Hearings to examine the posture of the United States Space Command and United States Strategic

The committee will come to order. I want to thank our witnesses for again appearing and for their long service to our nation. Over two years ago, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission reached the unanimous bipartisan conclusion that the United States must fundamentally update our strategic capabilities to have any hope of countering growing threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The progress we've made since then has been limited, but Russia and China have advanced by leaps and bounds in their nuclear and space programs. Even North Korea has outpaced our efforts as Kim Jong Un steadily expands his nuclear and missile arsenals. As we enter the fifth year of war criminal Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine, Russia remains a major strategic threat to the United States. Moscow owns the world's largest and most modern nuclear arsenal, giving it a 10-to-one advantage over the United States in tactical nuclear weapons. Russia has also developed new weapons unlike anything in the U.S. inventory. It stocks nuclear-powered transoceanic autonomous torpedoes and international cruise missiles. For its part, Xi's China is rapidly becoming an even greater threat. Beijing is expanding its nuclear arsenal at breakneck speed, likely outpacing the U.S. by the early 2030s. Already it has successfully deployed an operational strategic triad of nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines. Over the past few years, China quadrupled the size of its nuclear arsenal and built an ICBM network larger than our own here in the United States. The Chinese have flown a missile that can drop nuclear warheads from orbit anywhere on Earth with virtually no warning. Both Russia and China understand that space is a battlefield. They are openly developing and testing capabilities to degrade or destroy our satellite constellations. Each country has obliterated operational satellites, scattering thousands of fragments of debris and endangering hundreds of other orbital objects. Unfortunately, these aggressive actions only scratch the surface of Moscow and Beijing's militarization of space. North Korea is a less immediate threat than China or Russia, but it is a threat nonetheless. Kim Jong Un is increasingly able to attack the United States and our allies. North Korea is conducting frequent missile tests and is working to field ballistic missile submarines. Both actions make one thing clear: Kim Jong Un believes he can achieve his goals through nuclear threats. The Golden Dome initiative is long overdue and is a reassessment of the capabilities we need to defend our homeland from strategic attacks. The President allowed the outdated New START Treaty to expire, and he exposed Moscow's and Beijing's illicit nuclear testing. I believe both actions helped to reset the strategic balance that has tipped against us for decades. Operations Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury eliminated the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran permanently, I hope. Still, there's much more we need to do. We must restore the National Nuclear Security Administration's basic industrial capabilities. We must make progress on the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, the Columbia submarine, and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile programs. We must explore what additional nuclear and space capabilities we need to deter Putin's, Xi's, and Kim's ambitions. These efforts require sustained investment and innovation. We can afford no less. During this hearing, I'd like to hear how we are managing the risk of maintaining critical military capabilities that are both too old and too few in number to meet the threats of today, much less the threats of tomorrow. I'd also like to leave this hearing understanding better how our witnesses see the roles of their commands evolving under the latest National Defense Strategy. It's no secret that I believe this NDS falls short in several areas. I'm particularly concerned that the current strategy does not address space and nuclear threats with anywhere near the urgency they deserve. So undoubtedly we'll talk about that today, and I now turn to my friend and colleague, Ranking Member Reed.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to our witnesses. General Whiting, let me begin by thanking you for 36 years of service to the nation. I understand this will be your last posture hearing, and I want to wish you and your wife, Tammy, all the best as you go forward. Thank you for your service, sir. And Admiral Correll, welcome. This is your first posture hearing before the committee, and I thank you as well for your service and the dedication of your family. We are operating in a historically dangerous strategic environment. With the expiration of the New START Treaty, for the first time in half a century, the United States and Russia lack a framework to regulate their nuclear forces. I believe we must pursue a successor agreement. The alternative, an unconstrained arms competition, would serve no one's interest. At the same time, we now face two near-peer nuclear rivals. China is rapidly expanding its arsenal, with projections indicating it could reach rough parity with the United States and Russia by 2030. This problem is already shaping the operational environment, including increasingly coordinated military activity between Russia and China, such as joint strategic bombing patrols near Alaska and in the Western Pacific. In addition, the concept of extended deterrence, the bedrock of our alliance system, particularly with NATO, is under serious strain. For generations, the U.S. nuclear umbrella has reassured allies, deterred adversaries, and helped prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Today, confidence in America and its extended deterrence is eroding. In Europe, there are growing discussions of alternate deterrence arrangements outside NATO. In Asia, allies are openly reconsidering their nuclear options. This trend has profound implications. If allies doubt the credibility of U.S. commitments, weapons proliferation becomes a rational response. Admiral Correll, from your perspective, I would like to know how you assess the risk of overlapping or competing deterrence frameworks and any update you have on how Strategic Command is adapting its posture, planning, and doctrine to this more complex dynamic with China and Russia. I also want to address the recent discussions about resuming nuclear testing. I do not believe nuclear testing would be necessary or constructive to our nuclear capabilities. We have invested $10 billion in the National Ignition Facility, which allows us to study weapons physics without underground testing, a capability that Russia and China lack. Our laboratories have certified annually for nearly 25 years that we have no technical need to test. Additionally, it would invite others to follow suit, enabling nations such as North Korea and potentially India and Pakistan to advance their own designs while eroding long-standing non-proliferation norms. Admiral Correll, I would value your perspective of the strategic cost and benefits of testing, particularly in terms of how it might shape the behavior of the other nuclear-armed states. General Whiting, space is now a contested domain, and nearly every aspect of modern military operations depends upon space-based capabilities. Early phases of any future conflict will hinge on our ability to maintain command and control while denying the same to our adversaries. To the extent you can discuss this in an open setting, I would like your assessment on the resilience of our space-based command and control systems and the military services' progress toward delivering integrated space-based effects into operational planning. I'm also interested in SPACECOM's role as a supporting command. As a warfighting domain, space requires new battle management capabilities, especially the ability to detect a threat in space and to relay that information to a weapon system. This battle management directly affects our ability to protect troops on the ground, and SPACECOM must continue to fully integrate their capabilities, including command and control, with the other combatant commands. I would like to know what challenges you face in integrating with combatant commands, such as INDOPACOM, and what additional authorities or capabilities you need to meet those demands. I recognize many of these issues will be explored further in closed session, but it is important that we articulate to the extent possible the stakes and the trajectory in this forum as well. Thank you both again for your service, and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. General Whiting, would you like to make an opening statement, sir? Thank you, and yes, you are going to need the continued engagement and doubling of effort from the Congress. Thank you for your statement. Admiral Correll, you are recognized.

Yes, Chairman. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor for Chief Master Sergeant Simmons and me to appear before you today alongside Admiral Correll and Command Sergeant Major Nowman. And I am privileged to testify before this committee for a third time as the commander of United States Space Command, representing the men and women who work tirelessly to ensure the United States maintains our dominance in space. U.S. Space Command's area of responsibility is the ultimate high ground, from which we provide critical capabilities and overwatch that enhance the entire joint force. In space, we also protect American interests from the threats now arrayed against our space systems, to include our opponents' capabilities that allow them to conduct space-enabled attacks. Thanks to the steadfast support of Congress, U.S. space capabilities, ranging from precision navigation and global communications to missile warning and real-time intelligence, provide the joint force with unmatched precision, accuracy, reach, and lethality. We saw the joint force's unmatched integration of multi-domain capabilities in Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Resolve, and more recently, Operation Epic Fury, during which space effects were critical to mission success. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently highlighted, space and cyber forces were the first movers, employing layered and non-kinetic effects to enable freedom of maneuver for the joint force. General Kane's remarks underscore the importance of achieving and maintaining space superiority, not only to safeguard the systems essential for precision strike, missile warning and tracking, and secure communications, but also to provide overwatch for terrestrial forces operating in harm's way. Should an adversary degrade or destroy our space capabilities, the joint force's ability to fight as it is sized and designed would be immediately and materially impacted. At U.S. Space Command, we command and control offensive and defensive capabilities provided by the military services to conduct operations that set favorable conditions for our joint warfighters. This operational imperative aligns with Secretary Hegseth's observation during his Arsenal of Freedom tour that, quote, "space is the ultimate high ground, and we must deliver supporting fires from our positions of advantage to cover our maneuver forces." Make no mistake, our opponents are moving at an alarming pace, developing and deploying capabilities to deny us the use of space. China's on-orbit presence has grown exponentially, now operating over 1,300 active satellites, a 667 percent increase since 2015. Including more than 510 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. They are using these capabilities to integrate space-enabled effects across their forces, making them more lethal, precise, and far-ranging, while fielding weapons purpose-built to outmaneuver and destroy our satellites. At the same time, Russia continues to demonstrate capabilities designed to disrupt our assets, including the potential placement of a nuclear weapon on orbit, the single greatest threat to our space architecture. These developments threaten our joint force in every domain since the control of space shapes outcomes on land, at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace. To ensure U.S. Space Command can deter conflict and maintain deterrence in space, we request continued congressional support of our key fiscal year 2027 priorities. This includes fielding integrated space fires, active protection of our high-valued satellites, enhancing our battlespace awareness, building an integrated command and control system, sustaining our forces' freedom to maneuver, and providing sufficient cyber defenses of our space enterprise. We thank Congress for its support this past year, which has enabled us to begin the disciplined transition to our permanent headquarters at Redstone Arsenal, as directed by the President. To guarantee mission continuity, we are executing a phased relocation, operating from interim facilities while a new purpose-built command and control headquarters is constructed. Our people are central to this effort, and we are using retention and relocation incentives to keep our mission-critical talent throughout the move. Your continued support and authorizations for FY 26 and 27 are essential to accelerate the completion of this modern headquarters and ensure our uninterrupted readiness. With the continued support of Congress, U.S. Space Command will remain prepared to address the evolving threat landscape, deter aggression, counter adversary actions, and safeguard America's interest in space today and for generations to come. Armed conflict in space is not inevitable, but should deterrence fail, the integrated space power of our team will provide a decisive advantage. Chairman, my posture statement is submitted for the record and I look forward to answering your questions.

