Hearings to examine arms control and transforming international security functions at the State

United States Senate uh Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. Uh this morning we have an interesting uh agenda, and before we do we wanna welcome all our guests, the public. Uh we're glad to have you always. Uh we do have a zero tolerance policy for interruptions or attempt to communicate, but uh other than that uh we're glad to have you, glad to have you here and Glad to have everybody's uh um participation. Uh I'm going to give an opening statement, yield to the ranking member who will do so, and then uh we'll hear from our witness. And uh after that uh we will open it up to a round of questions. So, Mister Under Secretary, thank you uh so much for being here today to discuss an incredibly important issue, and that's arms control. Uh, timely issue given the President's actions in Iran to address a near-nuclear uh capable adversary, which one could argue is uh indeed uh arms control. The military action in the Middle East has uh highlighted what the United States must do to protect the American people from the imminent threat of an adversary, and the danger of nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. As we all know, uh having nuclear hap- weapons in the wrong hands is very, very dangerous for the entire planet. President Trump is rightly taking care of the Iranian nuclear capabilities. But as you know, uh, Iran is not the only country of concern. We are now, for the first time, in a multipolar nuclear landscape. It is a landscape where the US is facing two nuclear near-peer competitors in Russia and China, in addition to rogue states with, uh, nuclear ambitions, which are a, uh, a very, very concerning problem. As you have rightly noted before, we are in an inflection point, and a changing landscape requires change in policy. The expiration of the New START treaty with Russia wasn't just a symbolic milestone. By the way, I uh supported that and urged the president uh to uh terminate. It was the recognition that we have more than one nuclear threat to the American people and nuclear agreements of days gone by no longer meet the needs of our nation. If our adversaries are building nuclear stockpiles, We unfortunately must do so as well. Uh, I know you agree that any future agreement must be verifiable and forcible and inclusive of developing nuclear powers. A treaty with only Russia will not protect American interests. But building this kind of broad nuclear agreement won't be easy. Russia is a serial treaty violator, and that's putting it kindly. It has failed to uphold its end virtually every treaty that it has signed. And China, too, is violating its treaty obligations under the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal of any nuclear armed state. This is a dangerous time, but fortunately we have an administration that's up to the task. President Trump has stated clearly that future arms control must address both Russian and Chinese nuclear arsenals. And Secretary Rubio has laid out three foundations for any new arms control agreements that I think are spot on and worth noting here, as most things Secretary Rubio does. First, arms control can no longer be a bilateral issue between the United States and Russia. It must include China to be even remotely effective. Second, we will not accept terms that harm the United States or ignore nations who do not follow through on agreements in pursuit of a future agreement. It is pointless. Listen up, Russia. And third, we will always negotiate from a posi- position of strength. We are the United States of America, and we will act like it. We need a credible, modernized nuclear program that deters our enemies from ever uh trying to intimidate us with their own nuclear weapons. But we need to do this while pursuing all avenues to fill the President's genuine desire for a world with fewer of these awful weapons as Secretary has noted. Early in this administration, President Trump directed a landmark transformation of the State Department to reduce bureaucracy and structural inefficiencies that got in the way of effective foreign policy. The organization you lead now is able to align arms control, security assistance, emerging threats, counterterrorism, and counter uh narcotics policies all under one roof to support America's national interests. As the inaugural Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, I hope that you will use this opportunity to provide this committee with an update on the reorganization and the state of our nuclear programs, and negotiations as much as can be done in an open setting. Thank you uh for your service and that of your family, and I'll now turn it over to the ranking member, Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

Thank you, Mister Chairman, and welcome, Secretary Donato. Now that I know about your history, I will consider you an honorary Granite Stater. So, we're delighted to welcome you to the hearing today. Um, last Thursday, almost three weeks into this war against Iran, The administration pushed through more than sixteen billion dollars in arms sales to the Middle East, and they did that by using emergency authority to bypass normal congressional review. What we know is that our golf partners are burning through interceptors at a staggering rate using in a day what the United States produces in a year. Uh, we met with a number of our golf partners last week and heard that they are concerned about the availability of munitions. This is an emergency with respect to our munitions and weapons, I believe. And I think it's one that's driven by a lack of planning and a clear strategy. The United States is running through munitions as well here at home. In some cases we have only about a quarter of the interceptors we need. I've been in briefings and it's still not clear what the end goal of the war in Iran is. Without a clear end goal, we're making real trade-offs about where our resources go. We've seen these trade-offs already showing up in Ukraine, where it continues to adapt and is currently advancing against Russian forces. But US support has become less predictable, and allies are increasingly stepping in to purchase and backfill American-made arms. According to Ukrainian officials, over eighty percent of their strikes are now carried out by drones. the battlefield is moving toward autonomous systems and drone swarms. In fact, Senator Kane and I just were in a hearing, um, that was classified but is gonna become open, but it was about, um, how we are developing, uh, some of those developmental munitions, which are what we've been seeing in Ukraine and in among our adversaries in Iran from Russia from China. But unfortunately, the support that we have in the US is not keeping spa pace. And it doesn't stop with Ukraine. The broader security environment is becoming more dangerous. Russia is expanding and modernizing its nuclear capabilities. As we know, and the Chairman alluded to, the New START treaty has been suspended. That ends inspections and provides increasing uncertainty. tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, moving them closer to NATO and raising the risks. And we're hearing from a number of our NATO partners who are very concerned that within the next five years Russia intends to advance on a NATO country. It's also testing new underwater nuclear systems that are harder to track and control. And at the same time, China is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities. It's constructing more than three hundred new missile silos. It's growing its arsenal with little transparency and outside any arms control framework. And at the same time, the arms control framework that has helped manage these risks is breaking down. Talks on future arms control arrangements have stalled. There's broad agreement that a multilateral approach that includes Russia and China is best. But as we know, that's not viable right now. And China has consistently opposed joining such negotiations. In practice, that gives China an effective veto over progress that we can make with Russia and on other fronts. Waiting for perfect conditions while things are moving in the wrong direction is not a plan. Mister Donano, the Bureau of Arms Control and International Security has gone through a major reorganization. That was supposed to bring clarity and focus. I hope we will hear this morning how you're approaching this and what is guiding your decisions. I look forward to hearing your perspective. Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Uh, Mr. Donato, the floor is yours.

