Hearings to examine worldwide threats; to be immediately followed by a closed session in SH-219.

Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment hearing. Let me begin by welcoming our esteemed panel of witnesses, the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, the CIA Director, John Ratcliffe, the FBI Director, Kash Patel, the Acting Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of US Cyber Command Lieutenant General William Hartman, and the DIA Director, Lieutenant General James Adams. Thank you all for your appearance today and for your service. I also want to offer a special thanks to General Hartman, who is about to enter a well-earned and well-deserved retirement. General, on behalf of the committee, thank you for your lifetime of service to our nation. I'd first like to take this opportunity to commend the thousands of men and women in our intelligence agencies whom our witnesses represent. Our intelligent profe- professionals are second to none. Because of their service, their dedication and their sacrifice, Americans are safer at home and around the world. But because of the nature of their work, grateful Americans don't buy their lunch at restaurants or even have a chance to say thank you. So on their behalf, let me simply say thank you. I wanna make two basic points this morning. First, the world is always a dangerous place, especially for America. But thanks to your agencies and President Trump's leadership, the world isn't quite as dangerous for Americans as it was a year ago. Thanks to the efforts of our military and intelligence personnel, including my fellow Arkansans who are now serving in the Middle East, the Iranian revolutionary regime that terrorized the world for forty-seven years, is finally knocked on its back foot. Last summer we devastated Iran's nuclear facilities. In recent weeks, we have eliminated Iran's top leadership, pummeled its military, sunk its navy, destroyed its missiles, neutered its proxies, and left its economy reeling. After forty-seven years of indecision and timidity, America has finally put our foot down. I'm also pleased to report that things have improved a lot in our own backyard, now that Venezuela's illegitimate communist dictator Nicholas Maduro is rotting in a New York prison. Only the United States could execute a military and intelligence operation of this difficulty without a single uh American life lost. Our military is awesome. But these operations wouldn't have succeeded and they probably wouldn't have even been tried without timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence from your agencies. These successful operations are a testament to our intelligence professionals' ability to expose and uncover critical details about America's enemies. So let this be a warning to those who wish America harm. We leave no stone unturned. And there's no one or no thing close to you that might not betray you. Today's hearing is an opportunity for the American people to hear an unvarnished and unbiased account of the remaining threats we face, from Communist China, North Korea and Russia to the East, to narco-terrorist cartels here at home. These threats truly do span the globe. And for my second point, your agencies have improved over the last year, thanks to reforms that has gotten them back to basics. Of course, my two points are related. When our intelligence agencies return to their core mission, stealing the secrets of our adversaries to deliver timely and needful intelligence, America is safer for it. These efforts are already bearing fruit. For example, last year the CIA increased its foreign intelligence reporting by twenty-five percent. This year, the CIA is on track to hire and deploy more officers than at any point in the last quarter century. While I'm greatly encouraged by the progress, more remains to be done. We must always equip our intelligence personnel with the tools they need to do their jobs well, and execute their missions. That's why I fully support President Trump's request for a clean reauthorization of FISA section seven O two. And it's why I expect a healthy intelligence budget request in the administration's supplemental appropriations request to fund operations against Iran and narco-terrorists. No doubt our military needs supplemental funding, but our intelligence agencies need it just as badly. Moreover, I urge each of you to continue to make personnel and institutional reforms that will cement cement these changes and foreclose a return in the future to bureaucratic bloat, political bias, and excessive caution within your services. When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community. Our first Intelligence Authorization Act set the foundation for a more efficient intelligence community by, for example, reorganizing the ODNI, improving the security of CIA installations, and directing resources towards foreign intelligence collection and covert action. This year I look forward to going further, namely by growing our cadre of collectors, making generational investments in core capabilities, providing new capabilities to defend our space assets, and further codifying reforms to guard against any future return of bloated and biased bureaucracy. I look forward to working with you towards these ends. I now recognize the Vice Chairman.

