Hearings to examine the posture of United States European Command and United States Transportation

...approximately 80,000 military personnel in the U.S. European Command, EUCOM. He also serves as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, making him the military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, NATO, the world's only nuclear alliance. General Grynkewich comes before this committee at a time of great turmoil. The United States is engaged in a high-intensity conflict in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Ukraine's self-defense against the Russian invasion. EUCOM is involved in both efforts. The command provides extensive operational and logistics support to Operation Epic Fury. At the same time, it facilitates the flow of weapons and intelligence to Ukraine. And of course, our forces in Europe remain at the ready to deter and defend against Russian aggression. Our European allies provide access, basing, and overflight rights to our forces. This creates enormous military advantages for the United States. Our presence in Europe enables us to project power into adjacent theaters, most obviously into the Middle East, but also to Africa and now the Arctic. Our European allies are rightly increasing their defense spending. But we must recognize that they are sharing the political and military risk of war too, and that is every bit as important to U.S. interest. So this is a welcome development. Defending against armed aggression from Russia remains the most compelling rationale for the NATO alliance. Russia is led by Vladimir Putin, a war criminal and ruthless murderer and dictator. He possesses the world's largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal, and he always cheats on his arms control commitments. In Putin's twisted view of the world, Russia is the victim of historical injustices. He has proven willing to take on extreme risks to redress these perceived historical injustices against Russia, most notably by launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an entirely a war of choice. Some have proposed a precipitate reduction in U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Such an action, which some have entitled NATO 3.0, would have us take an unnecessary vulnerability on at a precarious moment. Putin could easily interpret that action as weakness rather than resolve. During the Cold War, we shared the burden of conventional defense in Europe precisely because it was in America's interest to do so. This remains the case today. Europe has heeded President Trump's call to step up on defense spending. We now need to ensure that political will is turned into hard combat capability as soon as possible. Mr. Putin has a predilection for war and aggression. That is a fact, and it led this committee to place a floor on the U.S. military's force posture in Europe, particularly the Army ground maneuver forces. Mr. Putin's aggression has caused us to make that decision. We took that step in the National Defense Authorization Act that became law in December, a bipartisan achievement. The law reflects our collective judgment that now is not the time to accept unnecessary risks in Europe. The best way to reduce the need for defense in Europe is to degrade the threat posed by Russia's military. Ukraine is doing exactly that. Its success in defending against Russia reflects Ukraine's resolve and ability to innovate during wartime. We should support these efforts. We should immediately begin a crash program to take advantage of new production lines here in America, building new low-cost weapons to help the Ukrainians defend themselves. This includes low-cost cruise missiles, which we can build thousands of every year, and it includes new, more easily producible air defense interceptors. While General Grynkewich is focused on the European theater, General Reed supports the global joint force. TRANSCOM's expertise and precision allows the joint force to extend its reach far beyond the safety of friendly confines. Whether supporting Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Resolve, or the hundreds of regular refueling and sealift missions required by other combatant commands. When most Americans think of the military, they imagine airplanes, warships, and big guns. Correctly, I might add. What they do not see is the system that moves all these pieces around the globe. A worldwide network of American logistic assets keeps our far-flung bases ready for action. We are the world's best military in part because TRANSCOM runs this complex system. China and Russia know this. These adversaries are not simply modernizing their armed forces, they are intentionally targeting our global logistics network to prevent us from operating around the world. Congress recognizes this danger. The Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, again, which was signed, which was passed on a bipartisan basis and signed by the President of the United States last December, elevated contested logistics management to a senior leader responsibility. We charged the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Vice Chief of the Joint Staff, and the Commander of TRANSCOM to work together to integrate contested logistics across the joint force. This statutory direction makes explicit what the battlefield has already proven: contested logistics is not owned by any single command or service. As I've outlined, these witnesses come before the committee at an important moment for American national security. I thank them for appearing today, and I look forward to our conversation. With that, I turn to my colleague, Ranking Member Reed.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome General Grynkewich and General Reed. Thank you for appearing today. Thank you for your service to the nation and to those who you command, our warmest thanks and appreciation. Both European Command and Transportation Command are deeply engaged in supporting the ongoing conflict with Iran. From enabling combat operations to moving personnel, equipment, weapons, and medical support across continents, EUCOM and TRANSCOM are playing critical roles in sustaining the United States military effort. This conflict is a reminder that modern warfare requires the full integration of every element of American military power, from operational forces, logistical networks, allied basing access, and the strategic mobility that connects them all. General Grynkewich, the convergence of interest among potential adversaries like Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea is of great concern to this committee. There is a recent development that deserves scrutiny. Media outlets report last week that Russia has been providing Iran with the locations of U.S. military personnel and assets for targeting in the Middle East. I'm deeply concerned about this development, especially because the White House has sought to downplay it and Secretary of Defense has said that he is, quote, "not concerned." If this reporting is true, it must be addressed with resolute and vocal condemnation by America's leaders. Our service members deserve nothing less. For more than three years, EUCOM has been the backbone of the international effort to support Ukraine in the war of survival against Russia. EUCOM has enabled the Ukrainians to defeat their and defend, defeat the Russians and defend their sovereignty, while sending an unmistakable message to America's adversaries about the strength of the NATO alliance and the resolve of the United States and its partners. The operational picture today remains difficult. Neither side has been able to secure a decisive advantage on the battlefield, but Ukrainian forces continue to battle bravely and the Ukrainian people remain steadfast in their resolve. At the same time, the broader strategic context in Europe is evolving. The Trump administration's new National Defense Strategy outlines a significant shift in how the United States views its role in the European AOR. The administration has argued for a significant reduction in American military engagement in Europe and for European allies to assume a much larger share of NATO's conventional defense responsibilities. Strengthening Europe's own defense capabilities is an important and necessary goal, which, it should be noted, our European partners are already making impressive strides. But any significant shifts in the capabilities or capacity of the United States will offer to the NATO alliance must be carefully assessed and closely coordinated with our allies. Anything less than close coordination could create unnecessary gaps and increase risk during a period of significant geopolitical tension. I worry that the administration is singularly focused on the speed of transition and not the strategic implications of getting it wrong. General Grynkewich, I would ask for your perspective on this. Is it your expectation that Europe could assume the majority of NATO's conventional defense burden by the end of this decade, and what risks do you foresee in accelerating such a transition before our allies may be fully constituted to do that? General Reed, TRANSCOM is vital to the ongoing operations in Iran. The success of any military campaign ultimately depends on the ability to move forces, equipment, and supplies across the globe at speed and scale. From strategic airlift and sealift to aerial refueling and the movement of munitions between theaters, your command is the logistical network that allows the United States military to operate worldwide. I would appreciate an update on the demands these current operations are placing on TRANSCOM and your assessment of the command's readiness to sustain them while maintaining the capacity to respond to crises in other theaters. Looking further ahead, one of the most important challenges facing the Department of Defense is the problem of contested logistics. For decades, American military operations have benefited from secure sea and air lines of communication. However, we have reached a point where potential adversaries will likely target the logistics network that underpin U.S. military power. These threats could include attacks against forward bases, aircraft and ships that resupply those bases, cyberattacks on the information technology systems that manage deployments, and even kinetic strikes against ports and airfields in the United States and abroad. General Reed, these vulnerabilities raise difficult questions about the survivability and resilience of the logistics systems on which our military depends. I would like an update on your command's efforts to address the contested logistics problem. In particular, how are you working with the military services to ensure that future logistics platforms and operational concepts are better suited to operate in a contested environment? Gentlemen, thank you again for your leadership and for the service of the men and women under your command. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Reed, and also thank you for giving them a preview of the questions you're going to ask. Who'd like to go first? General Grynkewich, would you like to go first? You are recognized for your opening statement.

Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed and distinguished members of the committee, it's an honor to be here today representing the men and women of US European Command. And I'm also grateful to have Command Sergeant Major T.J. Holland, our command senior enlisted leader, joining me today. It is also a privilege to be here with my good friend, General Randall Reed. Throughout my career, I've seen firsthand the extraordinary capability US Transportation Command delivers across our joint force. I'd like to begin by thanking this committee and Congress for your steadfast support to the warfighters and missions of US European Command. The United States faces a complex and evolving global security environment. Growing cooperation between Russia, North Korea, Iran, and the People's Republic of China has increased military risk across multiple theaters and domains. In Europe, North Korean troops and materiel, Iranian drone technology, and Chinese economic support enable Moscow to sustain its war in Ukraine. I have been privileged to be part of the negotiations working to fulfill the President's goal of a lasting peace, but in the meantime, this brutal war continues, recently starting its fifth year as both sides trade human life for time and territory. And despite significant losses in Ukraine, Russia retains the capability and capacity to threaten US interests with its large and increasingly diverse nuclear stockpile, asymmetric capabilities, and competent ground, air, and maritime forces. Given this environment, US European Command is focused on three priority missions. The first of these is protecting the US homeland. To do this, US European Command works closely with NORAD and US Northern Command to monitor and secure the strategic approaches to North America. Allies help with this by sharing intelligence, strengthening our early warning, and enhancing our ability to respond to potential threats. In the North Atlantic and in the Arctic, they help us monitor Russian and Chinese activity, including subs and long-range bomber patrols. Together we ensure these capabilities are unable to threaten the US or our interests in this hemisphere. Our second mission is to serve as a platform for projecting US combat power both in and beyond Europe. Our forces, bases, and infrastructure take advantage of the continent's strategic geography and allow the United States to rapidly move forces, sustain operations, and provide the President with diverse military options across multiple theaters. In the past year alone, US European Command increased pressure on the shadow fleet with the seizure of MV Bella, enabled strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities during Midnight Hammer, and facilitated strikes on ISIS-affiliated terror groups in Africa. This mission continues today with support to Operation Epic Fury in Iran. Our third mission area is positioning the NATO alliance to deter and defend. Given the possibility of simultaneous conflict in multiple theaters, a strong NATO allows the United States to redirect focus while still protecting our European interests. This requires allies to step up, and they're doing just that. Allies are increasing defense spending and building their readiness to assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe. This shift requires continued investment in a robust and resilient defense industrial base that can deliver the required military capabilities at scale. As the character of war continues to evolve, US European Command is working directly with NATO allies, industry, and the joint force to capture the lessons of contemporary conflicts. We're committed to ensuring NATO remains the most capable military alliance in history and to protecting our interests at home and abroad. Chairman Wicker and Ranking Member Reed and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your unwavering support to our warfighters and our mission. It's an honor to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much, General. General Reed, you're recognized.

Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee. Today I am joined by my wonderful bride, Lynn, and our senior enlisted leader, Chief Master Sergeant Brian Krzelnick. Together we represent the men, women, and families of United States Transportation Command. I am also privileged to serve and testify along alongside my longtime friend, General Grynkewich. Thank you, Grynch, for your leadership. As the champions of global logistics, USTRANSCOM is a total force team of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, coast guardsmen, civilians, and merchant mariners. Your unwavering support of these experts and the missions they fulfill daily allows the warfighter to thrive. I must highlight our most unique experts, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. This subordinate command is your first responder in a global crisis, the joint force's 911. They rapidly deploy planners, communicators, and command and control specialists that activate a joint task force headquarters and set the conditions for success. USTRANSCOM has three military service components. The Air Force's Air Mobility Command delivers rapid global airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation with speed and reach to provide immediate response. The Navy's Military Sealift Command delivers the mass of our combat power through the decisive strength of sealift sustainment. The Army Transportation Command is the critical link deploying the joint force from our forts to our strategic seaports, connecting the homeland to the global fight and operating critical ports worldwide. Completing the USTRANSCOM team is our fourth component, our commercial partners. Commercial airlines, trucking companies, rail operators, and ocean shipping companies move our service members and cargo anywhere, anytime. These industry leaders and partners offer expertise, capacity, and networks required for mission success. USTRANSCOM is the heart of a larger team, the Global Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, or the JDDE. Together, the military, commercial industry, allies, and partners form a network with a single mission: to deliver power and presence at the time and place of our choosing. We know the strategic environment continues to transform. Our competitors train to contest our every move and turn logistics into a primary battlespace. We acknowledge the challenge. This is precisely why we exist. USTRANSCOM specializes in winning the fight to get to the fight. Therefore, there should be no surprise that our priority remains keeping power projection as the joint force's decisive strategic advantage. First, we champion the American warfighter starting here in our homeland. The journey to the fight begins not on the battlefield, but on the nation's highways, railways, and commercial seaports. Your interest in securing and modernizing this fort-to-port network is a direct investment in the ability to project power. The resilience of this civilian infrastructure, the bedrock of the domestic supply chain, allows TRANSCOM forces to deploy and win. Second, your continued partnership helps forge the future of maritime dominance. By recapitalizing strategic sealift, America will deliver overwhelming combat power to any shore for the next 50 years. We must continue this vital work and champions the mariners who form the backbone of our fleet and underwrite our national security. We support the maritime policies including Maritime Security Program, Tanker Security Program, Cable Security Program, the Jones Act, and cargo preference laws. Together, these programs secure US-flagged vessels and the merchant mariners necessary to move sensitive defense materiel in emergency. Third, your support guarantees our air mobility fleet remains a dominant projection force, the ultimate display of American resolve. Through our global reach, we unleash the power of presence, reassuring allies and deterring adversaries. Continued modernization and recapitalization secures this advantage for the next generation of warfighters. Finally, we are transforming all mobility operation platforms into a survivable, connected node within the warfighting network as tankers and cargo planes link to battlespace awareness. They become the eyes and ears of our commanders as they drive toward mission success. Your support makes our forces more resilient. We are grateful for air fleet investments because connectivity creates survivability. Distinguished members, your leadership positions USTRANSCOM to overcome any challenge. Together, we send the message that America's logistic outreach is unmatched, our resolve is unbreakable, we are ready, united, and decisive, and that together we will always deliver. Thank you for the opportunity to represent USTRANSCOM and to answer your questions.

Well, thank you both for your service. General G, I'm going to ask you to pronounce your name.

Senator, it's Grynkewich.

Okay, with the wich. Okay, very good. Well, let me just ask you brief to answer a few questions briefly and then I'll let you elaborate. Do you agree that Russian the Russian military's lack of tactical skill has been exposed in the war in Ukraine?

Senator, Russia invaded Ukraine thinking it would be a two-week war, and as I heard a friend say recently, the hardest part of a short two-week war is the first couple of years, and I think Putin has learned that because of the problems he's had with fielding a modern and effective force.

In spite of that, do you agree that Russia has maintained the ability to wage war and continues to threaten our treaty allies in Europe?

I do, Senator.

And do and clearly you've already said that Russia stated Russia has demonstrated its its ability to sustain high-intensity war for over four years. And I guess it's fair to say also that the public somehow over there is willing to suffer suffer deprivation in pursuit of return to what they feel is Russian greatness. You agree with that statement?

Senator, I do. I'd just say that, you know, Putin as an autocrat is able to control the information environment in Russia, so the Russian people are probably not hearing all of the trials and tribulations that their forces are facing or understanding the the high casualty rates of the Russian forces.

And I guess it would be fair to say the elite in Russia are not feeling all of the negative effects that the general populace is feeling.

I assess as correct, Senator.

Okay. NATO Secretary General and the German Chancellor have both publicly stated that Russia, once the war is over, will again pose a dire threat to Europe by the end of a decade. Do you agree with that and I'll let you elaborate if you'd like.

Senator, thank you. You know, in Ukraine today, Russia has well over 500,000 troops, and so should the war in Ukraine end, which we all hope it does, we will have to see the contours of the agreement and then monitor Russian behavior to see what their intentions are. But from a purely military perspective, when 500,000 battle-hardened Russian troops are repositioned to other areas, we'll have to pay attention to that as a potential military threat and be cognizant of what it could pose to the alliance.

Okay. We're delighted to see our European allies agree to the five percent and to do their fair share of their part of the burden sharing. How long do you think it's going to take for our European friends once they've enacted this five percent to build the capabilities and force structure needed to actually assume the lead role in the conventional defense of Europe?

Chairman, thank you. I agree with you that the agreement made at the Hague summit to spend five percent of military spending is a tremendous accomplishment, and it shows how seriously the Europeans are taking their own security. Many nations are already on a pathway with five or six nations this year already near or above five percent of GDP. The biggest risk for those countries is now turning that money into actual military capability in their inventory, and that does take an industrial base that can deliver on time. So I see that as the biggest risk to them being able to achieve this on a quick timeline. So, you know, from my perspective, I think we're looking at, you know, different capabilities will show up at different times. It will be a gradual slope that will increase in the the pace of European rearmament as the defense industrial base gets healthy. So I think you'll see it start slowly and then as the industrial base investments take off, they'll be able to rearm quickly. So I would say by the end of this decade, they will have made great progress toward that. They won't be all the way there, but certainly by 2035 they will be.

Okay. So about 2030, they will have made great progress, but they won't be there. By 2035, if their commitment continues, they should be able to be in the leadership position on that.

Yes, Senator, I believe that's correct.

Thank you very much. Senator Reed.

Oh, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. General Reed, you have been quoted as saying that we must start a new program to modernize our strategic airlift, the C-5 and the C-17. I know you can't disclose details of the forthcoming budget proposals, but are you confident that we'll begin that process of modernization this year? Senator, thank you for the question. Strategic airlift is one of the most critical capabilities that we provide. It's what we call the immediate force when our nation needs to respond right away. That's how we get the force quickly projected out of the country and to the point of point of need. The challenge here is that for the capabilities that we need in those aircraft, it takes a long lead time to design and actually deliver the aircraft. C-5s and C-17s are capable today. Thank you for the investment for the upkeep, but the time is past now to start on the development of the next platform. In that platform, not only will it have to be able to do the things of the C-5 and the C-17 today, but we are also going to make sure that we have secure communications, that the platform will have the awareness of the space around it for the crews to be aware of what's going on around them, and at the same time it needs to be as survivable as we can create. Thank you. Thank you. General Grynkewich, one of the unexpected beneficiaries of our operations in Iran has been Russia. The price of gas has increased dramatically, which benefits their economy at a point where their economy was suffering after multiple years of warfare. We've in fact lifted sanctions on the delivery of their oil with India and other countries. We are now in a position where we must send missiles, particularly Patriot, to the Gulf area to replenish our supplies rather than to provide them to Ukrainians. This all seems to be a situation where Putin is benefiting dramatically. Is that your perception, that this has unexpectedly or unintentionally given him a significant increase in staying power?

Senator, a couple of thoughts on this. First, I'm very proud of the role that European Command is playing to support Operation Epic Fury, and our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and guardians have been operating at a high tempo in the Eastern Med and elsewhere, defending alliance territory and defending our forces and projecting power into U.S. Central Command. As you noted, the price of oil and gas has gone up. We know that Putin does depend on that. I think how much he benefits from it depends on how long those prices remain elevated. I know the leadership of the department is watching this very closely. I know the President's watching this very closely, and that they're certainly concerned about the prices that are out there. So I guess, on the munitions front, what I would say on that is we do continue to flow munitions into Ukraine. I could get into some of the specifics on implications in the classified session later today, but I assure you that support continues.

Should we increase our security assistance to Ukraine given the at least momentary strengthening of Russia's economy and Russia's capabilities?

Senator, I think the there are always global tradeoffs with the amount of security assistance that we can provide. So ultimately it's a policy question on what the level of support should be. I am in constant contact with the Ukrainians, though, and they do tell me where they see opportunities. I am validating and looking at those opportunities that they're providing to us and the weapons that they're requesting, and then providing my recommendations to the department on what we could provide them to help them exploit certain situations. I'd be happy to discuss more of that in detail in the classified session.

Thank you. General Reed, quickly, I've about 45 seconds. Contested logistics is an issue we've been grappling with for several years. Any quick thoughts about what we can do and what we are doing? Senator, thank you very much. We continue to pursue changes in how we operate, both any opportunity in current operations, exercises, and experimentation as well. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Fischer, you're recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here today and for your service to our country. General Reed, how is TRANSCOM preparing to perform strategic lift in a contested environment? That presents unique challenges, correct?

Yes, Senator, thank you. The strategic challenge as we see it begins here at home. We're finding that the adversaries are aligning and they are trying to contest us in every domain possible. That also begins in the cyber realm. Some of the ways that we're making sure that we harden ourselves there is through increased cyber hygiene. We also get great assistance from U.S. Cyber Command as well and law enforcement. That extends not only within the department, but since a significant portion of what we're able to do is in the commercial realm, we're also able to extend assistance to them as well. When it comes to being able to project the force and to project power, we continue investments and we welcome more in making the aircraft more survivable and also with more secure communications. Thank you.

Thank you. General Grynkewich, what's your assessment of the Russian military's progress reconstituting its losses in Ukraine, in particular in terms of the missile production or other weapons systems?

Senator, the Russian war economy is in high gear, if you will. So in terms of missile production and UAV production, my assessment is that they have the capacity resident in their defense industrial base to continue with high levels of production. And then as far as their personnel are concerned, to date they have been able to replenish the battlefield losses, the tremendous battlefield losses that they've been taking on a month-to-month basis.

