Hearings to examine the national security strategy and the western hemisphere.

Welcome, we'd like to convene our hearing. A first uh uh an uh a thank you to staff and everybody for understanding the flexibility in schedule, and uh particularly our witness thank you and uh we'll we will begin. Uh, ranking member, great to have you with us, thank you for participating and and being part of this. I'll start first with opening remarks. Iran, Iran and its proxies. Let me start here. This hearing of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee will come to order. This hearing is to examine how the Trump administration's national security strategy prioritizes the Western Hemisphere. In other words, what is the Trump corollary to the Monro doctrine? For too long, American policy has tr treated our own neighborhood as an afterthought, while our adv adversaries have treated it as an opportunity. The national security strategy makes a welcome correction by putting the Western hemisphere near the center of American national security policy. It is right that United States should focus first on the safety, security and prosperity of the American people, and frequently that means focusing on the security of our own region. That means securing our border, stopping deadly drugs before they enter our communities, strengthening supply chains closer to home, and ensuring that hostile powers cannot control strategic assets in our own hemisphere. In many ways, the real test of our Western hemisphere strategy is whether it can blunt and roll back the presence of our global adversaries China, Russia and Iran within our backyard. China has spent years building influence through ports, telecommunications infrastructure, natural resource surveillance, technology and diplomatic pressure. Russia has used Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua to project influence and challenge US interests from within the hemisphere. Iran and its proxies have also sought footholds through malign networks and anti-American regimes, which is why the committee has passed my bills, the No Hizballah in our hemisphere act and banned Latin in American act, which pushed back on these networks. The national security strategy is right to say that non-hemispheric competitors should not be allowed to position forces threatening capabilities or control s strategically vital assets in our hemisphere. The Maduro raid was exactly that principle put into practice. Nicholas Maduro's regime has been a platform for Russia, Chinese, Iran, and criminal influence in our hemisphere. His rege- regime destabilized neighborhoods, fueled migr migration, enriched corrupt networks, and cooperated with malign outside powers and allowed drug trafficking and other illicit activity to flourish. We're not going to let what h- amounted to an ill- illegitimate Russian puppet government corruptly cling to power and operate within our own backyard. And now Maduro resides in a prison in New York. We are beginning to see early signs of change inside Venezuela. Hundreds of political prisoners have been released. Opposition figures are able to organize more openly. Venezuela oil is no longer being exclusively used to supply China. And there are signs of shifts within the government structure, including the removal of some Maduro loyalist. Venezuela today is thankfully in a much different place than it was a year ago. However, Congress is going to be interested in what the path now looks like for Venezuela from here to the democratic transition. Progress has been made throughout the region on the diplomatic front as well. After secretary Rubio's visit, Panama announced it would move to leave China's Belt and Road Initiative. We also s saw the announcement sell of port assets operated by Hong Kong, based entities on both ends of the Panama Canal to a US-led consortium. Those developments should be seen as examples of the kind of strategic competition the United States can win when we're focused, engaged, and are willing to use diplomatic and commercial tools together. We should encourage more countries in the region to take similar steps. I'm supportive of this renewed focus on the Western hemisphere and the recognition that will happen in our neighborhood directly affects the security of the American people but support does not relieve us from our responsibility to conduct oversight. Goncas has a duty to ask hard questions about strategy, coordination with r- re- regional partners, and what comes next. And we must ensure that a stronger focus on our own hemisphere does not come at the expense of American leadership elsewhere. Strength in our neighborhood should reinforce, not replace, our engagement in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. The goal is not atmospheric seclusion, but strategic prioritization rooted in American strength. I look forward to hearing from the ambassador on how the State Department is implementing the strategy and how Congress can help ensure United States remains the partner of first choice in our own hemisphere. With that, I'd like to recognize my distinguished ranking member and friend for his comments, Senator Kaine.