Uh, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I'm honored to be the first Undersecretary appointed to lead what is known as the new and expanded "Tee" family since the State Department was reorganized in July of twenty twenty five. The reorganization consolidated the department's international security functions, expanding the " Tea" family from three to five bureaus and assigned three offices to our broad portfolio. I serve as the Senior Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for US Policies on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, and international security. Our team works on critical national security matters, ranging from preventing the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction, to countering terrorism, and international narcotics trade, to approving arms sales and security assistance to US partners and allies worldwide. When I was before you as an R and E almost a year ago, I committed to seeking verifiable and enforceable arms control agreements that enhance America's national security. I have used each day of my first months as the Under-Secretary to advance that very goal. Perhaps less publicly known than other State Department roles are the vast responsibilities that fall under the office of the Under-Secretary for Arms Control, International Security. We oversee nuclear, chemical, biological and conven conventional weapons issues. Export controls, sanctions enforcement, treaty verification. We drive inter-agency policy processes, coordinate closely with the War Department and other federal agencies, and represent the United States in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic settings, including the critical trilateral AUKUS arrangement. Tee family personnel largely consist of civil service experts. Our staff possess deep knowledge technical competencies that are relevant to a vast range of international security concerns. We leverage our in-house expertise of technologists like seismologists, nuclear physicists, counter drone experts, aviation experts, to fulfil an extensive array of T family responsibilities. We also negotiate, implement and rigorously verify an array of arms control, international arms control and disarming agreements, on behalf of the Secretary of State and President Trump. One such treaty, at the top of many minds, is New START, which expired last month. The treaty was ineffective and only constrained the United States, while al- allowing Russia to build and maintain a vast, theater-ranged, nuclear Arsenal. New START was a bilateral treaty that had no impact on the nuclear weapons programs in China or any other states. New START no longer served the national interest of the United States. And its expiration opened up a new era for us to pursue President Trump's vision for an improved and modernized agreement. Although the work of our team may often be invisible to the public, Our wide-ranging responsibilities are essential to keeping Americans safe at home and abroad. I'll share just a couple quick examples with you. In January, members of our Emerging Threats Bureau traveled to Antarctica to inspect foreign research stations and to verify the absence of any any military activity associated with the Antarctic treaty system. Our Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement operates a high-value high-value rewards program that offers financial incentives in information bringing major criminals, corrupt officials and transnational criminal networks to justice. The Counterterrorism Bureau supports Secretary Rubio's

Yep.

designat- designations of foreign terrorist organizations, including terrorist actors and cartels like the Muslim Brotherhood and Trend Agua. Since January, when President Trump took office, the Counterterrorism Bureau has designated nearly thirty foreign terrorist organizations including fifteen narco-terrorist cartels. Another significant T family requ- office is our Political Military Affairs Bureau. That has recently cut regulations, streamlined approval processes, and the number of restricted government-to-government transfers by over a third, as a part of the administration's priority to jumpstart the US Industrial Base and remove outdated regulations. Since our AUKUS partnership, similarly, our AUKUS partnership helped strengthen both US security and prosperity by securing significant Australian investments to uplift our submarine Industrial Base in an important arrangement with the United Kingdom and Australia. We work day in and day out to make America safer, more prosperous, and more secure, by modernizing arms control, countering adversaries, and protecting America's technological and military advantages. And we will continue to deliver measurable res- measurable results to the American people. I look forward to your questions.

Well, thank you so much. Uh, we certainly appreciate your expertise here and, uh, great background on this. I agree with virtually everything you said with one exception. And that is that uh you said that the New START treaty uh did not restrain uh any country on the planet. I would disagree with that, it restrained us. We were the only ones that uh uh kept uh our word under that agreement and as we know, Russia uh wa- was just uh totally uh loose uh under that. What um let let me ask this, uh obviously China's a a a big uh uh question mark here and uh the I don't think anybody would think that they are gonna negotiate until they get uh peer status with us. Once once they develop and produce enough uh uh nuclear uh uh material and arsenal, I I think at that point they may be interested in talking. Um what what's your view on that? Do you think when they get to peer status with us, they will indeed want to sit down and talk?

Uh, thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you, the New START treaty only constrained the United States. Um, uh, regarding the Chinese, I I think first of all it's important to point out it it's their international obligation under the non-proliferation treaty article six to engage in disarmament uh discussions and they have refused to do that uh so we continue to press them on that uh regarding uh the growth of their stockpile uh, uh as you said in your opening statement, we no longer view this as a bilateral problem. Um, even the new start number of fifteen hundred uh Russian strategic systems combined with what is approaching a thousand warheads uh that twenty-five hundred uh is already an asymmetry between the new start limit that the United States would be at under fifteen hundred um so um uh their incentive to engage with us is c number one it's their obligation and number two we have to work very closely with the War Department uh to understand that uh we're gonna vigorously compete um and modernize our deterrent uh uh to try to again roll back uh the Chinese uh uh stockpile.

Well, I I appreciate that. I uh I guess um I I look a little further down the road even than that, and that is that uh I don't lay awake at night worrying about Russia using a nuclear weapon nor for that matter China. Uh, both of them are are uh matured society is far enough to know that uh it's world destruction w- when someone presses the button for the first time. Uh what I worry about are the rogue countries uh that uh either have an ambit- or even non-state actors that have an ambition to get a nuclear weapon uh and and use it and of course once one is used who knows what what that's gonna set off. So what i- if let's assume uh for a for a minute the best And that is that once China gets to the point where it feels that it can sit down and negotiate and and reach a reasonable agreement and Russia comes to the table and uh the three of us get to a point where we have an agreement we can live with, um what do you think that the the uh possibilities are or the likelihood that the three of us together will then look to the other countries that have nuclear weapons and say, " Look, the three of us are going to help police the entire planet's uh arsenal of nuclear weapons. Do you think that's a reasonable possibility to look t- forward to in the future?

Um, thanks for the question. I think it's a uh um uh uh certainly a possibility. I mean I think it's important uh today to point out that uh we we do participate in the, in the P five um uh which is uh with the all the nuclear weapon states, UK, France. as well as uh China, Russia and the United States. Um I think the P five can be an effective tool. Um I think it needs to be more effective and take on some of the challenges that that that we've laid out. Um and also I uh I also think the the point that you may raise about uh really um nuclear uh potential proliferation risks uh continue. Um the the nuclear suppliers group for example uh was formulated in nineteen seventy four the uh, Australia group, uh, MTCR, the, our existing non-proliferation regimes are antiquated. They need to be modernized. Um, and I think we have to recognize that across uh, all nuclear weapon states. I think this is also an issue we'll discuss at length, uh, at the uh, NPT review conference next month. But these are all issues very much on the uh, on the uh, in my mind and um, uh, look forward to uh, working through some of these issues with you.

I I appreciate that. And I guess uh, One of the reasons that um uh that uh I think is I think um is the just recent experience we had, where war broke out between India and Pakistan. Uh both nuclear armed countries, one of those Pakistan, the nuclear weapons aren't even controlled by the government, they're controlled by the military. And that is an absolute recipe for uh for disaster. So uh so- something's gotta be done about this, I mean uh we're as I say, we we look over the fence, we look at Russia, we look at China, but those those aren't nearly as big a threat, I think, to the planet as are the rogue uh actors. Your thoughts?

Um, regarding um Indian Pakistan, uh, look there are there there are a lot of issues. Um um our approach as uh we laid out as the the president laid out is is broadly multilateral, uh not uh it's an evolution from the trilateral trilateral approach of the prior Trump administration. Um, and certainly we would welcome discussions with with with both India and Pakistan. Um, there are safety and reliability issues. There are uh uh there's l- there's lots for us to talk about, again, outside of the uh uh um the non-proliferation framework. Uh, so I think it's important we engage both c- uh countries, to your point, sir.

Uh, I I agree with that, and the president agrees with that. You noticed when that war broke out, both he and the secretary weighted into that really, really quickly and and were instrumental in bringing that to an end very quickly. Uh, and they they recognize the dangers that uh countries like this have, that possess nuclear weapons, particularly if two of them get into it with each other. Senator Shaheen.

