Building a New Regional Security Architecture: The Next Phase of the Abraham Accords

The subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the future of the Abraham Accords, and opportunities to strengthen and expand regional cooperation among existing and prospective partners. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing. on the future of the Abraham Accords. Thank you to my colleagues and our esteemed witnesses for being here today, as we examine one of the most transformative diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. Nearly six years ago, the Abraham Accords fundamentally changed the trajectory of the Middle East. They demonstrated that peace and cooperation are possible when countries choose shared interests over old divisions. The agreements between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, followed by Morocco and Kazakhstan, opened the door to a new era of diplomatic engagement, economic integration, technological innovation, and security cooperation. President Trump, during his first administration, was instrumental in making these agreements possible. And while they were an afterthought to President Biden, Mister Trump and his team have again brought them to the forefront of US policy in the Middle East. We will continue to play a central role in advancing similar agreements and ensuring the long-term success of those already in place. The Middle East looks very different today than it did in twenty twenty, prior to the Abraham accords. The region has faced unprecedented challenges from Iran's aggression and the threat posed by its terrorist proxies to the rapid evolution of emerging technologies. economic competition, and shifting geopolitical dynamics. At the same time, these challenges have reinforced an important lesson. America's partners are stronger and our interests are better protected when the region works together. The Abraham Accord should not be viewed as a finished product. They are a foundation upon which we can build a stronger regional security architecture, expand economic opportunity, encourage innovation and create new pathways for peace, which is why today's hearing is so important. We are not simply looking back at what the accords have accomplished. We are looking ahead, how we can deepen security cooperation, how we can accelerate trade and investment, how we can expand cooperation on artificial intelligence, cyber security, energy, infrastructure, and emerging technologies. What role shouldn't look forward to your testimony? as we examine how the United States can build one of the most consequential diplomatic achievements in moder- in the modern Middle East. And with that, I now recognize our ranking member for his opening statement.

Thank you. I support the Abrahamic Accords, but those accords are pretty much just normal relations with cooperation as normal countries do with Muslim majority countries. Israel has such relations with twenty-three Muslim majority countries, only three of which are a result of the Abrahamic Accords' uh efforts. East looks substantially different than it did in twenty-twenty. This is true. This is because of our unsuccessful I'm sorry. and uh uh disastrous unplanned war against Iran. Our witnesses today, uh who have served in the Trump administration, spend much of their uh opening uh statements, at least as provided uh in advance to us, attacking the Biden administration for not adequately enforcing sanctions against Iran but because we are in a losing position in this war, the President of the United States has signed this Memorandum of Understanding which states that the United States undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic, including the UN Security Council Resolution IEAE, all unilateral US sanctions, primary and section- secondary, and, uh, uh, uh, goes on to say that the United States is obligated to immediately, uh, waive all, uh, uh, to issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil petroleum products derivatives etcetera for is-

How many minutes?

for Israel

How many minutes? How many minutes again?

it's amazing uh how much activity you can generate here in the Rayburn building if you're the Chinese uh Communist Party and you pay certain people to do this. How many minutes? Couldn't agree more.

Yes.

So, uh the qu- the most important part of an Abrahamic Accords' success would be relations between Israel and uh Saudi Arabia, the guardian of the holy places. And the Saudis have made it clear that there needs to be progress toward a Palestinian state for them to move forward on that. There was some attempt to instead get the Saudis to ignore the Palestinians in return for a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. Today or last night it was announced uh that uh there is a an agreement uh with the the Saudis on nuclear cooperation that does nothing for the Abrahamic Accords but worse yet poses a severe threat of nuclear proliferation. Um, now there, I am, been doing this a long time. I remember when the most powerful monarch in the Middle East was a friend of the United States, and that was the Shah. And every weapons system the Shah had in nineteen seventy eight is in the hands of the Mullahs starting in nineteen seventy nine. We cannot allow a Saudi nuclear program to go forward without the same without the uh same uh uh uh uh safeguards that the UAE agreed to. Now the UAE agreed to standards that are fully consistent with generating electricity. That's why twenty five percent of the UAE's uh electricity today is generated with nuclear power but nuclear power, where the UAE has agreed to no enrichment, no reprocessing, and most has agreed to the additional protocol. Iran agreed to the additional protocol, uh, eh, i- in the JCPOA. The additional protocol does nothing to prevent anything that is of economic benefit to any of the parties. It simply provides for more IAEA inspections. The fact that Saudi Arabia would not only insist upon reprocessing, insist upon enrichment, things that we would never uh want to see Iran do,

We don't have the money yet.

wouldn't I I I think the Chinese Communist Party is getting its money's worth. Um, but uh uh w- for us to enter into green light a Saudi program that not only has enrichment and reprocessing things we severely limited Iran, on i in the JCPOA, but also doesn't even have an additional protocol, doesn't even have inspections, uh, i uh at that level, uh, is outrageous and it is not, uh, made better because Westinghouse stands to make a lot of money and they're a nice American company I yield back.

And gentlemen yields back. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. The Honorable David Friedman, the former US Ambassador to Israel, Mister Asher Friedman, the Executive Director of the Miskov Institute for National Security and Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and the Honorable Daniel B. Shapiro, the former US Ambassador to Israel, and distinguished fellow for the Scowcroft Middle East Initiative at the Atlantic Council. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us, and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Ambassador Friedman for an opening statement.

Thank you, Chairman Lawler, uh, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Uh, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this afternoon and to uh speak on an issue very near and dear to my heart, uh the Abraham Accords. Uh, my written statement as you pointed out is on file. Uh, I'd like to incorporate that within my testimony, but in the short time that is allotted to me, uh right now, I wanna focus on one critical point, which is the diplomatic predicate for the advancement of the Abraham Accords. Um, I I I think the the committee was wise

Go, go, go, go, idiot!

uh to invite my my predecessor, Ambassador Daniel Shapiro, to submit a a statement, I had a chance to look at his statement uh uh earlier today. Uh Dan is an American patriot, he's a uh believer in the strategic importance of the US-Israel relationship, and um I think he loves Israel. Uh he's offered an opinion with which I fundamentally uh disagree. I think he just happens to be wrong, well intentioned but wrong. And I've no interest in picking on him, but I think if I can just put the differences that we share uh on the record, it will put my thinking in high relief. uh, one of the critical issues with regard to advancing the Abraham Accords. Um, my opinion is based on facts. It's based on personal experiences. Uh, it's not based on wishful thinking. Uh, I was one of the few people who negotiated the Abraham Accords. I know what goes into expanding them. Uh, and we gotta start by understanding what the Abraham Accords are. Uh, all the parties recognized that the key to the Abraham Accords in a nutshell, they were a victory of the moderates over the extremists. within the Middle East. We were able to get there, and the first Trump administration, by doing two things. By degrading the extremists, and by standing shoulder to shoulder with Israel. It's a simple, basic and highly moral formula. How did we degrade the extremists? Well, President Trump restored back-breaking sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. It brought, he brought their oil exports down to essentially zero. And he cut off all funding for UNRRA. Which as we all know today, but frankly which was knowable for the last two decades, I I certainly knew about it for the last ten years, uh, UNRWA provided financial, military and propaganda support for Hamas' terror. And how did we stand with Israel? Frankly, like never before. Among other things, moving our embassy to Jerusalem and recognising Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Now in response to that strategy, many people on the left said that we were recklessly moving the region to war. the facts or otherwise, we were moving the region to peace. By standing closely with Israel and standing strongly against Iran and Hamas, President Trump was pursuing a policy that was embraced, not challenged, but embraced by moderate Arab countries. He also confirmed Israel's status as a regional superpower and a critical strategic partner in the region. It caused moderate Arab nations to want to partner with Israel. Now, when the Biden administration came in, the table was set to expand the Abraham Accords. But he reversed all of President Trump's policies that drove the accords in the first place, including restoring Iran to a wealthy adversary with extraordinary lax sanctions enforcement and providing UNRWA with over one billion dollars in cash. This put the extremists back in the lead. It was the antithesis of all the Abraham Accords were designed to avoid. In addition, when the Biden administration took up the accords, It added a condition that was not present in any of the other successful deals, a requirement of a Palestinian state. Such a condition was a guarantee of failure then, and it continues to guarantee failure today. Israel properly will not agree to it. The experiment has already been tried and failed in Gaza, and even Palestinians don't want this result either. Frankly, the United States should have no role, no role in putting it in perimeter on a corrupt Palestinian state, which will have no recognition of human rights, and it undoubtedly will fail. But not before wreaking havoc in the region and bringing Israel existential risk. Ambassador Shapiro says in his testimony that America's war against Iran is, quote, a strategic blunder on many counts. I don't think there's a single present or potential party to the Abraham Accords that agrees with that. And I hope that when the war ends successfully, victoriously for the United States, as we all hope, pray and believe it will, the moderates will be back in the lead, and the Abraham Accords will have a bright future. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Ambassador Friedman. I now recognize Mister Friedman for an opening statement.

Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Sherman, honorable members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My message is simple. The Abraham Accords can serve as the foundation of a new US aligned regional architecture of mutual security integrated economic development, cutting edge innovation and interfaith tolerance. If fully realized, it will strengthen American and regional prosperity and stability, create alternatives to Chinese dominated frameworks, and help ensure America's preeminence in the co- global competition over critical technology. However, realizing this potential after nearly three years of multi-front war in the Middle East, will require sustained and committed American leadership. The historic Abraham Accords, signed in twenty twenty under the auspices of President Trump, led to a flourishing of ties in many fields, AI, cyber, health, water, agricultural, defense, and many other areas. Israel's cumulative trade with the Abraham Accords and Arab peace partners has grown every year since the accords were signed. Despite regional tensions and disruptions, trade rose in twenty twenty four as compared to twenty twenty three, in twenty twenty five as compared to twenty twenty four, and it's up again in twenty twenty six as compared to twenty twenty five. It's increased since twenty twenty one, it's increased approximately by a hundred and thirty one percent. But, while the accords have demonstrated remarkable resilience, we must not downplay the damage caused by the regional war, which ensued following Hamas's October seventh attack. Public support for normalization declined, people-to-people initiative suffered, multilateral forums lost momentum, and normalization slowed. Restoring the accord's momentum is vital to US national security interests. I will now briefly present five ways Congress can contribute to achieving this goal, which are presented in greater detail in my written testimony. First, advance concrete steps to realize the vision of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, or IMEC. IMEC could become one of the most consequential infrastructure projects of this generation, shortening transit times between India and Europe by approximately fifty-one percent, supporting strategic East-West natural gas and digital infrastructure, and creating a US-aligned zone of economic growth, which serves as an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, there's been relatively little governmental analysis of IMX benefits, costs, and opportunities. Such analysis is crucial vis-a-vis our partners in the region, for overcoming geopolitical, financial, and bureaucratic hurdles. Congress shall request US International Trade Commission and Department of Commerce-led studies, to identify IMX impacts, and develop an actionable road map, including bankable projects, investment opportunities, and steps to harmonize custom procedures so that goods can move uh smoothly from India to Europe. United States also convene an IMEC leaders forum, and establish a standing secretariat to enhance accountability. Second, Congress should help establish an Abram Accords critical technology partnership. Technological leadership and alliances will increasingly shape the global balance of power. Legislation could build on the proposed US-Israel AI uh AI center act, introduced by then-Senator Marco Rubio in twenty twenty one, and expanded to include additional Abraham Accords partners, and additional areas such as quantum, biotech and space. Third, strengthen regional defense integration. The United States should establish an Abraham Accords Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, model on the agreement signed between the United States and the Kingdom of Bahrain in September twenty twenty three. Fourth, we must strengthen the foundations of people to people piece. This can be achieved by adapting existing US scientific, educational, and leadership programs to include dedicated Abraham Accords tracks, cohorts, and initiatives. These can be created through the State Department's International Visitor Leadership Program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Stevens Initiative for Virtual Exchange, the Middle East Regional Coop uh Cooperation Program, and other existing programs. Fifth, appoint the congressionally mandated special envoy for the Abraham Accords, and develop country-specific strategies for normalization with a broad range of countries. While Saudi Israel normalization is certainly important, there are more than two dozen countries, Arab and Muslim countries, that lack formal relations with Israel. The special envoy should develop detailed road maps for multiple potential Abraham Accord's countries based on the national priorities, goals, and shared interests with each. Honorable members, The Abram reports demonstrated how bold and innovative American leadership could produce outcomes many believed were impossible. With continued American leadership, these agreements can shape a new regional reality of peace, prosperity, and partnership. Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mister Freidman, I now recognize Ambassador Shapiro for an opening statement.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, Recognizer Sh- Member Sherman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, appreciate the opportunity to testify today. As we approach the sixth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, they continue to stand as a laudable diplomatic achievement of the first Trump administration, which formalized the first Arab-Israeli relationships in a generation, forged on a base, the basis of mutual security, trust, and economic benefits. They also catalyzed a series of additional steps towards regional integration during the Biden administration, so they were far from an afterthought. Uh, the Negev Forum, which brought together the United States, Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE, to support a range of projects to bring the benefits of integration to their populations. I led that as the Senior Advisor for Middle East Regional Integration. The I two U two partnership between India, Israel, UAE and the United States. The Indo-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, IMEC, unveiled at the two thousand twenty-three G twenty summit. And Israel's incorporation into the US Central Command area of responsibility in two thousand twenty-one, which has facilitated dramatic steps in Israeli Arab military cooperation, progress toward an integrated Middle East defense architecture, and important successes against common enemies. I had the honor to work on those issues as the Dep- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East in two thousand twenty four. Now, Hamas's brutal October seventh terrorist attacks and the war that followed have delayed many of the follow-on integration efforts, but they did not extinguish the Abraham Accords themselves. Those bilateral relations established between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, have withstood the enormous pressures of the last three years, and that gives us a solid base to build on. And it remains very much in the United States' interest to continue to expand regional integration. Our goal should be to entrench this process as an organic force to help stabilize the region through independ- interdependence and partnership. With my remaining time, I'll highlight a few openings in the region today that merit optimism, point out potential obstacles and impediments, and offer some recommendations for the way forward. First, the openings. New leadership in Lebanon and Syria present once in a generation opportunities for productive cooperation with Israel. The framework agreement signed between Beirut and Jerusalem in late June is a promising step for which the administration and both parties deserve credit. President Aoun reiterated at the White House yesterday that Lebanon seeks peaceful coexistence with Israel. The focus now must be on implementation with broad regional international support of the agreement's provisions to disarm Hezbollah, fully deploy the Lebanese armed forces, and enable full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. President Trump's recent decision to remove Syria's designation as a sponsor of terrorism is an important sign of confidence in President al-Shahra's administration. While carefully verifying Syria's commitments, this decision can reanimate negotiations between Israel and Syria on security agreements incentivized by the prospect of Israel's withdrawal from the buffer zone, yet established in Syrian territory. And although the war with Iran, about which I will say more, further complicates regional integration, the repeated closure of the Strait of Hormuz since March reinforces the value of alternative energy routes and expanded infrastructure, a core pillar of IMEC and similar efforts, and should energize near-term focus and investments on the infrastructure of that corridor. Now the challenges. Having seen the devastation in Gaza, and the suffering of Palestinian civilians, Arab publics have turned sharply negative toward normalization with Israel. The cease-fire and hostage release deal signed last October has provided some respite to Palestinians in Gaza. But the stalled implementation of President Trump's twenty point plan, caused by Hamas's refusal to disarm, but also hampered, by Israeli actions and sluggishness by Arab states leaves the issue woefully unsettled, and Palestinian civilian suffering continues in full view of the same publics that regional leaders must consider. The Israeli public is understandably fearful of another October seventh style attack, and is more supportive therefore of proactive posture to countering security threats. Israel's increasingly forward leaning defense posture, and also its aggressive settlement expansion and turning a blind eye toward terrorism by Jewish extremists, Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, and other measures intended to rule out any possible future establishment of a Palestinian state, add challenges to Arab leaders who want to make steps toward normalization palatable to their publics. The greatest impediment, however, is the Iran war, which has indeed been a strategic blunder on many counts. Despite impressive tactical successes by the US military, our political leadership has failed to translate this military precision into strategic success. The regime in Tehran, arguably even more radical now, has absorbed our strongest punch and emerged with unprecedented leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. Having achieved none of the various goals identified during the war, we now face the prospect of either leaving our regional partners to contend with an emboldened Iran or a highly costly forever war with massive sustained US military presence and periodic escalations around the Strait. That situation is not fertile ground for greater in a regional integration. In fact, it makes the task before us more difficult. Yes, Israel has provided important defense support to the UAE, But simultaneously, many of the Gulf States are reappraising the risk of allowing US bases on their soil, as they question the reliability of US security commitments. Going forward, CENTCOM's ability to serve as an integrator for prati- practical Arab-Israeli military cooperation, may face significant limits, as Gulf States worry about such initiatives at a time when Israeli and US decisions, in their view, are distri- contributing to regional instability. Very briefly, in my written testimony I lay out a number of recommendations. I'll just briefly mention them. The first and most foundational of these is to bring the war with Iran to its earliest possible end, ensuring the Strait of Hormuz remains open. Uh, second, pursuing active diplomacy on implementation of the President's twenty-point plan for Gaza, prioritizing prioritizing Hamas's disarmament, but advancing other elements in peril. Insisting on actions by Israel to lower tensions in the West Bank. Resuming normalization discussions with Saudi Arabia, mindful of the Saudi insistence at every stage, and I've negotiated with them on this. that it include a credible pathway to a Palestinian statehood. Normalization between Israel and the kingdom would be the single most transformative diplomatic breakthrough to reshape the region. Here I must confess to being concerned by President Trump's decision to provide Saudi Arabia with a civil nuclear energy deal without using it as an incentive for normalization uh s uh uh finally I'll just mention uh two others resisting the temptation to see the Abraham Accords as the exclusive brand, or vehicle, for regional integration, things like IMEC and uh, NEGA form and others are also, uh, valuable. And appointing and confirming, as, uh, was mentioned, a special envoy for the Abraham Accords, the product of the lawler tourist legislation incorporated into the FY two thousand twenty-four NDAA, which would bustr- buttress US diplomatic initiatives at a time when these officials uh uh charged with that responsibility have uh far too much on their plate, and are spread far too thin. Uh, thank you, Mister Chairman. Look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Ambassador Shapiro. I'll just ask all the witnesses, uh, to sit a little further back from the mikes or push the mike back a little bit, uh the audio is not necessarily as clear, just if you're right in it. So. Um, and I'll recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Uh, recent reporting shows some officials are proposing to remove Israel from existing plans to develop an India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor, known as IMEC. And this network would connect the regions through new rails, ports and shipping lanes, linking economies and providing greater integration. Israel has been a critical piece of the puzzle, connecting Saudi Arabia and Greece. Unfortunately, a reporting came out recently that anonymous Saudi officials were considering connecting these two countries through Syria instead. Uh, and just the other day it came out that Ambassador Barak out in Turkey, uh, was also supporting this. Uh, in my mind that is unacceptable, and I recently sent a letter to Secretary Rubio urging him to ensure Israel's inclusion in IMEC. Ambassador Friedman, can you speak to how IMEC and similar infrastructure projects could help further develop Israel's relationships with Arab nations in the Middle East?