Well, well, thank you, Chairman Curtis, this is an interesting subcommittee because I think it may be the only subcommittee where the chair and ranking were both missionaries. Um, and you were in Asia, and I was in Honduras. Um, and so my interest in the region really stems back to that experience in nineteen eighty and eighty one. I wanna let the audience know that many of our colleagues are not at the hearing now because there's a press conference in a couple of minutes to discuss the bipartisan Russia sanctions bill that was a a real passion of Senator Grams and a number of members of this committee both Democratic and Republican who might show up later are at that event, so Timing in as we would yeah we would like to be there but timing in the sand that there's As we would like to be there simply. mu- multiple things happening at the same time um I wanna thank Senator Curtis for being a great collaborator on Western hemisphere issues including the strengthening of rule of law in the Brazilian Amazon Act and the securing partner supply chains Act um he's a good colleague in this area um I am very appreciative of um of your service Michael Kozak's long service to the State Department under administrations your expertise in this area. Um, the Western hemisphere has been my region of focus since I came to the Senate in twenty thirteen because of that experience now forty five years ago. And I have long critiqued both Democratic and Republican administrations for persistent under-attention to the region. Um, and so I think the national security strategy, uh, both in word but also in the orientation of members of this administration, raising the profile of the Western hemisphere, um, is a good thing. I have some significant concerns about how it's being done and those will be the source of many of my questions today. Just, just to give you one. Um, and it has to do with terminology. The president and his team in talking about the Western hemisphere have talked about an updated Monroe doctrine, that they call the Donro doctrine. Um, that phrase lands very differently in Latin America than it does at home. Um, many of us have learned about the Monroe Doctrine in history here, and it was a decision undertaken first by President Monroe that nations outside the Americas, European nations at the time, should not be able to extend their sphere of influence into the Americas. From an American standpoint, that doesn't seem like that controversial a position. But from a Latin American standpoint, the Monroe Doctrine means dominance Everybody wants a partner. Nobody wants to be dominated. Nobody wants to be dominated. The smallest nation in the world would like a partnership with United States. They would not like dominance by the United States. And that phrase, Monroe Doctrine, has a very, very troubled and painful history attached to it in the Americas. We we don't feel pained by it here, but in the Americas they do. And I feel like some of what we are doing in this new Donro doctrine, particularly boat strikes um without congressional authorization in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the removal of the horrible dictator Maduro, but the decision to maintain in place his dictatorship when there is an opposition that essentially won an election a year and a half ago, and now being locked out of power, I have some real concern about the way this new focus on the Americas is being implemented. So, um, with with a compliment to begin, I'm glad we're paying more attention to the Americas, and I really am. Uh, we've ignored the Americas or under uh paid too little attention for way too long. I do feel like if we're gonna pay more attention, we gotta calibrate it the right way and a lot of my discussion today will kind of be in that space. But I appreciate um the chairman for for calling this hearing and I look forward to a good discussion.

Thank you. Um. Thank you, um, colleague, and I I greatly respect your expertise in this part of the world. I wish I would have spent two years uh there and also in Asia, but I know living there as you did gives you a a a great appreciation for the people,

Mm-hmm.

the culture, and I'm I'm glad you have that expertise on this committee. Um, would like to uh turn the time over to our witness, Ambassador Michael Kozak is the Senior Bureau Office Official for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the Department of State. He has more than five decades of service. I think that predates um our time abroad.

Yeah, we do.

Uh as a diplomat and has twice served as senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, including from twenty nineteen to twenty twenty one, and again beginning in January twenty twenty five. The ambassador has also served as acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. as Senior Official for Global Criminal Justice, as Ambassador to Belarus and Chief of Mission at the US Interest Section in Havana. Ambassador Kozak, the floor is yours.

