Countering Houthi Terrorism: Protecting U.S. Interests and Security in the Red Sea

a war. They are not. The Houthis are a foreign terrorist organization, armed with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, attack drones, and sophisticated maritime capabilities. They have targeted American forces, attacked our partners, and threatened commercial vessels transitioning one of the world's most important waterways. And we would sh- uh, and we should be clear about how they developed these capabilities. Iran. For years, the Iranian regime has provided the Houthis with weapons, money, training and technical expertise. Iran transformed a local armed movement into a terrorist organization capable of threatening Americans and disrupting international commerce. This is the strategy we've seen Iran utilize time and time again. Build an armed terrorist organizations and militias across the Middle East, that can attack the United States and our allies, so Tehran can try to distance itself from the consequences. And this becomes even more dangerous in Yemen, when the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz are involved. Iran and its Houthi proxies have now simultaneously put pressure on two of the world's most important maritime checkpoints, uh, chokepoints. Military deterrence is only one part of this challenge. The United States has demonstrated that we can destroy Houthi missiles, drones, launchers, and command infrastructure. The more difficult question is how we prevent the Houthis from replacing them. Behind every missile or drone is a system that helps finance, procure, smuggle, assemble, and ultimately replace these capabilities. Illicit financing networks, front companies, weapon smugglers, and black market procurement all supplement the direct Iranian assistance to the Houthis. If that system remains intact, we risk an expensive and unsustainable cycle. The Houthis acquire a missile or drone, the United States expends significant resources to destroy or intercept it, and the network simply helps replace it. We need to understand where that system is most vulnerable, and whether we are effectively using sanctions, export controls, interdictions, intelligence, and other tools to prevent the Houthis from regenerating their capabilities. We also need to examine what our partners can contribute. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, and other countries in the region have a direct stake in keeping these waterways open and preventing Houthi attacks. Yemen's internationally recognized government and other appropriate Yemeni partners also possess geographic access and local knowledge that the US cannot replicate. America will always defend its people and its interests, but regional security cannot depend indefinitely on the United States carrying the burden alone. Finally, any durable strategy must account for Yemen itself. Renewed conflict could further destabilize an already fragile country, while continued Houthi control and military entrenchment present their own risk to regional security. We need to understand what role legitimate Yemeni partners can realistically play in preventing weapons flows, holding territory, and creating the conditions for greater stability. Today I hope our witnesses can help members answer several fundamental questions. What does lasting deterrence of the Houthis actually require? Can we meaningfully reduce the Houthi threat without dismantling the financial and weapons networks that sustain it, where are those networks most vulnerable, and what can our regional partners realistically do to carry more of the security burden. One principle should be clear. An Iran-backed terrorist organization cannot be allowed to dictate whether American ships and international commerce can safely transit international waters. And Iran cannot be permitted to arm terrorists who attack Americans while escaping accountability for the consequences. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. I now wanna recognize the new ranking member of the MINA subcommittee, uh, Representative Moskowitz, uh, from Florida for his first opening statement.

Uh, well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure, uh, to be with you, uh, today as the new ranking member. I wanna thank obviously Leader Jeffries, uh, and Ranking Member Meeks, uh, and my colleagues on the committee, especially Representative Sherman. uh who gave me this opportunity. Uh so thank you Chairman Lawler for holding this important and timely hearing, uh t- for uh our witnesses and joining us today. Uh I look forward to your testimonies and to a robust discussion. Over the past year, the Houthis, an Iranian-backed militant group in Yemen, have attacked dozens of commercial ships, as well as Israel and Saudi Arabia, with no signs of stopping. Throughout this past spring and summer, Houthi militants launched dozens of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones at Israel, accompanied by public speeches and pronouncements trumpeting their slogan, God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam. On July twentieth, Houthi leadership announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, attacking Saudi oil tankers and expanding their threats to any vessels using Saudi Red Sea ports. In August, Houthi militants launched long-range drones and missiles against Saudi infrastructure. including the Aramco oil refinery, and have continued attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. These attacks have elevated the Houthi regional role in a disruptor aligned with Iran while exploiting long-standing grievances against Saudi Arabia. The immediate consequences have been heightened risks to commercial shipping and energy flows throughout maritime passage, on top of the already tenuous situation in the Strait of Hormuz, and threaten to plunge Yemen more deeply into the broader regional war with Iran. To fuel this campaign of terror, Houthis rely on a decentralized procurement and smuggling network to obtain weapons, military equipment and ammunition from outside sources, Iran in principle among them. While US and partner nation efforts have slowed and disrupted many of these flows, they continue to arm and equip Houthi militants and evade sanctions and interdiction efforts. Beyond weapons and ammunition, US government and outside investigations have identified illicit networks that also provide dual-use items like missile guidance equipment, uav components electronics and other technology to the houthis us international efforts must better curtail and restrict the trafficking of these items meanwhile houthi meanwhile yemen continues to face one of the world's most severe and protracted humanitarian crisis driven by more than a decade of war and economic deterioration displacement and disease according to the latest un humanitarian needs and response plan twenty two point three million Yemenis, half of the country's population, require humanitarian assistance to survive. Food insecurity is particularly acute. Roughly eighteen point three million people are experiencing acute food insecurity, while more than two point two million children under the age of five under the age of five are acutely malnourished. The humanitarian burden is essentially severe for children, women, displaced families, and those with medical needs. UNICEF reports that as of this year, ten point eight million children are in need of humanitarian assistance, and forty percent of health facilities were either mentally functional or completely out of service. Public health challenges also remain. UNICEF recorded ninety-three thousand four hundred and ninety-six suspected cholera cases and almost two hundred and fifty deaths in January of twenty twenty-six, following a late twenty twenty-five outbreak that affected virtually the entire country. Houthi militants have exacerbated and significantly worsened the already dire humanitarian situation by consistently stealing humanitarian aid away from civilians and either hoarding it from themselves and reselling it for profit or diverting it or redistributing it to Houthi supporters and political allies. In the face of the dire humanitarian needs, Yemen was among the countries hit particularly hard by the twenty twenty-five destruction of USAID and the elimination of thousands of USAID grants and contracts worth over twenty-seven billion globally. US assistance underpinned many of the most significant aid efforts in Yemen, including support for emergency food assistance, nutrition, health, and other lifesaving services. In July of twenty twenty-five, WFP estimated that as a result of such funding cuts, decreased aid efforts could leave as many as four point eight million Yemenis without lifesaving food assistance the largest country-level impact WFP reported during the year twenty twenty-five. The Trump administration has shown no evidence of a plan or even con- even contribute with allies or partners to addressing the hu- humanitarian crisis facing Yemen. It has failed to engage at all Yemen or put forward a strategy to address the terrorist threat the Houthis pose. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the persistent threat that the Houthis pose to US allies and partners in the region as well as the critical international shipping. Thank you and I yield back, Mister Chairman.

I thank the ranking member for his opening statement and look forward to working with him on these important issues as we move forward on the committee. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Miss Nadwa Al-Dawsari, an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute, and Miss Allison Miner, the Director of Project uh, for Middle East integration at the Atlantic Council. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us, and is grateful to have you here today to speak with us. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Miss Al-Dosari for an opening statement.

Sorry, Paul.

Just put the uh microphone. Is there a b should be a button there.

Oh, okay. Alright.

Perfect.

Thank you.

Thank you.

Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me. It's a great honor to be here. I was born in Yemen, where I spent the first three decades of my life. I spent decades studying the country and the Houthis. I watched them evolve from a small insurgency in northern Yemen into the regional threat we face today. I'd like to make four points. First, the Houthis did not become this dangerous overnight. Two main factors got us here. Iran's sustained investment in their capabilities and the United States and the international community consistently under-estimating them. For years We treated the Houthis as just another militia in another civil war. We assumed their extreme rhetoric was just rhetoric, and that the threat could be contained within Yemen through political engagement. Well, we were wrong. The Houthis used negotiations and cease-fires to buy time, consolidate power, and strengthen their military capabilities. And the threat could not be contained within Yemen through. And instead of Remaining contained within Yemen, the threat expanded beyond its borders. By the time the United States responded militarily, the Houthis had already acquired capabilities to threaten the US forces and international shipping. Second, to understand the threat, we have to understand who the Houthis are. They are a radical offshoot of Zaydi Shia Islam. They believe they are on a divine mission that started in Yemen. and that includes the destruction of Israel and liberation of Jerusalem. Their slogan, which includes " Death to America", tells us exactly how they see the United States. For years, those ambitions exceeded their capabilities, but Iran helped close that gap. With sustained Iranian support, the Houthis developed sophisticated missiles and drones capable of striking ships and targets across the region. Since then, they have attacked and sunk commercial vessels, targeted US forces and allies, and forced major shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea. Third, the US military pressure has imposed real cost on the Houthis, but airstrikes alone will not eliminate the threat. And repeated interventions risk pulling the United States into a prolonged war of attrition. The Houthis, meanwhile have shown that that they can adapt, rebuild and expand. Their influence now reaches across the whole of Africa, and they're collaborating with terrorist groups like Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. At home, the Houthis rule through extreme repression, targeting political opponents, tribes, women, minorities, and anyone who challenges their authority. They're a militarizing society, and recruiting and indoctrinating children and youth. They are not just recruiting fighters for today's wars, they are raising a generation to see America as the enemy. Finally, the United States needs a long-term strategy that builds real leverage on the Houthis. And the most important source of leverage is territory. Territory gives the Houthis people to recruit, revenue to collect, ports and smuggling routes to exploit, and space to build and store weapons. The most sustainable way to reduce the threat, therefore, is to empower Yemenis to retake territory from the Houthis. This does not require US boots on the ground. It requires US leadership. And for the US to work with allies to provide the Yemeni government with the political, military and economic support it needs to restore state authority. Members of the subcommittee, we've already seen the cost of underestimating the Houthis. We cannot afford to underestimate them again. Thank you.

Thank you, Miss Aldosari. I now recognize Miss Miner for an opening statement.

Chairman Ladler, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. The Houthi threat is not new. but it has expanded considerably over the past decade, threatening stability in Yemen and the Gulf, as well as global commerce through the Red Sea. Now, with their latest Red Sea blockade, the Houthis are threatening to take roughly four million barrels of oil per day, off the t- the markets at a time when global energy s- supplies are already strained. The United States needs a sustained strategy for countering this threat. I have worked on Yemen for much of the past decade across the US government. and I've drawn three important lessons from that experience. The first is that open-ended conflict ultimately advantages the Houthis. An aggressive Saudi-led ground and air campaign, US air strikes and Israeli strikes all failed to eliminate Houthi capabilities or alter their strategy. By twenty twenty-two, the Houthis had transformed from a local militia into a sophisticated military force, capable of striking almost anywhere in the Middle East. US and Israeli strikes also fueled Houthi recruitment inside of Yemen, elevated the group's standing within the axis of resistance, and contributed to new cooperation between the Houthis and Russia. The reality is that the Houthis thrive in a wartime environment, especially one characterized by foreign intervention. Military pressure can play a role in countering the Houthis, but only when it is grounded in credible objectives and part of a broader political strategy for resolving the conflict that is itself fueling the Houthis. The second lesson is that divisions within the anti-Houthi coalition have consistently jeopardized efforts to counter the Houthis. Finally, the third lesson is that the weakness of the Yemen government is among the Houthis' greatest sources of strength. The United States can help address both vulnerabilities. We can help partners unify around a credible strategy for resolving the conflict and strengthening the Yemen government. This approach helps secure the twenty twenty-two UN truce. But that effort focused on pausing the conflict, not resolving it. And the Houthis' attacks against commercial shipping in twenty twenty three, underscore that a pause is not enough. In the absence of US diplomatic engagement, instead fissures within the anti-Houthi coalition are growing in ways that the Houthis are well-placed to exploit. Without a consensus around a credible end state to the conflict, those fissures will continue to grow. Yemen is again on the brink of war. Now is the time for the United States to its regional and Yemeni partners for the coordinated, credible strategy for resolving the conflict. The goal should be a s- negotiated settlement that holds the Houthis accountable, both to Yemenis and to their neighbors. It's not any settlement. It's a settlement that provides a viable structure for governing Yemen and imposes enforceable constraints on Houthi cross-border and maritime attacks. This will take time. But there are three steps the United States can take now to get back on track. The first is to prevent another open-ended war in Yemen. This time, such a war could prove even more disastrous, given entanglement between Yemen and other conflicts in the region. Military fr- pressure from US partners may be necessary to defend against Houthi attacks and create leverage for negotiations but it should support a political strategy not substitute for one. Second, the United States should resume humanitarian assistance and support to the Yemen government. The best way to counter the Houthis inside of Yemen is to demonstrate that there is an effective alternative to Houthis, the Houthis' repressive rule. In the past, low-cost US capacity building has helped the government deliver services in economic stability, but that assistance was also severed with the elimination of USAID. US support to the Yemen Coast Guard also contributed to one of our most effective ap- approaches for constraining Houthi weapons flows. Yemeni forces have carried out four significant weapons interdictions in the past year alone. Separately, millions of people in Yemen government controlled areas are in need of humanitarian assistance, but the UN appeal is only twenty percent funded, leaving many needs unmet. Finally, the United States should restore intensive US diplomatic efforts on Yemen, including by appointing a Yemen special envoy. The United States is uniquely positioned to help partners build consensus around a common strategy, but doing so requi requires the kind of sustained, region-wide engagement that an empowered envoy is place to provide. The war in Yemen is not the United States' war, and we should not make it ours. But its consequences will continue to reverberate across the region and beyond. Instead of vacillating between U- costly US military inven- interventions and disengagement, we should pursue sustained strategic engagement with our regional and Yemeni partners to help them build a credible path toward resolving the conflict, and containing Houthi threats. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Miss Minor. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questionings. The Houthis largely remained on the sidelines for the first five months of this year's war with Iran. And that changed in July, when the group opened a new front against Saudi Arabia, declaring a blockade on Saudi-linked shipping and subsequently escalating attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure vessels in the Red Sea and Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. What does the Houthis' delayed entry tell us about Iran's future ability to use the group against the US, uh, and our partners, and has the group developed more autonomy from Iran, basing its participation in conflicts on its own interests and calculations? Ms. Darvasari.

Thank you, sir. Um, the Houthis did not intervene early on in the conflict between the United States and Iran because there was no strategic value in the Houthis intervention that early. Um, Iran has been able to impose cost on the US through the Strait of Hormuz. Um, and so, but the, but Iran has been working to prepare the Houthis in case the war continues to put pressure on the United States. Iranian officials themselves said that they are preparing to um, the Red Sea to put pressure on the United States. And over the past months, dozens of IRGC op- operatives and commanders came to Yemen to help the Houthis prepare for those attacks. So, if the war with the United States continue, and the pressure out of the state of Hormuz become less viable for Iran, we can expect the Houthis to escalate in the Red Sea.

To that end, obviously there's no question that folks back home are feeling some of the costs of Iran's blockades and the Houthi attacks uh at the pump and in their wallets, but what does the government need to do, not just simply to reduce the number of Houthi attacks, but to restore commercial confidence in the Red Sea and bringing shipping and insurance markets back to normal.

The US government?

I'm sorry?

Did you say the US government?

Yeah.

Well, the, what the United States has been doing so far to counter the Houthis have been effective. Air strikes have disrupted Houthi, um, op- operations and also, um, eh, ha has disrupted the Houthis um and undermined some of their capabilities, but the Houthis have proven that they are able to, like you said, they are able to regenerate some of these capabilities because of the vast smuggling network they have. So sanctions also have made it difficult for the Houthis to maintain a steady revenue stream, but they have also found ways to continue to generate revenues. The US Treasury said that the Houthis are able to generate two billion dollars a year from illicit oil despite the sanctions.

Twenty two.

In my opinion, in order to secure the Red Sea and freedom of navigation, the United States need to do the one thing that it hasn't done yet, is to support the Yemeni government to take territory from the Houthis. Territory helps the Houthis expand, help the Houthis attack ships in the Red Sea. And if we take territory from the Houthis, if we help the Yemeni government take territory from the Houthis, we build the leverage that then help, um, the - the political process or the peaceful negotiations.

So the Treasury Department has taken important steps to target Houthi financiers facilitators front companies and procurement networks, including those enabling the group's access to weapons and revenue. But significant elements of the Houthi's international financial and procurement networks still remain operational. Which foreign companies, banks, shipping networks and jurisdictions remain most important to Houthi procurement and financing? And what more can Congress and the administration do to meaningfully restrain uh their access to money and weapons?