In September, we saw a Russian drone incursion along the Polish border. How is EUCOM and NATO responded to that?

Senator, thanks. I was extremely proud of the immediate response that the alliance was able to take in response to that incursion. As you probably recall, Dutch F-35s who were operating under NATO command and control were able to shoot down several of those drones that came into the Polish airspace. Since then, the alliance has established Eastern Sentry, a vigilance activity that stitches together a number of disparate air and missile defense capabilities across the eastern flank of the alliance to thicken the lines for defense. And now we are also in the progress of rewriting our standing defense plan for integrated air and missile defense across the alliance. First time this has been done in decades, and should be done by the summit this summer.

So you feel pretty positive about Eastern Sentry and how it's working out now, but in the future as well?

I do, Senator. And I would cite as evidence of the alliance's ability to defend a couple of ballistic missiles that were launched by Iran toward Turkiye and the successful engagement of those ballistic missiles to neutralize that threat.

General, can you tell us in this setting what your views are and what you anticipate seeing in the future in cooperation between Russia and China?

Senator, I can talk a little bit about it here and of course elaborate in the classified session. But, you know, what we see is two primary means of support that the Chinese provide to the Russians. One is assisting them with evading sanctions and thereby helping their economy. And then the second is dual-use equipment that comes out of the Chinese industrial base and flows into Russia. You might think of this as, you know, different chips and different antennas that are then used on weapons of war that the Russians produce in their industrial base. So that certainly is concerning to us. You know, if I look into the future, I would expect that type of relationship to continue when their interests align and for Russia to be willing to support China in the opposite direction if China finds itself in need of assistance.

General Reed, I appreciated the conversation that we had concerning our tanker fleet. How are you working with the Air Force to communicate your needs to meet your requirements?

Thank you. We enjoy great support from the service. We continue to ask them to support us with spare parts, weapons systems sustainment, and to keep the training pipeline strong. In addition to that, they are assisting us with survivability of the aircraft as well.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Senator Fischer. We have Senator Gillibrand and then Senator Ernst.

General Grynkewich, we have seen horrific reports of a U.S. missile hitting a girl school in Iran. I recognize you're at EUCOM and this is not your AOR, but can you speak to the process that you at least have at EUCOM for developing targets? What type of protections you have? Based on what I have heard from reporting, the data that was looked at was a decade old. That any person who can get satellite access to Google Maps today can see that this was a school. New York Times had no problem getting that data and information for a report today. What do you intend to do at EUCOM to make sure your targeting is consistent with American values?

Senator, thanks. You know, over the course of my career, I've as a fighter pilot, I've always done everything I can to avoid civilian harm and civilian casualties. And I would tell you I'm absolutely committed to that. I know the department is committed to that, and that when tragedies like this happen, it causes us all to reflect and try to improve our processes. I've been involved in the targeting process both at the tactical and the operational levels throughout my career. And I would tell you we do have a number of safeguards in the system. You know, every single time that at the tactical level I was going to release a weapon on a target, I was personally making an assessment as to whether there was any chance of civilian harm, and if there was, was that proportional to the military necessity of striking the target. At the operational level, both from my time in U.S. Central Command previously and then now at U.S. European Command, I can assure you that we have robust standards that we go through and look to see and update the imagery and update our understanding of the target and refresh the intelligence on a recurring basis to determine the chances of civilian harm and to address any collateral concerns that might be there. So you just know I'm absolutely committed to trying to mitigate that risk.

I appreciate your testimony. I'm highly concerned, however, that Secretary Hegseth does not agree with you. Secretary Hegseth has criticized rules of engagement designed to adhere to the laws of armed conflict and support civilian harm mitigation. Secretary Hegseth has also cut the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence by about 90 percent. Their mission was to help you and to help protect against civilian casualties. So how do these changes by Secretary Hegseth affect your mission, your judgment, and the responsibility that you take so seriously?

Senator, they have not affected my ability to prevent civilian harm in any way. It's embedded in the targeting process. It's embedded in the culture of U.S. European Command and I would say in the culture of the U.S. military to try to avoid that civilian harm. So we're continuing to do the things that we have always done to comply with the law of armed conflict and ensure that we mitigate that risk.

Can you guess how we could have gotten this wrong in Iran?

I'm sorry, ma'am?

Can you guess how we could have gotten this wrong in Iran and targeted a children's school?

Ma'am, I would hesitate to speculate with any incident like this. There's, you know, I would just say there's usually a chain of errors and mistakes that happen, similar to an aviation accident or some other transportation accident. And I would say we just need to let the investigation play out and find all those factors.

Thank you, General. I'd like to talk a little bit about following the firing of the Pituffik Space Base commander and the stand-up of NATO's Arctic Sentry mission. How is EUCOM managing the operational friction caused by the administration's rhetoric regarding Greenland sovereignty and the associated tariff threats against our NATO allies?

Senator, at the military-to-military level, I can assure you that our relationship remains strong, that with every chief of defense across the alliance, we maintained our focus on what it was that we were responsible for doing, which was defending, deterring and defending every inch of alliance territory from any form of aggression. And our ability to focus on that, to focus on the Hague commitments and make our military stronger kept us on task, if you will, throughout throughout those discussions.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just to clarify for your benefit, Senator Gillibrand, you did not mean to say that we had targeted a school.

That a missile hit a school.

No, but it's the word targeting that you did not mean.

Yes, of course. How we chose a target that turned out to be a school, albeit next to an appropriate target of a naval base. But the fact that it is chosen as a target, I'd like to know and I hope that we can have an open hearing on this, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you. Senator Ernst.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses today for your service to our nation. President Trump has pushed our NATO allies very hard to commit five percent of their GDP toward defense and resilience. And we've seen a lot of headlines highlighting new defense investments across Europe. At the same time, NATO defense plans depend on interoperability across 32 allies operating across air, land, maritime, cyber, and space domains. So General Grynkewich, are these new investments translating into shared capabilities with NATO that are interoperable or are there gaps that our allies need to find and fill?

Senator, that's a terrific question. We focus very much on interoperability across the alliance and at US European Command. And I would say, you know, one of the best ways to ensure interoperability is when our allies buy American equipment from our defense industrial base. That solves the interoperability problem just at face value. Of course, the US industrial base can't deliver everything that Europeans need, so they're investing in their own industrial base as well. And to ensure that everything works together, we have NATO standards that both countries in the alliance and outside the alliance, including in the Indo-Pacific, adhere to in order to ensure that interoperability. But you know, there especially new members of the alliance or folks who are newly certified to NATO standards, we do need to help them along and make sure that they understand that this gets to be very technical when you get into the beeps and squeaks, if you will, of making sure that things can work together.

I appreciate that very much and the shout-out as well about the defense industrial base. And I think this just lends credibility to all of our voices when we are saying that we need to invest in more here in the United States. I'm glad that our partners are stepping up and developing their own industrial base, but certainly we need a stronger one here in our own nation. Just very briefly, I am a huge supporter of the State Partnership Program. I know we have spoken about this before. Our Iowa National Guard and Kosovo are partnered through SPP and we know that a strong American presence in these countries does maintain stability. Can you speak briefly about the State Partnership Program and your thoughts?

Yes, Senator, thanks. I've spent some time with your commanding general of the guard unit of your guard and they do tremendous work in Kosovo and I'm very thankful for it. Writ large, you know, the SPP builds deep and lasting relationships. Some of our state partners have been in the program for 30 years or more and over the course of those 30 years as exercises happened on both sides of the Atlantic, it just builds a bond you can't replace.

Yes, thank you so much. I'm in full agreement. General Reed, we have automatic equipment identifiers, identification tags that help rail providers track the location of our assets across our transportation system. But one of the largest manufacturers of those tags and the technology is owned by a parent company with ties to the Chinese Communist Party. Currently, TRANSCOM uses our rail system to move heavy assets like tanks from Fort Stewart or, you know, you name it, or other armored vehicles throughout the US. So my concern is that the CCP could utilize these tracking technologies to monitor our military movements, which is a major security risk during a build-up or a surge. So would you agree with that vulnerability? Do you think we are giving the Chinese access into a window of our military movements and engagements? And what can we do about that?

Senator, first and foremost, the department works really hard to eliminate any kind of Chinese component wherever we find it and that continues with all the energy and effort that we can put to that. Second of all, when it comes to all domain being contested in all domain, the cyber realm is one where this presents itself plain and clear. With that being said, while it may be a vulnerability, there are ways that we can harden that and we continue to do that. There are alternative ways to make sure that we can track the information. Increasingly, as we get stronger tools, we apply those tools. And one thing that's very, very important is as we continue to use the commercial realm, there are lots of other things that move in the commercial space and that itself makes it very, very hard for folks to track our equipment.

Very good. We need to recognize if we do have vulnerabilities and make sure they're not being exploited. So thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Senator. Senator Kaine, I understand you intend to yield your time to a person who is not yet in the room.

That is correct, so I'll take my time.

I think that would be the best backup plan. You're recognized.

