Hearings to examine the posture of United States Northern Command and United States Southern

The committee will come to order. Thank you all for being here. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture of the United States Northern Command and the United States Southern Command. We are joined by General Gregory Guillot from the U.S. Northern Command and General Frank Donovan for the U.S. Southern Command. I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today and for their decades of service to our nation. Thank you, gentlemen. Protecting the homeland is the first and most important duty of the federal government. Without a credible and effective homeland defense, there can be no United States of America for our 250th anniversary. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union represented the only true threat to the United States homeland. Today, the threat environment is much more complicated. Both Russia and China possess a range of nuclear, conventional, space, and cyber capabilities that threaten the U.S. homeland. Iran and Sunni jihadists remain intent on carrying out terrorist attacks in America. Tehran and Pyongyang have conducted cyberattacks against our critical infrastructure, and cartels are using innovative methods to traffic drugs and humans across our borders. All these adversaries share a common goal: to reduce our influence in the Western Hemisphere and to harm Americans at home. To counter these threats, we need a coordinated homeland defense strategy. It must weave together conventional defenses and new partnerships with allies and partners in our region, and we certainly appreciate our allies and partners. We are poised to make great progress on Golden Dome and similar efforts to protect the homeland from incoming drone and missile threats. I enthusiastically support these efforts. Golden Dome will reduce the threat posed by ballistic and cruise missiles from Russia, China, and North Korea. I look forward to hearing how General Guillot is working with the Golden Dome team to make these defenses a reality. In particular, I'd like to learn how his coordination with the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 will help counter the threat of small drones. I also applaud NORTHCOM's professionalism in support of the Department of Homeland Security. This has helped reinforce our border and helped stop virtually all illegal immigration, a singular achievement. We know that homeland defense does not stop at our border with Mexico. More than 100,000 Americans are killed annually in drug-related deaths. These immense and tragic losses come at the hands of South American cartels. Cartels contribute to violence, undermine regional stability, and are linked to human trafficking, weapon smuggling, and financial crime. I commend SOUTHCOM for its execution of Operation Southern Spear, which is helping to stop narcoterrorists from bringing drugs to our shores. It is also deterring future traffickers from attempting the same. I hope General Donovan can expound on the department's efforts to coordinate more closely with our Central and South American partners to fight back against cartels. China, Russia, and Iran all target the Western Hemisphere in their influence operations. Xi Jinping seeks to control telecommunications systems, critical infrastructure such as the Panama Canal, and major deepwater ports such as Chancay in Peru. China has also expanded defense cooperation across South America through arms sales, police training, and space and cyber partnerships. Likewise, Russia is selling arms, providing military advisors, and expanding intelligence cooperation to South American nations. In exchange, it gets permission to deploy Russian military aircraft and naval vessels to the region. Together, China and Russia exploit local corruption and partner with hostile authoritarian regimes like Cuba and Nicaragua. They build influence and gain political leverage to target the United States close to home. We must resist these malign influence campaigns in our neighborhood, and that's what we're about today. I'd like to hear General Donovan's ideas about how we can do so, especially through increased coordination with the Economic Defense Unit, intelligence community, and the Office of Strategic Capital. So expect that question. I commend the Trump administration for the decisive action it has taken to reassert U.S. interests near the homeland, including the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. I strongly support the more aggressive counter-drug strategy. This must emphasize border security, cripple the cartels, and expand security partnerships with Latin American countries in order to eliminate safe havens for the illicit networks that plague our hemisphere. So thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and I now recognize my friend and colleague, the ranking member, Senator Reed.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And General Donovan, General Guillot, thank you very much for being here this morning and for your leadership, and please pass our commendations on to the men and women you lead. Thank you very much. General Guillot, Northern Command has been at the center of several significant and at times controversial domestic operations over the past year. Thousands of National Guard and active-duty troops have been deployed to Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Chicago, and Portland over the objections of the respective governors and mayors. Multiple federal courts have ruled against these deployments, and the Supreme Court itself has acted to limit the use of federalized National Guard forces. I want to be clear: the safety of local communities is of the utmost importance, but the legal and constitutional framework that governs our military must not be eroded. Our nation has clear, long-standing laws to enforce the boundary between military and civilian law enforcement, and the boundary exists for reasons deeply rooted in our democratic traditions. General Guillot, I would like to know what guardrails you have in place to ensure compliance with these laws and an update on the financial and readiness cost from the missions to date on your command. Additionally, I would appreciate an update on the use of multiple Department of Defense-developed high-energy laser systems at the southwest border. I understand that these military systems were used despite explicit objections from the FAA, which warned that the technology poses a, quote, "grave risk of fatalities or permanent injuries" to civilian aircraft and pilots. The shutdown of the airspace over El Paso raises serious questions about the legal authorities, the coordination process among federal agencies, and the standards governing the transfer and use of such weapon systems. Finally, on the subject of homeland missile defense and the proposed Golden Dome program, I would emphasize that this committee is supportive of robust homeland defense. We recognize the urgency that recent drone incursions and our adversaries' advanced missile capabilities create for the NORTHCOM. General Guillot, I would appreciate an assessment of the Golden Dome's projected cost beyond the 2028 timeframe and its technical realism with respect to such systems such as space-based interceptors. In particular, I'd like to know how it fits within the broader architecture of deterrence, including its potential effects on strategic stability with Russia and China. General Donovan, the scope of military activity in Southern Command has expanded dramatically over the past year. The deployment of thousands of military personnel and hundreds of ships and aircraft into your area of responsibility represents an extraordinary expansion of American military force in the Western Hemisphere. In January, that buildup culminated in the raid to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The operation itself was a testament to the skill and courage of American service members, and every member of this committee joins in recognizing their incredible service. But military excellence does not resolve the strategic and political questions that must follow. General, I would ask for an update on the current status of our forces in the region, their assigned missions going forward, and any contingency planning for political instability in Venezuela. Additionally, to date, Operation Southern Spear has resulted in 156 fatalities from 45 airstrikes on suspected narcotraficking boats. I continue to believe that this operation is strategically misguided and of dubious legality. General Donovan, I would ask you to explain the objective of continuing this operation given that Maduro is no longer in power and to provide any measure of effects on illicit drug flows into the United States. Finally, I would like to understand what operations, if any, are being planned or contemplated in or around Cuba, both military and humanitarian, and what objectives your command is pursuing in this area. Gentlemen, thank you again for your leadership and for the service of the men and women under your command, and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. General Guillot, you are now recognized for your opening statement.

Thank you, Chairman Wicker, and good morning to you, Ranking Member Reed, and the distinguished members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today alongside General Donovan and represent the dedicated and disciplined men and women of United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. As the strategic environment has grown more complex, NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM have responded by transforming both commands, executing new missions, and implementing innovative approaches to safeguard North America. Both commands campaign 24/7 to deter adversaries and defend against threats in all domains. Since March of 2025, NORAD intercepted long-range bombers off the coasts of Alaska and Canada 19 times, scrambled fighters 82 times, and committed fighters from airborne patrols 156 times in support of Operation Noble Eagle, protecting the President, Washington, D.C., and national special security events. The commands tracked Russian and Chinese submarines and surface vessels in the approaches to North America and remain ready to defend against ballistic and cruise missile attacks. Our commands remain vigilant, capable, and committed. That commitment is evidenced by the operational units activated over the last year. To secure the U.S. southern border, U.S. NORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Southern Border in March of 2025. Since then, JTF-SB has supported Customs and Border Protection with unique military capabilities in all domains that have helped reduce illegal border activities to historic lows. Those service members are now executing the southern border mission with expanded authorities and within their occupational specialties, which has enhanced readiness and increased reenlistment rates. U.S. NORTHCOM also established Joint Interagency Task Force Counter-Cartel, a whole-of-government enterprise dedicated to fusing intelligence used to help dismantle cartel networks. And to accelerate our integrated air and missile defense capabilities, U.S. NORTHCOM activated Joint Task Force Gold to serve as the operational arm for the future layered defense systems provided by Golden Dome for America. U.S. NORTHCOM is the department's synchronizer for counter-small UAS activities in the continental U.S. and Alaska. Thanks to the counter-small UAS authorities provided by Congress and policies updated by Secretary Hegseth, the service members along the border defeated 93 UAS that crossed the border and posed a threat to our personnel. Assuring our ability to operate in the high north is a strategic necessity. With the inclusion of Greenland into the U.S. NORTHCOM area of responsibility, we are executing seamless defensive operations across the harsh environment of the Arctic, ensuring we are ready to defend the high north anytime and under all conditions. Domestically, U.S. NORTHCOM's mission to provide defense support of civil authorities remains a critical responsibility, and we stand ready to support lead federal agencies during natural disasters and key events, including America's 250 celebrations and World Cup 2026, co-hosted by Canada, Mexico, and the United States. All NORAD and Northcom missions are reinforced by partnerships. From our unique binational relationship with Canada through NORAD, our close cooperation with Mexico, the Bahamas, and now Denmark and Greenland, trusted relationships are a cornerstone of regional security and homeland defense. The men and women of US Northcom and NORAD have embraced these new challenges and are unwavering in their no-fail mission. The disciplined defense of our homelands in all domains, from all avenues of approach, against all those who intend us harm. We appreciate the steadfast support of the committee, and I look forward to answering your questions today. We have the watch.

Thank you very much, General Donovan.

Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the posture of United States Southern Command. I would like to thank the members of this committee for their trust and confidence you have placed in me to lead this organization at such a critical moment. On behalf of the men and women of Southcom, Sergeant Major Rodriguez and I appreciate your continued support. I am joined today by my good friend General Guillot. We are aligned with the department's focus in the Western Hemisphere. We are dedicated to rebuilding US leadership and presence in this critical part of the world. Let me begin by saying I've learned a lot in the past 42 days about the dynamic region I am responsible for and the incredible organization I am now leading. As this committee knows, last year was a pivotal moment in Southcom's history. The command was responsible for multiple priority missions and operations, each with enormous national security implications. The Southcom team rose to the challenge while remaining true to its legacy of partnering and collaboration. I want to specifically thank the leaders of Joint Task Force Southern Spear. This is Southcom's warfighting headquarters, who are leading our efforts against drug cartels and terrorist networks with incredible levels of professionalism and precision. Now we are ready to evolve for the future. The 2026 National Defense Strategy lays out the threats we face in this hemisphere and Southcom's role in addressing them. In response, I have developed four imperatives. First, Southcom strengthens hemispheric command and control by redesigning and building the Southcom headquarters for strategic level operations at range, speed, and scale. Second, Southcom imposes total systemic friction on drug cartels and terrorist networks. This requires a hemisphere-wide approach led by Southcom and Northcom to help our partners degrade these organizations and reduce the threat they pose to our partners and to our nation. Third, Southcom develops and fields cost-effective, modernized forces tailored for the missions in this hemisphere. These forces fully maximize operational maneuver, autonomous systems, and human-machine teaming to greatly increase lethality, all-domain awareness, and most importantly, data sharing for US and partner forces. And finally, Southcom denies adversary footholds and undue influence in this hemisphere. That includes their ability to position forces or other capabilities that threaten our homeland or our regional partners and challenge our access to key terrain like the Panama Canal and its approaches. These imperatives and the dynamic security environment we operate in will require the right structures, authorities, and forces to keep pace with mission needs. Southcom is moving out with speed and urgency and stands ready to work with Congress to defend our homeland and our hemisphere. I thank this committee for their unyielding support to US Southern Command and look forward to our discussion this morning. Thank you very much.

Well thank you, gentlemen. And without objection, the entire statement of General Guillot, the entire prepared statement of General Guillot consisting of 21 pages provided to us in advance, and the entire statement of General Donovan, again provided to us in advance, consisting of 11 pages, will be added into the record at this point without objection. Okay. Well, General Donovan, tell us how the Maduro effort, the removal of him and the installation of his vice president, has affected our interests in the area.

Mr. Chairman, soon after assuming command of Southcom, I was directed to take a trip to Venezuela, to Caracas, and meet with the current leadership of the Venezuelan government. And I will pause just for a second to highlight...