Good morning, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. Command Sergeant Major Naumann and I are honored to appear before you today alongside our teammates General Whiting and Chief Master Sergeant Simmons. It's a privilege to represent the dedicated men and women of United States Strategic Command and to discuss the critical role we play in safeguarding our nation's security. I'd like to begin by taking a moment to honor our fallen U.S. service members. The joint force is eternally grateful to those that have paid the ultimate sacrifice in service of our country. Our thoughts and prayers remain with their families, and their legacy inspires us to continue our mission with unwavering resolve. This is my first time addressing this committee as commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and I want to express my sincere gratitude for this committee's steadfast support. Your commitment to providing the resources necessary for us to execute our mission during this bi-generational period of modernization and recapitalization is deeply appreciated. I also extend my heartfelt thanks to the American people. Their unwavering support helps us to remain the most advanced, lethal, and credible fighting force in the world. It is their trust and confidence that drive us to excel in our mission every day. Our nation's nuclear forces, the foundation of our national security, are safe, secure, effective, and credible. My confidence in this assessment is not based solely on our combat capability, but rather on the extraordinary professionals at U.S. Strategic Command. They are the very essence of our credibility. And their expertise and dedication ensure that we remain ready to deter aggression and respond decisively when directed. As I testify before you today, STRATCOM and its components stand ready, not seeking out confrontation, but deterring strategic attack and underpinning all Department of War operational plans. The strategic capabilities provided by each leg of the triad, coupled with assured nuclear command, control, and communications, or NC3 systems, underpin everything the department does in defense of our nation and American interests abroad. Our fundamental challenge, one that we successfully face each and every day, is to deter great power conflict and manage the complexities of deterring multiple nuclear competitors simultaneously, all while adapting to rapid technological change and advancements. This change is most evident in five evolving threat vectors: cyber, counter-U.S. space capabilities, in other words, what can the adversary do to us in space to challenge what we deliver from space for the joint force, a contested electromagnetic spectrum, novel missile systems, and supply chain challenges. Adapting to today's strategic landscape demands sustained focus, vigilance, and modernization of our strategic forces. As we bring the B-21 bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system online, we will ensure the credibility of our deterrent for decades to come. Thank you once again for your support and trust in the soldiers, sailors, airmen, guardians, marines, and civilian professionals who comprise U.S. Strategic Command, and for dedicating your time and effort to our mission and portfolio. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Admiral Correll. It's going to take quite a bit of resources, quite a plus-up of resources to make good on the last statement you made about putting us where we need to be for decades to come. Can you comment about that?

Senator, I pay very close attention to the ability to sustain all three legs of the triad and bridge to the next generation of capability. This committee and the legislature have been very supportive in providing funding to bring those new capabilities online and sustain the existing capabilities. That will be, as you said, Senator, that will be for the next 15 years, that transition, and we'll need to continue to pay very close attention to that. In terms of the resources...

And when we pay close attention, that's going to require a great deal more resources, is it not?

The resources are going to be approximately five percent of the defense budget to sustain existing capability and bridge to the new capability. And I would offer that that's an existential insurance policy for our country and a good value proposition for our nation. And again, I appreciate the committee's support.

Yeah, absolutely a required insurance policy. You know, it certainly is obvious that both of you are in this together. And we had some testimony about a nuclear-armed space. How close is anyone to getting to that? I'll stay with you, Admiral Correll, and then move over to General Whiting.

Russia has indicated and it's been publicly acknowledged that they're working on a nuclear capability that could be placed in space.

What's your estimate of how soon that might be?

With respect, I'd prefer to answer that in a closed testimony session.

It would amount to a major game changer, would it not?

Very, very significant, and we have to account for it in terms of the architecture that we have and what we can do about it. And the department's very focused on that. We do have some options.

General Whiting, we will be in a closed session down in the SCIF, but what can you tell the American public in answer to my question?

I associate myself with Admiral Correll's comments, Chairman. The reports are that Russia has developed a nuclear anti-satellite weapon that they could potentially place on orbit. They have not done that today. If they did that, that would be an indiscriminate weapon that if detonated on orbit would immediately place at risk every country's space capability in low Earth orbit: the United States, China, Russia, Japan, Europe, you name it. And so that would violate the Outer Space Treaty and would not be a development, obviously, that we could tolerate.

And then tell us about this debris that was caused by the destruction of one of the satellites, or one or more of the satellites.

Chairman, in early 2007, China executed a hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons test against one of their own defunct satellites. They did it at a relatively high altitude in low Earth orbit and it created over 3,600 pieces of long-lived debris that we still have to deal with today. And then in November of 2021, Russia executed a hit-to-kill ASAT test against one of their satellites, and that was about three months before they invaded Ukraine, which seemed to be they were sending a signal to the United States and to the West that they could hold our satellites at risk. And that created about 1,500 pieces of debris that we had to deal with at the time, that even caused their cosmonauts on board the International Space Station to have to take shelter because of a potential collision between that debris and the International Space Station. Fortunately, that didn't happen, but it was a reckless test nonetheless.

It's been almost two decades since China did this, right?

That's correct, Senator.

And more recently for Russia. Do you think China realized that they should never do this again, or do you think it's just a matter of time?

I think the fact that they have not re-conducted a similar test indicates that they realize that they made a mistake at the way in which they executed that test and the fact that we and they still have to deal with that debris. I hope that's the case, and we would not want to see a similar test like that happen again.

And when we deal with debris, as you say we've had to deal with it, are we removing some of it somehow, or are we just having to deal with it by avoiding it?

Chairman, we do not have any way to remove it today other than just to allow natural gravity to pull it back into the Earth's atmosphere, but depending on the altitude, that can take decades. So today we track it and then we provide warnings out to all satellite owner-operators around the world so that they can maneuver their active satellites away from that debris if they're able to do that.

Thank you. Senator Reed.

Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Correll, from a cost-benefit perspective, including not just monetary costs but political costs, do you see a military need right now for nuclear weapons testing?

Senator, the Department of Energy determines the need for nuclear warhead testing. The department does a variety of tests with our launchers and missile systems to validate the performance of those systems, and I would associate myself with the comments from the Department of Energy with respect to nuclear warhead testing.

Can you update us on the current comments from the Department of Energy?

From the Department of Energy?

Yes. Are you aware of them taking a position that they have to test or that they are not testing? They have taken any type of position with respect to testing, i.e., no further testing necessary, we must test, etc.

On an annual basis, I am obligated to review a letter that's a joint letter between the Department of Energy and Department of Defense that looks hard at whether or not we need to do anything more in terms of nuclear warhead testing. And in that most recent letter that came forward to Congress, it indicated we have the capabilities and sufficient testing to satisfy ourselves on the reliability and efficacy of our nuclear warheads. But we monitor that very closely, and I'll continue to provide my best military advice. What I would say is we would want to be in a position where if we needed to resume some kind of testing that we had thought through that and have the capabilities and then, you know, to deter other nations from resuming or doing any kind of nuclear yield testing, and those nations are signatory to a treaty that obligates them not to do that.

Thank you, sir. General Whiting, you've stated very precisely that the opening stages of recent operations stressed the reliance on space-based command and control. I mean, that's going to be the first sort of area of conflict in any major conflagration. Are you concerned regarding the vulnerability of our space-based command and control at this point?

Sir, today our command and control does rely on a number of systems, some of which are legacy and were built before the era we find ourselves in today where they face a number of ground-based and space-based threats. And so we have to figure out ways to continue to defend those capabilities while they are modernized. We do have some new capabilities that are starting to arrive, such as proliferated low-Earth orbit constellations, and that has added to our resiliency. So I think we're on the right path. We continue to need to execute on the programs that will continue to make us even more resilient going forward.

Thank you. A question for both of you. The nation's principal test range, which both of you use, is at Kwajalein and ICBM range, also space surveillance. I'm told that the condition of the infrastructure there is very much deteriorated. Can each of you describe the importance of the range and your observation on its condition and what we have to do? This is a topic that is often overlooked.

Senator, I have visited Kwajalein Atoll, and it's a very important location for the United States military. And as you indicate, it's a location from which we execute important space domain awareness operations, both under the United States Space Force and the United States Army. Also, unique missile defense testing can occur there as well. So from a Space Command perspective, it is definitely a location that we want to see continued investment in so that we can continue to sustain the operations that are there, and I routinely have engagements with the United States Army to help them understand my requirements there.

Admiral?