Um, thank you, Mister Chairman, and let me also offer a good morning to our witnesses. Um, let me also join you, Mister Chairman, by and begin by thanking, literally, the tens of thousands of men and women across America's intelligence community. who work every day to keep our country safe. Their work is by necessity secret. That is the nature of intelligence. But that is also why hearings like this one matter so much. Over the past year, we have seen a series of developments that raise serious concerns about the erosion of safeguards that protect both our democracy and our security. And nowhere is that more worrying than when it comes to the integrity of our elections. For decades now, our intelligence community has warned that foreign adversaries, including Russia, China, and Iran, are actively seeking to shape the outcome of American elections. These efforts have included cyber-intrusions, disinformation campaigns, and covert influence operations designed to divide Americans and undermine our confidence in our democratic institutions. Protecting our elections from these threats should be one of the intelligence community's highest priorities. The D N I is supposed to be coordinating intelligence on foreign election interference, warning the American people about adversaries seeking to undermine our democracy, ensuring that federal, state, and local officials have the information they need, Congress even required the creation of a foreign malign influence center inside the office of the DNI to coordinate the intelligence community's response to foreign election interference and ensure that these threats are properly shared across the government. That is the mission Congress assigned to the DNI. But while foreign adversaries are actively probing our democratic institutions, the DNI has eliminated the foreign malign influence center and does not have a designated official coordinating the response to election threats. And for months the committee has reportedly, has repeatedly requested briefings from the IC, briefings that are required by law on legitimate foreign threats to the midterms. We have received no response. Now that silence, I believe, should concern every member of the committee. Because it clearly demonstrates the DNI is not interested in protecting American democracy by combating foreign influence. Instead, unfortunately, we have seen the DNI involve herself in purely domestic matters. Last month, we saw Director Gabbard personally participate in a law enforcement raid to seize election ballots. in voting machine records in Fulton County, Georgia. A raid tied to an election that the president lost six years ago. When the warrant supporting the raid was unsealed, it showed something deeply troubling. There was no foreign connection to justify the involvement of our nation's top spy. Instead, the predicate for the warrant was a slop of debunked conspiracy theories that had already been rejected repeatedly by courts, by independent investigators, and by even by George's own Republican Secretary of State. Yet the nation's top intelligence officer official was personally involved in this operation. This raises one very ser serious question. If the intelligence community is not being deployed to mobilize agin- to mobilize against foreign threats, why is it being deployed at all on a domestic issue the d n i s appearance at this rate as well as her involvement in seizing seizing voting machines from puerto rico suggests something that should also alarm every american i believe in organized effort to misuse her national security powers to interfere in domestic politics and potentially provide a pretext for the president's unconstitutional efforts to seize control of the upcoming elections. Don't take my word for it. The president has repeatedly pushed for the nationalization of our elections, calling for federal government to override the state election laws and quote, "take over" voting while continuing to make false statements about election fraud. And we have heard troubling rhetoric from senior officials that reinforce these concerns. As former Homeland Security Secretary Christy Noem said publicly, "We've been," and this is a quote, " We've been proactive, trying to make sure we have the right people voting, electing the right leaders to lead this country." At the same time, the administration has brought into government individuals promoting conspiracy theories about our elections. The so-called White House Director of Election Security and Integrity Kurt Olsen played a key role in efforts to overturn the results of the twenty twenty election. Now, mister Olsen holds a position inside the federal government with the ref- authority to refer criminal investigations and access our most sensitive security information. All supposedly doing his witch hunts around elections. Matter of fact, according to the court filings, he helped trigger the FBI's seizure of the ballots and Fulton County. So it is worth asking why is someone whose career has been devoted to undermining the legitimate results of a democratic election, now operating from inside the federal government, with access to law enforcement and intelligence authorities, what exactly has he been empowered to do? As members of our committee know, this crea uh, as members know, this committee was created in the aftermath of the unconstitutional abuses exposed after Watergate. The guardrails have been built around our intelligence and law enforcement agencies over the past several decades exist for a reason. Without them, America begins to look more like adversaries, emphasized in this year's annual threat assessment. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and less like a democracy. Confront confronting these very clear and present threats to American security requires experienced professionals and ex- intelligence agencies that are focused squarely on their mission. Instead, over the past year we've seen actions that only serve to weaken them. Politically motivated purges at the FBI has resulted in the exodus of hundreds of agents. and the reassignments of hundreds more from key national security areas, like counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber, and where they've been redeployed to immigration enforcement. In one troubling case, agents working on a task force focused on threats from Iran, clearly something that's pretty damn important right now, were dismissed because they had previously participated in the investigation of the president's mishandling of classified information. Elsewhere, the Bureau's budget is being slashed. Last year it cut over five hundred million dollars, with the largest decreases from cyber, counterterrorism, and counterespionage. And the remaining scarce resources are being squandered on things like a sixty million dollar jet for the director's personal travel, so it can go golfing in Scotland or parting with athletes in Milan. In fact, according to a whistle-blower account, those flights became so frequent they even delayed the bureau's response to major incidents like the Charlie Kirk assassination or the shooting at Brown University. Credible reports also indicate that highly trained FBI agents from elite SWAT units have been reassigned to chauffeur his girlfriend, an unprecedented use of personnel whose training intended are actually intended for hunting violent criminals and neutralizing terrorists. Unfortunately, this dysfunction has not been limited to the FBI. Both the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and this is no reflection on the two gentlemen sitting in front of us, were both left leaderless for months after the president fired their directors. One at the behest of a nine eleven conspiracy theorist. And the other, for providing a fact-based assessment that contradicted the president's claims about obliterating Iran's nuclear program. Clearly if the program had been truly obliterated, the president wouldn't be bombing again right now. And again, more than one third of the personnel at SISC, created by Congress to protect critical infrastructure, like power, water, and election systems, have been forced out. That seems like a real mistake, as we still grapple with the intrusion called Sight-Ti-Syphon and the recent Iranian cyber-attack on Stryker. And we are now seeing in real time the cost to the State Department. Thousands of American citizens were trapped in a literal war zone with little assistance from their own government. For a time, those calling the State Department hotline for assistance were greeted with a pre-recorded message that said, quote, please do not require rely on the US government for assisted departure or evacuation. This was a foreseeable security crisis. When you start a war of choice, when there was no imminent threat, you should be able to prepare to make sure you get Americans out of the war zone. That same attitude pushing some of our closest friends into the arms of our most capable foes has profound consequences. Two of our most significant allies, Canada and the UK, are currently working to sign trade deals with China because they no longer believe the United States is a dependable partner. That's a remarkable statement in twenty twenty six. And in the president's war of choice with Iran, war that has already killed thirteen service members, cost Americans, taxpayers, billions of dollars, and scrambled supply chains from oil to fertilizer to aluminum, nobody answered the call when the president asked our allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. As the president's own counterterrorism chief acknowledged in his resignation yesterday, Iran posed no imminent threat the united states unfortunately our allies have been alienated and distracted by the administration's unilateral threats like invading greenland and the result is clear americans have been left more exposed in an already dangerous conflict now what i say what i just outlined is quite a list and it's a partial one at that matter of fact we've got a full list we'd like to share with all the press So what does this all mean? It matters because I believe the warnings contained in this year's annual threat assessment. I believe our IC when they say the global security environment is becoming more complex. And that armed conflict is becoming more global. And I also agree with the assessment when it says that to succeed, we must think prudently and prioritize our efforts. On the topic of the annual threat assessment, I wanna close where I began by noting that since the first time since twenty seventeen in the aftermath of Russia's intervention in our twenty sixteen elections, the annual threat assessment includes nothing, nothing, about adversary attempts to influence American elections. Now, I don't believe this omission means that the threat is disappeared. It means that the intelligence community is no longer being allowed to speak honestly about it. And it raises serious questions. And I will be asking about the, your priorities, Director Gabbert, in terms of what you're choosing to prioritize instead. Thank you, Mister Chairman. I yield back.