Whom did you meet?

We met Delcy Rodriguez and a number of her senior generals, the top four, Mr. Chairman, we speak of. But I will highlight for one second the incredible work Ambassador or now Chargé d'Affaires Doe is doing down there as our representative with a small team of 10 diplomats. Their work they're doing with the Venezuelan government is staggering.

Is a Chargé as high as we'll get down there?

Chairman, I hope eventually have an ambassador one day. And she was just recognized on the 5th of March as official Chargé. And we put the, raised the flag over the embassy the first time in I think nine years. So a good moment. But we got a chance to meet with the government there, highlight our concerns that had developed over time since the Maduro event. It was 46 days since that event, so it was a pretty remarkable setting. And we laid out what our concerns were, and since then that, those actions have all been acted on by that government.

In a positive way that met with your approval.

Yes, Mr. Chairman. And I think in a classified setting, one specific action against an actor we're very concerned about, aggressive action was taken.

All right, we'll certainly have an opportunity to do that later on. Well tell us then about coordination with the Economic Defense Unit, the intelligence community, and the Office of Strategic Capital. Can you enlarge on my statement about that?

Chairman, yes I can. As we look at all the tools available to Southcom, and really our strength remains our ability to partner with these allies and partners. If you look at the recent Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition now that we've set up, that the Secretary has set up, and that we believe Southcom will take a key role in. We have more tools through OSC, through EDU to bring to bear. So you have the exercises, you have the, you have even foreign military sales, but we have 17, actually now with Chile 18 key partners that have signed up to the, for the A-Triple-C to be part of this now. And now we have more tools with EDU.

Partner, partner nations, partner...

Yes sir, the partner nations that signed the agreement to be part of the Americas, without apostrophe, Counter-Cartel Coalition. And the EDU and OSC give us additional capabilities we haven't had in the past, specifically when we can counter other malign actors like China directly with some economic incentives, Chairman.

Is OAS being utilized to the extent that it could?

Chairman, I'll put it this way. In 43 days, I have not contacted the OAS yet or really been fully involved. That is something I need to do and I intend to pursue to ensure that we're fully aligned or they're in full support of the way forward.

I think it's an opportunity that we ought to try to enlarge, and I say that for the benefit of my colleagues also. Let's see, General Guillot, how are you working with the Golden Dome team to improve our defenses and particularly I promised to ask you about Joint Interagency Task Force 401.

Chairman, I'm working very closely with General Gutlein and his program office. In fact, the day after he was confirmed, he flew to Colorado Springs where we outlined what I felt were the operational necessities for the Golden Dome. And then he agreed at that time that it one, aligned with his approach and two, that he felt he could build the architecture necessary to deliver that on time. And we also brought General Stephen Whiting, who is the commander of US Space Command, who was in Colorado Springs and he was in on the meeting too. And so the three of us left fully aligned. Since then, as he's worked with industry and developed this architecture, anytime he finds something that either the technology isn't there yet or maybe the cost is too high, he comes back to me and explains his adjustment and confirms that it still meets our operational needs. I also gave him a general officer that is working as a liaison in his office to ensure that there's no separation between the operational requirements and his development of the architecture. So in short, I think it's a very tight relationship. I'm very encouraged by it, and I think that we will be able to demonstrate the capabilities that have been advertised on or ahead of schedule.

Thank you very much. Senator Reed is now recognized.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Donovan, the lethal boat strikes that are being conducted in your AOR are based on a still secret directive signed by the President ordering the Pentagon to conduct maritime strikes on these alleged drug trafficking boats. And the affiliation is with organizations that are still secret, have not been revealed to the public yet. Those operations have been going on for over six months and as I indicated, there are 157 killed in action or killed personnel. When you came before the committee, you indicated that you would check each one of these operations. Have you been able to do that and what conclusions have you reached?

Ranking Member, before assuming command on 5 February, I actually took a number of steps. I'd like to highlight them if I could. First one is I read all the legal opinions tied to these operations. Next I read every single execute order Southcom's been given since well prior to Southern Spear to ensure that I could link those together. So when I stepped into command, I could carry out those specific strikes if required and if they were part of the tactical solution.

Well thank you, General. What is the metrics of success in this operation? Is it the reduction of drugs entering the United States and by how much? Are there metrics involved?

Ranking Member, as I've looked at this over the last 43 days, I cannot stand before you and tell you that there's a percentage drop in American deaths inside the United States or number of a certain percentage of drugs reaching the United States. What looking forward, what we're building is actual campaign against these cartels that will actually look really more systematically across the board from point of production to point of delivery up in the plazas. And look at it more holistically and really what I'd like, what I'm planning on applying is total systemic friction on these networks. And I believe these kinetic strikes are just one small part of that. If you look at all the tools available, specifically the tools that will strengthen partners so they will have a better economic future in these towns, villages, cities where a lot of the production takes place, where these cartels and other nefarious actors like China can step in and influence. I believe that's the step in the measure of success that those partner nations can actually create security environments where we start this, stop this at the actual source itself.

Can you indicate the chain of command above you? Who is immediately above you then all the way up to the very top?

The Secretary of the War to the President of the United States.

And do you have contact with the White House directly through individuals in the White House?

No, Ranking Member Reed.

So you get all your orders from the Secretary of Defense.

Those orders are from the Secretary of Defense translated through the Joint Staff in the form of execute orders, which are the ones I referenced, I've read every single one.

Thank you very much. General Guillot, as I indicated in my opening statement, you have at the orders of the President deployed significant forces throughout the United States, and you've drawn, the action has drawn criticism by many governors, mayors, and also the courts. I'm really concerned, though, is looking beyond just what these deployments, the Secretary of Defense has set up a response force from the National Guard, quick reaction forces from the National Guard, which mobilize within 24 hours and can be sent anywhere at the order of the President to, quote, "quell civilian disturbances." All of that adds up to the obvious question, the concern that these forces could be used to interrupt the First Amendment rights of Americans, and particularly their right to vote. As you know, federal law explicitly bans the deployment of armed federal troops or any armed troops to polling places. Specifically, Section 18 USC Section 592 makes it a crime punishable by up to five years in prison to deploy federal, quote, "troops or armed men," which I presumably would include ICE, to any location where voting is taking place or elections are being held, unless such force be necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States, armed enemies of the United States. Other than that narrow legal exception that I just described, do you agree that it is illegal to deploy the armed forces to polling places?

Senator, I am aware of the, of the code and I recognize that it is against the law, and I would not follow an unlawful order. And then thank you for noting the exception.

Thank you very much, sir. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield my six seconds.

Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Senator Fischer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, I've appreciated our conversations over the years about the increasingly complex and diverse threats that we face to our homeland. You are always insistent that improving domain awareness is foundational to protecting the homeland, because after all, we cannot shoot what we cannot see. How are you seeing our ability to detect and characterize threats earlier improve?

Senator, thank you for your support in those efforts. I am seeing immediate improvement. We can see at longer ranges with more fidelity, and also in a layered approach where one phenomena or, or one system is no longer responsible solely to detect, we have backup systems as well. And then I also note because of the partnership with the Golden Dome for America program office, many of the domain awareness systems that we need for improved NORAD and NORTHCOM detection also serve the purpose of Golden Dome, and so we're really getting two or three for one with many of these systems that are either in, in development now or being implemented now or will be implemented in the near future.

I really appreciated your comments about working with General Goutline on Golden Dome and how, and how you are working together to make sure, first of all, that we, we have what we need in order to protect this homeland and the collaboration there will, will hopefully hold down expenses as well as you each bring forth ideas that are, are necessary. So I really appreciate your comments there. As, as we're looking to improve on, on the threats, do you have anything specific you could say in this setting on what you think needs to be improved?

Senator, I'd like to see continued improvement in the persistence of our ability to detect and track adversaries from seabed all the way to space. As I mentioned, it's a layered approach and I have confidence in all the layers, but as the adversary grows capability, we need to see them further away from our continent than we have in the past. And so I'd like to see incremental improvement in reaching out further from our shores to ensure that we stay ahead of the adversary as they improve their capabilities.

Thank you. Turning to your role as the NORAD commander, how are the U.S. and Canadian militaries deepening their military partnership in the face of, of greater threats?

Senator, at the mil-to-mil level, we're working very closely together as we have since 1958 when NORAD was established, with Canadians and U.S. members side-by-side in the headquarters and out in the field. Most recently, you may have seen that a combined force of, of NORAD fighters both and tankers, both U.S. and Canadian, intercepted Russian aircraft north of Alaska that went from the Alaskan ADIZ into the Canadian ADIZ and then back across. And because of the seamless approach that we have from the headquarters on down to units, that is fully integrated on the same data links, the same mission planning systems, using the same refueling tankers, operating sometimes from the same base. It's a, it's an incredibly tight and, I think, inseparable relationship that we have to defend North America.

It sounds like you're evolving and adjusting the relationship to meet the new threats that are out there.

Yes, ma'am, we absolutely are, and both of our countries are pursuing NORAD modernization capabilities that will make sure that we can stay ahead, as I mentioned.

Thank you. General Donovan, what actions is SOUTHCOM taking to increase and leverage partnerships to advance our country's interests in the region?

Senator, we've had an opportunity to meet with almost every leader of my equivalent, the MODs or CHODs of the southern countries that we're tied to through the CHOD conference we had with the chairman here in D.C. And then this Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition. Their ask is, is the same thing. They need assistance with domain awareness. And, and really it's key between air domain awareness, as we believe some of these drug trafficking flows are, are moving into the airspace again, and maritime domain awareness to look out over the horizon not only for the, the cartel efforts, but really the PRC, the Chinese influence, illicit fishing. So really domain awareness is the, is the thing they ask for more than anything else, Senator.

To what extent can lessons from the Joint Security Cooperation Group Panama, how can those be applied to SOUTHCOM's relationships to other countries?

I think that's an exemplar, Senator, that we're just starting to realize how we could export that to other places in South America and the Caribbean and Central America.

Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Shaheen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here this morning and for your service to our country. General Donovan, throughout the past fall, this committee was briefed several times on ongoing operations in the Caribbean, as you've heard from Senator Reed. And when we asked point-blank about plans to remove Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela, we were told both at the cabinet level and from senior military leaders that there were no plans to conduct regime change. And yet, come to find out, the military was in the process of conducting rehearsals to remove Nicolas Maduro from power. So, General Donovan, now we're hearing President Trump make several comments about his intent to remove from power the current president of Cuba, to own Cuba. And while both Cuba and Venezuela are repressive regimes and I don't have any sympathy for their leadership, they pose no immediate threat to the United States. So I'm going to ask you very directly. Are we currently conducting any military rehearsals that involve seizing, occupying, or otherwise asserting control over Cuba?

Senator, U.S. Southern Command is not.

Thank you. Pardon me? Is any other command that you know of?

No, Senator.

Thank you. Thank you, Senator Reed. General Guillot, U.S. space and satellite tracking infrastructure in Greenland now falls under your area of responsibility, as you've pointed out in your testimony. And I noticed in your statement for the record that in addition to the U.S.-Canada relationship through NORAD, you benefit from cooperation with the Danish Armed Forces and with the inclusion of Greenland in your AOR. So can you tell us, has the United States ever made a request of Denmark or Greenland regarding military cooperation that has not been granted or accommodated by the Danish and Greenlandic authorities?

No, Senator, we have not. I enjoy a very strong relationship with the Danish CHOD, and every request and partnership opportunity has been fulfilled.

Thank you. And in your exchange with Senator Fischer, you talked about the efforts underway with Canada on NORAD. Can you speak a little in a little greater detail to the benefit that Canada provides us as a partner in NORAD?

Senator, as I mentioned, they're fully integrated in all of our operations for NORAD. The benefits that I see underway and coming in the future are long-range radar systems that could help detect threats at range, an interest in joining us in satellite detection capabilities which would give persistence, and then the purchase of advanced fighter aircraft such as the F-35 which would give us lethality to defeat threats further away from our continent.