I'm not the experts in terror financing, but most of the weapons smuggling to the Houthis come through Chinese companies. So the United States could use its diplomatic, um, it could engage diplomatically with China to pressure the Chinese government to crack down on these companies, or limit Houthis' access to weapons through Chinese companies.

OK. Uh, my time has expired, I now recognize the ranking member for five minutes.

Uh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanna follow up on um the the chairman's questioning. Because obviously there's there's vast agreement h- on the committee uh about the Houthis and the threat that they pose. Um, but you mentioned that you know, we've done airstrikes and they work until they regroup. And then you mentioned that, you know, we do economic sanctions, but then they work around that. So if military in interdiction isn't working, or intervention isn't working, and economic sanctions are not working, then what do you suggest?

I su- I suggest, I think the United States should do, is working with US allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, to support Yemeni government forces to retake territory from the Houthis, to deny the Houthis access to the Red Sea. If the Houthis lose territory, they will lose a lot of the advantage they have now to smuggle, to um position forces and weapons to attack ships in the Red Sea and US forces as well. So that's what the United States should do, work with allies, support Yemeni government to take territory from the Houthis, and that will build the necessary leverage to engage in a political process that then can end the Yemen conflict as my colleague here said, and then and the threat.

So, uh, but are you suggesting are you suggesting a diplomatic approach with our allies? Are you are you suggesting that the United States should,

Um, um

um, arm Saudi Arabia to go and prosecute the war in Yemen?

Yes. The United States should consider arming, training Yemeni forces in collaboration with with Saudi Arabia, but also should consider um collaboration in in terms of mentoring and intelligence sharing.

Great. How many people have perished over a decade now, uh, in in the war, uh, in in Yemen? And and I would include people either directly from the war or from famine, from humanitarian crises that were created. What what is the what is the death count there?

I don't have the exact number, um, on hand, but in my opinion it exceeds a hundred thousand people, at least. Some some people say quarter a million, uh but also four million people are displaced and a a lot more people are suffering from hunger. The question is the Houthis continue to escalate. They have they have not engaged in the peace negotiations in good faith. And even when everybody else gave concessions, the Houthis used that time to rebuild, recruit and prepare for the next war. from Yemen to the Red Sea to Israel, and now they have a, you know, an open-ended conflict with Saudi Arabia and and and the US as well.

Is it your assessment,

So, so

is it your, is it your assessment in the region that obviously Hamas has been degraded, Hezbollah has been degraded, uh, but that the Houthis have not been degraded?

Yes, the Houthis have not been degraded. The Houthis need to be contained, militarily, and the only entity that contain them long-term sustainably is the Yemeni government and so far the Yemeni government has not been given the support it needs from the United States to do that.

So you're saying the Trump administration has not supported the Yemeni government. Is that what you're

Both government, the Biden administration, the Trump administration,

Right, but the Biden administration was two years ago.

this is

So you're saying the Trump administration is not supporting the Yemeni government in its fight against the Houthis? Is that your testimony?

My testimony is that US administrations, Republicans and Democrats have not supported Yemeni government, they have not provided.

But who's, but who's in charge now?

Well, the Trump administration is in charge now.

OK, so the current,

Well, yes, the Trump,

the current administration,

the Trump.

his name is Trump, we could say, he puts his name on everything, is not, is not, your testimony is that the current administration, the Trump administration, is not supporting the Yemeni government in its

I.

fight against one of the largest terrorist militant groups in the Middle East. That's your testimony?

I think the current administration, the Trump administration, should consider supporting them and the government, and yes, it hasn't done that yet.

OK. Alright. I appreciate it. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

I now recognize Representative Wilson for five minutes.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our ranking member, Jared Miskoets. Uh, we're so grateful for his uh service, and I'm really grateful that there'll be a a good team for America with uh Carson Moskowitz with uh Chairman Mike Lawler. With that in mind, it's clear that uh in the with the regime in Tehran, there's a terrorist puppets uh across the Middle Eastern, Iraq, Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen, and they're playing the long game. The Houthis have ideologically driven expansionist objectives that extend beyond Yemen to achieve these martyrs' sins, the Houthis continue building networks with terrorist groups and nation state adversaries of the United States, such as War Colonel Putin and the Chinese Communist Party. Self-declared enemies of America and democracies worldwide worked together, driven by a common goal of undermining American interests, regional destabilization, and weakening free governments for their own malign objectives. We're in a war I believe that we didn't choose, and that is of dictators with rule of gun, invading democracies with rule of law, It began with Walker Putin invading Ukraine on February twenty four, twenty twenty two, and the Iranian puppets invading Israel on October seven, twenty twenty three. With that in mind, uh, Ms. Zaldisari, uh, how has the welcome of Putin with the Chinese Communist Party helped the Houthis attack American assets and partners uh in the region? And what examples of the Houthis directly being aided by the Chinese Communist Party and Putin.

Thank you, sir. Um, there's there's been some evidence that the Houthis are building ties with Russia and China. There's been reports that as early as twenty twenty four, Russian operatives were in Sana'a aiding the Houthis targeting ships in the Red Sea with data and um and and support. technical support. Um, also the Chinese, a Chinese satellite company, and this is all according to US officials, a Chinese company linked to the Chinese army has helped the Houthis target US warships and Red Sea shipping in the past. These also very important and and US treasury documented that procurement of weapons, including parts, uh, dual components and and parts that are that are used to build drones and missiles, have been procured from China and Russia to the Houthis. And also the two countries have supported the Houthis diplomatically at the UN. Both countries abstain from condemning Houthi Red Sea attacks. So, There is a relationship and it's evolving. And as you said, sir, this relationship is for the purpose of increasing Russia and Chinese influence in the region at the expense of the United States.

And and I uh, in particularly very sophisticated underwater sea drones, uh, that the Luthis could not have developed themselves. Also in the past couple of months, I'm very grateful that we've been able to see Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia unify the pro-government uh Yemeni forces into a cohesive force, which is the first time, and may provide opportunity for extending uh ground victory against the run back uh Houthi's uh forces. Um, Saudi Arabia, uh, we should always appreciate was successful helping President al-Shara of Syria remove the Assad dictatorship, where Assad uh fled to Moscow after a fifty-four year bath in socialist dictatorship. With that in mind, uh, uh, Al- Ms. Aldis, sorry, in your testimony you mentioned uh the training and equipment of your mining forces. How can you, United States, ass- assist Saudi Arabia to help train?

Yes, absolutely, sir. We do need to work with Saudi Arabia because it is Yemen's main security partner and the country with with more influence on all the forces on the ground. And there has been, my my colleague here mentioned that the government has been forces have been divided and that's true. But over the past eight months there has been a noticeable improvement in coordination among these forces and also a more unified command structure. So we have to acknowledge that. Um and so working with Saudi Arabia is very important because it's on the ground, it's working with the Yemeni government, it uh it is also in the best position to help unify these forces using its leverage, but also beyond that Saudi Arabia is in the best position to help reconstruct Yemen after the war.

And hey, this this is so mutually beneficial, the Saudi Arabia

Absolutely.

Thank you very much for your uh uh yield back.

Absolutely.

Thank you. I now recognize uh Representative Schneider from Illinois for five minutes.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and I want to thank the witnesses for joining us and sharing your perspectives. Um, as we've heard, the Houthis have a complex and long embedded insurgency in Yemen that the United States with support of our allies have failed to rein in. I appreciate a witness's perspective that this is not a war. I also appreciate that the war in Yemen and its consequences have profound effect on US allies and US interests in the region as well as here at home. Over the last ten years, the Houthis have continued to target and attack civilians and align themselves with other terrorist proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah. The Houthis' support, Houthis' support for Hamas throughout the war in Gaza and direct strikes on Israel and Israeli shipping vessels has raised the group's profile as a violent dangerous group that will continue to commit atrocities until they are stopped. The United States and our allies must continue to take action by using enhanced defensive capabilities, economic sanctions, and diplomacy to deter the Houthis' malign activities and de-escalate threats to civilians and the regional and global economies. It is also important that the Trump administration maintain the foreign terrorist organization designation and to engage Congress as re- as required by the War Powers Resolution and other statutes with with respect to current and future authorities, actions and goals. I remain deeply concerned with this administration's decision to go to war with Iran without consulting Congress, and apparently without a coherent set of goals or strategy, and its failure to share critical and timely information about the administration's plans for civilians in the region. The Houthi's capabilities and their threats, from closing the shipping lanes at Bab al-Mandab to supporting proxies in the region, and even around the world, are something we have to take seriously. What strikes me as I I'm listening to two of you is this concern of how do we close in on the Houthis' capacities without ending up with an open-ended war? And that is the challenge. And I think what we need to achieve are common goals with our allies, an understanding what the threats are and how we address them and end them, a unified strategy to achieve those goals, and a sta- a sustained commitment that will allow us to work with our allies to close the assets and resources the Houthis have. Among these are territory, money, people, weapons, and know-how. So my question for the two of you is how do we balance not having an open-ended war, Miss Minor, as you uh clearly stated, with, as you said, uh Miss Al- uh Al-Asari, making sure the Houthis can continue to expand their their reach, their capacities, their capabilities, and consequently the threat they pose to the US and our allies.