Sure, thank you for the question. Um, I think that and other projects are uh, are integral to a more peaceful and uh Cooperative Middle East. Um, I would be uh very skeptical about financing a pipeline that ran through Syria, notwithstanding the advancements that they've made uh in the past, but forgetting about, forgetting about the diplomatic aspects of it, I don't think I wanna pipeline of that significance running through Syria until, you know, twenty years have gone by and we see a real uh stable nation there, as opposed to uh putting it through Israel, ideally putting it, you know, uh inside of Judean Samari and creating uh uh job opportunities for the tens of thousands of Palestinians. I think it's um these are these are important steps where I think Congress, you know, as the as as the keeper of the purse, I think has a real role to play. And um and I would encourage Congress to always be looking for ways uh to create better economic opportunities. That is of course in most cases how how peace is born.

I have said repeatedly that I think Jordan has uh, not only ours, but uh, in many respects Israel's greatest ally uh, in the Middle East. Uh, and uh, we have uh, certainly seen Jordan maintain diplomatic relations with Israel since nineteen ninety four but one could argue that Israel's relationship with newer Abraham Accords partners like UAE and Bahrain are significantly stronger than the relationship with Jordan. Uh, Jordan has been an instrumental partner for the US. Uh, especially in support of our military and in defense against Iranian attacks. Uh, all the while the country is facing growing poverty, an influx of refugees, and water scarcity. Uh, Ambassador Friedman, what can we in the US, uh, and the Israeli government do to bolster Israel's relationship with Jordan and show the King and the Jordanian people how much we value their partnership?

Well, Jordan is is Israeli's long Israel's longest border is is alongside of Jordan. Uh, it's been a quiet border, thank God, for uh for for quite a long time, since probably the nineteen seventies. Uh, but it is, it is a poor and an unstable country. Uh, the the the king's um grandfather was assassinated by radical Palestinians. Um, most of Jordan is uh, is a Palestinian uh, society. Um. I I would say that Jordan is Palestine, but you don't need to go there right now. But the the the way the way to bolster Jordan, I think, is to um, the the king needs to have better economic opportunities for his people. And I think that um, there there there needs to be a a resolution of that very very hostile land in between the Green Line and Jordan that that that works. And um, I'll I'll say something that I don't think the king would say publicly, but I think the last thing he wants. is a Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan, I think that would pose an enormous risk to to to Jordan. So I would say, again, it's it's a similar answer to your f- your prior question. They need jobs, they need a better economy. Uh, it's not a country with with oil uh, natural resources, uh, it's a country which um, you know, is it's autocratic, there's no democracy there, it's it's got lots of issues. Um, we should we should bolster them as as much as we can. Um. The, that border, if that border fails, uh, we're talking about something far worse for Israel and the world than what we saw on October seventh.

Appreciate it. Uh, during the Biden administration, no country has joined, uh, the Abraham Accords, and just last week, over one hundred members of the Democratic Party voted to defund all State Department funding for Israel. Uh, this includes cross-cultural programs that have improved people-to-people relationships in the Middle East. Ambassador Shapiro, in your view, is there, still,

Could mostly speak for myself, uh, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the question. Uh, but I do believe there remains, uh, a strong base of support, uh, to continue to try to strengthen the relationships, not just between Israel and, uh, its Arab neighbors, but, uh, as a kind of coalition of US partners. uh, of moderate nations, uh, aligned, uh, to deal with the, what's called the axis of resistance, Iran and its terrorist proxies. Um, and that should remain, uh, certainly I'll be an advocate for it to remain a focal point of US policy. Uh, I think that fundamentally serves US interests and fundamentally serves the interests of Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, uh, and all of our partners in the region.

Were you disappointed by that vote last week, and with a, over a hundred of, uh, your party's members of Congress voting to strip all aid and support to Israel?

I wou I would not have, uh, had I been a member of Congress, would not have voted in support of that amendment.

OK. Thank you. I now recognize the ranking member for five minutes of questioning. I now recognize Mister Keating for five minutes of questioning.

Chairman uh Uh, thank you, Mister Sherman. Uh, I have a meeting with the EU, uh,

delegation at the same time. So thank you for giving me the opportunity to ask some questions. Uh, I just wanna reflect and and res- and and really talk about couple of comments that our witnesses uh mentioned in their opening testimony and I thank you all for being here um prior to October seventh and the horrific attack uh that occurred, uh uh in Israel uh there were talks that were going on uh I was privy to a lot of those talks Uh, the, the nature of them was such that we were given that information in classified, uh, in a classified setting, so I can't get into the details, but I can speak as mist, uh, as Ambassador Shapiro did, in, in broad terms, and maybe you can put more detail, but, um, the discussions at that point for regional approach at normaliz- normalization was something, uh, I had only dreamt about. I, the, the scope of it, the expansiveness of it, uh, the, the way it was both economically and security-based, uh, would have been a real breakthrough. And, yeah, all the information I got at that time was that, uh, this was very real, and it could be very close. Uh, so, uh, I'm concerned with the Saudi civil nuclear deal, because we're losing our leverage, uh, I think, with Saudi Arabia, too. Uh, take normalization with Israel. Uh, and use that leverage to push them, and I think if they do, there'll be other Arab States that would follow, uh, forward. Uh, if you could, you mentioned it, uh, quickly in your, uh, testimony, but if you can expand on that, that's a real concern I had, because I think, I still have hope that we can bring this regional approach together. In fact, with private conversations I've had, uh, with, uh, high representatives from the Gulf, uh, and and Arab states in the region, uh, they still privately hold hope that they could get back to some of that. And in fact, we're here talking about the Abraham Accords, I wou I would te- I would call it the Abraham Accord and steroids. Uh, so if you could address, you mentioned that and didn't have a lot of time to expand on it, Ambassador.

Sure. Uh, thank you, Mr. Keating, for the question. Uh, indeed, uh, right up until October seventh, uh, negotiations were, uh, deep underway. for uh the possibility of a breakthrough agreement that would uh move towards Saudi normalization of Israel. Uh indeed there was always going to be a Palestinian component of that, that was something the Saudis made clear at every stage, uh that they wanted to see, something that would be defined maybe as a credible pathway to a Palestinian state, by the way that's language incorporated into President Trump's twenty point plan for Gaza um as well as US security commitments for Saudi Arabia, certain Saudi security commitments to the United States, And a civil nuclear agreement, which has now been uh just announced. Um so that occurred until October seventh, for understandable reasons it was disrupted then, but actually those negotiations continued all the way well into two thousand twenty four and I wou took part in them from the Department of Defense. Uh and that same structure of a deal uh was one we hoped we'd be able to advance, if we had gotten to a hostage release and a cease-fire arrangement. Of course those didn't happen, and so uh we ran out of time to do that. So uh what I still hope, and I think you're absolutely right, uh many of the region hope that that still, breakthrough can still happen, because it will be transformative. I don't think there's any change in the Saudi determination to see that there be a Palestinian component that they would define as, I don't wanna p- speak for them, but something in the lines of a credible pathway to a Palestinian state, that's always been their position. Uh, now of course the structure of the deal would probably look different. For one thing, this important point of leverage, the civil nuclear agreement seems to have been provided without tying it to normalization. I think that May have been a mistake, there may be details behind the scenes of this diplomacy we don't know, uh but we've lost that card, or we've played that card I should say. Uh, but also in light of the Iran war, a war that many of our Gulf partners urged us not to engage in, uh and now feel somewhat dragged into a very destructive uh war that's harming their economies that's harming their s their stability and are worried about what it means for long-term US commitments, uh whether the same kind of security arrangements that were originally gonna be part of that package, uh, are still relevant. So I do think we do need to, uh, deepen a conversation with the Saudis about, uh, what a package for normalization with Israel looks like. It may not be the same kind of package we were working on in the Biden administration, but it will probably still be a package, and I have no doubt they will continue to insist it have that Palestinian component.

Yeah, I, I feel nothing would have isolated Iran more, uh, than that, and with thirteen seconds left, I can't do that, and I'm not gonna abuse the uh courtesy that I was given to take out a turn, so I yield back.

Uh, I'll give you a little bit. Go. You wanna you wanna I I'm okay with it.

Everyone else okay. I just wanted to follow up.