Thank you. America's been at war with Iran for 12 days. The cost to our troops, to everyday Americans and to innocent Iranian civilians, even school children, are dramatic. The war is deeply unpopular. To begin, the war is illegal. The Constitution makes plain that only Congress can declare war. The reason for this provision was articulated by Abraham Lincoln. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most kingly of all kingly oppressions and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. The President has escalated his use of military to carry out hostilities all over the globe without Congress while threatening military action against many more nations. We're at war because of the unilateral actions of one man who has grown very confident that Congress will not challenge his kingly behavior. The war's unprecedented. We've heard from the President many shifting reasons for the war, but senators have now heard both publicly from the Secretary of State and from multiple sessions with civilian and military leaders a more precise and consistent reason. The President sent our sons and daughters, spouses, parents into war because another nation was determined to invade Iran and if that occurred, Iran would likely target US troops for retaliation. The trigger event of this war was Israel's decision to invade Iran on February 28. We could have avoided this war by persuading Israel that it shouldn't invade and that doing so would hurt its ally America and cause global instability. There's no evidence that we tried to do that. Or we could have focused on protecting our own troops from retaliation following an Israeli invasion. Instead, President Trump decided to join an invasion of Iran initiated by another nation. He is not the first American president who has been urged to take this step. Others wisely resisted. He did not. The war's unnecessary. Iran and America were allies during and after World War II until America engineered the toppling of Iran's democratically elected government in 1953. That act, followed by 26 years of a brutal dictatorship that the US helped fund, created a deep hostility between our two nations, formerly friends. When the Iranian people finally threw off that oppressive dictatorship in 1979, that hostility resulted in five decades of violence between our countries, the facts of which are well known to American and Iranian citizens alike. Iran engages in dangerous behavior toward the US, its neighbors and its citizens. But does that danger more than 6,000 miles from our shores warrant the sacrifice of our troops, the killing of innocent civilians and the expense of billions of taxpayer dollars? If more war between Iran and the United States were the answer, we would have found it sometime in the last 73 years. We had a diplomatic off-ramp to decades of hostility in the Iranian nuclear deal that the US and Iran together with our European allies plus China and Russia negotiated in 2015. President Trump's decision to abandon that deal, even though it was working and even though many of his closest advisors told him to maintain it, ushered in a sharp spike of Iranian aggression. American troops are dying because this nation's political leadership tragically abandoned diplomacy. We owe our troops better than this. They serve with such skill and bravery, but as our experiences in Vietnam and Iraq have shown, the bravest patriotic service cannot overcome poor civilian decision-making, whether by a president grown too fond of war or a Congress unwilling to provide a check against such behavior. Virginians feel this deeply. One of the first casualties of the war, Chief Warrant Officer Robert Marzan, lived in Spotsylvania County. Hundreds of Virginians are now deployed with the Ford Carrier Strike Group, more have received orders that they'll deploy with the Bush Carrier Strike Group. Their families ask me, have we learned nothing from 25 years of war in the Middle East? More than 14,000 American troops and contractors dead, more than 65,000 injured, more than $8 trillion spent that could have gone to our education, our healthcare or economic development. Have we learned nothing? Like all in this room, I pray that this war ends soon. Virginians have suffered this year as a sputtering economy burdened by tariffs and chaos produces higher prices, fewer jobs and slower growth. Gas has gone up 60 cents a gallon in the last 11 days, costing Virginians near me $5 million a day just in increased fuel costs. We need a president who will honor his promises to avoid foreign wars of choice and strengthen the economy here at home. And we need a Congress who will not stand silent as these promises are broken. I yield back.

Senator Scott, you are recognized.

Thank you, Chairman. First I want to I want to thank our troops. I had the opportunity to serve in the in the Navy at the tail end of Vietnam, fortunately I was not didn't have to go to Vietnam, but anybody that puts on the uniform, you have to admire them because they they're making the decision to put their life on the line for our freedom. We have a lot of troops at risk right now. I pray for their safety. We unfortunately we've lost seven members, one in Florida, Cody Cork. I know we have 140 or so injured, I hope they have a full recovery, but I want the most important thing I think we can all say is we admire what the military has done, we respect what the military has done, we support what the military is doing, and we hope they all come back safely. And the the goals of of this conflict is that they don't have a nuclear weapon, the goals of this conflict they don't have the ability to have ballistic missiles that's going to kill Americans like they've been doing for for decades. So I don't think any of us ever want to go to war, but I think we all do respect our freedom and want to keep our freedom. So I want to thank all our troops for what they're doing. Thank you both for being here. And thank you for your hard work. One of the things I appreciate about this president is he sees the value in putting America first and working with our friends across Europe, Asia, and around the world to ensure peace through strength. Over the past few years I've had the opportunity to visit a lot of our allies, last year I went to Denmark, Estonia, and Finland, all of which are doing their part to increase their national defense spending. They all had great things to say about President Trump's efforts in the defense space and as a partner. But a number of allies have been frustrated with being told as a matter of policy that they can't buy U.S. weapons, and the White House and the Secretary I know have had to deal with that. Nevertheless the problem I want to focus on today is that they're also frustrated with the foreign military sales program, frankly I understand why. They are they're facing a defense industry that too often fails to deliver ships and aircraft, I think you've talked about that a little bit, we can't our manufacturers are not getting things done on time or on budget, or people in the Department of War saying they can't have the weapons that they want. It's forcing them to turn to other countries because they need the weapons now. They're doing exactly what we've asked, they're stepping up their defense spending, but they there's not enough American weapons to buy. They want our weapons because they know they're the best weapons in the world, they want to train with us. They don't want to buy other systems, and I know you're working on interoperability, but they want to buy American weapons. What's unfortunate is the President and Secretary themselves have made clear why it's good for our allies to buy American-made ships, aircraft, and weapons, it creates good-paying jobs in America, allows our allies to fight their own fights and do it with the best weaponry in the world. And while I've gone over I've said the most important thing is you've got to defend yourself, we'll be a partner but we're not going to be your first line of defense. So General Grynkewich, is it good for our allies to buy American-made planes, ships, and weapons and to train with us, and how does this impact our relationship with our allies and does it make all our military a better fighting force?

Yes, Senator, I encourage our allies to buy American equipment as as often as possible. We do make the best equipment in the world, it's the highest end kit in so many different areas, and it does enhance interoperability when they do so. Fortunately there is action that's being taken here with the America First arms export strategy that the department is working on at the direction of the President, which will move several things out of the very frustrating FMS process that you described rightly so, I've heard that from allies time and time again, and moving things into direct commercial sales which will speed the pace at which they can acquire. And then I'd also say that the work that Secretary Feinberg, our deputy, is doing to supercharge the defense industrial base is going to have a big payoff here in helping allies get equipment quicker than they would without those actions.

General, when General Cavoli testified before Congress, he told us the current force posture was five brigade combat teams and two division headquarters. He stated it was his advice to maintain that force posture. Is that the force posture the same today?

Senator, we have one one infantry brigade combat team returned home at the end of last year, so that's the the only adjustment that's been made.

Okay. Well, I want to first off I just want to finish by thanking you for what you're doing. I pray all of our troops come home safely. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Kelly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Reed. Everything happening in Iran and the Middle East right now highlights the how critical the maritime domain is. Not just for our ability to sustain military operations but for the global economy. I want to drill into this a little bit with you. So first on March 2nd while docked at the port in Bahrain, the U.S. flag tanker Stena Imperative was struck by projectiles that caused a fire on board. Are you familiar with this, General?

I'm aware, Senator.

Thankfully the crew is safe, one shipyard worker was killed. That vessel's part of MARAD's tanker security program, is that correct?

That's correct.

And how many tankers are enrolled in that program?

Sir, the program is fully subscribed at this point and it's upwards of 60.

Upwards of 60.

Excuse me, if you're talking about the tanker security program.

Yes.

Yes, we currently have 10 that are funded.

Okay. 10 that are funded, this ship Stena Imperative was one of those, it's now damaged. So obviously not a large fleet, 10 ships. So when even just one of these vessels is damaged or unavailable, it can have an outsized impact, is that correct?

That's correct.

So in your opening statement you highlighted the importance of the commercial maritime industry to TRANSCOM's strategic sealift capability during a crisis. And I agree with that. But what we're seeing in the Middle East also demonstrates that we need to do more to support the commercial industry we rely on. So let me ask a practical question here. So since TRANSCOM relies on commercial vessels that require insurance, what happens when no one is willing to insure ships that are operating in a conflict zone?

Senator, thanks to the emergency program of the tanker security program, the value of that for U.S. Transportation Command is the fact that we have assured access to those ships. Those ships are committing to serve with us and to partner with us, and we have the ability to to employ them in a maneuver scheme in conjunction with the with the theater commanders. Part of that also drives us to plan with the theaters to make sure that we have force protection with them as well, but to meet the need. We fully understand...

Can you explain, General, can you explain the tender security program that you just mentioned? I mean is this the reinsurance that the President mentioned the other day?

Sir, the tanker security program is our U.S. flag ships...

No, no, no, I I thought you said something else. So my concern is with the insurance. Right? Can these ships in the tanker security program, the 10 ships which really nine are available right now, are they without the required insurance because they're in a conflict zone, how does that affect their ability to be used to our benefit?

There is a provision for war risk insurance, that program by and large is run by the Maritime Administration within the Department of Transportation. U.S. TRANSCOM works with them in in conjunction. If that is required, there is a conversation and cooperation that exists between the the two of us, and we can recommend the requirement for that at which time the carriers have the opportunity to apply for the insurance.

So do you see this as an as an issue today that it's going to be challenging to get some of these ships underway through the Straits of Hormuz because of insurance issues or do you think there's no problem?

Senator, the challenge with transiting the strait really depends on the conditions that exist and actually to make the safe transit. That will depend on the conditions at hand, that will be judged best by the theater commander in this case CENTCOM, but once the conditions are set we'll sail.

So no resistance by the the ship owners in the tanker security program to sail as soon as TRANSCOM says it's okay?

We hold conversations with the ship owners several times a week, there's an information exchange that exists, there's also a form that we have called the executive working group. In that we we advise them of the situation, we point out to them what's going on, they fully understand the risk and they also give advice to us in terms of the best way ahead.

If I could just have 30 more seconds, Mr. Chairman. So you know I think a lot of this highlights we only have 10 ships in the tanker security program. MSC has a limited number of vessels. Would you agree that that our country needs a whole-of-government national maritime strategy so that our maritime transportation system is prepared for crises when we look at a conflict going across the Pacific in the Western Pacific let's say in the future, you know with China, are we prepared with our current maritime industry to support a long-term conflict with a near-peer adversary?

Senator, I'll tell you that if we were given the task to go today we would all go. We would all take what we have and we would execute and support the combatant commander in their needs based on what they require. I will tell you that there is a lot of work to be done to strengthen the health of the fleet, to strengthen the help of the workforce. Part of the challenge of that is cargo. Having cargo available will actually drive the overall plan for the demand to build ships, the demand to have the ships, and work to be done by the crews.

Well thank thank you, General, because I'm out of time, but that's what my and that issue is addressed in my bipartisan Ships for America Act, so I hope to move that legislation forward so you're in a better position to be able to do your job. Thank you.

General Reed, have you had a chance to look at the Ships for America Act?

Senator, I have. Excuse me, Chairman, I have.

You have?

Yes, I have.

What do you think about it? It's got a pretty good suggestion, don't you think?

Chairman, there there are a lot of aspects in that and it's incredibly comprehensive. And it does address a lot of things, but it does bring home the fact that we do need a comprehensive approach with comprehensive investment, and we also need to make sure that there's a provision to invite to invite the commercial leaders as well to help us through this. In the end the fundamental success will ultimately be driven by the amount of cargo, and when we have cargo that will drive the demand for shipping, we'll find a way to actually construct here, and then we'll actually have the the crews because they'll have work to do.