Uh, thank you, Chairman Curtis and Ranking Member Cain, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. President Trump's national security strategy affirms the critical importance of the Western hemisphere, as you both mentioned. It outlines an agenda that includes ending illegal immigration, defeating narco-terrorist groups and eliminating the influence of malign, uh, extra-hemispheric actors. Daily immigrant encounters in the, uh, U. S. southwest border are down by ninety-two percent. Partners across the region have also enhanced the control of their own borders. They now realize the societal ills their country suffered because of the human trafficking from and through them. A very significant amount of the cartel's overall revenue came from moving illegal immigrants to the to the United States. And that's now substantially uh taken away from them. We've designated eighteen transnational criminal organizations and gangs as terrorist groups. These designations enable us to use additional law enforcement tools against these organizations. In March, President Trump expanded our efforts through the shield of the America's summit and the America's counter-cartel coalition. Leaders who share our resolve to defeat the cartels are engaged as never before. The January third US law enforcement operation removed Venezuela's top narco-trafficker, Nicolas Maduro. The officials of the interim Venezuelan government now comply with our request uh in the area of counter-narcotics. Malign foreign actors seek to undermine the sovereignty of states and to control critical m- critical minerals and other vital resources in the region. This April we expanded visa restrictions on those working on behalf of such US adversaries in the Western hemisphere. We've already seen a deterrent effect. We, along with others in the region, supported Panama as China attempted economic retaliation following the decision of Panama's independent Supreme Court regarding control of the Balboa and, Cristobal ports, as the chairman mentioned. A related objective has been to advance the involvement of US and allied firms in the construction of an investment in critical infrastructure. We've signed seven cooperative critical critical minerals, uh, MOUs that will speed up resource development. We're also addressing natural and man-made disasters in the region. We've mobilized an unprecedented effort to support Venezuela, including more than three hundred and forty-six million in assistance, And uh we also deployed to Venezuela uh within hours urban uh search and rescue teams from Los Angeles Fairfax County Miami Dade and the city of Miami. These these uh groups saved people who were trapped under the rubble. The Department of War repaired damaged runways and assisted with logistics in support of emergency personnel. We're now working to help the interim government address the housing problem that is uh the earthquake caused. But Venezuela also suffers from man-made tragedies caused by the Maduro regime. To this end, we will continue to implement our three-phased approach of stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, and then transition to a democratically elected government. Uh, I should note here, uh, the interim government and leaders of the twenty-fifteen uh National Assembly of Venezuela are the last democratically elected institution of that country. um, which we recognize as the government of Venezuela up until a few months ago, uh, shortly before the earthquake, came together and agreed on a very ambitious agenda to put in place the the steps necessary to have incredible uh free and fair elections in Venezuela. That uh activity got overshadowed a little bit by the earthquake, but uh happily today both sides announced that they will be resuming uh, they their dialogue in setting up the working groups to deal with the mechanics of having elections, uh, come August first, so fairly soon they will be back at it again. Uh, so this is something very encouraging to us. Um, with, uh, Maduro's arrest, the Co- Cuban communist regime lost its last benefactor. The end of massive sub- subsidies exposed the regime's economic incompetence. Uh, as the secretary said, we have ninety miles from our shores, a failed state that is friendly territory for some of our adversaries. President Trump has made it clear we will not tolerate that threat any longer. The president's executive order t- uh, targets the Cuban regime, its security apparatus and its grip on the economy, not the people of Cuba. On, uh, May twenty, uh, Raul Castro was finally indicted for his role in the nineteen ninety-six murder of three US citizens in one LPR. July eleven marked a five year anniversary of a widespread protest in Cuba. Several hundred peaceful protesters remain in jail, and we continue to demand that the regime release all political prisoners. And Secretary Rubio has said the status quo is no longer tenable. Cuba must make immediate economic and political reforms that'll allow it to reemerge as a productive and responsible member of the Western hemisphere. Nicaragua suffers from a brutal kleptocratic dictatorial dynasty that represses the Catholic Church as well as its citizens. It hosts security adversaries of the United States. The status quo in Nicaragua also is intolerable. It must change, and soon. In May twenty twenty five, the Trump administration designated Haitian gangs as foreign terrorist organizations. The swift mobilization of the gang suppression force will help restore Haiti's baseline security, prevent state collapse and deter mass illegal migration to the United States. We expect to see greater gains as the gang suppression force fully deploys and as the Haitian police increase their numbers thanks to a program developed by our colleagues in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement so these are several highlights of our engagement with the Western Hemisphere I thank you and look forward to your questions.