Hey, I'm chair.

Alright.

Hey, I need uh, before you do that, I need to recognize probably one of the best friends I have in this world, it's my buddy Bruce Pearl sittin' right there. I didn't see Bruce sittin' right there. I was at his wedding. He has been with me when I've had some tough times and some good times, and he's always been my buddy. I just wanna recognize him.

Yeah.

Do you do you happen to know where Mister Pearl went to high school?

I don't really care. Probably up north we all speak with a funny accent. I don't know where.

Uh, he graduated from that same high school I did,

I wa

Sharon High School,

Yeah, okay.

Eagles.

Well, let me tell you a quick Bruce Pearl story.

Does this conclude our time or

He's co No, I'll give you some more time, but when he was a coach at UT, I always remembered this. I was sitting down close and some friends, uh Ray and Lucy, and they were they were kind enough to let us sit down there and um Uh one of the kids, the ball boys got hurt, a kid ran at one of the ball players, and I remember coach was still coaching, the kid was down here and he hollered at his um his uh uh trainer, he said, get over and take care of that kid. And you know, and we didn't miss a beat, and then took care of the kid and I thought, nobody's looking, that's that's the real the real deal. So, anyway, sorry coach, didn't mean to embarrass your brother.

Well I've got I've got the

Oh hey, you're recognized sir.

I've got entire EU delegation sitting in my office, so I am gonna yield back. Thank you. And thanks for recognising me.

Alright, brother, I guess.

That's cool. Sold me. Thanks.

Alright. I recognise myself. Um, Ambassador Friedman, thank you, brother. And I was I believe I I visited you one time in Israel, one time.

Yes, you did.

And I um I I actually uh I took an orange dreidel off your counter. I thought that I am the one.

You're the one.

Oh, man.

I mean, well,

Yeah.

I'm from Tennessee, so I thought it was a I thought it was a gift, but I guess it wasn't. But anyway. Um, what do you, uh, what do you think it'd take for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords?

Well, I would make this general observation and then and focus it on Saudi. What is made, what is said publicly in the Arab world, and what is discussed privately are not necessarily the same thing. And um, a lot of positions are taken by the Saudis, other countries as well. that in private discussions, um, are not necessarily the case. Um, these, none of these countries are democracies, none of them have the kind of transparency that you would have in Israel, you would have in, in the United States. Um, every one of the Abraham Accords, if you think about it, is, is a triangle with the United States at the apex of the triangle, Israel and an Arab country at the base. And every one of them is seeking the same goal, but usually for different reasons and different terms. So it depends, it depends what they want, what they need, what their perceptions are. Um, on this uh point that was raised about uh uh nuclear, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia without the Abraham Accords being rolled in, without, gar- I'm assuming someone would mention the fact that there aren't the kind of typical guardrails that exist in other. I don't know that that's, I just heard about it today. I don't know if that's the way this will end, what this will be. There's a lot of stagecraft. There's a lot of negotiations about how this will be surfaced to the public. And so I would say, um, uh, it it it's a function of very close-knit discussions. Look, the Abraham Accords were, we talked about it for a year and a half, nobody knew about it. We announced it on August fifteenth. It was a shock to the whole world. That's the way, that's what I was thinking.

It really was. I was, when they did the signing at the White House, I always remembered that, and the historical significance of it, all I could think was, they had this incredibly good lemonade and they had these

But I would say it's the I would say on the issue of Saudi Arabia, their primary concern is their own national security. They're in a very tough neighborhood. They're getting they're they're taking incoming right now from their kind of natural sworn enemy both um both geopolitically and and religiously their enemy. And um That's what they're gonna be concerned about, that's what they want, and there are there are ways to uh to to solve that problem. Um, they tend not to be discussed publicly. But I I do believe it's it's doable, and I and I would say, look, I've said this before, but this idea, I I think Israel would love to normalize with Saudi Arabia. They're not going to commit suicide to do so. And I think they truly believe at this point that creating a Palestinian state, uh, I think that most of them felt this way before October seventh, but post October seventh, this is a country that believes They have no margin of error. And they're not gonna do experiments or diplomatic experiments just to get the Saudis on board. And I think people need to realize that.

What do you think we've learned from the first five years of this thing?

Um, I think what we've learned is that none none of the countries, you know, read Theodor Herzl's the Zionist idea and suddenly decided to become Zionist. That's not what this is about. These are really hard-bargained, practical, national security. They're, none of these countries are poor. You know, they they're not they're not doing it for the money. Okay, Israel by the way is is is the father strings from poor, it's no one is poor, no one needs the money. They need to be safe and they're in a very tough neighborhood. If you can solve people's national security issues, you can expand the Abraham Accords. If you can't, they're not going anywhere. And and one last thing. America needs to decide what where it stands on these issues. We have a country right now where Israel has become such a political football, and you've got, you know, on the extreme right and the extreme left, I mean this is not I'm not, you know, limiting this criticism to, to my friends on the left. It's everywhere, okay. And these countries are watching this every single day. And they're writing about it every single day. And until we know who we are, where we stand as a country with regard to Israel, none of these, no one's gonna take a gamble. No one's gonna say, well, you know what, we'll make a deal for with with Trump for two years and then, you know, we don't know what it's gonna be. We'll have to re- relitigate everything over again. We have to take this issue and make it a a bipartisan, predictable issue, and that I think will bring uh a lot of good, a lot of good outcomes.

Real quick, Mister Fredman, um the war, the the conflict with Iran has affected the relationship between the countries in the Abraham accords. Would you say that's a fair statement?

It's a fair statement. We're seeing the Israel deploy sensitive systems, like the Iron Dome, like others, that are developed with the United States to defend the UAE. So a a a US-Israel system defending an Arab country. And that's pretty remarkable. We saw CENTCOM announce in January the establishment of a Middle East Air Defense cell in their headquarters in the region, and we saw just a month later how important that cooperation was. So it's had I think largely positive effects in terms of the ability to cooperate.

Alright, thank you. I've used up my a lot of time, I will yield to my buddy, Mister Sherman.

Thank you.

You're recognized sir.

Um, after I ask questions I'm gonna need to go to the Asia subcommittee, which I'm also a a member of uh and my uh colleague from Illinois will take over as ranking member for a while. Uh uh Mister uh Fredman uh uh you allude to uh legislation carried by Senator Rubio, my favorite piece of legislation of Sena- Senator Rubio, and I wish he was related to Secretary Rubio, uh was the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, which he and I introduced in twenty eighteen. which required the gold standards of control to have uh uh i- uh including of course the additional protocol uh in order for us to have a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia um so I'm hoping that Senator Rubio will come back to us and support that effort um eh Mister Friedman you point out that the Abrahamic Accords represent a victory of the moderates over the extremists. But those victories were completed in twenty twenty. We haven't seen any further. And I think the reason for that is we've seen the moderates lose to the extremists in Israel, which now has a government with Ben-Gavir and Shmultridge, uh, the apostles of settler violence. I think it's, uh, highly unlikely that we're going to, um, that we're gonna see any progress with Israel's Arab's neighbors Uh, so long as uh we see the continuation of settler violence and uh uh until we see progress toward a two-state solution. Uh and uh I would point out uh that statehood does not require uh uh that uh you have uh uh weapons. Uh Costa Rica does not have an army, it is a state. Um Eh, the uh, um, I think that the country, uh, Mister Freeman, you say that the countries that might enter in the Abrahamic Accords don't regard the war as a disaster. Right now, no country is interested in joining the Abrahamic Accords, becau- or the Abraham Accords because of the extremists in the Israeli government. Uh, but we've heard from the Gulf Cooperation Council again and again, uh, that they, uh, uh regard this war as a disaster. Uh well what they're saying even more privately I don't know. Um so uh Ambassador Shapiro, we've heard that uh talk of a Palestinian state in the halls of Congress is widely out of touch with realities on the ground uh but is an Israel that renounces a um a Palestinian state as even a possibility wildly out of touch with political realities in the Arab world. Uh, if Crown Prince uh, Ben Salman were to normalize relations and and enter into the positive relationship, uh, that the Abraham Accords called for, uh, without any uh, uh, movement toward a two-state solution, without even any punishment of those guilty of settler violence, um, would that pose a uh threat to him? continuing to serve as uh the leader of Saudi Arabia?

Thank you, mister Sherman. Uh, I don't think it's really a possibility he's gonna do it, so I don't think it poses a threat in that sense. Uh, the uh, it is true of course, as you stated, that uh, the idea of a Palestinian state being created is uh, not uh, immediately on the agenda, not something most Israelis feel ready to take a risk on. Uh, any change toward that goal, which I repeat, is part of uh point nineteen of President Point's, President Trump's twenty point plan, the credible pathway to that Palestinian state. Requires reform of the Palestinian Authority, obviously requires removal of Hamas from power in Gaza. Uh, but uh, it is necessary to be on the table, and there to be directionality toward that, uh, if we do hope to see further expansion of these accords. And particularly the Saudi has been very clear, I'll just mention that, uh, the person who probably spent more time than anybody, uh devoted to this effort to Saudi Israeli normalization with s late Senator Lindsey Graham, who we're all remembering and honoring uh this this at this time. Uh and he said very very clearly there was no way, and based on his private conversations with the Crown Prince, uh and I can uh attest to those as well, uh that this would be a possibility for him to take forward without that credible pathway to a Palestinian state also being part of it.