Thank you very much, Representative Schneider. I I couldn't agree more on the need for sustained engagement and a unifying strategy. And those are unfortunately things that we have not seen throughout the decade of this conflict. I think we s- we made some progress in twenty twenty one, twenty twenty two towards this goal, and it resulted in the UN truce. But I think the US and the Saudi approach to that, that truce can be rightfully criticized as focusing on pausing the conflict not on resolving the conflict. So I think we need to to take that unified strategy and try to craft a durable political resolution to the conflict. Again, this is not simply conceding to Houthi demands. It is providing a viable negotiated settlement that can contain Houthi threats while addressing the governance issues that have been fueling this Houthi threat for over a decade. And I think that in terms of uh avoiding an open-ended conflict, it is active US engagement, it is not outsourcing

Ms. Al-Asari.

Yes, um. So what we need to do, again, same, keep the FTO designations, sanctions, protect Red Sea shipping, but as my colleague said before, this is not the United States' war and it shouldn't be, which is why the United States need to help its regional allies and its ally, which is the Yemeni government, to take on this threat. But they do need our support. We need to work with the Yemeni government. We need to provide them with the necessary military and economic and political support in order to be able to take on the Houthis on their own. Long term. That's the only way to do it. There is no other substitute.

And my last question with the twenty seconds I I have remaining. Who within the administration has the understanding, the appreciation, and the voice to speak of what we need to do? Miss Miner?

Unfortunately, the Trump administration made the decision to get rid of their Yemen special envoy who I think would have been best placed to be leading on this file.

Miss Aldosari?

I agree.

Sadly, I knew the answer before I asked the question, but we need that voice and we needed expertise in the administration and we need it now. I yield back.

Now recognize Representative Kane for five minutes.

Thank you, uh, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here today. As we remember the twenty-fifth anniversary of nine eleven this month, I want to take a moment to honor the victims of the nine eleven terrorist attacks. September eleventh, two thousand and one is a day etched into our memory, a day that forever changed the nation and the world. We will never forget. Through our grief, through our grief, we are reminded of the courage and the resilience that defines us as Americans. Remember the f- brave first responders who rushed towards danger, the firefighters, the police officers, and the EMTs who selflessly put their lives on the line to save others. As Congress remembers this senseless act of terror, we must also act to ensure that terrorism never again reaches our shores or impacts American safety at home and abroad. Houthi terrorism in the Middle East represents one of the ongoing terrorist threats in the Middle East. and must be addressed. Miss Al- uh, Darussari, as the Houthis continue to consolidate power, their position as a regional influence continues to grow beyond their existing ties to Iran. How can the Abraham Accords and other US alliances in the region serve as a check on the expansion of Houthi power?

Yeah.

How can the Abraham Accords and other US alliances in the region serve as a check on the expansion of Houthi power.

I cannot speak to the Abraham Accords in that context, but I can speak to US allies.

And so if, then I'll ask in this way, as the Houthi capabilities expand, what are the primary areas that Congress should focus on to counter uh counter Houthi influence in the region?

The Congress should focus on supporting Yemeni government, working with allies to support the Yemeni government militarily, politically and economically. I would like to see, for example, humanitarian assistance resume to Yemen, because humanitarian crisis, hunger makes people more vulnerable to Houthi recruitment. So, as a immediate measure, we could do that. But at the same time, we need to think long-term. We need to work with our allies to contain the Houthi threat within Yemen.

Thank you. Ms. Meijer, the Houthis have long been a source of instability in the Middle East, particularly, as you noted in your testimony, they have been a threat to shipping corridors in the region. Can you dis- please discuss the impact of current Houthi efforts, uh, to impact shipping corridors entering the Red Sea?

I think it's important to look back at Houthi, uh, efforts starting in twenty twenty-three against,

Yeah.

uh, Red Sea shipping and Really, this served as a playbook that Iran has now used in it with its actions in the Strait of Hormuz. So we can take the Houthi actions in twenty twenty-three as as a precedent that could have consequences far outside of the Middle East, and on maritime choke points globally. Um, we are s- we have seen about a a fifty to sixty percent reduction in Red Sea traffic consistently since the Houthi's twenty twenty-three campaign, that never resumed, precisely because even if the the attacks paused, Commercial companies and insurance uh vendors were not confident that the attacks would not resume which which bore fruit with their their latest blockade announced in July I think until we have a durable resolution to this threat, we will continue to see a disruption to commerce that has immediate e- impacts on global energy markets and long-term consequences for freedom of navigation globally.

And what steps can Congress take as a follow-up

I

to protect the American shipping against terrorist disruptions in the region?

Again, I think until we get a durable settlement to the conflict that contains the Houthis that threat will remain. So I would call on Congress to call on the administration to articulate its strategy with regional allies for providing a durable resolution to the Yemen conflict. I would call on the administration to reappoint a Yemen special envoy, and I would encourage the resumption of humanitarian assistance to Yemen government controlled areas. Title two, US food assistance alone, could go far in meeting many of the needs. only half of which are being currently met in government-controlled areas, and while doing so also benefit U. S. farmers.

Thank you. You're back.

And I'll recognize Representative Keating for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Uh, Ms. Miner, just following up on what you said in terms of the Red Sea and the impact on global energy and gas prices here at home, um, is it, uh, not the case that the, closure and and the limitation on the Strait of Hormuz has given uh the Houthis even more leverage than before. Is that the case?

It is.

So they uh as a result of that, would you say uh inherent in that question was that the Strait of Hormuz is now open and operating uh and it's in extremely good shape? Is that a fair statement?

Unfortunately it's not.

Do you know who made that statement?

Uh, I believe President Trump.

President Trump made that statement, that's correct. So, President Trump, through his actions uh and the war of his choice, has acted so that the Strait of Hommous, which was open before then and is now uh effectively closed, has given the Houthis more leverage and more influence as a result of his actions. Is that correct?

That's correct.

Is it also correct that in in our engagement with the Houthis uh militarily, the UK uh assisted in some of those actions and participated?

It is.

So uh it's not true that our European allies uh have not done anything to help the US in this endeavor. Is that a fact?

That's fair.

Who has said that uh the the that our allies in Europe are doing nothing to help?

I believe that was also President Trump.

I believe you're correct with that as well. I wanna get into the, uh, follow-up on another issue, uh, as well. Uh, and that's, uh, an important one that, that was just touched upon. So, what is the current state of the US diplomatic corps, uh, in Yemen and in the region?

Unfortunately, the United States does not have an ambassador appointed to Yemen, to Saudi Arabia, or to the UAE, the countries that are most important to resolving the conflict.

So, who's home?

We have career diplomats in place as charge d'affaires, but unfortunately it's not sufficient for the kind of sustained high level.

Right, who's who's making those uh uh who's making those kind of who's filling that void or trying to fill that void?

I think you have caretaker career diplomatic staff in place, but

But who uh who's directly involved in negotiations in the region? Is it Jared Kushner?

I think there are a handful of of envoys this administration has appointed for a a series of global conflicts. I don't think they have the bandwidth currently for Yemen.

They don't have the bandwidth, so indeed they're not effective in that area. And and that's a huge void, and that's hurting us as well, because I can't agree more that uh, you know, this solution in this region will have to be done diplomatically. How about some of our other leverage that we had in terms of USAIAID, and some of the pullbacks in that area and the cuts in that area, how has that helped our leverage or hurt our leverage in this region?

