Special Operations and Cyber Commands Posture for FY 2027 Defense Authorization

Um, when, when we recessed until um eleven fifteen, I didn't know that um a vote was going on on the Senate floor. So um we appreciate our witnesses um visiting with us down in the classified skiff. And now we meet today to receive testimony, um, in open session on the posture of United States Special Operations Command, United States Cyber Command. We're joined by Admiral Mitch Bradley, Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, General Joshua Rudd, Commander of the United States Cyber Command and Director of the National Security Agency, Mister Derrick Anderson, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict and miss k sutton assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy and um all members are um reminded to silence their devices including the chair um recent operations including absolute resolve, mid-height hammer, and epic fury, represent a watershed moment for american military power. Each operation wove cyber effects into the fabric of joint force operations at the beginning of planning. Consequently, our cyber operators were able to illustrate the potential of these capabilities as a force multiplier. unlike any other. We must ensure that the lessons learned from recent operations are fully digested and integrated into our doctrine and planning. However, we cannot allow these successes to lull us into complacency. Cyber threats are immediate, persistent, and they are escalating. Every day our adversaries target America's critical infrastructure and government networks. They're advancing their capabilities to outpace and out-compete our forces in cyberspace, and we must not allow that. To keep up with these threats, we must redouble our efforts to modernize and strengthen American cyber forces. Doing so requires us to make fundamental updates to the way military services generate, organize and sustain cyber forces. This effort is as ambitious as it is necessary. The Pentagon has launched a department-wide initiative, CyberKom two point zero. Two, increased skill and readiness of our cyber forces. This initiative is simple. Just like any other military service, we will need well-trained, a well-trained pipeline of cyber operators, supported by a whole range of acquisition professionals. And we do not have that today, perhaps have testimony about how far along we are. Our test, our cyber operators are working overtime, and we're not ready to generate new forces to replace them. I'm troubled that this effort is not moving fast enough. Current operations will always be priority number one, but we must ensure this pace is sustainable. Our cyber operators are not the only highly specialized forces in demand. America's special operations forces are more important now than ever before. No longer confi confined to their traditional role as a force of last resort, special operations forces often serve as a first choice across the full spectrum of military action. Special operations forces conduct direct action against high-value targets, as we witnessed during the raid to apprehend Nicolas Maduro from his heavily fortified compound outside Caracas. They train and advise partner forces, building capacity and strengthening alliances across Latin America, Europe, and the first island change. They gather intelligence against our adversaries and hostile environments. They respond to crises worldwide at a moment's notice, and they operate in the gray zone between peace and war. Um, the context in which much of today's strategic competition unfolds. However, the funding provided to Special Operations Command has not kept pace with the seemingly insatiable demand for its capabilities. The command faces a troubling gap between its mission requirements and available resources. And I do think there's consensus on both sides of the dais and both sides of the aisle to correct that as soon as we can. Last year, General Brian F- Fenton, then Commander of Special Operations Command, stated before this committee, and I'm gonna quote uh General Fenton, "We continue to grapple with years of flat budgets." a fourteen percent decrease in buying power, significant personnel reductions, and the requirement to evolve our technology and authorities. All this forces trade-offs, tough choices that challenge current missions, and put modernization at risk." End of quote from General Fenton. Uh, ladies and gentlemen, unfortunately, the one point six billion dollar increase in last year's reconciliation funding was not fully applied to the purpose for which Congress intended it. Perhaps we could discuss that today. This morning I looked to Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson to tell us, um, to tell this committee what they need. I hope they will tell us how to equip their force to combat the advanced militaries of china and russia to remain fully engaged in the fight against violent islamic terrorism and to respond at a moment's notice as our nation's premier crisis response force and with that i recognize my friend and colleague the ranking member reid for his opening remarks

thank you very much mr. chairman and welcome uh admiral bradley and general rudd mister henderson and miss sutton thank you very much and please convey our thanks our deep thanks to the men and women under your command tomorrow marks two months since president trump launched uh the war with iran both special operations command and cyber command are deeply engaged in this conflict Our special operators and cyber forces have played a major role in enabling combat operations, conducting information warfare, and providing intelligence support, including the remarkable mission to rescue the crew of the F-fifteen aircraft shot down in Iran early this month. This hearing is a reminder that modern warfare requires the full integration of every element of American military power. Today I would like my our witnesses to provide updates on how their personnel are engaged in the war with Iran and what lessons should be drawn for future conflicts. Admiral Bradley, our special operations forces are unparalleled, but they are not without limits. I am concerned the administration has been deploying your forces at an unsustainable pace and for uh missions that could be questioned. Over the past year, SOCOM has led and executed the attack on Venezuela to capture Nicolas Maduro, the boat strike campaign in the Caribbean and Pacific, and various operations throughout the Middle East and Africa. I have serious concerns about Operation Southern Sphere in particular. Our service members have been ordered to strike and kill hundreds of suspected criminals in the open ocean over the past eight months. placing them in legally and ethically powerless circumstances. I would ask for an update on SOCOM's role in Southern Sphere and its missions in the region, moving forward. Additional, Bradley, in your prepared statement you rightly discussed how warfare is increasingly defined by, in your words, competition below the threshold of armed conflict. In essence, a gray zone environment. that is precisely where our special operations forces should be most affected and i would ask for your plans to prepare our special forces for such environments and what impact today's high operations tempo could have on future readiness similarly mister anderson i would appreciate an update on the role of our special operations in advising us partners in europe and the indo-pacific and what steps you are taking to help equip and modernize our forces i would also ask for an update on your efforts to strengthen the abilities of your office to fill its service secretary like responsibilities for the oversight of the organization and readiness of our special operations forces general rudd miss sutton i understand you are conducting a cyber two point o force structure review i welcome such a review the current cyber mission force design is more than a decade old and chronic readiness problems persist Our most skilled cyber operators are highly sought after in the private sector, and the military cannot easily match uh the financial incentives that they're presented with. As such, a professional attrition in cyber comm remains high. I would appreciate an update on the force design changes you are considering, and how such changes could affect the joint cyber warfare warfare fighting architecture. Additionally, this committee has been briefed in closed session about the cyber activities used during recent operations like midnight hammer and absolute resolve. I would like to understand in open session how you are integrating cyber effects into combat missions and operational planning, and where shortfalls remain that can be addressed through legislation. Finally, Miss Sutton, your office is new, and it's mandate is very consequential. providing civilian oversight and advocacy for cybercom. i would like to hear how you are structuring your office, whether you are adequately resourced, and how you are working across the department to improve acquisition functions and civilian hiring authorities for the command. thank you again uh all of you that the missions of socom and cybercom are indispensable to our national security And I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. John.

Alright, Secretary Anderson, I think we'll start with you on opening statements, um, if you don't mind. And I know you you um you you uh gave um full statement in the classified section. But but feel free to go ahead and and um tell us what you have in mind.

Uh, thank you, uh, Senator, and appreciate that. Uh, Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reid, and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our nation's special operations forces. I'm honored to testify alongside Assistant Secretary Catherine Sutton, Admiral Mitch Bradley, and Jo- uh, General Joshua Rudd. The solid team together with their US SOCOM counterparts bring invaluable expertise, leadership, and insight as we advocate on behalf of the soft enterprise our service members and their families. People are the foundation of SOF and of the joint force. They are our competitive advantage against our adversaries. We are thankful for those who have volunteered to serve, those currently in harm's way, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including the thirteen US service members we've lost during ongoing operations. We honor their lives and legacy and will never forget the sacrifices in defense of our country. Today's security environment is defined by simultaneity, convergence, and speed. State adversaries, terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal networks are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active across domains and regions. To answer these challenges, the national defense strategy marks a fundamental shift, directing the Department of War to implement a flexible, realistic approach to protect America's interests. Purpose built for this era, soft provides capability and optionality. Comprising only three percent of the joint force, and less than two percent of the department's budget, roughly equivalent to the procurement cost of a single aircraft carrier, SOF delivers outsized strategic value. SOF provides senior leaders with scalable, tailorable, and asymmetric options across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Leveraging persistent global presence, generational relationships, and unique authorities, the quiet professionals within SOF shape the operating environment, strengthen partners, and impose cost on our adversaries. While you may not read about it in the headlines, Ager, m- every major operation has a soft component to it. Operations like Southern Spear, Rough Rider, Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and Epic Fury have demonstrated our nation's prowess and commitment to confront our adversaries wherever they may be. From the Western Hemisphere across the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and beyond, SOF has been decisive in defending the homeland, deterring China, and enabling our partners and allies. Should deterrence fail, SOF's posture with the joint force to prevail in high-end conflict. In accordance with the law and congressional guidance, of which we are immensely grateful, the department has taken decisive and concrete steps to institutionalize Solick's oversight and advocacy role, and strengthen the governments of the SOF enterprise. Over the last year and a half, we have transformed the Secretariat for Special Operations to provide direct civilian oversight across organized train and equip responsibilities. not to duplicate or disrupt the operational execution role of US SOCOM, but to support, sustain, and strengthen it. This transformation moves us beyond beyond the old advisory construct, to a true exercise of authority, direction, and control through an analytical, disciplined, data-driven, and strategically sound approach. While the maturation of these initiatives is ongoing, these foundational changes fulfill congressional intent and provide the oversight mechanisms needed to shape force structure, guide budgetarian planning processes, and forge the future of soft. The optionality that soft delivers requires resourcing and investments. To maintain our competitive edge, soft needs sustained partnership, predictable resourcing, and continued modernization. We greatly appreciate the support from this committee, and I commit to continued collaboration with Congress and to make full use of my position in the department and alongside the services to ensure soft remains resourced, ready, relevant, and accountable. and to ensure that they can meet today's missions while transforming for tomorrow's challenges. I'm honored to lead the soft lead the soft enterprise. I invite you to visit our special operators and their families across the globe, to see firsthand in the great work they do and the challenges they face. Our service members and their families represent the finest that America has to offer and are something we as a nation should be proud of. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