And the UAE agreed to the Abraham Accords. and received a uh, uh a promise that uh the West Bank would not be annexed. Uh, what happens to the UAE's participation in the Abrahamic Accords if there's conti- i- i- i- if uh there's continued discussion at the highest levels in the Israeli government of violating uh that agreement,

Congressman, that was, that wasn't the, that wasn't the deal.

and Well, it's the deal that uh, that

I negotiated the deal, that wasn't the deal.

Uh, it's the deal that I've heard from them, if not from you.

I'm happy to share with you what you hear.

So, i- in any case, uh, would any other country be interested in the Abraham, uh, uh, in the Abraham Accords if they see Israel at least appear to, uh, uh, renounce, uh, annexation and then continue to move them into it?

Sure. What was announced at the time of the Abraham Accords was a moratorium on, uh, a move, progress toward annexation, something like four years. There were different reports on it. Ambassador Friedman obviously was deeply in- involved in it. Uh, eh, but it was definitely an element in, uh, the UAE's decision to go forward with those accords that was laid out publicly by the UAE ambassador to Israel to Washington in an op-ed in an Israeli newspaper. Um, so, uh, it's not, wouldn't be a violation of that agreement if it had a time limit on it. However, the UAE has spoken out very forcefully against moves towards annexation, against settler violence, uh, and again, I think in the atmosphere created by, uh, the extremists within the Israeli government, you mentioned and some of those activities that seem to close all doors to a future Palestinian state and seem to raise tensions in the West Bank and expand settlements and permit federal violence I don't think it's an atmosphere in which other countries will come forward.

Thank you.

Representative Latimer.

Uh, Mr. Chairman, I'll defer at this time.

Thank you. Um, Representative Schneider.

Uh, thank you um uh, Mister Chairman, and I wanna th thank the witnesses uh, for being here. S I consider one of my most important roles in Congress, one of the things I'm most proud of is being a co-founder and co-chair of the bipartisan bicameral Abraham Accords caucus joined by my colleague uh, Deborah Wasserman-Schultz, Craig Goldman, and Anne Wagner in the house. Just one example of the caucus working together. We introduced the Defend Act in twenty twenty two to develop a strategy for Abraham Accords countries and uh others to combat Iranian aggression, with a unified air defence. We're seeing the benefit and fruits of that today. That law signed i into, or that bill signed into law in December of twenty twenty two. So at the risk of coming off pedantic, uh, I wanna start with an observation. As long as some of our most important leaders, ambassadors, ambassador, continue to play petty domestic politics. When we stand united, committed to a strong US-Israel relationship, Israel's security is a Jewish democratic state, and peace for the region, that benefits and includes Israel integrated into the entire Middle East. It's the modern equivalent of Hillel and Shammai, which most will understand, but I know you do. We risk laundering the opportunity to help lead a region lead the region of the Middle East, critical to the United States, we risk squandering the opportunity to lead them to a more stable, secure, prosperous and ultimately more peaceful future. We have to be united in our commitment to that vision of regional integration. The vision of a safe and secure Jewish democratic state of Israel living collectively integrated with the twenty-one Arabs uh s the states of the Arab League and the Palestinians and their aspirations to self-determination and peace with Israel. That's what we're fighting for, and as long as we're fighting with each other, we're not helping those who are moving towards peace. So I, I'm sorry for lecturing, but I felt it was important to say. I often talk about how I lose sleep thinking about Iran as a nuclear country. It scares me to death. But I say I've been able to go back to sleep. because of the Abraham Accords. And Ambassador, thank you for your leadership in helping achieve them. The agreements were the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab country since nineteen ninety four. I remember that handshake on the lawn in September of nineteen ninety three, and I got to be there in September of two thousand to celebrate a peace gr agreement between Israel and an Arab country. Unfortunately, Hamas did not share the optimism that we all held that day. As documents found in their tunnel network attest, the ran-back terrorists saw normalization as an existential threat to their cause of spreading terror and chaos across the region, of defeating Israel and eliminating any Jewish presence in the Middle East. And they countered the progress towards peace that was coming so close to normalization with the Saudis. They countered that with a barbaric invasion, massacre, rapes, kidnap. They invaded Israel with genocidal intent. Since that attack, things have gone from bad to worse for Israelis, Palestinians, residents of the Gulf, and the Iranian people, in fact. And of course, a dent to our power and prestige. There remain a few bright spots, as were noted. Syria is no longer ruled by Assad. The trilateral framework between Lebanon, Israel, led by the United States, offers hope and potentially a model that will lift up the entire region. And we've seen how the Abraham Accords have held up better than imagined. Ambassador Friedman, as you noted, through th three years of war, those accords have held fast and I believe continue to be strong. Gases flowing between Israel, Jordan and Egypt and our partners have demonstrated incredible

Right.

inter-op interoperability repelling Iran's drone and missile attacks. Mister Friedman, the five points you laid out. I think are things we all need to ho hold on to. I have the mid-east uh Mediterranean gate, eastern Mediterranean gateway promoting IMAC. We need to connect and continue the people-to-people programs that bring people face-to-face, so they can know each other before they're willing to make the sacrifices to live together in peace. Ambassador Shapiro, you led on the Abraham Accords, and thank you for all your leadership and have been a great partner. What can Congress do to support the Accords in the f twelve seconds we have left?

Mm-hmm.

So maybe I'll stop there.

No, I'll give you, right, if that's all right.

Okay. What can Congress do?

So.

Maybe just one sentence from each of you,

Go, go ahead.

three of you, what do we need to do?

Well, thank you, Mister Schneier. Uh, I was going to mention earlier, ran out of time, to uh, that the bipartisan Congressional Labor Hand Accords caucus is a critical element, its very existence is, to demonstrate that there is a widespread and broad-based uh bipartisan commitment to this, that's a crucial message to countries already in the accords and countries considering joining it uh there's a wide range we could discuss it uh at length of, uh people to people programmes, of economic programmes, of security related uh programmes you've already highlighted several of them, uh that the I hope a uh an even more active uh congressional caucus can engage in, and do so in partnership with private sector and non-profit organisations that are also deeply committed to this at the Atlantic Council, We are uh we have been uh doing such convenings and leading on uh promoting Middle East regional integration since two thousand twenty one, and uh intend to continue to do so. So I'll I'll be happy to speak with you and your team later about a long list of opportunities.

I I would like And Mister Fredman, let me ask you one thing, and and Ambassador Friedman one thing that we we need to focus on. In my remarks I noticed I I noted five different areas. I would say turning the IMEC vision into reality, moving from rhetoric to reality, and then

the people-to-people component. Because business people, economic interests will find a way together. Security defense is always easier. The most difficult thing following three years of war, I think, is the people-to-people aspect, and Congress can play a major role in helping bring entrepreneurs, youth, uh innovators, researchers, scientists together.

Ambassador.

Well, I'm not uh directing this at you or anybody who's sitting here, but I would say Congress, support Israel. Uh, a hundred and four, a hundred and three votes, a hundred and three Democrats. one misguided Republican, uh against Israel, uh is, spoke volumes and was heard loud and clear by every one of our Arab friends. If Arab countries think that Israel is losing American support, throw the Abrahamic courts out the window, you'll never get another one.

So let's work together to bring that support to the back, back, it has to be bipartisan and it has to be ironclad.

Indeed. Indeed.

I yield back.

Thank you. I yield to uh, my good friend, Miss Wasserman-Schultz.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it is Good to see you, Ambassador Friedman and Ambassador Shapiro, Mister Fredman. Um, I had the privilege of leading trips to Israel with members of Congress on bi, in a bipartisan way, um, when, when you were both ambassadors and uh appreciate the opportunity to talk with you today about the A Abraham Accords. As my co-chair um Mister Schneider mentioned, I am also a co-chair of the bipartisan Abraham Accords caucus, and it really is a a a critical vehicle for us to be able to continue dialogue with these countries and uh and with Israel. Um I wanna take you back to uh twenty twenty three, uh when I was part of a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Middle East, focused on the state of the Abraham uh Ha- Abraham Accords, and our goal in part was to advance normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Um I remember our delegation met with Crown Prince Ben Salman, um and we all left that meeting which was very late at night, um, by the time it wrapped up, with optimism, brimming with optimism, that we were on the verge of a breakthrough. That meeting was the night of October sixth. So since then, the accords have borne as much pressure as they could possibly bear. Um, I I have trouble even, you know, getting through this without getting choked up. Um, with the horrors of October seventh, the tragedy in Gaza, And now the unauthorized strategic disaster of a war with Iran. Um. Gaza needs to be freed from Hamas. I mean, that is very clear. I wanna just make sure that it is clear where I stand. Um, they need to disarm. They need to commit to normalization and, you know, a real process to rebuild, and that can't happen if they are still weaponized. Um, what I've heard from Gulf Arab leaders since this war started is that they don't see the uni- unity of purpose with the Trump administration or with the Netanyahu government and they don't see enough progress toward a political horizon, as you mentioned Ambassador Shapiro, for the Palestinians. And that is clearly an essential component of being able to advance normalization with other countries and bring other agreements forward. Um, I'm It's clear we're further away from that likelihood than we were on October sixth, from seeing this vision through. And I believe strongly in the Abraham accords, and I believe in their expansion. But we can't do that at the expense of forgetting about the countries that have already bought in. In progress in the countries that we've already made progress in, and then we already have agreements is critical. So if we invest in expanding the Abraham accords rather than seeing through integration and improvement with current members, Are we abandoning the core mission? And and what are the risks of shifting our focus elsewhere when Gulf nations are losing faith in our credibility? And I'd love both ambassadors to to answer that question. Ambassador Shapiro.