Well, thank you, Mister Chairman, and I certainly agree with you that the th- the threat, the more alarming threat is probably from non-state actors and from countries that have not uh been part of a previous um controlled regime around nuclear weapons. And I certainly agree with you, Mr. DiNano, that we need a new way to think about it. But we had a hearing here in December where our witnesses they had some disagreement, but I think there was general appreciation for the fact that if China is not willing to join discussions and Russia is, why would we not go ahead and start engaging with um Russia? Because they have more nuclear weapons right now than China does. What we've heard from some sources is that China doesn't intend to engage in nuclear talks until it is on parity on nuclear weapons with the United States. So, it It seems to me that there would be some benefits as we're looking at upgrading the nuclear non-proliferation guidelines to going ahead and engaging with some of those countries that pose a a concern um for the United States. So how do you answer that?

So um we've not put any limits on our uh our our approach uh our multilateral approach, it doesn't shut off any bilateral engagements that might lead to this uh to a multilateral ap- approach. And that also

Are are we are we engaging however in those?

yes.

Because there's a difference between saying yeah if somebody wants to come and approach us we're happy to engage and our being proactive about how we engage with other countries.

Oh yes ma'am, uh again I as I mentioned earlier uh we uh our engagement in the P five is ongoing. Uh, again, that that that's always a challenge. Uh, but I think it needs to uh, uh, uh, uh, like some of our other regimes, uh, needs addi additional uh, attention, uh, and additional caregiving. Uh, and again, the the the Russians and the Chinese, as well as UK uh, and France, uh, are all involved in these uh, these discussions. So there are are are that's would be a multilateral venue. And again, we have not uh, um, shut off any uh uh channel that would exist uh for bilateral engagement. Uh again I think it's important um uh that we we keep all our options open and I think the president's policy has clearly done that.

Well thank you. I'd um well I appreciate that the threat of nuclear weapons is a concern that has much greater ramifications The reality we're seeing right now, whether it's in the war in Ukraine, in Iran, um in other parts of the world where conflict is existing is that um warfare is changing and that the weapons are changing and that the bigger threat right now may not be those nuclear weapons, it may be the other weapons that are being used. Um we really pushed our European allies to step up. on their own defense and on Ukraine, and they have, right now they spend more than we do supporting Ukraine, and they're spending that money on American weapons. Are we in a, are we in a position where we can actually deliver the weapons that they're buying from us?

Uh, thanks for the question, uh, Senator. I think it's an important one. Um, uh, and I think really shows why the reorganization of the State Department and and putting all of the bureaus, uh, do international security together makes sense, uh because I think uh in relation to our uh political military uh bureau, and the work that we're doing to modernize our defense industrial base, uh we have released two executive orders, um uh we worked very closely with the War Department, um as part of uh the most recent executive order had uh announced that it uh wanted an executive council to to stand up between the Communist Department. the State Department and the War Department. And uh that council, that meeting took place within a month. That's unheard of bureaucratic speed. Um I can tell you. Uh so the c- the commitment

That doesn't make me feel better.

uh the the the

It's not a very high bar.

No.

the c- the commitment to uh uh to modernizing our defense industrial and industrial base uh is uh, couldn't be stronger. Um I uh heard it loud and clear during my confirmation process. The State Department role here is to make sure that our regulatory approach uh, doesn't constrain our allies and partners, um, that uh the demand signal from every part of the government, from this committee, uh from my leadership was to move faster uh and to provide more capability. I think our uh recent America First arms transfer strategy is a is a uh a r- a really good iteration on that. that uh for our partners and allies uh around the world, it might not always require our most uh exquisite platform, might not require an F-thirty-five, might not require a Patriot system. But there are other systems uh that are certainly good enough, that complement existing US posture in the region, and that can g- send a demand signal to industry uh to uh stand up other capabilities. So again the State Department piece of this is to uh open up the aperture, take on a little more risk and move faster. Um it really is dwarfed by the reforms they're making in the War Department. And Under Secretary Duffy and his team uh are making um drastic reforms. Uh we work very closely with them. I'm on a call with them uh uh weekly uh driving change, driving integration. Uh so it's a pr- it is a priority for us. And again I think the the uh uh it's not gonna happen overnight. Um, and it's not gonna be easy or painless. I think we need to work together, the administration and the Congress, to undersh- to uh, there may be some legislative relief we may need along the way here, uh, but it's absolute uh national security imperative, uh, not only for the uh security of the United States, but as well as our partners and allies. And I seen I think this is what you're seeing play out.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, sir. Senator Corbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and uh, Mr. Dano Danano, thank you for being here. Uh. You know, we're in the middle obviously of this active conflict with Iran, and Iran has a record of global menace in nuclear proliferation that's well established. But it's worth discussing now, I think, how we'll monitor and evaluate Iran's nuclear drone and missile capabilities following the conclusion of uh of the military campaign.

Hmm. Yeah. Mm.

Uh, the recent launch of an Iranian missile on Diego Garcia now puts European capitals within direct range of the regime's missiles. In in addition, the DIA concluded even prior to Operation Epic Fury that Iran had developed space launch with vehicles they could use to develop a military viable ICBM by twenty thirty five should Iran uh Tehran decide to do so. So first question to you is how are you engaging with our NATO allies to update their threat assessments and perceptions regarding Iran the missile threat, and what arms control regimes are viable to constrain Iran's ability to threaten Europe?

Uh, thanks for the question, Senator. Uh, the first question is I just got back from Europe last week, um, meeting uh extensive meetings with the British and the French. Um, I've uh had multiple engagements with other NATO allies, uh the Germans, uh the Danish, uh the Dutch, uh the Polish, you name it. Uh, we are actively involved. It's uh, I was telling the staff earlier, um, this is really the the the bulk of my time and my job, uh is to engage uh uh foreign partners Uh, certainly NATO is a huge part to that. Um, and we need to be uh, again extremely clear on uh, our support to NATO. I think the President has been, and we need to continue to, to double down on that. The second part of your question, uh, look I've, I've, I've really, I've given this a lot of thought. I'm very troubled. Uh, when I look across, I mentioned this a little bit earlier, uh, across our non-proliferation regimes are all antiquated. Nuclear suppliers group was formed in nineteen seventy-four. The MTCR, nineteen eighty-seven. the Australia group, which addresses chemical and biological threats, uh, in nineteen eighty five. Um, I mean this, my entire adult life, so we're trying to s- shove twenty twenty six, twenty thirty, next generation problem set into an old business model. Uh, so I really uh uh I'm currently chairing a a group inside the state department on how to modernize for example, the MTCR. Um, I'm personally overseeing that, 'cause that's a regime where we have to be extremely concerned that we're not constraining our allies, uh, and partners more than we are the adversary. Um, and I think there's hard questions to ask, so, uh, I look forward to working with you and your team on, um, soliciting ideas. Uh, I don't wanna predetermine the outcome of that, uh, of that, uh, that engagement. Uh, there may very well be elements, and I'm sure there will be, uh, that we need to maintain, but it absolutely needs to be modernized.