Before we go to the witnesses, now that we have a critical mass of members, I would simply like to remind members that we will handle questions as we did last year, uh seniority. uh, at the time of the gavel and alternating between Democrats and Republicans. We'll have one round of questions, seven minutes per round. I will not entertain questions after seven minute time has expired. Furthermore, I expect to convene the closed session in our usual location promptly thirty minutes after the open session begins. Director Gabbard, the floor is yours.

Thank you, Chairman Cotton, Vice Chair Warner, members of the committee, good morning. I'm here today to present the twenty twenty six annual threat assessment, joined by the directors of the CIA, FBI, DIA and NSA. Uh, before I continue, on behalf of the intelligence community, want to extend our thanks to General Hartman for his thirty seven years of service in uniform, and closing out his thirty seven years with tremendous leadership of the NSA. This briefing is being provided in accordance with ODNI's statutory responsibility. I'd like to remind those who are watching what I am briefing here today, conveys the intelligence community's assessment of the threats facing US citizens our homeland and our interests not my personal views or opinions. In this assessment, we're following the structure of priorities that were laid out in the President's National Security Strategy,

Nice web.

starting with threats to our homeland and then shifting to global risks. The defense of our homeland is of the utmost importance. to the American people. And efforts by this administration have shown over the last year, the results of bolstering homeland defense in the security of the American people. For example, the strict enforcement of US policies at the US-Mexico border and regionally have served as a deterrent, drastically reducing illegal immigration. Based on Customs and Border Patrol data, January twenty twenty-six's monthly encounters are down eighty-three point eight percent compared to January, twenty twenty five. Encounters declined seventy nine percent compared to twenty twenty four. The drivers of migration are likely to continue. Potential worsening instability in countries like Cuba and Haiti risk triggering migration surges, and smugglers who have long operated as transnational criminal organizations continue to view chaos as an opportunity for profit, and will continue to look to profit from illegal immigration flows. These transnational criminal organizations continue to pose a daily and direct threat to the health and safety of millions of US citizens, primarily and directly by producing and trafficking in illegal drugs. Under President Trump's leadership, fentanyl overdose deaths have seen a thirty percent decrease from September twenty twenty four to September twenty twenty five. President Trump's aggressive efforts to more directly and actively target these transnational criminal organizations and the inflow of fentanyl precursors has already had a significant impact, which is likely to continue. We've seen fentanyl potency also decrease, likely due to disruptions to the production supply chain. US efforts to work with China and India to halt the flow of fent- fentanyl precursor chemicals to North America are demonstrating some improvement, but there is more work to be done, as sadly, there are still tens of thousands of fentanyl-related deaths in America. every year. Mexico-based TCOs like the Sinaloa cartel and Jalisco new generation cartel dominate the production and smuggling of fentanyl, heroin, meth, and cocaine into the United States. Columbia-based TCOs and illegal armed groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and the National Liberation Army are responsible for producing and trafficking large volumes of cocaine to the US and European markets with now some indicators of attempts to expand their market to the Asia-Pacific region. Colombia remains the world's largest producer of cocaine, and Colombian criminal groups have expanded their trafficking relationships with the n- neighboring Ecuadorian and Brazilian gangs. As you know, MS thirteen is well established in cells within the United States and uses violence to in- intimidate the Salvadoran diaspora, engaging in murder, extortion, retail drug trafficking, firearms offenses and prostitution, fueling increased violence and instability. These and other TCOs continue to present a very tangible and individualized risk of violent crime to everyday Americans, and contribute to regional instability. As the president increases his focus on counter-drug and counter-cartel pressures, they're likely to seek ways to try to adapt their operations, including shifting production locations and trafficking routes and methods. The United States continues to face a complex and evolving threat landscape with a geographically geographically diverse set of Islamist terrorist actors, seeking to propagate their ideology globally and harm Americans, even as Al-Qaeda and ISIS remain weaker today than they were at their respective peaks. The spread of Islamist ideology, in some cases led by individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood poses a fundamental threat to freedom and the foundational that underp- underpin Western civilization. Islamist groups and individuals use this ideology for recruiting and financial support for terrorist groups and individuals around the world and to advance their political objectives of establishing is an Islamist caliphate, which governs based on Sharia. There are increasing examples of this in various European countries, and President Trump's designation of certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters as foreign terrorist organizations is a mechanism to secure Americans against In response to setbacks to their capabilities of conducting large scale complex attacks Islamist terrorist groups have shifted toward focusing on executing information operations to spread propaganda and inspire or enable individuals located in or with access to the West. US counterterrorism efforts, primarily in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Syria in twenty twenty five were instrumental in removing key terrorist leaders and operatives, degrading the ability of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to quickly reconstitute its leadership, and plan large-scale attacks against the homeland and US interests abroad. Strict US border enforcement measures and increased deportations of individuals with suspected links to Islamist terrorists have reduced access to the homeland and removed some potential sources of future terrorist attacks. Since January, Many of our official have only had a handful of encounters at our borders with individuals associated with terrorist groups. This is a positive trend. However, our inter-agency coordinated efforts to continue to identify, locate and remove known or suspected terrorists who may already be in the United States continues with vigilance. In twenty twenty five, there were at least three Islamist terrorist attacks in the United States. Law enforcement disrupted fifteen US-based Islamist terrorist plotters. Roughly half of last year's disrupted