Thank you, uh, Congresswoman. Uh, there's uh, y you're right that we are further away from those breakthroughs uh on uh than we were on October sixth. We even had opportunities uh e even during the war uh, as negotiations persisted with the Saudis, uh, for a breakthrough that would be connected to an end of war, a hostage deal, a cease-fire, and so forth. Uh, candidly I was not optimistic that the current Israeli government was gonna be able to meet its part of finding the language to express that uh, Palestinian uh, horizon that you mentioned. Uh, if it had been possible, it might have required a change of coalition in Israel, or even an election. Um, But uh, there is no question, uh, I hear it all the time from Gulf partners and from other uh, Arab partners in the region, uh, a belief that there's something still possible in the region, and that they want to be part of that coalition, uh, of US aligned moderate nations, uh, building a better future through interdependence, through economic uh, cooperation, through security cooperation.

Wonderful.

The the the Iran war uh, has thrown a major uh, curveball into this undertaking, uh, because every country is now focused on its primary security requirements. Uh, every country has to ask the question. Can they count on US security guarantees, given that we essentially dragged them into a conflict they did not wanna be part of? Uh, there are questions about whether Israel is a destabilizing actor, again, something one hears from Gulf nations all the time. So I don't think this is a moment, uh, when those breakthroughs are likely, but if and when this war ends, and it needs to end as soon as possible, it should never have been Uh, that's the work uh that needs to be uh resumed. Uh, a special envoy focused exclusively on expanding uh these agreements, I think would be a very important tool to do so.

Thank you, Ambassador Beeman.

Thank you, Congresswoman. Um, th there is uh, there's no question there, this is a difficult time to be thinking about expanding it. Um, what what I would suggest though is that um, and and I know Congress, you've got seventy five other things on your plate, maybe I'm understating it, so I don't mean to suggest that there's there's more work to do on this. But in in hearing for example, um Congressman Schneider talking about, not, no I'm sorry, uh uh Sherman speaking about settler violence as if it's this thing that exists out there which is dragging everybody down. Um you know, we're we're being flooded by a tidal wave uh of anti-Israel media. Uh maybe it comes from China, maybe it comes from Qatar, maybe it comes from Maybe it's homegrown. But there's there's a lot of news out there which isn't right. And and uh just on that one point, you know, we talk about um um a dog bites man story and a man bites dog story. You know, nobody reports about a dog biting a man, 'cause it's not interesting, it happens all the time. When a man bites a dog, that's a story, right? And settler violence is man bites dog, because it doesn't happen that often but it's so prone with It's not safe for me to ask that. emotion and anger that it gets the headlines I I'm there all the time. I mean, I I live this, I live this issue. We have to stop settler violence, of course we do. But let's let's try to stop the violence that that causes the settler violence, which is on a magnitude of ten times. So I I think, you know, it's important just to get our arms around the facts, um, and not be um driven by by the again the tidal wave of anti-semitic, anti-Israel uh incorrect media, which is just making very very hard to make good decisions.

Okay, well I'm gonna reclaim my time, cuz we're getting a little far afield of the question I asked, and I wanna The chairman's gonna indulge me for another question, but I appreciate your your feedback. Um, Ambassador Shapiro, another concern that I have is that the current scope of the Abraham Accords is is far too focused on the grass tops, on the elites, senior officials, major businesses, tech investors, weapons sales, and not nearly enough on the grassroots, the the rank and file people on the ground. And when I have talked with each of the Abraham Accord country leaders, and asked them, you know, and even for example, you know, we would obviously all have preferred more robust statements following October seventh from Abraham Accord con- led countries. Um, and when I asked many of those leaders why, even though they obviously did condemn the attacks by Hamas, they said that there is not the buy-in, the same kind of buy-in on the ground in those Abraham Accord countries as there is among the elites. ordinary people in the region, it, this is not, these accords have not permeated. So the Trump administration, just for example, has drained the bipartisan Nitalawi Middle East Partnership Peace Act or the MEPA Act. That that made those kinds of investments in Israeli and Palestinian civil society possible, um, including collaborative projects that brought Israelis and Palestinians together. And there there's there's so much more that we need to do to push down that interaction and engagement so that there's buy-in that frees up those leaders to integrate their societies even more. And the Trump administration also made substantial cuts to effe- to efforts to modernize education in the Middle East and North Africa not only to remove anti-semitism from curricula, but to add in Holocaust education. So Ambassador Shapiro, is it possible for the AMRCram accords to live up to their uh intended goals without those investments in building mutual understanding and normalization at the grassroots level and What can we do to advance that goal?

Thank you, Congresswoman. Uh, you're correct that, uh, the initial agreements were, uh, between governments. There's been a z- tremendous amount of progress, uh, in integration between security professionals, militaries, intelligence have been part of that, um, but not nearly enough, uh, penetration to, uh, the people-to-people level. Now, this is a difficult environment to do that. I highlighted in my testimony before you arrived, uh, that Arab publics are affected. by what they've seen in terms of devastation in Gaza and the suffering of Palestinian civilians. Uh, we're gonna need time to move past that. We need a better situation in Gaza to move past that. So, that means implementation of the twenty point plan. Uh, that's gonna help those leaders who want to bring their f their publics along to do that. But, as far as the initiatives go, this was something we were very focused on in the Biden administration with the NEGA forum. And I'm sorry to say that the NEGA forum seems to have uh, fallen off the table. It should have, I think, survive the change of administrations, both in this country and in Israel, does not seem to have much interest, perhaps because of who the, uh, initiators were, uh, by, uh, this administration or by the Israel, current Israeli government. But, that was an excellent opportunity, uh, i- with working groups on energy, on water, on education and coexistence, on health, on, uh, on, uh, uh, uh, var- various other fields, uh, that were drawing in, private sector elements that were drawing in hospitals, universities, uh, uh, start-up companies, uh, and getting a much deeper engagement. We at the Atlantic Council at the time were supporting that effort with conferences that we were convening as well uh with the same uh cross-section of, uh, all those societies. Uh, and you could see in those twenty two, thousand twenty two, two thousand twenty t- three period, uh, those routes starting to, to, to take those, uh, connections starting to take root, uh, and, uh, giving more balance to the leaders to go even further on deepening these relationships. Also, to make this a club other countries wanted to join, other societies wanted to join. So uh, that's uh, that, that's why that regional aspect of it, rather than a series of bipartisan agreements and kind of a hub and spoke model, uh, really is important. The NEGA forum gave us that. I hope we will resume some of that work, uh, as again, as this war winds down and as we get Gaza on the path toward recovery from the terrible war it's been through.

Thank you. We just have to double down on the agreements we have so that we can really make sure that they're long-lasting. Thank you. Yield back the time I don't have.

That's all right. Uh, Representative Kane, you're recognized.

Uh, thank you, Mister Chairman. And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here today. The Abraham Accords have already demonstrated their diplomatic and their security value. But their long-term success will ultimately depend on whether they deliver tangible economic benefits for citizens of the region and create new opportunities for for cooperation. If Congress considers on how to build the on the accords, it is important to examine what will the United States can play in advancing trade, investment, connectivity, and shared prosperity among participating countries. Ambassador Friedman, as Congress considers on how to build on the accords, is important to examine what role the United States can play in advancing trade, investment, connectivity, and shared prosperity among participating countries. Can you discuss how the US government is currently promoting trade and investment, regional economic integration among the Abraham Accord countries? And what, how how should we measure whether that those efforts are being successful or not?

Well, I think the efforts are demonstrably not successful because we see the uh, we see a a world there that's aflame. And um, doesn't look at anything like what we would we would like it to look like. Um, I I would suggest, uh, Congressman, that um, we we do have an overblown sense of our ability to change the facts on the ground. Um, when when the United States enters or Western, wealthy Western countries enter this region, um, most of the money usually gets spent in ways that are unaccounted for, uh, that don't go to the right people. Um, Sometimes we'll look at like a turkey on Thanksgiving, you know, someone just gonna take, " Well, take your money and then we'll." There needs to be an adult in the room in that area. Um, I would suggest that the only real adult in the room, the only country that has a track record of empowering an Arab minority is the State of Israel the the the Christian uh Arabs in Israel have the highest standard of living in Israel even more so than the Jews the Arabs in Israel have the highest standard of living in the Middle East if we're gonna let somebody own this It should be a real country, it should be an adult country, it should be a democracy, and and that's a pa- that's a path where the money will be spent, every penny will be accounted for, and we can see the results of our efforts. I I've spent a lot of time with USAID, you know they're good people, they mean well, spent a lot, I've seen a lot of what happened with the the efforts to um to uh mitigate the the tragedy in Gaza. Um without Israel, which is the only country on the ground that we can rely upon, um it needs, it's it's not gonna be successful, so I think we need to work through Israel, not around Israel.