What are you thinking? Yeah. I agree with that. According to, uh, Also, according to the Director of National Intelligence, twenty twenty six annual threat assessment, Russia is developing anti-satellite nuclear weapons, which the intelligence community describes as the single greatest single threat to the world's space ar- architecture. So, Under Secretary, how should the United States respond to the expanding threat of outer space weapons, challenges by peer and near-peer adversaries, and which arms control approaches, along with risk reduction measures, offer the most promise given the expiration of the New START treaty.

Uh, thanks to the question, Senator, again very um uh important question. Um, specifically to the to the Russian outer space system, uh I I don't wanna come into too much detail here in an open forum. Um, but what I can say uh is that any deployment of that system would be a violation of the outer space treaty. So sort of, you know, directly focused on sort of the arms control piece of it. Um uh, these the Russian exotic systems uh are getting crazy, even for the Russians. Uh, so uh, I think this uh um, the President's approach uh again to the, and the ranking members earlier question uh about other bilateral uh as well as you know other multilateral uh ways to get at the problem, um the answer is yes. Uh, that's not, that's uh obviously a system that diplomatically we would pressure, aggressively uh uh pressure the Russians and I'm sure it'll come up in our uh, P five uh engagement which is imminent. Uh, so uh I'm uh again I I don't wanna talk too much more about the Russian capability in open forum, um but uh certainly the the exotic systems, the underwater system, the Poseidon, uh the Bervesnik which is their nuclear powered cruise missile, these are all systems uh that wou that fall outside of New Start to your point, um that uh we need to have a a a direct conversation uh uh with with the Russians and I'm sure we will.

Thank you. Mister Chairman, I'll yield my remaining ten seconds.

Will gladly accept that, Senator. Uh, Senator Keene.

Thank you, Mister Chairman. Thanks for holding this hearing. Um, just for the audience, the Senate uses a lot of acronyms. So we'll talk about NATO and AUKUS and CDC. So, tea family, what is the tea family at the State Department and what does it stand for? The tea does not mean anything. It's just historically been called the tea family. Um, the the functions within it are very important functions, and I'm glad that the chair has called this hearing so that we can explore. Um, Secretary Donato, you uh in your opening comments talked about a little uh w- talked a little bit about a priority that's important to me and many on the committee, which is the AUKUS framework. This was a framework announced um by President Biden. It's been worked on and supported in a bipartisan way by this committee. Um, President Trump uh had a a very productive meeting with the Australian PM last October about AUKUS, critical minerals, other issues, um came out of that meeting saying full steam ahead on AUKUS. The the NDAA that we did in FY twenty-four created the office of AUKUS senior advisor in the State Department, as a primary integrator of the partnership. The senior advisor is intended to streamline regulatory barriers to enable us to have this framework be all that it can be be between the US, Australia and the UK. So how are you attempting to empower that senior advisor position to develop and cement the AUKUS partnership?

Uh, first to your very important first point. Uh, I think T was for the first Under-Secretary's name was Tom.

Okay.

So, and if it's not and if it's not, that's my name, so it's it's good for me,

That that'll make it easier.

so.

I think that's classified information.

Yeah, so. And there is a State Department. historian that actually we work with um who's terrific that I'm gonna ask that question. Uh thanks for the AUKUS question, uh it's very important. Uh so number one, the AUKUS coordinator reports directly to me. Uh number two, uh so I see him every day. Um uh he's extremely experienced, uh his team is uh small but uh uh extremely uh knowledgeable on some of the details, uh the regulatory pieces that need to uh fall into place here. Um Another data point I think is important, just yesterday I met with the uh the U uh the Australian coordinator, and last week I was in the UK meeting with the the uh UK coordinator.

Good.

Um and the the UK coordinator sort of felt that hey you guys are really talking a lot about Australia we have the UK piece here too as well uh so it actually uh uh um we had extremely productive discussion about the type of capabilities, getting understanding the geography of course uh and uh the their footprint in NATO offers a little different flavor um than say uh the the Australia uh team um so uh we've made some some positive steps uh forward in AUKUS

Here.

um I think uh obviously uh one is the MTCR uh we moved the uh uh we look at UAVs now, tier one UAVs as um would be manned aircraft instead of MTCR controlled um so that's a good start Uh, however, when you get into the actual agreement, some of the provisos, that would be attached, I mean it's like a, you know, the old like a fishing knot, the more you pull it apart, the more, the more you figure out, you know, the more problems there is, there are. Um, so that, that's gonna happen here. Um, so uh, sort of looking at AUKUS as a bit of a the canary in the coal mine on this regulatory reform, um, again pulling apart the knot here, Uh, w- uh, we'll we'll we'll take them one at a time. Uh, I mentioned earlier, um, again, uh, we are going through an MTCR review. I don't wanna predetermine the outcomes. I'm happy when that's done to come back and talk to you about it. Uh, but I believe we'll probably need some regulatory uh relief and legislative relief so I'd like to work with you and your com the committee on this. Um, the War Department has moved uh uh um v- very smartly on this. We're we're anxiously awaiting uh uh some announcements on Um, and um, uh, another point here is uh, uh, the um, excluded technology list, right, is the other sort of eight hundred pound gorilla here. Uh, it needs to be a lot smaller.

Well, I I I like the the, you know, progress. I just went to Australia in February. We did thirty seven events in four cities in seven days, thirty five of which were AUKUS related, to really kick the tires to see what the Aussies are doing by way of investment. We had hard questions for them, if they had hard questions for us, it was a really good dialogue. One of the areas just to, you know, to put two on your radar screen that, you know, continues to be important is the implementation of the ITAR reforms. And you were right to point out in your answer that we gotta get it right here, because we may wanna do similar partnerships with other allies. And to the extent that we figure out how to do ITAR reform right for AUKUS, it will also make it easier to decide how to apply that to other allies.

Hundred percent.

And then on pillar two,

Sure.

Um, e- everybody's talking about what's a marquee project, what's a signature project. It could be anything, but sometimes they makes it hard to focus. I'm excited to hear that there may be some announcements forthcoming

We're getting closer.

that will give it some focus. I appreciate that. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Thank you.

There's nothing to yield back, Senator.

That's right.

Thank you very much. Um, Senator Cornyn, you occupy the far end of the diaspora, uh, but having said that, I, and that's the result of the idiosyncracies of the uh, Arcanian uh committee system here in the Senate, but I don't think there's anyone on this committee that's got a longer history of dealing with this subject of more seniority than you do. Um, appreciate hearing your thoughts on this.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Present company accepted between you and the ranking member. Um. Miss, Mister Secretary, you certainly have an expansive portfolio. Uh, I don't know how you do it, but thank you for for doing it. Senator Shaheen talked about the rapid rate which we are um using uh various uh munitions and uh counter drone technology, counter uh missile technology in the Middle East and the conflict with Iran. Um, I know we all are concerned about our defense industrial base, but we als- it also takes money uh to buy these munitions and this this uh materiel. The president is uh allegedly going to request four hundred billion dollars in emergency supplemental for the Department of War, um presumably to replenish a lot of this and can you exp- can you talk a little bit about the necessity of those that uh, whether it's a two hundred billion or some other figure, whatever the figure is, necessity of Congress funding uh the effort to replenish these munitions and develop our industrial base where it should be?