Well thank you for that insight. Senator Sheehy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would second what Senator Kelly was saying and some others that we need to be focusing not just on our exquisite platforms but also the broader capacity of the logistics system that's going to support that frontline fight. And to that end to General Reed, and I'm sorry you're getting all the inbounds here, but specifically I'd like to talk about our future airlift platforms. We spend a lot of time in these hearing rooms talking about the F-47 and the B-21 and the F-35 and the F-22 and and of course those are all critical platforms, but at the end of the day moving material into theater especially as we evaluate a Westpac engagement with a peer adversary, I don't say near-peer because I believe we're in a peer-to-peer situation now with China, physically moving people, bullets, bombs, food, clothes, physically moving millions of tons of gear halfway around the world quickly, especially in an area where we're fighting in someone else's backyard and we're having to project that material around the world to tiny islands that we may or may not be in control of. Our C-5s are I've heard in some cases 40 percent dispatch reliability, they're half-century old if not more. Our C-17s as incredible platforms as they are are also aging. And as far as I know we don't currently have a follow-on long-range heavy-lift logistics aircraft that's been decided on, awarded and certainly not in production but isn't quite even in decided conceptual stages. And when we look at how challenging our KC-46 program has been to roll out to replace I still hear that the last KC-135 pilot hasn't been born yet and that's probably true and the KC-46 rollout has been very problematic. So I think we need to have a very serious focused effort this committee does but also at the general officer level of focusing on bringing that next generation heavy airlift platform into reality. And whether that's restart on the C-17 with some great upgrades or whether that's reimagining a new platform whatever we do we got to do it quick so I'd like your thoughts on that please. And I understand you're not the procurement command for this I realize you're the customer of this platform but I think part of the defense acquisition paradigm we're trying to change at this committee is making sure the customer is closer to to the actual specification process for the platforms because we've we've given the power to the PEOs and and the contract officers and and the most powerful voice in any acquisition process should be the actual end-user customer. So you and your captains and majors flying these planes and driving these ships should be the ones driving the requirements not bureaucrats somewhere else. So if you could talk to us about next-gen airlift and and where you think it needs to go I'd appreciate that.

Thank you. Our primary job at TRANSCOM is to set the conditions to to move. Within the headquarters excuse me. We frequently start with the idea we need to set the globe to set the theater. What that means is we have aircraft that are operating around the world each day along with sealift but when a crisis arises there's the need to make the shift. Once we do that every aircraft that we have available that already originates in the region we employ them directly. All the aircraft that we have here in the United States we generate that and then we build the network to connect the two. Our C-17s and our C-5s are the most capable things in the world right now to make that bridge to get the force out of the United States. That's incredibly key because greater than 85 percent of the joint force still resides here. And so when they're needed abroad those are the aircraft that we use to start that that move. The challenge that we have predominantly with our with our competitor is that they're actively developing weapon systems to threaten our aircraft. And so not only do we need new aircraft to get us into the future we also need the aircraft that are more survivable. So in dealing with the Air Force we are working with them on the requirements to meet that but also to track the development of the threats as they emerge from from our our competitors.

One I'd also encourage us to explore all alternatives expanding and having a wider guarantee for our contract-operated cargo carriers not best for contested environments but at least they can get tonnage forward. And then exploring things like amphibious aircraft or even submarines that can provide logistical support. Subs have typically been reserved for exquisite tactical missions as they should but when we're going to be operating in a West Pac first second island chain contested environment literally moving logistics under the water where we still have dominance. So thanks for your time today I yield back my time sir.

Thank you Senator Sheehy. We have Senator King and then Senator Hirono.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. There's been a lot of confusion about the war and the the effects, the causes, why we did it, why we didn't, what our strategy is. But one thing has emerged just in the last few days. There is a clear winner in this war. The clear winner is Vladimir Putin and Russia. Estimates released a few hours ago are that Russia has reaped $6 billion of benefit from this war since it began just two weeks ago. That's about $400 million a day from the increase in oil prices and the easing the easing of sanctions which is somewhat puzzling to me. So I just think the record should show that the real winner so far is is Vladimir Putin to the tune of $6 billion in two weeks. General Reed can you give me a percentage if we had a a serious need for transport what percentage of the transport on on the sea and in the air would be commercial carriers who are under contract to TRANSCOM?

Senator day-to-day in competition about 40 percent of what we fly around the skies is commercial. When we transition to crisis or conflict we make a conscious decision on where we actually employ the commercial aircraft. Even as we're supporting operations in CENTCOM today the commercial airlines are supporting us in high volume in places outside the theater.

So in a in a conflict situation that 40 percent would go up I presume.

If it's required yes. In the case of sealift once the ready reserve force makes the initial surge commercial really plays in for sustainment and greater than 90 percent of all the sustainment is done by the commercial fleet.

Okay that's what worries me. You have controlled and I'm sure pay great attention to cyber possibilities. But we're talking about hundreds if not thousands of commercial carriers who may or may not be as secure in terms of cyber as you are. My question is what steps do we take to to ensure that this you said 90 percent on the ships 40, 50, 60 percent in the air are commercial carriers to ensure that they are protected from a cyber attack because if we're in a serious conflict with a significant adversary the first thing that's going to happen is a major cyber attack to attempt to blind us and disable our transportation system. Do you red team for example the commercial carriers to determine the extent of their cyber vulnerability?

Senator we do and there's a lot of cooperation in that realm. We operate mainly through two different channels so within the Department of War when we organize and plan that is done on secure systems and we have a lot of help to make sure that we can protect ourselves.

I understand that. What I'm worried about is is Delta Airlines security if they're called upon to be transporting troops and and the extent to which they can be penetrated their systems not yours but theirs.

Yes Senator once that planning is complete we do have some secure channels with the commercial transportation providers and also we red team and we cooperate and provide help with them for cyber hygiene. Among some of the sources are CYBERCOM, National Security Agency as well as the Department of War Cyber Crime Center.

I I would urge you to step up those efforts because this is this is where the first wave of the attack is going to come. General Grynkewich to what extent are the Russians and there's been some discussion about this probing in Eastern Europe and doing asymmetric warfare in the Baltics for example and Poland disinformation, cyber attacks, even drone incursions. What are the Russians up to? Are they building troops up along along their western border?

Yes Senator right now we we see a fairly robust amount of what we call Russian hybrid activities or asymmetric activities and you mentioned some of those whether it's information operations or sabotage and and those types of things. There have been several incidences in the Baltics and in Poland in particular over the last several months since I've been in command. As far as conventional troop buildups most of the Russian ground forces are focused on Ukraine so we do not see significant Russian buildups right now but I know that there are concerns that those could be coming at some point in the future particularly once Russia's able to reconstitute its forces.

And if if there was if President Zelenskyy was here what would be the one thing he would tell us that he needed right now? I suspect you hear that fairly regularly.

Yes sir he would ask for air defense capability based on the Russian attacks on his his heating and electrical infrastructure.

And a great deal of our air defense capability is now tied up in the in the Gulf region is that correct?

Senator yes we do have a a robust set of air defense capabilities in the in the Middle East and I've used some of our EUCOM air defense capabilities to defend some of our NATO allies as well.

In the Middle East.

Near the Middle East if you will in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Okay so so air defense capabilities have been moved toward the Middle East as a result of this conflict. That's correct.

Yes sir absolutely.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator Cotton.

Thank you gentlemen thank you for your appearance today and more importantly for your service. General Grynkewich it's well known that Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds maybe thousands of one-way attack drones since the start of the Ukraine conflict. I assume you agree that passing on the counter-drone warfare lessons that Ukraine and EUCOM has learned from that fight to the forces in the Middle East today and and also to the Pacific is a top priority right?

Absolutely Senator and we're we are doing that and deploying capabilities into the Middle East for those purposes.

Could you use some additional funds to ensure that we have all the right people and processes to capture all those lessons and implement them?

Senator more funds for things like that are always welcome.

I agree and I look forward to working with the committee to consider the funding for the NDAA or a potential supplemental down the road. I know that the experience that Ukraine has had and that EUCOM's had in that fight has saved lives in the Middle East today. General can you tell us a little bit about what's going on on the southern flank of EUCOM in Cyprus right now?

Yes Senator down in the we have a fair amount of activity in the Eastern Mediterranean our destroyers are out in the Eastern Mediterranean defending our allies and defending our US forces in that region. Several of several capabilities are on the island of Cyprus I could go into some of the details of what those are in the classified session but we are very very much watching that there have been a few one-way attack drones that we've assessed have come from somewhere likely from from Lebanon toward Cyprus and so we are focused on defending that piece of terrain.

Okay. Thank you. You're an old fighter pilot, right?

Yes, sir.

16s and 22s?

Yes, sir.

Well, I think that the men and women we have in uniform are the best fighting force in the world. I know you agree and that our Air Force and Navy right now are on the forefront of the current campaign, Operation Epic Fury. So I have just a few questions about what they may be seeing based on your tactical experience. How complex of an operation is it for our fighters to conduct a campaign the size of Operation Epic Fury?

Senator, just based on my my experience looking at campaigns like this in the past, it is incredibly complex and the sequencing of of events and the technical acumen that's required at the operational or tactical level is is quite high.

It's my understanding from the briefings that the Secretary and the Chairman have given is that our combined force and the CENTCOM commander, I should say, that the combined force has dropped no less than 5,000 bombs on key enemy targets. How impressive is it for our bombers to execute a mission of that size with such precision?

Senator, that's a very powerful demonstration of American strength and to orchestrate that size of a campaign, I think Admiral Cooper deserves great praise for how he's been able to manage that at the operational level.

General Kane has said that ballistic missile attacks continue to trend downward 90 percent from where they've started and one-way attack drones have decreased 83 percent since the beginning of the operation, a testament to our air defenders and our air defense system. Based on your experience flying those fighters, I would assume that you would agree with him that Operation Epic Fury is a real testament to those young men and women we have on the front lines operating those systems and flying those aircraft.

Senator, I would, and you know, I'd just take the opportunity to say that it's always better to get the archer than the arrows, and so the offensive counter-air aspect of this that is being prosecuted in U.S. Central Command is as impressive as the defensive side of things.

Okay. General Reed, you also have prior experience in the cockpit. How impressive is it that our tanker fleet has supported these continuous operations in the Middle East for the largest air campaign in recent memory?

The tanker fleet has been very impressive to get the forces across the ocean and to get them into CENTCOM. I'm also very grateful to my friend here who's also been able to help with the portion of his fleet, but the fact that we were able to get our forces in place to get defense set and to go on the offensive is quite impressive.

Do you think there's any other force in the world that has the tanker and mobility aircraft to sustain an operation like Epic Fury?

Not to the scale that we can at the moment. Thank you.