OK, let's go Admiral Bradley and then we'll do secretary. sutton and general rudd admiral you're recognized

chairman thank you chairman wicker ranking member reid and distinguished members of this of this committee thank you for the opportunity to represent the men and women of the united states special operations command i am honored to testify alongside honorable derrick Anderson resw solic in socom we rely upon the empowered socom solic team for oversight support and advocacy to succeed in all of our global missions Furthermore, privileged to testify alongside our partners from CyberKom, General Josh Rudd and ASW Honorable Katie Sutton, the deep integration between our commands ensures, as you have said, Chairman, that we can project power and protect the homeland across all domains. Distinguished members of this committee, the Honorable Anderson has laid out the strategic challenge and I I'd like to emphasize what this means for uh for your war fighters inside SOCOM. The bottom line is we do not have the luxury of focusing on only a single goal or mission. While we defend the homeland as our top priority, we must also orient our force on the long-term pacing challenge of of China. We simultaneously deter the acute threat of conventional aggression from Russia and Iran, and remain postured to dismantle the networks of their proxies, while we guard against the reckless provocations of isolated rogue states. And through it all, the persistent threat of ideologically driven and narco-terrorism continues to demand our, and our integrated inter-agencies, constant vigilance. This is the reality of simultaneity. To meet this reality, we carry on the legacy of the Chindits, the Marine Raiders, the underwater demolition teams, and the Jedburgs of World War Two. small teams who flew and parachuted behind enemy lines or swam through murky waters, not to win the war by themselves, but to empower our partners to win it as part of a greater alliance. That is the essence of how we, as just three percent of the joint force and less two percent of the department's budget, provide an un- indispensable asymmetric advantage. We are a force ready to multiply the effects of our allies, partners, and our joint force teammates. Our joint force teammates recognize this. They recognize that our SOF are more in demand today than we ever have been. Your two billion dollar, near two billion dollar uplift to our budget last year in twenty-six, was an important down payment. But after five years of flat bell- budgets, only with increased investment can we continue to meet the demands of the competition crisis and modernization for future conflict. You see, our purpose is our mission. This means that we are laser focused on maintaining the readiness required to defend the homeland, to deter aggression from our pacing challenge, and to enable true burden sharing by empowering the growing capacity of our allies and partners. But that mission is not accomplished by technology alone. It is executed by the most decisive advantage we have, our people. Empowered by a culture of meritocracy and supported by critical programs that you have helped to manifest. like the preservation of the force in family. The health of your soft formation is not just strong, it's getting stronger every day. And to ensure these exceptional men and women can succeed in the complex environments of tomorrow increasingly encroaching upon today, we are making transformation our imperative. We must adapt faster than our adversaries. We must sustain and improve our ability to project force through the most contested environments. We must evolve to leverage the ubiquitous information environment, and we must make advantageous use of abundant, attritable autonomy, as we support the joint force. We are evolving our force design, accelerating capability development, and strengthening our partnerships with the services and allies, to stay ahead of emerging threats. Our partnership with SOCOM with Cybercom is a hallmark of this evolution, synchronizing virtual and physical domain maneuver across the spectrum for mission success. As the department's lead for experimentation in autonomy, we are not just adapting, we are driving change. We are working with the services to incorporate next-generation capabilities, systems that are precise, autonomous, affordable, and always consistent with the law of war. Our goal? To deliver these tools with the element of surprise from unwarned access and placement at scale ensuring our forces maintain the decisive advantage against any adversary. However, our ability to accomplish this is not guaranteed. It requires accelerated modernization in your continued partnership. Predictable resourcing for our program's modernization is a strategic necessity. Soft was purpose-built for this era of competition, and with your continued support, we will meet today's missions while transforming to ensure we are ready for the challenges of tomorrow. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Admiral. Secretary Sutton, you are recognized.

Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reid, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I am honored to be here with General Rudd, whose immense experience, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, will prove invaluable as we posture to implement the priorities of the national defense strategy. I congratulate Lieutenant General Hartman and his wife, Catherine, on his retirement and thank him for his service and visionary leadership that has built the cyber enterprise over the years, setting the stage for our future success. It is a privilege to also testify alongside our special operations partners, Assistant Secretary of War, Derek Anderson and Admiral Rich Bradley. This joint appearance underscores a critical reality. The synergy between our communities creates an asymmetric advantage, presenting our adversaries with compounding dilemmas in both physical and virtual worlds. In my role, I'm responsible for overseeing the department's cyber operations part policies, integrating cyber activities, and exercising authority, direction, and control over US Cyber Command. I'd like to start by describing two key dynamics of the strategic cyber environment. The character of cyber warfare is changing rapidly, shaped by the growing threat posed by our adversaries and accelerated by the ever-growing power of technology. The first major change we are seeing is that our adversaries have moved beyond conducting espionage and theft and are preparing for conflict by pre-positioning disruptive capabilities inside our nation's critical infrastructure. This strategic shift from exploitation to effects aims to disrupt military deployments and sow chaos in crisis or conflict. Cyber-threats like Volt Typhoon are not just a nuisance, they represent a significant and persistent threat to our national security. Second, artificial intelligence is a powerful force multiplier, increasing the speed, scale, and sophistication of these threats. AI accelerates the entire attack life cycle, creating a new dynamic where the pace of attacks challenges our ability to react, and the scale overwhelms our ability to defend. Rapid innovation has lowered the barrier for entry for advanced cyber actors, blurring the line between nation-states and other malicious actors. Our adversaries are operationalizing AI to out-compete us, and we must move urgently to put these same tools in the hands of our war fighters. Given these realities, a purely defensive posture is no longer sufficient. To implement the twenty twenty six national defense strategies, vision of achieving peace through strength, we must act decisively to transform the cyber enterprise, guided by three core priorities. First, we must integrate cyber across all domains. Cyber is the connective tissue of modern warfare, playing a critical role in joint operations alongside our special operations partners. We will continue to integrate cyber capabilities across every warfighting domain to develop a full range of options to deter conflict and ensure the joint force has every advantage. Second, we must gain strategic advantage below the level of armed conflict. A resilient defense must be paired with proactive, relentless disruption. By empowering our world-class cyber operators to execute full spectrum cyber operations we will systematically erode our adversaries' cyber capabilities dismantle their infrastructure and impose consequences. Third, our fourth our force must organize to dominate. Our strategies are only as effective as the force that executes them. Through the Cyber Command two dot O initiative, we are undertaking the most comprehensive transformation of our cyber force since its inception to elevate our operational readiness scale technological advantage and propel our force to meet the modern demands of conflict. To achieve these priorities, we are leveraging the ene- engine of American industry, harnessing the speed and innovation of the private sector to protect the cyber domain that powers our national security, our economic prosperity, and the American way of life. My office is leading the development of a Department of War cyber strategy to implement this pivot which I look forward to sharing with the committee when complete. Let there be no doubt, the Department of War's commitment to the defense of this nation is absolute. We have a solemn duty to ensure our joint force is equipped to dominate within the highly contested cyber domain. The support of this committee is fundamental to this mission's success. Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much. General Rudd.

Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, alongside my distinguished colleagues from the Department and US Special Operations Command. With me today is Command Chief Master Sergeant Kenneth Bruce, the US Cyber Command and National Security Agency Senior Senior Enlisted Leader. We are honored to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, guardians, and coast guardsmen, as well as the civilians who defend our networks and deliver effects that matter every day. I want to thank this committee for your continued support for our critical mission at US Cyber Command. I also want to recognize and thank Lieutenant Lieutenant General Joe Hartman and his wife Catherine for their many years of service to this nation and their incredible contribution to Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. The people of US Cyber Command are paramount to our success. Their professionalism and dedication enable everything we accomplish. Our workforce represents the finest talent in cyber operations, a broad team of military service members and civilian professionals, delivering unparalleled expertise to one of the nation's most critical missions. CyberKom's mission is three-fold. Defend the homeland. defend the Department of War's information networks, and support the joint force. In executing these missions, we maintain a formidable partnership with the National Security Agency. NSA's roles, responsibilities, and capabilities complement CyberKom's, creating a unity of effort that strengthens our common defense. Since taking command, I've emphasized four operating principles, speed, scale, innovation, and integration. I'm proud to report that CyberKom has been executing under these principles since before my arrival, which has made for a smooth transition and allowed me to hit the ground running. Throughout twenty twenty five and into twenty twenty six, we've quickly adapted to the dynamic and complex cyber domain, demonstrating our value at scale. In two thousand and twenty-five, we executed more than eight thousand cyber-missions, an increase of twenty-five percent compared to twenty-twenty-four. This year, we expect even more activity, and with your support, I'm certain our talented force is up to the task. CyberKom gains experience and insights from real-world operations every day, and that experience guides our operational support to the warfighter. Our innovative activity contributes to mission outcomes, to force-building initiatives like CyberKom two point O, and to the employment of emerging technologies. Cyber domain cuts across all war-fighting domains, and integrating cyber into the joint force operations enhances combatant command effectiveness across the board. When called upon, CyberKom employs full spectrum cyber operations with and on behalf of the other combatant commands to deter and if necessary defeat our adversaries. Our participation in Operation Absolute Resolve and Operation Epic Theory are prime examples of this integration in action, cyber and kinetic operations working seamlessly to achieve joint objectives. We're also executing the service-like authorities granted to us by Congress. CyberKom two point O is moving at pace and achieving new milestones each month. Through CyberKom two point O, we will deliver the capability and capacity to identify and hire a talented workforce, provide them with optimal training, and incentivize them to stay in the cyber force. Additionally, it will enhance our ability to work more closely with industry and academia to develop, acquire, and operationalize cutting-edge capabilities. Cyber Command will continue to work with the Cyber Policy team and the services to ensure CyberKom two point O is implemented effectively. Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. I look forward to working with you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much. Uh, Secretary Sutton and General Rudd, let me begin with the two of you. Um, I read um a pretty um disturbing quote from um General Brian Fenton um last year. Uh, about years of flat budgets, fourteen percent decrease in buying power. and and significant personnel reductions. Um. How is um Cybercom two point zero going to address these? Um. And i- is the work uh, is our pace at this point happening fast enough? Secretary Sutton.

Senator, thanks for the opportunity to talk about this really critical initiative. Uh, one of the concepts of Cyber Command two dot O is really looking at how we build mastery into our force before we continue to just grow the force. We have our built out our cyber mission force and have largely been able to get them to a basic trained and qualified level. What we really need to look at and what the aim of Cyber Command two dot O is how do we take that basic and trained force and build in domain mastery and specialized skills to be able to get after some of these problems that we face and to have them be a more effective and more lethal lethal force. To do that, the Cyber Command two dot O implementation plan looks across the entire talent management pipeline to really address this not as an incremental one by one step, but to re-look at the entire way that we talent manage this force, to really build that unique technical skill set in, the way that we've done other models in the department, like the medical community, the soft community, the nuclear community. And so we are take undertaking that implementation plan very rapidly, looking at how we can do quick wins and pilots off the bat, and then learn take lessons learned from those and implement more of the long-term policies. We can always move faster and we continue to move faster, and look forward to continuing to brief you on our progress as we move forward.

Uh, well General Rutter, I'll let you follow up there, but it, could you identify your most um in in um in connection with CyberKom two point O, your most important milestone to achieve um um at the earliest possible moment?

Yeah. Thanks Chairman, uh appreciate the opportunity to follow up on this. The CyberKom two point O approach is built on seven attributes. First and foremost, it's the people. We've gotta identify, recruit, and assess and bring in the right people and get them at that baseline level of certification that enables them to do the mission as soon as they get to the force. The next, the next attribute that's really guiding and driving us is incentivization. So both, uh, um monetarily for the skill set great competition with the private sector as you would imagine for this type of skill set and making sure that we harness every authority and every scent that we have to incentivize the workforce next critical piece of this is training we've gotta have the right training pipeline and the right resources centered around training to go again from what the services provide which is that baseline operational capability, and then bringing it to what we desire for every member is the mastery. We've then gotta make sure that we can retain this force. This is where we look at models like special operations command, where across the service components, there's a career path where we can retain the best and the highly trained ones, that have again, ideally gained mastery or working towards mastery. We can repeatedly keep them in a rotation and a an assignment here at at cyber command. And then also much like uh special operations, we're developing and executing special admission sets. That requires specialized training and again, the ability to incentivize and and retain that talent. And then finally, we're looking at it's not just the cyber operator, but it's also the enablers, it's the headquarters element and the support pieces that come with that. That's part of the forced presentation model from the services, and that's what we're getting after. Chairman, the the the most, I think one of the biggest challenges is really just figuring out how do we attract the right people and incentivize them to wanna have a a career in in cyber force

and um just you can't do this on the cheap can you general

chairman we certainly can

uh thank you very much senator reed

thank you very much mr. chairman uh admiral bradley and uh mr. anderson um you have some of the same issues and you've been working on it before as uh secretary sutton and general rudd of creating a service secretary like position and um since you've been uh both confirmed what have you done to sort of accomplish that mission getting you into the service secretary like mode and maybe what advice you have for our cyberconf friends

As Senator, first and foremost, uh, you know, Honorable Sutton and I uh speak regularly about this topic. Uh, I can assure you of that, but I want to thank the committee specifically on the nine O seven authorities that you gave us and the NDA that allowed us to be a service-like entity. Uh, since taking the seat we've had a few initiatives uh, but just to highlight a few, Senator Uh, you know, we've been investing more in our personnel, having that advocacy for the budget, um, specifically being in the room with our service secretaries, uh, to make sure we're doing things in an efficient manner and it's the best dollar going uh for the taxpayer. Um, administratively, um, Admiral Bradley and I have done a a sprint, as you might call it, uh, where we have taken our staffs to look at where there might be efficiencies made, so we don't have duplicate efforts, both from the SOLIC enterprise as well as from the so so come enterprise ideally uh we come out with a general order one similar to what the army uh and other services do where it lays out the roles and the responsibilities for uh us as a service like in solic and then obviously uh so common animal so it's been a great great initiative that we've been pushing forward and it's and it's quite honestly uh made our staffs talk uh and be and be more open in dialogue in how we do things. So uh I'd be remiss not to mention I have I think one of uh how we've

Hmm.

organized ourselves specifically in to mirror something like what the services have where we have a capabilities and development, we have an MNRA uh and we have a special operations analytical arm as well. So um it's a lot of work, but we're moving headstrong uh forward with it. Admiral?

Uh, yes. Remember, at first I'd start foundationally, we inside the uniform uh aspects of SOCOM recognize a constitutional foundation of civilian control of the uniformed service. It's a critical facet of our constitutional democracy, and uh we are fully supportive of manifesting it inside our formations as well. Very pragmatically as well, uh, as SOCOM recognizes that the next challenges we face will be solved through a tighter integration with our service uh teammates, we have to also have that uh service connection at the secretariat level. And so inside the Pentagon it's very important for a robust, empowered, solely to be able to uh to be in the same meetings and to have the same interactions to complement what we are doing on the uniform side. And uh the sprint and the interactions that our staff are having to to both find places where horizontal integration is appropriate, that is, teaming to divide labor and be better, but also appropriately where vertically oversight functions need to exist. Both of those are are critical aspects that are coming out of this sprint.

Thank you very much. Uh, General Rudd, uh, we've talked a lot about cyber comp, can you, uh, tell us what you believe your three top challenges are at NSA?

and sorry ranking member at nsa

yes i'm sorry that's my rural accent forgive me

alright no thanks ranking member the i you know it it kind of goes back to the operating principles against which i conveyed both to the committee in my opening statement but also to the forces we have to move at the pace of the strategic environment in which driven really in large part by the pace of technology. So the ability to be able to harness technology ahead of an adversary to be at the foremost front and retain and maintain that advantage is is really what's critical. The next piece is the ability to scale. Um, we've gotta take our our our efforts, again, to move fast, figure out where does it apply not only across other parts of NSA, but across CyberKom, but then of course across the entirety of the joint force. Um, and then driven by innovation, moving creatively to solve the hardest problems. We may not always have the scale and mass that we would we would desire, but we know that we can creatively outthink anybody. and then finally it's integration we wanna make sure that we are nested with again not only across the two commands to be complimentary that delivers that speed but then in support of the joint force but also in support of inter-agency where where required

well i've fourteen seconds left so i can just salute uh secretary sutton i think you're gonna do an excellent job uh and one of the issues of the question i was gonna ask send you a written question with the center thank you the center of gravity for your ai

time's up

uh efforts in the uh cybercom uh realm and also i think in uh special ops i think that's the question we'll send in writing but it's important thank you very much mr.

thank you sir senator fisher

thank you mr. chairman uh admiral bradley how are you working um And assessing so comes, um, if it's appropriately postured for the Indo-Pacific.