Uh uh Senator, thanks for the question. Uh first of all, I I do the job because I have hundreds of dedicated uh state departments, uh civil and foreign service officers that work for me. Uh they're they're a really special group, uh and they work really hard. Um specific to your question, uh um the the sp the specific uh uh supplemental I p- I probably can't speak to. Um I haven't been p- part of those uh those discussions, but uh I I think bro broader um on modernizing the defense industrial base that some of the points I was making earlier. Um the uh foreign military sale reform uh uh h has to be a priority. Uh uniquely it's uh it has to be a partnership between the federal government, both the administration and the congress, um our allies and partners, as well as industry. Uh so I think uh again this is a little bit of outside of my purview at the State Department, The War Department has really leaned forward on this and are looking towards uh some extremely unique uh uh arrangements with uh with industry on how to get uh uh sort of um give some certainty to their investments uh so I would I would I would defer most of the sort of the questions on those uh what those look like what those private sector uh and uh government arrangements look like to bring more capabilities faster again the State Department piece here is the regulatory piece. I I I don't wanna downplay it because it's important and it can get in the way. Um, again the demand signal that I've gotten again acro across again from the committee,

Mm.

uh, to my leadership is to open up the app, make sure to make more capabilities available. And again, uh, the War Department and the administration are doing some extremely creative financing um to bring more capabilities uh uh to our forces and to our partners and allies I'm not sure that answers your question directly on the on the supplemental,

No.

but I I don't wanna get that wrong.

Thank you. I just wanna make the point we're gonna have to come up with the money to pay for it. Uh, Congress's, uh, one way or the other. So. The New START treaty, I agree with the comments that you and others have made that, uh, that Russia cheats and, uh, does, uh, uh, but also the president's, uh, determination to somehow bring China into those negotiations and for any new uh arms control uh treaties in the future. Uh, what's it gonna take to get China engaged in your view?

Uh, uh, it's a great question, sir. Thank you. Um, so I think um the the the the the president's broad view, and he's been extremely forward leaning on this, is he wants to see fewer nuclear weapons in the world. Um, and that's a good place to start. Um, again, the problem with Newstart, uh, again not to uh sort of repeat what we've we've already talked about a little bit, is only covered part of the Russian

Right.

uh stockpile and none of the Chinese stockpile. Uh so I think there's two two points to make here, arms control and non-proliferation are one side of the coin. Uh the other side of the coin of course is the war department, in a vigorous modernization effort, which is ongoing, uh that will bring new capabilities uh a across the spectrum. Um, I think a hundred and fifty B-twenty-ones will get the Chinese attention. I think, uh, hundreds of LRSO will get their attention. Admiral Karel, uh, testified in front of the House Armed Services Committee, I think last week, and went through, uh, exactly what that modernization looks like. I don't think anyone wants an arms race. We, I know the President doesn't. He's been very clear he wants to see fewer nuclear weapons. But if, if the Chinese ins- continue, uh uh this breakout again and they're approaching parity. Again, this isn't a twenty forty problem. Uh it's very much becoming a twenty thirty problem um as uh um uh that we will compete uh vigorously across the spectrum of uh uh of modernizing our nuclear uh forces.

Thank you, Senator Gordy.

Mr. Chairman, will you indulge one more question?

The the chairman is most generous. Feel free.

So, Mister Secretary, let me ask you about the enriched uranium in in Iran. Where is it? How big a concern is it to you? And uh what do you what what's your opinion about uh Iran's determination to continue developing um a capacity to develop a nuclear weapon?

Mr. Secretary, before you answer that question, is that answerable in the setting we're in?

Uh, I I can I can lay out some some thoughts on the investigation.

He asked for a specific location and uh I didn't get I I've

Uh, I I wouldn't let

been in an intel briefing on this and I I my my sense is that there's a

We should defer that. I'll withdraw that part of the question.

Okay, that that'll make it easier.

Uh, I

Thank you.

Certainly. Um. Look, I think the uh the administration's uh Iran policy was clear and it didn't start three weeks ago. Um. President Trump issued NSPM two fourteen months ago, um, laid out a policy that Iran's nuclear program and their nuclear capable missiles pose an existential threat to the United States, and that Iran can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. That was the U S policy fourteen months ago, maintains the US policy today. Um, again to the Chairman's point, uh, on the on the uranium stockpiles, Uh, that active theater of operation uh, will be with the War Department uh, and uh, uh, uh, Central Command uh, wou is, it would be sort of the, the, the folks to talk to directly about that. What we do at the State Department, and inside the, and again the, the T family bureaus, um, uh, we would uh, support the IEA, um, that, that uh, engagement would uh, resides under me, but uh, any of that uh, uh would uh probably be after the cessation of hostilities, but I I don't wanna get out in front of uh um again what's happening in the region there that's the purview of the War Department.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Cor- uh Senator Merkley.

Ah thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Undersecretary DiNano, and I appreciated our earlier discussion on on a number of these questions. I wanted to ask primarily about the arrangements with Saudi Arabia. Uh you mentioned in your testimony that five one two three agreements have been struck. I believe that Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Hungary, South Korea and Armenia.

Um, so I'm sorry, I didn't I didn't mention that.

The you in your testimony you say that you've negotiated five one two three agreements. I'm assuming one of those is the Saudi Arabia agreement.

Yeah, so the Saudi Arabia agreement hasn't been signed by the president yet. Um, um, a a a as you know, uh, any once the president signs it, if he signs it, Uh, that would be due to Congress. And uh.

Was that one of the five that you were referring to in your testimony? Or you're talking about five different one two three agreements?

Uh, so the the administration's laid out uh a goal of signing twenty one two three agreements.

I know, I know that. I don't wanna take a lot of time on this. I'm just asking if Saudi Arabia is one of the five that you referred to in your testimony.

I believe so.

OK. So, uh, if it it hasn't been signed, so that probably answers my next question, which is the the associated bilateral safeguards agreement. probably has not been completed with Saudi Arabia as well.

Yeah, again, that uh w- w- once the agreement is signed, uh I'm happy to give talk through those details, but um until the president actually signs it,

So my under- my understanding has been,

it'd be pretty decisional.

and I'm referring to your uh your November twenty fourth report to to Congress. Uh you note Saudi Arabia's uh reservations about the additional protocol. And the three things that normally comprise the gold standard, are the additional protocol that allows inspection of all nuclear sites, including ones that we are not directly involved in, and also no reprocessing and no enrichment. Of those three things, do you think that any of those three might be included in the agreement with Saudi Arabia? No processing, no enrichment, and the inspection of all sites, including ones n- civilian nuclear sites, including ones that are not

Uh, yeah, thanks for the question, Senator. Look, um uh again w- once the agreement's actually signed we can go through some of the details. Uh um until it's signed I don't wanna go through the details, but what I can tell you is um I I think we will have a a uh a solid and compliant with the Atomic Energy Act uh nonproliferation approach, uh again if it gets signed by the president. Um wh whether it meets some of those uh the um you know uh data points AP or or gold standard again I it's pre-decisional for us to talk about that uh once it's signed and uh and delivered I'm happy to come back and answer all those questions in detail.