plotters had some on-line contact with Islamist terrorists inspired by Islamist foreign terrorist organizations abroad. For example, in the recent attempt to attack a synagogue in Michigan, the shooter had familial ties to a Hezbollah leader. Al-Qaeda and ISIS pose the biggest threat to US interests overseas, in parts of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, where these groups operate. In the Middle East, AQAP in Yemen, ISIS-K in South Asia, and ISIS in Syria are among the most likely groups conducting external plotting. ISIS in Syria is likely seeking to rebuild its ranks, expand support networks, and solicit funds by re-engaging with and recruiting from the likely hundreds of ISIS detainees, and thousands of ISIS-linked women and children who were either released or escaped from prisons and displaced person camps. that were previously run by the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria. Meanwhile, state actors present a risk broader in scope by seeking new capabilities in kinetic and cyber warfare. The United States' secure nuclear deterrent continues to ensure safety in the homeland against strategic threats. However, the intelligence community assesses that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan have been researching and developing an array of novel advanced or traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional payloads that put our homeland within range. The IC assesses that threats to the homeland will expand collectively to more than sixteen thousand missiles by twenty thirty five from the current assessed figure of more than three thousand missiles. The IC assesses that China and Russia are developing advanced delivery systems meant to be capable of penetrating or bypassing US missile defenses. North Korea's ICBMs can already reach US soil, and the ICSS is that it is committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with a range capable of striking the homeland. The ICSS's that Iran has previously demonstrated space launch and other technology, it could use to begin to develop a militarily viable ICBM before twenty thirty five, should Tehran attempt to pursue that capability. However, these assessments will clearly be updated as the full impact of Operation Epic Fury's devastating strikes on Iran's missile production facilities, stockpiles, and launch capabilities is determined. These nations collectively will likely seek to understand US plans for advanced missile defense for the homeland, probably for the purpose of shaping their own missile development programs, and assessing US intentions regarding deterrence. Shifting to the cyber domain, the IC assesses that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and non-state ransomware groups will continue to seek to compromise US government and private sector networks, as well as critical infrastructure, to collect intelligence, create options for future disruption and for financial gain. The IC assesses that China and Russia present the most persistent and active threats and are continuing their R and D efforts. North Korea's cyber program is sophisticated and agile. In twenty twenty five alone, North Korea's cryptocurrency heist probably stole two billion dollars, which the ICSS is helping to fund the regime and include further development of its strategic weapons programs. Financially or ideologically motivated non-state actors are becoming more bold, with ransomware groups shifting to faster high-volume attacks that are harder to identify and mitigate. Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence. will likely accelerate these threats in the cyber domain. The ICSS's that it will increasingly shape cyber operations with both cyber operators and defenders using these tools to improve their speed and effectiveness. For example, in August of twenty twenty five, cyber actors used an AI tool to conduct a data extortion operation against international government healthcare and public health emergency service sectors, as well as religious institutions. Moving to the Arctic, the IC assesses that Russia, and to a lesser extent China, aim to strengthen their presence in the region through increased maritime trade, natural resource extraction, and military activity. Russia, which has the longest coastline in the Arctic, has long sought recognition of its polar great power status, and is deploying more military forces and building new permanent infrastructure. China, though not an Arctic country, is engaged in more limited efforts in the region to advance its own strategic and economic The ICSS's that China is the most capable competitor in the field of artificial intelligence. The ICSS's that AI capabilities are rapidly advancing and changing the threat landscape. As this is a defining technology that enables computers and machines to simulate human learning comprehension, problem solving, creativity, and autonomy, it will be critical to ensure that humans remain in control of how AI is used, and of the machines that may threaten to autonomously violate the interests of the American people across all domains. AI adoption at scale across the spectrum of usage poses serious risks. AI has the potential to aid in weapons and systems design, has been used in recent conflicts to influence targeting and streamline decision making underscoring the risk and likely threats that could manifest on the battlefield early developers in the quantum in quantum computers will give countries an extraordinary technological advantage over others to quickly process national security information and break current encryption methodology used to protect sensitive finance, health care, and government information. The global security landscape is volatile and complex, with armed conflict growing more common and posing potential threats against US interests. Strategic competition and regional and smaller powers are becoming more willing to use force to pursue their interests, heightening the risk of conflict. The ICSS's the space domain is becoming increasingly contested, with China and Russia developing counter space capabilities to challenge US space efforts. The threat of nuclear proliferation and advancing chemical and biological warfare capabilities continues to grow. I'll turn now to our neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere, where flagging economies high crime rates, pervasive organized crime, migration flows, corruption, narcotics trafficking, all of these present a spectrum of risks to US interests, and where strategic competitors seek to gain greater influence in the region. The IC assesses that Latin America and the Caribbean almost certainly will see hot spots of vol- volatility in the coming year. Since Maduro's arrest, the IC assesses a shift in Venezuela's leadership, towards cooperating with the US to open its economy, to develop the country's oil and gas extraction capability, and we've seen their movement in releasing political prisoners. The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement review in twenty twenty six will likely increase uncertainty in many Latin American countries, especially those that rely on Mexico as an export destination for intermediate goods for manufacture and onward export to the