Senator, thank you. Uh, first, uh, we we look at it across the spectrum of conflict. Competition, crisis, and, uh, should, uh, crisis cascade into conflict, how are we positioned to be able to, uh, support the combatant commander? uh, my good friend, Admiral Sam Paparo. Um, how are we prepared to integrate with the services and the service components there in the Endopaycom AOR? And at a competition level, how are we able to, uh, provide value to our allies and partners to strengthen the resilience of our, of our alliances there? And we believe that that is, uh, foremost and, and most important in any strategy of deterrence, is to have that stronger alliance. So.

Do you, do you have direct impact um input when you're talking about being able to uh integrate with the services do you have input on the training and um equipping the them for the uh specifically

uh certainly on our soft forces i do i have i have direct responsibility statutory responsibility to ensure that our our soft members are trained and adequate to the missions that they'll be presented with

to integrate with the services

Uh, well, to do our missions, and part of our mission is to integrate with the service. So, yes.

OK. Thank you. Um, we've seen our adversaries increasingly, uh, coordinate, especially on malign activity. So how is, how is SOCOM working to strengthen relationships with our allies and our partners, which you talked about earlier, but both in terms of building up uh first of all our capabilities with them but also their own capabilities and when you work on those combined uh training exercises.

Senator, the uh of course the first level in in a relationship is trust, the first uh the most basic essence, and that trust comes from credibility. Um our relationships over generations help us to give that credibility, bring that credibility and that trust. Um, I might pick just one as an example, the the country of the Philippines, where, um, for a hundred years, over a hundred years now, we've had an institutional relationship as a as a nation. But just since twenty sixteen and our partnership on island to help the Philippine, uh, armed forces clear Marawi, uh, one of their principal cities of the threat from ISIS, has given us great ability to stretch across turbulent political and diplomatic times, to today where we are able to use that credibility, help them see and share information with them through uh some new relationship uh dynamics to understand the threats to their sovereign territory. And so that that sharing of information is a critical aspect to allow them to take action uh for their own problems in the information in the competition space.

Uh I'm I'm sure you've um had a number of opportunities there in the Indo-Pacific to work on having that greater uh collaboration with our partner forces. I was um interested in your view on the exercises that took place uh with cold response twenty six. Well, you know, looking at Norway and Finland, an entirely different, uh, environment, I'd say.

Yes, ma'am. I'll I'll I'll, uh, I'll speak, uh, more generally, and I, I don't want to get ahead of, uh, of my good friend, General Grinkovich there who, who of course oversees those. But but, uh, from a soft perspective, our partnership with our Scandinavian and European and NATO allies has has always been critical. Um, of course, for the last twenty-five years, a lot of focus for us in the Middle East. not as many uh snow-capped mountains to to work in as in the as in the high north. And so as we re-enter into that area, working with our Scandinavian partners has brought an awful lot of uh uh reprisal of old skills back. And so we are we are deepening those and I think that partnership not just in the uh on the land but in the maritime domain is a critical component to what uh we will offer to NATO for future deterrence.

Good to hear. Uh, Miss Sutton. How will cyber comm two point O enable the department to better adapt to the evolving technological landscape, uh, when we look at AI? That's kind of what the question is that, uh, Senator Reid, I think, was going to send you.

So, as technology continues to move at a tremendous speed, One of the gaps we're seeing in the force is the ability to get our force after they've made it through the service basic training, to have training available at the speed of need to address some of these technologies. So, for example, um, someone might have made it through their basic training. How do we provide training for them on cloud, AI, on SCADA systems, other specialized things we're gonna need? One of the enablers of Cyber Command two dot O is creation of an advanced cyber training and education center which is not gonna be a brick and mortar institution that builds courses sort of the traditional way but is looking at how we leverage industry and academia to have training available for our active force to be able to get it closing those skill gaps as technology continues to move quickly, let's leverage the training that's available in industry that's moving at that speed as well.

Uh, thank you. I will have a question for General Red for the record, uh, when we look at CyberCon, uh, two point O and it's specifically for the Indo-Pacific. Thank you.

Thank you. Senator Fischer, Senator Blumenthal.

Thank you, Senator Wicker. Uh, thank you all for being here and again, as I expressed this morning, thank you all for your service in our closed session we discussed a number of the questions i'd like to raise now first um i think our cooperation with ukraine is tremendously important i'm regretful that we are in my view failing to provide all of the support that we should militarily um i am working hard on a russian sanctions bill that i hope will help economically stop the flow of revenue to putin's war machine from purchasers of russian oil and gas and intelligence sharing has been tremendously important to ukraine in pushing back and i think impressively on russia's assault the false narrative that russia is winning i've tried to counter based on my trips to ukraine ten in all uh most recently in february where i saw really the progress that ukraine is making contrary to some of the propaganda that russia is spreading about how they are winning but i'd like to ask uh this panel maybe beginning with general rudd um whether our intelligence sharing is continuing in a robust way as it has been in the past, which i think has been tremendously important, to the extent you can comment in this setting.

uh thanks senator blumenthal um as we discussed previously the uh the focus and attention um on a variety of priorities and and efforts is remains steady we move in an agile manner to various crisis and or efforts, but we maintain focus and pressure on that. And so our support through European command, from an intelligence perspective, in support of that effort, uh, remains intact. We're looking consistently and making sure that we have the right resources and folks focused on that, working very closely with General Grinkovich on that.

I hope that our military command will let us know if there's any change in that approach and policy because i think that the american people deserve to know if there is a reduction or diminution in our intelligence commitment um general bradley uh i'm sorry admiral bradley uh if you could tell us a bit about the lessons learned from ukraine

Senator, abs- absolutely. Uh, first, uh, to answer the original question and maybe bridge to that, um, one of the things that I think we provide through those relationships long-standing is the venue for others to partner in to bring capacity and capability. And so one of our soft headquarters there, uh, a siege of sort of, uh, offers the opportunity for nineteen different nations to partner to come to support the uh the effort across the area. And I, and I think that's critical because it is not just about what we bring, but it's about enabling those partners to really share more of the burden, to be able to provide assistance to the Ukrainians as well. Ultimately though, I think to your point about lessons learned, if I look back over the last twenty-five years of counterterrorism targeting, where our integrated inter-agency, law enforcement, intel community and military, We're able to bring great precision to our understanding of both the adversary, but also the context around the adversary, those civilians that were not adversaries. That has been very important. Those lessons have translated very, uh, importantly into the high-end conflict of the Ukraine battlefield. And so we, we continue to apply those lessons, refine them with new information, and, and frankly, we learn from them as well as we do impart to our teammates there.

When I've visited Ukraine, uh, often i've gone to the drone manufacturing facilities which have grown in sophistication and number they're producing i think a thousand drones a day now and what is so impress me is they change they work on the evolution of their drones on the assembly line they'll get real time information from the battlefield and they'll make adjustments literally as they are manufacturing and uh i don't know anything in our industrial base that is as nimble and agile and quick, um, I hope this panel agrees that we need to move more in that direction. Would you agree, Admiral?

Senator, I do, although I will say that many of our business, our defense industrial base partners are watching this as well. And of course,

Yeah.

Ukrainians are driven by the existential need for that cycle of adaptation. Uh, as we watch that, I have great confidence that our uh, industrial base here can do the same.

Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Uh, thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal. Senator Budd.

Thank you, Chairman. Good to see each of you. Thank you all for being here. Uh, Admiral Bradley, I want to talk about SOCOM's operation and maintenance budget, if you will. So, I noticed that O and M has only increased from nine point four billion to ten point nine billion between twenty nineteen and twenty seven. Um, so it it's failing to keep pace with inflation and more importantly the increase in the operational tempo. So can you talk about what you'd be able to do with a higher top-line and some of the trade-offs that you're currently making between O and M as it is and modernization and also Milkon?

Senator, I I will um specifically to O and M in in uh in unique ways, uh Special Operations Command uses our ops and maintenance budget for our m- key modernization efforts. Uh, in most cases to be able to re-modernize just not just through the development of new means, articles and and uh and devices but also the ways in which those means are used. That requires, uh, more exquisite ranges that have the ability for us to be able to practice, train, and rehearse in increasingly contested electromagnetic spectrum environments. Those are difficult to be able to produce inside the United States, but, but not undoable. It just takes more money. Um, we also need threat representative systems to be able to operate against, again, though, and operators to mimic our adversaries as they operate them. All of that takes, uh, new ranges in money. and for the employment of autonomy, as uh Senator Blumenthal was uh discussing. We have to be able to bring together our standard uh exquisite weapons systems now with teamed and collaborative autonomy. And there are very few places inside the United States where that is an easy thing to do, um, in many places where it needs to be done, and we are working to do that.