I would wholeheartedly agree with General Whiting's comments with respect to the importance of Kwajalein Atoll with respect to STRATCOM's portfolio. The Air Force uses that facility to test our intercontinental ballistic missile and validate that it performs end-to-end the way we expect it to do. And we conduct three to four tests a year, and we use that range for those tests, and they provide incredibly important feedback on the accuracy and efficacy of the system. So we need to sustain it and wholeheartedly support additional investments, and I would agree that there are challenges there with the infrastructure, and we need to pay very close attention to it. And then the other comment I would make relative to capabilities and insights into testing, you mentioned it in your opening remarks, Senator, the National Ignition Facility. That's a really, really important capability for our nation in terms of validating the efficacy of our stockpile.

Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you, ma'am.

Thank you, Senator Reed. Admiral, welcome. I've really appreciated our conversations on the need for a nuclear force posture that's relevant to our expected threat environment. Holding on to a force structure that was decided 16 years ago that was based on flawed assumptions is irresponsible and risks eroding the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. For example, the program of record for at least 100 B-21 bombers no longer appears to be sufficient. Do you still agree with your predecessor that we need to procure at least 145 B-21s?

Yes, Senator, I fully support 145 to meet STRATCOM's requirements, and it may be higher than that for the joint force, but through the STRATCOM lens, 145.

And I've been encouraged by the department's strategy to consolidate acquisition authorities into a single D-RPOM for the Sentinel program. And how are you working with General White to ensure that the program is meeting your requirements?

As you mentioned, Senator, General White is a direct report portfolio manager reporting directly to Deputy Secretary Feinberg. And I would say that is a very tight linkage, that he's reporting if not at least once a week to twice a week in terms of collaboration, coordination, and common understanding of where we stand with the Sentinel program. General White and myself and my component commander at Air Force Global Strike talk at least once a week and discuss where we stand with respect to Sentinel, what the next milestone is, and any challenges associated with that. And what I've seen since General White has taken the position as the D-RPOM is key milestones being pulled to the left, and two that I would highlight is the Milestone B certification that's required as a result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach. Previously, that was indicated to occur sometime in 2027. He's now indicated that it will occur before the end of calendar year 2026. And then first launch from Vandenberg of the missile itself is expected in 2027, and that's also pulled to the left. So it's a good mechanism to lay flat the understanding of where the challenges are going forward.

We also need to ensure that the Minuteman III is going to remain credible, safe, efficient, and effective. So what steps are you taking to make sure that that happens until Sentinel's ready?

Over-communicating with stakeholders on any challenges as they occur. And I see my responsibility to the department to pay very close attention to sustainment, where challenges might manifest themselves, and then articulate how we're addressing those challenges or if there's any additional resources or assistance needed to address those challenges.

Since you've taken command, do you see any opportunities out there to be able to strengthen the work that we need to see on NC3 modernization?

I would say that we're on a good trajectory with NC3 modernization. We've developed an analytic model that addresses the threats, those threat vectors that I talked about, to provide decision-quality information to the department on future capability investments. One area I would highlight that's been of particular instance and very strong support from the department and other supporting agencies is cyber, and you noticed that I listed that as the number one threat vector, and that was purposeful.

Do you see some opportunities to be able to work with the private sector with respect to being able to leverage their emerging technologies that they have as well? Will STRATCOM look at that, or are you already doing that?

We look at that, and we look at that through what we refer to as the REACH facility. It's an arrangement that's associated with the University of Nebraska, and it's a mechanism for the command to bring in smaller companies, look at new technology and how that might be employed as we look at future capabilities. And that's both for NC3 and for electromagnetic spectrum capabilities.

Thank you. And General Whiting, I have a question for you for the record about working with our NATO allies on capabilities, being able to integrate with them as well. So thank you. Senator Shaheen, you are recognized.

Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you both for being here and for your service. I want to start with the Iran war because we have seen that the Iranians have been targeting our satellites, our radars, our communications capabilities there. We've also seen reports that they are considering cyber strikes in the United States against our systems, and we saw that they hacked Stryker Medical earlier this month. That blocked some of the data was completely deleted and others was blocked. So General Whiting, are you concerned about Iranian-backed hacker groups who could be targeting our satellites, cutting off our communications, trying to hack into our radar capabilities?

Senator, we are as concerned about cyber generically as Admiral Correll mentioned because it's the soft underbelly of our space enterprise. There are countries, not Iran, but countries like Russia and China who have demonstrated they could attack us in space with ASAT weapons or co-orbital satellites, but they would rather attack us in cyber because it's cheaper for them and harder for us to attribute. So I believe the defenses that we have put in place for our cyber against those kind of threats are up to the challenge of an Iranian cyberattack, but it's not something that we ever rest on our laurels, and we have to be very vigilant to make sure that we understand what their intent is and what their capability is and then modify our defenses accordingly.

And do you feel that same sense of assurance about the private sector and the threat that they also could be facing from Iran?

Well, ma'am, I think with the situation that you noted that was in the press here in the last couple of weeks, I think there probably are vulnerabilities there that a nation like Iran could seek to exploit.

Thank you. Admiral Correll, are you, do you have anything to add to that?

I agree with General Whiting's characterization of that and having the sensing capability to understand when there's a sophisticated operator on the network that causes traffic patterns to adjust, really sophisticated actor. We need that sensing capability and then the ability to vector the right subject matter expertise to address it where we see it.

This question is also for you, Admiral Correll, because it was reported last year that the Trump administration is considering making changes to the unified command plan that would hand over U.S. command and control of nuclear weapons to the purview of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. I know you don't want to comment on the policy there, but can you comment on how you view U.S. command and control over nuclear weapons in a scenario where Article 5 is invoked?

Senator, I would say that the arrangement that we have with the Supreme Allied Commander is a mechanism that has been in place for many years that functions appropriately for its intent and I've had no discussions within the department about adjustments to that arrangement and should I be asked to, I'd provide my best advice with respect to that.

Thank you. We have heard since the start of this war in Ukraine and actually even before that a number of our security partners have publicly questioned whether they should have their own nuclear weapon capabilities, whether they can really rely on the United States' nuclear umbrella. Can you comment on that? Are you concerned about that? Do you hear any of our allies and partners talking seriously about that and how are you thinking about addressing those concerns from our allies?

I have reasonably frequent conversations with Secretary Colby or Under Secretary for Policy and at every opportunity in mil-to-mil engagements, I reinforce our extended deterrence commitment on the part of the United States and I've detected no change in my mil-to-mil engagements in concern for our commitment and our stated commitment with respect to that and that includes in my discussions with Secretary Colby. And I would highlight that STRATCOM has several liaison officers from other countries at our command and we're scheduled to add a liaison officer from France to help with those communications and enable those and that individual is scheduled to report this summer.

Well, thank you. I'm out of time, but if I could just ask, has Secretary Colby shared your view of that situation when you had those conversations with him?

I feedback any conversations that I have within the department appropriately and reinforce our extended deterrence commitments. There is a conventional burden sharing element to the National Defense Strategy which the department has talked about extensively and those are part of the conversations as well.

Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Rounds, you are recognized.

Thank you, Madam Chair. First to both you, General Whiting and Admiral Correll, thank you to you and your teams for your service to our country. I'd like to begin by asking you both a specific question with regard to the many systems that your commands rely on for missile warning, space-based sensing, and nuclear command and control. Most of them depend on access to key portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Can we talk a little bit about how critical it is to have assured access to the 3.1 to 3.45 portion of the band and the 7.4 to 8.4 band of the spectrum for the systems that SPACECOM and STRATCOM use to conduct your missions and in particular the need for direct access for both of you to those parts of the spectrum? General Whiting.

Senator, thank you for the question. Certainly access to those bands that you highlighted is critical for our mission. In the 3 megahertz range that you highlighted, we have key radars there that support our space domain awareness and missile defense missions and then in the 7 gigahertz range, we have key communications, SATCOM communications and so we want to be able to make sure we can continue to operate. We recognize that the President has called for the United States to win the 6G race and we support the department's efforts to find technological solutions and ways that we can share the spectrum, leverage the spectrum for our economy, but also ensure that we have it for national defense purposes.

Thank you. Admiral Correll.

I would associate myself with the comments from General Whiting and just foot stomp the incredible importance of sustaining that access. Our missile warning, missile tracking, missile defense capabilities would be severely impacted negatively.

Thank you. And General Whiting, just to go back on this a little bit, what I'm concerned about is that both of those bands, the lower 3 and the 7 and 8 bands, they're protected from spectrum auction, but some folks remain interested in shifting additional federal users back into those bands, which would then free up that portion of the band that the federal users had been using, but it adds additional challenges within these bands that you rely on. In your professional military opinion, what would be the impact to our strategic communications, nuclear deterrence, and homeland defense missions, including Golden Dome, if the military were forced to share those bands with other federal users in a suboptimal manner?

Senator, with your caveat there about the suboptimal manner, which would assume that we don't have the full usage and protection of that bandwidth, it would be a significant detriment to our mission because the satellites we have on orbit today, we're going to rely on those for years and years, if not decades to come, and we can't shift them out of a band that might be using the bands that we just talked about. Including, I would also say that's true for our ground-based radars that use those bands as well. So we have to figure out how to be able to continue to use our legacy systems that we're going to have to rely on for years to come.

Admiral Correll, do you agree?

I agree.

Thank you. Would it be fair to say that Washington, D.C. is protected by radars in those bands?

