, I believe, as on Operation Epic Fury, was the Minister of Defense of the Philippines, Secretary of Defense of the Philippines. So we are laser-focused on the first island chain.

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Duckworth, thank you for ending our public hearing with a question about the subject matter of this hearing. It is 11:36. The committee will reconvene in the Senate SCIF in precisely 15 minutes. We're adjourned.