Yes, I guess we could debate if they're highlights or lowlights. Um, I'll begin the questioning. Uh, thank you. Uh, Mister Ambassador, after Secretary Rubio's visit to Panama, they announced it would move to leave the China's Belt and Road Initiative. And we also saw the announce sell the Panama Canal port assets operated by Hong Kong-based entities to US-led consortium. Are there lessons that we can draw from Panama about how the United States can use diplomacy, commercial engagement, and strategic clarity? to roll back China's influence in the region and, uh, part two, are there other countries in the hemisphere where you believe a similar approach might be uh equally successful?

Yes, thank you, Chairman. Um, I would say there are some good lessons out of it. I mean, each situation is somewhat different. But, uh, uh, Panama I think part of it was Panama had come to its own conclusion that being part of the Belt and Road Initiative was more liability than it was gain. So they told us they were ready to leave on that. They also had uh their comptroller look into the way that those port concessions had been granted and found a great deal of fraud and and failure to uh, to implement the uh the agreement. So their Supreme Court took action there. I think what was key in this though was China then attempted to intimidate them by their doing a inspections and detaining of their of Panama flag vessels and their ports and so on. And Panama needed a little bit of a back-up and got it from countries in the region. The countries that joined the uh uh shield of the Americas uh by and large issued statements uh standing in solidarity with Panama against that that threat from China. But we've also seen in other parts of uh of the region uh the Chinese try to move in, uh deal with for example in some places they'll go directly to a university and say, oh, we'll donate a a telescope to you so you can do high level research and so on. And it turns out the telescope is really designed to spy on American satellites and and other uh things like that and they go they bypass the uh the national government. So we've had some success talking directly with the subnational groups, We've had some dealing with the national governments or urging national governments throughout the region to adopt uh investment screening um

So let me yeah,

mechanism.

let me board down in that a little bit,

Yes, sir.

because you kinda hit on uh one of the questions I wanted to ask, which is this uh this China strategy. You've mentioned a couple of things, I think the the loans that uh then become predatory um and they foreclose on I mean there's a quite a long list. And it's your interesting, your answer on Panama is interesting, and I guess, uh let me come back to this concept, if that's what brought clarity to Panama, how do we how do we bring clarity to these other countries, and not just with elected officials, but but the voters, the constituents who who tend to see all of this, uh coming from China and the United States not doing anything, and the reality of it is we have this little thing called rule of law, and we do things differently, we're far more transparent, and the way we help isn't always uh seen um the way that China seems to be seeing. So w- w- what would you suggest um particularly f- uh from a congressional role of um how we, A, b, we get better clarity of what China is doing and then also get better credit for what we are doing uh when we're doing good things?

Yes, I uh I think it's it's super important to get uh people sensitized to this. And I at the beginning I think governments didn't realize how predatory the Chinese loan strategy and so on was. They now learned by adverse experience what it was. What we've been trying to do, and this goes back to uh the last time I had this job, was to publicize throughout the region just the facts. We're not saying don't engage with China. You know, we still buy things from China and so on, but we're saying, look at what happens to you if you get into this kind of a deal. don't enter into it on their terms. Um, that's been quite successful, but I think more of it it's certainly successful with national government level. Uh, not not so much with the populations at large, we've been trying to do more public relations and I think anything that Congress can do to bring a focus on this. One of the things we did that I mentioned in my testimony though was this uh restrictions on visas now where we're saying if And this happens all over the place. Basically, you know, members of the legislature, judiciary, labor unions in other countries take bribes from the Chinese. Or sometimes they they take other forms of compensation, but they they end up acting as as agents for for China in pushing some of this stuff. And basically the administration has said, um, if you're gonna do that, you're not welcome here anymore, we're not gonna give you or your family visas to come to the United States.

Yeah.

And uh we'd we'd tried this originally in Central America, it worked very well, we've now expanded it to the whole hemisphere.

It seems like a a a stronger coordination between Congress and State, as we go into those countries, um, knowing which messages to carry, uh, which things to point out might also be helpful.

Yes.

Um, be assured I have a lot of questions, I think we may have time for more questions, but I would like to yield to the ranking member. At this point.