The closure of US aid in Yemen has only hurt Yemeni civilians, including those in government-controlled areas, and hurt the Yemen government.

And who'd made that decision to do that?

That was President Trump.

That was President Trump as well. So, when we look at what's happening here, and we're having this hearing on the threat of the Houthis, which we all agree i- is uh one that is becoming greater and greater and greater, uh, and we look at the effect on our other partners in the Gulf and what that does to them, And we look at what partners that we've had uh in Europe and other countries, especially UK, and the way they've been uh rebuffed uh by the US, even though they were engaged before. Uh, this to me, one person that's so solely responsible uh for such a downturn uh in our economy, uh upturn in gas prices and retail prices and cost of living prices, uh our projection of power in the region has now been reduced? And that was the person that you answered to all those questions, none other than President Donald Trump is responsible for this mess. I yield back.

I now recognize Representative Burchett for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, um, Chairman Moskowitz and, uh, Chairman Quatsi-Muthumi. He's technically not a chairman, but I like him better than you two, so I'm just gonna recognize him just as well. Um, Miss Aldosari, how have recent hoody attacks on American ships affected our economy? If you don't, no, that's fine.

Yes, I don't have the figures on me, but I know it it came at a great cost to the international economy, not just the US.

K, do you think it's possible for the US to stop the flow of weapons to the Houthis?

It can help with that, yes.

What can United States do differently to ensure our ships can take the safest routes through the Red Sea?

As I said before, sir, the United States has to work with its allies in the region, in particular Saudi Arabia, to empower the Yemeni government, militarily and economically, in order to take on the Houthi threat and take territory away from the Houthis. in order to create room for serious diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.

OK. How can the US petition countries in the region to invest more military resources in combating the hoodies? And do you think it we need to do militarily, or do you think it needs to be economically, or a combination thereof?

It's a combination of of economi- militarily, economically, and politically.

How can we, I guess, force our friends to help us in this endeavor?

friends as in regional allies?

Yes, ma'am.

Well, Saudi Arabia is already working with the Yemeni government, so work with Saudi Arabia to support the process now of uniting the forces and arming and equipping and training them in order to take territory from the Houthis.

What do you feel like our long-term strategy would be to deal with this issue?

Long-term strategy should be containing the Houthis, take territory, help the government take territory from the Houthis, and then As my, my colleague said, that should be part of a road map that in- involves ending the conflict in Yemen and then reconstruction beyond that.

OK. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, and now recognize Representative Sherman for five minutes.

Ms. Minor, uh um How many troops do the Houthi have? How many does the um Government of uh Yemen have?

Yemen is not a great information environment. The Houthis claim they have around a million troops, I think maybe half of that or a third of that. And uh the Yemen government I think is several hundred thousand troops is what they claim.

Those are bad. How well armed are uh is the, are the government troops?

The government troops have been trained and equipped by the Saudi-led coalition, for years. Um. There have been recent improvements in governance, but unfortunately the Yemen government has not proven capable of significantly retaking territory from yet from the Houthis for some time.

In spite of the fact that they do, they could control the air, either the Saudi Air Force or or ourselves, uh they still haven't been able to take territory. Correct?

There have been some battlefield wins, but nothing significant since twenty eighteen.

So how many troops did the Southern Transition Council have before they uh uh faded away?

So I've heard that there are roughly eighty thousand troops affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council and and their partners, but I will say that the Southern Transitional Council has not faded away. Uh,

Hmm.

they were officially dissolved,

As

but their their supporters still remain inside southern Yemen.

Has the uh Yemeni government uh uh legal government uh entered in negotiations with them and are they willing to uh provide the south with a kind of uh autonomy that would lead to a an understanding between these two anti-Houthi forces?

There was supposed to be a southern dialogue sponsored by Saudi Arabia, but I understand that it's currently on pause.

That isn't helpful. Um, we know of the uh food insecurity of the Yemeni people. What doesn't get near as n- enough attention is what the Houthis have done to all of the uh poorest countries in the Indian Ocean area. Um Russia and Ukraine are both major exporters of grain. That grain needs to go through the Suez Canal. But instead it can't. It's going around South Africa, as reported recently by the uh uh New York Times. And uh the UN released a statement uh stating that uh uh Houthi attacks on shipping are having uh an effect on global food prices, squeezing the global food system especially hard. higher prices, deepening hunger. Uh, it's not as acute. We don't see starvation. What we see is people who are very poor, who used to be able to afford three meals a day, are now living on two meals a day, thanks to the Houthi. What can we do to make the uh Houthi responsible in the eyes of the world? Well, for hungry people and increased disease in the poorest country in the Indian Ocean area.

I think it's a tough question. I think that the Houthis are not going to become more responsible clear and forcible measures to contain the threat that they pose to Yemenis and globally. I think as we talk about food insecurity, it's also important that we acknowledge the Houthis are currently detaining seventy-three UN staff,

Mm-hmm.

ten current US staff.

And then blaming the United States for the fact that people aren't fe- uh fed, while uh stealing money and imprisoning people uh who are trying to feed them. Um, it Are ships allowed to go from Iran uh to the Houthi controlled areas without US inspection?

They're technically not allowed to, but it's still happening, and this is the problem.

So somehow our US Navy misses these cargo craft going hundreds of miles.

These are big waterways and Shepard, the shadow fleet, use a series of practices, turning off their identification systems, transhipment at major ports like Djibouti.

Have we blockaded the Houthi ports to make sure that no ship goes in that we don't approve.

There's been a Saudi enforced embargo of Houthi controlled ports for over a decade.

Yet somehow ships get into the port uninspected from Iran?

It's a very long coastline in an area where smugglers have been operating for centuries.

Um, buy you a buck.

And now rep uh recognize representative Zinke for five minutes.

Uh first, uh I've heard many times, a war at choice. This is not a war at choice for United States. This is a war at choice for Iran. I've talked to almost every ambassador in the region, and we all are unified on these fronts. No nuclear weapons for Iran. No nuclear material. No arsenal destruction and the straits.

I'm not sh- uh sure of the current number in the Red Sea. I can say that we have multiple battles that we're fighting simultaneously. It leaves far fewer hostiles.

Well, how many how many NATO, how many European ships warships are in the persian gulf and yemen my esteemed colleague mentioned that perhaps there is frequent traffic between iran and yemen and yet we don't have any help from european allies whatsoever but they did say they would deploy their ships once the shooting stopped

they did

so i think president trump is in fact correct shifting gears let's talk about the hoodies and the chain of command. Uh, and thank you for your service and you have distinguished career in things. Uh, the seems to me that Iran has a distributed chain of command now in the Republican Guard. It's very difficult target when it doesn't seem to be one head. What's the, what's the chain of command in the structure of the Houthis, both militarily and politically? Do we know who's in charge?

We have some understanding.

But who's in charge? I mean, is there a name involved? Is there, and who is who is that both politically and militarily?

Mm.

And the military side, what's the balance? power. Is it politically more, you know, uh, is is that he's calling the shots or is it their military or both?

Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, uh, the Houthi leader, is calling the shots. I would say the military and intelligence components of the Houthi apparatus are are far more powerful than the political components.

And who is in charge of the military?

The military ultimately, again, military decisions are made by Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, but there are senior members of of his family and of his network who who retain, sir, uh, senior positions.

Had they been targeted?

Israel did target much of the Houthi leadership and, uh, they did, uh, kill some senior Houthi military leaders, but the Houthis have proven, again, they they grew up again in a, uh, an environment of war and including an, uh, an aggressive Saudi air campaign. So they have employed, uh, extensive measures to make their leadership resilient against the kind of strikes that uh the US, Israel or our other partners can conduct.

Has Saudi targeted them?

There have been uh uh targets killing senior Houthi political figures from the Saudi-led coalition in the past, yes.

On the maritime interdiction side, um very difficult because many vessels look very deceiving, small, small vessels can carry. So is is there an analysis of what it would take as far as a uh, a blockade of of merit? What that what that constru what that configuration would look like?