Yes, Senator.

What about Hawaii?

Same.

What about Alaska?

Same.

What about the West Coast of the United States?

The same.

Thank you. Admiral Correll, just a little bit of a discussion please on with regard to the B-21 and its growing demand for that particular product. It's coming online shortly. I'm just curious, when you were answering the question for Senator Fischer, you indicated that you agreed that 145 was an optimal number for this. Can you talk a little bit about what the determining factors were that you used in coming up with that analysis?

When you look at the required readiness and timeliness of bomber response options with respect to STRATCOM's operational plans, that drives the number of 145 in terms of the capability of the B-21. And I could expound more in a classified setting, Senator. In terms of the capability of the B-21, I would highlight that part of the big so what there is its ability to sense and maneuver in a contested electromagnetic spectrum. So yes, it's a conventional and strategic stand-in, stand-off precision strike bomber, but it's also a key enabler for the joint force in terms of electromagnetic spectrum and its capabilities in that area along with other capabilities associated that we would have to talk in a classified setting.

Very good. Thank you. And once again, gentlemen, thank you both and your teams for your service. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I believe Senator Kaine is next.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to our witnesses for your service. I have one topic really to address with each of you. First, Admiral Correll, I want to talk about delays in the Columbia-class submarine. The delay in the first Columbia-class suggests that it will be delivered about 12 to 16 months after its originally planned date. What are you all doing to extend the useful life of the Ohio-class submarines so that we can take care of any delay in Columbia production?

Thanks, Senator Kaine. The Navy has a plan to do maintenance on existing Ohio-class submarines to extend their service life and there's high confidence in the ability to extend their service life so that we can manage the risk of sustaining the capability we have to bridge to the Columbia-class and the new capability and there's sufficient margin there to address that with the maintenance plans that the Navy has.

And if they do that successfully, is it fair to say that STRATCOM's capabilities will not be jeopardized so long as that Ohio-class extension is done well?

Yes, Senator.

Thank you for that. General Whiting, we're very proud in Virginia of Wallops. Wallops is NASA's only owned and operated launch range and it's a national asset that supports both governmental operations across multiple governmental agencies, but also commercial spaceflight. I think Wallops will continue to play a key role in enabling national security missions at its launch range. How do you view Wallops as an asset for SPACECOM operations?

Senator, I think you well noted there the importance of Wallops. I think it's been an amazing story over the last decade as the United States military at our ranges in Cape Canaveral, at Vandenberg, has upped the launch tempo with the commercial industry as they have ramped up. I think as that continues to go up, we're going to have to look at other launch locations to help absorb some of that capacity and I think Wallops having matured the way it has could be a potential to do that. But from a Space Command perspective, we think that the capabilities at Wallops Island, Senator, and the resilience that it provides into the broader launch enterprise are very important.

Last time I checked, I think there had been more rockets launched from Wallops than either Vandenberg or Canaveral, but not with the attention necessarily because they're unmanned rockets and they tend to be smaller, but the ability to hit orbits off the East Coast as compared to where the other ranges are very important. The other thing about Wallops that's interesting is it is a launch range that's used both for governmental and for commercial launches. What commercial space capabilities should we be leveraging more effectively and how do you think about the importance of collaboration with commercial space industry?

Senator, I think the U.S. commercial space industry is one of the United States' most significant advantages, not just for Space Command or the Space Force, but for our nation writ large. It is driving innovation, it is expanding economic opportunities and so from a United States Space Command perspective, we want to make sure that we are leveraging that innovation, leveraging the cost curves that are delivering capability faster and cheaper and then work with the services, the Space Force in particular, to be able to bring that capability into operations. So we think it's a massive advantage for us and then we see we have a role, Senator, in helping to defend those commercial companies who the U.S. government most contracts with for space services and we do that at a cell that we have in Vandenberg Space Force Base in California where we share information, threat information up to the top secret level with those companies so they understand the domain that they are operating in, the threats that they're facing and then they can share with us back the insights they're gaining from their operations as well.

Right. I think I'll ask a question for the record to pick up on a comment that the chairman made about this space debris problem. It's one thing if there's debris because of, you know, target shots on defunct satellites in orbit continually when there's not a lot of satellites in orbit. But both governmental and private companies around the world are putting more and more satellites in orbit for security reasons, for communications reasons. And so that the value of what's up in orbit right now makes this debris problem much, much worse in terms of trying to get a handle on it. I know there's space treaties dealing with it, and I know we generally have pretty good protocols about trying to minimize debris or avoid it, but this is going to be a larger and larger problem as more and more satellites get put up into orbit. And so it's something that we have to get a handle on, and I'm glad that the chairman raised it. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Can you tell us approximately how many satellites are in space right now, all told?

Total number of trackable objects just went over 50,000. And just to give you a context on that, when Space Command was stood back up six and a half years ago, from that time to today, that number's gone up almost 90 percent. It has almost doubled in six and a half years.

And headed much higher.

Absolutely. We've seen recent reports from commercial space companies that not only do they want to continue to build out these proliferated low Earth orbit communications constellations, but now going to space for data centers and artificial intelligence purposes. That's a very exciting future that's coming.

Thank you very much. Senator Ernst.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, gentlemen, very much for being in front of us today and to your teams as well and their service to our great United States of America. Admiral Correll, I'll start with you, and we're just going to keep hammering on this, but right now the United States is undertaking a once-in-a-generation effort to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad. We all know it's incredibly essential to credible deterrence, but it is, of course, increasingly defined by the cost growth, the schedule delays, and, of course, something we're well aware of here, budgetary pressures. So we have the president that says he wants to spend another $500 billion in defense. We have heard that we are going to get another request for $200 billion, perhaps in the form of a supplemental. The department has to demonstrate that it can deliver these capabilities on time and on budget without crowding out our other critical priorities. So if you can tie it up neatly with a bow on it for the committee today, which programs are experiencing the most significant cost growth and schedule delays, and what specifically is driving those cost overruns?

Senator, I don't want to duck the question, but the direct report portfolio managers are the subject matter experts with respect to real-time reporting on costs and schedule with those programs. I would tell you that in my interactions with the direct report portfolio managers and their leadership, so this is Vice Admiral Gaucher and General White and General Gootlein for Golden Dome, they're laser-focused on delivering for our country and understanding where the risks are and addressing those risks in terms of schedule and keeping pressure on costs. And that arrangement, from my perspective, the organizational arrangement of a direct report portfolio manager with a direct report to the deputy secretary has been very powerful in keeping our foot on the gas for delivering the capability, as you said, on schedule and on budget. And I acknowledge there's been significant challenges there in the past.

No, thank you, Admiral. And I appreciate you reiterating that. I think it's incredibly important. I know that we continue to place additional pressures on your shoulders, but those portfolio managers as well. But we as Congress, we also need to keep the pressure on those primes and others that are engaged in this process, understanding that we have limited resources and we absolutely need to modernize our nuclear triad. So pressure all the way around, including here on the Hill on members in Congress. If we can turn just briefly to SPACECOM as well, we have seen with the operations that are ongoing in Iran, we have seen then counterattacks coming from Iran. General Whiting, we saw this incredible shot fired from Iran towards Diego Garcia. So what we are learning from this, that that missile has traveled over 2,500 miles. And it really just underscores the growing range of weapons and ballistic missiles coming from our adversaries. And what can we do then in that scenario, and how do we adapt within SPACECOM to make sure that our missile warning architecture is able to account for these long-range threats like this recent attempted strike on Diego Garcia?

Senator, thank you for highlighting that. At Diego Garcia, we have critical Space Command capabilities for our satellite command and control as well as space domain awareness. So our missile warning architecture is absolutely the foundational capability that allows our joint force and our national leadership to know about those kinds of launches. Today we do a very good job, in fact, best in the world of detecting those kinds of launches. But ma'am, you asked about what kind of evolutions do we need. The Congress has funded several additional missile warning capabilities that are coming. There'll be a low Earth orbit tracking constellation, a medium Earth orbit tracking constellation, and then a modernized strategic constellation in geosynchronous orbit. As those continue to come online, it will allow us to track those missiles and have full custody all the way until they're impacting. And that allows us to tip and cue missile defenses to be even more successful. So those are important investments, ma'am, and I would ask for the Congress's continued support.

Wonderful. And my time is expired. Thank you again, gentlemen, very much.

Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Scott, it seems that you touched base 7.2 seconds before Senator Cotton, so you're recognized right now.