So is it fair to say that we're safer and stronger because of our partnership with Canada?

Yes, ma'am, in NORAD for sure.

Thank you. As you point out in your testimony, General Guillot, drone incursions over the United States pose a real threat to our homeland, especially over critical U.S. military infrastructure. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have really made progress on both offensive and counter-drone technology and are now assisting in with air defense in the Middle East. Can you talk about the lessons that have been learned from the Ukrainian military as you think about developing counter-drone technology?

Yes, Senator. And we're very fortunate, as the chairman mentioned, to have JIATF 401, which is a newly established organization that looks at the procurement and development of counter-UAS systems which can be passed to combatant commands like ours and others. First, I see that it's important to move from a point defense, which counter-UAS in the last few years has been, into more of a regional area because of the longer range and indiscriminate nature with which they, the adversary has employed these systems. Also, they've helped illuminate that you can't have just one or two different defeat mechanisms. They have to be across multiple mediums, everything from denying satellite guidance all the way to first-person view and everything in between, which means that we have to expand our arsenal in ways that we didn't think two or three years ago, and we wouldn't have known that without the benefit of the Ukraine.

Thank you. And General Donovan, when I was recently, Senator Blumenthal and I actually were recently in Odessa in Ukraine, and one of the people we met along the way was an official from Colombia who is was working with the Ukrainian Armed Forces to combat drug cartels in Latin America and in Colombia specifically. Can you have are you looking at some of those efforts to address what you're trying to do in SOUTHCOM to address cartels and the narcotics trade?

Yes, Senator, we are. Colombia, after really decades of Plan Colombia, they're a very effective organization and we still have very strong mil-to-mil ties in a fusion cell in Bogota. So we continue to learn from their, their successes they're having against the cartels.

And and what they're learning is from the Ukrainians as well, correct?

Absolutely, Senator.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Cotton.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance and for your service. General Donovan, I want to return to the question of Cuba. I understand that you may not be actively rehearsing an invasion of Cuba, but surely we have plans to deal with any contingency related to Cuba. I mean, there's there's a vast cadre, thousands of majors and colonels just sitting around the Pentagon making plans for every possible contingency in the world. It'd be a mass unemployment event if we didn't have plans for every potential crisis around the world. So I want to ask specifically about one potential crisis given the state of play in Cuba, which has never been able to stand on its own two feet. It relied for 30 years on support from Soviet Russia, and then it was wobbly in the 1990s until Chavez's Venezuela came to the rescue and supported it for the last 30 years. Are we prepared for any kind of humanitarian crisis in Cuba, the possible flow of refugees or other civil disorder that may threaten our interests, especially if the decrepit, corrupt Castro regime finally falls or flees?

Senator, yes, we are. SOUTHCOM, our core task, we have a we have an execute order to be prepared to support DHS in a mass migration event. They would take the lead. We would follow either at sea or primarily ashore at Guantanamo Bay, where we would set up a camp to deal with those migrants or any overflow from a any situation in Cuba itself. Otherwise, my other core task is to protect the embassy, which we are in contact with the embassy every single day. We had the CDA, the Charge d'Affaires Hammer, in my office about a week ago, and we talked about what he thought was going to happen in Cuba. And so we're very much aligned with the diplomats there. That's my responsibility. In Cuba, the responsibility I have is protecting that the base and those families and US Americans living on the eastern part of the island. So all those together, we're constantly watching. If asked to support a humanitarian event, that's what we do actually very well also. We can we are very strong in logistics and we could move support and supplies if if asked to do so.

Okay. Thank you. You've been on the job now for a little over a month. What's been your assessment of the state of our infrastructure in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean? Has it does it need additional support given the fact that SOUTHCOM is now a much more active combatant command than it has been in the past?

Senator, in the last 43 days, I've learned a lot about the budget of SOUTHCOM and have looked at the the base and stations that we've had in the past, like like Guantanamo Bay and other locations that we're coming back to, like in Puerto Rico. Then areas like Soto Cano, where we have a great relationship with the Hondurans, all all in different degrees need a refresh. I'd like to pause for a minute on Guantanamo Bay. I think that is one of the more key locations we have and and it's I won't pull any punches, it's in rough shape. Because of hurricane damage, we're down to one working pier and one refueling pier. I believe that is a pivotal point for any operations in the Caribbean is Gitmo. And so right now we're working for opportunities and the funding in the resources. Is it MILCON? Is it other contingency funds to really figure out how to go to those key locations? And they become both not just logistics hubs, but maneuver hubs as we look at going on a on a consistent counter-cartel campaign and or better partners and use those hubs for hubs of partnership, like we mentioned before, how to export some of the good things we're doing in Panama.

Okay. And I I trust that your budget request will reflect the needs for those infrastructure upgrades, especially at Guantanamo Bay.

Yes, Senator. And in how our budget's structured right now, executive agent's United States Army, so we're working with the United States Army on looking at that budget structure and then how do we actually have a budget built over time with the right amount of O and M to actually make improvements and sustain those, not just one-year shots in the arm, but a sustained budget approach that will actually let us campaign from very effective forward locations.

Thank you. I think your appointment reflects in part that Southern Command is a combatant command, not a training command and certainly not a diplomatic command, and I think the budget needs to reflect that as well. General Guillot, as the commander of NORAD, one of your central missions is the defense of American and Canadian airspace. That depends on a robust fighter force, but today's Air Force fleet is the smallest and the oldest it's ever been. The Air Force also struggles with low readiness rates for its fighters. Do you believe that NORTHCOM and NORAD would benefit from an expanded fighter force?

Yes, Senator, we would. I would like to see continued modernization of fourth-generation fighter fleet. Frankly, sir, we don't need fifth-gen to defend our borders. Those capabilities are better used overseas where their stealth, air-to-ground weapons, and penetration capability are needed. So revamped and modernized fourth-gen to include F-15EX in select locations would meet all of our requirements.

Good. I'm glad you said that. I think we need more fourth-generation fighters as well, like the F-15EX, and for that matter, they can be pretty useful overseas once those fifth-generation fighters and bombers plow the road and knock out the air defenses as we're seeing right now in Iran. Thank you, gentlemen.

General Donovan, how how many Americans are at Gitmo right now?

Yes, Senator, I'm going to I'm going to look at my cheat sheet because as I learn the

I do that often.

Let me get back to you on it.

Okay, that's fine.

I'll let you know. I know what we are prepared for if migrants come in. I don't have the base structure and what we have down there right now.

Okay. Are the Russians resupplying Cuba now, and how much of a game changer is that or would that be?

Chairman, we haven't seen an active resupply of of Russians coming to the aid of of Cuba from a military perspective.

I saw a news article about that.

What we're tracking right now is one destroyer with an accompanying oiler, which is a or replenishment ship heading towards Cuba on a port call. We I believe that oiler is just supporting that ship moving there. I don't think it's going to deliver any. If it did, it wouldn't have the impact at scale. So that's the only event I'm tracking, Chairman.

Thank you. Senator Blumenthal.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for your service and to your families. General Donovan, to your wife, and I understand your two children are Marines, thank them as well for their service. There have been reports of a request by the Pentagon for $200 billion supplemental. It seems to me that a supplemental to support a war that the President has never asked Congress to approve as constitutionally required without a clear statement of objectives or strategy, disclosure of accurate information about the cost of the war or public hearings with relevant officials would make it a non-starter at this point. And it's added to a $1.5 trillion Department of Defense FY 27 request and could be misinterpreted or spun as congressional approval for the war. Are you aware of the request made by the Department of Defense, Department of War for $200 billion supplemental? Either of you.

Senator, I read it in the news this morning.

General.

Senator, I'm in the same position as General Donovan.

Thank you. All right, you've been asked, General Donovan, about plans and rehearsals for Cuba. Are you aware of any plans to aid non-governmental groups, exile groups, or any other groups in potentially action within Cuba to overthrow this government or to take over if there is an overthrow?

No, Senator.

And are you aware of any contingency plans to put American troops in Cuba if there is unrest there that threatens Americans who are there now?

Senator, that situation, if it developed a physical security threat to the US embassy or the base at Gitmo, I would we would put US troops to defend US American lives.

Thank you. As Senator Shaheen has said, I have no sympathy for a the repressive regime there, which has caused deaths and economic turmoil, but I think we should be informed about any such plans if they are made. Would you agree?

Yes, Senator.

Thank you. In terms of the seizure of boats emanating from Venezuela, is that are those operations continuing, General Donovan?

Senator, Southern Command continues to track the dark fleet, those vessels been designated carrying illicit oil from or to Venezuela. We continue to track those. Right now, all in our AOR are actually in port or not transiting. There have been a number of engagements called maritime interception operations. Some have happened in in SOUTHCOM. One has happened in EUCOM in the middle of the Atlantic, and one's happened also in INDOPACOM in the Indian Ocean. So we continue to track those illicit shipping and when directed, we can conduct interception operations.

To what extent are other nations in the hemisphere aiding the United States in those operations?

Senator, I do not know if we're getting direct aid in the sense of a tactical action. It is all US US personnel involved, led by law enforcement the Coast Guard, but I am not aware of other unless it's intel or information sharing, we depend on partners, but no other direct support. I do I will tell you that we part of our trip to Venezuela was to put pressure on that government to let us board two of the ship that they have in port pier side in Caracas. They executed the boarding and and determined for us to determine what was actually on board.

During your nomination hearings, I asked you whether you supported releasing various Office of Legal Counsel opinions. I think there are at least two of them which right now are classified. You deferred to the policy and legal advisors in the office of the Secretary. Now that you're confirmed, I'll ask you again, do you believe that the American people should have available or have access to those opinions that are the legal basis for the administration carrying out the strikes?

Senator, the department has kept the information release authority. I'm just carrying out the assigned tasks.

Thank you. My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Ernst.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, gentlemen, and your teams as well for your exceptional service to our nation. General Guillot, I'll start with you, sir. I want to start by highlighting the 185th Air Refueling Wing in Sioux City, Iowa, which plays a critical role in supporting both global operations and homeland defense missions. Our airmen are operating the KC-135 tankers, and they do an exceptional job. That mission provides essential air refueling, which enables everything from strategic bomber operations to fighter alert missions and rapid response here at home. This capability is essential to projecting power abroad while also supporting NORTHCOM's homeland defense function. Ensuring the Sioux City runway renovations are completed is critical to sustaining this tanker mission and maintaining the Air National Guard's ability to support combatant command operations overseas and contingency response in the United States. So, sir, can you speak to the operational importance of maintaining strong aerial refueling capabilities in the nation's interior and how critical it is to maintain infrastructure like the Sioux City runway to ensure those missions continue to support both homeland defense and global force projection?

Yes, Senator, I absolutely can. But first I'd say you mentioned the Air National Guard, the National Guard as a whole, and the success of the NORAD and NORTHCOM mission starts and stops with our relationship with the Air National Guard and the National Guard, to include that of Iowa. Regarding refuelers, that's our lifeline. We rely on some very incredible and incredibly capable fighter aircraft, but the range and duration is limited, especially when you're defending a vast homeland like the United States. And so with every launch of an alert fighter that seems to get more attention, there's a launch of one or two tankers to make sure that they can stay on station and flexible and mobile to meet the threat wherever it is. We could not do our job without the air refueling tankers.

Thank you. I appreciate that. And with that, I'm going to yield back my time, Mr. Chair.

Thank you. Thank you very much. We now have Senator Hirono.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The picture that is being painted with regard to our ability to engage in any kind of an operation in Cuba, the picture that is being painted in spite of assurances that there are no ongoing preparations to do anything particularly militarily, but the picture I have is that it would not take very long for us to be able to respond in some fashion if the President said we are going to go in, we should seize Cuba. Wouldn't we be able to execute on that in a pretty expeditious way? General Donovan?