Okay, I'll just express my concerns, which I know you've already heard from me, but I'll express them again here. Uh, and that is all the public reports are that none of those three things will be covered by the agreement with Saudi Arabia. And if they're not covered with Saudi Arabians, so they're they able to reprocess or able to enrich that we cannot inspect sites, IAEA cannot insi inspect and we cannot inspect sites that are other nuclear sites, it seems to me the the perfect set up for a potential proliferation. And also that once that standard is set, other nations find it very hard to agree to standards that Saudi Arabia hasn't agreed to. As you and I discussed, you have in the Islamic. world a major shiite superpower iran you have a major uh sunni superpower saudi arabia and anything that saudi arabia gets in terms of not covering enrichment not covering reprocessing not covering the additional civilian nuclear sites for inspections makes it very hard for anyone else to ever agree to those and uh so i'm i i know you're you're saying there'll be strong standards uh and uh but uh i'm i guess count me concerned.

Uh, if I if I could just respond quickly, uh, um, the, Saudi Arabia is determined to develop a civilian nuclear program. Um, I think the approach that we have, um, in the non-proliferation requirements inside the, uh, section one two three of the Atomic Energy Act, which we will meet, and I'm confident, that we'll have a, uh, uh, extremely defensible non-proliferation, uh, program. Um, and, um, it's most important, that that non-proliferation program is run by an American, a company, an American program as opposed to a Russian or Chinese program. Uh, so, uh, again, I understand, uh, exactly what you're referring to. Um, again, uh, uh, I'm happy to come back, uh, if, if we get the agreement signed and walk through some of those details. But I'm, uh, I'm supremely confident, uh, that we will have a non-proliferation, a, a footprint. Again, should it get signed, that'll, uh, that would more than meet uh the minimum standards in the atomic energy act

yeah uh thank you

uh thank you mister chairman secretary dinano good to see you and i just wanna underscore the concerns raised by senator merkeley regarding reports that the administration is talking about going into a nuclear cooperation agreement with saudi arabia without the gold standard one two three standards. That of course is what we required of the UAE uh and other recent countries. And if we're really concerned about non-proliferation, it seems we should have the strongest standards. Uh I you know, the chairman mentioned during his opening comments uh the Iranian nuclear enrichment uh program and of course you have non-proliferation in your portfolio. Um you're familiar with uh DNI Tulsi Gabbard's recent testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, right? Are you aware that the DNI testified just recently for the Senate townspeople and in her testimony she said,

Yes.

and I'm quoting, as a result of Operation Midnight Hammer, and of course that was the operation that took place last year, as a result of the Op Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran's nuclear enrichment program was obliterated, unquote. You can test that finding that was presented by the DNI.

Uh, uh, so I'm not in a position to to revisit the the her testimony or the president's decision.

I I'm I'm asking you about right now a comment that the DNI made.

Uh.

Are you privy to you're you're you have nonproliferation in your portfolio. I would I would think that you were following this issue closely. Are you?

Uh, I I am happy to talk about this the role that the bureaus that I oversee play in nonproliferation in regards to Iran. Um, but again to um

Well, do you agree with her her statement? This was public testimony and I'm quoting again. "There had been no effort since then to try to rebuild their enrichment capability." Unquote. Do you disagree with that statement from the DNI?

Uh, the the intelligence community's job is to inform policy makers. Um, uh, I I'm not I am not a I am a consumer of intelligence, I'm not a maker of intelligence in that sense. Um, and uh,

Right.

he,

So, OK. You're

she, she provided, I believe, her her, uh, the intelligence community's view,

Yeah.

uh, to the policymaker. The President Trump is the policymaker.

I, I understand that.

Yeah.

Uh, that that sort of goes without saying, but go ahead and say it. Um, Joe Cant, who as you know resigned in protest, said that all eighteen of America's intelligence agencies agreed that Iran had no capacity to develop a nuclear bomb, unquote. As you say, you're a consumer of intelligence. Have you seen anything to dispute that statement?

Uh, I I don't wanna respond to what uh one individual I mean, I I haven't seen.

I'm asking you about the intelligence community's

Yeah.

assessment with D which D and I gabbered testified publicly about.

Yeah. Yeah. Yes, sir, I'm responding to your comment about uh the individual that you mentioned. Um, I I haven't seen that those his comments. I don't follow his comments. Um, and uh.

Well, you you don't wanna you you didn't wanna respond to my question about DNI Gabbard either. Yeah, I asked this because President Trump said on March fourth, quote, if we didn't hit them within two weeks, they would have a nuclear weapon, unquote, which is manifestly untrue based on all the testimony we've seen uh from the intelligence uh community. Let me turn to it another uh issue. You're responsible for ensuring that US arms transfers consistent with the Trump administration's conventional arms transfer policy, right?

Yes, sir.

Right. And that policy requires that you consider the risk that a proposed arms transfer may contribute to violations of international humanitarian law, right?

Yes, sir.

Right. Were you involved in assessing that risk in connection with the administration's recent decision to invoke emergency powers to bypass congressional review and transfer over twenty thousand bombs to the Netanyahu government?

Um, in response to the uh administration's uh emergency um um declaration, um, if there's ever a circumstance that's an emergency, um, this would be it.

Mister DiNero, this is non-responsive.

Uh, let me just, if I could just uh, no, sir.

I didn't ask you whether it was an emergency.

I'd like to if I can just finish

I asked you whether you complied with the tax policy requirements.

I'll finish my answer if if you let me if you let me finish, I'm happy to a- answer your question, sir. Um. Yeah, that being said, um, uh, I sat before the committee, uh, during my confirmation process and committed to working with the committee to follow the law. Um, the, the law does allow for the emergency exemption. That's why we used it.

I'm not asking you about the emergency exemption.

So I understand that, but then I think the context is important,

I'm I I know,

sir.

cuz I submitted a question for the record and you said you would comply with the cat policy. So now I'm asking you whether you were involved in reviewing the transfer of twenty thousand bombs to the Netanyahu government. With respect to compliance with the cat policy.

Um, uh, i- any uh foreign military sale uh that we do um would fall underneath the conventional arms transfer

Did you personally review that assessment?

policy. Uh, uh, a- again, Senator, the the the emergency declaration

No, not the emergency declaration. Did you review the assessment regarding whether or not transfer of twenty thousand bombs complied with the cat policy.

Uh, everything that we do complies with the law and

Did you personally or were you personally involved in that review?

Uh, I I w- I was involved with the uh with with the transfer and anything that we would do would w- uh would be consistent with our cat policy which is compliant with the law.

So I'm gonna take it as a a no that you did not personally review whether or not that transfer complied with cat policy. I I just did you personally review that?

You can you can take it any way you want.

Well, did you?

Uh, I've already told you I was involved with the policy. I oversee the Political Military Bureau.

No. I know, I okay.

Um.

Did you personally review? It's obvious.

Uh, I I review hundreds of arms sales. Um, I signed hundreds of them. Uh, the emergency declaration, again, it was consistent with the law. Um, and most importantly, I think it's important for the committee that that we lay out, we're not trying to establish a new norm. uh, that will continue to, uh, address, uh, on a case-by-case basis, look at emergencies, if they exist, just like the Biden administration did in twenty twenty three, I'll finish with you. use the same, Here, I'm not asking you about, I'm not asking use the same authority. No, sir, let me finish my comment. I think it's important. But I'm not asking you about the emergency department. I know, but I mean, I'm trying to address your concern. No, you're actually, uh Yes, sir, I am.