Thank you, and I hope we'll have a second round as well. Um, Mr. Koestrich, I wanna ask you about Venezuela, so in July of twenty twenty four there were presidential elections, um in Maduro uh with his dictatorship was running to continue his reign of terror over the country. Um he disqualified the leading opposition figure Maria Karina Machado a year previously from being a presidential candidate, and so she through her port behind the Unitary Platform's candidate, Armando Gonzalez. The election happened in July of twenty twenty four and virtually all who watched that election said that the opposition won two to one. The Maduro officials claimed that they won the election. Uh, Gonzalez was forced into exile in Spain and Machado forced into exile as well. But it was clear that the Venezuelan people spoke loudly that they were tired of the Chavez, Maduro, reign of terror, and they wanted change. That change has not yet come to pass. Um, in the aftermath of the removal of Maduro from power, Maria Corina Machado, who has since won a Nobel Prize for her advocacy for Venezuelans, and who has visited Washington and and presented the Nobel Prize to President Trump as a thank you for the US's role in removing Maduro, has essentially been blocked from going back into Venezuela. There's been recent reporting, and I would like to just put one article in for the record, from June twenty nine, US backed Venezuelan government blocks opposition leaders' flight home, if I could introduce that.

Oh, okay.

And that's just one of a number of articles that have reported that in the aftermath of the earthquake um Ms. Machado wanting to return home as any of us would want to go back to our homes in the aftermath of a disaster in our home, has been essentially rebuffed. And to short form the reporting, the reporting suggests that she has been in dialogue with the State Department. Um, Secretary Landau had given her reason to believe she could return, but on two occasions, when she's made effort to fly back to Venezuela in the last two weeks, her plane has been turned around reportedly at the direction of other U S officials. Um, this reporting i has occurred during the two weeks we've been on recess, and I've made efforts to reach Mister Landau to find out what's going on, I was very heartened to see that President Trump, on the way back to the United States from the Ankara and NATO summit, was asked by reporters about this and said he has no opposition to Maria Karina Machado returning to Venezuela. And I just wanna clarify that the administration is not opposed to the Nobel laureate returning to her home country as the country is dealing with uh earthquake relief. Is that correct?

It i- it is correct. Uh let me comment on a couple of things quickly,

Yep.

Senator. First, uh you're absolutely right about the uh twenty twenty-four elections. Uh as we have said uh before, M- Maduro's uh leaving Edmondo Gonzalez was the rightful president-elect of uh of uh Venezuela. Um With respect to Maria Corina Machalo, who, you know, I think we all know uh and admire. The administration has tried to walk the line with the with the uh earthquake relief of saying, we don't oppose her returning. I mean, she's not a prisoner or or anything like that. At the same time, we have said in in terms of using our energies and resources that we're not going to facilitate or encourage or endorse it. It will take the the steps that would be necessary to get the the interim regime to accept her at the time that we're trying to deal with the earthquake relief. I mean, this is a fairly narrow window here of not introducing

But it's a really

a political element into the earthquake

Yeah, but but I wanna drill down on that.

relief.

So not opposing her return, not able to facilitate the return, but not even willing to speak to the government to say she should be treated fairly. I mean, i- she is a Venezuelan citizen. I- wh- where did you grow up, Mr. Kozak?

In California.

Did you, did you still have family there?

Yes.

So if there was an earthquake in California, I can almost guarantee you would want to go home to be with your family and help them. There's nothing unusual or political about that as a motivation. So to say that, well, we need to be worried about the politics of her returning. She is a Venezuelan citizen. She would want to return to her home in the same way that you would or I would, to try to help her family and friends. And so I don't I don't think um there's an expectation that the US has to to protect her, but the US has huge influence in Venezuela. And if she were to wanna go home, the US should say, and you should treat her with the respect that she deserves as a Nobel Laureate and as somebody whose political party just won a presidential election in the eyes of the world in the last two years and I would hope that that would be the administration's position.

Our position, Senator, has been that all of the uh Venezuelans who have been in exile because they have arrest warrants out for them in Venezuela and stuff, should be able to go back.