Thank you for that. Um, a question, uh, for you, Admiral Bradley, and also Secretary Anderson. Um, I'd like your thoughts on how we retain mid-career operators, if you will. You know, I know, um, each service drives their own bonus programs, and I acknowledge that money is not the only reason why folks stay or go. Um, but, so tell us what you're doing to help retain our most seasoned operators, whether it's through non-monetary or monetary. Secretary Anderson, we'll start with you and then, uh, Admiral Bradley, please.

Yes, Senator, um, one of the things I noticed uh when I was over in the army was, you know, you just can't throw money at the problem all the time, right? Whether it be retention bonuses, that certainly is helpful, but we've seen things in the army where, you know, change of duty location, um, those small things are what keep our individuals in. But what I would argue within the SOCOM community that we do incredibly well is our preservation of the force in family. uh which um uh congress has has been so gracious to give us that eleven million dollars. Now granted we're gonna see uh an increase uh in the workforce on that, um but what I will tell you is when we look at the the service member and when they're making those decisions to stay in the military, it's typically not done in the team room, it's not done at the pool, it's not done wherever, it's usually done at the kitchen table. So the preservation of the force and family has been an absolutely amazing program. where we're not only taking care of our operators from a physical standpoint, but from a mental standpoint. Uh, you'll hear Admiral Bradley talk about the mind gym, um, that we, that we, uh, have our service members where if you see a professional athlete when they go out to to the to the top tiers, uh, yes, their physical body is absolutely, uh, in great shape, but their minds also have to be pristine. And so, uh, whether it be family, uh, family, uh, outings, uh where we can take individuals and have them speak uh with folks to help their family out uh but that but that um motive program the preservation of the force in family is absolutely critical when we look at retention senator

thank you sir thank you

senator the only thing i would add is that um as you highlighted pay incentives are a part of it but those are controlled by the services in another place where a robust and empowered so like helps us to be able to stitch those together to insure we have uh, a common approach across all the services for all of our operators and enablers.

Very helpful. Thank you both. Um, Secretary Anderson, I'm a strong supporter of the US-Israel counter-UXS program. Um, I think that's in your office. So can you talk about what your team's doing to assist Israel in countering Iranian unmanned systems and how these programs actually help our own military in return?

Uh yes, Senator. Uh so we have a unique ability to be able to work with countries like Israel and there's a few other countries out there where we do essentially a fifty-fifty burden sharing uh investment um what we have found incredibly uh helpful is to see some of the the counter-UXS that uh us and Israel have developed um together uh that have one hundred percent been applicable to uh operations like Epic-Fury. Um now granted we al- we don't always have the capability that has the same function, if that makes sense. So there's certainly things that we wanna use the capability for, that the Israelis wanna use the capability for, but it's been one hundred percent an absolute um uh great partnership with the Israelis to be able to uh not only on the counter-UXS front, but a few other different areas that that we've been able to work with the Israelis.

Very helpful. Thank you all.

thank you very much senator bud senator hirono

thank you mr. chairman general rudd you know in previous elections as part of the election security group esg uh both cybercom and nsa played a vital role in protecting our democratic processes from foreign interference and i and i i assume you share my concern that uh there is a potential for foreign interference in our upcoming elections And so um I'd like to ask if uh you you have already set up or you gonna you're planning to set up uh the ESG to ensure that there is no foreign interference in our upcoming elections.

Hey, Senator, we we certainly share your concern and we're always looking as you would expect us to for any type of foreign activity that would undermine our our democratic process. And as as as we discussed, we are we are postured and ready to uh support as required our task in making sure that we safeguard our elections.

Well, do you have an ESG set up for this purpose?

Yeah, Senator, I don't I don't know that an ESG has been established yet, but we are prepared to as as required.

well we used to have uh esg and see i i think you can understand why i'm concerned because there is no reason not to anticipate a foreign interference in our elections ie russia china possibly iran although they're being uh maybe they have other uh things to deal with but uh do you uh do you anticipate foreign interference with our upcoming elections

senator i think it's it's reasonable to expect based on what we've seen in the past that the

uh and so i i think it is really important to uh to set up an esg and i will follow up with you on whether that is happening uh will you commit to zealously guarding our elections this year and uh report to congress any attempts by um by this uh administration to polarize the process

senator we'll we will certainly uh execute uh what we're tasked to in in regards to that

yeah i realize that that uh you have a responsibility regarding foreign interference with our elections but there is uh definitely uh efforts uh to um uh domestically interfere with our elections by for example uh having the former attorney general sue twenty nine states for voter rolls these are millions of people's information what does uh the department of justice need with these uh with this information what do they intend to do and not to mention they desire to to uh push for the passage of the so-called save act which will result in millions of people who are currently registered to vote unable to register to vote because they don't have either a birth certificate or um uh passport so there are things happening on the domestic front and that's why i have uh you know i have some serious concerns uh for admiral bradley uh one of the so so comes enduring competitive advantage and you mentioned that they how important our allies are uh in great power competition is its network of allies and partners in the inter-pacific built over decades through sustained engagement training and interoperability um given the increased demands for homeland defense and ally burden sharing in the new n. d. s. how are you increasing soph's posture and presence in the first and second island chains i mean that's a good question to deter chinese aggression and support our more powerful's uh denial defense

Senator, thank you. Um, as you know, uh, General Fenton, um, um, was very strong on leading to adjust our posture over the last four years, to be able to, uh, have, uh, to empower those generational relationships. And thanks to both chambers, frankly, but, uh, your strong work, we are well-resourced with, uh, with people in the right structure to be able to sustain that, uh, that presence and that commitment, uh, while we manage the ongoing threats to the homeland and the other, uh, commitments that we have.

um ok i'm i'm glad that uh some of you already uh uh talked about the importance of having the uh the kind of workforce that is trained to deal with uh the needs of the of the the uh cyber domain and um um general rod you mentioned that it is really critical get to get the right kind of people what what are the right kind of people that you are hoping to recruit uh to be trained in the cyber domain

yeah thanks senator as you would expect someone who's highly technical-minded smart innovative motivated and uh is committed to uh doing something extraordinary

do you have a number of goal i mean how many thousands of people are we gonna need to have this kind of training to counter the malign activities of of our near peer competitors

Yeah, Senator, I I think we have objectives that are outlined within CyberKom two point O, but I think what what I owe this committee and frankly the nation is a continuous assessment to make sure that we have the right numbers. And to your opening point, that they're the best high most highly qualified talent and that we can make sure that we can up game them through training and through the the mechanisms that'll that'll make this enduring.

General, if you could quantify that on the on the record, um, by supplementing your answer, we'd appreciate it.

Chairman, I'll I'll I certainly will.

Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Scott.

Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank each of you for joining us here today. It is critical that the US is always ready to deter any threats. One big way is by working with our allies and partner nations to solidify our coordinated efforts to ensure security around the world. Even in places where we don't have our own troops readily stationed. Admiral Bradley, how do foreign military sales programs enhance US military to military relationships in the Indo-Pacific and globally?

Senator, uh, foreign military sales, uh, direct commercial sales and and the like are all critical to us being able to have expectation of interoperability and expectation of what our allies and partners will be able to uh perform when they act on their own behalf. That in turn gives us a much better ability to understand what their weaknesses might be or what gaps that might need to be filled by US contributions. And so, as you, as you highlight, even in places where we are not present in all times or all, always, knowing what they are using and how they're using it gives us that extra advantage.

So you know their cap- capability and you also, if you're ever gonna work with them, you know what, how you operate with them.

Yes, sir.

What risk do we face to access an, to access an influence if we fail to work well with our allies and remain a reliable and timely defense partner compared to competitors like Communist China?

Well, Senator, in all cases, uh, placement and access is, uh, is a corollary to understanding. And so being on the ground with those out on the edge of the, of the territory to be able to appreciate the context of what's happening, helps to inform our decision making in the rear and throughout the chain of command. So, uh, I believe that it is fundamental to our ability to know not only when we should act, but how we should act. And that, that is a partnership that we see play out, uh, across the world, not just in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, in Ecuador recently, some really good, uh, operational results. informed by our Ecuadorian partners to help us choose which and how to target uh adversaries there. But that of course is just an instance that has been played out over the last twenty-five years across the Middle East, Africa, across Europe as well, and and I and I believe uh the same uh analog applies globally.