Yeah, I didn't think so either. All right. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Blumenthal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here today and and for your service. General Grynkewich, I've recently visited Ukraine and in addition to going to Odessa to visit with the men and women of the Ukrainian armed services who are serving there, also met with the American Chamber of Commerce, 600 major businesses with operations in Ukraine. Almost half of them have been targeted and attacked by Russia. Within days of my visit, an Oreo manufacturing plant was hit by Russian attacks. Are you looking into the attacks on American businesses in Ukraine? Are you familiar with that issue?

Senator, I am familiar with that. This is mostly managed through the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv who takes those reports and sends them back through State Department channels, but our defense attache office is also aware of them and reports them to me.

Are you taking action to protect those businesses?

Sir, we are we are not taking any direct action, but I would tell you that all the support that the department and the United States provides to Ukraine is certainly going to have a benefit for those businesses as the Ukrainians fight back against the Russian assault.

Isn't an attack on those businesses in effect an attack on American interests? An attack on American property, is it not?

Certainly it is, Senator. I think it's a complex issue and from a policy perspective, the approach that we've taken is to try to help the Ukrainians to defend things that are within their country as best as possible, and so that's where we're focused in EUCOM.

Wouldn't you recommend that we take an a more aggressive posture vis-a-vis Russia when it's attacking our businesses purposefully? These are not mistakes. Close to 300 American businesses have been damaged significantly as a result of these attacks targeting them by Russia.

Senator, it's certainly a tragedy that Russia targeting is indiscriminate. It's indiscriminate against American businesses, it's indiscriminate against other targets across Ukraine. As we as we think about how do we best enable the Ukrainians to fight back against the Russians, all of this goes into our calculus.

Well, I respectfully disagree with your use of the word indiscriminate. It is very discriminating. They are purposely targeting hospitals. I saw a hospital specifically destroyed in large part. They are targeting electric generation facilities, which I also saw, and they are targeting American businesses, discriminating in a very purposeful way. Let me move on.

Well, I'll give you a little extra time. Do you agree with that, General Grynkewich? He's pretty much correct.

Senator, I I do agree. So when I use the word indiscriminate, I'm applying to the the moral lens perhaps that they're looking at this through and that they aren't discriminating in the way that we would under the law of armed conflict as to what the targets are.

Got you. I think you and the Senator actually agree on that. You can resume your time, Senator.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think your your questions were helpful and I appreciate the distinction that you're drawing, General. EUCOM is the global integrator for all defense matters relating to Russia, so I'm presuming you know about Russia's role in the war with Ukraine. I know you've been asked a bit about it so far. I am assuming the public reports are correct and that Russia is aiding Iran. Can you tell us more about requests from I'm sorry, aiding Iran. Can you tell us more about the requests from Iran to Russia for assistance and how Russia has responded?

Senator, I'm certainly aware of all the public reporting on this. I can go into specifics on your question in the classified session, but you know, I would just echo what Secretary Hegseth has said recently that if Russia is doing this, they would be wise to reconsider providing any assistance to the Iranians during Epic Fury.

You believe that we should respond aggressively to that kind of assistance that's putting our men and women in greater harm's way?

Senator, anytime anyone puts American service members in harm's way in any manner whatsoever, I believe we should respond robustly.

Why haven't we done it?

Senator, I am confident that we are responding robustly to anyone who is assisting the Iranians with targeting U.S. forces.

Perhaps you can tell us more in a classified setting?

Yes, sir, I'd be happy to elaborate.

Thank you.

Thank you very much. Senator Budd.

Thank you, Chairman. General Grynkewich, it's good to see you. Thanks for the meeting yesterday, very informative. Much of the discussion of the Russia-Ukraine war, it's focused just on those two countries, but I want to talk about other nations that are assisting the Russians, if you will. Talk about North Korea's role in this conflict and the threat that they pose and also about the Iranian contribution today and even prior to Operation Epic Fury.

Senator, you bet. One of the things that we watch very closely is how some of our competitors around the globe will work with each other when they share interests, and we've certainly seen that with the North Koreans and the Iranians and the Russians. In the North Korean case, as you know, it's been widely reported there's a number of North Korean troops that have been deployed to the border with Ukraine and have made up some substantial combat power shortfalls that the Russians have had and supplemented them. There's also a number of reports of North Korean individuals now going to work in the in the Russian industrial base to generate some of the ballistic missiles and UAVs that they're building based on the labor shortfalls that the Russians have within their industrial base. Of course, that industrial base got started because of the Iranian sharing of technology of their Shahed drones and sharing the blueprints and teaching the Russians how to build them and how to build them at scale, and that's one of the main threats facing the Ukrainians today.

Are the Russians short on people and essentially bringing in labor from North Korea?

That's my assessment, Senator.

Okay. General Reed, thanks also for being here. Appreciate what you've done in TRANSCOM and just a heroic effort leading up to Epic Fury. Talk about some of the numbers, if you will, some of the success stories so far, and then where are the gaps where Congress can assist?

Thank you, Senator. Some of the success is the ability to generate the aircraft to actually get on the move, and so I'm grateful to the Congress for the sustained funding for weapon system sustainment and spares. Because of that, we're able to keep pace and we've been doing that extremely well, so thank you for that. Other success stories is the fact that we've been able to establish a network for air medical evacuation in order to bring home the wounded and to also get them to a higher level of care.

Thank you. What concerns does TRANSCOM have regarding Chinese and Russian naval deployments and commercial investments in ports across the globe?

For the Russian deployments, we monitor those, we maintain an awareness of where they're going and make assessments in terms of what capabilities they may be seeking. When it comes to the Chinese fleet deployments, we do the exact same, but we also go one step further to track their footprint infrastructure and what types of things that they put in place, mainly in seaports. So we keep a very close eye on their electronic systems, cranes, and that type of thing. We work with port authorities to make sure that we know where those are and then we operate in ways to circumvent that.

So at this point, General Reed, are those adversaries, are they limiting your ability at TRANSCOM to enable logistics around the globe?

Currently they are not. We plan for that. Thank you.

General Grynkewich, how is our air domain awareness in the Russia-Ukraine conflict throughout EUCOM?

Senator, we have a robust set of agreements with allies and partners that we stitch together a very comprehensive air picture. Certainly it's not perfect, but I'm I'm very confident that we're on the right path to make it better, but we do have very good awareness, particularly in and around Ukraine.

I'm concerned about the uncertainty around the purchase of the E-7 Wedgetail. That's affecting our NATO partners who also canceled E-7 orders last November. What's your what's your thoughts on this platform in terms of current and future EUCOM needs?

Senator, I've I've seen the capabilities of the E-7 in action in previous jobs, particularly for low radar cross-section platforms, things like the UASs. It's an incredibly capable platform for detecting those.

They had canceled orders, though. Any concern there?

Senator, I am concerned. On the alliance side, the E-3 fleet is is aging. It's about 50 percent combat effective as many of the aircraft are in depot. The alliance does need a replacement aircraft. The E-7 was the plan for a while, but now we're looking at other options based on affordability and who is purchasing the E-7. Depending on where the United States goes, considering the E-7 in the future, it may be back on the table or it may not, but we're looking at it closely.

Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you very much. Senator Hirono.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Grynkewich noted that the Russian people are probably not given accurate information on Russia's war against Ukraine. So I do think that it is very important for the American people to know what is happening with regard to Iran. So before I begin my questions, I'd like to take a moment to highlight for the American people the cost of this President's reckless decision to take our country into war with Iran without congressional authorization. Seven brave U.S. service members have been killed, 150 wounded, eight severely injured. Over $11 billion in the first six days, and this is day 13, so we're likely closer to $20 billion already spent on this what I would consider an illegal war with no end in sight and no plan for what will come next. Oil prices are going up. As noted, the major beneficiary of this is Russia. And despite how impressive and professional our military is, this is a real war. It is not a game. It is certainly not an excursion. And it is important, even if the President won't, to acknowledge when errors happen. Preliminary findings of the strike on an elementary school in Iran that killed 175 civilians, mostly children, point to U.S. responsibility. But this tragedy didn't happen in a vacuum. Secretary Hicks said in his misguided attempt to focus on lethality, gutted the office that focuses on mitigating civilian casualties, reducing personnel there from 200 people to less than 40. In that kind of an environment, errors can occur, and as noted once again by General Grynkewich, what may have happened in the instance of the killing of all these school children is it's just a error upon error, a chain of errors as he put it. So we mourn the deaths of our brave soldiers, but as this war continues, there will be more civilian deaths, there will be more costs to our American families. And I join all those who pray that this war will end even if there is really no articulated end in sight. I'd like to start my questions with General Reed. It was nice to meet with you the other day. And TRANSCOM is playing a vital role supporting this war in Iran, even though as I noted, I totally disagree with the President's decision to launch this war. That said, this war is placing significant demands on our aging, acknowledged aging, air mobility and refueling fleets, both of which need to be recapitalized. I'm also concerned this war is going to impact TRANSCOM's ability to support important planned exercises and training in other theaters, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. General Reed, have you had to cancel or scale back any planned TRANSCOM exercises with INDOPACOM because of this war?

Senator, since the start of the war, we have certainly surged to meet the need of CENTCOM. One of the things we've been able to do is to get access to greater numbers of Guard and Reserve to assist with that. In addition, access to Guard and Reserve also helps to preserve our ability to support other combatant commanders as well, to include exercises in the Pacific. In addition to that, we also work with the Joint Staff to make sure that as the needs arise, that we can meet the needs as best we can while we support the warfight.

So you're telling me that as this war against Iran continues, that you are needing to make adjustments with regard to any needs, particularly in INDOPACOM? Because we have a lot of exercises that are really important with our allies in that part of the world. So you are having to make adjustments. Will you commit to informing this committee if TRANSCOM is unable to fully support upcoming exercises in INDOPACOM or other combatant commands?

Yes, Senator.

For General Grynkewich. One of the United States' greatest asymmetric, I'm running out of time. Mr. Chairman, may I finish my question?

Yes, ma'am.

I did want to get your sense that we are stronger when we work closely with our international partners. And would you agree, General, that this requires constant investment in interoperability and training as technology and threats evolve? Would you agree with that?

Senator, I would, and we focus on that every single day at U.S. European Command.

There's a whole series of questions that follows our need to maintain that kind of interoperability, and I will submit those questions as well as others for the record.