Thank you.

Uh, and that includes first and foremost, Maria Corina Machado. At the same time that we have we've made progress on that, we haven't reached a complete uh resolution of it with the interim authorities. They there are a lot of people were in that same boat they passed an amnesty law to amnesty a lot of the people who were in jail and a lot of the people who were in exile.

Right.

It is not a perfect amnesty law. It it worked for a lot of people, a lot of politicians have been able to go back and get active. Her party was able to reopen its headquarters and so on. But there are still something just under four hundred uh political prisoners in Venezuela that should all be released and there are still people like her outside Venezuela. who should be able to come back and can't yet because of this.

I- it it's i- i- it it's my hope,

This is why we're

and I'm I wanna cede to Senator Scott cuz my time's up, I will come back on a second round on another topic. But look, it's my hope, when when I see reporting suggesting that the US is actually blocking her from returning, A, I hope that that's wrong, B, if it was right for a week, I hope President Trump clarifying on the plane home

Thank you. I would actually um associate myself with that um that wish as well.

Mm.

And uh we will give you a chance to come back, but right now I would like to yield to our our friend from Florida, uh Senator Scott.

Thank you, Chairman. Um, Ambassador, thank you for what you do. So, I'm from Florida. We've got a significant Cuban population, uh, and a significant Venezuelan population. So let's go to what, um, Senator Kaine was talking about. So, arresting Maduro Maduro was a big deal. Right? No prior president would do it. So Venezuelans in Florida are ecstatic over that. What they're concerned about is all the political prisoners haven't been released. There's still oppression. They're even with this earthquake, um the um um the regime is, you know, if people say the wrong thing about uh the Venezuelan regime, they're getting arrested. So there's still all this oppression. We don't have a date for an election. And so in my state, uh we can't talk about any place else, but Venezuelans are are losing hope uh that, you know, this is gonna be Delsey Rodriguez, who was Maduro's vice president, not duly elected, as we talked about, is just gonna wait out the Trump administration and nothing's ever gonna happen. So that's that's the perception. Doesn't means reality, that's the perception. So what should I tell the Venezuelan community in my state?

I think I would uh refer back, Senator Scott, to uh Secretary Rubio's statements. He said, you know, we don't want elections too soon when they don't have the machinery set up. forty percent of the eligible voters in Venezuela are not registered at this point. So they've gotta clean up the voter rolls, they've gotta get the uh election tribunal uh renovated. This is why we uh but he he's also said but we don't wanna have elections too late, and making the point that people aren't gonna invest in in a long-term way in Venezuela until they say a stable democratically elected government there. So we've been trying to you know, get where find the sweet spot between those two things. Um, uh, what I mentioned earlier, one of the good developments in our view has been the the effort between the twenty fifteen National Assembly that was a democratically elected group, it includes I think all the political parties of Venezuela, and the interim authority group t that they just uh announced today that they're going to resume their discussions on August one. to try to put in place all those elements that you need to have the elections. So we're not uh we're not looking at, you know, letting this go on and on and on beyond the uh administration. But we also don't wanna do it at a time not in the middle of an earthquake and and not when when uh a lot of people as we were mentioning with the with uh Senator Cain when people that should be able to participate in the election can't go back to to Venezuela, and so on. We need to work through those issues. But we're working on them and we think that there's a good institutional structure now amongst the Venezuelans to do that.

So thank you. What uh let's talk about Cuba for a second.

Yes, sir.

Again, uh Cubans in Miami in particular, uh but we have Cubans all over our state, they were happy that Raul Castro was indicted, and had been calling for that for a long time, and so that's that's a positive. Um but they, you know, they're they're worried that nothing's really happening. Um d uh so How how can you give Cubans in Florida hope that something's actually gonna change there and, uh, that we're actually gonna see or should see an accountability? You you saw what, um, Ambassador Walts said at the, uh, United Nations about the opulence of the, um, uh, the Cuban regime. Um, so so how would you give Cubans hope that something's actually gonna happen?