Thank you. That's the first time I've called for instant replay on that one. Can't imagine that happened. All right. Well, thank both of you for being here. So let me start and talk about something that's really important to Florida, space dominance. It's a pretty big issue. I got to serve as governor of Florida for eight years and now senator. So we prioritized and put a lot of effort into the Space Coast. It was right after I became governor right after manned flight was shut down, so it was a big issue. We tried to make sure that the Space Coast is an aerospace hub and a model of what happens when we use public-private partnerships to help America reach its exploration goals. So unfortunately, we're not the only one trying to do this. We've got adversaries like Communist China. So I'm very appreciative that the president has prioritized national security to include space, and I think the discussion today is really important. So General Whiting, can you talk about and explain to the American people why space is so important to our national security and how adversaries like Communist China, who is a complete adversary, can use it to undermine our country? Thank you. That's the first time I've called for instant replay on that one. Can't imagine that happened. All right. Well, thank both of you for being here. So let me start and talk about something that's really important to Florida, space dominance. It's a pretty big issue. I got to serve as governor of Florida for eight years and now senator. So we prioritized and put a lot of effort into the Space Coast. It was right, I became governor right after manned flight was shut down, so it was a big issue. We tried to make sure that the Space Coast is an aerospace hub and a model of what happens when we use public-private partnerships to help America's reach its exploration goals. So unfortunately, we're not the only one trying to do this. We've got adversaries like Communist China. So I'm very appreciative the president has prioritized national security to include space. And I think the discussion today is really important. So General Whiting, can you talk about and explain to the American people why space is so important to our national security and how adversaries like Communist China, who is a complete adversary, can use it to undermine our country? Can you talk about the importance of public and private partnerships at Florida's Space Coast? Yeah, we put, when I was governor, we put up a lot of money, but we were able to get a lot of companies to come in there and spend a lot of money. So Blue Origin and Boeing, SpaceX, a lot of them spent a lot of money.

The Columbia-class submarine represents our assured second-strike capability for our nation. So it doesn't get any more important or necessary than that, Senator. And so that submarine will be world-class decades ahead of what China or Russia can produce in terms of technology, quietness, and capability. It's a critical capability for our deterrent. And with the appointment of Vice Admiral Gaucher as a direct report portfolio manager, it will get a laser focus, which it already has, to deliver that capability for our nation. The Navy is continuing to fund Columbia, so it's had no negative impact on funding for Columbia, and the priority on delivery remains the Navy's number one priority, and I see the Navy's budget backs that up, Senator.

Senator Warren.

Senator, thank you for the question. Today, as we sit here in 2024, the entire United States joint force is sized with an assumption they will have access to space capabilities through all levels of conflict. We do not have the force structure to fight the way we did before the space age when our systems were not space-enabled. We didn't have precision strike, we didn't have global navigation, global communications. And so, Senator, it's vital that we defend those capabilities in space so that we can continue to deliver them against the threats that are now arrayed against us. And we've seen just a dramatic increase in the threats over the last several years from China and from Russia. And so that's why at U.S. Space Command, we say it's a moral responsibility to defend our space capabilities so that we can continue to support the rest of the joint force. Yes, Senator. I've been an observer of that, not directly involved in it, but it's pretty remarkable to me how that public-private partnership is able to deliver infrastructure at Cape Canaveral and at Patrick Space Force Base to ensure that those ranges, those launch ranges, that launch range has been able to keep up with the dramatic increase in commercial launch tempo that we've seen. And I think it's true that that range has not been a constraint on commercial launch growing, and a big part of that is not only the government investment, but the commercial and private investment that we've seen through Space Florida.

So Admiral, as we're all aware, the very real threat of adversaries like Communist China is not just in space. Communist China is also actively focused on dominance around the world. It's critical our nation is prepared to not only project peace through strength, but also act if necessary. It's no secret the Navy's had some struggles building ships on time and on budget. Secretary Del Toro, I know is working hard to try to change that. Can you talk about the importance of the Columbia-class submarine and why you need that asset now? So the fact that it's late, does it impact the Navy's resourcing decisions? Thank both of you and thanks for the men and women that serve with you.

Senator, thank you for the question. Today, as we sit here in 2026, the entire United States joint force is sized with an assumption they will have access to space capabilities through all levels of conflict. We do not have the force structure to fight the way we did before the space age when our systems were not space-enabled. We didn't have precision strike. We didn't have global navigation, global communications. And so Senator, it's vital that we defend those capabilities in space so that we can continue to deliver them against the threats that are now arrayed against us. And we've seen just a dramatic increase in the threats over the last several years from China and from Russia. And so that's why at U.S. Space Command, we say it's a moral responsibility to defend our space capability so that we can continue to support the rest of the joint force.

Can you talk about the importance of public and private partnerships at Florida's Space Coast?

Yes, Senator. I've been an observer of that, not directly involved in it, but it's pretty remarkable to me how that public-private partnership is able to deliver infrastructure at Cape Canaveral and at Patrick Space Force Base to ensure that those ranges, those launch ranges, that launch range has been able to keep up with the dramatic increase in commercial launch tempo that we've seen. And I think it's true that that range has not been a constraint on commercial launch growing. And a big part of that is not only the government investment, but the commercial and private investment that we've seen through Space Florida.

Yeah, we put, when I was governor, we put up a lot of money, but we were able to get a lot of companies to come in there and spend a lot of money. So Blue Origin and Boeing, SpaceX, a lot of them spent a lot of money. So Admiral, as we're all aware, the very real threat of adversaries like Communist China is not just in space. Communist China is also actively focused on dominance around the world. It's critical our nation is prepared to not only project peace through strength, but also act if necessary. It's no secret the Navy's had some struggles building ships on time and on budget. Secretary Del Toro, I know is working hard to try to change that. Can you talk about the importance of the Columbia-class submarine and why you need that asset now?

The Columbia-class submarine represents our assured second-strike capability for our nation. So it doesn't get any more important or necessary than that, Senator. And so that submarine will be world-class, decades ahead of what China or Russia can produce in terms of technology, quietness, and capability. It's a critical capability for our deterrent. And with the appointment of Vice Admiral Gaucher as a direct report portfolio manager, it will get a laser focus, which it already has, to deliver that capability for our nation.

So the fact that it's late, does it impact the Navy's resourcing decisions?

The Navy is continuing to fund Columbia, so it's had no negative impact on funding for Columbia and the priority and delivery. It remains the Navy's number one priority, and I see in the Navy's budget backs that up, Senator.

Okay. Thank both of you and thanks for the men and women that serve with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So President Trump has dragged us into war against Iran, and we're all paying the price. Service members have died, oil prices are soaring, and we are facing a global economic crisis over the Strait of Hormuz. One big reason, Donald Trump's go-it-alone approach to blowing up long-standing American alliances. He has insulted and tariffed just about everyone, and he launched this war alongside Israel without telling our other allies. And then when he sees gas prices skyrocket, Donald Trump changes his tune and starts begging our allies to help us patrol the Strait of Hormuz. And our partners have said they want to help, but only if the fighting stops. Admiral Correll, U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for strategic deterrence and nuclear operations, and you have said repeatedly that alliances are critical to deterrence. So Admiral, do Russia and China think that our alliances are strong when our partners refuse to help?

My military assessment is that they continue to think they're very strong and I think their China and Russia's behavior in terms of attempting to undermine those alliances demonstrates their continued concern for America's alliances.

I just have to say, your answer makes no sense to me. That Russia and China watch us insult our allies, then beg for their help, and then our allies don't give that help, and you think Russia and China think, there's an alliance that's working just great. Look, it is not only an embarrassment when the President begs and our allies say no, it is a national security threat because our enemies take note of that. It is your job to advise the Secretary about how to deter our greatest threats, and you're telling me your view is there's no threat here. And I'm just telling you, that just does not bear credible analysis. So look, Trump has alienated many of our allies, and those costs are becoming clear. At the same time, we have launched war with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who seems to be pursuing a completely different set of objectives. And President Trump is unwilling or unable even to rein in Netanyahu. On March 18, the Netanyahu government bombed one of the region's largest oil fields. Trump then posted that the U.S. didn't even know in advance and that we didn't want further oil strikes because of the economic danger that it would pose. So Admiral, does it enhance strategic deterrence to have major partners undermining explicit U.S. policy goals?

Senator, I respectfully disagree with your overall assessment and the...

What part do you disagree with? That Trump posted that we didn't know and didn't agree with what Netanyahu did, but Netanyahu did it anyway? What part are you disagreeing?

Senator, I can just speak to my portfolio and my responsibilities and our capabilities remain ready to respond and deter and they deter each and every day.

I appreciate that, but that is not my question. My question is, does it enhance strategic deterrence to have major partners undermining explicit U.S. policy goals?

Strong mil-to-mil relationships and our alliance network are part of our overall deterrence.

Look, again, your answer just lacks any credibility. If this administration can't keep its main partner in line and can't keep its own story straight, then we've got a problem. In June, the White House issued a press release proclaiming that, quote, Iran's nuclear facilities have been obliterated and suggestions otherwise are fake news. And yet now, Iran's nuclear program is one of the many changing reasons that the administration has given for this war. So Admiral Correll, let me ask one more. Does it help strategic deterrence when the White House changes its story minute by minute on the reasons for this war?

Senator Warren, the witness on three occasions has said that he is declining to answer that question because he disagrees with the premise. I appreciate that members are able to make whatever points they want, but I think it's clear why he's unable to answer your question because he completely disagrees with the premise.

Well, I'm glad that it's clear to you, Mr. Chairman, but with respect, I don't understand what part of the premise he disagrees with. I'm stating facts here. And I'm asking if those facts are helpful for the United States or unhelpful for the United States.

Admiral, you can answer the question if you're able.

I have no further comments to make other than what I've previously said.

Thank you, Senator Warren. Senator Cotton.

Well, for the record, I think your credibility is very high, Admiral. And you're the commander of Strategic Command, you're not the Central Command commander, you're not the Secretary of State. So I don't think it's in your portfolio to make judgments about allies all around the world. Frankly, I commend your restraint by the second or third time you're asked the question, you didn't just borrow from the internet meme that this is a Wendy's, ma'am. But I just want to press the point a little bit. This idea that we went it alone, obviously we didn't go it alone with Israel. Israel is one of the most capable military partners we have in the world, correct, Admiral?