Okay, thank you. And, Mister uh Fredman, recent Iranian aggression in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the importance of secure resilient trade and c- and connectivity corridors that promote regional stability, ensured prosperity. With growing interest in the Middle East East Europe Economic Corridor, IMEC, as a means of diversifying global supply chains and reducing uh reliance on vulnerable choke points, how can the US ensure that IMEC develops an inclusive multi-route in uh initiative anchored in the partnerships forward to the Abraham Accords.

Thank you Congressman. And I'd also like to acknowledge the role of the Abraham Accords caucus, the Baibarsan caucus has been incredibly important and positive, in terms of promoting the Accords. If we look at how we make IMEC into a reality, there are geopolitical challenges. For example, even today Saudi Arabia will not allow Israel, goods destined for Israel, originating in Israel to cross its territory, even in trucks, even if you don't have a railroad. Now, in July twenty twenty two, when Saudi Arabia allowed Israeli overflights in its territory, it didn't say it's because we wanna normalize with Israel, it said we wanna be a global logistics hub and the Chicago convention etcetera. I think we could get to a point, even as been discussed, where Saudi Arabia is not, the the conditions may not be right for full normalization, but to, for Saudi Arabia for its own interest, it wants to be a global logistics and transportation hub, to allow goods destined for Haifa, coming from Haifa port, through its territory. Jordan as well, there are currently no plans, or no no practical plans for a rail line connecting Saudi Arabia on one side and Israel on the other side. And I think the United States, perhaps with the DFC, other mechanisms can help create that infrastructure, would be good for American companies, for American technologies, and would be good for making IMEC a reality.

And then what other alternatives do you think we can have to make sure that Israel is is is central? rather than sidelined. There other things the conference can do?

I think that Israel needs to be the, the the most successful uh cooperation on the scientific level innovation has been three-way cooperation, so between Israeli, American and Emirati entrepreneurs, between Israeli, Bahraini and German youth as an example. At the Mishgav Institute, which I direct, we've hosted numerous Moroccan delegations, we've been brought together with American counterparts. So creating those three-way cooperation I think would be essential. Because, you know, the neg the media in the region is largely negative towards Israel. And decades of negative, of education, um, which is starting to change but is still far from changing, has created a baseline of negative views. And I think America and Congress can be critical in that evolution towards accepting Israel as a authentic part of the region, and a potential partner for all these countries.

Thank you f- to the panel for your, your insights. Appreciate that, your time and

Take care. Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you, Mister Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. King.

You're back.

I guess we'll start over again if it's okay if I go next. Is that alright with you? Is that acceptable? I don't see any other. Oh wait, no, I'm sorry, makes. Uh, he's already. Chairman makes. Let me recognize you and then I'll we'll start again. Sorry, Chairman.

Thank you. Uh, and thank you to the witnesses, uh, for being here. And I wanted to make sure that I was here because, uh, really what I've been focusing on is to have a change in the Middle East. to have a peace in the Middle East, where Israel could live side by side uh with its neighbors. Uh the Palestinians uh in Gaza, uh in the West Bank, and the Arab States, uh and that's where I saw uh up to October the seventh that real possible, real change was taking place. Because one of the things that I've saw in you know post uh with the UN uh when it created the uh Jewish state of Israel uh that it was the many of these Arab States that were trying to take the property that had been designated as a Jewish uh, state of Israel. Uh, and uh, so there was fights and wars that were going on between that because it was trying to say they Israel did not have the right to exist. In fact, when I first visited Israel uh, back in the early uh, uh nineties, uh, and I would talk to some of the Arab states, they said Israel did not have the right to exist. Uh, and so therefore you cannot have peace If one side is trying to negotiate peace and the other side says you don't have the right to exist, there can't be any peace. The major change for me came though when we start talking about, uh when I start seeing some of the Arab countries saying Israel had the right to exist. And we wanted to live with our neighbors, uh and we wanted to make sure that we'd, you know, to exchange a diplomatic uh uh uh uh personnel and and try to figure out how to do the best of both things. Uh, and Saudi Arabia was talking about moving forward before October the seventh, et cetera. One of the things that Saudi Arabia was uh indicating uh was though, they wanted to make sure that it was indeed a two-state solution, that there was a Palestinian state that was gonna be created, and that the Palestinians were treated with respect and move forward so that we can you know get certain things done. Um, so that, you know, I think changed the paradigm of what's where where we needed to go. Uh, and so um I believe that a successful normalization requires perspectives, uh perspective partners to believe that also Israel will act as a stable and reliable regional partner. Uh Israel expects the same from its perfect s- perspective. So it's gotta be from both sides as I see that. Uh and at the same time, now we have the war in Iran, uh and continuing developments in Gaza and the West Bank, have intensified re- concerns across the region about Israel's broader strategic direction. So, brings me to the question of, you know, how have post-October seven events, uh, in Gaza, the West Bank, and Iran, impacted Israel's credibility with Arab and Muslim countries, considering closer diplomatic or security ties? I guess, I'll go to you, Ambassador Shapiro.

Thank you, uh, ranking member Meeks. Um, I was present, uh, with numerous conversations with Arab states, uh, post-October seventh. Uh, they raised serious concerns about civilian casualties in Gaza, of course. They raised concerns, as they continue to raise today, about uh various Israeli conduct on the West Bank as well. But uh nearly uh uniformly, uh especially among Gulf partners, uh they all said that they wanted to get past this war uh and get back on the road toward expanding regional integration. They put on the table proposals, not perfect proposals, But proposals that would help end the war and move smartly out in that direction. Uh, they see that still as their strategic interest, and they see that as a strategic interest because it, uh, includes them in a coalition of US aligned partners, focused on common adversaries and building interdependence and and security and prosperity together. However, uh, they have also raised concerns, for example the Israeli strike, uh, on, uh, Hamas, uh, leaders in Doha, Qatar. Uh, and of course this current war that, uh, most Gulf States counseled against, uh, but saw the United States and Israel undertake, uh, and raised the question about whether they are dealing with Israel, and with the United States frankly, uh, that is also a destabilizing actor. That shakes the foundations of that belief that they had told us they are committed to, and I believe they do w- still want to be part of, uh, that there's a coalition of Israeli, Arab, uh, and American partners, uh, obviously with progress toward an Israeli-Palestine resolution as well, uh, that they wanna be part of.

So, how does this help with reference to, uh, oh, I've heard in fact of, uh, in some meeting that I've had with, uh, Prime Minister Netanyahu, uh, when, uh, he says basically he doesn't believe in a two-state solution. Uh, so how can further normalization proceed, uh, when you have regional leaders believe that Israel is unwilling to pursue a viable two-state solution, or restraining his actions that uh deeply uh instable the whole situation. How does how does that work?

It's a divide, of course it's a divide not just with to the Prime Minister, the current Prime Minister. It's broadly felt across Israeli society, uh still traumatized by the events of October seventh, that a Palestinian state would be very risky. But uh it is part of the President's twenty point plan for Gaza, that there should be a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. As I quoted uh Senator Graham, the late Senator Graham a few minutes ago, Uh, he reminded us uh last fall, uh there really is no future for Israel as both a Jewish and a democratic state, without some uh s agreed and negotiated separation between Israelis and Palestinians, in which both sides can have self-determination and peace living alongside each other. Um, and uh it is definitely a factor. Uh, it there's probably no chance, and that the Saudis have been clear on this publicly, but they've also been clear on this privately, uh that they could get as far as full normalization with Israel, which I believe the Crown Prince has made clear he still views as the best course for his country and for the region as a whole unless there is a component for the Palestinians that includes a credible pathway. Is that gonna take time? It definitely is. Is it gonna take reform of the Palestinian Authority? For sure. Is it gonna take removal of Hamas from power in Gaza? Absolutely. But uh that is a critical element if we want to see the full realization of this uh of this en- enterprise.

I mean, this is the last question. So What diplomatic structure and personnel would actually be required to convert any post-post-war opening uh into a durable normalization agreements?

Um, making remember me, uh other members of this panel and I have agreed uh that the the uh special envoy for Abraham Accords that was passed by the uh as the lawler uh Torah's nor uh legislation and included in the two thousand twenty-four NDAA uh is an important and still unfilled position, uh, to provide a very senior official, uh, authority and, uh, broad, uh, focus on a range of countries, uh, that could be part of this, uh, expansion of in- regional integration. Uh, it has not yet been appointed, not in the Biden administration, not in the Trump administration. I think it's overdue. I think the officials tasked with much of our Middle East diplomacy, particularly, Mister Wyckoff and Mister Kushner, are spread far too thin. They have far too much on their plate, with all the various responsibilities they've been given, to give this the kind of focus they need. I'd add, I believe we are lacking ambassadors in many of the Middle East capitals, certainly in Riyadh, in Abu Dhabi, uh in Doha, and a number of other key Middle East capitals, as well as we've uh uh we've uh degraded our broader diplomatic infrastructure there by uh l uh r the removal the r reductions in force at the State Department, that have removed many serious regional experts, uh, from their jobs as well. So, we need, we need active diplomats. We need senior diplomats. We need ambassadors in country. We need a special envoy. And we need to sustain a focus on the kinds of diplomatic and, uh, assistance programs that, uh, that Congressman Wasserman Schultz was referencing. Those that do people to people, as well as security ties, those that promote business, those that promote economic connections like IMEC, those that uh, promote people to people even between Israelis and Palestinians, such as the MEPA program, which, uh, is still awaiting, uh, obligation under the f- uh, fiscal year twenty-six, uh, funding that Congress passed. So, uh, there's many, many tools available, and they're not all being used, to be honest. Now, we still have to focus on the immediate diplomacy needs, end the war as soon as possible, get Gaza on a path towards, uh, fulfilling and implementing the twenty point plan, but all those other tools should be b- being activated even now. while we wait to get to that point.