We'll take another round if necessary, and of course there'll be a classified portion. Senator Slotkin is next.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of you for being here and thanks for all you're doing to support this significant effort that's going on in the Middle East. It is hard, you know, as someone who was at the Pentagon and at the CIA, it's hard to miss I think two important trends that are happening in this war in the Middle East that are connected I think to to what you all do. One is just I feel like the conversation on drones has come home to roost. You know, the Pentagon over many administrations, Democrat and Republican, has had this unbelievably glacially slow process of acquisition. And so even though we know that the drones we build are big and expensive and take two years to build and they're $30 million and and you can buy them off Amazon, we just haven't been able to get them into the doctrine, into the force in a serious way. And now I feel like unfortunately, we're we're paying the price for that. This is a different chapter in American warfare with the Shahed drones from Iran killing American forces, hitting U.S. embassies, hitting civilian targets and I think 11 other countries, evading our air defenses which are set up for much bigger projectiles. And then we've had I think according to press reports, 11 MQ-9s downed in the course of two weeks. The Iranians are figuring out how to bleed us with money and with time, to the point where we now have Ukrainian advisors coming from Ukraine to train us, right, because they're the the experts. And I I just it's not for either of you two to respond to, but I I just feel like, you know, we need to understand that warfare has fundamentally changed. And if Iran is able to hold us at bay and continue that power projection, you know, we keep hearing that the reason why or one of the reasons why we went to this war is because of Iran's power projection. They're now holding the Persian Gulf at bay, we can't move ships through it, and they're able to use low-cost drones, $20,000 to $50,000 each, to kill U.S. forces. So I just I hope this is in a moment of inflection for the Pentagon, for all of us, that unless we understand how to more quickly get our acquisition system to be responsive, we're going to continue to lose our soldiers. And and I just I hope that's a major lesson that we're all learning. The second one is the role of Iran and China, I'm sorry, Russia and China in supporting Iran. And I know we can't talk about it in an open setting, but the you know, the there's press reports that the Russians are helping target U.S. ships and aircraft. And I just hope we can all be on the same page and certainly in the in Europe, you understand the threat of Russia, that if Russia is helping to kill U.S. forces, we have crossed a Rubicon. We are in another moment and that we have to take decisive action on that. And instead, we're giving them breaks on oil, they're making a ton of money, and and all the weapons and all the systems that we need for this war are what we would have otherwise given Ukraine to defend themselves. So I I just I just hope we're all on the same page on this committee and a bipartisan basis that the situation with drones in this war and the situation with Russia in helping to potentially kill U.S. forces and target our weapons and our systems, our ships are totally they are new and we need to adjust to that new reality. Can can you just tell me in my last minute here, General Grynkewich, just I'm concerned that we're going to lose a lot of capabilities out of Europe and then this administration's never going to put them back in. Can you talk about the importance of capability in Europe?

Yes, Senator, thanks. I think having capability in Europe ultimately provides options for this administration or any administration in the event of a conflict. And you know, I would highlight that in my opening statement I talked about one of the missions of U.S. European Command is to serve as a power projection platform. And so it is having capabilities in Europe, munitions in Europe that allow us to to help U.S. Africa Command to target terrorists in Africa or to help U.S. Central Command as they execute Operation Epic Fury. And so, you know, the distances are shorter, it's less expensive, and it's much easier to project power with our network of bases and allies.

I would just say American power is still important and deterrence is the best option and the way we do that is with capabilities. If anyone thinks that Vladimir Putin is deterred when we leave Europe, I would love to sell them a bridge. Thanks very much, I yield back.

Thank you, Senator Slotkin. Senator Banks.

General Grynkewich, we hear a lot from Democrats often about how our European allies don't trust us, they don't like us, President Trump has pushed them away. But can you could you talk for a minute about what President Trump has taught us in in Operation Epic Fury about how to how to bring our European allies on board? Seems like there's a lot of good news here of our European allies coming to the table to help us out.

Yes, Senator, I would I would tell you that by and large, the vast majority of our European allies, especially at the military level, which is where I engage most often, have been extremely supportive. They've provided access, basing, and overflight that enables General Reed's operations to refuel aircraft coming from the United States or the great amount of logistics that flow through Europe. And it's it's really been incredible to see. The you know, there's certainly some discussions in the press about allies who did not move quick enough or who did not provide the access that we wanted, but I would tell you that under the tip of that iceberg, there's much more support in Europe for the things that are ongoing in the Middle East right now.

And what do we make of it? What do we what do we learn from that?

Sir, I think that the relationships we have with our European allies matter. I think they admire what the U.S. military is able to do. I think many nations of course recognize as several senators have have mentioned the threat that Iran has played over the years. You know, I I reflect on my time in Iraq during the defeat ISIS operations in 2019 to 2020, and our European allies were side-by-side with us. And the biggest threat to us was not actually ISIS, it was Iranian threat network backed forces that were in in Iraq attacking and and killing U.S. and and European forces. And so I think on the military level, many of us understand that threat and understand the the menace that it poses.

Can you give us a quick thumbnail on an update on NATO's strength and what we're seeing from our allies stepping up to the plate to do more?

Yes, Senator, you bet. This this coming year we'll have five or six allies that will already be at or near the 5 percent Hague spending commitments. Many other allies, some of the biggest economies in Europe like Germany on a rapid pace to achieve 3 or 3.5 percent spending by the end of the decade. So there is there's plenty of appetite and plenty of understanding that a more balanced and strong European pillar within the NATO alliance to complement what America has done for so many years is essential and that it will make for a stronger and more healthy alliance moving forward.

This is really good news, right? And compared to years in the past where the NATO is stronger and has more money and doing more to step up to the plate to support all of our shared causes, right?

I agree, Senator.

One thing that I am concerned about, though, with our NATO allies is their reliance on Chinese technology that could compromise the security of critical infrastructure that impacts our forces, U.S. forces. Thanks to President Trump's leadership, NATO allies have committed to spending 5 percent of GDP, as you just discussed, on their security, including 1.5 percent on defense-related activities. If allies use part of this funding to rip and replace high-tech Chinese technology, how would that contribute to EUCOM's mission?

Senator, we want Chinese technology out of anything related with the defense of the United States or Europe or across the alliance. And so we focus our efforts to help our allies identify where they have Chinese technology in their information networks, particularly their defense information networks. And then there's Chinese technology and ownership across much of the infrastructure that folks like General Reed would rely on to flow forces either across or into the continent.

Do you see progress on this front? Do all of our NATO allies share our concern about Chinese technology?

Sir, they do. Even the allies that I would traditionally put in a category where they didn't pay attention to this, when we highlight it today, they absolutely understand the threat and the risk and they take action.

And would it likewise be helpful if our allies remove China from satellite ground stations in the Arctic?

Absolutely, Senator.

Okay, that's all I have. Thanks, I yield back.

Thank you. Senator Duckworth.

Thank you, Chairman. We're now in the second week of President Trump's illegal war against Iran with no end in sight, and I fear the longer that this war goes on, it will have lasting impacts on the readiness of our military to respond to crises and threats elsewhere. Meanwhile, this administration is hiding its incompetence behind the valor of our military men and women, as if questioning why we're at war is equal to questioning the valor of our troops. We all know that that is not true. I know that our military will always do the best and most professional job possible. But that means that we here in these chambers, who are the elected representatives of the American people, are beholden to do our job and make sure that this is the right war, one that is worth our troops' sacrifices. And we can't forget that that sacrifice extends to our logisticians and support staff, as we've been tragically reminded by the six soldiers of the 103rd Sustainment Command that we lost last week. Anytime that we conduct significant military action, especially on this scale, we must understand the demands that it puts on our military. By choosing this illegal war, one that he still cannot justify, Trump has put our service members at risk in completely unnecessary ways. Seven service members have been killed. Seven families had to hear the worst news of their lives. And the department has now confirmed at least 140 service members have been wounded, eight severely. And with the expansion of this campaign, including to overhead air operations within Iran and possible naval escorts, our troops may be at even greater risk going forward. General Reed, TRANSCOM has been working for years to modernize our global patient movement enterprises for the complexities of large-scale combat operations. Can you explain the challenges that our medical evacuation system faces in transporting critical care patients when airspaces and maritime routes are contested, as we're seeing currently happening in the Middle East?

Senator, initially what has to happen is we need to put the entire system in place. That requires us to forward stage teams, not just the teams that will provide the care, but the teams who actually provide the scheduling and the teams who have the initial communications with higher-level facilities along the route. Sometimes we have to put those in place in an environment that's contested, and then they continue to serve throughout. But that is done in concert with the theater commander who provides the force protection, and then once the scheduling begins, we then put the aircraft in place at the point in time of need. It requires that the patients are stabilized, and once they're assembled, we pick them up and then we fly them out. We also depend on force protection to clear the airspace so that the aircraft can get to the next station. And then also important for us is the permission to overfly so that we can have the shortest and the fastest routes.

So to summarize, it's incredibly complex. We need to make investments in this system, and there's a lot more work to be done, but you're doing the absolute heroic best with what you have. Our wounded service members and logistics professionals now face the realities of medical evacuation in an airspace, as you've mentioned, contested by missiles and drones from the enemy. I don't believe Trump considered these risks when he chose this war without understanding how it would spread in the region. And I know they are not investing in medical readiness in the Indo-Pacific, where despite the real possibility of military conflict, actually in our national interest, we have actually less medevac experience and much greater distances to cover. Similarly is the same situation in Africa. Even before this war, the department underinvested in our medical evacuation system, which is why I've advocated for years to give TRANSCOM and the services the resources that you need to rapidly adapt to future contested environments. These gaps will only widen as we continue to strain our system. General Reed, can you speak to the importance of secure connectivity and the potential impacts, both logistically for logistical support, but also its potential impacts on existing gaps to this essential medical evacuation mission? You and I discussed this a little bit the other day.

Yes, Senator. What's important is making sure that we can pass the information on the status of each person that we attend to. Being able to make sure that information gets established at the point, but also forwarded to the next station, that way we can have the proper physician with the proper care and the proper equipment to attend to them. As we continue to press for more secure communications, then we will make sure that there is no drop in the care.

Are you facing some challenges right now?

We are facing challenges in terms of secure funding.

Okay, thank you. This administration's inexcusable poor planning in the lead-up to this war of choice has only exacerbated the toll on our logistics system. General Grynkewich, I will not ask you to speak to current operations, but in your experience, do you agree that coordinating with allies and partners before an operation is critical to ensuring that our air assets have the necessary logistical nodes for rest and refueling to reduce the strain on our aging aerial refueling tanker fleet?

Senator, there's always a balance in terms of when you do the coordination. If you have the luxury of it based on operational security concerns to engage with allies and partners and secure access, basing, and overflight ahead of time, that is incredibly valuable, but there's a host of factors that may limit your ability to do that.