Senator, since we do not have that plan, we have a number of tasks for Cuba, but since we have not, we're not executing any rehearsals for that plan, the number of forces required, we have general ideas, but the focus right now is purely on securing Guantanamo Bay and the U.S. Embassy to protect American personnel. That is the only facts and figures and planning we have underway at this time.

How long would it take for if the President gave an order to seize Cuba because it's a pretty unstable situation there now, how long would it take for you to be able to execute on that order?

Senator, I'd have to go through a planning process with the SOUTHCOM team to determine what are the actual objectives of the operation to determine what size force would be required, but again, we are currently not executing that planning at this time.

Well, the picture I'm painting, and I don't want to get into an argument with you about this, General, but I do think that you're already there and therefore you're paying attention to what's going on there. It doesn't seem as though it would take very long for us to execute any kind of a plan there. Southern Command has previously worked with USAID on humanitarian aid to Cuba, and now that this aid has been cut, has that not really made the humanitarian aspects of what you're doing with regard to Cuba more difficult?

Secretary, as the U.S. State Department is restructured and those elements that were USAID in the past, actually I've asked a lot of questions about this because I grew up for 37 years have operated with State and USAID across the globe. There are other entities that have taken up those roles inside of the State Department, and now we are connected with them on the aid front in many ways similar, both in disaster relief and in planning, so we have some of the similar capabilities, just not the name, and we are learning how to actually work together in the new structure from the State Department.

General, based on the questions from a number of the members of this committee, you can see that there are definitely expressed concerns about what might be in the President's mind with regard to Cuba. General Guillot, I know you are working closely with General Gurtline, I don't know if I'm pronouncing that correctly, on Golden Dome, and as you know, Hawaii is unique for purposes of missile defense with you and Admiral Paparo shaping or sharing responsibilities based on the kind of threat being posed in terms of our need for missile defense. So General Gurtline previously committed to me that defense of Hawaii will be included as part of Golden Dome mission, missile defense, sorry, architecture, and I just want to get that kind of commitment from you.

Senator, absolutely. The defense of Hawaii from ballistic missiles is a responsibility of U.S. Northern Command, and from the very inception of our planning for Golden Dome with General Gurtline, it has included the ability to protect those islands from ballistic missile defense. And to your comment, ma'am, on the cooperation with Admiral Paparo, since it's a shared defense of Hawaii between our two commands, we've combined our main exercises, Northern Edge and Arctic Edge, to ensure that it is seamless protection.

Thank you. That's reassuring. General Donovan, in light of what happened with the strike on the school in Iran, there is a concern that we ought to be doing anything we can to mitigate harm to civilians. So during your confirmation hearing, I raised concerns about reports that SOUTHCOM lacked a functioning mechanism to receive civilian casualty reports and that SOUTHCOM civilian harm mitigation staff had been cut from four personnel to a single contractor. You had not assumed your responsibility at that point, and I'd like to hear what steps SOUTHCOM has taken to address the issue of mitigating civilian harm in any of your actions.

Senator, yes, and I did, that was one of the first things I did to look at our program for not only planning but response to operations. And what I found, as you mentioned, four positions, we had four positions, one I'm paying for out of my own budget to ensure that I do have that capability built as a separate entity, moved other capabilities into our J3 fires and kinetic effects so they're part of the planning cell and part of the any investigations post.

I take it that you are increasing your capacity to be able to mitigate civilian harm.

Yes, Senator.

Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator King.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Shaheen's questions with regard to discussions, consultations, negotiations with Denmark and Greenland with regard to additional security assets in Greenland. Number one, are those discussions taking place? And number two, are they productive? And number three, are you meeting any resistance to establishing additional security assets in Greenland?

Senator, we are pursuing with Denmark expansion on the defense areas which are allowed under the 1951 agreement, and we've submitted...

The 1951 agreement is quite comprehensive. We don't really need a new treaty.

It's very comprehensive and it's frankly very favorable to our operations or potential operations in Greenland. And so working with the Department of State, we have three areas that we would like to negotiate with Denmark and Greenland to see if we could expand the defense areas from Pituffik where we are now into these other areas which would help our homeland defense mission.

And my final question is, are you meeting any resistance? Are they being cooperative and receptive to these discussions?

Senator, very cooperative with both Greenland and Denmark and very eager to discuss ways to move forward to improve our defense capabilities.

Let me expand the vision a little bit to the Arctic. Do we have sufficient assets in the Arctic? I'm worried about, for example, a lack of a port, deepwater port facility on the Arctic Ocean, whether or not we have, well, it's I'm sort of almost laughing because of our lack of icebreakers. We have about one and a half icebreakers, the Russians have 40. What are our gaps in the Arctic in terms of our ability because the Russians are building up their assets on the Arctic side very extensively?

Senator, our challenges in the Arctic start with what you mentioned, ports and the ability to navigate freely through the harsh conditions of the Arctic, both maritime, land, and air. So I'm working with our department and others to try to develop more ports, more airfields, which leads to more options for our Secretary and for the President should we need them up in the Arctic. And that is from Alaska all the way across through Canada and into Greenland.

Final question on this area. One of your principal responsibilities is sensing, is knowing what's coming, domain awareness. My concern is that a lot of our doctrine and technology, frankly, is geared toward yesterday's threats. We're not going to have time if a hypersonic is coming from somewhere in Siberia or somewhere in the Northern Pacific. Are we extending our sensor sense further off the coast of Alaska, for example, so that we have more time to assess the risk and to try to defeat it? It's a big difference between an ICBM when you have 20 or 30 minutes and a hypersonic is coming at 100 feet off the water at 6,000 miles an hour. Can we detect that hypersonic right now?

Senator, we have the ability to detect the hypersonics now, but I agree with you that we need to get better and see further so we have more decision space. And that would require us to move from one phenomenology into multiple. We have to have space, ground, surface, and undersea capability to detect all of those threats from further away.

Well, as you know, we're moving into the defense bill season here at this committee. Please let us know what's necessary in that area so that we can be sure that we address it in the defense bill that's coming up in several months.

Thank you, Senator.

General Donovan, are the SOUTHCOM countries cooperating on this anti-drug mission? In other words, are the governments our partners? Are they standing aside? Are they corrupted by the cartels? What's the level of cooperation from the other countries in the region?

Senator, obviously on the surface, the recent announcement at our headquarters, the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition, those we have 18 signing members that do want to get at these problems, all with different degrees of capabilities, whether that's a functional military, a police capability, or even a legal system that will actually support getting at these problem sets. So really that's the goal of the coalition is to determine how best to help each of those partners actually find the way forward to counter in their location, and then the U.S. would play the role maybe as a synchronizer or bringing the capabilities to enhance their capabilities. And each have a different degree.

But do they have the will? That's the real question. I guess it varies.

It varies, but Senator, I've been from that CHOD conference here in D.C. and then the ACCC we had in our headquarters, I believe they do have the will and they're looking to follow and execute operations that could again range from local security and improving the lives of their citizens all the way to offensive options if required.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of more questions I hope I can follow up after the next.

Yes, we will take another round. Senator Slotkin.

Thank you. Thanks to both of you for being here. General Guillot, I was at the Homeland Security hearing yesterday for the incoming Secretary of Homeland Security talking about what he would do if asked to put armed ICE agents at polling locations. And so could you just state for us very clearly, do you believe that it is legal to put uniformed military active duty at polling locations or any other parts of the voting process, ballot, you know, centers, for political purposes?

Senator, it is strictly illegal to do what you described, putting military at a polling place unless the, as Senator Reed mentioned, the exception for countering an armed rebellion.

Right. There is an exception for countering an armed force, an armed rebellion. We didn't need uniformed military at our polls during World War II after Pearl Harbor, in Korea, during Vietnam, during the riots in the 60s, and after 9/11 when we had been attacked on our soil. So and yesterday the Director of National Intelligence mentioned in her world, mentioned no mention in the worldwide threat briefing of any threats to our election. So are you aware of any threats that meet the definition of armed force, you know, countering the United States that would be, that would require you to consider deploying to the polls?

Senator, I'm not aware of any threats at this time.

And if you were asked to move uniformed military into polling locations without any credible threat reporting of an armed force countering the United States, would you send those forces in?

Ma'am, I recognize that that's against the law and I would not follow an unlawful order.

Thank you. That hits my ears in a, in an important way since I made a 90-second video with Senator Kelly that said the uniformed military has a requirement to refuse illegal orders and because of that they attempted to criminally indict us in front of a grand jury for sedition. So I appreciate the ease with which you say just what should be a very standard thing and what I know you all learn in sort of basic training. Let me turn to a very different issue and that's artificial intelligence. You know, there's been a bunch of talk lately about the use of artificial intelligence in military targeting in the kill chain, in sort of the decisions on life and death. And there's also been discussion about domestic surveillance, right? Do you agree that it is illegal for the Department of Defense to surveil the American people unless individual Americans have proven a threat to U.S. security?

Yes, Senator, that falls under the intel oversight and I'm very aware and we follow all of those rules.

Yeah. And I think, you know, the, we never want our military, you know, we don't want anyone to be questioning that our military is looking at, you know, Americans as a topic to surveil. So do you believe that we should have restrictions in place that would just say for everybody, for the AI companies, for any future or current Secretary of Defense, that you cannot use artificial intelligence for mass surveillance of American citizens?

Senator, doing so would violate the intel oversight rules that I mentioned and so I support the rules that are in place.

Great. And what about having a human being in the loop on decisions of life and death, you know, of targeting? I think about nuclear weapons, right? Right now there's no law saying that you couldn't have artificial intelligence and sort of an autonomous system make decisions on the deployment of nuclear weapons. What do you think about having a human being in the decision tree on the use of lethal force?

Senator, having a human being on the loop in all decisions I think is important, some more than others obviously, and every use of artificial intelligence that we use in our command does have humans at the appropriate places on the loop to make sure that we are making the right decision with the right information.

Yeah. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, this is an issue that we should on a bipartisan basis take up in the committee for this NDAA because I think, you know, we shouldn't be leaving decision making up to any private company or any one Secretary of Defense or administration. We need to do our job and put some rules of the road in place. So look forward to discussing that this year's NDAA. Thank you.

Senator Budd.

Thank you, Chairman. Thank you all for being here. It's good to see you both. So General Donovan, in your short time in the seat, how have you seen special operations forces contributing to countering the expanding influence of China, Russia, and other adversaries in the Western Hemisphere?

Senator, thank you. The role of special operations forces, I think we all believe that their role is direct action and what we see maybe in the movies. The reality is irregular warfare and irregular warfare options are the strength of special operations forces. So in SOUTHCOM, when we see those activities by PRC or Russia, China, Russia, or other actors, it is always the special forces that really set the conditions to determine what comes next. They're very agile, mature, and we can put them in locations where either in a low visibility or an overt capability working with partners directly, they're really our best first tool to assess the situation and determine the way ahead.

Thank you for that. Let's talk for a minute about SOF integration with Ecuador if you will. So I saw that Ecuadorian and U.S. military forces completed a successful operation against terrorist organizations on March 3. So what are some of the success stories of this operation and any lessons learned for the broader region?

Senator, hopefully in the closed session I can provide additional details, but the success is that from a phone call between President Noboa and President Trump to moving forces very quickly to partner with our Ecuadorian forces, it was very short timeline. Now, that was based on years investment over time of Ecuadorian partnership at different types of training events, but the fact that the special operations forces including both ground forces and air forces could quickly plan with the Ecuadorians to ensure that any use of force fell within our requirements, very impressed on how again the Ecuadorians operated on both those operations and in a short period of time, very professional planning and I took part in both, observed both, and I thought very professional execution.

General, what's your assessment on their willingness in Ecuador and their capability to take a greater role in contributing to regional security there? And then what are some other countries in SOUTHCOM that are also leading the way?