Thank you, and I'm I'm gonna, I'm yielding back. I wanna put something into the record, and I also hope that we get into, Mister Chairman, Chairman uh you know, 'cause recently uh and I would l- l- love to hear if it comes up between all three, uh how do you square reports that the United States may permit Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium domestically,

How about this?

without the struggles available.

We're we're gonna have to adjourn, and I want you to get your

But, I w- I wanna submit, uh for the record though, 'cause I'm concerned about what's taking place on the West Bank, Uh and here's an article that took place that says that the UAE warns the White House that Israel annexations uh could unravel the uh Abraham Accord so there's real concerns by those that are part of the Abraham Accords now that if something is not done or changed in the West Bank it could in fact unravel uh the uh the the conversations uh that's taken place in regards to all the uh the uh the uh the uh the uh the uh the

Ch- chair will allow it. We we get we're not to adjourn but you wanna ask a question. Why don't we allow each Well, i- uh, maybe uh, can you do it in two minutes apace, do you think? I know it's tough for diplomats to do that. But why don't we just, you had that question. D- can we start with Mister Friedman?

Yeah, go.

Go ahead, brother.

Thank you. Thank you, uh, Mister, Mister Chairman. Um, look, I d- I don't think this is about uh, Netanyahu. I mean, there'll be an election in three months. The Israelis will elect whoever they want to elect. But um, I I would urge uh, the members of Congress to put themselves in the shoes of a typical Israeli. I I was in Israel the entire war.

But the but the question was about Saudi Arabia uh and uh the

Well, I was asked to give a two minute summation.

Oh, summa- that's what you're doing?

Yeah.

Yeah, he he everybody gets to

Okay. Summation, okay.

Yeah. So so I would ask people to put themselves in the shoes of of a typical Israeli. Uh, Netanyahu is a politician. He has to answer to the will of uh of the Israeli population. This is not about him, this is about the people of Israel. And um, having lived through the entire war, uh, the forty day war, uh, between Israel and Iran, uh, having watched uh, every night, uh, parents take their children in the middle of the night, at uh, three AM, I was blessed with having my own shelter in my house. But um, most people don't. So you wake up your kids at three o'clock in the morning, you run down the street, you try to find a shelter, sometimes they're already filled. You run down to the next shelter, you have ninety seconds to get to a shelter, or else you're risking your life and your children's lives. And um, and you know, People in Congress would like to say, " Well, you know, you should, you should really get over all that and just, you know, make peace with the Palestinians who've been shooting rockets at you for twenty years." And, and ignore all that stuff, uh, even though the Palestinians, uh, acted on October seventh, cheered October seventh, on the West Bank they were cheering October seventh. The Palestinian Authority continues to have the pay for slave program where they pay terrorists to kill Jews. Just ignore all that stuff and just You know, kumbaya, live in peace. Uh, and at the same time, give up every single part of your country that makes you a Jewish state. Give up Hebron, give up Shlem, give up Bethlehem, give up Jerusalem, give up all these places, okay, so, you you know, all, everything makes you Jewish is in the land the Palestinians want, because by the way, they wanna destroy every connection the Jewish people have to this land. So just do it. And and now you blame Netanyahu for not agreeing to it? I gotta tell you, who wh whoever wins this election is gonna be exactly of the same view. So we need a realistic view about the state of Israel, and if it means you can't support Israel, you won't support Israel, but Israel will will will survive this as best it can. It's not gonna commit suicide for the benefit of a piece of paper.

Mister Friedman.

Thank you. I live in Jerusalem with my four children, about twenty minutes from Ramallah. And I would like nothing more for them to grow up in a world where they could travel freely to Ramallah or to Beirut or to Damascus. And the same way, you know, were welcomed warmly in Dubai or in Marrakesh, or even in Khartoum when I visited there before the civil war to have an exchange with the Palestinian neighbors. After October seventh, uh s- uh Ambassador Shapiro referred it as trauma. I don't think it's trauma, it's really looking reality straight in the face. And according to the best Palestinian polling that's available, fifty-three percent of Palestinians think that Hamas's decision to launch an October seventh attack was a good idea. And Hamas is far more popular than other factions in the West Bank, again according to Palestinian polling. So I think, do we want to get to a peaceful solution with the Palestinians? I think we do. Do we have to look at reality, the fact that Hamas still fully controls Gaza, the fact that there is no o no other force other than the IDF that will actually go and do the difficult and dangerous work of disarming Hamas. We gotta help. And if we pull back, Hamas will be able to easily shoot into Israeli communities once again. I'll give you another question. I think we have to recognize the realities and look to exp

Sure.

Yeah.

Uh, I had my say earlier, uh, Mister, just uh, try to address your brief question on uh, the Saudi nuclear deal. Of course there's much we don't know. It's only only been announced in their last several hours. Uh, it does uh, uh, undertake uh, a joint study between the United States and Saudi Arabia, after which Uh, i i Saudi Arabia could be allowed to enrich uranium on its soil. Uh, exactly what the safeguards would be for that is not entirely clear. It does not appear to include Saudi Arabia signing the additional protocol of the non-proliferation treaty. Um, so if there are other safeguards involved, I think that's something Congress should very give very close uh, attention to. Uh, there is danger of course, uh, if Saudi Arabia gets that capability, uh, that there is a kind of race to the bottom, uh, as other countries, Turkey, Egypt, uh, seek uh to match a Saudi capability. And of course we know we are uh uh holding to a position that Iran, uh, quite reasonably given its history, should not have any enrichment on its soil. But maybe that position will be somewhat undercut, at least in terms of international support, uh, by this deal. So there's a lot that's not known, uh, and needs to be studied carefully, uh, about it. I do think, uh, there's a, uh, question mark about why the President felt he should move forward with this deal now at a in previous negotiations, this idea of a civil nuclear uh cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia which was something President Biden was working on and might have even allowed uh at some point a US supervised or even controlled uh enrichment capability on Saudi soil uh but why uh it's being moved forward as kind of a stand alone deal. Again, maybe there are things we don't know, but it is not connected to, as it was in the Biden time, uh, a clear decision by Saudi Arabia to normalize their relations with Israel, have the Palestinian component be built into that, have the other US and Saudi security commitments made to one another. Uh, and so I'm concerned that it has removed a card of leverage and an important incentive, uh, from our hands, uh, to try to bring the Saudis along to where we want them to get to ultimately, which is full normalization with Israel.

Thank you, Mr. Schneider.

Can, can I request just one quick, real quickly?

I know

to submit an article for the record, it is from the Times of Israel, I'll get you a printout, March nineteenth, twenty twenty six. I'll read the first paragraph. IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Yaliz Amir, on Wednesday issued sharp condemnation of settler violence, calling attacks against Palestinian civilians and soldiers in the West Bank, quote, morally and ethically unacceptable, end quote, and a major strategic impenet impediment. But Ambassador, I think you make an important point. It's too broad to call it settler violence. The vast majority of settlers are not involved in these attacks. But the many people that are involved, and they're not all settlers, are a threat to Israel's security and the prospects for peace.

I, I agree completely.

We need to work together, and I understand the concerns of Israelis, uh, uh, Ambassador, the, the memory for many m- all Israelis who were there on October seventh is as if it was yesterday. And the prospects for peace seem far across the horizon. I think our responsibility as Congress is to continue

I

to harbor the hopes and possibilities of peace and to lay down the path that both Israelis and Palestinians and the people of the region can find a path together to live in security, prosperity and ultimately peace. I yield back.

Recognize Representative Sherman quickly, so he gets the votes.

Quickly.

The IDF says settler violence is up twenty-seven percent. The Times of London s- uh, the Times of Israel says, uh, that severe attacks are up fifty percent. These attacks would not happen. if sup- if s- cl- supporters of ethnic cleansing do not have uh strong sup- uh at least some significant support in the Israeli cabinet. There are two ways for Israel to commit suicide. Uh, one of those is to allow a Saudi and ultimately Egyptian, Turkish uh uh nuclear program, and the other is to annex the West Bank uh w- a- and Gaza, which ultimately will turn uh will lead as it uh to the enfranchisement of uh the Arab population,

Right.

uh or uh the real crazies will take over in Israel and they will attempt physical ethnic cleansing. Uh,

Tha-

a two state solutions where we gotta go and I yield back.

Thank you. I wanna thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, members for their questions, the members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, we will ask you to respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members have five days to submit statements, questions extraneous. Materials for the record, subject to the length limitations, without objection the committee stands adjourned.