I'm O'Briley, Assistant Secretary Anderson. How does the forward presence of US special operations forces contribute to countering communist China's influence campaigns particularly in the Indo-Pacific and other key regions? And what advantages do special operations forces bring in building partner capacity, strength and resilience, and shaping the competitive environment below the level of armed conflict?

Senator, I might start, but just quickly. That same placement and access and that understanding allows us to use what is the, uh, the equivalent of the high ground in the influence sphere of competition, the truth. In almost every case, all we have to do is illuminate the truth of our adversary's nefarious activity, to allow our partners to then counter it, uh, and to be able to use it to their advantage.

Senator, my I might add just uh the back to Admiral Bradley's point of placement and access, without going into some detail, but uh just being president of some of these areas with our partners is an absolute deterrent. Uh not only that, but we sh- uh some of our forces and what they've been able and the capabilities they've been able to create if you might call it within some of these uh areas of responsibility. Uh one example is uh you know some of our special operations forces had a critical need for medical uh and so a medical uh role to facility and what they were able to do is work with the local hospital to embed themselves within that hospital not only providing uh care for that local area but also providing training for themselves that in itself is one a capabilities development a readiness uh development but also you know we talk about by with and through your partners there's no better way than than through the local population

Thank you. MR. Bradley, how are US Special Force Operations Forces integrating unmanned and autonomous technologies into their operations?

Senator, at every level. Um, as we say from the battlefield to the back office, finding ways to be able to bring autonomy, a treatable mass autonomy to bear, um, is a very important part of how we on the edge can leverage our placement and access to not only serve our own interests but to be able to help uh, our partners who generally don't have the same budgets we do, to be able to buy that kind of capacity to give them asymmetric advantages. So, uh, um, uh, autonomous capability is critical to our understanding from a sensing perspective, as well as it is from a, uh, from a surveillance to be able to sustain containment of an objective that you would wanna watch. And then finally, clearly for, uh, for the ability to project violence, should that be required.

So looking at the success the Ukrainian uh armed forces have had with um drones and other autonomous uh opportunities, do you think we're moving fast enough?

Senator, I I would never suggest that uh the pace at which we are moving today is fast enough. We need to continue to accelerate it. Um, clearly the Ukrainians are driven by an existential need that we do not feel. And so we need to make up that difference in existential motivation, uh, with a real appreciation of the advantage that it will provide us. And, uh, importantly to deal with the challenges of simultaneity, to be able to help our partners to do the same. Um, our role inside the department there is to, uh, identify opportunities to test, to validate, and to illuminate those uh down selected and uh and frankly to work with our industry partners to help them improve their capabilities so that they might be more readily integrated into our services war fighting constructs as well as our allies and partners.

Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Cain.

Thank you, Mister Chair, and thanks to the witnesses, I have questions for Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson really about two topics, Operation Southern Spear and then the um, preservation of force and family initiative that you've discussed. On on Southern Spear, um, I'm correct, am I not, that the that the lead on Southern Spear operations is SouthKom, but special operators often play a role in particular, um, operations within that. Am I correct?

Yes, Senator.

Um, there is an article that was published on April twenty-one in The Guardian that I'd like to introduce for the record. The title of it is We were terrified they were going to kill us, fishers who survived US boat strike speak out. If I might introduce that into the record, Mr. Chair.

Object.

You guys will be surprised to know that I don't just believe everything I read in, in news accounts, but this is one that is public that I wanna ask about. It's, it's a story about a US strike, purportedly, on an Ecuadoran fishing vessel near the Galapagos that took place on March twenty-six. And the indication in the story, uh, so say it's a week old, is that this was a fishing vessel, that after the boat was struck, a US patrol boat rescued those on the vessel, um, handcuffed them, transferred them to a Salvadoran patrol boat. They were eventually taken to Salvador where they were released to a UN shelter, and then eventually taken back home to Ecuador where they were released without charge. Are you aware of the allegation of this US strike on this Ecuadoran fishing vessel, Admiral or Secretary?

Senator, I am aware of the article. Uh, I'm also aware that later in the article it quotes, uh, the department's, uh, response to it as, uh, there not having been any US military involvement. Uh, I'm also aware that there are, there were no recorded or, uh, no, no US strikes within three weeks around that incident. Uh, as well I believe the, the Ecuadorian government has, has rendered judgment that there were no US involvement in that. So I, I can't speak to the, any greater detail, obviously SouthKom, uh, and the department would own that. But those are, those are from, um, you know, superficial observations.

Yeah, let, let me read the portion from the article that I think you're referring to. The Pentagon and the White House did not respond to requests for comment. US Southern Command said it had quote " no information to provide" regarding any US government personal personnel involvement in any of the incidents, close quote " laid out". Um, are you aware of any um investigation into this? Maybe, thi- this is a pretty, you know, s- tough claim, the tough the tough claim that the US would have attacked a fishing boat that had nothing to do with any group on the the classified DTO list. Are you aware of any investigation that's being done into this public reporting to see if it's accurate or not?

Senator, I'm not, I I believe though the the the uh the methodology we go through is first to assess a claim like this, whether or not it is credible,

Mm-hmm.

uh and I believe from what you've cited there and what I understand from uh from the uh rendering, that it was deemed not to be credible, therefore further investigation not required.

And Secretary Anderson, is that your understanding as well?

Yes, Senator Kaine, uh uh uh exactly what Admiral Bradley say, I uh unaware as well from what I've what I've been uh told.

So y- so your testimony, based on your understanding, and this is SouthKom equities obviously, but Special Operations uh participates, is that this public reporting, at least SouthKom has gone back and they cannot find evidence that the US carried out uh, strike operations of that kind on that day. That's your understanding?

Yes, Senator, it is.

Yeah. Well, I think it's important to put that on the record because obviously if there is information about the veracity of this it should come out. Um, one of the things that I think can be a little confusing in this instance that could have led to confusion in this in this circumstance, is as far as I know Southern Spear is a military operation carried out against targets connected to organizations, the list of whom are still classified. Is that correct?

Uh, I I'm I believe so, Senator.

I I think that the the the operations authorized by the president can be carried out against organizations on a list of DTO's designated terrorist organizations that is classified it's only been shared with Congress in a classified setting. It's not been made public. And that also means the the enemy hasn't been told you're an enemy. If you if you declare war against Iraq, for example, or Al-Qaeda, that public declaration alerts the enemy to know that, hey, you're the enemy if you associate with the group subject to the designation. If the DTO list in Southern Spear is purely classified, that means we haven't alerted, uh, those who the US has determined are combatants, that we are in fact engaging in war against them and that can lead to confusion. My my time is up, but I just wanna just say this. I do commend what you guys have done um on this um preservation of force in family initiative and I think it's particularly needed among special operators, but I also think it offers a template more generally for the way we ought to approach the issue of the you know long-term well-being of our service members. So keep it up and spread the the best practices from what you're doing. Thank you.

Senator Sullivan.

Thank you, Miss Chairman, and uh thank you uh to the witnesses, I just wanna add Senator Cain's point, we we had a classified briefing a couple months ago on the ways in which uh both SOCOM, Southern Command, NSA go through the target targeting in in this regard and admiral isn't it true it's uh the jag officers are there in every step of the way the nsa is i mean it is an exquisite detailed and very uh robust targeting op before anyone is given the authority to go strike correct

senator that is correct it is based off of the lessons learned and the processes uh perfected over the last twenty five years of uh persona targeting

yeah no i think the Uh, that briefing from my perspective was very impressive. General Rudd, I wanna go back to where you and I had a good conversation during your confirmation process. And it's about how our adversaries often, all over the place, take aggressive, offensive, state-sponsored, kind of cyber-related actions against us across so many spheres, elections, infrastructure, Uh, NSA and our other uh services do a great job on defending that. But um, I think, you know, the best defense is also a good offense, right? And I know you probably can't answer the questions here. But um, are we also looking at offensive operations from a cyber perspective to keep our adversaries at bay the one i always think would be good is letting the people of china and russia know just how corrupt their leaders are how rich they are putin i think is one of the richest guys in the world xi jin xi jinping's sister is a billionaire hmm wonder how that happened um i mean isn't it also good to go on offense right we get we get attacked a lot but to let people know that uh we can go on offense with exquisite capabilities that you have

Senator, I We absolutely have to be capable of providing offensive options and certainly working in concert with Honorable Sutton as she crafts out the strategy for the department in support of the NDS. You could expect it. We'll be in a position and we have to have the capabilities to

I mean, when these dictators are using cyber ops to come after the most important thing to all of us, which are the you know, American elections, well, none of them would ever stand for election, cuz they fear their own people. I think we should flex a little offensive cyber capability. Do you agree with that, Madam Secretary?

Absolutely. As was articulated in the President's cyber strategy for America, we need to be very clear that malicious cyber actors in the space have, and will, feel the consequences of their action. We need to look at how we leverage all tools of national power. Uh, whether it be military offensive capabilities or other inter-agency efforts. And that is something we are gonna be posturing with the new department of war cyber strategy to make sure we have those capabilities.