I would say Ecuador is a primary focus. We just recently established, Senator, an Ecuador fusion cell in with the Ecuadorian Minister of Defense because they are, they're leading the way very similar to the fusion cell we have in Colombia, the one that's in Mexico City right now. There's different fusion cells in the region. The other nation that is really stepping forward is Paraguay, recently signed a SOFA agreement with the United States, which Status of Forces Agreement, which allows us to operate much more closely together and there's some great opportunities there with air domain awareness. We have FMS sales of radars coming down to increase the air domain awareness. So Paraguay is another recent kind of leader. But I will tell you the Americas Counter Coalition, that is Counter Cartel Coalition with 18 members right now, all seem to have different degrees of desire to move forward very quickly. So I think we have a number of partners moving forward at this time.

I appreciate that. General Guillot, it's good to see you. I saw that NORTHCOM and NORAD just wrapped up Exercise Arctic Edge last week. So tell us about some of the key lessons learned from the exercise in terms of NORTHCOM's priorities and are there areas that you needed any congressional support with regarding that?

Senator, Arctic Edge this year I deliberately moved from the quote warm months in Alaska into the harsher conditions to ensure that we had the ability to generate forces and execute in the harshest conditions. And so we learned some lessons about that. The forces in that are stationed in Alaska are very good at that, but as we brought forces in from the outside we see that they need to make sure they have the right equipment, right viscosity of oil in their generators and the right procedures to operate on the flight line to generate, launch, and then receive and repair aircraft. The operational focus was on cruise missile defense and so we brought out some cruise missile replicators that gave us a lot of insights on how we would defend that critical landscape and others from the cruise missile threat. So it's a very, very profitable exercise for us. What did we learn? Fourth generation fighter aircraft such as the ones that we have in Alaska are very important and with the cruise missile threat, having aircraft like the F-15E or the F-15EX, which has longer range, longer duration, and more missiles on board to defeat that threat would be critical in the future.

Just quickly, thank you, General. So I saw that Arctic Edge also was trilateral with the Canadians and the Danes. Why is Greenland important for our national security and what was cooperation with the Danes like?

Senator, very briefly, it's because we spend a lot of time looking at our 10 o'clock approach through Alaska and our 12 o'clock approach through Canada. Having full cooperation on the 2 o'clock approach through Greenland with Denmark is essential. The cooperation and the participation by the Danes in special operations as well as in fighters was outstanding. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Senator Kelly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Donovan, I want to start with Operation Southern Spear and the continued use of maritime strikes. As of March 9, the Joint Task Force Southern Spear has reportedly conducted I think about 45 boat strikes resulting in the deaths of approximately 156 people. That's a significant number of strikes and casualties in what is fundamentally a counter-trafficking mission, not a traditional armed conflict. These operations raise serious concerns and questions about effectiveness and a strategic outcome. I want to understand the strategic rationale here. These repeated boat strikes suggest a tactical approach that may be generating headlines, but it's far less clear that they are producing durable security outcomes. To me, this operation looks like a cycle of reactive strikes with limited long-term impact. So General, what evidence do you have that this campaign is actually degrading cartel operations rather than simply destroying some low-level assets, boats, and killing some people and displacing some trafficking routes?

Senator, in the last 43 days I've looked directly at that. Provide, I couldn't provide you say measures of effectiveness of the current effort, but I will share with you that what I've seen, the reports I've read, talking to partner nations, primarily partner nations that have talked to, had this exact same conversation. We've seen changes in the narcotraffickers' patterns. And in the closed setting I'd like to provide some more details specifically on that, but I will looking forward, Senator, the boat strikes aren't the answer. What we're, what we're moving for right now is a, and it might be an extension of Southern Spear, but really a counter-cartel campaign process that puts total systemic friction across this network, the number of networks. We know there's a number of cartels involved on four or five different land and sea routes, but putting total systemic friction from point of production to point of delivery, which would be in the plazas. Putting that together, I believe actually kinetic strikes will be one of the many tools and probably not the most effective tool when we actually look at it as more of a campaign approach.

Yeah, I agree. You said it's not the answer, it's not an effective tool, and it's hard to find a measure of effectiveness here. I get the systemic friction thing, but consider for a second, General, we moved a battle group halfway across the planet to do this and then had to move it back for the war in Iran. So I am, you know, concerned about a strategic goal here and having the intended effect of reducing the inflow of drugs into our country, especially when you consider that the, the thing where the most significant downside for the American people is fentanyl and that mostly comes through the southern borders, the land borders. And if we would put those kind of resources, when you, when you think about what it takes to have a battle group there on station, multiple ships, burning a lot of fuel, crew members, and if you put that kind of resource towards dealing with the fentanyl problem at the ports of entry, I think that would have a greater strategic impact on the overall problem. I got about a minute and 15 left. General Guillot, in your written testimony you stated that Iran's military capability has been severely degraded by the strikes executed during Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury, but that Iran seems to retain some capacity to direct reprisal attacks on the homeland through asymmetric means. So how has the war in Iran altered the overall threat landscape to the homeland, specifically as the degradation of Iran's conventional warfare systems increased the likelihood of harder to detect asymmetric attacks like cyber and the potential for homegrown violent extremists?

Senator, approaching the beginning of the operations, I was concerned about cyber attacks and espionage. I was worried about terrorism and lethal plots, and I was also very concerned about the missile capabilities where they have a space launch vehicle with the capability and range and throw weight that could be turned into an ICBM and threaten us. Certainly the cyber attacks and the terrorism and lethal plot concerns remain, and I'm very hopeful that the strikes by CENTCOM will negate the ballistic missile threat, but we'll wait for the debrief to see if that's actually happened, but I'm very confident it will be.

All right, let's follow up on this in the SCIF after this hearing.

Yes, sir.

All right, thank you.

Very good, then Senator Scott.

Thank you, Chairman. Well, first off, thanks both of you for being here. Thanks for all the men and women that serve for both of you. My questions today are going to be for General Donovan. As you know, my state has a large Venezuelan American population, many of whom came here seeking freedom after witnessing the evils of Chavez and Maduro and his thugs firsthand. It's clear to everyone that Operation Absolute Resolve was a success thanks to our warfighters and the decisive leadership of the President and Secretary of War. Today, Maduro and his thugs are no longer wreaking havoc in our hemisphere and putting American lives at risk by sending deadly drugs into our country. General Donovan, while I know you could spend a lot of time outlining just how crucial every person and unit's contribution was to the operation's success, could you specifically talk about the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit and what they did and their success?

Senator, thank you. And when I talk about the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, you have to also talk about the amphibious ready group that they ride on because that team is an incredible, you know, synchronized joint force that is still on task today at 12 nautical miles off the coast of Venezuela. And this was key in the visit I think I told you, Senator, I traveled to Caracas to meet with that government and our amazing Charge d'Affaires there. Their safety and security is based on that amphibious platform and those Marines and sailors 12 nautical miles off the coast with that quick reaction force, but also with a Role 2 Plus surgical suite, four ORs, operating tables, ready to respond. That's the only capability we have in the entire region until we get back to Gitmo where you have a Navy base hospital that doesn't have similar surgical capabilities. So that Marine Expeditionary Unit, and then I will tell you with a bit of pride, just on about four days ago, we got our first picture of the flag being raised over the embassy and when we recognized it as a U.S. embassy again, and those were Marines and SOF teammates around the flag with their ambassador, with their diplomat, the CDA, putting that flag up. That's what the MEU continues to do today.

Moving forward, how do you assess the importance of maintaining a continuous amphibious readiness group presence in SOUTHCOM?

As we look at all, Senator, all the capabilities that were brought to SOUTHCOM for Operation Absolute Resolve and other activities, the carrier strike group that we mentioned before with Senator Kelly, incredible capabilities, but there's a whole joint force from very clandestine low-observable aircraft to high-end destroyer systems, Aegis-class cruisers. The reality is the ARG/MEU itself, sustaining that capability in SOUTHCOM is important because alone by itself as it operates as a three-ship group, I call it the Swiss Army knife of the joint force. It can do just about everything. And as far as economy of force, it can deliver relief supplies or it can deliver kinetic strike if it had to. It's the most effective tool we have. The reality is we don't have enough, and that's just a challenge that we in the 90s, we had what was called heel-to-toe ARG/MEU deployments, when one went out, one came back. We've dropped our numbers of available ships and so we can't do that. We are looking at alternatives that we want to use other platforms like the littoral combat ship and maybe the expeditionary support base, other combinations that would be less than what an ARG/MEU brings to SOUTHCOM.

What are the risks you could encounter if you don't have the assets?

If we don't have those assets, and I think about a really I think my most important role is to obviously achieve the mission but take care of our joint force team members. If we don't have that surgical suite, if we don't have the long-range flights for whether it's a kinetic strike or a logistics transport, we just can't operate. It goes back to also looking at our bases in the region that hadn't received a whole lot of upkeep over the last decades. And whether that's again reopening and taking part in operations in Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rican government has been amazing, the Puerto Rican National Guard has been the backbone of a lot of our operations, but are we going to stay? If we are, are we going to invest? The same thing in Guantanamo Bay and other locations like Soto Cano, Honduras, great relationships, great support, but are we up to speed to be able to operate without those key heavier assets? And that's what we're looking at right now, Senator.

Can you talk about the importance of Homestead Air Force Base?

We believe Homestead is, I believe its key location, especially for high-wing, if we have big-wing autonomous ISR type platforms, specifically as we look at really bringing that machine-human teaming with what we could launch there and sustain there over especially the Caribbean would be key to any our plans to really develop a almost an autonomous maritime domain awareness and really go seabed to space, but I think Homestead plays a key role in that.

Thanks to both of you and the people you work with.

Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I still have grave concerns about how the targeting was done, how the choice of the first Iran attack that hit a girls' school took place. And we need to have a bipartisan hearing, discussion, and legislation about the use of AI, whether it's used, when it's used, how it's used. We don't have any details about that strike, whether AI was used in targeting. We obviously need to know that. But I'd like to learn from both of you, and I know that Senator Slotkin covered this, and you said that currently no AI is being used for domestic surveillance, and you said that AI is not used in decision-making for a kinetic attack. So I'd like to have a commitment from you that you will not use AI for decision-making and making the final decision about whether to an attack a location, to strike a location and use lethal force. And second, I want a commitment from both of you that you will not be using AI for any domestic surveillance in your AORs.

Senator, to the first, I will make all decisions at my authority or it will be to someone who is legally delegated the authority, it will be a human. And then we will not use, we will not survey U.S. citizens.

General Donovan?

Senator, we will not survey U.S. citizens and as you were speaking, Senator, we were involved in a process last night, a targeting process, there were only humans involved. The data was helping us make decisions and in a closed setting I'd like to share with you watching these young Americans make really hard decisions, they made the right decisions in the end.

I'm aware that our service members are trained to the highest standards for targeting in warfare. I know that our service members follow the law of war, I understand they follow all the Geneva Conventions, and I've great faith that they will continue to do so. I'm deeply concerned with Secretary Hegseth's decision-making with regard to undermining the personnel and department whose job is to protect civilians and to assure compliance with all those laws of war. I'm deeply concerned about Secretary Hegseth's rhetoric saying that we need a lethal force and we don't need these types of protections. I'm deeply concerned about his firing of senior counsel and JAGs throughout the services. Those are some of the best trained men and women we have to make sure our warfighters have the tools, advice, and guidance that you need to fight wars consistent with America's values. So I'm deeply concerned how those protections will be eroded. And so I'd like your commitment that those protections will not be eroded under your command.

Senator, they will not be eroded and just to illustrate, the JAG in our command is integrated into all of our activities and is in fact sitting behind me right now.

Thank you, General. General Donovan?

Very similar, Senator, they will not be eroded in U.S. Southern Command.

Thank you. I'd like to turn to the issue of UASs. When we had Mr. DeLibson here, I asked him about the requirements that DOD pushes down to DHS when it allows DHS to use DOD counter-UAS systems and whether that included requirements for coordination with relevant agencies. He said that the policy defers to NORTHCOM on this question. So General Guillot, I'd like you to talk to us a little bit about what requirements, including for interagency coordination, do you pass down to DHS in order for them to take possession of the systems? And I ask this in the context of the recent drone incursion over one of our military bases that was just reported on today.