Yeah, I think the hope comes from the fact that the the pressure on the regime to make the fundamental changes that that have to occur if that country is ever gonna be a viable uh country again, the pressure is is har uh harsher than it ever has been. And it's not only because of our doing. The first and foremost, as I mentioned in testimony, uh, cutting off the the free oil supply from Venezuela has really put pressure on it. The the that regime was able to survive for years, 'cause the Soviets gave them free stuff, largely oil. They've been able to survive for the last twenty years because Venezuela was giving them oil, which by the way, something like. Uh, forty to sixty percent of the oil that they were getting from Venezuela, they were selling it. They weren't using it to power generators or or do things in Cuba. They were selling it uh to China and other places and using the hard currency. They got from that to line their uh their pockets. So. they've been able to survive because of that, they don't have it anymore, and the administration has put clamps on to prevent anybody else from trying to step in. Nobody's gonna really step in and provide that kind of uh, you know, bonanza to to the Castro regime. But we're also, and I think with some success, talking to countries around the world and we saw some reflection of this with uh Ambassador Walz in the uh vote in the in the UN, We've said, you know, this is like trying to help somebody stop smoking. And when you see them suffering, you don't hand them a cigarette. Uh, so don't don't give them a little bit of help that will only help them push off the decision. That bureaucracy in Cuba was designed to never make any change, unless Fidel Castro told them to. And they're having a really hard time. I think some of them realize the changes they need to make, but they're having a hard time getting from here to there. Just because of the structure that they set up.

Sure, absolutely.

But I can't tell you exactly how this is gonna go down, but I the hope I think in this is that the the pressures are intense on them to make change. There's really no way out. They're gonna have to do it. And you know exactly how that breaks, I can't say, but but uh we feel like we got the elements there to, you know, hopefully really make a a big difference.

So um the last question is the um The Cubans trafficked doctors and nurses through Pajo for decades or a long time.

Mm-hmm.

Finally, the Trump administration has has uh helped stop that, but it's not allowed uh doctors that had been trafficked to to sue uh the Pan American Health Or organization. And if they don't, how are we ever gonna, you know, and let's say another administration allows them to do it again, if we if we don't go ahead and waive the um immunity for Pajo, what's gonna be the impetus to not allow this to happen again?

Yeah, Pajo was particularly uh guilty of that with respect to the program in Brazil, where they basically served as a intermediary or

Right.

money launderer or whatever you wanna call it. Uh in the in first Trump administration actually we put uh a lot of uh pressure on on Pajo to as as members of the board, we and Brazil and others, and they undertook a bunch of reforms that are supposed to prevent this from happening again. Uh, we, you know, trust but verify we're gonna keep uh looking at that. We've also had some some great successes recently, and I think more to come, in getting countries to just say enough of this, we're not gonna um

Mm-hmm.

do this anymore. It's not it's not that they're getting aid from Cuba with the doctors, they're paying huge amounts of money to Cuba.

We we're we're ready to go, yeah.

The doctors are getting very little, the Cuban the Cuban regime.

No, Pajo Pajo was the uh in they they allowed it.

Yeah, they did with with respect to the Brazil program, but we've that that has ended. Uh, we've gotten a number of countries now to just break with it, and countries are either hiring directly uh Cuban doctors, they some some cases the doctors decide they want to leave Cuba, they'll live in the country they were assigned to, get paid directly, not going through the regime. Other places, people are hiring doctors from Ghana and other parts of the world that uh can come and and make up for their uh deficits. So we're making progress on that front and uh you know, we we could we could give you some more detail on it later, but I think it's it's been a real um uh priority for Secretary Rubio. Thank you, Chairman.

Yep. Thank you. We'd lio uh like to yield to our colleague from Nevada.