Good. Good. I think it's really important. We don't have to say it. But, I mean, they wanna come play with our elections, we can make sure their people know how corrupt they are. Their leaders, cuz a lot of them are corrupt. And, um. there people should know that general rudd uh we're really excited in alaska nsa alaska's expansion is almost complete um you know it's uh it's great to see that my understanding is the new uh addition is gonna be able to house um uh fifty additional billets there um you know that the group in alaska they do fantastic work it's not on the front pages it doesn't need to be but um Would you be willing to visit NSA Alaska with me soon and meet these uh great Americans who are conducting these missions under your command from my state and work with me on ensuring any additional requirements we need to fully man that expansion in NSA Alaska, fifty additional billets, uh we can make sure we get done.

Hey Senator, I I look forward to that opportunity. I think we may have a chance here in the near future to uh see that site uh at its ribbon cutting.

Yeah.

But I also have a confession to make. I think I pledged in confirmation hearing that I would go there first, if confirmed. Um, I I hope you'll appreciate and understand.

Everybody commits to coming to Alaska for a confirmation.

Well, I it'll be my second location um in the role only because Hawaii, as you I think you know, experienced some pretty horrific uh

Yeah.

storms and it caused some physical damage and wanted to check on our folks there to see that so

your your your excuse is exceptional

general general all all of our witnesses are absolved from that promise it's you know

but no senator i'm i'm more into it

it's made by everyone under duress and we understand that

it's it's it's it's not duress they're just going to see mister chairman the most strategic place in the world and uh admiral i i wanna and maybe i'll submit this for the record but um Uh, the University of Alaska Fairbanks is doing fantastic work on the UAS, counter UAS strategy testing. Uh, DIU is gonna make an announcement here on a, uh, commitment to work with the University of Alaska Fairbanks on, uh, all the counter UAS stuff that they're doing, which is really needed, and we're at the cutting edge up in Alaska. So, I'd like to get secretary anderson you and the admiral maybe uh in a um answer for a question for the record cause i'm over my time here to work with me and the committee on those really good opportunities on a critical area for our national security and that's the counter drone mission thank you thank you mr. chairman

thank you senator sullivan and thank you for your question uh about the leaders of our adversaries uh vladimir putin is not our friend. Uh, not only is he one of the most notorious war criminals of our time, but, um, one, one of the greediest thieves breathing, uh, on the earth at this at this moment.

Well, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warren and I have worked on this, uh, very issue together. It's a bipartisan issue that, hey, these guys are coming after our elections. We need to make them, uh, feel the pain. You know.

Why don't we recognize her at this moment?

Good.

Thank you.

Thank you. Um, I wanna talk about what's going on with our troops when they're injured. We have four hundred troops, at least so far, who've been injured in President Trump's war with Iran. And now traumatic brain injuries have become the quote, signature injury of the war against Iran. Research has shown that special operators are at a higher risk of blast exposure and TBI, which, as you know, increases the risk of suicide, of seizures, and of memory loss. Several hundred special operators are now deployed in the Middle East, and I'm very concerned about whether or not our troops are getting the care that they need for these injuries. For instance, we know about a soldier who was injured in the Iranian drone strike in Kuwait, and he was promised TBI care once they made it out of the war zone. But even after being shipped to Germany and then to Texas, the soldier didn't receive care for weeks. So, Admiral Bradley, uh, do you think that wounded soldiers should have to wait nearly a month to see a doctor?

Uh, Senator, I, uh, no, uh, in the in the hypothetical I I absolutely don't believe that. I I don't know the details of the situation, though.

Fair enough. Yeah, but but that's the real point. We can agree they need help and they need to be evaluated right away. And this committee has worked on a bipartisan basis to help service members with brain injuries. But without records of these injuries, it becomes harder and harder to get care. That's particularly critical for high speedboat teams, uh and special operators, given the exposure to these pounding waves and high caliber weapons. Boat team leaders have described how quote, "the damage piles up almost unnoticed for years, and then cascades." But DOD requires cognitive assessments only every five years and SOCOM every three. I have a bipartisan bill with Senators Ernst and King and others on this committee to make sure that these injuries don't fall through the cracks, including by requiring more regular screening and logs to be able to track exposure. And more broadly, The effects of TBIs can compound over time, as we know. Do you agree that it is better if we catch these brain injuries earlier rather than later?

Senator, I absolutely do.

Good. And do you support keeping better records so that we're able to do that, and and more frequent evaluations?

Senator, I do, they, it is critical to, uh, to be able to understand the mechanisms of harm that come from these various sources, that we don't understand very well. And that data, those logs, that data will help to inform not only treatment, but also means to be able to prevent it in its outset.

Good, I I appreciate that. You know, the fact that troops have faced long wait lists to get specialty care for brain health within DOD's military system, and one of the ways that DOD has tried to address these wait lists is by partnering with outside experts, like home base, uh, back in Massachusetts. Home base's comprehensive brain health and trauma program has helped get ninety-five percent of special operators that it's treated back into the field. Admiral Bradley, in your experience, have special operators benefited from programs like home base?

Senator, a- absolutely, combat, that comprehensive uh program for uh brain health is a critical part. We also have partnerships with uh UNC, University of North Carolina and Southern Florida, and and several others to be able to do the same thing. They are all very capable uh in progressing programs. I I think as you highlight, institutionalizing those beyond the pilot, that they are into something that is a part of our mainstream system, that can then be treated with TRICARE and with our VA systems, is a critical next step.

And I very much appreciate your point about institutionalizing it. We can't just treat this as a one-off. We know the problem exists, we've got to record, we've got to document, and we've gotta have people who can treat it. we need to have dedicated resources to support our troops who are suffering from brain injuries. The Trump administration has plunged us into a war and is asking Congress for a record one point five trillion dollars for the Pentagon. It is outrageous that we would be cutting corners on treating wounded warriors. Thank you, Admiral. I look forward to working with you on this.

Sen-

Thank you, Mister Chairman.

Thank you. Senator Rosen.

Well, thank you Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and uh uh thank you for uh well I saw you a little bit earlier today, so thank you again for your service and and for being here. Um, I wanna talk a little bit about operational tempo and readiness reporting, because cyber operation forces of course have well they're always in high demand, but they've been in extra high demand since CyberKom was established, which has been exacerbated by the challenges of getting the unit readiness numbers up at the same time. Now that we're fighting wars in multiple theaters, I have to imagine that the operational tempo of those forces is also increasing dramatically so General Rudd uh could you give us a sense of what the trend is for the op tempo of cybernational miss mission force please.

Thanks Senator Rosen, I I appreciate uh the attention on this this topic. as you described and as we would expect, very high demand and a very high operational tempo for our our cyber warriors in support, in real time, twenty four seven of of the joint force across a number of problem sets. And so, this really speaks to the heart of one of the attributes of CyberKom two point O, that we refer to as optimized unit phasing. So, think of a cycle upon which you rotate, again, this is where we have a a lot to uh gain from understanding socom's model for for years. Um, both Admiral Bradley and I were part of a system that had a rotational force effort. Now, granted, there are surges um, and we account for those, but part of the way we accounted for that is size of the force and bringing in uh, sufficient capacity to be able to operationally employ the force continuously across a number of of of problem sets.

Well that's good because you didn't know what my next question would be, but it's to Secretary Sutton, the status of implementing the ninety-seven recommendations from CyberKom two point O. What is that? And the resources, speaking of of to your point, General, the resources needed to implement them, especially when setting up three enabling organizations.

Senator, thank you for that question and for your continued focus on this on the cyber topic over the years. From an implementation perspective, as you mentioned, there's a lot of tasks. So the approach that we're taking is that within my office I've built a core team that is dedicated to to the implementation process and one of the things that's really exciting to me about that is it uh features contributions from all of our service cyber components. And we've actually brought in people who have been in our force for a long time, that are now have the opportunity to build the system, the talent management system that they wish they would have had. So it's the unicorns that we're trying to build at scope and scale,

Mm-hmm.

are now coming in and helping to write the details, build out the assessments we need, and come up with the models of how we keep careers going, um, to build mastery. From a resource perspective, the uh we have included funding for the Cyber Command two dot O initiatives in the President's twenty-seven budget, including funding to start incentive pay to get uh mastery incentives implemented as well as for some of the enabling organizations and some of the other service requirements to be able to get this to speed and look forward to being able to execute that upon passage of the budget for FY twenty-seven.