Senator, when the counter-UAS laser system was temporarily transferred from our department to DHS, JTF Southern Border, which is the organization that was operating the laser, told DHS that it was, they would do the training, but any coordination must be through their department because it's operating under 124N, which is a code that we do not have experience with or understand, we operate it under 130I. But bigger than that, we understand that there has to be massive coordination and I think that our coordination with FAA, with DHS, and with others was strong before, but this highlighted an area that required improvement and we have addressed those since then.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Cramer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Generals, both for being here, for your service, and certainly to the men and women under your command. Thank you all. I want to follow up a little bit on the counter-UAS topic that began with Senator Shaheen and a little bit now with Senator Gillibrand and talk to you, General Guillot. First of all, though, let me ask a question. I guess this also came up under Senator Shaheen. With regard to Canada and their involvement and their role and their partnership, and I agree with everything that she asked and everything that you said. But one question that I've been thinking a lot about is one of the encouraging things in the new administration in Canada, I think, and I've met the Prime Minister on a couple of occasions, was is their commitment to put more of their own resources into their own defense, and he made the 2 percent pledge. But we've, you know, we've gotten kind of used to pledges that aren't fulfilled by certain countries. Is there evidence, pretty solid evidence, that they are acting on that commitment to get to 2 percent or greater in their defense budget?

Senator, like in our system, you know, it takes a while for the procurement and the and the employment, but everything I'm seeing at my level is full commitment to include exchanges with our F-35 base at Eielson, where we're bringing their pilots and maintainers in to learn how to operate fifth generation in the Arctic, air defense radar and satellite discussions. So everything I'm seeing at NORAD is full commitment and full eagerness to expand.

I appreciate that validation. It's my observation as well, but I don't see it as closely as you do, so that's very encouraging. So thank you for that, and I think it's important for us all to take note of that, that commitment. So with regard to the unauthorized incursions of UAS into particularly over our bases and the use of counter-UAS, one of the things to address that threat in my part of the world is, of course, that the ACC has named Grand Forks Air Force Base as their point defense as a point defense battle lab. In fact, I think I'm going out there in a couple of weeks to cut a ribbon on that. And the whole PDBL is ACC's designated organization to assume that, you know, the tactical, the experimental, training, just helping us to better inform policy as well as decisions on the spot. But I'd also just add to that that Colonel Roselle is at the 319th, the reconnaissance wing at Grand Forks, really is well-postured and able to leverage industry contacts over at Grand Sky, which is an enhanced use lease UAS park with big and small and innovative industries. Maybe you could just elaborate a little bit on the role of all of the above. It seems to me this is not just an all-of-government or an all-of-joint-force, but an all-of-innovation challenge that needs to be dealt with. Maybe you could give me, you know, your take on how you see it all coming together.

Yes, Senator, it's certainly a mission area that has expanded greatly over the last couple of years. Our command was named the department synchronizer with not only within our department but within the interagency. And then they also established JIATF 401, which has been a fantastic organization commanded by General Matt Ross, who has done a great job of getting with industry and bringing in a lot of the legislative requirements that combatant command is not equipped to address. So teaming with them and installations such as Grand Forks, we see we have and also, sir, with the with this body, your committee helped us last year with four authorities that we needed to ensure that we could effectively employ UASs to defend installations. And one of those was to allow us to exchange information with local and state capabilities with our department's capabilities on the base. And that has since been addressed, and I think it's just going to get stronger and stronger and more necessary to tie, instead of single-point counter-UAS capabilities, into a network that extends beyond bases and into cities and communities.

And does higher education play some role in some of the institutions that have those kind of capabilities, research capabilities?

I'm sorry, can you say?

Higher education.

Absolutely. We work with the University of Arizona, University of Texas El Paso, and many others that have great systems that use common off-the-shelf capabilities that we can spread very quickly.

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Cramer. Senator Kaine.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And General Donovan, the National Defense Strategy lists the Western Hemisphere as the most important region for national security. And I actually am very supportive of that recognition. I have some real concerns about the legality of the boat strikes in international waters and the legality of the Venezuela operation. And as you and I have talked before, I also worry about a U.S. posture that suggests that the attitude toward the region should be a kind of updating of the Monroe Doctrine because having lived in Latin America, that really lands badly in Latin America. It suggests the U.S. will be a dominator rather than a partner, and what nations want is a partner, not a dominator. But still, I think the escalation of the priority of the Western Hemisphere makes a lot of sense, and your discussion of things like this counter-cartel consortium that you're putting together, I mean, that's the kind of thing I think we should do more of. But here's a challenge. Every year, the SOUTHCOM posture hearing involves the COCOM saying they're under-resourced to do the more modest mission we've been expecting of them. And now the NDS suggests that the mission will become even more important. I think Senator Cotton, when I was at another hearing, asked you some resource questions. Let me ask a different question, which is about sort of the structure of the SOUTHCOM HQ and operation. Do you have the current structure that you need to take on effectively this mission of increasing importance?

Senator, thank you. No, we do not. And in 43 days, the strength, I knew it all along, the strength of SOUTHCOM is that partnership and in in the relationships throughout the region. I've found out a couple of things that right now currently because of over the years maybe how SOUTHCOM is viewed, some people say economy of force, whatever it was, we ended up with a one-third military, one-third GS, government service, one-third contractor headquarters. It's not sustainable. And so I think of almost like a two-layer cake now, Senator, that the base layer of theater security cooperation, we do some great things, and that's the that is really the strength that enables everything else. To be at that next level, and we're calling that kind of hemispheric approach to be able to partner better with NORTHCOM, that layer of the cake is not even existent. And so that's what we're working on right now. We want to make the base layer strong to do what it needs to do, but find the right balance of of people, the right talent to be able to actually function as a geographic combatant command and not at the low tactical level. We have elements that can do this, but actually the adjacents to be that good partner with the partners in the region. And then also, how do we actually compete for resources on an equal level to other geographic combatant commands? What I have found though, Senator, is that right now the budget resources comes from an executive agent, which is the United States Army because we live on an Army compound. So it's an interesting look at this, is that do I expect the Army then to fund campaigning in South America? They're not structured to do so. There's a mismatch here, Senator.

Well, you're 43 days in, so you're not at the end of this analysis and decision about what the right structure would be. But obviously, we want to be in dialogue with you so that the committee can do the right thing to elevate the importance of SOUTHCOM to where it needs to be given the NDS. A question about the boat strikes. I have reviewed the all the material available to Congress on each of the strikes current through last week, so there might have been one or two that I haven't looked at. And I would encourage my colleagues to do the same. The last time, though, that I got briefed about the targeting criteria, which was a classified briefing, was in December. Do you know whether the targeting criteria with respect to the boat strikes in international waters have changed or not since December?

Senator, I do not believe it's changed. It hasn't changed since I took over, but I haven't seen any changes since. We're still using the same process of near-certain, reasonable certainty, reasonable certainty, near-certainty to make the final decision.

Right. Well, I don't want to get into this more in open. I may ask another question in classified. General Guillot, you've been asked some questions, I think the chair asked you about JIATF 401, you were just engaging with with Senator Gillibrand on UAS issues, and we had a real good discussion about it. I think the JIATF 401, Matt Ross, I think it's now sort of in a good place that's giving the committee some confidence about it. However, the confidence that I have is about the aerial concern. I'm starting to get more and more worried about surface and marine uncrewed weapon systems that could do damage to ships and ports and other assets that we have. Talk a little bit about from the NORTHCOM space, what are you doing to make sure that we're really appropriately assessing and guarding against other uncrewed systems other than the aerial systems?

Senator, I share your concern, and I think General Ross would tell you that we look at unmanned systems as opposed to aerial more and more frequently. I really would like to learn from Admiral Cooper in CENTCOM and some of the work that he has done in his present position, but also in a previous position when he was the Fifth Fleet commander there, where he used unmanned detection systems and defensive systems in and around ports there in the Middle East. So I think you'll see that as becoming a an increasing focus of ours to the point where sometimes you don't say UAS anymore, you just talk about unmanned systems.

Yeah. Thanks so much. I yield back.

And thank you very much. Senator Banks.

General Guillot, can you talk more about what we want in Greenland? As I understand it, the the agreement is that the unofficial agreement is that we would have more troop presence, more bases, Golden Dome presence there, and then kick the Chinese out. I mean, is that is that accurate? What more do we want?

From from my perspective at NORAD and NORTHCOM, Senator, what I want is the resources and the force projection capability along that avenue of approach to North America, which, you know, through the Arctic is is our most the shortest route, so therefore in many ways our most vulnerable route. We're very well established in Canada and Alaska, and having more capability along what I call the 2 o'clock approach would be key. Space systems to enable Golden Dome, the ability to launch fighters and tankers to be the first line of defense against cruise missiles that could be launched from the Arctic. And then also having SOF and ports for SOF presence and then for regular activities, and then port presence for our Navy, which also gives us Golden Dome and ballistic missile defense capability.

Can you give us some context, though, on what what we have now and and what this agreement that President Trump is negotiating would would allow us to do that we can't do currently?

Yes, Senator. What we have now is access to Pituffik Air Base, which is at the northern part of Greenland, which gives us some of the fighter and tanker capability and a lot of space capability. But we don't have a permanent presence for the SOF, and then we don't have a permanent presence for some of the maritime capabilities that I need. And that's what we're working with Denmark to to get more access.

It sounds like Denmark and Greenland are willing to give us that.

They've been very, very supportive partners.

But there's been a lot of noise about this, a lot of politics about Greenland, but it sounds like these negotiations are productive and could lead to a place that would leave America better off.

Yes, sir, they're very productive, and the need there is very real.

Thank you. General Donovan, can you talk more about what some of us would call the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and what that means to the National Security Strategy and specifically, I'm curious, what does that mean to Cuba? I mean, what would happen if the Chinese were kicked out of Cuba? Would we be better off for that? Is that an accurate way to interpret the Trump corollary?

Senator, I'm not tracking a heavy presence of China in Cuba at this time. Our focus again remains on our core tasks of protecting the embassy and our operations in Gitmo, so I'm not tracking specifically China unless you have some of the smaller maybe intel collection type capabilities that we believe are there, but that's all I'm tracking this time.

Have there been public reports that there are Chinese intelligence facilities in Cuba?

Yes, there have been reports of that. And again, the collection at the local level.

And the department's 2025 China Military Power Report indicates that China has likely considered military basing, at least considered it in Cuba.

Yes, Senator, as you mentioned, the bigger concern is a collection capability that close to U.S. shores. That's my biggest concern. Not very robust, but still there.

So unpack for us what the National Security Strategy means then vis-a-vis Cuba.

With a focus on the Western Hemisphere, the reality is we have to ensure that those maligned actors, whether it's China or Russia or Iran, anywhere in South America, how are we countering them from different degrees of capabilities they bring? I think most of those would be economic and most of them would be partnerships to enable our partners to identify the threat. That's why maritime domain awareness becomes a big piece for us so that our partners can see over the horizon, whether that's seeing drug traffickers or seeing illicit PRC Chinese fishing fleets, both same-same so they can actually make better decisions and we're there as a better partner.

Would you say the National Security Strategy is a warning to China not to think about it, stay away or we'll do something about it?

Absolutely, Senator. Absolutely, Senator.

Good. I like that. China's nuclear-powered guided missile submarines threaten the U.S. homeland. How important is it that we detect those Chinese submarines before they enter U.S. waters? Good. I like that.

Senator, it's of the highest importance. And I have asked for and the Navy is certainly supportive of increased undersea detection capability, both the Atlantic and the Pacific, to ensure that we detect threats to our continent further and further away.

Thank you. I yield back.

Thank you, Senator Peters.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, the war with Iran has already led to state-sponsored cyberattacks here in the United States. In fact, a pro-Iranian hackers attacked a Michigan-based medical device company just recently, as I'm sure you're well aware of. But in addition to cyberattacks, I think it's certainly not unreasonable to assume that Iran is also working hard to initiate kinetic attacks here in the homeland as well. Obviously, your command, NORTHCOM, plays a critical role in deterring and preventing these kinds of kinetic and cyberattacks through your defensive operations, intelligence sharing, and integration with Cyber Command. But I just want to get your sense generally, given the setting that we're in right now, but generally, how do you assess this risk?