US. China, Russia and Iran are likely seeking to sustain economic, political, and military engagement with Latin America. The ICSS's that China's demand for raw materials is likely to continue to drive its economic outreach, while Russia likely wants to expand its current security and diplomatic ties with Cuba and Nicaragua. The ICSS's that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and technological power to increase its own regional positioning. global influence to fend off threats to their interests. While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with Pres- President Xi to work towards US interests have enabled progress where those interests align. The ICSS says that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. This includes with the aim of being capable of deterring US and allied forces in the region, and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the IC assesses that China likely prefer prefers to set the conditions for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict. The IC assesses that an increasingly confident North Korean regime remains a source of concern regionally and globally. Its weapons of mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, illicit cyber activities and demonstrated willingness to use asymmetric capabilities poses a threat to US and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. North Korea's partnership with Russia is growing. And in twenty twenty five, Kim took steps to improve ties with China, still North Korea's most important trading partner and economic benefactor. The ICSS's that North Korea's support for Russia in the war against Ukraine has increased Korea's capabilities as their forces have gained combat experience in twenty-first century warfare along with equipment. In twenty twenty four, North Korea deployed more than eleven thousand troops to Russia to support combat operations in Kursk. Pyongyang continues to develop and expand its strategic weapons programs, including missiles that can evade US and regional missile defenses. It is continuing to work to increase its nuclear warhead stockpile. and maintains biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Russia retains the capability to selectively challenge US interests globally by military and non-military means. The ICSS says that the most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the US is the potential of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict, such as Ukraine, or a new conflict that led to direct hostilities, including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons. The ICSS's that Putin continues to invest in Russia's defense industrial base, as well as novel capabilities that may pose a greater threat to the US homeland and forces abroad than conventional weapons. Russia has advanced systems, hypersonic missiles, and undersea capabilities designed to negate US military advantage. Moscow also relies on other tools to exert pressure, using gray zone tactics to further its goals and compete below the level of armed conflict. Russia is also building an extensive counter space capabilities to contest US space dominance. Its development of a nuclear counter space weapon poses the greatest single threat to the world's space architecture. During the past year, the ICSS is that Russia has maintained the upper hand in the war against Ukraine. US-led negotiations between Moscow and Kiev are ongoing. Until such an agreement is met, Moscow is likely to continue fighting a slow war of attrition. until they view their objectives have been achieved. In the Middle East, conflict and instability will shape security, political and economic dynamics in a variety of ways. The ICSS says that Operation Epic Fury is advancing fundamental change in the region that began with Hamas's attack on Israel, in Oc- on October seventh, twenty twenty three, and continued with the twelve day war last year, resulting in weakening Iran and its proxies. The ICSS's the regime in Iran appears to be intact but largely degraded, due to attacks on its leadership and military capabilities. Its conventional military power projection capabilities have largely been destroyed, leaving limited options. Iran's strategic position has been significantly degraded. The US-led maximum pressure campaign and snapback of European sanctions added additional pressure to an already bleak Iranian economy resulting in mass protest earlier this year that Tehran suppressed by killing thousands of protesters. Even if the regime remains intact, the ICSS says that internal tensions are likely to increase as econ- as Iran's economy worsens. Even so, Iran and its proxies continue to attack US and allied interests in the Middle East. The ICSS says that if a hostile regime survives, it will likely seek to begin a years-long effort to rebuild its military, missiles, and UAV forces. Prior to Operation Epic Fury, the ICSS's Iran was trying to recover from the severe damage to its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the Twelve Day War, and continued to refuse to comply with its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, refusing them access to key facilities. The ICSS's that China, Russia, and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary. Iran has long viewed the US as an adversary and is engaged in active conflict with the US as of today. These four countries, the ICSSs are likely to continue their selective cooperation with each other, which could bolster their individual capabilities and threats to US interests more broadly. However, currently these relationships are primarily bilateral on selective issues and depend on broader circumstances, divergent sovereign interests, and in some cases, concerns over directly confronting the United States. These factors, the ICSS's are likely to constrain their relationships. Finally, conflicts on the continent of Africa are likely to persist through twenty twenty six due to poor governance economic demands and external support. Tensions continue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which could rapidly accelerate to conflict. Contentious national elections in Somalia could distract the federal government away from counterterrorism actions. against al-Shabaab, which continues to conduct terror attacks while providing funding and propaganda support to other elements of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. The civil war in Sudan continues, even as external negotiations occur. ISIS in West Africa and the Sahel have increased the intensity of their attacks against local security forces, expanding their areas of operation and moving closer to cities with the US presence. The ICSS's that African governments will likely use their wealth and critical minerals to seek partnerships that deliver them meaningful benefit. Concurrent conflicts and crises across the continent will continue to put US citizens at risk and cause further instability. In closing, as leaders of the intelligence community, we remain committed to providing the president and policy makers with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence to inform decision making and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of the American people. Thank you.