Thank you, Senator Duckworth. Senator Warren.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So on February 28, Donald Trump launched his war against Iran. By March 1, Iranian strikes had hit at least six surrounding countries. But all the Trump administration said to Americans in the region was exercise caution. On March 2, the State Department finally told Americans in over a dozen countries to evacuate, but gave no real guidance on how to do that. As thousands of flights were canceled, the State Department initially told Americans to, quote, not rely on the U.S. government for assisted departure or evacuation. Let's be clear. The Trump administration chose this war. They planned this war for months, and they made no plans to safeguard hundreds of thousands of Americans in the region. There is no excuse for this. And I just want to draw a comparison here. In 2006, the State Department requested support from DOD just two days into the war in Lebanon. TRANSCOM arranged ships, commercial charter, and military flights for nearly 15,000 Americans. So General Reed, let me ask you, if the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense asked TRANSCOM for help to evacuate Americans, would you provide that support?

Senator, I would.

Thank you. So General Reed, we're almost two weeks into this war. Have Secretary Rubio and State Department made any requests for TRANSCOM to help evacuate Americans out of the Middle East?

Senator, on the 28th of February, the Department of State made a request to my department for that and we have provided some assistance.

So you're saying they made that request back on February 28.

Yes, Senator.

So when we called them yesterday, they said they had not asked you for assistance. Can you explain why that would be so?

Senator, I cannot explain that.

I just don't understand this. And you have been helping them all this time?

Senator, what we have done is through Central Command have responded to the request for the State Department to provide airlift at locations that they have specified.

And how much have you airlifted in this period of time? How many people?

Senator, I'll have to get that number for you for our record.

Can you give me a rough idea?

Senator, it's been in the hundreds.

Hundreds, not in the thousands.

That's correct. And but I will say that as we continue to watch the situation, there have been other flights and other opportunities for American citizens to get out of the way. Some of that has been by ground transportation and some of it has been by commercial charters by the State Department.

Are you saying you're not doing more because you think that Americans who are in the region are currently being adequately served by commercial flights and private vehicles out of the region? Is that what you're saying?

Senator, what I'm saying is we have respond to requests for specific tasks in conjunction with the commercial flights in which TRANSCOM is providing. There are a number of ways to get our citizens out of harm's way.

Okay, and what I'm trying to understand is why you're not doing more, because I'm hearing from my constituents who are stranded there, who've been stranded there for two weeks, and they're asking for help and they're not getting help from the U.S. government. And you're telling me that you're not helping because you think they've got plenty of other ways to get out of the region? Or is it that Secretary Rubio is not asking you for that help? I just want to understand who bears responsibility here.

Senator, it is the responsibility of all to care for the citizens that we have in harm's way. And as we receive a tasking and the opportunities to do that, TRANSCOM is responding.

Okay, so my constituents and other Americans who are trapped in the region are trapped there because Secretary Rubio is not asking you for help, is that right? I just want to understand what's happening.

We've been asked for help and we're available to do that. And so as we are able and the conditions permit with CENTCOM, we are involved in all the coordination to meet our citizens where we can get to them and then transport them to safety.

So you have provided all the help you've been asked for, you just haven't been asked for more help, is that right?

Senator, we have been tasked and we have responded to each of those tasks.

Look, I understand military speak here, but I don't understand how it is that we could get 15,000 people evacuated shortly after the war in Lebanon and now we've still got thousands, tens of thousands of people trapped in the region and I'm not understanding what your answer is here. And I don't think the American people are either.

Thank you, Senator Warren. General Reed, has the State Department contacted you in this regard to ask for help?

The State Department has, just as they did in the response to Lebanon as well. During that time, there were provisions to get people out by sealift and charter and so the the amount of people who left left with TRANSCOM help as well as State Department charter.

Thank you very much. Senator Peters.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Reed, as you're fully aware, the Straits of Hormuz is a strategic choke point in the Middle East with nearly one-fifth of the global petroleum and three and a half trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas annually transits the straits. The straits closure that we're seeing right now has left about 1,000 vessels stuck in the Persian Gulf. Two tankers were set ablaze just this morning. And even before these attacks, the uncertainty have caused gas prices to skyrocket, oil trading up to $120 a barrel this weekend and still at elevated levels and likely to continue to go up. In fact, according to the International Energy Agency, the war has caused, and this is quote from them, the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. That's a big statement, in the history of the global market. Additionally, 30 percent of the world's fertilizer supply passes through the straits. This increases prices for American farmers as they're beginning planting season. This will mean food prices will also go up dramatically across the the world. We have felt the impacts of the straits closure here, surely in prices in many goods, but we also can't forget the impacts of our service members who rely on being resupplied. So a question for you, sir, is are you in talks with the CENTCOM commander, Admiral Cooper, on having actual plans to open up the strait to commercial traffic and also to ease service member resupply in the region?

We are working with Admiral Cooper as he continues to prosecute the operations that he has. In the warfighting sense, we are doing all that we can to help him get after the targets that he needs to actually suppress the threats on the straits. There is intense concentration to make sure that we can reduce that enough to get to a point where we can get through the straits. When it comes to the sustainment for the forces, the strait is not the only way that that we're restricted to in order to resupply force sustainment. We have alternatives for that and we're currently executing that as we speak.

General Reed, TRANSCOM provides basically the logistics backbone to support our forces in any conflict, including the war in Iran as you're talking about. But this means not only moving troops into the region but also ensuring they have food, fuel, and munitions. And we talked about this issue at length on an office call and we talked about how TRANSCOM relies heavily upon commercial partners to be able to augment your capacity to ensure the delivery of these key supplies. So my question for you is how has your ability to deliver these critical supplies been impacted given the contested logistics environment we're in right now where we have commercial ports, commercial fuel networks, and commercial partners that have been significantly disrupted as a result of the closure of the Straits of Hormuz?

So we do acknowledge the disruptions, but this is exactly what we expect in a contested environment. When it comes to the commercial participation, they are able to deliver to points that are safe and then we will transload and then we take the responsibility from there. And so in this way, together we do and operate where we can, where we operate the best, and then we still get the warfighter the things that they need in their hands when they need it.

So are you believing you're still able to rely on commercial partners for logistic capabilities or does this mean we have to shift to more military options where we have greater control and greater security?

We can absolutely rely on them.

Very good. General Grynkewich, we have seen public reporting on the DOD withdrawing Patriot and THAAD missile defense systems from the Indo-Pacific. These are public reports and repositioning them into the Middle East. These moves I know have alarmed our allies, simultaneously weakening our regional deterrence and emboldening our adversaries including China as well as North Korea. Have you been asked to reposition any of your missile defense systems away from Europe in order to send them to the Middle East?

No, sir, I have not.

Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much. Senator Rosen.

Well, thank you Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed for holding this hearing. Thank you General Grynkewich and General Reed. We have two Reeds here today, right? For your service for to our country. So I want to talk about support for Ukraine's critical infrastructure right now. So General Grynkewich, you know Russia has engaged in a concerted campaign to attack Ukraine's civilian power infrastructure during what's been a brutally cold winter. Despite now entering spring, I'm incredibly concerned that Russia will continue to sustain attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure. So I know you have thoughts on this based on our recent conversation in Munich. And so can you discuss your views on the threat posed by Russian attacks on Ukraine's infrastructure and what kind of support has the U.S. government provided Ukraine to support its critical infrastructure? What more should we be doing in this space?

Yes, Senator. As you alluded to, there were a number of attacks over the coldest winter in decades in Eastern Europe against the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. This included their electrical grid. At times during this period, we saw down to just a couple of hours of electricity per day in Kyiv as an example. And then attacks on the thermo heating plants as well, cutting heat to large swaths of many of the cities across Ukraine. So, you know, the what I would say is I think that these attacks were broadly intended to put pressure on the civilian population to then pressure the government of Ukraine to come to to agreement to end the war. And the what I've observed over the course of studying airpower in history is that anytime you attack a civilian population, you usually end up finding that it just hardens their resolve. We take this all the way back to the London Blitz in World War II. The Brits just had a stiff upper lip and kept on fighting. And I think that's what we've seen in Ukraine as well. Moving forward, I am watching very carefully to see now that it is warming up, do the Russians continue these attacks on that civilian electrical and thermal infrastructure or do they shift to other targets? At this point, it's still unclear, but we're watching it closely.

Thank you. We'll be looking forward to updates from that. I also want to talk about NATO cyber preparedness because NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, they warned that Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. So as you know, Russia's cyber capabilities were core to its invasion and continued war with Ukraine. Russia's demonstrating a growing willingness to employ cyber aggression towards NATO. I'm glad that NATO hosts an annual cyber exercise, Locked Shields, the world's largest multinational cyber defense exercise, is begun to strengthen its cyber capabilities by creating the Integrated Cyber Defense Center, but that's not going to be operational until 2028. So General Grynkewich, how are you and Cybercom working with our NATO allies, Ukraine, European partners to enhance our cyber security capabilities, our cooperation, particularly with those less cyber capable NATO nations because that puts us all at risk and makes us more vulnerable to our adversaries?

Yes, Senator. That's a great question and thanks for asking it. This is one of the areas where the alliance and and I are focused to try to understand how we can bring the cyber capabilities to bear that nations do have. And while there's some countries that don't have a lot of capability in cyber, there are some within the alliance that do and some that we wouldn't expect to have so much.

But we're only as strong as our weakest link, right?

That's true, ma'am, but in alliance that's built on collective defense, we can help each other. If one country is strong in air defense and another country is strong in cyber, there's a natural synergy there where we can help each other to get stronger together. In the classified session, I'd be happy to give you some details on on who the main players are, but we are working to modernize how we access those cyber effects and can use them in a potential conflict.

Thank you. Well, I'm going to stick on this topic because over the past year, Russian aircraft and drones have flown into NATO airspace on multiple occasions. I don't believe these incursions were accidental. Russia's deliberately testing NATO countries, their readiness, their resolve, and the manner and timing of all of our response to this aggression. So building on Senator Fischer, I know she asked this earlier, how do you think NATO can and should most effectively respond to these Russian acts of aggression even if they say they were accidental?

Yes, Senator. I'm very proud of the initial responses I mentioned a little bit earlier, but I would also say that the stand-up of our Eastern Century vigilance activity across the alliance has resulted in a dramatic decrease in this activity. So it has had not just a preventive effect in terms of when when drones are incurring into the airspace being able to stop them, but it's also deterred the Russians from taking that kind of reckless behavior in the first place. So I think there's always there's always work to be done here. It's not perfect. We continue to have limited incursions, but I think we're on the right path and making great progress.

Thank you. I look forward to the classified briefing.

Which will begin precisely at 12:00 noon. A vote is going on right now. Members are encouraged to to go ahead and vote and we will see you in the SVC precisely at 12:00 noon. The hearing will now move to a closed session in SVC-217. This hearing is adjourned.