Senator, I think you described it very well, or I share the description that you gave, is that their cyber capability is real and it is significant and they have the ability to find what they think are the weakest points in our cyber defense, which unfortunately is some of the critical infrastructure that we have across the U.S. And I think that they're vulnerable to remain vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

So we have CISA and other groups associated with Homeland Security and others. Your relationship with them, I know you do cooperate on a regular basis, but we've also seen that about a third of the cyber professionals at CISA were basically removed from the department, kicked out or took RIFs, and they are not able to do what they were able to do in the past. Are you backfilling that or do we have actually an enhanced cyber vulnerability now?

Sir, I don't think that we have an enhanced vulnerability right now, but it does take strong cooperation between our command, Cyber Command, the FBI, and CISA to ensure that we share information on potential attacks and ensure that we're covered to the best degree possible.

But your command is on heightened alert for all of these?

Absolutely, yes, sir.

Good. There's been some discussion about Greenland by some of my colleagues. I was on a recent trip up there and we were at Pituffik, which is an incredible facility, completely dark when I was there, about 750 miles north of the Arctic Circle, but clearly an important strategic position for us there. Couple of things related to that trip. When we were there, the folks in Greenland were incredibly angry that the United States, the rhetoric coming from this administration was that they were either going to be purchased, which they were pretty clear to tell us that they cannot be bought, or they were going to have a military invasion. In fact, when I was there, they talked about a power outage that they had in Nuuk in the capital city there and everybody was in fear that this meant the Americans were invading. Children were highly distressed, they didn't go to school, which is pretty outrageous that an ally believes that when power goes out, that means U.S. troops are invading. It's a pretty horrible situation that we're in right now. Some of the comments that I heard from people were highly emotional and felt betrayed by the United States. So tell me what are you doing in your command to try to work with our ally and get past what was a pretty horrible situation for them? But you know, I've often found that I think it's true in life, if you breach someone's trust, it takes a lot of work to get that trust back. How are you going to get how are we or you in particular with your command, because I know you care a lot about Greenland, how are we going to regain this trust?

Senator, I try to maintain the trust that we've established with both Greenland through our military operations and with our partners in Denmark by being open and transparent and seeking new and improved ways to partner together. And we've done that even since your recent visit with Noble Defender, an exercise that had traditionally been only NORAD forces, we partnered with Denmark for the most recent Noble Defender. And then for our Arctic Edge exercise, also including Denmark, which is the military presence that Greenland has. So being open, transparent, and exploring opportunities where we can partner together is where I want to show that we are a valued partner and can be trusted, and I think that we've been very successful in that.

Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just briefly, certainly that is good. And what I talked to the military, especially the Danish military, that relationship is still there. That wasn't where the problem was. Where the problem is is with the people who are not part of the military. And I would just hope that as you continue these kinds of efforts as you just described, that it's actually communicated to the general populace of Greenland, because that's where the trust has been broken and where the work is really going to be necessary.

Yes, Senator.

Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Sullivan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you for your service and to your staff and team members, thank you as well. General Guillot, I want to appreciate the meeting in my office yesterday. I talk about this chart a lot. By the way, this chart's actually running out of room now. These are all the Russian and Chinese incursions into the Arctic, into the Alaska AOR that you and the INDOPACOM commander are both responsible for. The tempo, as I mentioned, is increased. We're out of room here. We've had two Russian Bear bomber incursions in the last three weeks. The last one in our response, which was NORAD, we launched nine assets: two F-16s, two F-35s, an AWACS, and I think four or five tankers. Now, you know, when these make the news, they never make the news down here, by the way. In Alaska, they make the news. You know, we say, oh, the Russians came into our airspace, we intercepted them. But these are highly complex, high-risk missions, dangerous. Our airmen, Guard, Reserve, active duty, they do a great job. But can you explain a little bit of the danger and complexity? I'll bring up a map here. You know, we're launching from JBER or Eielson. I mean, how far are our F-16s and F-35s flying just to intercept the Russians before they cross into our ADIZ?

Senator, you're absolutely right. The picture of our fighters next to their bombers looks very harmless and very easy, but especially from Alaska with the distances and the harsh environment make it very complex. When they get the alert klaxon to scramble from either Eielson or Elmendorf, they know that they're probably going to have to fly 1,500, 1,600 miles from the nearest suitable concrete to land if they have an emergency.

Just to intercept the Russians.

Just to intercept them.

Just to get that's only halfway through the mission, right? 1,500 miles.

Yeah, not even halfway, sir, because they'll intercept them, then they'll escort them for the duration of their period, then they have to fly back. So these missions are often six to eight hours in flight gear that has to accommodate if they eject and survive, and so they're in...

And it's 50 below zero in Alaska.

That's right. So the cockpits are comfortable, but they have to wear the gear in case they have to leave the cockpit in an ejection. These are some of the most challenging and really brave missions that we can do.

So I want to commend our Alaska-based military. They're doing a great job. How many tanker top-offs would a mission like that entail?

If they go to the extent of the Aleutians or up into on the north part of your map there, I would say a minimum of six air refuelings, often at night, in that cumbersome gear, which gives me just a second to point out that the tankers and the AWACS are also up there to make sure that we can complete the mission along with the fighters.

So couple other quick things. Thank you for that. And again, I want to thank them, our military. So let's say you're doing an intercept up here, Arctic Ocean. You're in an F-16, you lose an engine in February in the middle of night. How's that going to play out for that pilot? F-16s have one engine, right?

They have they're a single engine. If they have any engine indications, hopefully, I know they will be heading back over land so if they do have to eject, at least it's over land and not over the water. If the engine is still working, they're 1,500 miles or so from the nearest suitable runway at Eielson.

Let me ask a kind of combined question. I spoke to the Secretary of the Air Force, General Wilsbach, very recently. The Air Force has committed to me 10 years ago, 10 years ago, to get more KC-135s up to Eielson for this exact purpose, but other reasons. I think they're working it, but 10 years is a long, hell of a long time to wait for a commitment from the Air Force. I hope we get on it. But we also need more infrastructure, right? We're reopening the Navy base at Adak, we're building out a port in Nome finally, we're looking at Deadhorse up here, we're looking at King Salmon down here. Can you talk about both the need for tankers and expanded infrastructure that you're working on that can help make this mission more doable, more safe, and to give the power projection that we need to make sure that when the Russians and Chinese keep doing this, and all indications are they're going to keep doing it, that we have the ability to intercept them?

Yes, sir, we need the tankers, and I know the Air Force is working on that. That's the lifeline up there. All of the bases that you pointed out are extremely important for a couple reasons. One is resiliency, safety, as you mentioned, and then also it gives the President and the Secretary options if we do come into conflict, we have more avenues of approach that we can defend or project power from if necessary.

Well, I look forward to continuing to work with you on all these things. Thanks for your great service.

Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Is there objection to putting copies of these two posters in the record? So ordered. Senator Duckworth.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guillot, I wish I could ask you about the range of threats from adversaries that I know your team is battling every day, but instead, President Trump has forced us to again grapple with another possible unprecedented domestic misuse of our military. He seems to his seeming desire to send troops to polling places. In February, President Trump said, and I quote, "Republicans ought to nationalize the voting," end quote. And in late February, multiple media outlets reported that a draft executive order is being circulated that would use a claim of foreign interference as justification to declare a national emergency around our elections. Let me be clear: sending troops to polling places is illegal unless it is necessary to repel armed enemies of the United States. And we can't forget that U.S. Code also outlaws troops from intimidating any voter from fully exercising the right of suffrage at any general or special election. General Guillot, I appreciated your previously that you previously committed before this committee to establish guardrails within your authorities for domestically deployed troops, including by distinguishing between military and federal agents. If President Trump orders troops to American cities around the midterm elections, what guardrails will you commit to within your authorities to ensure that no voters feel intimidated by the presence of troops?

Senator, I very clearly understand the law there and the illegality of putting armed forces there unless, as you said, there is the exception for the armed rebellion. And so if given the order, I would look at it very closely and if it did not meet what I felt were, you know, the legal hurdles, I would consult with my JAG and then I would bring up that concern with the secretary and the chairman to ensure that I could stay on the right side of the law.

Thank you. If you're ordered to deploy troops to provide logistical support to federal agents around the election, would you see any reason for having troops in full battle dress, body armor, carrying their weapons and ammunition if it's for logistical support?

Senator, logistical support is not one of the exceptions, so no, I would not see any reason to use armed and uniformed members around a polling place for logistics.

Thank you. Would you be advised that they not be allowed around a certain radius of polling places?

Senator, I don't think that's defined, but I don't think they should be anywhere near there where we would give the perception that we're trying to operate illegally.

Thank you. Misusing troops on the election is just another way that this administration is shifting the burden of legal liability onto service members. This is my concern because the statutes specify that any member of the Armed Forces who deploys to polling places or intimidates voters could be imprisoned or disqualified from office. As we saw during the December hearing on domestic deployments that I secured, this administration is comfortable thrusting our service members into legally ambiguous situations and leaving them to hang out to dry without legal protection. We know that President Trump, who grandstands at rallies that he's all about warfighters, is actually the fastest to betray them. As a guardsman, or as a former guardsman, it's always going to be in my heart, this is serious to me. We saw the toll Trump's misadventure last year deploying troops to American cities took on my fellow guardsmen and on their communities that we call home. Taxpayers had to pay $21 million for President Trump's decision to federalize 500 guardsmen in Illinois alone, troops who, despite his claims that they reduced crime in Chicago, never actually set foot in Chicago. They sat around training sites for three months away from their families and civilian careers because the courts found the deployments illegal within the first 24 hours, and yet he kept them there for another three months through the Christmas holidays. And now he might once again pull our military away from their daily lives to police Americans, this time to intimidate voters with no basis in facts, no basis in law, and at the expense of millions of taxpayer dollars. I'd like to use my remaining time to turn to operations in SOUTHCOM, another arena of concerning misuse of force by this administration. General Donovan, in our private conversations prior to your confirmation, I expressed my concern about this administration's targeting decisions and what you might be asked to do once you are in leadership of SOUTHCOM. Now that you're in the seat, I want to follow up on our conversation. What guidance have you received or issued for how to treat associates of a group differently from a confirmed direct member of a group?

Senator, thank you. In associates, affiliates, I think is the term we're using now, is that the same term, Senator?

Well, the administration in their legal justifications are calling these folks associates, but it's different from being a confirmed direct member of a group.

We have a definition of affiliates tied to that classified definition in a closed session, I would like to share word for word what that definition is, Senator.

Okay. But this is about the term associate, which is what the administration has used. I'm concerned about the looseness of the term that SOUTHCOM has been using to publicly report an individual we killed, specifically affiliate or associate. Those are the two words that were used, which implies an even weaker association with any concerning threat. To be clear, striking people in the Caribbean Sea under weak justification is not only disturbing, it is illegal. This campaign has not been authorized by Congress. So despite what this administration may say or want to believe, this is not a global war on terror when the American people authorized the use of force through their congressional representative after attacks on September 11. This is a different situation entirely, one in which the administration is risking American troops and innocent civilians at the expense of American taxpayers with no transparency or rational justification. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator Schmitt, you are recognized and you temporarily have the gavel.

Wow. Big promotion there. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Donovan, I wanted to ask you, the PRC is dramatically sort of increased their footprint by way of infrastructure, ports, including I think one of the largest distant water fishing fleets in the world. But in your view, well, in the 2025 National Security Strategy, it declares that we're going to deny non-hemispheric competitors the ability to own or control significant vital assets in our hemisphere. What are some of those assets that are of concern?