Yes, Senator.

And it seems like every Arab nation is with us as well. In fact, the ambassador from the United Arab Emirates just published an op-ed today in the Wall Street Journal explaining why we need to finish the job in Iran. And the President of the UAE, Mohammed bin Zayed, has been an unflappable ally, as has the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. Even countries like Oman and Qatar that tried to mediate differences, maintain friendly relationships with Iran, have expressed their dismay for what's happened. Not surprisingly, since what their friendly relations with Iran got them was a bunch of missiles shot into their country. So I think it's far from accurate to say we are going it alone in this war against Iran's revolutionary terror regime. I want to borrow from both of your expertise about missiles and space and build on what Senator Ernst was discussing, the launch of the intermediate-range ballistic missile towards our base in Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean. That's bad. I'm glad that it failed. I'm glad that we shot down one. It also, of course, shows that the fatwa against missiles of that range is not exactly worth the paper it was written on, probably like the fatwas against other long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. But let me just ask this. The technology needed, not for an intermediate-range missile, but an intercontinental missile, a missile that could hit the United States, is pretty much the same as an intermediate-range missile. Isn't that right, Admiral Correll?

Yes, Senator, that's correct.

General Whiting, isn't that correct?

It is, Senator, and it's not too much different from a space launch vehicle either.

Yeah, and so you need enough boost or thrust to get something into space, and then you need a reentry vehicle to get it back from outer space or from space into the Earth's surface. And as you said, General Whiting, Iran has long had a space launch vehicle program. Have you, in your observations about space, have you seen any Iranian astronauts up there lately?

They do not have a manned spaceflight program, Senator.

Wow, shocking. Do you think maybe the space launch vehicle program is just flimsy cover for an intercontinental missile?

I do think they were developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, Senator.

And Admiral Correll, for a reentry vehicle, what they used for that missile going to Diego Garcia, for that matter, the medium-range missiles that are shot at Israel, that'd be a suitable reentry vehicle, right?

That's correct, Senator.

So all you'd have to do in a crude but functioning fashion is marry those two technologies and Iran would be able to strike us here in the United States. Is that correct?

That's correct.

And I have to say, I think that could be done in a matter of months, not years, and maybe not that many months. Is that on your mind, Admiral Correll, at STRATCOM?

Absolutely. And they've demonstrated that technology.

Thank you for that. I want to turn to slightly shorter-range weapons. You testified, Admiral, at the House Armed Services Committee that China, quote, seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision-strike missiles to a bunch of other stuff. I want to talk about the low-yield precision-strike missiles and also the need that you've also discussed for an enhanced theater-capable, theater nuclear capability to counter such developments from China, from Russia, from North Korea. Could you discuss what resources, capabilities, authorities you need to counter the threat of theater nuclear forces?

Yes, Senator. In terms of the deterrence challenge associated with Russia or China and their theater nuclear force capability, part of the strategy there is to ensure that we raise the threshold for use of that capability by Xi or Putin. And so we're investing in theater nuclear forces capabilities and SLCM-N is a primary example of that capability intended to have a response that is in kind and could match should Xi or Putin determine to think that there was a lower threshold for use.

Thank you. Well, I don't think we can do it fast enough.

Thank you very much, Senator Cotton. Senator Kelly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you both for being here today. Admiral, I want to start with you and talk a little bit about missile defense and Golden Dome. As I understand, the architecture envisions a much more expansive layered system capable of defending against large-scale missile threats, maybe including up to a salvo from peer adversaries. That kind of vision requires a large number of interceptors, far beyond our current inventories. We're talking about different ways how we could do this, but also increasingly sophisticated electromagnetic countermeasures to deal with decoys, jamming, other countermeasures. It's a complicated problem. We could be seeing issues with trying to intercept ICBMs that are on trajectories on different orbital inclinations because of the latitude they're launching from, some land-based, some sea-based. So Admiral, how do you assess the operational feasibility of this approach? I understand the argument that a more robust missile defense architecture could strengthen deterrence by denial and provide additional protection for the homeland, but at scale, this becomes a question of cost, capability, and plain physics. One of my big concerns here is we spend $500 billion, a trillion dollars, we get to the end of the timeline here and we have a system that just fundamentally does not work or does not work well enough to increase deterrence.

From my perspective, Senator, the work initially on the sensor layer and the capability to detect and track advanced missiles that would be advanced hypersonics, advanced cruise missiles, and fractional orbital bombardment capability, that's step one in the architecture that we're talking about.

And I also agree, I see the benefit in that. Hypersonics with hypersonic glide vehicles being able to maneuver coming from a non-standard, let's say, direction is something we have to focus on. It's like the bigger picture of a salvo and being able to intercept multiple rounds coming at us simultaneously.

Yes, Senator. And there's a universe of capabilities and efforts associated with that. You talked about space-based interceptors, that's one technology that we'll need to mature and see what the limits are of that in terms of interception capability. General Guetlein is approaching it from a kill chain perspective and understanding the whole system that goes into the ability to launch an attack against the U.S. So that includes looking closely at left-of-launch capabilities. So you're looking at left-of-launch, initial launch, boost phase, and the full range of capabilities there in terms of that Golden Dome for America.

You think we can build something that achieves the requirements?

I think we're going to advance our understanding and our capabilities considerably with that effort, yes, Senator.

Thank you. General. There's been reports that last year China's SJ-25 and SJ-21 maneuvered into prox-ops, and we think they may have done a satellite refueling experiment, probably an experiment. If confirmed, this would be the first time a satellite in GEO refueled another, that's my understanding. That represents a significant leap, not just in sustainment, but in China's capability to conduct precise rendezvous, maneuver, prox-ops, docking operations. So taken together with their broader investments in counterspace capabilities, they're building a dynamic and maneuver-driven approach to space, one that would allow them to persist on orbit longer, reposition assets, and potentially hold U.S. systems at risk. Can you comment about your concern and about what steps we should be taking to counter that or build our own capability to be able to match the on-orbit persistence?

Senator, thank you for the question, and we were watching that SJ-21, SJ-25 operation last year very closely. And I think your question well articulated what is happening. China has demonstrated their sophistication on orbit to include now starting to deliver a maneuver, a broad maneuver capability on orbit. And my concern is if they develop that, they will have the ability to maneuver for advantage the way the United States has for decades on the land, at sea, and in the air used maneuver for our advantage. In fact, we talk about maneuver warfare. So Senator, my belief is that we need to deliver our own maneuver warfare capability to make sure that we can leverage the advantages that the joint force has developed over the decades in space as we have in other domains.

Thank you, General.

Senator Sullivan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Admiral, I want to follow up on Senator Kelly's Golden Dome discussion. I've been one of the senators who've been very focused on missile defense for a long time, including Golden Dome. Senator Cramer and I here on the committee have focused a lot on that, our Golden Dome Act that we introduced last year, a lot of that was in the NDAA. General Guetlein mentioned that he clearly thought we had the technology to do this. I think we have the leadership, certainly the President has made this a priority of his, which is important for getting an initiative of this size and complexity completed. You have a lot of interest in Congress, you have good funding from the Working Families Tax Cuts Act that we got done in July. So, but one of the things that General Guetlein mentioned that could be a challenge was actually not the technology, but the organizational structure within the U.S. government to make this happen. You know, we kind of in a hearing a number of months ago we talked about this in some ways like a Manhattan Project 2.0, that's the scale. So can you give me a sense from your perspective on how this is moving forward and where we need to continue to focus? As I mentioned in the NDAA, Senator Cramer and I were able to get a lot of elements of legislation supporting and accelerating the Golden Dome initiative into law, but I'd like your assessment.

So STRATCOM is one of the key COCOMs that is supporting General Guetlein's leadership on this effort, STRATCOM, General Whiting at SPACECOM, and then General Guillot at NORTHCOM in particular for the joint force and from my perspective, General Guetlein's providing superb leadership.

Yeah, I think he's doing a great job too.

Yeah. And right now he's focused on the various capabilities, the as-is capabilities in terms of the architecture to sense, detect, and track, and integrating that, all of that information so you have a data layer that enhances our ability to detect and track any kind of inbound threat, and then integrating the command and control associated with that to your point about the organizational alignment, what's the optimum organizational alignment associated with that. And that's where he's focused for a technology demonstration this summer on the command and control capability and how we've advanced that. And there's a number of innovative companies that are closely aligned and supporting that effort, and I'm highly encouraged, we could talk more in a classified setting, but I'm highly encouraged by the progress that they're making.

Good. I am as well. Let me, you mentioned sense, detect, track, and there's one more element in that chain and that's kill. A lot of that currently, those elements of missile defense are based in Alaska. Actually most of them in terms of ground-based interceptors, tracking. One of the things I've been concerned about, Admiral, is in 2017, again working directly with the President and his team, my bill, the Advancing America's Missile Defense Act passed as part of the NDAA. It called for more ground-based missile interceptors at Fort Greely, which we built out 20 more silos, but they're empty and they remain empty, which to me makes zero sense. How quickly are we going to fill those 20 empty silos with the next generation ground-based missile interceptor? It seems to me a huge miss in our current posture to protect the country when we have missile interceptor silos that are built, ready to go, and they're empty and they remain empty.