Thank you, Director Gabbard. General Adams, Camden, Arkansas is the home of brand new production lines for the Israeli missile defense interceptors. Could you please explain how critical arrow and iron dome systems being built in Camden um are for not only Israel's defenses, but the defense of hundreds of thousands of American citizens and troops in the region?

Uh, Chairman Cotton, uh, thank you for that question, and uh, I I have to say that the Aero system and the Iron Dome system are critical defensive systems that prevent uh uh adversary power projection from impacting um the uh, the the targets in the friendly areas i- in Israel. The Aero system itself is uh the high altitude, primarily against uh MRBMs, yeah, and it's proven to be very, very effective against those uh systems. The Iron Dome uh is more of a closer-in system, uh protecting against rockets and things of that nature. But the combination of those two with uh U uh US uh systems creates a shield, uh to prevent uh those attacks from the Iranians uh impacting key areas in uh in in areas where they're protecting.

Thank you, General Adams. Uh, I was recently in Camden with Secretary Hegseth as part of his Arsenal of Freedom tour, and they or greater Kansans who do great work to keep our nation safe. Uh, General Hartman, we've often spoken about our pressing need for more cyber security manpower and part-time formation such as the Arkansas Air National Guards, two hundred and twenty-third Cyber Space Operations Squadron are a great way to grow the force. What recommendations do you have to grow the cyber protection teams and develop more capacity for local and national missions?

chairman cotton thank thanks for the question um i uh did hear a little bit about the great team in uh arkansas there and i know eight fifty five cpt uh operates from that formation and so for us certainly looking at a number of different initiatives one ensure that we can share all of the relevant top secret classified information and uh other uh sort of indications and warning that the organizations need but i will tell you i'm an advocate for uh inability to establish some sort of joint reserve cyber organization and so that at cyber comm we can insure that those organizations uh have all of the advanced training that they need uh to insure that those organizations have access to all of the intelligence that they need uh and to insure that we control some level of funding at both cyber comm and nsa uh that can be used to mobilize those personnel to handle the most difficult problems that we're faced with uh and we have been working with congress on some of that language and the department and we appreciate it sir

Thank you, General Hartman. As I said in my opening, um, we only have this one public hearing a year, even though the committee hears from each of you several times throughout the year in classified settings. Um, so we don't often have a chance to tell the American people what great work their intelligence professionals are doing for them. So, Director Ratcliffe, um, could, could you take the opportunity to, to maybe join in the excellent briefings that Secretary Hegseth and General Kane have provided on a regular basis. um, over the last couple months, um, on the military aspects of both the Maduro raid and Operation Epic Fury, to explain the CIA's contributions to those operations.

Uh, thank you, Senator. Um, you know, last year when I was here, uh, in in my confirmation, uh, I promised you all, and you had all asked for, a more aggressive CIA, one that was focused on core mission, getting back to the business of stealing secrets. to be able to provide our policymakers with a decisive strategic advantage that would allow, uh, an advance and contribute to foreign policy and national security successes. To the credit of the CIA workforce, um, the CIA has delivered. Uh, some of those successes have been very public. Um, as you mentioned, Senator, uh, Operation Midnight Hammer, Operation Absolute Res- Flawless military operations like that are hostage to, uh, a flawless intelligence picture and the CIA, uh, as you know from classified briefings, contributed in myriad ways to the success of that. But what I would say to you is, uh, those successes are just emblematic of the phenomenal progress and success really by every measure, every metric, every standard across every national security space. Uh, with regard to the work of the CIA, uh, Senator, you mentioned some of it in your opening. Um, the increase of our asset stable, um, and our human sources up by twenty-five percent. Our FI collection across the board, our foreign intelligence collection, uh, up by f- twenty-five percent overall, and in important categories like China, for instance, up a hundred percent. Uh, in areas like tech and AI, up forty-five percent. On the counter-narcotics front, our operations up by seventy percent. And with regard to counterterrorism, uh, those are classified numbers that I'll share with you in the classified portion of this hearing, but they're off the charts good. Um, the best way I can summarize it, um, Senator, is I had a thirty-two year veteran, uh, of the agency retire this year and he said to me, I hate to go. Uh, I don't know if it's the best year that the CI has ever had, but it's the best year I can ever remember. And I think that reflects the current morale of the of the CIA. It's a workforce that knows it's doing a great job. It's know it's it's it knows that it's being allowed to do what they signed up to do, which is uh provide that decisive strategic advantage uh to our country for great successes that everyone can see. So I thank you for the opportunity to let me uh recognize the CIA workforce.