Well, thank you, Chairman Curtis, Ranking Member Cain, for holding this hearing. Thank you, Ambassador Kozak, uh, for speaking with us today. Um, I want to talk a little bit more about Venezuela because the Trump administration has reportedly overseen the sale of nearly one hundred million barrels of Venezuelan oil worth an estimated eight billion dollars. Yet Congress and the American people still have no idea what agreements actually govern these sales, how much revenue's actually been collected, who controls the money, or what safeguards are in place or should be in place to prevent corruption or money laundering. And so, Ambassador Kozak, how much Venezuelan oil, gold, other revenue is the US currently managing? Is the money in Qatari accounts, city accounts in New York, with the US treasury, a combination. Um, we really like to know where the money is held, sir, so if you could tell us how what the revenue is and where the money's held, I sure would appreciate that.

Certainly, and thank you for the question, uh, Senator Rosen. Uh, first, with respect, the the Qatari account was used I think once or twice in the early days, because it was before we'd set up a uh American account,

Mm-hmm.

so that That was a one-time thing. It's it's out of the picture now.

Mm-hmm.

What what uh was set up pursuant to executive order is that there's an account that Treasury Department uh has set up it it's controlled by the Treasury Department and the State Department,

Mm-hmm.

but it is it is the the money remains Venezuelan money. It's it's money that they get from oil. They put it in that account, and then in order to spend it, uh we have to approve the expenditure. So this is by agreement with them. So it's their money,

Mm-hmm.

but we're it's it's part of the the sanctions,

They have to ask permission from us.

the they have to get our our permission. We've got we made a a basic agreement with them on things that were permitted and weren't permitted. So paying government salaries, buying supplies that they need for the oil industry.

And would you provide us a list of that? Because I'm interested in the status of an audit of the funds, especially an independent audit.

Yeah. And

Are there auditing firms that are involved and how they were selected? Because um the American taxpayer really deserves transparency. It's a lot of money. Where it's going, who's approving it, how it's being spent, uh I think it's important for us to know. So will you commit to sending us that some of that information?

Yes, ma'am. Yes, um I can give you some of it right now. The

Well, you know, our time is limited, so we'll I'll have my team reach out and we can um get that from you.

Okay.

Um I wanna ask One more question about the Venezuelan oil because Secretary Rubio in January assured this committee that multinational companies like Trafigura and Vitol were only a short-term fix uh for marketing, selling that Venezuelan oil. And so six months and billions of dollars later, both companies, which by the way have documented histories of bribery related to oil trading, remain involved. And now a third trader, GE Warren, has been added. So why are these firms still handling Venezuelan oil revenue managed by the US government?

I think the the uh oil's being sold on the open market now, so a lot of different companies are are involved. But I would go back on the

So even companies that have documented history of bribery, we're okay, we have to give them permission to spend the money, why aren't we involved in in in bringing these uh companies in and making sure, again They're auditing what's happening, where's it going, what they're doing.

Not mentioned.

The auditing is we have, we the US government have KPMG monitoring the expenditures as they are made. And so we

Will you be making those audits public?

They'll they'll be shared,

Or at least to the committee?

we'll we'll get a report in due course from the fr from the the monitoring uh firm from KPMG and and we'll share the results of that with Congress.

And we c-

I'm not sure exactly when our colleagues uh in treasury and uh economic and business bureau are gonna be receiving that, but it shouldn't be you know too long. But we've got there's very close monitoring on the on the expenditures going on, and then the uh Venezuelan government has has hired another big five auditing firm to audit. So we've kind of we're looking at it as it's being expended, they're looking at it afterwards, and we'll we'll have all that data to Sure we do.

It's important to be sh- uh sure that we have transparency and accountability.

Yes ma'am.

Um I have uh just a few seconds left, I wanna ask a little bit uh about the catastrophic earthquakes last month. Nearly four thousand Venezuelans have uh sadly lost their lives, we believe sixteen thousand sustained injuries, thousands more left homeless without adequate shelter as a result of um it's horrific earthquakes. And experts estimate that Venezuela will require roughly thirty-seven billion dollars to recover. Yet the country's institutions just have very limited capacity to manage any reconstruction. And again, the risks of corruption are significant. We've talked about that with the the oil companies. So how is the State Department working with international partners to reassure to ensure that reconstruction assistance is coordinated, is transparent, is protected from corruption, and really helps um these folks who've lost everything? Um what are you doing um uh to help there?