Again, there has been a complex embargo backed by a UN monitoring mechanism in Saudi warships for over a decade that has not proven effective at containing Houthi weapons flows. It was during that period that they transformed from a local militia to a sophisticated military force capable of striking the whole region. The best solution are the Yemeni officials on the ground that are best adapted to these various smuggling routes, as the Houthis shift their tactics, um, and to get weapons flows in. And I think we've seen real results from those officials with four major interdictions in the past year, including one, one of the largest interdictions in in Yemen's history with seven hundred and fifty tons of ma- of uh weapons material. So I think we need to be increasing our support to the Yemeni Coast Guard and, and other relevant bodies to crack down on, on the interdictions at the source.

So you would concentrate on the maritime interdiction side by giving coastal patrols intelligence uh to the Yemen officials?

Yes, and and focusing on on Yemeni territory itself. We've seen the Houthis shift when maritime routes are blocked off, they shift over land. So, again, this is a a very adaptable group. We can't deploy an old playbook to a group that is always three steps ahead of us.

And how is our friends and allied uh Omanians? Uh, are we supplying them with with what they need, because they they seem to share a very long border with Yemen.

So the Omanis have served as a mediator in negotiations. Uh, they host the Houthi spokesperson, who has been their lead negotiator in the past. Um, they also have their own incentives to keep the border with Yemen secure. Um, I think that they certainly could be doing more in that front. Um, but their primary role in the past has been one of a mediator.

The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize representative Mfiume for five minutes.

Thank you very much, uh, Mr. Chairman. Miss Adesari and Miss Miner, thank you both for being here. I wanna appreciate and publicly thank you for your testimony, but more importantly the work that both of you do, which does not get heralded often enough, in my opinion. I wanna ask a couple of questions, and I'd like very much to, uh, um, put forth a couple of suggestions. And then I'd like to end up with talking about the balance of power between the uh Houthis and the Republic of Yemen um and how the United States might be able to more effectively cooperate with the Republic to be able to bolster uh their military capacity but more importantly uh to strengthen them against the Houthis um I I'm gonna as I said before, bring up this subject of food insecurity. As you know, the United States has effectively ended all Title Two food for peace assistance to Yemen. Twenty-two million people are affected that by that, morning, noon, and night. Five million are internally displaced, and another eighteen million face acute food security, meaning they're dying as we speak. And they are not all adults, many are children, and it seems to me that with all that we've been talking about, this is a tragedy that the world is not paying attention to. And it calls, I think, upon the United States to figure out the best way to go forward instead of doing what we have been doing and not really succeeding. We should be, I think, trying to gain influence in the area. Would you agree with that?

I would.

And would you agree that that influence ought to be uh, economic and political support for the people and the government that's pushing back against the Houthis?

I agree that that's critical.

And would you agree that it was not the best thing in the world to fire the special envoy from the United States?

I would certainly agree with that.

OK. In an increasingly multipolar world, our adversaries continue to exploit every opportunity, like the ones I just mentioned, to be able to sow chaos and to do that by reducing US influence. Instead of withdrawing from the world stage and withdrawing by destroying federal assistance programs, would you agree that the administration should thoughtfully and carefully engage with our partners and allies in the region, to protect our national and economic security.

I fully agree.

In your testimony, you reference several incidents in which China and Russia have directly or in some instances indirectly helped the Houthis by shutting down shipping in the Red Sea. These have included Russian logistical support for Houthi operations and Chinese companies allowing the Houthis to use their satellite imagery to target commercial ships. Would you agree that it is clearly the design and the goal of both of those nations to gain more influence in that area and in Yemen?

It is.

I agree.

And would you agree that their efforts further not only stab- de-stabilize the region but put in some instances our military at risk?

I agree, I agree.

OK. I I think for me at least. The economic aspect of this is is just unbelievable. I can't speak for my colleagues here, but my constituents that I represent cannot continue to find themselves suffering under skyrocketing inflation rates since the beginning of the war in Iran, and certainly don't need another war here in Yemen. And they can't afford another Middle East conflict. that drives prices even further up. So the question becomes, is there a way out of this? And if so, I think the first part of that question has to be who has the upper hand? What is the current balance of power, if you will, between the Houthis and the Republic of Yemen?

Well, the Houthis have much more capabilities because they spent the entire decade building those capabilities, particularly after the twenty-two truce. Twenty-two truce was supposed, you know, was supposed to go to a road map, political settlement, but the Houthis did not engage in that process, and instead they continued to rebuild their capabilities. They they struck government ports, depriving the government of seventy percent of its revenues, and then they escalated in the Red Sea. So, the solution for this, because we don't want to to be plunged into endless war in the Middle East.

Mm-hmm.

We'd but we'd we do need to help our allies on the ground to take on this threat long term. And we can do that by working with our allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government, to contain the Houthi threat.

Well

We need to provide the

Saudi Arabia ought to do more in my opinion.

They do, they do.

They've got the power, they've got the influence,

Absolutely.

and they don't have thirty million of their people starving today.

Absolutely, I completely agree with you. But they need our support. It doesn't have to be financial.

Mm-hmm.

They need our military s- the Yemeni government need our military support. They need our guidance. They need intelligence. They need training. They need mentoring. All of the above.

Thank you. My my time has expired.

The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize Representative Issa for five minutes.

Thank you, Chairman. I'm gonna follow up on the gentleman from Maryland and and sort of asked the first question, uh, we don't need another war, he said. Aren't we at a war when in fact missiles are being fired, people are dying, and international trade is being interrupted by the Houthis. So, just like Iran, was there a war? Just like Ukraine, was there a war? I'm gonna ask both of you a question is, have we been at war in that region including the Houthis, the Iranians, and I'll skip over Ukraine, going back anywhere from nineteen seventy nine to nineteen to twenty fourteen, take your pick. Are those valid questions that in fact there i- there may be a difference in the escalation de-escalation the techniques. But do you either of you uh disagree with the premise that we have been at a war? Call it a a slow burn war, but a war in all of those regions.

I agree. And I think what we need to do is reflect on why we are at war. I can talk about the Houthis, why we are at war with the Houthis right now.

OK, and I'll get back, uh, to that. I've I've I've had the luxury of visiting Yemen

OK.

back when it was under a a dictator that kept it stable. Uh, Jews in Yemen were business people. It was a different era. Um, but I'd and I'd love to get back to that a l- longer. Let me follow up with this question. Presuming that we have been in conflict in these areas. And I'll take particularly the last statement that came out between you and uh, my colleague from Maryland. Twenty twenty-two, prior to that time, the Jo- Jordanians and others in assistance with the Saudis leading, were fighting the Houthis. Wasn't there in fact an effort to bring the Houthis activity in that region to an end, prior to the United States telling Saudi Arabia to back off? Is that a fair statement historically?

Can Sir, so the Yemeni the That's partially true. Um, the Yemeni government was forced to remain on the offensive since the Stockholm agreement in twenty eighteen, when the Yemeni government tried to retake Hodeidah seaport from the Houthis, and then thank you to pressure from the international community and the United States. Well, that operation was halted and the Houthis kept the port. And that's five years later, they threatened international shipping. And that's what,

OK, so

that's why we're, we're,

Right, and so picking up on that,

the Houthis are.

we have a problem with Iran that is similar to the Houthis or Houthis similar to Iran and I'll take Hezbollah, and throw them in. These are Shia entities who want to dominate control of their country and the region. They have historically gotten their money from Iranian oil. Iran is shifting, if it can, to revenue from essentially tolling international waterways. Yemen is trying to toll international uh uh waterways. Hezbollah is finding additional, including drug sale, ways to find revenues. As we look at this problem as the foreign affairs committee, isn't it really a situation in which yes, kinetic power probably needs to continue to be used in all areas, yes, we need to unleash uh Saudi Arabia and this time assure them that we're not gonna bow to international pressure, if in fact they are diminishing the Houthis' military capability. But whether it's one strait, another strait, you know, uh up toward the Sinai, obviously the Suez Canal, or the sea uh the the uh the China Straits as it's known, where China is trying to take over that waterway and effectively toll it. Isn't one of the things this committee has to look for above the fray of each of these conflicts is do we have a policy of eliminating or deterring any uh lack of freedom of international travel as it historically, at least post-World War Two, has been done, where it has been toll-free over international waters and only tolled, for example, at the Suez when appropriate for a canal. Isn't that something that we have to focus on, that in fact each of these conflicts, including probably kinetically and in other ways defeating the Houthis, but isn't the real goal to make sure that no country and no region thinks that they can apply a toll to international waterways?

Yes, sir.

I didn't, haven't let you answer a question yet, so please.