Senator, I do not have the exact details on that. I can, I'll take that as a look up and come back to you and work with General Guetlein. I know we have challenges in our defense industrial base in terms of delivering at scale some of the capabilities that we need.

And let me just thank you on that. For the record, General Whiting, I would appreciate if you can give me a sense, and I don't want to run over my time here so I'll just ask the question if you can provide it, on a lot of your missions, a key anchor point on that is Clear Space Force Station in Alaska. And I'm just wondering if you are looking at other missions and capabilities and build out of that critical area, particularly with the long-range discrimination radar that's now up and running as probably the most important ground-based radar system in the world. But if you can get back to me for a question for the record on that.

We will take that on the record. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan. Senator Rosen.

Thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and General and Admiral, thank you for being here today and for your service. I want to talk a little bit about nuclear testing. As members of this committee, they've heard me raise it over and over again, the Nevada National Security Site, formerly the Nevada Test Site, continues and will continue to play a critical role in nuclear weapons development. But some of my colleagues on the other side like to throw about nuclear response as if it were nothing. As if it were nothing, as if there were no consequences, and no consequences that last for decades, even longer in some cases. And so Nevada was ground zero for a majority of these tests, the United States explosive nuclear testing from 1951 to 1992 with 100 atmospheric and 820 underground tests. There are consequences to what my friends are just bantering around like it is nothing. And after George H.W. Bush signed a testing moratorium in 1992, the U.S. rightfully developed the Stockpile Stewardship Program and subcritical experiments through which the Nevada National Security Site has continued to certify the reliability, the safety, the effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile. And using science and physics and math and technology, we do not need explosive nuclear testing. So today the site's underground laboratory is undergoing major mining and construction to provide enhanced capabilities for the subcritical experiments, ECSE. It's going to host two of the most capable weapons radiographic systems in the world. Together with these efforts, these machines will provide even greater certainty and data about performance of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, far better data than experts say than any information that could be gleaned if the U.S. were to break that moratorium and conduct explosive nuclear tests, either below ground or above ground as the President and some of his orbit have advocated. For decades, the directors of the national laboratories, STRATCOM commanders, and Secretaries of Defense and Energy have annually certified the military effectiveness of our stockpile and certified that it does not require resumption of explosive testing with over 1,000 subcritical experiments, robust computer modeling providing the data to support these positions. So Admiral Correll, following up on a question I asked you at your nomination hearing, now that you've taken command, do you see any technical or strategic justification for resuming explosive testing, and do you agree with these data-informed assessments that it is unnecessary for the United States to resume explosive nuclear testing of any kind?

Senator, as you mentioned, I review an annual assessment of our existing testing capability and its ability to certify that our warheads are safe, secure, effective, and remain credible as a deterrent. And that process will continue, and there are exquisite capabilities associated with that. You mentioned many of those capabilities, in addition to that, the National Ignition Facility is another really important one that give us insights as those warheads age. We need to continue to be vigilant about that, and I'll continue to provide my best military advice with respect for the need, should there be a need to resume any testing, but I stand by the letter that I endorsed most recently this last year in terms of the sufficiency of testing. The only caveat I'd put on that is having the capability to resume additional testing should the need arise, that we posture ourselves to be able to do that.

Well, I'm going to disagree with you there, resuming, putting us, spending billion dollars to put us in a position to resume explosive testing.

The caveat I'd put on that is having the capability to resume additional testing should the need arise, that we posture ourselves to be able to do that.

Well, I'm going to disagree with you there, resuming, putting us, spending billion dollars to put us in a position to resume explosive testing after all the money that we have spent on the science so far with stockpile stewardship programs, enhanced capabilities for subcritical experiments, artificial intelligence for weapons design, productions of new pits to replace the aging ones. All of these initiatives, they will affect our certainty about our warhead performance and will be able to let help us go forward. And so I believe we should be able to use those experiments to the safety of our American citizens where you'll be testing this.

Thank you, Senator Rosen. Clearly we have a disagreement on this subject between you and the witness. But thank you, ma'am. Senator Tuberville.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Morning. General Whiting, just a couple updates on move from Space Command. Securing a new military construction agent today, March 26th is the deadline. Do we have any update on that?

Senator, thank you for the question. Our move to Huntsville is moving forward and we are right now in final discussions with elements of the United States Air Force and the Army Corps of Engineers to pull together what the team of that construction agent will look like. I believe the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary Kendall and I will memorialize that decision in the very near future. So I'm very happy that we're able to take advantage of the MILCON reform language that the committee inserted into the last National Defense Authorization Act, which is allowing us to build our new headquarters in a different way than we would have last year without that language.

Existing facilities, what are you thinking about that or are you thinking new facilities? Any update on that?

Yes, Senator. As we're building that new headquarters, that will take a few years, we are modifying existing facilities on Redstone Arsenal. And in fact, next month in April, we will do our first ribbon cutting on a top secret SCIF that'll seat over 80 people and then we will start moving personnel there to begin work at that level. So I'm happy at the progress that we're making and that progress will continue over the next couple of years as we work to get significant portion of our staff there even while the permanent headquarters is being built.

What's the timeline on that? My understanding was it's three to seven years. Is that correct?

For the permanent headquarters, Senator, I would expect right now that that facility will break ground next year and will come online likely in 2031. And then there'll be probably a year's worth of time that we're moving people into that facility. But that's the timeline we're currently looking at.

Personnel transition, any update on that, present, future?

Yes, Senator. So we have a small office that we've stood up there, about 20 people right now. And then by the end of this year, we are targeting that number to be closer to 200 people that will be working from Redstone from our headquarters. Of course, that will be paced with the delivery of interim facilities that are appropriate to the security classification level we need and that we have all of the appropriate IT networks. We are offering relocation incentives for our workforce in Colorado to consider moving to Alabama. We also are offering retention incentives because I need my workforce to stay with me in Colorado until their function is ready to move. And so those are some of the updates that we have as we're working the movement of personnel, Senator.

Talk about logistics for a second of Space Command's mission. Air Force has over 10 percent of its aircraft dedicated to aerial refueling. Satellites have historically been built with no way to refuel here in the U.S., but the Chinese Communist Party demonstrated space refueling capabilities for the first time last year. Any recommendations for the future?

Senator, you know well in your question that our traditional domains, air, land, and sea, those military services that have lead there have extraordinary percentages of their force dedicated to enabling maneuver through sustainment and logistics. In fact, there's a great quote from Admiral Nimitz in World War II that he said at-sea replenishment and refueling is what won World War II for the U.S. Navy because they could continue to fight. And as you noted, in space, we launch typically a satellite with all the fuel it's ever going to have. And every time we maneuver, we expend fuel. And so we always have to have this discussion, should I maneuver even though it's going to take life off the end of that satellite? And that creates a psychology of scarcity across our enterprise where we don't enable tactical commanders to maneuver the way they might want to because we're concerned about the expenditure of fuel. So my recommendation, Senator, is that the United States develop an on-orbit logistics and servicing capability that would allow us to bring maneuver warfare to space the same way that the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps execute maneuver warfare in their respective domains.

Thank you. Admiral, submarines are the tip of the spear for our nuclear capabilities. The problem is we just can't seem to build them fast enough. So what flexibility and capability does STRATCOM gain if we were able to field 16 Columbia-class submarines versus 12?

Senator, the existing capability we have includes 14 Ohio-class boats with 20 tubes. So that's 280 launch tubes. The program of record is a minimum of 12 Columbia with 16 tubes each and that's 192. So that's 280 versus 192. Chairman Wicker in his opening remarks talked about the challenges and the complexities in the strategic environment. So additional capacity and capability at sea in terms of launchers is very beneficial from my perspective. There's ongoing work within the department in terms of force sufficiency and that work will inform any future budget decisions associated with Columbia. But if you just do the math for what we have and the program of record, I will continue to advocate for additional capability at sea in terms of the Columbia class.

I think Chairman Wicker's listening to that.

Yes, absolutely. You're not suggesting that there's some questions I listen to more carefully than others, are you? Maybe a little. Admiral, the first part of your answer was about our capacity right now to build. And really the thrust of Senator Tuberville's question is how much better defended we would be if we were able to reach the goal that he mentioned. And the answer is that we very much need to do that. Is that correct?

That's correct, Senator. And that maximizes flexibility and options to present to the president should the need arise.

Right. And there's, I would just observe, there's still time before Governor Tuberville moves off the dais for us to make more progress on that and he and I are teammates. Senator Blumenthal, you are next.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for your service. Both of you are in charge of some of the most advanced technology and scientific breakthroughs available to our military. Admiral Correll, you're a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and both of you, I'm sure, are familiar with the importance of alliances. How would you explain to the American people the importance of our alliances in the fields where you have authority?

Senator, thank you for the question. Certainly, from my perspective, our partnerships in space are one of our strengths. And it's something that Russia and China do not have. At U.S. Space Command, I have the privilege to lead a named operation in space that includes six other countries. It's Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Germany, where we operate together each and every day in space to maintain vigilance against threats and track debris and to show our interoperability. And we're continuing to press forward with that and strengthen those relationships.

Admiral.