Were you, are you concerned that, um, Israeli Defense Minister Katz said with respect to Lebanon that they were gonna use the quote " RAFA model" in Gaza? Does that concern you?

I have not uh I'm not familiar with that comment uh.

Right, it's a matter of public record, could you take a look at it and get back to me,

I would happily look at it.

let me know if that concerns you.

Yes sir, I'm happy to look at it.

Thank you. Thank you, sure. Oh, I was

Great, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Alright, so last week NVIDIA said that it had been licensed for many customers in China. for its advanced AI chips, the H two hundred, and had received purchase orders from many companies." On January thirteenth, the Department of Commerce ruled governing the H two hundred license process which State Department plays a role in, as a reviewing agency contains various end-use certification requirements. For instance, the export must certify the chips will not be used for military intelligence or weapons of mass destruction. However, given Beijing's military civil fusion, that seems difficult, possible to certify. Currently, Communist China is so compute constrained that it continues to resort to smuggling AI, US AI chips and distilling from US models just to remain competitive. As evidence of this, on Thursday the Justice Department charged three people diverting two and a half billion dollars worth of servers with NVIDIA AI chips to Communist China. Um, Under Secretary Donato, is it your understanding that Communist China pursuing a civil-military fusion strategy whereby it has eliminated any barriers between its commercial and defense sectors to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world?

Uh, thank you, uh, Senator, for the question. Uh, so, uh, the State Department role and the the bureaus that I oversee, uh, specifically in regards to, uh, uh, export control enforcement, uh, we had direction from the President to support, uh, um, these uh, this chip sale to China with the caveat, and an important caveat, that we would only do so uh by establishing, I'm trying to remember the President's exact phrasing of it, strong national security. Um and that is exactly what the Non-Proliferation Bureau uh that reports to me uh does. Uh we review uh I can't talk about specific licenses per se uh But uh we're uh uh have reviewed and continue to review uh to imply the h- apply the highest standards to uh look at all the intelligence and all the derogatory information that we may find and uh and push that into the decision process.

Okay.

Ultimately, I'm sorry, sir.

Well, I was gonna say so uh cuz I'm talking about the Chinese military fusion. You you've heard of that term before, right?

Yes, sir.

All right, so and I and I hadn't asked you about a specific license yet, so let's talk about it at a high level. How would you be able to certify that a technology that may have dual use, like I don't know, say a high-end AI chip would be able to be used for only one purpose versus going into some of the other things that again the license has to prescribe so it can't go into weapons of mass destruction or intelligence or something like that. How can you possibly certify that if if they've got this middle this military sort of this military civil Fusion.

Yeah, so the the review process uh is extensive. Uh, it is informed by uh the best intelligence that we have available uh from uh, again from uh from the intelligence community. Um, and all of that uh any derogatory information would go into uh um sort of our decision process whether or not we would recommend approval or not. Uh, ul ultimately the uh uh your your concern is noted and uh I think it's important uh Uh, but looking at each individual entity with their extremely high bar, again, the the bar that the president himself set, and that's the that's the bar that that, uh, uh, uh, we implement, that I oversee and implement, is a that high national security standard. And part of that would be to address the diversion risk.

Yeah.

So the ability to design and produce advanced IH chip lies at the heart of our technology competition with Communist China currently Communist China cannot manufacture these chips without US and allied semiconductor manufacturing equipment, or SME. As a result, export controls on SME SME represent one of our most significant points of leverage with Beijing. At present, US companies are barred from selling certain SME to communist China. For the past several years, we have prioritized diplomacy with allies to convince them to match our same level of controls however our allies' controls are still not as stringent as foreign companies uh and foreign companies are able to continue filling orders for critical tools to Communist China and providing them support. This misalignment uplifts Chinese shipmaking capabilities, helps Communist China maintain existing advanced allied tools and shifts markets away from American firms. And given the AI is a dual use, it contributes to the enhanced capabilities for the PLA posing serious national security threat. Do you agree that ensuring our allies have fully aligned our export controls on SME to ours is critical for national security?

Uh, Senator, uh, thanks for the question. Uh, we have extremely active diplomacy, uh, with our allies. Uh, we have programs, uh, not not only sort of information sharing engagement, uh, the Non-Proliferation Bureau, which I oversee, actively, uh, um, seeks out and trains. Uh, we have, uh, in in, attempting to raise the standards of potential, uh, uh, weak spots or potential, uh, um, partners uh that we felt that we need to raise their standards. So not all not all no not only do we actively engage uh with our again, well, I would uh characterize as traditional allies, but it's very important that we raise the standards uh uh uh ac- ac- across the board, that across the the countries that might be might be involved in that supply chain. And we have active programming that does that.

Well, this issue is why I plan to introduce the multilateral alignment of technology controls on hardware or match act. to harmonize export controls on SMEs to Communist China with our allies. The match act will ensure that if an adversary cannot build a tool themselves, they're not be able to buy it from the US or our partners. I hope that my colleagues will join me in this effort so that the United States and not Communist China can lead the world in AI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Senator Ricketts, I know you've been very active in this area and it is it is of absolutely critical concern. Uh, not only what uh we sell to them but also with uh also what our uh what our allies uh such as uh those for the Netherlands uh sells to them, that's absolutely critical too. So uh thank you, thank you for your work in that regard. With that, Senator Rosen.

Thank you Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, for today's hearing and uh thank you Mister Donato for uh joining us today. I wanna go and uh talk about Nevada a little bit. Because the Nevada National Security Site, the NNSS uh was ground zero. for the vast majority of the United States explosive nuclear testing from nineteen fifty-one to nineteen ninety-two which uh during which there were a hundred atmospheric tests and eight hundred and twenty-eight underground tests conducted. Many Nevadans and downwind communities suffered from these exposures. They're still waiting for justice and compensation. Today the NNSS plays a critical role in certifying the reliability, safety and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile But without, without, I'm gonna emphasize that, I could say it a hundred times, without the need for explosive testing. So you can imagine my surprise when President Trump and others, such as Assistant Secretary Yeoh suggested that the US should resume explosive nuclear testing. So, Mister Donano, um, what is the State's Department's position on explosive nuclear testing? And if President Trump were to order a nuclear test, how do you expect Russia or China to respond? What about other countries with nuclear weapons and how would we manage the inevitable damage that this is gonna cause uh to your efforts to pursue multilateral arms control and risk reduction uh measures?

Uh, thanks for your question. Uh, Senator Paul.

Sorry. Uh, thank you, Senator. Um, uh, let me start by saying, uh, the President has laid out uh, a view that, uh, that I elaborated on and Assistant Secretary Yaw elaborated upon, uh, where the President, uh, instructed the War Department and the Energy Department to test on an equal basis, um, to that with our adversaries. Um, the b- the b- the backdrop of that is important to understand that both the Russians and the Chinese are testing at yield. Um

And I can tell you that in our U one A tunnel and the f of the radiographic things that we have there and the new kinds of technology we have we have adequately without explosive testing ensured the the capabilities of our nuclear stockpile.