Thank you. I, Director Ratcliffe, I wanna address one specific threat from Iran, the threat of an intercontinental missile. Which is really just the combination of two technologies, one thrust to get something into space and a re-entry vehicle to get it back to Earth. Um, Iran has always had a space launch program, which is flimsy cover. For the first part of that intercontinental missile program, I haven't seen any Iranian astronauts in space lately. And second, they have medium range ballistic missiles, which already have a re-entry vehicle. So if you crudely married those two technologies together, um, I've heard some analysts say that Iran could have had a uh, functioning intercontinental missile to threaten the United States in as few as six months. Would you agree with that assessment?

Well, you're uh, you're right to be concerned about Iran's uh, development of longer range ballistic missiles, Senator. If, if, if Iran were allowed, uh, to develop at the IRBR IRBM ranges, which is three thousand kilometers, it would uh, it would threaten most of Europe. And yes, as you mentioned, um, we know that Iran is gaining experience in these larger uh, more powerful booster technologies through its, uh, so-called space launch vehicle program. Um, if left um, uh, unimpeded, yes, uh, Senator, uh, they would have the ability to, uh, range missiles to the continental US. Um, it's one of the reasons why degrading Iran's, um, uh, missile production capabilities that is taking place right now in Operation Epic Fury is so important to our national security.

Thank you. Bye, Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, Dr. Gab, Dr. Gabbert, the um whole country knows that you were recently involved in a FBI operation to seize ballots in Fulton County, Georgia. Yet, this was despite the fact that the warrant showed no foreign interference or nexus. Matter of fact, the warrant was based entirely on conspiracy theories that have already been examined and rejected repeatedly. Now, where is the authority for you to involve yourself in a domestic law enforcement activity?

Thank you, Vice Chairman. I appreciate the question. I, as you know, I've addressed uh every issue you've raised in detail in a letter, but I'm grateful for the opportunity to do it in this forum. Uh, as you stated, Congress provided uh by statute, ODNI, with the responsibility of election security and counterintelligence. uh in twenty twenty one. Uh as you also know, ODNI has purview and oversight.

Ma'am, could you, could you, I I I know the history very well, but could you just dir- address where

I I am addressing the question. ODNI also uh has purview and overview over two uh domestic related agencies, the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, both of which have purview over election security responsibilities, to ensure the integrity of our elections. Uh I wanna correct one of your statements that you've made multiple times, which is false. I did not participate in a law enforcement activity, nor would I, because that does not exist within my authorities.

You were present on the scene.

I was at Fulton, I was at Fulton County.

There are the photos, are the photos of you on the scene false?

I was, I was at Fulton County, sir, uh, at the request of the president and to work with the FBI to observe this action, uh, that had long been awaited, I was not aware of what was in the warrant or was not in the warrant,

And, and what was the president's specific request for you to go to,

and to say thank you to the FBI agent for their work.

what was the specific request that was made by the president? For you to show up in Fulton County.

To go and observe the FBI's activities on this issue.

So why why do you have the answer of do you have the answer why

When you look at the for your question, sir.

the president was knowing about this affidavit before it was even served?

Your question, sir. I'm not aware that the president knew about an affidavit before it was served.

Then why was he sending you to Fulton County?

This occurred the day that the FBI had it approved, they're Warren approved by a local judge, and they began to execute this.

Director Gamble.

Could you ask your question, sir, about the foreign nexus question? in order for us to better understand the vulnerabilities in our election systems that may exist today, as we look to twenty twenty six. And yes, we are very focused on trying to make sure that this election is one that the American people have faith in,

I, Director Gabin, let me, I've got a number of questions.

and count their votes as passive.