Senator, thank you. The primary asset I'm concerned about is the Panama Canal. It's to maintain the Panama Canal open for free flow of commerce, but with the true focus of ensuring that we can flow forces, U.S. forces, east to west through the Panama Canal. Further south in the Southern Cone, you have other mineral assets we're concerned with. I'm concerned about an undersea cable coming into Chile that the PRC are tied to and otherwise the dual-use nature of almost everything they install in our region.

I think it's encouraging that Panama acted on this. It doesn't feel like a one and done kind of thing, though. So what's kind of on the horizon that we have to be mindful of?

Senator, thank you for...

With regard to the Panama Canal specifically.

Well, thank you for highlighting. President Mulino, a great partner. The fact that we are holding the PANAMAX, our SOUTHCOM's largest exercise, the first time in 14 years in Panama. There's 24 other nations coming. So they're becoming not only holding the Chinese at bay, they've also become key partners in the region. And we believe that, you know, things like the jungle training operation school, those are core not only to increase our capabilities as U.S. service members, but also to bring other partners together to develop those relationships. And Senator, what I've also realized in these first 43 days, that same environment that these cartels thrive in, that they look to create those anarchic situations that they can flourish in, the PRC are right there with them. The Chinese are right in those same areas, countering local government, and then the Chinese can move in very quickly and build the cheap school, the cheap soccer stadium, or the cheap road and gain influence. And I think the more we work with these partners, exercise like PANAMAX where we show that we're good partners and teammates and use some of the other tools we have, the Economic Defense Unit, Office of Strategic Capital, we're introducing new tools to counter the PRC influence in the region.

And it feels like post the Maduro, it feels like that a lot of folks are coming our way, right, in that part of the world? More sort of Latin American governments and friends are becoming better friends and people who were maybe not so outwardly favorable to us have sort of come our way. Is that your assessment?

Senator, maybe you've heard of the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition. It started as a conference in our headquarters led by the secretary about two weeks ago. They signed a document that we now have a coalition that will have a military aspect to it, and when I say military, it's really it's partners that are willing to join with us to move forward on the against the cartels with different degrees based on what they can bring. But a pretty positive and you can sense that folks want to get at this problem set. Thank you.

General Guillot, I wanted to ask you for counter-UAS threats that are the threats that are out there and sort of counter-UAS. Missouri is home to Whiteman Air Force Base, obviously. How are you assessing the threat level to military installations that are out there right now and how far along are we in countering that?

Senator, we've seen an increase from last year in the number of detections over military installations over the course of the year. Some of that might be due to the fact that we have more detection capability now than we did in the past. And then our ability to defeat them has improved, whereas a year ago almost every one that was detected was not defeated, now about a quarter of the ones that we detect we're able to defeat. I pay particular attention to Whiteman and other strategic bases, whether submarine, silos, or aircraft, and work very closely with Admiral Correll at STRATCOM to make sure that either through the services or through our own capabilities at NORTHCOM, we are protecting those vital locations from UASs.

You could put me in the category of somebody that's very supportive of our efforts to increase our presence, our footprint in Greenland. I think it's vital for a bunch of different reasons. What are sort of the what are the designs that we might have for expansion given the strategic importance that it has? Where do you see that right now and why is that important?

Senator, it is extremely important strategically and operationally for our command. We're very supportive of expanding access to and cooperation with Greenland and Denmark. I have a strong relationship with the Danish CHOD and we're working together to bring more capability there. What I'd like to see added to what we have now, which is primarily space and initial fighter and tanker response, is more locations where we can do special operations and more access in the maritime domain to to build up our defense defense of approaches from that northeast approach to North America. Thank you, General. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Schmitt. Senator Rosen.

Well, thank you, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed for holding this hearing, and I'd really like to thank General Guillot and General Donovan not just for testifying today, but for your lifetime of service to the nation. Thank you. I want to start with you, General Guillot, about defense of critical infrastructure because defending critical infrastructure in the homeland from cyber attacks involves multiple federal entities, as we know. Civilian agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, have primary responsibility for working with the infrastructure owners, while the Department of Defense brings unique capabilities in cyber operations and homeland defense. Countries such as China and Russia have demonstrated sophisticated cyber operations that could potentially disrupt power, transportation, or communications networks inside the United States. So can you speak to how, excuse me, Northern Command fits into that framework and specifically what role does NORTHCOM play in supporting the defense of critical infrastructure against cyber threats? How do you coordinate these responsibilities with other agencies? Excuse me.

Senator, defense of critical infrastructure happens to be one of the three or four main goals for our headquarters this year to improve our capability for all the reasons that you mentioned. Starting with the cyber, we have a very strong working relationship with first Cyber Command, with CISA, and with the FBI to make sure that it's a seamless defense of of our networks, not only within our own department, but as it goes out into critical infrastructure and the defense industrial base, because we need all of those entities to be free from cyber threats for us to be successful militarily in defending the homeland. So we have a very strong relationship and then we work and exercise and tabletop exercise with them to make sure that on the cyber front that we're unified and very sharing of all information that we have. I think the defense in industrial, excuse me, the critical defense critical infrastructure faces more threats than just cyber. There's certainly physical threats that they have. And in that regard, working very closely with the National Guard from each state where they recently had their TAG conference in Colorado where we hosted that, and then we made a pact this year to work with each state to see what critical infrastructure they felt that they would protect and then what they might need from Title 10 forces to augment that to make sure that we had a seamless protection of defense critical infrastructure in the physical domain as well as in the cyber domain.

Thank you. In Nevada, we have lots of critical infrastructure, Hoover Dam and others. So thank you for that. General Donovan, I want to move to you and talk about Guantanamo Bay because with the use of our naval base at Guantanamo Bay to house undocumented individuals detained in the United States, I have concerns about the delineation between the responsibilities of DOD and ICE and whether the military was ever made whole after having to foot the bill for Department of Homeland Security carrying out its mission. So General Donovan, for those who are deported now being held at Guantanamo, excuse me, are military personnel charged with guarding, caring, and feeding them? If so, who's paying for it? And what is the division of responsibilities between DOD and ICE there?

Senator, SOUTHCOM's job is to ensure safety, care, and humane treatment of those IAs at that facility at Gitmo. Currently, those all costs associated that go through the services, not directly to SOUTHCOM, so I'd have to defer that to the service or the comptroller.

Well, can you tell me that do you have plans to hold people at Gitmo for years if they can't be returned to their country of origin? And again, what about your manpower if you do that, resources? Are you going to be coming to us for that? Can you speak to that at all, please?

Again, Senator, those are decisions that would be at DHS and above the Secretary. So we'll just continue to carry out our responsibility to provide security for that actual campus itself.

Thank you. I'm going to build a little bit, General Guillot, on Senator Duckworth's remarks about DOD deployment to American cities and I'm just concerned that our guardsmen, our guardsmen are going to be placed in dangerous situations deployed to patrol American cities where they're working in close proximity to ICE and involved in sensitive community interactions. So what guidance has been provided to our guardsmen in order to avoid eroding trust in diverse communities where they're patrolling, and what is the division of missions responsibility between DOD and ICE as it refers to our National Guard?

Senator, at this time, there are no guard forces under my command in any of the cities that you mentioned. But in the past, as you know, we did have some under Title 10 authorities, and the first thing that they are briefed when they come under Title 10 is not so much what they can do, but what they cannot do. And that is they cannot execute any law enforcement activities, even if they're perhaps policemen in their civilian job or if they're military policemen in their guard unit. If they're under Title 10 authority, due to the Posse Comitatus Act, they are not allowed to execute any law enforcement activities, and that's the first level of briefing that we gave in the past when we had forces assigned to us. But at this time, all of the guard forces that are operating in various cities, they're not under Title 10, so therefore they're not under my authority.

Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Warren.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. President Trump and Secretary Hegseth are repeatedly dragging the U.S. military across both legal and moral lines. Trump and Hegseth have plunged us into an illegal war with Iran where a U.S. airstrike appears to have killed 150 schoolchildren. And it's not just in Iran. Under Trump and Hegseth, the military fired on civilians and shipwreck survivors in the Caribbean, and now Secretary Hegseth is threatening to give quote, no quarter, to adversaries. This is not who we are. Our enemies might not care about civilian casualties, but the U.S. military always, always has. And that is why Secretary Hegseth's attacks on the guardrails that prevent civilian harm and civilian casualties is so dangerous. So take the JAGs. Now more than ever, we need strong, independent military lawyers. But there are serious concerns that JAGs cannot give honest legal advice right now. So General Guillot, let me ask you, have you seen any evidence of the JAG Corps being sidelined, whether at NORTHCOM or elsewhere in the department?

Senator, I have not seen any evidence of the JAGs being sidelined in our command. I will point out that our JAG is included in all of our battle rhythm meetings, and in fact, our JAG is sitting behind me right now.

Yeah, and I just want you to know, I'm glad to hear that. Glad to hear it's not happening in your command. But we know that this is a problem across the department. Secretary Hegseth fired TJAGs because he thought they were quote, roadblocks, and he installed his personal lawyer to retrain military lawyers to water down constraints. He reassigned hundreds of JAGs to work on Trump's radical immigration agenda, and last week the Secretary said he's starting a quote, ruthless overhaul, of the JAG system. Look, for decades, military lawyers have worked side by side with officers to make sure that strikes are lawful and that they minimize civilian casualties. That doesn't make us weaker. It saves innocent lives and it prevents fueling terrorism. But Secretary Hegseth has blamed JAGs for what he calls quote, stupid rules of engagement. So General Donovan, let me ask you, if a JAG or a civilian harm advisor says to distinguish between a military base and an elementary school in an airstrike, is that a stupid rule of engagement?

No, Senator.

Yeah. Look, JAGs can't give their best advice if they fear losing their job just for raising legal concerns with an operation. One way we protect the integrity of legal advice in our military is by creating for-cause removal protections for our JAGs. Commanders also need to be able to speak up when they're being asked to break the law. General Donovan, your predecessor was reportedly ousted because he raised concerns about the legality of the Caribbean boat strikes. Will you commit to informing this committee if SOUTHCOM is directed to do something that you or your JAG thinks may be illegal?

Senator, my first obligation if I face what I believe is an unlawful or illegal order is to obviously seek legal counsel, discuss that with my higher headquarters, and then and then move forward and not carry out an illegal order.

Yeah, I maybe you didn't hear my question. My question was will you commit to informing this committee if SOUTHCOM is directed to do something that you or your JAG thinks is illegal?

If I reported that to this committee, Senator, it'd be through my chain of command.

But you would make sure that we got the information?

I would report to my chain of command.

And you will not take any responsibility for making sure we got that information? You do realize we have oversight responsibilities here?

Senator, I would work that information through my chain of command.

All right, that's a very concerning answer here. Look, what's happening right now is very dangerous. We need our nonpartisan military leaders to double down on their commitment to following the law and speaking up when they are asked to break it. And Congress needs to be able to step in and rein in this lawless commander in chief and his self-styled Secretary of War. Thank you.

I think we have another series of questions by Senator Reed.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have one question. General Donovan, you noted twice that you reviewed every single EXORD or EXORD related to the boat strikes. Just to confirm, it was important to you to your understanding and oversight of these strikes to review these EXORD documents all, is that correct?

Yes, Senator.

Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to reiterate that there is a legal requirement for the department to provide those EXORDs to the committee, which you and I have requested multiple times to include letters to the Secretary of Defense. Section 1744 of the FY20 NDAA requires DOD to provide the EXORDs at the request of the committee, but in FY25, Section 1067, it requires DOD to provide copy of any new or revised EXORDs within 15 days, so there's no requirement for request. The Secretary has not fulfilled this legal requirement, and your testimony, General Donovan, further confirms in my mind that we need these documents to understand and oversee, that's our role, oversee these operations. I just for the record want to make that very clear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Reed. If there's nothing further, let's let's reconvene at at 12:00 at 12:10 in the SCIF. Will that be all right, gentlemen?

Yes, Senator.

And we are recessed until then.

Thank you both. My time has expired.

Thank you, Senator Warren. That concludes our open session. We will now adjourn and move to SVC-217 for our closed session. The committee stands adjourned.