Uh so uh thank you, Senator, look I uh couple points to make, number one uh we're still assessing uh We we we've made no decision specifically on uh how or what that any testing program would look like so that's pre-decisional um if the administration comes to that decision I'm sure would happy come back and talk to you uh at details.

You better come back and talk to me, cuz the people of Nevada and the people of Utah and the people all around, do you think what happens in Nevada with an explosive test stays in Nevada because it sure doesn't.

Yes ma'am. Uh I I think you're refer referring to any potential atmospheric testing.

I'm just telling you,

Uh, there is I have been, let me if let me ju- let

they cratered they cratered the ground in Nevada,

ma'am, yes ma'am.

and let me tell you, there's ground water, it it doesn't go away.

L let me l if let me answer your concern if I could. I have not been in any discussions that have uh uh where atmospheric open atmospheric testing has been under consideration. The testing uh any testing uh is uh under consideration again it is currently predecisional but the president has laid out and I think it's important to understand that the United States is at this ma-

Well it's important to understand that he better come talk to us in Nevada if he is planning to do that because the people of Nevada have a stake in that the people of

Yes ma'am I I am I I am

Utah have a stake in that and I will look everybody uh Idaho right above us Texas, the wind, everything goes around this country,

Yeah.

trust me.

I understand that ma'am and I

I I I'll move on to something else.

Yeah, well, uh, hold on. I wanna address that.

I wanna

I think it's important. Um, you're talk you're talking about the wind that there is no discussion that I've been a part of that there any atmospheric testing would take place uh uh again, the the the the Chinese and Russian programs are underground. They are uh at uh uh um yields that I can't talk too much about in this open hearing. But for example, the Chinese underground testing program uh would be uh in the hundreds of tons. Uh, no discussions, again, I've been part of would in any way talk about uh uh winds or downrange uh that is uh I've heard nothing to that effect. Um, and uh I

Well, you would understand my uh

Of course I would.

my concern

Yes, ma'am, and I absolutely

about the need for a visual besides the ground cratering in,

Of course.

and we have made millions of billions of dollars of investments in radiographic and other technology, using math, using physics, using science to be sure that we ensure the integrity of our nuclear arsenal. We have been very specific in that and we can I'm glad to take you down there, if you haven't been, to see what they're doing and how they're doing it before you enter into more of these discussions.

Yes, ma'am. I I I'd happily go there. I know what they do there. Um, and again, I think it's extremely important to understand that the Russian and Chinese systems of the Russians and Chinese are testing at yield, that creates an intolerable disadvantage for the United States by not testing. And again, I've heard no discussion of any sort of atmospheric testing whatsoever.

Well, I tend to disagree with you, but I yield. Thank you.

Sarah Cruz.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find it troubling that the United Kingdom is prepared to transfer the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius, a deal that is straightforwardly dangerous to US interests. Mauritius is closely aligned to Beijing, and the transfer gives China leverage over one of our most strategic military assets, significantly impacting our ability to operate from Diego Garcia. I have argued that giving the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius is in direct violation of the United Kingdom's treaty commitments to the United States, where the United Kingdom agreed to keep the base under British control and out of foreign control. President Trump has been pressing back very hard against this deal for months. Yet there are serious concerns that elements within the State Department continue to support it, even as Iran targets Diego Garcia with ballistic missiles. Public reporting indicates that support for this agreement originated within the Political Military Affairs Bureau and that state doubled down on a February statement announcing a PM delegation to Mauritius. So let me ask you directly, do you support the Chagos Island deal between the United Kingdom and Mauritius?

Uh, thanks for the question, Senator. I think the President's been pretty clear that uh uh and obviously I follow the the p- the President's policy lead uh specific to Diego Garcia. Uh, uh, the most important thing that we have uh, we have to have, and I agree with your assessment on the potential uh concerns with the Chinese as well. Uh, but uh, uh, the preservation of Diego Garcia as a as a a f- a forward operating base for the US military again slightly outside of my purview, um, is without question the priority of the administration and of the State Department.

So I agree with you that the president has been quite clear, I'd like to get you explicitly on the record with a yes or no answer. Do you support the Chagos Island deal between the United Kingdom and Mauritius?

Uh, uh, uh, again, uh, I I'm I'm unclear the current state of the negotiation between the United Kingdom uh and uh, uh and and and and Mauritius. Uh, can what what I support is the that the United States have the ability to use Diego Garcia. And again, I don't, you know, your reference to elements inside the State Department, uh, I don't know where those elements are. Political Military Bureau answers to me. Uh, I answer to Secretary Rubio and of course to the President, uh, so we would be completely aligned with the President and the Secretary's guidance on that.

Well, let me help you out because there appears to be some real tension. On February eighteenth, President Trump issued the following truth social. "I had been telling Prime Minister Kirstarmer of the United Kingdom that leases are no good comes to countries and that he is making a big mistake by entering a hundred year lease with whoever i- it is that is claiming right title and interest to Diego Garcia strategically located in the Indian Ocean. Our relationship with the United Kingdom is strong and a powerful one and it has been for many years but Prime Minister Starmer is losing control of this important island by claims of entities never known of before. In our opinion, they are fictitious, in nature. And just to resolve any ambiguity, the true social ends with in all caps, "DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA!" Is there any ambiguity in what the president said on February eighteenth?

No, sir, I uh there's not.

OK, so then why did the PM bureau announce a delegation to Mauritius and signal its support for the deal? And the official statement says, The US supports the decision of the UK to proceed with its agreement with Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago. How do you reconcile that statement from state with the president's statement on the same topic?

Well, I I don't think any delegation actually went, most importantly, um, because the president sets the policy and we implement the president's policy.

Well, I would ask you to figure out who the hell wrote that statement that the US supports this deal? And why they are putting out statements from the Department of State that are directly contrary to the position of the President of the United States, who is charged with the responsibility of making that decision.

Yeah, and just one other statement, I think I would agree certainly that the UK is would be the partner of choice there. Uh, and uh, um, there's no daylight between uh, me or anybody at the State Department. And um, The president.

Well, I I am very glad to hear it because as we have seen with the recent targeting of Diego Garcia by Iran, this base is critically important for protecting American national security interest and if the United Kingdom is to compromise that base that would A, harm our national security interest and B, be in direct violation of a binding treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Yes, sir.

Thank you.

Thank you, Senator Cruz. I suspect, I could be wrong, but I suspect that the White House has already figured out who authorized that text that went out and I'd be interested in hearing uh,

A- and if they And if they haven't,

hearing the answer.

I hope this questioning will accelerate that process.

I I expect that will, I expect that will help. So, thank you so much uh for appearing here today. I think this was uh uh incredibly important hearing and uh appreciate a uh good airing of uh of these issues. Obviously it's ongoing and uh it's uh Gonna be something that's gonna be around for a long time and uh we uh look forward to uh working with you as we go forward uh on all of these so thanks much. Uh for the information of the c- members of the committee the reclimate will remain open until the close of business tomorrow, March twenty fifth and if we get any other questions uh I'd ask uh you to respond to them as uh quickly as possible. Again with a thanks to the committee, we appreciate it, this committee is adjourned.