I would ag- I would agree, we do need to protect the freedom of navigation, I think that's why the US needs to mount this sort of sustained, credible US strategy with allies in the region to end the Yemen conflict.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to make the point that I hope this committee will take into the future that since Thomas Jefferson this committee and our Congress and our government has looked at international right of waterways, as an essential part of our international policy, and I yield back.

Thank you to the representative from California, and I recognize representative Wasserman Schultz for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and uh first I wanna wish a hearty mazel tof to my colleague and friend from Florida, my next door neighbor, Jared Moskowitz, on his uh assumption of the role of ranking member. Well deserved, and I look forward to the great job that you're gonna continue to do. It is important for Americans to understand scale of the crisis in Yemen and we've gotten a chance to really uh scratch the surface here this morning. Um and also how this administration's policy choices have made it even worse. Yemen is not a tiny country. It has a population bigger than California, nearly forty-two million people, the majority of whom live in crushing poverty. Under the grip of terrorist rulers, this is on top of being following a civil war. And the number of people in emergency need of a humanitarian assistance is equal to Florida's population, which is half the country, twenty-one, twenty-two million people and growing rapidly. This is an unparalleled humanitarian disaster, and since coming into office, President Trump has only made it worse. Trump's devastating assault on foreign assistance has cut food aid to Yemen by more than sixty percent, more than doubling the number of starving women and children going without help. The elimination of USAID wiped out more than four hundred and fifty health clinics, while Yemen experiences large-scale outbreaks of cholera, measles, dengue, and polio. In the meantime, the State Department has withheld billions in congressionally authorized funds for vaccines and medications that cost pennies per life saved and could have prevented these diseases from taking hold. Ms. Miner, Secretary Rubio insisted that the destruction and dismantling of USAID would not impact "life-saving assistance". Has that been true in the case of Yemen, yes or no?

No.

And are people who are desperate for food, medicine, and any form of income more or less likely to join up with the Houthis or one of the other dangerous organizations in Yemen?

They are more likely.

These cruel cuts to desperately needed humanitarian aid certainly cost Yemeni lives, and they may well cost American lives too. And for what? Cutting aid hasn't saved Americans a dollar. In fact, the Trump administration spent more money bombing the Houthis for two months, which accomplished absolutely nothing, than the cost of a full year of assistance to Yemeni people. Instead of saving Yemeni lives, Trump spent that money killing no less than a hundred and fifty-three civilians, including at least eighty in a single bombing on a civilian fuel storage facility. Ms. Miner, I believe these aid cuts have only empowered Houthi terrorist rule and further undermined the legitimate government of Yemen and now the Houthis are emboldened by Trump's strategic failure in Iran and loss of the Strait of Hormuz. How will their threats to shutdown shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb impact the price of gas and other costs for Americans?

I think you're right about the impacts of USAID in in in boldening the Houthis, and I think that we are seeing with the escalation in Yemen and the Houthis' actions, further ripple effects of the war in Iran that we're only beginning to understand, and that will continue to drive up prices for Americans at the gas pump and more broadly.

In a moment when America's cost of living crisis is spinning out of control, as Trump's quote "short-term excursion turns into a months-long quagmire", my constituents, our constituents cannot afford another strategic disaster. We certainly don't wanna see an expansion of this war in the Middle East. So what's the solution? How can we clean up the mess that Trump and Haegsteth have made in the Gulf region, stop the economic damage, and engage productively to mitigate the Houthi threat? And I'll give you the rest of the time to respond. Thank you, Ms. Meyner.

I think it's it starts with stop vas- stopping vacillating between costly military engagement and disengagement in Yemen. We need the kind of sustained US strategy with our regional partners to actually bring the conflict to a durable resolution. I wanna go back to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen briefly and stress that we don't even know how bad the crisis is in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen because of the Houthis' detention of UN and US staff. most aid workers have had to stop operations, including data collection. So, the, it, there could be famine in northern Yemen right now and we just would not know it. I think the detention of that UN staff also has consequences for the international order for the UN's ability to operate in difficult environments and that's something that the US needs to care about and we need to be speaking about those detained staff and making sure that it's a priority as we seek a durable resolution to the conflict.

Mister Chairman, I think Yemen is an example of where the withdrawal of our soft power that we express as a country uh with instead the imposition of hard power that has done nothing but made things worse is an example of what a tragic mistake the shutting down of USAID was and that we are absolutely going to have to make sure we reassert reassert our soft power to help make a difference to protect our national security. Thank you both for your service and I yield back.

And I'll recognize Representative Jackson for five minutes.

Uh, thank you, Mister Chairman, and uh thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Uh, as we've been discussing, the Red Sea remains a vital artery for global commerce and a critical passage for energy and goods and an important part of the international maritime system. When terrorists like the Iranian Bakouthis threaten this important waterway, they threaten American economic and national security interest. Thankfully, President Trump has made it clear that attacks on American personnel, American ships, and American e- economic interest will be met with major significant military consequences. The Houthis terrorist organization has made it clear that they're willing to use missiles drones and and other weapons to attack commercial shipping and threaten American forces but they haven't stopped at the Bob Elman Dob Miss Al D- Al D- sorry, excuse me, uh as you mentioned the Houthis are building human networks across the Horn of Africa. From recruiting African migrants to collaborating with Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Houthis' growing collaboration to Al Qaeda affiliates extends far beyond the Red Sea and the current conflict. I personally believe that one of the uh the most disturbing things that's happening right now in the uh environment or the community of violent extremist organizations, VEOs, is the collaboration between the Houthis and Al Shabaab, and the potential to export that terror throughout the continent of Africa to other Al Shabaab, I'm sorry, other Al Qaeda affiliates. Uh, can you tell me what you what you what you think about this this evolving threat? Is it as serious as as I'm stating? And can you tell me what you think we should be doing, uh, to prevent this collaboration between, uh, Al Shabaab and the Houthis? And, uh, and we should, and it extends a little bit beyond, uh, uh, the Houthis per se, but what should we be doing in Somalia right now to stop that as well?

Yes, this threat is evolving and it's serious and we should see it as such. The Houthis have been collaborating with Al Shabaab. They have provided the terrorist group with training, including on drone adaptation, weapons maintenance and and manufacturing of IEDs. At least four hundred Al Shabaab members have come to Yemen where they were trained by the Houthis in ideology but also military training. Houthi operatives have traveled to Somalia and trained there as well, and the Houthis are trying also to establish operational presence in Somalia. They're now present in Puntland and Somaliland and Jilib, which is the the command center of um of Al Shabaab. Both organizations have discussed collaboration against the US, but also international shipping and Gulf allies as well. Um So, again, this relationship is evolving. And we have seen some evidence that these two organizations are also working together to disrupt uh red sea shipping. Uh there's al- there's also been reporting that the two groups have agreed, well the Houthis have agreed with Al Shabaab that Al Shabaab would work with Somali pirates to also

Right because the the obviously the the Houthis would like to get uh continue their relationship with Al Shabaab but then they control both sides of the strait to some extent,

Yes,

right?

so yes, so they you know, bi- big picture strategically what the Houthis are looking at, now they they can launch attacks across the Bab al-Mandab and the red sea. But with Al Shabaab they can also disrupt the Indian Ocean.

In uh

And and what we need to do in order to contain that threat is work with governments in those countries to help counter these threats from Al Shabaab, but also from the Houthis.

But you think that we need to, we need to pick up our support for uh the uh Somali government as well in their fight against Al Shabaab because it will ultimately help us in this fight against the Houthis?

Yes, we do, but we do need, but the Houthis are the main actors. So according to the UN, the Houthis

Right.

are now the main act the main they they're in control of smuggling networks, uh along with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula. The Houthis are the actor in charge, OK, of this relationship, so what we need to do is deny the Houthis access to Somalia, and we can deny the Houthis access to Somalia by supporting the Yemeni government to push the Houthis.

And if we if if we if we continue our our our efforts against Iran, then uh it's gonna be very difficult for the Houthis to maintain the resources that they need, without Iranian support uh to uh to work with al-Shabaab and to export uh this terror into other areas of Africa. Would you agree?

To some extent, yes. But the Houthis have developed their own sources, their own network. Now they can

But they are still getting some significant support from Iran,

They, yes, they do, and

correct? Weapons systems, missiles, things of that nature?