Thank you. I I'm gonna stick on cyber operations for a minute because I wanna talk about intelligence capabilities. So General Rudd, um your responses to uh our advanced policy questions during your nomination process, you mentioned the critical criticality of foundational intelligence to support cyberspace operations and the need for that capability to keep pace with operational needs. So as we all know, the FY twenty-five NDA is set a requirement for DOD to establish a cyber intelligence capability to provide just that sort of foundational intelligence support. So General Rudd, have you uh you have the ability to shape this foundational intelligence capability from the start. So could you elaborate a little bit more based on your experiences at Indopaycom and SOCOM, what you would like to see incorporated in this foundation intelligence capability please?

Well, Senator, the the reference to my past experience, I would tell you intelligence drives ops and ops drives intelligence. And so it's a continuous cycle. And what we learned over decades of uh fighting alongside each other in a variety of places is the intelligence apparatus has to be closely linked to and understand the operational side of this. Oh. Great, cool. And i haven't had the chance to specifically dive into this yet it's gonna be part of my initial assessment and happy to come back to you for the record uh as i look more closely at that

thank you i look forward to that we have a lot of work to do thank you mr. chair

senator slotkin we're doing everything we can to keep you from um asking your question S- Senator Banks, you're recognized.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Redd, can you talk about how the PLA is using artificial intelligence to enhance its military operations?

Senator, I w- As you would hope and expect, that's certainly something that we are paying particular attention to. The the details of which I'd I'd probably rather go into in a close session,

You you can vaguely, you can vaguely,

but I but I I mean

you could vaguely talk about how artificial intelligence is used in warfare and gains that they're making. I mean, I I don't think there's anything classified about that.

Yeah, Senator, I I appreciate that.

Or agree that they are using artificial intelligence.

I'm sorry?

You can agree, you would agree that they are using artificial intelligence in their military capabilities?

Senator, I think that's that's quite clear that they are. Yes, sir.

Thank you. Um, so um, that being the case, would you agree that AI is a quote, dual use technology?

Senator, dual use in in in what sense, both for non-military and military? I I, Senator, I think that's that's a fair way to characterize it.

Um, and how important is it for the US to have more and better high-end chips than what China does?

Well, Senator, I would take that category more broadly and say I think it's critical that the US has the technological advantage in every aspect of war fighting. And certainly, as we see the increase in the advent of the application of of artificial intelligence, we're gonna have to make sure that, uh, we retain and maintain our advantage in that and move as fast as we can.

You you agree. I mean, I I I believe we we have today we have the advantage, I think you would. you just said that to maintain our advantage so you agree that we have the advantage what would happen if we lost that advantage

well senator the i think this team right here is gonna do everything we can to make sure that we don't do that um certainly we're working furiously to do that and we're not gonna be complacent we won't be satisfied in uh in my in my opening statement i emphasized four operating principles speed scale innovation and integration i think if we press as hard as we can to apply those principles to everything that we're doing, but in particular, an effort to maintain our advantage in the the highest tech areas will be OK, and yet we'll never be satisfied.

But it it would be completely unacceptable, wouldn't it, General Rudd, if we lost that advantage.

Chair Chairman, it it would be unacceptable and we'll make sure that uh we do everything to retain that.

Yeah, I I I think that's um I understand there are a lot of things that you can't say in this setting. But I think it's important for the American people to know that the the critical nature of us keeping that advantage and the role that uh, high-end chips play in all of it. I mean, you you you've already agreed that um, it's important that we maintain high high-end chips for America and for American, Amer- our our own use and develop our own technologies and how dangerous it would be if our adversary um gained an advantage on us on that front or even that we would give away our high-end chips to our adversaries. That make sense?

Senator Arb- I'd uh it does make sense and again that that's a critical piece of uh how we're gonna maintain our advantage um and we also have to understand and expect that capability will be distributed and available to others, which is why this continuous cycle of maintaining our edge is is really important.

Um, I'll I'll I'll move on, la- last week President Trump said that quote, America's aging and constrained electric grid infrastructure poses an increasing threat to national defenses. End quote. What what risks do cyber attacks pose to our critical infrastructure?

Well, Senator, the It's certainly a vulnerability, and I think that's the awareness and understanding of that is the first line of defense, and then making sure that uh experts in this field know how to get ahead of it, know how to apply the best cyber defenses, and uh certainly to the extent we're able and we have the capacity, we wanna make sure that we're working with the right folks to uh protect our critical infrastructure.

And I assume what President Trump is saying, um, about the infrastructure, that would extend to transportation nodes like seaports, airports, and railroads. Would you agree with that?

No, Senator, I I won't speculate on on what the president meant specifically. I haven't had that conversation with him. Um, but I think it's fair, actually I think it's, it's important that we figure out what the definition of critical infrastructure is. Um, prioritize where we need to put our efforts and, and resources to safeguard it.

Thank you. My time has expired.

Uh, thank you very much, Senator Slotkin.

Thank you. Um, I wanna, um, support everything that Senator Banks just said, and just re- return to the topic on the classified AI race. I know we can't talk about it here, but um, I don't think the American public understands how important it is to win that race, that it's the equivalent of winning the nuclear race, like whoever gets there first. Um, and I think, um, you know, if we were healthy, as a country, then elected officials from both sides of the aisle would be focusing on this constantly to make sure we win this race. Um, in that spirit, um, General Rudd, you know, I think the thing that has been, congratulations on being in the seat, I think the thing that, um, has caught, I think, the attention of a lot of us is the announcement in the last three or four weeks by Anthropic and then OpenAI of new products, Mythos being the Anthropic product and the OpenAI product having a a longer name. Um, and they are testing this new product very differently than a commercial product. They are testing it like a weapon. They have provided, at least in Anthropic's case, they've provided Mythos to like fifty big companies for them to test and and stress test and figure out the vulnerabilities. Microsoft is one of those companies. They're turning around and announcing like two hundred and seventy new patches just last week which we assume Mythos picked up and I was so concerned about this new step we're taking in the how it supercharges cyber attacks that I did a big Zoom yesterday with three hundred and fifty Michiganders IT professionals for our hospitals our schools on how to prepare for this threat. Um, is the NSA or CyberKom testing mythos right now and using this moment to test out our own vulnerabilities?

Senator, this is a critically important topic. Uh, I think the way you described it was, uh, appropriate and, uh, you I I what I don't wanna do is speak to one specific model. I think what we need to think about is the application and the access to early all future models that we see in terms of the capability that uh the the most current models and the new models potentially imply for both defensive, Yeah.

I I understand uh but but we

defense of our critical infrastructure, our nation, our our our our our uh networks?

We have two companies, right? Who have, I mean this is public information, right? They've come out with these products in the past month. Um it sent the cyber security world and the commercial sector kind of spinning that we um now have this super-charged um, uh, AI technology that finds these vulnerabilities. I'm just asking if the Pentagon or NSA is testing out either of these two companies' models.

Senator, again, we're we're looking at all models that, uh, we think have the power that, uh,

So, y- yes,

is being associated with this.

you're us- I want you to be using them, I want you to be experimenting with them, and, uh, but y- the Pentagon has had a very public fight with anthropic. Again, this is public information, so I'm just making sure that the newest, hottest, AI-empowered cyber security models are being used by the Pentagon, um, on cyber security. So I I I I'm taking your answer as yes and and correct me if I'm wrong. Um, let me turn to another topic and, you know, we're heading towards a summit between the president and Xi Jinping, um, a Chinese president on May fourteenth. Huge deal, right, in the in the world, um, of negotiation and security. Um, and I am just concerned that there's a, uh, a topic on the table of allowing Chinese vehicles into the United States. And I think the Chinese have shown themselves to be bad actors when it comes to collecting data on American citizens. They hacked the president and vice president's phones during the campaign, salt typhoon, volt typhoon, getting into our infrastructure. Um, they stole a bunch of our records, probably yours, definitely mine, in twenty sixteen from, That was yesterday. um, OPM. I mean, they are not positive actors, No. and this body banned Huawei and TikTok, um, because of the data they were taking on Americans. So can you just say aloud, I asked others in uniform this last week, Um, do you believe that allowing in Chinese cars with LIDAR and full motion video, geolocation, Geo-con. the ability to be hacked via Bluetooth,

That sounds good.

do you believe that that is a threat to our military bases, our critical infrastructure, and generally to collecting on American citizens?

Yeah, Senator, I think uh we need to uh take into account any potential technological application that poses a threat against our our bases, our our service members,

Well

and make sure we do everything to protect against that.

Yeah, I would love the Chairman's help. I've tried for two years in a row to ban Chinese vehicles from our military bases. As I understand it, abroad our military bases, with all these Chinese cars, they can already get on. Um, they've got fifteen percent market share in Mexico, so would hope that this committee could at least do the banning of them collecting on our military bases. And I yield back.

Thank you very much, Senator Slotkin. Um, and this concludes today's hearing. I'd like to thank our witness for the, for their testimony, for the information of members, questions for the record will be due to the committee within two business days of the conclusion of this hearing. thank you very very much for your information and your testimony today and we are adjourned