I would echo the sentiment expressed by General Whiting. Those alliances and partnerships are incredibly important to the overall deterrence that we present against potential competitors or challengers. With respect to U.S. Strategic Command, we have four liaison officers in the headquarters embedded in the headquarters and that includes Japan, Republic of Korea, the UK of course, and Australia. And we are about to receive a fifth liaison officer embedded into our staff from France and that reinforces the importance of those mil-to-mil relationships and they enhance our capabilities and our deterrence overall.

There's been a fair amount of turbulence in our diplomatic relations with our allies. I think I'm using a euphemism. I am hopeful that at your level of cooperation and partnership, the alliances continue to be strong and resilient whatever the political turmoil at the surface. Underneath the potential contention, I'm hopeful that your work together with our allies continues to be strong. Am I wrong in that hope?

Senator, I have seen no impact on our ability to partner the way that my command needs to partner and wants to partner and I have not detected any reluctance on the part of our partners to continue to move forward with us.

And I have the same experience, Senator.

Well, my hope is that that turbulence is going to be passing a phase that we'll work through and reestablish in public statements and rhetoric the appreciation for our partnership and alliances that you reflected in your testimony. Because at the working level, at the point where rubber meets the road, so to speak, although that's not exactly a good analogy for space, I am very hopeful that we can sustain and enhance those alliances and that the American public appreciate how important they are. Admiral, could you talk a little bit about the importance of the Columbia class? I know you've spoken to Senator Kaine about the impact of delays, but maybe you can comment a little further on the importance of getting back on track.

Yes. The department has appointed a direct report portfolio manager, Vice Admiral Gaucher, to focus on submarine construction and he has a direct reporting relationship with Deputy Secretary Feinberg. And the intent there is to have an individual with the experience that can manage that program and optimize the performance for delivery of Columbia and other submarine construction, Virginia class as well. The importance to our deterring capability, I can't overstate that. All three legs are vitally important, they complement each other and the sum of the parts is very much greater than the whole. For the SSBN, that assured second strike capability that's always at sea, always ready to respond, deters effectively and I see that in the intel reporting record.

And I know that General Dynamics and Electric Boat are really doing very dedicated, valiant, monumental work in producing the Columbia and I think we should appreciate their contributions to our nation's national security.

We have an incredible blue collar workforce committed to that.

Best in the nation. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Banks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Whiting, you are tasked with the transregional missile defense mission, which relies on space-based sensors. How critical is this mission to homeland defense?

Senator, it's foundational to homeland defense. It is all about detecting threats that are launched in other areas of responsibility outside of this hemisphere and continent and then being able to provide that warning to U.S. Northern Command so that General Guillot under his authorities can employ national missile defenses as he's able to do that.

It can only be accomplished in space, is that right?

Correct, Senator. And it's one of the unique aspects that the U.S. military has that any launch anywhere around the world, we detect that in near real time and provide that information to not only fielded forces, but to other combatant commands and ultimately up to the president.

Explain, explain more why that is the case that it can only be accomplished in space. On that point, how urgent is it to deploy additional missile tracking space sensors with fire control capability to defeat hypersonic and advanced ballistic missile threats?

Senator, from space, we have the unique vantage to be able to see the entire globe. And so we have satellites in geosynchronous orbits, satellites in highly elliptical orbits and we can perform that detection. The Congress is investing in improved missile warning, missile track, missile defense capabilities that will allow us to improve our ability to have custody of those threats from launch all the way through to impact, which will continue to support our missile defenses. Senator, your question highlights the advancement of modern threats that we see like hypersonics, like aero-maneuvering missiles, like fractional orbital bombardment systems. And for those, we need these enhanced capabilities so that we can maintain custody of the threats to enable our missile defenses.

As we work on the next NDAA, give us a timeframe of how urgent is it?

The threats are present today. So we need these capabilities as soon as we can field the capabilities, yes, sir.

ASAP.

Yes, sir.

The CCP fields several counter-space weapons that could potentially disrupt or destroy our satellites. If our space-based sensors were disrupted, how would that impact the joint force?

Senator, the entire joint force is sized with an assumption they'll have access to space capabilities. It's not only the number of forces we have, but it's the kind of capabilities. Precision-guided weapons, for example, not only need the GPS signal to be able to be employed, but they need space-based contributions to the kill chain. How do you find, fix, track, and target the location that you're trying to impact? All of that is enabled from space, and without those capabilities, we could not fight the way the joint force is designed.

And would more space sensors build an additional resilience to ensure you are able to accomplish your mission?

Yes, the number helps with resilience, also a distribution of those capabilities through multiple orbits also helps us with resilience.

Admiral, you already talked a little bit about SLCM-N and its importance. Could you, your predecessor testified to this committee last year that SLCM-N would provide an, quote, "additional at-sea nuclear deterrent capability." Do you agree with that statement?

I do, and specifically again raising the threshold for a potential adversary contemplating use of a lower-yield theater nuclear weapon. It's very helpful from a deterrence perspective to have a capability that is non-visible in terms of generation, that has a non-ballistic trajectory and is low-yield overall.

Can you explain the importance of having low-yield, survivable, persistent nuclear capabilities like SLCM-N?

It puts, it complicates the adversary's decision-making, potential adversary's decision-making, so Xi or Putin don't see a gap in the ability to deliver a theater nuclear, use a theater nuclear weapon and put the position where they feel they're putting the U.S. in a position where we would have to escalate beyond a theater capability.

That's a very helpful explanation. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities. It now includes expanded stockpiles and dual-capable systems. What evidence do you see that China is shifting toward a more aggressive nuclear doctrine?

China's nuclear doctrine continues to evolve. It remains to be seen where it ultimately lands. What I would say is they're developing capabilities both in terms of diversity and quantity and various mechanisms of delivery of those capabilities, which includes a full range, including an emphasis on theater nuclear capabilities that are inconsistent with their stated no-first-use policy.

Thank you. My time has expired.

Thank you, Senator, and Senator Sheehy.

General, what do you assess as our resilience against a Chinese first strike against our orbital infrastructure?

Senator, China has significantly increased the number of threats they can employ from both ground-based systems like direct-ascent ASAT weapons as well as on-orbit co-orbital ASAT capabilities. We continue to have the world's best space architecture and we continue to develop and deploy capabilities that improve our resilience, but we must focus on those continued investments and the programs that the Congress has funded must continue to deliver so that we can maintain our resilience relative to those growing threats.

How old is our GPS hardware and infrastructure architecture design of our GPS systems?

Senator, we have a mix of satellites on orbit today that provide that operational constellation. Some of them are probably 20 years old, some are recent launches. So those 20-year-old satellites were built for a different era where we didn't face these kind of threats, and so we want to continue to see that capability modernized.

And how new are some of the Chinese offensive systems designed to disrupt or destroy that infrastructure?

There have been launches within just the last couple of months that are capable of impacting our space capabilities. So some of those Chinese threats are as up-to-date as they could possibly be, Senator.

Right, so that's like if you went down to the Apple Store and you walked in with a flip phone, or perhaps even one of those old briefcase phones that we grew up with, and traded that in for an iPhone 17. We're dealing with, in some cases, that gap of technological capability.

I think you're right, Senator. In some cases, China has skipped a generation or two of legacy technology and gone right to using today's capabilities, and they are demonstrating they're developing some very capable systems.

And do you think, and this is probably for both of you, but obviously, General, this is your domain primarily, but it would very quickly become the Admiral's domain as well, you know, the opening shots of a potential conflict, which we hope never happens, but should it happen with our peer adversary—and I don't use the word near-peer because I don't think they are near, I believe they are a peer—do you think the first shots would start in space?

Senator, I do think it's likely that in a conflict, the first shots would occur in cyber and in space. As you noted, that is not inevitable, that there will be a conflict, but we do expect that China would make an attempt to neutralize our space capabilities early in a conflict.

Admiral, do you care to comment on that?

Senator, I agree with that assessment, and I would just say we would expect a global all-domain effort on the part of a peer adversary.

Exactly. I mean, the next Pearl Harbor won't be around a small island with a few ships, it'll be a global space infrastructure attack. I hope it doesn't happen, but if I were them, that's how I'd open it up. Because as you stated, General, our entire force structure, from technology to force formations, is really predicated on uninterrupted access to our space infrastructure and architecture with a low-to-no latency, high-bandwidth connection. And most of those connections are very vulnerable, both from a software, hardware, and just an EW perspective. So I think what I would ask from both of you, being the primary uniformed voices around this paradigm, is be very vocal that modernization is not going from a VHS tape to a DVD, it's making sure we're the most up-to-date, latest 21st-century streaming capability. And unfortunately, oftentimes modernization, by the time it goes through the program of record, the committees, the evaluations, the discussions, the bureaucracy, it's not modern anymore, it's just less old than the original model was. So this is a time where I think you have bipartisan commitment to force modernization, especially in this realm, and I'd ask you be as vocal as possible and aggressive as possible to make sure we're not going from a VHS tape to a DVD, we are coming to the absolute most front edge of capability so we're ready for that first strike. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Sheehy, for a very sobering but appropriate line of questioning. This concludes the open portion of today's hearing. There are some matters that are classified that we need to take up in the sensitive compartmented information facility, and we will reconvene there in precisely 15 minutes. With that, we are recessed.