Yes, yes, they do. They also have military expertise on the ground, helping them with with expansion across the Horn of Africa, Red Sea attacks, and also against the United States, yes.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

And now recognize Representative Costa for five minutes.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, uh members of the committee. Um How many uh ambassadorships within the Gulf States have we filled in terms of posts um today to this time, up two years into this administration?

I believe we currently have an ambassador serving in Oman,

So it is ten or twelve uh ambassadorships that we have not appointed?

That's correct.

Well, you know, it it it tells me a lot about what this administration is trying to do in terms of um this war in Iran that um still to this time has has has not proven to be any of the successes that president has claimed over the last six months in terms of the competing goals um would you would you say that yemen today is among the list of um countries in that part of the world that we could characterize as a failed state

i think it is certainly verging on that definition

along with uh syria and you could go on to libya and and sadly um so so how capable are the hooties in replicating in this failed state of Yemen, uh, a Strait of Hormuz fiasco that was a open, uh, international waterway until we decided to, uh, engage in this war in Iran.

I think the Houthis set the model for what Iran has done in the Strait of Hormuz. It's not a matter of replicating it, but they are certainly expanding it.

That was standing our, our previous attacks, uh, there, um, among the Houthis. What weapons do they now have and are capable of coordinating with other Isla Islamic Revolutionary Guard um since the war in Iran's begun.

The Houthis have an arsenal ri- rivaling many states. They have ballistic and cruise missiles that are capable of going over two thousand kilometers, drones that can go even further than that, anti-ship ballistic missiles,

So are they in US meant they're capable of of blocking uh access to the Red Sea?

it's just They are.

And so depending upon what Saudi Arabia decides to take in military action against the Houthis, uh what role do you see as depending upon what actions take place with the Saudis?

I think our role is supporting the Yemen government through technical assistance and capacity building. I think it's

Not withstanding the failed state uh we're gonna

I said it's verging on that definition. I think that there's important nuance here. You you mentioned Syria. Syria is a case where we are actually seeing the central government take important steps towards stabilizing that country. And I've think we've seen the Yemen government make important strides in our progress.

Do you think we have a red line there, uh, in terms of the Red Sea, um, with regards to US military action against the Houthis?

I'm sorry, what was the question?

Do you think we have established a a clear red line, uh, based on, uh, military action against the Houthis?

No, the Houthis continued their attacks on commercial shipping after the Trump administration declared a ceasefire with them in May twenty twenty five.

How capable are the Yemeni governments, going back to your point, in addressing uh this threat from the Houthis?

I think that they can be made more capable, but this is ultimately why we need a diplomatic solution to the conflict. It is the

Well how are they organized? What weapons do they have?

They have a significant arsenal at plan aga again they've been receiving significant military support from the Saudis and the Emiratis for over a decade now, and and extensive training, and they have made some military gains on the ground. They are a force that is capable of countering the Houthis. It's just they're not capable of delivering a military defeat to the Houthis, and neither are we and neither are the the Saudis.

Oh, and we've tried, and and I mean, unless there was some sort of a significant effort placed with ourselves the Saudis and p- some other partners. I mean, uh, the massive attempt that we've had with Iran has uh, after destroying, as the President likes to say, their navy, their air force, and everything else, They still uh are in for the long haul, clearly, and capable of uh uh limiting access uh through the straight of her mouse, would you not say?

I would. I th I think we've seen an evolution in the nature of military technology and how it benefits these sorts of groups and unless we're willing to put US troops on the ground to for a ground invasion, like

Correct, and we're not willing to do that.

We're not willing.

Uh and we don't have the political support. Let me make one other final point, and you know I I think General Powell a long time ago had had it right, you have to have overwhelming support of the American public, we don't have that. Uh, you have to have an exit strategy, that's clear we don't have an exit strategy. You go in with overwhelming force. We've done that and we saw what what work product's coming. The criticism of our allies not joining us, I think is is really uh fraught with uh a a lot of contradictions. I mean, we didn't bring them into it in the first place, we didn't brief them as previous administrations briefed them, get them to buy in, and then now after we're in this st- prolonged stalemate for six months, we say, oh by the way, would you please come and join us? I mean, friends don't treat friends like that. And it, and it runs contrary to the alliance and the, the uh, efforts that we have engaged in for decades. So this finger pointing and blaming someone else, frankly uh, I think uh, does not respond to the American public and why this war is not popular. Uh, I've exceeded my time.

Gentlemen, this time has expired.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for five minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to the ringing member. Uh, well, Yemen is one of the few countries in the Middle East I've not been to. I've actually wanted to go a couple of times. My my wife has been there several times, uh, quite in Joad- Joad-Santa and S- is it Sukatra is the island off the coast? Uh, sorry.

It's a culture.

Yeah. And, uh, we were actually, uh, wanted to go for our honeymoon, but my wife is from England and we'd gotten the, uh, fiance visa waiting for the green card so she couldn't travel out of the country. So we went to the Oregon coast, which I guess for our purposes is the Yemen of America. But, uh, uh, in any event, I'm, I'm just in your thoughts on, uh, building regional coalitions. It seems to me that, uh, we can't get much good done in, uh, in Yemen without getting Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the same page. And I I know Egypt is largely a basket case uh uh c- economy, but nobody has suffered more from the closure of the strange threads from Egypt. And there has to be something we can get out of Egypt uh for solving this. So, could you I guess and to start this uh I I'd like you to address these two issues, how we get UAE and and Saudi on the same page. And then if I I completely disagree with with this idea that came from some our democratic colleagues that this is an issue of of international aid. Certainly aid uh plays an important role. Look, I studied international development. Uh, this was w- was my background, but I had the opportunity uh to look at counterterrorism operations uh in that part of the world last year and and actually our direct action versus the Houthis last year uh was significant in improving uh the situation so this is not a, a, a, a international aid issue. But uh to begin with, if we had to look back, w- was it, was it the wrong policy to to to pull the Emiratis? uh off of the their offensive uh military uh actions in in the uh in the previous administration in the first trump administration

um did you mean the twenty eighteen or

yes

yes that was a in my opinion that was a fatal mistake and that's what enabled the hoothees to keep the port and then threaten international shipping to the south

and that was largely because out of humanitarian concern And it has caused the issue to fester in in a worse situation today.

I'm sorry?

And it's caused a worse situation today.

Absolutely.

And Allison, what do you think about twenty eighteen? Was that the the wrong call to to pull the the Emiratis out?

It was, sorry.

I think at the time I had my own reservations about the military viability of the strategy of both taking and holding Hodeidah.

OK, but in hindsight.

And it's I'm sorry?

Not at the time, in hindsight. Was it a mistake?

At the Uh, in hindsight, I think if it had been part of a coherent political strategy, it could have been an effective tactic in that strategy, but that strategy did not exist. At that time, the coalition still had maximalist expectations of completely militarily defeating the Houthis that were unrealistic.

And what do we do today to get the Emiratis and the Saudis on the same page on this issue?

I think it goes, you have to have a serious conversation with them about the desired end state. That's what's been missing since the coalition can pain began in twenty fifteen. I agree that the the Yemen government has been stronger since the Saudis have have increased support and reforms within the government, but until you address that underlying issue within the coalition and within the Yemen government you're going to continue to see these fissures grow, and only the United States can provide that kind of leadership and convening power to bring our our regional partners together on this issue.

And what is what is the difference in uh if you wanna take a shipment of oil uh from the Gulf, presuming you can get through, uh through the red sea or around africa what is the difference in in cost in time of those two uh pathways

i believe it adds additional two weeks and then the costs are enormous in fuel and then also opportunity cost and availability of of ships and especially at a time when when we're uh we're seeing this proliferation of alternative routes

do you wanna say anything about the saudis and the ambratis yeah

oh uh

yeah i agree with with what allison said i think we need us leadership here and for the us to with its allies and also the Yemeni government to sort differences and see what we can do together to address the Houthi threat.

And and what are reasonable expectations for the US to place on Egypt, uh, given our our our uh financial a assistance to Egypt and otherwise involvement with them with this problem?

I think, as you mentioned, the stakes are high for Egypt, it definitely suffered a lot, um, and I think Egypt should be also part of that conversation.

Anything more than having a conversation with the Egyptians?

I I don't know.

No. Thank you, Mister Chair. You're back.

Thank you. I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask uh you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length limitations. with that objection the committee stands adjourned